The Issue Mary Harrison's charge of discrimination dated August 4, 1995, alleges that Jodan, Inc., doing business as Manpower (Jodan), discriminated on the basis of her race and for retaliation by constructively discharging her, giving her verbal and written reprimands and a poor performance rating, by denying her training and by intimidating her. The issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether the alleged discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Jodan, Inc., is a family owned franchise of Manpower Temporary Services. Jodan provides temporary staff to its clients. It has six offices in Central Florida: two in north Orlando; one in south Orlando; and one each in Deland, Daytona, and Melbourne. Dan Gavin, president, is responsible for the day to day operations; John Gavin, his brother, is a co-owner. In March 1994, Margaret Jones was Jodan's district manager for the north Orlando (Maitland) and south Orlando (Sand Lake Road) offices. She recruited and hired Ms. Harrison to work as a service representative in the Maitland office. Shortly before that time John Gavin had asked her to recruit specifically for a minority employee as it would be helpful for the office to have a more diverse staff to serve its clients. Ms. Harrison is an African-American woman. At the time that she was hired by Ms. Jones in March 1994, her substantial work experience was in real estate and property management. Service representatives at Jodan perform the intake process with temporary employees (application, interview and testing); they take orders from clients and place temporary employees with those clients. Jodan provides a detailed training program for its employees, including its service representatives. Upon the commencement of her employment with Jodan, Ms. Harrison began a training program known as Professional Service 1 (PS-1) under the supervision of Margaret Jones. PS-1 is a self study course where the employee learns the policies and procedures of a Manpower franchise through tapes and other training materials. It is the responsibility of the employee to keep track of and complete PS-1. Normally it takes between three and six months for an employee to complete PS-1; however, it can take longer, depending on the employee's office work load at the time. Disgruntled and upset by what she perceived as criticism of her management and hiring decisions, Ms. Jones left the employ of Jodan on or about August 1, 1994. Prior to that time, Ms. Harrison had completed all but three or four minor details in the PS-1 training. Ms. Harrison was satisfied by her training under Ms. Jones and she admits that no one at Jodan attempted to prevent her from completing PS-1. In September 1994, Ms. Harrison reported to Dan Gavin that her PS-1 materials were lost. He was surprised that one of his employees would lose her training materials and he assisted Ms. Harrison in looking for the materials by, among other things, looking in an off-site storage facility for them. Ms. Harrison's materials were never found and she includes the disappearance of her training materials as one of the basis for her charge of discrimination. There is no evidence that anyone took the materials but neither is there any explanation for their disappearance. Normally, when an employee completes PS-1, a checklist is sent to Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, indicating the employee has completed the training. On the checklist, the employee is required to record the dates that she completed each aspect of PS-1. Mr. Gavin contacted Manpower headquarters and obtained a new checklist. He also set up a schedule to meet with Ms. Harrison to go over the items on the checklist and verify that all of PS-1 had been completed. At their first meeting, Ms. Harrison assured Mr. Gavin that she had completed all of PS-1. Based on their conversation, he called Manpower headquarters and verbally confirmed that Ms. Harrison had completed PS-1. Manpower records indicate that she officially completed PS-1 as of December 1, 1994. Ms. Harrison's testimony at hearing with regard to whether she actually had an opportunity to finish the training was confused and unclear as she seemed to contend that there were materials that she was supposed to send to the home office, but could not, due to the lapse of time and loss of her training package. After an employee completes PS-1, the next step is to attend PS-2, which is a week-long training seminar at Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee. PS-2 reinforces what is learned in PS-1 and teaches additional marketing skills. Employees are given a list of dates during which PS-2 will be offered and, because the training requires them to be away from home for a week, they can schedule it at their convenience. Employees can schedule PS-2 before actually completing PS-1 but must have completed PS-1 before they actually attend PS-2. Ms. Harrison could have attended PS-2 any time after December 1, 1994. In January 1995, Mr. Gavin directed the area manager, Kathy Stanford, to ensure that all eligible employees, including Ms. Harrison, sign up for and attend PS-2. The PS-2 classes fill up quickly and it was a priority for Mr. Gavin to have his employees enroll. On more than one occasion, Ms. Stanford gave Ms. Harrison a list of available classes and the opportunity to attend PS-2. However, Ms. Harrison failed to sign up for PS-2. Jodan evaluates employees' performance and salaries on an annual basis. On January 30, 1995, Ms. Harrison was given her annual evaluation. Although the "Appraisal Period" on her evaluation is listed as March 21, 1994, to September 1994, the uncontradicted evidence was that this was a scrivener's error and the appraisal period was March 21, 1994, (Harrison's date of hire) through December 31, 1994. Her review was performed by Mr. Gavin, who was familiar with her performance, with input from Ms. Harrison's immediate supervisor, Gloria Michael. Ms. Stanford sat in on all evaluations done at that time, including Ms. Harrison's, because she was the new area manager and sitting in on the reviews was one way for her to become familiar with the staff and their performances. Ms. Harrison's overall score on the evaluation was a 2.66 on a scale of 1 to 5. A score of 2 means "Below Expectations" and a score of 3 means "Consistently Meets Expectations." A service representative learns all performance areas covered by the evaluation through PS-1. Although she claims that she was evaluated in areas in which she was not trained, Ms. Harrison did not raise this issue with Mr. Gavin and she did not write in any comments on the evaluation in the space provided for employee comments. Further, the uncontradicted testimony, including that of Margaret Jones, established that Ms. Harrison did receive training in all areas of her job in which she was evaluated. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any job detriment as the result of this evaluation or the unusual circumstances surrounding her PS-1 training. She received a pay increase following the evaluation and was then the highest paid service representative. On March 29, 1995, Ms. Harrison was presented with a memorandum by Ms. Michael that addressed concerns she had with Ms. Harrison's job performance. Specifically, the memorandum addressed the following areas: Failure to be responsive to customer needs; The high number of personal calls Ms. Harrison was receiving at the office; Failure to properly match an employee's skills with a client's needs; Failure to consistently enter and update employee information in the computer system each time she spoke with an employee; Failure to open the office on time in the morning; Failure to set up computer training for applicants when she opened the office in the morning. Neither Mr. Gavin nor Ms. Stanford played any role in the preparation or presentation of this memorandum. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any adverse employment action as the result of the March 29, 1995, memorandum. Ms. Michael followed up the March 29, 1995, memorandum with a memorandum on May 3, 1995, detailing Ms. Harrison's improvement in all of the areas discussed in the March 29, 1995, memorandum. On May 15-16, 1995, Ms. Harrison and Ms. Michael (who is white) failed to provide an important client with prompt and appropriate service. As a result, Ms. Stanford counseled both women and placed them both on 90 days probation. Ms. Harrison does not contend that this action was discriminatory. On July 17, 1995, Ms. Harrison submitted a letter of resignation. In the letter she stated that she enjoyed her position as service representative. She also stated that she felt she had been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Ms. Harrison's resignation and the allegations of discriminatory treatment came as a surprise to Ms. Stanford and Mr. Gavin as Ms. Harrison had never before told them she was unhappy or felt discriminated against. In her letter of resignation, Ms. Harrison offered to meet with Mr. Gavin and Ms. Stanford to discuss her resignation, but during her exit interview she refused to discuss her allegations. Although many of Jodan's temporary employees were minorities, Ms. Harrison was the only African-American service representative. There were, however, other minorities, including Hispanic-Americans. Ms. Harrison presented her case in an articulate organized professional manner. It is clear that she felt the work environment was stressful and uncomfortable. However, she did not prove that she was discriminated against or was the object of hostile or adverse employment actions. The temporary employment agency business is highly competitive. Jodan had several large corporate clients and it had to work hard to meet the needs of those clients, sometimes on short notice. This created pressure on Jordan's regular staff that was experienced by white or non-minority employees as well as Ms. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the above, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Ms. Harrison's charge of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary A. Harrison 2356 Carborn Street Orlando, Florida 32839 Kelly T. Blystone, Esquire Moran & Shams, P.A. Post Office Box 472 Orlando, Florida 32802-0472 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes, the Florida Equal Access To Justice Act?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The action in this case was initiated by the Respondent, a state agency. The Respondent was not a nominal party. Petitioner was the prevailing party in the administrative action brought against his license by Respondent in Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Board of Veterinary Medicine vs. William H. Jernigan, D.V.M., Case No. 95-4487 in that Respondent voluntarily dismissed the case. Petitioner incurred attorney's fees and costs in excess of $15,000, and there is no dispute as to the reasonableness of attorney's fees and costs. There are no special circumstances which would make an award of attorney's fees and costs unjust. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner's veterinary practice was organized as a sole proprietorship under the fictitious name of Sebring Animal Hospital located in Sebring, Florida. Petitioner is the sole proprietor of Sebring Animal Hospital, an unincorporated business. Both Petitioner and Sebring Animal Hospital are domiciled in the State of Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Petitioner through Sebring Animal Hospital employed less than 25 employees. At no time pertinent to this proceeding, did Petitioner and Sebring Animal Hospital have a combined net worth in excess of two million dollars. Petitioner is a "small business party" as that term is defined in Section 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes. On or about September 23, 1993, a dog was presented to the Sebring Animal Hospital for boarding and grooming. On or about October 1, 1993, a hospital employee, during the course of grooming the dog, left the dog unattended. While unattended, the dog either fell or jumped off the grooming table and accidentally hanged herself with a leash that was being used to restrain her. The dog's owner was notified of the accident on October 1, 1993. Petitioner was not present in the hospital at the time of the accident. The owner of the dog subsequently filed a complaint with the Respondent on March 28, 1995. An investigation of the incident was conducted by an investigator from the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (Department). The investigator prepared an Investigative Report which included, among other things, the Investigator's interview with the complainant and Petitioner's response. The factual allegations of the incident contained in the Investigative Report are the same as those set out in findings of fact 9, 10, and 11. The Investigative Report was presented to the Probable Cause Panel (PCP) of the Board of Veterinary Medicine. The members of the PCP reviewed the Investigative Report prior to its meeting and discussed the Investigative Report at the PCP meeting on June 29, 1995. The PCP found probable cause and issued a Memorandum of Finding of Probable Cause but did not state the statutory violations upon which the finding of probable cause was based. The PCP directed the Department to file an Administrative Complaint. Although the Board's attorney was present at the PCP meeting on June 29, 1995, none of the panel members made an inquiry of the Board's counsel as to whether under the facts presented there was a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes, specifically Section 474.214(1)(o), Florida Statutes. In fact, the PCP made no inquiry of anyone as whether the facts as presented constituted a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes. Of all the evidence considered by the PCP, there was no evidence which would reasonably indicate that a violation of Chapter 474, Florida Statutes, had occurred. As directed by the PCP, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint against Petitioner alleging a violation of Section 474.214(1)(o), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is accordingly, ORDERED that Petitioner's Application for Attorney's Fees is Granted and the Respondent shall forthwith pay Petitioner the sum of $15,000 for attorney's fees and costs. ORDERED this 18th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard T. Ferrell Secretary Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Sue Foster Executive Director Board of Veterinary Medicine Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Bert J. Harris, III, Esquire SWAIN, HARRIS, SHEEHAN and MCCLURE, P.A. 212 Interlake Boulevard Lake Placid, Florida 33852 James E. Manning, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Suite Number 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Latonia Enzor, was an employee of Tallahassee Contractors, LLC. While the exact dates of her employment are not in evidence, she was first paid by the company on December 29, 2006, and last paid on June 8, 2007. Based upon federal tax returns submitted, for the July- September quarter of 2006, Tallahassee Contractors had nine employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the October-December quarter of 2006, Tallahassee Contractors had nine employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the January-March quarter of 2007, Tallahassee contractors had 9-11 employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the April-June quarter of 2007, Tallahassee Contractors had 11 employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. Each of the tax returns also listed Connie Fletcher as "an employee, a paid tax preparer, or another person [allowed] to discuss this return with the IRS." The Department of Revenue unemployment compensation return for the quarter ending March 31, 2007, also included an e-mail address for Ms. Fletcher at cfletcher@sandcofl.com. Sandco, Inc., is one of the companies Petitioner alleges is interrelated with Tallahassee Contractors. However, no evidence was presented to show what position Ms. Fletcher holds with either company. No competent evidence was presented to show that Tallahassee Contractors had fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. While Petitioner indicated her belief that more than fifteen employees existed, and felt that Tallahassee Contractors was affiliated with other companies, she admitted she did not know the nature of the business or how it operated. Her knowledge was limited to her job duties, i.e., driving a truck.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Latonia Enzor 3535 Roberts Avenue, Number 274 Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Steve Ghazvini, Director Tallahassee Contractors, LLC 662 Crossway Road Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission) created by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and is an agency within the meaning of Section 20.03(11), Florida Statutes (1993). The Commission consists of twelve (12) members appointed by the Governor. The Commission is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is Parrish Management, Inc. Petitioner is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, and, in accordance with stipulation of the parties, has standing to bring this proceeding. Evidence in this record of Petitioner's involvement as a participating party in another administrative proceeding convened pursuant to provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, as the result of a determination of reasonable cause, further serves to underscore Petitioner's qualification as a substantially affected party for purposes of this proceeding. Respondent enacted Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, ostensibly pursuant to authority contained in Subsections 760.06(6) and (12), Florida Statutes. Those statutory provisions read as follows: Powers of the commission.--Within the limitations provided by law, the commission shall have the following powers: * * * (6) To issue subpoenas for, administer oaths or affirmations to and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or to issue subpoenas for and compel the production of books, papers, records, documents and other evidence pertaining to any investigation or hearing convened pursuant to the powers of the commission. In conducting an investigation, the commission and its inves- tigators shall have access at all reasonable times to premises, records, documents, and other evidence or possible sources of evidence and may examine, record, and copy such materials and take and record the testimony or statements of such persons as are reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investigation. The authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths may be delegated by the commission, for investigations or hearings, to a commissioner or the executive director. In the case of a refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the commission may make application to any circuit court in this state, which shall have jurisdiction to order the witness to appear before the commission to give testimony and to produce evidence concerning the matter in question. Failure to obey the court's order may be punished by the court as contempt. If the court enters an order holding a person in contempt or compelling the person to comply with the commission's order or subpoena, the court shall order the person to pay the commission reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, accrued by the commission in obtaining the order from the court. * * * (12) To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and govern the proceedings of the commission in accordance with chapter 120. (emphasis supplied.) Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, read as follows: 60Y-2.004 General Description of Organization and Functions of Commission Staff. (2) The Executive Director is the chief administrative officer of the Commission and is responsible for implementing policy of the Commission. The Executive Director is appointed by the Commission and may be removed by the Commission for cause. The Executive Director has the following duties: make determinations as provided by Rule 60Y-5.004; * * * 60Y-5.004 Executive Director's Investigatory Determination; Notice. Upon completion of an investigation, if a complaint has not been settled or withdrawn, the Office of Employment Investigations shall report the investigation, with recommendation, to the Office of General Counsel. The Office of General Counsel shall review the report and shall make a recommendation to the Executive Director as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the recommendation is based upon lack of jurisdiction over the respondent or subject matter of the complaint or upon untimely filing of the complaint, the Executive Director may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Subsection 60Y- 5.006(3) or (11), provided that the investigation does not reveal any disputed issues of material fact. The Executive Director shall issue a determination on the foregoing bases of lack of jurisdiction or untimeliness where disputed issues of material fact appear to exist. After a determination has been made by the Executive Director, the Clerk shall serve a Notice of Determination, with copies of the determination, upon the complainant and the respondent. A Notice of Determination of Reasonable Cause shall include an invitation to participate in conciliation. A Notice of Determination of No Reasonable Cause, No Jurisdiction or Untimeliness shall advise the complainant of the right to file a Petition for Relief, pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.008, within 30 days of service of the notice. A form, Petition for Relief, hereby incorporated by reference, in blank, shall be provided to the complainant at the time of service of the notice. A Notice of Determination shall further advise the parties of the right to request redetermination, pursuant to Rule 6OY-5.007, within 20 days of service of the notice. If the complainant requests redetermination, the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Relief shall be tolled until service of a Notice of Redetermination. After service of a Notice of Determination, the parties named in the determination may inspect the records and documents, in the custody of the Commission, which pertain to the determination. The Executive Director may direct that a particular record, document or portion thereof be withheld from inspection by a party only when necessary for the protection of a witness or third party, or for the preservation of a trade secret. Helpful to an understanding of the legal authority of the Commission and consideration of whether the subject rules are an appropriate result of legislatively delegated authority, is Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, which provides that: In the event that the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under s. 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. (emphasis supplied.) Further, Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that, "Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the Commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." (emphasis supplied.) As noted, Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, provides two separate avenues of relief, one administrative and one judicial. Additionally, as set forth in Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes, the judicial remedy permits the recovery of back pay, and allows damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. The Commission's determination of reasonable cause pursuant to Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, is a condition or restriction upon the exercise by a complainant of a substantive right, i.e. the right to judicial remedy. Accordingly, provisions of Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which authorize the Commission's determination constitute a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, law. In those instances of the Commission's determination of no reasonable cause, Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, provides: If the Commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under s.120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause any such hearing shall be heard by a hearing officer and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. . . . As established by evidence presented at the final hearing, members of the Commission meet formally on a quarterly basis throughout the year to consider policy issues but have no formal knowledge or involvement in any pending case prior to presentment of recommended orders rendered by Hearing Officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. As established through official recognition of provisions of Section 760.11, Florida Statutes, the Commission is an adjudicative body with the quasi- judicial authority to determine the substantive rights of the parties, award back pay, prohibit specified discriminatory employment practices and provide affirmative relief from the effects of those practices.
The Issue Whether Respondent County is guilty of an unlawful employment practice pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and if so, what is the appropriate remedy?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is female, and within a class protected by Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent County is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner claimed that Respondent treated her disparately from male employees on the basis of her gender in the areas of pay during her probationary period, reprimands and discipline, provision of equipment, poor performance evaluations, and training. Petitioner's initial relationship with Respondent was as an independent contractor at Respondent's Sanitary Landfill under a written contract entered into on September 15, 1989. In this capacity, she acted as a "spotter." As an independent contractor, she received $250 per month and salvage rights to whatever material customers brought to the Respondent's Sanitary Landfill. Effective August 14, 1990, the State Division of Personnel and Retirement required Respondent to put all contractual people on the County payroll. Thereafter, Petitioner was paid $350 per month and continued to have salvage rights only at the sufferance of the Respondent. After that date, Petitioner earned retirement and social security benefits. Withholding of federal taxes and deduction of social security benefits were also provided.(P-12). The value of the salvage rights were never calculated by anyone. While she was employed as a "spotter," Petitioner was the only female "spotter." Petitioner was on probation as an employee from August to December 1990. Petitioner was paid $1.442 per hour from August 12, 1990 through October 1990, and $1.63 per hour from October 1990 through December 3, 1990. At that time, her rate of pay was raised to $3.85 per hour. The record contains no evidence of what was paid to any male employee similarly situated during this period. Without proof that similarly situated male spotters were consistently paid better, there is no proof of gender discrimination in pay during Petitioner's probationary period.3 Mark Hawes, a male, was hired as a spotter on June 1, 1993. He was paid $4.35 per hour while on probation. Willie George, also male, was hired as a spotter on October 1, 1993, and was paid $4.4805 per hour while on probation. There is no evidence of how much Petitioner was being paid during this period, so there is no means of assessing disparate treatment in pay, if any, during this period.4 During the period that Petitioner was employed as a "spotter," there was no statute or rule requiring that "spotters" receive formalized training or be certified in any field. During Petitioner's employment, no spotter were provided more than a printed Job Description and on-the-job oral instructions. They were expected to use courtesy and common sense in dealing with the public. Two employees (gender unspecified) who were not spotters were sent to train at a state "school" to become Certified Landfill Operators. A State Rule was enacted after Petitioner was terminated which required that all spotters must have eight hours of specialized training. Thereafter, the Respondent provided such training to spotters. At all times material to any Personnel Citations, Petitioner was a union member, and all benefits of her union's collective bargaining agreement with the Respondent accrued to her. No performance evaluations were submitted in evidence. With the exception of the events related within the following findings of fact, no witness found any fault with Petitioner in the performance of her job description as a "spotter" at Respondent's landfill. (P-1) Wayne Hardee, Director of the Landfill, issued a Personnel Citation against Petitioner early in her employment on the basis of lack of personal hygiene. The citation was later removed from Petitioner's personnel file as an act of good will. On or about January 16, 1994, Petitioner admitted to an immediate supervisor that her carelessness with a hand-held CB radio had resulted in loss of the radio. She offered to pay for the radio. Mr. Hardee did not require her to pay for the radio, but issued a written Personnel Citation to her on January 20, 1994 for her carelessness. This Personnel Citation simultaneously cited Petitioner because Mr. Hardee had received complaints that Petitioner was overly concerned about other spotters doing their jobs. In this Personnel Citation, Mr. Hardee warned Petitioner to do her job without complaining about other employees. Petitioner admitted that she signed this citation and that she did not grieve it through her union. The radio was later recovered, but the citation remained in Petitioner's personnel file. (P-2) On Saturday, July 9, 1994, Petitioner called her union's senior shop steward, Jessie Ellzey, to the landfill to complain about items left at her spotter station. Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner was accusing another employee of putting the items in the wrong place. Petitioner also told Mr. Ellzey that another employee had threatened her. After investigation and interviews the following week, Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Hardee determined that the items had been brought by a landfill customer to the landfill between shift changes. Mr. Hardee's and Mr. Ellzey's perception was that Petitioner had unfairly complained about another spotter, Willie George, not doing his job. At least three days and two meetings were involved in this investigation and counseling procedure. Mr. Hardee issued a written Personnel Citation against Petitioner for complaining about a co-employee. (P-3) Petitioner also was suspended without pay for one day and warned that if the problem was not corrected, further disciplinary action would be taken against her. Petitioner did not grieve this citation through her union. Based on all of Mr. Ellzey's credible testimony, due to reputation testimony about Mr. Ellzey's standard operating procedure, and because Petitioner was actually suspended for one day without pay, I reject as not credible Petitioner's testimony that she never knew of this citation in time to grieve it. On August 13, 1994, Ann Harrell, a landfill customer, filed a written complaint of rudeness against Petitioner. (P-9) A written complaint of rudeness by Petitioner was also filed by another customer, Mr. Richburg, at about the same time. Mr. Hardee considered courtesy to customers to be an unstated policy of County government and further perceived rudeness to customers to be an on-going problem in Petitioner's relationship with the public. Due to the foregoing written complaints and many similar oral complaints he had received, Mr. Hardee assigned Petitioner two days' suspension without pay by a written Personnel Citation issued August 15, 1994. The citation also warned Petitioner she would be terminated if there were another complaint about her. Petitioner refused to sign this citation. (P-4) On August 25, 1994, Petitioner grieved the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation through her union. (P-5) A hearing was held in response to Petitioner's grievance. All concerned agree that Mr. Ellzey, the union representative advocating Petitioner's position, and not a representative of management, kept Petitioner from testifying. Chester Humphries testified on Petitioner's behalf at the grievance hearing that he had been unable to hear what Mr. Richburg said but could hear what Petitioner said to Mr. Richburg. From this, Mr. Hardee inferred that Petitioner had raised her voice to Mr. Richburg. Mr. Hardee assessed Petitioner's character witnesses in Petitioner's favor but noted that they knew nothing about the specific incident between Petitioner and Mr. Richburg. Ultimately, Mr. Hardee relied on Mr. Richburg's testimony concerning the incident. (P-6) Mr. Hardee denied Petitioner's grievance and disciplined Petitioner in accord with the August 15, 1994 Personnel Citation. Upon advice of her union steward, Petitioner did not appeal the grievance hearing result. It was further agreed that if Petitioner's behavior resulted in no more complaints against her for 30 working days, the August 15, 1994, citation would be removed from her personnel file. Petitioner met this requirement, and the citation was removed from her personnel file. (P-6; P-7). Petitioner's December 13, 1994, charge of discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations listed August 11, 1994, as the last date of alleged discrimination. No witness at formal hearing herein, including Mr. Ellzey and Mr. Humphries, both of whom also had been present at the grievance hearing, confirmed Petitioner's perception that her gender had affected the result of her grievance hearing. Another female employee (not a landfill spotter) currently works in Respondent's administrative offices. That female employee also has had employment disputes with Mr. Hardee which she attributes to his gender bias, but the type of dispute was not clearly specified on this record. Therefore, no similarity to Petitioner's situation can be discerned and no pattern of gender bias was proven on that basis. This female employee is still employed by Respondent. A different female employee (also not a spotter) employed by Respondent's Emergency Medical Services (EMS) was terminated by Mr. Bill Beddow, EMS Director, for failing to timely report (or complain about) her immediate supervisor for "doing something [Mr. Beddow] thought he shouldn't be doing with drugs." The male supervisor resigned for "personal reasons." The female employee was rehired by Mr. Beddow after intercession by her union. This means another female not similarly situated to Petitioner was terminated for not complaining about a male employee's job performance and was then hired back, whereas Petitioner was progressively disciplined with reprimands and suspensions for repetitive unsubstantiated complaints about male employees' job performances. Petitioner seeks to have the conclusion drawn that female employees were disciplined both for reporting and for not reporting male employees' misbehavior. However, the two isolated situations are so dissimilar as to develop no pattern recognizable at law. I accept as credible and unrefuted Petitioner's testimony that all of the complaints she initiated about other employees were oral. However, Petitioner's testimony that she did not complain about other employees' performance of, or failure to perform, their jobs and her assertion that her complaints were only motivated by the requirements of her Job Description to "inspect loads" and "report all problems" was not corroborated by any other witness. Petitioner's testimony that her concerns were directed not at individual employees but at addressing hazardous wastes also was not corroborated by any other witness.5 Petitioner's middle level supervisor acknowledged that Petitioner told him that other employees had improperly handled hazardous materials as well as non-hazardous materials but that he did not cite anyone as a result of Petitioner's complaints about hazardous wastes because it was impossible to prove who was responsible. He counseled all subordinates about each incident whenever he considered counseling appropriate. Otherwise, all witnesses with reason to know the situation generally acknowledged that Petitioner's oral complaints were recurring almost daily and were directed to other employees' job performances rather than hazardous materials. It is the repetitive and personal nature of Petitioner's complaints rather than their being oral that management found offensive. The evidence also generally shows that all employees orally complained about each other and that Petitioner's two immediate supervisors, Felippe McCelroy and Robert Murray, orally reprimanded everybody who complained or who was complained about as they each saw fit within their supervisory discretion on individual occasions. No gender pattern is to be discerned from the foregoing. Only on those occasions that either an oral or written complaint reached Mr. Hardee was anyone written up and/or disciplined. Petitioner complained about not being assigned or provided with one of Respondent employer's trucks when other male employees were provided trucks. With the exception of the following findings related to the Respondent's trucks, there is no relevant evidence in this record concerning employees' use of trucks. All employees were cautioned against carelessness. Tommy Dean, a male employee, dented one of Respondent's trucks. He was not disciplined for careless driving. There is no evidence the dent was caused by Mr. Dean's careless driving. In February 1995, Charles Kennedy, a male spotter, filed a written complaint or incident report. Therein, he claimed that Petitioner had attempted to prohibit his bulldozing landfill material out of the way because Petitioner was trying to remove salvageable items. He further alleged that Petitioner had thrown a jar of grease at him. Petitioner was requested to file a written account of the incident. In her written account, she basically admitted the incident but not any intent to hit Mr. Kennedy with the grease jar. Mr. Kennedy was not disciplined for filing the written complaint/report. Petitioner was not disciplined for the actions complained about by Mr. Kennedy. Instead, as of February 3, 1995, landfill spotters were prohibited from salvaging at the landfill. (P-13) Petitioner desires that the conclusion be drawn that male spotters who complained in writing about other employees were not disciplined for complaining but that Petitioner, a female, was disciplined for making oral complaints. However, it appears Respondent addressed Mr. Kennedy's written complaint in much the same way as it had addressed Petitioner's oral complaint against Willie George, by giving each participant in the dispute a chance to state his or her position, before management decided who should be disciplined. The difference was that Mr. Kennedy was not a chronic complainer and management's investigation revealed some fault on both sides, so a neutral solution was found rather than discipline being imposed. There is no evidence beyond Petitioner's assertion that she was ever asked to do more work or heavier work than male spotters. From this point on, the dates that events occurred or their chronology is not entirely clear from the record. However, approximately April 14, 1995, there was an occasion when Petitioner was asked to move metal pieces in a wheelbarrow-sized pile over a three-hour period. The largest piece weighed 21 pounds. The next day, Petitioner reported a workers' compensation back injury or aggravation. She was then off work until approximately May 11, 1995, when she returned to "light duty." She worked for awhile for only four hours per day. Respondent hired someone to help her. It is disputed whether Petitioner was reinjured or whether Mr. Hardee just sent her home. However, on or about July 8, 1995, Mr. Hardee discussed the situation with "the workers' compensation people," and it was agreed there was not enough light duty work for Petitioner. Three months later, Petitioner returned to full duty. Because a spotter had been hired to do her work, Petitioner was assigned to a variety of jobs. She worked at the dog pound, the recycling building, and even washed Mr. Hardee's truck.6 One day, Petitioner's immediate supervisor ordered her to cut out the top of a metal drum. At formal hearing, Petitioner asserted that this was heavier work than she should have been required to do on light duty, but there is no evidence the supervisor's order was motivated by gender bias. There also is no evidence a full-time male spotter was never required to do similarly heavy work. Petitioner advised her supervisor that she had hurt her arms and elbows and she went home on sick leave. Petitioner had complained over the term of her employment about not being provided one of Respondent's trucks so that she could conveniently get from her sector of the landfill to a restroom. After her workers' compensation injury, Respondent arranged for male employees to drive Petitioner to the restroom. Eventually, Respondent provided Petitioner with a portable toilet in her work sector. Mr. Hardee maintained that no spotter had ever been assigned a truck but that all spotters, including Petitioner, had access to one. There is evidence to show that male employees drove the trucks and Petitioner did not, but insufficient evidence to show this was an active management decision or that Mr. Hardee acquiesced in male employees preempting trucks as a result of any gender bias. On or about November 13, 1995, Petitioner informed Mr. Hardee that she was permanently physically disabled and would have to be on light duty indefinitely. After consultation with his "workers' compensation people," Mr. Hardee terminated Petitioner as of that date. 7 At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted Respondent was still paying her workers' compensation benefits and that her workers' compensation claim has not been settled.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order finding no discrimination and dismissing the Petition for Relief. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1997.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unfair employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of race, in violation of chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2012), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Nepton is a Hispanic man who worked as a collector for CCS from November, 2011, to February, 2012. CCS is a collection agency that employs approximately 80 collectors, who are divided into departments based on the different accounts they service. Mr. Nepton was originally hired to work under the supervision of Julio Castellon, and then was transferred to a unit supervised by Danielle Santilli. All of the work collectors perform is via telephone; persons who have outstanding bills are called in order to attempt collection of the debt. During his training in Ms. Santilli's department, he received most of his training from Ms. Santilli. According to Mr. Nepton, during these training sessions, Ms. Santilli made derogatory comments about Hispanic people. If the person being called was Hispanic, she would mention that Hispanic people were stupid, dumb, and never paid their bills. Mr. Nepton claims that the comments were made throughout his entire training, which lasted approximately one month. He claims that he reported his dislike of the derogatory comments to Ariel Castellon, a supervisor. Ms. Santilli testified, and denied ever making any derogatory or inappropriate remarks about Hispanics. Mr. Castellon also denied any knowledge of Ms. Santilli making any such remarks, and testified that Mr. Nepton never complained of any such comments while he worked at CCS. Lori French testified that in her capacity as the Human Resources Director, she never received any type of complaint regarding Ms. Santilli from any employee. The undersigned credits the testimony of the CCS employees, finding it consistent and credible in light of the scant evidence produced by Mr. Nepton. Mr. Nepton did not produce a single witness who could corroborate his testimony, despite the fact that the collectors worked in an open area, in close proximity to each other. The employee handbook instructed employees to report any workplace harassment of any type with the Human Resources Department. Mr. Nepton never filed such a complaint with the Human Resources Department. On February 1, 2012, Mr. Nepton received a call from a patient of a hospital inquiring as to whether the account was paid in full. Mr. Nepton requested the patient's date of birth, but the patient asked why that information was necessary. Mr. Nepton raised his voice and became argumentative with the patient. When Mr. Nepton was asked about the phone call by his supervisor, he became argumentative in the presence of the other collectors. On February 2, 2012, Mr. Nepton met with management regarding the incident on the previous day. He became agitated, raised his voice, and pointed his finger in the supervisor's face. Mr. Nepton, who was on probationary status, was discharged from his employment on that date.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2012.
