The Issue Whether Respondent was Petitioner’s employer at the time of Petitioner’s alleged unlawful termination, or is otherwise liable to Petitioner for alleged unlawful termination under any theory of successor liability.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed as a Legal Assistant by Igler & Dougherty Law Offices, P.A. (Igler & Dougherty), in Tallahassee, Florida, for approximately three-and-a-half years. Petitioner was terminated by Igler & Dougherty by letter dated February 6, 2012, allegedly for failure to make “adequate progression to date.” Petitioner alleges that she was unlawfully terminated after treatment for migraine headaches during an extended hospital stay. Respondent, Adams and Reese, LLP, is a limited liability law partnership headquartered in Louisiana, with offices in Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Alabama, Florida, and Washington, D.C. Charles P. Adams, Jr., is Respondent’s Managing Partner. In mid-summer 2012, Respondent approached George Igler, Partner in Igler & Dougherty, about the possibility of joining Adams and Reese to establish the firm’s Tallahassee office. Mr. Adams was primarily responsible for all discussions with Mr. Igler and other members of Igler & Dougherty who eventually joined Respondent. On October 1, 2012, Respondent announced the official opening of its Tallahassee office. The new office was located at 2457 Care Drive, the building that formerly housed Igler & Dougherty. At no time before October 1, 2012, did Respondent maintain an office or employ individuals in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty joined Respondent as partners. Other former Igler & Dougherty lawyers joined Respondent as partners and associates. Respondent also hired some of the support staff from Igler & Dougherty. Respondent did not hire Petitioner. Respondent did not merge with Igler & Dougherty, did not acquire the assets of Igler & Dougherty, and did not assume the liabilities of Igler & Dougherty. Igler & Dougherty retained its accounts receivable and work in progress, and Mr. Igler and Mr. Dougherty continued to wrap up the business of Igler & Dougherty after joining Adams and Reese. Respondent is managed by its Managing Partner and an Executive Committee comprised of six partners. None of the attorneys or employees of Igler & Dougherty hired by Respondent are Executive Committee members. Respondent has two classes of partners, capital partners and income partners. Only capital partners have an ownership interest in the firm. Only one of the seven attorneys hired by Respondent from Igler & Dougherty, Mr. Igler, is a capital partner. On October 12, 2012, the date Respondent opened its Tallahassee office, Respondent had 114 additional capital partners, none of whom had worked for Igler & Dougherty. At no time did Respondent employ Petitioner. Respondent did not participate in Petitioner’s termination nor did it have any role in the decision to terminate her. At the time Petitioner filed her Charge of Discrimination with the Commission, the Florida Secretary of State website showed that Igler & Dougherty, P.A., was an active Florida registered corporation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Kelli Lawhead in FCHR No. 2013-00581. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of July, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Violet Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lauren F. Strickland, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, P.A. 310 East Bradford Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Leslie A. Lanusse, Esquire Adams and Reese, LLP 701 Poydras Street, Suite 4500 New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Lauren L. Tafaro, Esquire Adams and Reese, LLP 701 Poydras Street 4500 One Shell Square New Orleans, Louisiana 70139 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission of Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations ("FCHR") and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Background From 2006 through May 3, 2010, Petitioner was employed by Respondent as a classification officer at Glades C.I.1 At all times material to this proceeding, Robert Shannon served as the warden at Glades C.I. and was responsible for the daily operation of the facility. Petitioner's immediate superior, Everett McPherson, supervised Petitioner, several other classification officers, and three senior classification officers. Petitioner contends that during her term of employment with Respondent, one of the senior classification officers (Barry Carrigan) and another co-worker (Janet Smith) subjected her to a hostile work environment. In addition, Petitioner alleges that she was subjected to a variety of discrete acts of discrimination, which include: a search of her person in May 2009; a written reprimand in June 2009; a delayed transfer to the work camp facility located at Glades C.I.; a belated performance evaluation from her supervisor; delayed training opportunities; and a prohibition against bringing her bible into the facility. Beginning with Petitioner's hostile environment claim, each allegation is discussed separately below. Improper Comments / E-Mails On December 23, 2008, various Glades C.I. employees—— including Petitioner and Mr. Carrigan——attended a Christmas luncheon on the grounds of the facility. During the event, Mr. Carrigan remarked to the other attendees (but not to Petitioner in particular) that all African-Americans from the city of Pahokee look like "monkeys" and African "tribesmen." In addition, Mr. Carrigan opined, in essence, that women are inferior to men.2 Understandably offended, Petitioner reported the remarks the next day by filing an anonymous complaint with Warden Shannon. An investigation ensued, at the conclusion of which Warden Shannon suspended Mr. Carrigan for ten days.3 Subsequently, in May 2009, Petitioner discovered copies of two e-mails on the floor of her office, which were sent by a co-worker, Janet Smith (on Ms. Smith's work e-mail account), to another employee, Tricinia Washington. In the e-mails, Ms. Smith called Ms. Jackson "Blackee," and referred to Petitioner as a "monkey and idiot." Upset by the contents of the e-mails, Petitioner timely reported the contents of the e-mails to Warden Shannon. At the conclusion of an investigation into the matter, Ms. Smith was suspended for five days. Search of Petitioner On or about May 15, 2009, Mr. McPherson observed Petitioner exiting the prison facility carrying a bulky package that he thought was suspicious. In compliance with Respondent's entry and exit procedure, Mr. McPherson notified the prison control room with the expectation that a search of Petitioner's person would occur. A search of Petitioner was subsequently conducted, which yielded no contraband or other improper items.4 During the final hearing, Warden Shannon credibly testified that because of unique problems regarding contraband at Glades C.I., facility employees are subject to search upon exit from the facility. As such, Mr. McPherson committed no violation of policy by reporting what he observed Petitioner carrying as she left the facility. Reprimand On June 24, 2009, Warden Shannon disciplined Respondent by issuing a written reprimand. Warden Shannon credibly testified——and there is no evidence to the contrary—— that the reprimand was prompted by an incident in May 2009 in which Petitioner, in a loud and aggressive voice, called a co- worker "low down and dirty" in the presence of other employees. As a result of the written reprimand, Department of Corrections Procedure 605.011 rendered Petitioner ineligible for promotion for a six-month period. Accordingly, Petitioner could not apply for an assistant warden position during the summer of 2009 that she was interested in pursuing. However, Petitioner failed to prove that the reprimand was unwarranted or issued with the intent to deprive Petitioner of a promotional opportunity. In addition, there is no evidence that Warden Shannon issued the reprimand based upon a protected characteristic of Petitioner or in retaliation for five discrimination complaints Petitioner filed through Respondent's internal complaint procedure approximately one month before the reprimand.5 Late Performance Evaluation As indicated previously, Everett McPherson served as Petitioner's immediate supervisor during her term of employment. As a classification officer supervisor, Mr. McPherson was responsible for preparing annual performance evaluations of his subordinates, including Petitioner, by the end of each April. The evidence is undisputed that Mr. McPherson failed to timely complete Petitioner's evaluation, a copy of which was not provided to her until June 2009. While Mr. McPherson attempted during his final hearing testimony to attribute the delay to Petitioner, he was unable to recall on cross- examination if he had even completed a draft of Petitioner's evaluation by April 30, 2009. Accordingly, it is determined Mr. McPherson was responsible, at least in part, for the late completion of Petitioner's evaluation.6 Although Petitioner asserts that the belated performance evaluation deprived her of the opportunity to apply for an assistant warden position, the evidence refutes this contention. First, as discussed above, Petitioner's June 24, 2009, reprimand rendered her ineligible for promotion for six months. Further, even if Petitioner's reprimand did not temporarily disqualify her from seeking a promotion, Warden Shannon credibly testified that pursuant to Department of Corrections Procedure 605.011, Petitioner could have timely submitted a promotional packet once her evaluation was completed. Training Opportunities During the final hearing, Petitioner testified that she was unable to obtain re-training to conduct criminal background checks because Mr. McPherson refused to provide her with a computer "code" necessary to complete an on-line course. Petitioner further testified that she filed a grievance regarding the matter that resulted in the training being conducted within one month. Although the undersigned credits Petitioner's testimony as to particular claim, she adduced no evidence concerning when this event occurred, nor did she prove that the delay adversely affected her ability to complete her duties or impeded her ability to seek promotion. In addition, Petitioner failed to demonstrate that Mr. McPherson was motivated by any unlawful animus. Transfer to Work Camp At some point during June 2008 or earlier, Petitioner requested a lateral transfer from the main unit at Glades C.I. to the facility's work camp. Petitioner was ultimately transferred to the work camp shortly before her termination in May 2009. Although Petitioner complains that she was not transferred to the work camp at an earlier date because of her gender, she adduced no evidence to support such an allegation. Further, Petitioner made no showing that the transfer to the work camp resulted in increased pay, benefits, or materially different responsibilities. Allegations of Religious Discrimination During all relevant times to this proceeding, Department of Corrections Procedure 602.016(4)(j)17 prohibited prison employees from bringing "recreational reading material (non-work related) such as books, magazines, newspapers, etc" into secure areas of corrections facilities. There is no dispute that "recreational reading material" encompasses religious texts and that the policy therefore barred Petitioner from brining her Gideon Bible into the facility. However, Petitioner has wholly failed to demonstrate that the policy is improper on its face or was applied differently to any other prison employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of July, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Edward T. Bauer Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 2011.
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Raymond Howard Hildebrand, Jr., telephoned A. C. "Art" Murph in response to a newspaper ad, and, on November 17, 1981, signed an agreement with Mr. Murph under which, in exchange for title to and possession of the Hildebrands' 1979 Dodge Leisure Craft, Mr. Murph agreed to make specified monthly payments to Pen Air Federal Credit Union (PAFCU) until he could sell the recreation vehicle, and to satisfy the PAFCU lien with the sale proceeds, when it was sold. Under their agreement, Mr. Murph was to retain any sale proceeds in excess of what was needed to satisfy PAFCU's lien, as a commission on the sale. Mr. Hildebrand left the recreation vehicle with respondent on November 17, 1981. When the December payment on the loan PAFCU had made to the Hildebrands, the loan respondent had undertaken to repay, was overdue, Mr. Hildebrand got a notice to that effect. He got a similar notice in January. Respondent made these payments belatedly. On December 10, 1981, respondent sold the Hildebrands' vehicle to a third party who at that time paid respondent, in full, a price that exceeded the amount owed PAFCU by almost $2,000. Mr. Hildebrand happened to see the motor home parked at a neighbor's house on January 25, 1982, and, on inquiring, learned of the preceding month's sale. In a conversation with respondent on January 27, 1982, he was told everything would be straightened out in 10 to 14 days. Respondent told him somebody else had written respondent a bad check so that he needed the proceeds of the sale of the Hildebrands' motor home for some other purpose. Only after the Hildebrands engaged counsel and incurred legal fees did respondent pay PAFCU what was owed, more than a year later. It took that long for the new owner to receive title, as well. Sylvia Galloway's parents placed a motor home with respondent on consignment last May, and respondent sold it in June of 1982. Also in June, Ms. Galloway's parents received a check representing their agreed share of the sale proceeds. Only several months later, however, did the financing institution receive the moneys owed it, and it was Christmas before the new owners got title.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to institute judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr. Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Art Murph and Art's Motor Homes 6813 Pine Forest Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Curtis Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed as untimely pursuant to Section 760.11, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination dated June 2, 1998, alleges that Respondent discriminated against him because of his age and in retaliation for opposing illegal behavior. FCHR received the Charge of Discrimination on June 18, 1998. For purposes of this Recommended Order of Dismissal, it is assumed that the Charge of Discrimination was timely filed with FCHR. As of December 15, 1998, 180 days after Petitioner filed his Charge of Discrimination, FCHR had not assigned an investigator to investigate Petitioner's complaint or taken any other action related to the complaint. As of January 19, 1999, 35 days after December 15, 1998, Petitioner had not requested an administrative hearing. By letter dated June 2, 1999, Petitioner requested FCHR to forward his complaint to the Division of Administrative Hearings. FCHR received the request for an administrative hearing on June 7, 1999. This request was filed 354 days after June 18, 1998, 174 days after December 15, 1998, and 139 days after January 19, 1999. Petitioner does not argue or present any facts to support a finding that the doctrines of equitable tolling or excusable neglect apply in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue The issue is whether the Respondent discriminated unlawfully against the Petitioner by discharging him because of a handicap contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and, if so, the nature and extent of financial loss suffered by the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Shannon M. Spence, was employed from March 1993 until May 1, 1993 by the Respondent. The Respondent is an employer as defined by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner, who earned on average $125/week, was employed by the Respondent as a bouncer and "bar backer", a person who assisted the bartender. On or about April 29, 1993, the Petitioner suffered an on the job injury which was duly reported to the employer and for which the Petitioner was treated at a local hospital pursuant to arrangements made by the employer. The Petitioner's injury was determined to be a right inguinal hernia, and the Petitioner was cautioned against lifting more than 25 pounds and standing for long periods of time. The Petitioner reported for work the following day, and communicated to his supervisor his inability to lift and to stand for long periods of time. His supervisor, Jess Wall or J.W., placed the Petitioner on security detail for the parking lot and entrance. There were additional light duties available for security personnel within the employer's business in which the employee could have been placed. The Petitioner's employment was terminated later that evening. The testimony is conflicting regarding whether the Petitioner was discharged because he was dating another employee, or because he was injured, or quit in sympathy with Jess Wall, who was also terminated on that evening. The most credible evidence is that the Petitioner was discharged because of his injury, but was told it was because he was dating another employee. The prohibition against dating was a new rule, it was applied against the Petitioner without any prior warning, the female employee was not discharged, and the Petitioner was the only person discharged for this activity although there were others who dated employees. The alternative theory that Petitioner quit in sympathy with the head bouncer, Mr. Wall, is specifically rejected for lack of credibility of the various witnesses. The Petitioner subsequently settled his workman's compensation claim arising from this injury with the Respondent for $15,000. No details were received regarding the allocation of moneys for medical and wages. The Petitioner is entitled to back wages from his discharge until the hearing on April 27, 1995, less any mitigation, including any portion of the settlement of his workman's compensation claim attributable to lost wages, occurring after surgical repair of the hernia when the Petitioner was reemployed. The Petitioner is entitled to reasonable costs and attorneys fees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission find that the Petitioner was unlawfully discriminated against by the Respondent, and that the Respondent be ordered to pay the Petitioner his lost wages from May 1, 1993 until April 27, 1995 less any amounts the Petitioner earned during this period and any amounts included in the workman's compensation settlement specifically provided for wages; that the Commission retain jurisdiction for the award of damages and attorney's fees and costs; and the Commission remand the matter for a determination of the attorney's fees and costs and to permit the Respondent to present any evidence in mitigation of its damages. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1995. APPENDIX The parties filed proposed findings which were read and considered. The following states which of their findings were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraph 1,2 Subsumed in Paragraph 1 and 2. Paragraph 3-5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 3-5. Paragraph 6-8 Subsumed in Paragraphs 6-9. Paragraph 9 Subsumed in 3 and 11. Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraphs 1-3 Paragraph 4 Rejected because the date was April 29, 1993. Paragraph 5 Subsumed in Paragraphs 4,5. Paragraph 6,7 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraph 8,9 Subsumed in Paragraphs 10,11. COPIES FURNISHED: James P. Tarquin, Esquire Michael B. Staley, Esquire P.O. Box 906190 Ocala, FL 34478 John Daley, Esquire 201 E. Pine Street 15th Floor Orlando, FL 32801 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
The Issue The issue is whether the contractor's license of Respondent, Robert L. Fountain, Jr., (Fountain) should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Robert L. Fountain, Jr., is a certified building contractor in the State of Florida, license no. CB C022113. On or about May 22, 1987, Fountain contracted with Joseph L. Webster for the construction of a custom home for a price of $206,469.00. Webster paid Fountain a deposit of $20,646. Webster was denied financing for the construction of the home. Even though Fountain maintains that financing was available, he presented no credible evidence in this regard to rebut the testimony of Webster. Webster requested that the deposit be returned to him. Fountain refused to refund the deposit. Fountain maintains that he does not have to repay the deposit because it represents compensation for the time he spent on the project before and after the contract was signed and for the profit he would have received on the job. Except for receipts totaling $1,553.70, Fountain has no documentation to establish the amount of time allegedly spent, the expenses incurred or the value of the time spent on the Webster project. Financing was never secured and construction never commenced. Because of Fountain's refusal to refund the deposit, Webster sued Fountain for the money. A Final Judgment was entered in Case No. 89-46, in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit for Leon County, Florida, on January 31, 1991. The Final Judgment found for Webster and ordered Fountain to pay Webster $20,646.90, plus interest of 12% from January 4, 1988, in the amount of $7,622.70, and costs of $327.50. Fountain has not satisfied that judgment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a Final Order and therein: Find Robert L. Fountain, Jr., guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(m) by committing misconduct in the practice of contracting. Impose a fine of $1,000. Suspend the license of Robert L. Fountain, Jr., until the damage suffered by Joseph L. Webster, Sr., as reflected by the Circuit Court's Final Judgment, has been relieved. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-6655 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-6(1-6). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Robert L. Fountain, Jr. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 2-4(1&2). Proposed finding of fact 1 is unnecessary. Proposed finding of fact 5 is unsupported by the competent and substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: G. W. Harrell, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert L. Fountain, Jr. 2124 Shady Oaks Drive Tallahassee, FL 32303 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Daniel O'Brien Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202
The Issue Whether Respondent, McDonald's Corporation, discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Hadley, in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2000).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American female who worked at the Cocoa Beach, Florida, McDonald's restaurant from October 1, 2000, until March 17, 2001. She voluntarily terminated her employment. Respondent owns and operates restaurants and is subject to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes (2000). Respondent has an extensive, well-conceived, "Zero Tolerance" policy which prohibits unlawful discrimination. This policy is posted in the workplace, is distributed to every employee at the time he or she is employed, and is vigorously enforced by management. There are published procedures which can be easily followed by an employee who believes that he or she has been the victim of unlawful discrimination. Petitioner did not avail herself of Respondent's "Zero Tolerance" policy. Petitioner complains of two isolated instances of what the evidence clearly shows to be workplace "horseplay" as the basis of her unlawful employment discrimination claim. On one occasion, a shift manager placed a promotional sticker on Petitioner's forehead. The second involved ice cream being placed on Petitioner's face. The evidence reveals that the "horseplay" complained of was typical of this workplace and not race or sex based. Practical jokes, food fights, ice down shirt backs, and similar activities, while not encouraged by corporate management, were a part of the routine at this restaurant. Petitioner was not the singular focus of the "horseplay"; it involved all employees. There is no evidentiary basis for alleging that it was racial or sexual in nature, as it involved employees of differing races and sexes. Approximately a month after the latest of the incidents complained of, on March 17, 2001, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment. Six months later, in September, 2001, Petitioner complained to Dexter Lewis, an African-American corporate employee who is responsible for investigating claims of unlawful workplace discrimination, about the two incidents. She claimed that she had been embarrassed by the incidents but did not suggest to him that they had been racially or sexually motivated. Mr. Lewis investigated the alleged incidents; he confirmed that the incidents had occurred and that similar incidents were widespread, but not racially or sexually motivated; he reprimanded the store manager and shift manager for their unprofessional management.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Carolyn Hadley 135 Minna Lane Merritt Island, Florida 32953 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cynthia Brennan Ryan, Esquire Holland & Knight, LLP Post Office Box 1526 Orlando, Florida 32802-1526 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the bid response of the Petitioner and/or the bid response of General Maintenance Corporation of Northwest Florida, Inc., was responsive to Invitation to Bid No. 88/89-027?
Findings Of Fact The Department issued Invitation to Bid No. DGS 88/89-027, titled "Exterior Repairs & Painting/Elliot Building/Tallahassee, Fl." (hereinafter referred to as the on September 9, 1988. No challenge to the specifications contained in the ITB was filed. Bids in response to the ITB were filed by the Petitioner, Professional Painting Services, Inc., and by General Maintenance Corporation of Northwest Florida, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "General"), and others. When a bid response is received by the Department it stamps the time and date of receipt on the bid response. The time and date are used to determine whether a bid has been filed within the time specified in an invitation to bid. The time that a bid response is opened does not determine whether the bid response was filed within the time specified in an Invitation to bid. The bid responses in this case were to be opened at 2:00 p.m., October 26, 1988. Therefore, bid responses were required to be received by the Department before that time. The bid responses of the Petitioner and General were received by the Department before 2:00 p.m., October 26, 1988. The envelope in which the bid response filed by General was filed identified the Department and the Department's address, the title of the bid, the date the bid responses were to be opened and the time of the opening. The number of the ITB was not included on the envelope in which General's bid response was filed. Bid responses are generally filed by the Department by bid number, title and date. The bid responses to the ITB were filed in this manner. The Department does not consider the failure to include the number of a bid on a bid response to affect the responsiveness of the bid response. The bid response of General was misfiled by the Department. 11 The bid responses were opened by the Department on October 26, 1988, at 2:00 p.m. The bid response of General was not opened, however, because the Department had misfiled General's bid response. General's bid response was discovered later in the day on October 26, 1988. It was then opened by the Department. The Petitioner was notified by telephone that General's bid response had been misfiled and that it had been opened after the Department discovered its mistake. The winner of the bid on the ITB was not determined at the time when the bid responses were opened. The bid responses were evaluated first to determine who the winner was. The failure of the Department to open General's bid at 2:00 p.m. did not have any affect on the price bid by General. General was not able to modify or supplement its bid response as a result of the Department's error. Based upon the Department's evaluation of the bid responses it received on the ITB, the Department rejected the Petitioner's response as nonresponsive. The Petitioner's response was determined to be nonresponsive because the Petitioner had not submitted proof of automobile insurance as required by the ITB. Bidders were informed that General was the intended awardee of the ITB on November 2, 1988, by posting of a bid tabulation sheet. The ITB provided the following with regard to certain information to be provided concerning insurance (hereinafter referred to as the "Insurance Requirements"): NOTE BIDDER MUST SUBMIT WITH BID PACKAGE EVIDENCE OF THE FOLLOWING INSURANCE IN EFFECT, EQUAL TO OR EXCEEDING THE LIMITS REQUIRED BY THE BIDDING DOCUMENTS. PROOF OF INSURANCE TO BE ON STANDARD ACCORD FORM, AND IN THE CANCELLATION CLAUSE THE WORD ENDEAVOR MUST BE CHANGED TO SHALL: WORKER'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE CONTRACTOR'S COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGES, BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE $300,000.00 Each Occurrence, Combined Single Limit AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY COVERAGES, BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE $100,000.00 Each Occurrence Combined Single Limit PLEASE READY [sic] CAREFULLY AND MAKE SURE TO COMPLY WITH ALL THE INSURANCE REQUIREMENTS OF BID DOCUMENTS. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THESE BID REQUIREMENTS WILL BE CAUSE FOR REJECTION OF YOUR BID. The Petitioner's bid response did not include proof of automobile insurance as specified in the Insurance Requirements. Subsequent to the date the bid was awarded, the Petitioner has attempted to provide proof of automobile insurance as specified in the Insurance Requirements. The information provided from the Petitioner indicates that insurance coverage was effective beginning on November 21, 1988, after the bid was awarded. The Petitioner has not provided proof that insurance in compliance with the Insurance Requirement was in effect as of time bid responses were due. The Department has rejected bid responses in other cases where bid responses did not comply with insurance requirements similar to the Insurance Requirements. Failing to provide proof of required insurance can affect the price of a bid and can give one bidder an advantage not enjoyed by other bidders. For example, a bidder that does not have insurance can wait until the bid responses are opened and, if the bidder does not want its bid accepted, for whatever reason, the bidder can refuse to acquire the required insurance. Or, if a bidder determines that it should go forward with its bid response, it can provide proof of insurance or even acquire the insurance. The Department will not be able to verify when insurance was required with an independent source. The ITB included an information questionnaire. Among other things not relevant to this proceeding, the information questionnaire requested the number of each bidder's current county occupational license number. The ITB did not require that a bidder have a current Leon County occupational license even though the job was to be performed in Leon County. General did not include its current county occupational license on the information questionnaire submitted with its bid response. The Department determined that General had a current county occupational license at the time it submitted its bid response by contacting the Okaloosa County Tax Collector's Office. The Department considers the failure to list a current county occupational license number to be a minor irregularity because the Department can verify whether a bidder has a county occupational license by checking with a Tax Collector's Office, a public entity. The Department has not rejected other bid responses for omission of a current county occupational license number. The ITB also required that the bid price submitted by any bidder was to be guaranteed for a period of sixty days. The ITB allowed the winning contractor forty-five days after the date stipulated in the purchase order to complete the contract. No credit was authorized by the ITB for bidders who indicated they would complete the contract in less than forty-five days. The Petitioner's bid response was not responsive to the ITB. General's bid response was responsive to the ITB. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction of the parties to and the subject matter of this proceeding. Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes (1987). Based upon the terms of the ITB involved in this proceeding, the Petitioner's bid response was not responsive. The ITB specifically requires that bid responses include evidence that the Insurance Requirements have been met. Bidders are warned that "[f]ailure to comply with [the insurance requirements] will be cause for rejection of your bid. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 13A- 1.006, Florida Administrative Code, provide the manner in which bid specifications may be challenged. The Petitioner has provided no evidence that it challenged the bid specifications quoted in finding of fact 18. The Petitioner has, therefore, waived any right it may have had to challenge the Insurance Requirements. Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes; and Capeletti Bros., Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 499 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). The Petitioner's failure to comply with the Insurance Requirements by the very terms of the ITB require that the Petitioner's bid response be rejected. Subsequent to the proposed award of a contract pursuant to the ITB, the Petitioner attempted to comply with the Insurance Requirements by providing additional information. Rule 13A- 1.001(13), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following definition of a "valid bid/proposal": A responsive offer in full compliance with the invitation to bid . . . by a responsible person or firm. The responsiveness of a bid . . . shall be determined based on the documents submitted with the bid . . . In order for the Petitioner's bid response to be considered a valid bid pursuant to Rule 13A-1.001(13), Florida Administrative Code, the response was required to be "in full compliance with the invitation to bid" based upon the "documents submitted with the bid." Since the Petitioner's bid response was not in full compliance with the ITB based upon the documents it submitted with its bid response, the Petitioner's bid response was not a valid bid. Because the determination of whether a bid response is valid is based upon documentation provided at the time a bid response is tiled, the Petitioner's bid response cannot be made a valid bid by filing required documentation after the deadline for filing bid responses. This conclusion is consistent with Rule 13A- 1.002(11), Florida Administrative Code, which specifically prohibits the modification of a bid response once bid responses have been opened. The rationale for not allowing modifications of bid responses was explained in Harry Pepper & Associates, Inc. v. City of Cape Coral, 352 So. 2d 1190, 1192 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978): [I]t is apparent that the entire scheme of bidding on public projects is to insure the sanctity of the competitive atmosphere prior to and after the actual letting of the contract. In order to insure this desired competitiveness, a bidder cannot be permitted to change his bid after the bids have been opened, except to cure minor irregularities. See also, Saxon Business Products, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 4 FALR 1102-A (1982); Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply, Inc. v. Department of General Services, DOAH Case No. 88- 2211BID (June 28, 1988); and Tel Plus Florida, Inc. v. Department of General Services, DOAH Case No. 86-4701BID (May 6, 1987). The Petitioner's failure to meet the Insurance Requirements is not a minor irregularity which can be cured after the bid responses were opened. Nor is the Petitioner's failure to comply an irregularity which can be waived by the Department. Rule 13A-1.002(10), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following with regard to minor irregularities: The agency shall reserve the right to waive any minor irregularities in an otherwise valid bid . . . . A minor irregularity is a variation from the invitation to bid . . . which does not affect the price of the bid . . . or give the bidder or offeror an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders or offerors, or does not adversely impact the interests of the agency. Variations which are not minor cannot be waived. The court in Harry Pepper & Associates, discussed the waiver of minor irregularities: The test for measuring whether a deviation in a bid is sufficiently material to destroy its competitive character is whether the variation affects the amount of the bid by giving the bidder an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. 352 So. 2d at 1193. The Petitioner's failure to meet the Insurance Requirements in this case is not a minor irregularity. The Petitioner's failure to meet the Insurance Requirements conceivably could have given it an unfair bidding advantage. If a bidder does not submit proof of insurance as required by an invitation to bid and is allowed to provide such proof after the bids are open, the bidder can decline to do so if the bidder determines that his or its bid is too low based upon the bids submitted by other bidders. Additionally, if a bidder decides to proceed with a bid, proof of insurance could then be provided or even obtained and the Department would not be able to verify with an independent source that the bidder had the insurance at the time bid responses were submitted. These possible situations would give a bidder an unfair competitive advantage. Although the Petitioner has not attempted to obtain such an advantage in this case, the potential for such an abuse was present when the aids were open. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner's failure to comply with the Insurance Requirements is not a minor irregularity. The Department cannot, therefore, waive the irregularity or allow the Petitioner to now supplement its bid response by providing proof that it meets the Insurance Requirements. Finally, even if the Petitioner's failure to meet the Insurance Requirements was a minor irregularity which could be corrected, the Petitioner has failed to meet its burden of proving at the formal hearing that it meets the Insurance Requirements. The failure of General to provide its county occupational license number does not render General's bid response nonresponsive. General's failure is a minor irregularity which can be waived by the Department. Unlike the Insurance Requirements, the Department can verify the existence of a County occupational license with a public entity, a tax collector's office. Bidder's are not able to obtain an occupational license after bid responses are open. Therefore, bidders who fail to provide a county occupational license number with their bid responses cannot gain a competitive advantage. While General may have a problem with Leon County because it may not have a Leon County occupational license, General's bid response was responsive to the ITB. Finally, the failure to open General's bid response at the same time other bids were opened should not affect General's right to an award of the contract for the ITB. Although General did not Include the number of the ITB on the envelope in which it submitted its bid response, it included sufficient information on the envelope for the Department to determine that the response was filed on the ITB at issue in this proceeding. The error in filing General's bid response was therefore the responsibility of the Department. General should not be disqualified for the Department's error. More importantly, the failure to open General's bid response when the other bid responses were opened did not give General any advantage over the other bidders. Therefore General's failure is a minor irregularity. Based upon the foregoing, it is concluded that the Petitioner's bid response was not response to the ITB and was properly rejected by the Department. It is also concluded that the Petitioner has failed to prove that the bid response of General should be rejected.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered dismissing the formal protest filed by the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1989. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioner failed to number the paragraph's of his proposed recommended order as instructed at the formal hearing. The "Proposed Finding of Fact Numbers" of the Petitioner referred to below correspond generally with the order in which each paragraph of the Petitioner's proposed recommended order appear. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Page 1 1 See 7-9. See 23-24. The portion of this paragraph dealing with Leon County requirements is not relevant to this proceeding. Argument and quotation of testimony. 4 See 18-22. Page 2 1-2 Argument and quotation of testimony. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Argument and quotation of testimony. Page 3 Continues with quotation of testimony. 1-2 Argument. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 1. 2 18. 3 23. 4 27. 5 28. 6 11. 7 10-11. 8 6. 9 4. 10 13. 11 14. 12 8. 13 7. 14 15. 15 9. 16 15. 17 19. 18 16. 19 17. 20-22 20. 23-24 23. 25 24-25. 26 25-26. 27-28 26. 29 21. 30 2. 31-32 22. 33 29. 34 30. COPIES 35 FURNISHED TO: Not relevant to this proceeding. RONALD W. THOMAS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES 133 LARSON BUILDING 200 EAST GAINES STREET TALLAHASSEE, FL 32399-0955 JOHN A. TENNANT, PRESIDENT PROFESSIONAL SERVICES, INC. POST OFFICE BOX 20803 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32316 ROBERT D. STINSON, ESQUIRE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL SERVICES ROOM 452, LARSON BUILDING 200 EAST GAINES STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0955
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a payroll clerk with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Prior to November 1994, Petitioner was employed by Markings and Equipment Corporation, first as a receptionist, later as a payroll clerk for several years. She had a good working relationship with management and staff. In November 1994, Edward T. Quinn and two other investors purchased the assets of Markings and Equipment Co. and established a new corporation named Mill-it Striping, Inc., a Florida corporation. On November 7, 1994, Mill-It Striping began operations. Edward T. Quinn was named Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer. Petitioner and one other person were retained as office staff. Other employees of the former owner were retained as field workers in their same positions. Petitioner and the other employees were retained on a 90-day probationary period. All employees were required to complete application forms for the new company. The organization of the company was revamped and operating policies were changed. Petitioner and Quinn became embroiled in disputes over policy and procedures on a nearly daily basis. Quinn's management style was gruff and unprofessional. Foul language was directed toward Petitioner's work by Quinn on a regular basis. There was insufficient evidence to prove that Quinn's derogatory remarks of a social nature were directed toward Petitioner. On December 5, 1994, Petitioner was terminated from her position as a payroll clerk. Quinn alleged that Petitioner was terminated because of her poor work performance and reporting to work late on more than one occasion while on probation. Petitioner, who is an African-American female, was replaced in her position by a Caucasian female. Respondent's company presently has been administratively dissolved, as of September 24, 1999. There is no evidence that the corporation is active, is a subsidiary to another company, or that it has any remaining assets.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Acting Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Edward T. Quinn as former Vice President Mill-It Stripping, Inc. 107 Shore Drive Longwood, Florida 32779 Valerie A. Roberts Post Office Box 543 Maitland, Florida 32751 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his age.
Findings Of Fact Currently, Petitioner is a retired, 68-year-old male. He retired from Respondent at the age of 66. Petitioner began his employment with Respondent as a truck driver. The position of truck driver, involves many long hours of driving (sometimes over 56 hours) various interstate and intrastate truck routes, along with some lifting and exposure to diesel fumes. Petitioner attributed a variety of illnesses and health problems to his work as a truck driver. Some of the illnesses and health problems are hypertension and heart blockage and failure, which resulted in the implantation of a pacemaker, carpal tunnel syndrome, polyneuropathy, muscular and autonomic system problems and pathological hyper-insomnia. Petitioner offered no evidence that any of these conditions resulted from his employment with Respondent. Prior to September 9 or 10, 2000, at the age of 64, Petitioner was hospitalized for heart problems. Around September 9 or 10, 2000, Petitioner was released from the hospital. Upon his return to work, he gave his employer a physician’s note indicating that his work duties be limited to 40 hours a week. Petitioner met with Respondent’s transportation manager regarding whether less lengthy routes were available or whether his schedule or work duties could be adjusted. The employer did not have the ability to adjust the length of the routes, but added a second driver to ride and help with the driving on any route that Petitioner drove. Petitioner inquired about office work and was told that if he was interested in such work he needed to apply at the main office to see what was available. In part, because Petitioner liked driving and in part because the lesser number of hours involved in office work would cause Petitioner to earn less, Petitioner elected not to pursue and did not apply for such office work. No adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner, and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. At some point during this meeting, Petitioner alleges that the transportation manager said, “Why don’t you just retire.” Petitioner offered no specific context for this statement other than it was a general conversation about his health and closeness to retirement age relative to the adjustments that could be made to his driving duties. One isolated statement such as the one above does not demonstrate any intent to discriminate on Respondent’s part based on Petitioner’s age, especially since no adverse employment action was taken against Petitioner and Petitioner continued to work for Respondent. Around January 1, 2001, for medical reasons, Respondent approved a Leave of Absence with pay for Petitioner. In June or July, 2002, Petitioner filed his first workers compensation claim with Respondent. Petitioner’s claim was turned over to Respondent’s workers' compensation insurer, Kemper Insurance Company. Petitioner did not offer any evidence that Kemper was under the direction or control of Respondent in any decisions Kemper made regarding paying or litigating Petitioner’s claim. In any event, Petitioner’s claim was contested. The main reason the claim was contested was that Kemper alleged that Petitioner’s “injuries” were not work-related. Over the years, Petitioner has amended his claim to include, among other health claims, the health problems listed above. Kemper has maintained its defense. During a mediation session on December 11, 2002, at which the employer was not present and in response to an inquiry regarding Kemper’s defense, Kemper’s representative stated that except for the carpal tunnel claim, all of Petitioner’s medical conditions were due to the natural aging process. Petitioner claims this statement demonstrates an intent on his employer’s part to discriminate against him based on his age. Such an isolated statement does not demonstrate such an intent especially since such conditions can be age related, there was no expert medical evidence demonstrating the cause of Petitioner’s health problems, the statement did not come from the employer, and there was no evidence that the insurer was under the direction or control of the employer regarding decisions to litigate or the factual basis for the defenses that the insurer would raise. The workers' compensation litigation continues to date. In the interim, Petitioner remained on a leave of absence with pay until January 1, 2003. He retired thereafter. There was no evidence that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner or that Petitioner suffered any adverse employment action based on his age. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relation 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Glynda Copeland Qualified Representative Tree of Life, Inc. Post Office Box 410 St. Augustine, Florida 32095-0410 Robert C. Johnson 560 Florida Club Boulevard, Suite 112 St. Augustine, Florida 32084
