Findings Of Fact After the motion for continuance was again denied, petitioners declined to offer any evidence and petitioners announced that they would be pursuing certain supposed federal remedies.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a janitor with Respondent because of his handicap, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Lee, was hired by Respondent in August 1994 as a custodial worker at the Tallahassee Mall in Tallahassee, Florida. As a janitor Petitioner's duties included bending, stooping, and lifting. He was assigned to zone 3 in the Mall. Up until 1996, when Petitioner was injured, Petitioner received good evaluations on his job performance. Indeed Petitioner was very proud of the quality of his work and took special care to do his job well. Sometime prior to May 20, 1996, Petitioner, while at work and in the scope of his employment, stepped on a set of stairs which were not properly attached to a stage in the Tallahassee Mall. The steps slipped causing Petitioner's feet to come out from under him. Petitioner fell flat on his back. As a consequence Petitioner suffered a permanent back injury for which he received workers' compensation. The injury impairs his ability to work and therefore is a handicap. Around May 20, 1996, Petitioner was released by his doctor and was given orders for light duty with no bending, stooping, or heavy lifting. Petitioner gave these orders to his supervisor, Mr. Navin, when he returned to work on May 20, 1996. Respondent had light duty work available which Petitioner was qualified to perform. However, Respondent did not assign Petitioner to light duty work, but changed his work area from zone 3 to zone 1. Zone 1 is located at the front entrance to the mall and requires more work to maintain. Petitioner attempted to perform his duties but could only work for 3 1/2 hours before being overcome by pain from his injury. Petitioner could not work the next four working days because of the aggravation of his injury. On May 28, 1996, after returning to work, Petitioner was again given full duty work. Petitioner attempted to perform his custodial duties for about 2 weeks. However, the pain from his injury was so severe he again requested light duty work. Petitioner's supervisor asked Petitioner to bring him another notice from his doctor. Petitioner's doctor faxed the supervisor a second notice and Petitioner was placed on light duty work. Once Petitioner was placed on light duty work, the mall manager, Mr. Renninger, followed Petitioner around the mall watching him all the time while he worked. On July 8, 1996, prior to the mall opening for business, Petitioner was helping one of the mall store owners with a problem. Such aid was part of Petitioner's job. The mall manager walked up to Petitioner and began to yell at him in a very rude and disrespectful manner. The manager would not listen to Petitioner's explanation of the event. The manager gave Petitioner a written disciplinary notice for his aid to the mall store owner. The manager continued to follow Petitioner around the mall while he worked. Sometime around August 15, 1996, the mall manager advised the mall's employees that they should take their respective vacations prior to October. Petitioner thought it would be a good time for him to take the 4-day vacation time he had accumulated during his employment with the mall. He could use the time to allow his back to heal more. On August 15, 1996, Petitioner requested vacation leave and vacation pay for the period beginning September 3, 1996 and ending September 9, 1996. Initially, the request was denied. Petitioner's supervisor felt he had missed too much work and been late too often. However, Petitioner had only been absent or late in relation to his back injury. Petitioner explained that fact to his supervisor. His supervisor agreed and approved Petitioner's vacation. Petitioner returned to work on August 10, 1996. An argument with the administrative assistant occurred when she refused to recognize that Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his vacation time. She was not going to turn in any time for him so that Petitioner could get paid while on vacation. Getting a paycheck was a serious matter to Petitioner, and Petitioner, understandably, became gruff with the administrative assistant. Petitioner only raised his voice at the administrative assistant. He was not abusive and did not curse at her. In fact, the administrative assistant yelled at Petitioner when he raised the subject of his pay "Now, before you start bitching." Petitioner called the headquarters of Respondent and confirmed he had vacation time and pay accrued. After this incident Petitioner was fired ostensibly for mistreating the administrative assistant. The administrative assistant, who was incorrect, was not terminated. The reason appears to be a pretext. Petitioner's pay was $5.35 per hour and he worked a 40-hour-work-week. After his termination, Petitioner actively sought employment but could not find any until September 1, 1997. At that time he began work for Tallahassee Community College as a custodial worker with light duties at a higher rate of pay. Petitioner's search for work was reasonable.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner and awarding Petitioner backpay in the amount of $11,770.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent is an employer as defined in Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Latonia Enzor, was an employee of Tallahassee Contractors, LLC. While the exact dates of her employment are not in evidence, she was first paid by the company on December 29, 2006, and last paid on June 8, 2007. Based upon federal tax returns submitted, for the July- September quarter of 2006, Tallahassee Contractors had nine employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the October-December quarter of 2006, Tallahassee Contractors had nine employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the January-March quarter of 2007, Tallahassee contractors had 9-11 employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. For the April-June quarter of 2007, Tallahassee Contractors had 11 employees. This tax return was signed by Frank Williams, as Manager member of the company. Each of the tax returns also listed Connie Fletcher as "an employee, a paid tax preparer, or another person [allowed] to discuss this return with the IRS." The Department of Revenue unemployment compensation return for the quarter ending March 31, 2007, also included an e-mail address for Ms. Fletcher at cfletcher@sandcofl.com. Sandco, Inc., is one of the companies Petitioner alleges is interrelated with Tallahassee Contractors. However, no evidence was presented to show what position Ms. Fletcher holds with either company. No competent evidence was presented to show that Tallahassee Contractors had fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year. While Petitioner indicated her belief that more than fifteen employees existed, and felt that Tallahassee Contractors was affiliated with other companies, she admitted she did not know the nature of the business or how it operated. Her knowledge was limited to her job duties, i.e., driving a truck.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of May 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Latonia Enzor 3535 Roberts Avenue, Number 274 Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Steve Ghazvini, Director Tallahassee Contractors, LLC 662 Crossway Road Tallahassee, Florida 32305 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission) created by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and is an agency within the meaning of Section 20.03(11), Florida Statutes (1993). The Commission consists of twelve (12) members appointed by the Governor. The Commission is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is Parrish Management, Inc. Petitioner is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, and, in accordance with stipulation of the parties, has standing to bring this proceeding. Evidence in this record of Petitioner's involvement as a participating party in another administrative proceeding convened pursuant to provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, as the result of a determination of reasonable cause, further serves to underscore Petitioner's qualification as a substantially affected party for purposes of this proceeding. Respondent enacted Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, ostensibly pursuant to authority contained in Subsections 760.06(6) and (12), Florida Statutes. Those statutory provisions read as follows: Powers of the commission.--Within the limitations provided by law, the commission shall have the following powers: * * * (6) To issue subpoenas for, administer oaths or affirmations to and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or to issue subpoenas for and compel the production of books, papers, records, documents and other evidence pertaining to any investigation or hearing convened pursuant to the powers of the commission. In conducting an investigation, the commission and its inves- tigators shall have access at all reasonable times to premises, records, documents, and other evidence or possible sources of evidence and may examine, record, and copy such materials and take and record the testimony or statements of such persons as are reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investigation. The authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths may be delegated by the commission, for investigations or hearings, to a commissioner or the executive director. In the case of a refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the commission may make application to any circuit court in this state, which shall have jurisdiction to order the witness to appear before the commission to give testimony and to produce evidence concerning the matter in question. Failure to obey the court's order may be punished by the court as contempt. If the court enters an order holding a person in contempt or compelling the person to comply with the commission's order or subpoena, the court shall order the person to pay the commission reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, accrued by the commission in obtaining the order from the court. * * * (12) To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and govern the proceedings of the commission in accordance with chapter 120. (emphasis supplied.) Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, read as follows: 60Y-2.004 General Description of Organization and Functions of Commission Staff. (2) The Executive Director is the chief administrative officer of the Commission and is responsible for implementing policy of the Commission. The Executive Director is appointed by the Commission and may be removed by the Commission for cause. The Executive Director has the following duties: make determinations as provided by Rule 60Y-5.004; * * * 60Y-5.004 Executive Director's Investigatory Determination; Notice. Upon completion of an investigation, if a complaint has not been settled or withdrawn, the Office of Employment Investigations shall report the investigation, with recommendation, to the Office of General Counsel. The Office of General Counsel shall review the report and shall make a recommendation to the Executive Director as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the recommendation is based upon lack of jurisdiction over the respondent or subject matter of the complaint or upon untimely filing of the complaint, the Executive Director may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Subsection 60Y- 5.006(3) or (11), provided that the investigation does not reveal any disputed issues of material fact. The Executive Director shall issue a determination on the foregoing bases of lack of jurisdiction or untimeliness where disputed issues of material fact appear to exist. After a determination has been made by the Executive Director, the Clerk shall serve a Notice of Determination, with copies of the determination, upon the complainant and the respondent. A Notice of Determination of Reasonable Cause shall include an invitation to participate in conciliation. A Notice of Determination of No Reasonable Cause, No Jurisdiction or Untimeliness shall advise the complainant of the right to file a Petition for Relief, pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.008, within 30 days of service of the notice. A form, Petition for Relief, hereby incorporated by reference, in blank, shall be provided to the complainant at the time of service of the notice. A Notice of Determination shall further advise the parties of the right to request redetermination, pursuant to Rule 6OY-5.007, within 20 days of service of the notice. If the complainant requests redetermination, the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Relief shall be tolled until service of a Notice of Redetermination. After service of a Notice of Determination, the parties named in the determination may inspect the records and documents, in the custody of the Commission, which pertain to the determination. The Executive Director may direct that a particular record, document or portion thereof be withheld from inspection by a party only when necessary for the protection of a witness or third party, or for the preservation of a trade secret. Helpful to an understanding of the legal authority of the Commission and consideration of whether the subject rules are an appropriate result of legislatively delegated authority, is Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, which provides that: In the event that the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under s. 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. (emphasis supplied.) Further, Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that, "Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the Commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." (emphasis supplied.) As noted, Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, provides two separate avenues of relief, one administrative and one judicial. Additionally, as set forth in Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes, the judicial remedy permits the recovery of back pay, and allows damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. The Commission's determination of reasonable cause pursuant to Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, is a condition or restriction upon the exercise by a complainant of a substantive right, i.e. the right to judicial remedy. Accordingly, provisions of Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which authorize the Commission's determination constitute a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, law. In those instances of the Commission's determination of no reasonable cause, Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, provides: If the Commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under s.120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause any such hearing shall be heard by a hearing officer and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. . . . As established by evidence presented at the final hearing, members of the Commission meet formally on a quarterly basis throughout the year to consider policy issues but have no formal knowledge or involvement in any pending case prior to presentment of recommended orders rendered by Hearing Officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. As established through official recognition of provisions of Section 760.11, Florida Statutes, the Commission is an adjudicative body with the quasi- judicial authority to determine the substantive rights of the parties, award back pay, prohibit specified discriminatory employment practices and provide affirmative relief from the effects of those practices.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed by Petitioner on January 2, 1998.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In his Charge of Discrimination, Petitioner, Jeffrey S. Wytrwal, alleges that after he had suffered a knee injury, Respondent, Waste Management of Putnam County, violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, by failing to find him a "light duty" position "due to [his] disability and [because of] unfair favoritism throughout this company." Respondent denies the charge of discrimination and contends that Petitioner does not suffer from a disability, and even if he did, it had no positions in the company which were compatible with his medical restrictions. Respondent is engaged in the business of providing solid waste collection services for the residents of Putnam County, Florida. Testimony by Respondent's district manager, Brian Watkins, established that Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the law and is thus subject to the provisions of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner worked for Respondent as a driver on a garbage truck from 1990 until 1993, and then again beginning in January 1995. The work is physically demanding, and it requires that the driver frequently jump in and out of the vehicle to sling or empty garbage cans into the rear-end loader. After working a 12-15 hour shift on January 28, 1997, Petitioner was home sitting on his bed "half Indian style" when he attempted to stand up. His right knee locked; he was transported to a local hospital; and he later underwent arthroscopic surgery to correct the injury. After suffering the foregoing injury, Petitioner qualified for disability payments from his employer, and he began receiving a monthly disability check in the amount of $888.00. On an undisclosed date after Petitioner suffered his injury, Respondent changed its hauling operation from a two-man team (a driver and swingman) on each truck to a single driver. This meant that the bona fide occupational requirements for the position of driver required that he engage in bending, stooping, and climbing on a repetitive basis for long hours each day without the aid of a "swingman." On October 14, 1997, Petitioner was released by his doctor to return to work and was given a certificate which read "No bending, stooping, climbing (Light Duty Only, if available)." These restrictions obviously did not allow Petitioner to return to his former job. Upon obtaining the release, Petitioner telephoned his supervisor, John Rakoczy, and asked if he could go back to work on "light duty," performing duties that would be compatible with his medical restrictions. On a very few occasions, Respondent had authorized an injured worker to perform other temporary duties if his injuries "fit a temporary job." However, except for two already filled dispatcher positions in the office, Respondent had no jobs which did not require bending, stooping, or climbing. Therefore, without making fundamental alterations in the company's operations, which would result in an undue hardship to the company, Rakoczy could not offer Petitioner part- time or restricted work. Petitioner did not seek the office dispatcher position, and he produced no evidence that he was qualified to perform that job. Although Petitioner admits that his knee has improved since October 1997, he never again contacted his employer regarding reemployment. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged that he agreed with Rakoczy's assessment that no light duty jobs were available within the company. Even so, he and his wife "took it hard," and in January 1998 he filed his Charge of Discrimination. Petitioner has not alleged, nor presented competent and credible evidence, that his knee injury continues to limit the full and normal uses of his physical facilities. While it is undisputed that the injury may have limited his physical facilities during his recuperation, there is no evidence that it continues to do so, or that others regard him as having a disability. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that he is disabled within the meaning of the law. Respondent's decision to not offer Petitioner light duty was not based on discriminatory reasons, as Petitioner has alleged, but was based on the fact that there were no jobs which were compatible with Petitioner's medical restrictions. While collecting medical disability payments, Petitioner also filed a worker's compensation claim against his employer in October 1997, and this claim was settled in May 1999 for the sum of $27,000.00. By agreeing to the settlement, Petitioner was no longer eligible for disability payments, and they terminated in May 1999. Until he settled his worker's compensation claim, Petitioner did not look for other employment. After the case was settled, however, he secured a job within a week at a local country club doing maintenance and landscaping work, and he has worked there since that time. There is no evidence as to how his current job duties compare with the duties that he performed for Respondent. Further, the difference in compensation, if any, between the new job and Petitioner's former job is not of record. Although Petitioner contended that Respondent had offered "light duty" to other injured workers in the past, he could only identify one such worker named "Keith," who had lost four fingers in an accident. Unlike Petitioner, however, that worker was able to perform a variety of temporary jobs despite the limitations caused by his injury. Neither the Charge of Discrimination, nor the record evidence, reveals the specific relief that Petitioner is requesting. Rather, the complaint merely lodges allegations of discrimination against Respondent. Respondent suggests that Petitioner's injury was pre-existing, and occurred before January 28, 1997, and that Petitioner may be malingering. This is based on the treating physician's notes which reflected that Petitioner had his symptoms prior to the date of the injury. Even if this were true, however, this fact would appear to bear on the legitimacy of Petitioner's worker's compensation claim, and not the charge of discrimination. Finally, even though the treating physician suspected that Petitioner might be malingering with his injury, this was only a suspicion and was not medically confirmed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing, with prejudice, Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of August, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Jeffrey S. Wytrwal Post Office Box 701 Satsuma, Florida 32189-0701 Joseph P. Shelton, Esquire 1500 Resurgens Plaza 945 East Paces Ferry Road Atlanta, Georgia 30326-1125 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Conclusions The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that on or about December 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a certification certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Patrolmen, Patrolmen 1st class, Master Patrolmen, Evidence Technician, and Traffic Enforcement officer. EXCLUDED: All other employees of the Ocala Police Department including Sergeants who are shift commanders. The pleadings establish that during 1972, the Respondent, by and through its City Council, promulgated a City Ordinance (Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code) which regulates labor relations for its employees. Chapter 13B has remained in full force and effect and has never been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Among other things, the ordinance provides that: "Solicitation for membership in a labor organization or the collection of dues therefor, or other internal affairs of a labor organization shall not be con- ducted by employees on working time, or on city premises. Labor organization literature, pamphlets, handbills and the like shall not be distributed in the work areas of the city premises at any time." (See Section 13B-8.) A summary review of the parties' joint exhibits demonstrate that Chapter 13B attempts to regulate nearly all aspects of a collective bargaining relationship. In PERC v. The City of Naples, 327 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) the court determined that an entity may not assume jurisdiction of a public employee bargaining procedure until PERC has approved that procedure. In this case, no such approval has been granted by PERC as it is required pursuant to 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Further comparison of the provisions of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, lends support to the conclusion that Respondent's employees' collective bargaining rights are not on a parity with those rights guaranteed them by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. For example, 13B-1(c) of the ordinance defines "supervisor" and section 13B-1(b) defines "employee". Supervisors are excluded from the definition of employee and thereby from collective bargaining whereas Chapter 447 contains no definition of supervisor and the Commission consistently determines that supervisors are entitled to protections guaranteed by Chapter 447. See CWA and Hillsborough County Hospital and Welfare Board, case no. 8H- RC-752-0175, 2 FPER 46 (1976); Hillsborough County PBA and Florida State Lodge, FOP and City of Tampa, 2 FPER 72 (1976). Additional distinctions are found respecting the definition of confidential employees and the determination by despondent in its code of "bargainable" subjects. It was noted that Respondent does not consider itself required to negotiate with respect to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. See the May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1972). While Chapter 447 vests all authority respecting appropriate unit placement of employees with PERC, Chapter 13B-2(b)(1) authorized Respondent's City Manager to make such determinations. A further examination of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code reveals that it makes a striking distinction between the authority guaranteed employees respecting the proper bounds for solicitation-distribution rules. Chapter 447.509, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that during an employee's lunch hour, an employer may not restrict solicitation and distribution whereas Chapter 13B of the Respondent's Code restricts solicitation and distribution during working time and on the premises of the City, making no exception or distinction for lunch breaks and therefore Respondent's maintenance of such provisions amounts to unlawful interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the Respondent defends in part on the fact that no employee had been disciplined for violating the above referenced rules, legions of cases have held that the maintenance, without enforcement of an overly broad solicitation-distribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice. (See for example Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 934, 86 LRRM 1411; Dreis and Krump Manufacturing, Inc., 221 NLRB 309, 90 LRRM 1647 (1975).
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to: A. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them under the Florida Public Employees Relations Act; that it will upon request of the above-named employee organization, rescind the applicability of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code as it relates to the regulation of organizational rights of employees, without having been first approved by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Seymour H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 105 Legal Center 19 N.W. Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Jane Rigler, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142
Findings Of Fact We find the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact to be supported by competent substantial evidence. We adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s findings of fact. Conclusions of Law We find the Administrative Law Judge’s application of the law to the facts to result ina correct disposition of the matter. FCHR Order No. 01-012 Page 2 We note a statement of the Administrative Law Judge that we believe requires correction/clarification. Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge stated, “The Division of Administrative Hearings has no jurisdiction to hear allegations of discriminatory conduct which FCHR has not investigated or made a determination as to reasonable cause.” Recommended Order of Dismissal, 7 19. The Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 does allow Petitioners to file a request for administrative hearing in situations where 180 days have passed since the filing of the complaint and the Commission has not yet reached a determination as to reasonable cause, and, therefore, in those instances, the Division of Administrative Hearings would have jurisdiction to hear allegations of discriminatory conduct “which FCHR has not investigated or made a determination as to reasonable cause.” See, Sections 760.11(8) and 760.11(4), Florida Statutes (1999). We, therefore, correct/clarify this conclusion of law. In so doing we find: (1) that the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusion of law we are correcting is within. the substantive jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations, namely the interpretation of in what instances a Petitioner is entitled to an administrative hearing under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992; (2) the reason the correction is being made is that the conclusion of law as stated by the Administrative Law Judge is not supported in law; and (3) that in making this correction the rejection of the conclusion of law in question is as or more reasonable than allowing the incorrect conclusion of law to remain. See, Section 120.57(1)(), Florida Statutes (1999). With the above-stated correction/clarification, we adopt the Administrative Law Judge’s conclusions of law. Exceptions Neither party filed exceptions to the Administrative Law Judge’s recommended order. Dismissal The Petition for Relief and Complaint of Discrimination are DISMISSED with prejudice. The parties have the right to seek judicial review of this Order. The Commission and the appropriate District Court of Appeal must receive notice of appeal within 30 days of the date this Order is filed with the Clerk of the Commission. Explanation of the right to appeal is found in Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and in the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.110. DONE AND ORDERED this 21 day of (ranch. 2001. FOR THE FLORIDA COMMISSION ON HUMAN RELATIONS: FCHR Order No. (1-012 Page 3 Commissioner Sharon Ofuani, Panel Chairperson; Commissioner Juan Montes; and Commissioner Aristides Sosa Filed this 2 \_ day of YYa@nCW _, 2001, in Tallahassee, Florida. Azizi man, Acting Clerk Commission on Human Relatioris 325 John Knox Rd., Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 (850) 488-7082 NOTICE TO COMPLAINANT / PETITIONER As your complaint was filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which is enforced by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), you have the right to request EEOC to review this Commission’s final agency action. To secure a “substantial weight review” by EEOC, you must request it in writing within 15 days of your receipt of this Order. Send your request to Miami District Office (EEOC), One Biscayne Tower, 2 South Biscayne Blvd., Suite 2700, 27th Floor, Miami, FL 33131. Copies furnished to: Anthony Akins 7880 Talley Ann Court Tallahassee, FL 32311 Richard D. Courtemanche, Jr., Esq. David Sessions, Esq. Department of Law Enforcement P.O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Suzanne F. Hood, Administrative Law Judge, DOAH James Mallue, Legal Advisor for Commission Panel
