The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact In March of 1983, Ms. Yvonne LeBerg purchased a green 1972 Pontiac Catalina from respondent MPG Economy Motors (MPG), after a conversation with respondent Leland A. Taylor. She told him she wanted to give her daughter and her family a car, and that her son-in-law could fix any minor problems. Mr. Taylor told her that the 1972 Pontiac (the car) had a hole in the trunk from rust; and there was some talk of "oil in the bottom"; but he assured her that the car was in "good running condition." Ms. Cardinale Williams, a friend of Ms. LeBerg who overheard discussions between Mr. Taylor and Ms. LeBerg, remembers Mr. Taylor's presentation that the car was in good running condition. Ms. LeBerg decided to buy the car, made a deposit against the purchase price, and left with Ms. Williams. Wallace Carter, who is married to Ms. LeBerg's daughter Suzanne, picked the car up and closed the transaction on March 12, 1983. Neither he nor Ms. LeBerg drove the car beforehand, although he did start the engine and suggest a test drive. Mr. Taylor said he wanted to get home to supper. As far as the evidence shows, Mr. Carter was aware at the time that the rear view mirror had come unattached and needed regluing. At no time did Mr. Taylor or anybody else disclaim any warranty in writing or otherwise. Boy scouts were in the car on an outing and Mrs. Suzanne Carter was driving, when the car caught fire; smoke billowed and everyone escaped unharmed. The fire is thought to have been caused by some electrical problem. The headlights have not worked since, and the car has hardly been driven since. About three months later, the Carters asked Mr. Wayne Sturdivant a "service advisor" at the local Pontiac dealer, to make a visual inspection of the car and estimate the cost of repair. The exhaust system needed replacement. A power steering hose leaked fluid, as did the transmission, which required a new front pump seal. Valve cover gaskets needed replacement. In addition, the air conditioning compressor was out, and, of course, the headlights did not work. According to Mr. Sturdivant's uncontroverted testimony, only the power steering and exhaust problems were serious enough to affect safety. The record does not establish the reasonable cost of repairs necessary to put the car in good running condition. The Carters brought their problems with the car to Mr. Taylor'S attention. They also complained of poor gas mileage and cracks at the edge of the windowshield that Mr. Carter uncovered when he removed some chrome trim. At one time Mr. Taylor offered to take the car back on consignment, do some repairs, and make the Carters whole (except for registration fees) if it could be sold for $100.00 more than Ms. LeBerg paid for it, and if Ms. LeBerg would withdraw her complaint. Negotiations faltered, however, and were eventually broken off, with Mr. Taylor declining to effect any repairs or rescind the sale. THE IMPALA The day the car she then had threw a rod, Ms. Barbara J. Blinz Wilson left it at the MPG lot, with Mr. Taylor's permission. On May 24, 1983, she bought a 1963 Chevrolet Impala from MPG, after a friend had looked the car over for her, and after a test drive. The sale documents include a form warranty disclaimer signed by Ms. Wilson and her daughter, which states: AS IS THIS USED MOTOR VEHICLE IS SOLD AS IS WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED. THE BUYER WILL BEAR THE ENTIRE EXPENSE OF REPAIRING OR CORRECTING ANY DEFECTS THAT MAY PRESENTLY EXIST OR THAT MAY OCCUR IN THE VEHICLE. THE DEALER (SELLER) SHALL NOT HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES. DAMAGES TO PROPERTY, DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF USE, LOSS OF TIME, LOSS OF PROFITS, OR INCOME OR ANY INCIDENTAL DAMAGES WITH RESPECT TO ANY DEFE [sic] OR MALFUNCTION OR UNFITNESS OR OTHER DEFICIENCY OF THIS VEHICLE. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Ms. Wilson understood that she was buying the Chevrolet as is. Mr. Taylor did not know that such forms existed at the time he sold Ms. LeBerg the Pontiac. Three weeks after she purchased the car, Ms. Wilson spent $31 for a radiator repair, and a water hose sprung a leak the day before the hearing. She still used the car daily. Her principal complaint was that, until it was removed, the headliner tended to fall from the ceiling in swatches, obstructing her view.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Leland A. Taylor 828 Michigan Avenue Pensacola, Florida 32505 William P. White, Jr. Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue Whether Respondent's working conditions or termination of Petitioner as its employee on July 12, 1996, constitutes unlawful employment practices based on Petitioner's race (African-American)?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black male.2 Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination before the Florida Commission on Human Relations is not before the undersigned because it was not included in the referral package nor admitted in evidence. The Petition for Relief vaguely alleged "harassment" and clearly asserted termination on the basis of race - "Black." 3 Petitioner was employed by Respondent in its Quincy, Florida, furniture manufacturing plant from January 25, 1983, to July 12, 1996, when he was terminated. Most, but not all, of Respondent's employees are Black. Petitioner was replaced by another Black male, William Baker. The decision to terminate Petitioner, as well as the decision to promote Mr. Baker into the position vacated by Petitioner, was made by Hershel Shepard, plant manager. Mr. Shepard, who died before the evidentiary hearing, was white. The plant manager is the highest-ranking person in the factory. Petitioner was initially hired in 1983 as a double- ended tendon (D.E.T.) machine operator. A D.E.T. machine is a wood-working machine which cuts off two opposite ends of a board at the same time. It requires pre-setting, and it throws out debris and sawdust which is hazardous to employees' eyes. The factory also utilizes other types of wood-working equipment, all of which throw out debris and sawdust which are hazardous to employees' eyes. On January 25, 1983, his hiring date, Petitioner received written safety rules requiring him to wear safety glasses at all times. On May 1, 1986, he signed for an updated set of similar rules. In 1988, Petitioner was promoted to D.E.T. "lead hand," with two or three employees subordinate to him. Petitioner was uniquely valuable to Respondent because he was the only person in the factory who knew how to adjust the D.E.T. machine. That is, he was the only person who knew how to set it up to do specific tasks. However, other employees could run the D.E.T. machine after Petitioner had, in essence, "programmed" it. In 1991, Petitioner hurt his back and was required by his orthopedic physician to wear a back support belt when lifting. He did not go out on workers' compensation leave/pay, but continued to report for work and was given time off to go to therapy. At some point, Petitioner and Mr. Shepard had a dispute about how the belt was supposed to be worn, and Mr. Shepard threatened to "write-up" Petitioner. There is no evidence that Petitioner was, in fact, "written-up" for this. On May 5, 1991, after his back injury, Petitioner was evaluated by Mr. Shepard to the following effect: that he could do the job, but perhaps not as fast as it should be done; that he had a problem keeping his machines running and coordinating loads; that he did "okay" on instructions, but that he had lost his initiative to get the job done and to take an interest in new products; and that he needed to improve his work habits. Mark Maxwell, a white male, supervised Petitioner for two to three months immediately prior to Petitioner's next promotion in 1993. Mr. Maxwell could not get Petitioner to produce the furniture parts from the D.E.T. machine when they were needed. According to Mr. Maxwell, Petitioner's cooperation and/or output fluctuated. Sometimes, Mr. Maxwell ordered Petitioner to run certain parts and the parts were not run. On one occasion, he had ordered Petitioner to run drawer fronts, and Petitioner set up to do another type of piece. Nonetheless, Petitioner was promoted to D.E.T. supervisor in approximately 1993. As such, Petitioner regularly supervised four employees. Mr. Shepard may or may not have had input as to Petitioner's first promotion in 1988, but it was solely his decision to promote Petitioner in 1993. Petitioner was promoted at that time, despite the unfavorable aspects in his employment record. Petitioner continued to have disciplinary problems with management after his 1993 promotion. On October 2, 1995, Mr. Maxwell, by then a middle- manager, wrote-up Petitioner because, knowing a particular type of pine chest of drawers was to go on the assembly line the next day, Petitioner allowed his crew to go home at the regular quitting time of 4:00 p.m., showing very little regard or devotion to Respondent employer. Employees often were required to work overtime on short notice in order to set up for the next day. Petitioner's failure to have the furniture parts ready from the D.E.T. machine the night before would cause several employees to stand around, drawing pay, with no assembly line work to do the next morning. Mr. Maxwell, who personally has worked overtime on short notice, considered working overtime on short notice to be part of the furniture-making business, and he expected that commitment from all Respondent's employees, including Petitioner and Petitioner's subordinates. Mr. Sheperd approved the write-up. Sometime in 1995, Petitioner was suspended without pay for three days as the result of damaging a bookcase and not repairing it. Petitioner contended at hearing that he had repaired the bookcase's top. At hearing, Petitioner acknowledged receiving two written warnings concerning his repeated failure to wear safety glasses on the job. One warning was undated. The other was dated March 25, 1996, and signed by Mr. Shepard. It specified that Petitioner had previously been warned in writing on September 18, 1995, October 2-3, 1995, and November 17, 1995, and that Mr. Shepard had warned Petitioner orally on each of the six consecutive days immediately preceding the March 25, 1996, written warning. At hearing, Petitioner did not refute the accuracy of the March 25, 1996, warning or claim its content was untrue. He also acknowledged that he was supposed to wear safety glasses at all times on the job and that as D.E.T. supervisor, he was supposed to be an example to his subordinates. Petitioner claimed to have seen white employees not wearing safety glasses, but there was no corroborative evidence that this was so. Petitioner also claimed that white employees who did not wear safety glasses were never written-up, but there was no corroborative evidence that this was so or any explanation of how Petitioner would know if any other employee had been warned or written-up for any reason, including but not limited to wearing safety glasses. In 1996, Petitioner's job as D.E.T. supervisor was basically to report to work, receive a list specifying the furniture parts (such as drawers or front rails) which he was to "run" on his machine(s), and run/create those listed parts. Sometimes, Petitioner disagreed with the order of parts as listed by his supervisors because, in his opinion, the list could have been better organized to ensure maximum efficiency at subsequent points on the furniture assembly line. Petitioner blamed the list and felt he was unfairly blamed by his supervisors when assemblers ran out of all parts they needed or they ran out of Part A pieces before they ran out of Part B pieces. Other recurring job problems from Petitioner's point of view were that the night crew broke his machine and/or would not set-up so that he could immediately start work when he came on the premises with the day crew each morning and that his FT01 machine was old and its settings would slide, making mistakes on cutting or forming wooden furniture parts out of round or in slightly flawed lengths and shapes. Mr. Maxwell confirmed only that some machines were old and that sometimes it was hard to get parts for the machines. He reiterated that Petitioner's conduct and output fluctuated. Management viewed it as Petitioner's job duty to run the correct furniture parts to the correct specifications, in the correct order, so that the correct size and shape of the correct type of part arrived at the next stage of the assembly line in sufficient quantities, at the right time, without delay. According to Petitioner, his troubles with Mr. Shepard began on an unspecified date when Petitioner had been ordered to run some impounds. Because he was short-handed due to two absentees, Petitioner requested help, and the machine room foreman promised to send Petitioner two helpers as soon as he could. Mr. Shepard saw that Petitioner was not working and demanded to know why Petitioner was not running the impounds. Petitioner explained that he was waiting for two more laborers. Then Mr. Shepard demanded, "Bubba, why you not running the machine?" Petitioner replied, "Herschel, you know, I would appreciate it if you wouldn't call me Bubba. My name is Lonnie." Mr. Shepard walked off without a word. Petitioner contended that thereafter, Mr. Shepard "harassed" him; however, Petitioner conceded that Mr. Shepard never again addressed him as "Bubba."4 Petitioner was terminated with abusive and profane language by Mr. Shepard on July 12, 1996. Mr. Shepard stated on Petitioner's termination papers that Petitioner had cut an entire run of bases one inch shorter than the 22-3/8 inches they were supposed to have been cut and that there was no more rough lumber in the plant with which to run more bases. In testimony, Petitioner stated that he believed he had correctly set his machine to cut the bases the correct length and that he had run about 200 bases correctly and someone else ran 900 incorrectly. However, he could not "remember whether I had run just enough to get them started that morning or someone else ran the load." He conjectured that the night shift might have run the incorrect bases, but he could not remember either way whether there had been, or had not been, a night shift in 1996. Petitioner also believed there had been available enough rough lumber to run a new load. Mr. Maxwell acknowledged the possibility that someone other than Petitioner could have run the useless bases, but he testified that he knew there had been no night shift in July 1996. Therefore, the night shift could not have been responsible for running the useless bases. Although Petitioner did not know whether or not he had personally cut the load short, he conceded that as D.E.T. supervisor, he was responsible for overseeing his suborindates' work on the machine. Petitioner's brother, Benjamin, also worked for Respondent in 1996, the year Petitioner was terminated, and for some unspecified period of time before that. In Petitioner's and his brother's opinions, working conditions in Respondent's factory were those of a "concentration camp," because of poor wages, because people were spoken to "as if they were not human," and because no one was given a day off. However, Benjamin McMillon described being let off early when he requested it, and both Petitioner and Mr. Maxwell described an incentive pay plan based on being paid more money for producing more product. Benjamin McMillon described employees, including one white woman, who feared Hershel Shepard's power over them and who feared that Hershel Shepard might terminate them. The following exchange, at pages 36-37 of the Transcript, sums up Petitioner's testimony as to the effect of his race on conditions at Respondent's factory: Q: You don't have any evidence that anything that happened between you and Mr. Hershel Shepard happened because you were black; is that right? A: No, but I know he was harassing me.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying all claims and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., is the holder of a motor vehicle dealer license issued by the Petitioner, Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("the Department"). Richard R. Borst ("Borst") is the president of Respondent Dick's Auto Sales, Inc., and one of two stockholders in the company. At all times material hereto, the Respondent maintained a business address at 110 N.W. 18th Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. Borst also operates an auto parts business at the same address as the motor vehicle dealership. On or about June 9, 1989, Borst appeared before the Honorable James C. Payne, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, and entered a plea of guilty to aiding and abetting the transportation of stolen motor vehicle parts in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. Section 2314 & 2 in Case Number 89-6032- Cr-PAYNE-(01), United States v. Richard Borst,. Based on the plea entered and the plea agreement then before the court, Borst was adjudicated guilty in a Criminal Judgment dated June 28, 1989. Imposition of a sentence of confinement was suspended and Borst was placed on probation for a period of three (3) years. Borst was also fined Fifty Dollars ($50.00). Borst's conviction arose in connection with his purchase of auto parts from a "chop shop" (i.e., an operation which dismantled stolen cars and sold the parts,) in the Connecticut area. The purchase took place in May, 1987. In April, 1988, Borst met with state and federal investigators and agreed to fully cooperate with a task force set up to investigate the operation. He also agreed to testify against the individuals involved. While Borst was in Connecticut waiting to testify, the other defendants entered guilty pleas. In Respondent's initial dealer license application dated September 24, 1987, Borst stated under oath that he was not facing criminal charges. On April 27, 1989, Borst, as president of Respondent, signed an application to renew Respondent's license, stating under oath: Under penalty of perjury, I do swear or affirm that the information contained in this application is true and correct and that nothing has occurred since I filed my last application for a license or application for renewal of said license, as the case may be, which would change the answers given in such previous application. On January 18, 1989, Borst and his attorney signed a "Consent to Transfer of Case for Plea and Sentence", in United States v. Richard Borst, Criminal No. B-89-6-(TFGD), United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (the "Connecticut Case"). This document expressly acknowledges that an Information was pending against Borst in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, that Borst wished to plead guilty to the offense charged, and that he consented to the disposition of the case in the Southern District of Florida. The Information entered in the Connecticut Case, charged Borst with violation of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, for transporting motor vehicle parts in interstate commerce knowing them to have been stolen. The date of this Information was not established, but it was clearly on or before January 18, 1989. Thus, sometime prior to January 18, 1989, Borst was charged with criminal violations of 18 U.S.C. Sections 2314 and 2, and these charges were pending when Borst signed and filed Respondent's renewal application for 1989. Petitioner contends that Borst's conviction is directly related to the business of being a motor vehicle dealer, especially since Borst operates a motor vehicle parts business in conjunction with his motor vehicle dealership. However, the evidence presented provided only a very limited factual background regarding the conviction, none of Petitioner's representatives talked with the investigators or prosecutors in the criminal case and no evidence was presented regarding the Respondent's role in the transactions leading to Borst's conviction. At the time of the hearing, Borst was fifty-three (53) years of age. Within the last twenty-four (24) months, he has suffered numerous health problems including a nervous breakdown which necessitated an eighteen (18) week period of confinement to his residence for rest. He currently undergoes twice- weekly therapy with a psychiatrist and has been taking an antidepressant prescription. In addition, in October of 1989, he was admitted to the hospital for a heart condition. Subsequently, a balloon angioplasty was performed on him. He was later re-admitted to the hospital for five (5) days as a result of post surgery complications. He is also an insulin dependent diabetic. He attributes most of these health problems to the stress and turmoil of his criminal conviction. In light of his emotional and physical condition, he has been required to reduce his work load. Borst has been actively trying to sell the existing business in order to retire the outstanding indebtedness on the business and the property on which it is located. There is no evidence that the Respondent and/or any of its duly elected officers or stockholders have ever been subjected to any other complaints and/or investigations by the Department or by any other investigatory or regulatory agency during the past seventeen (17) years since it was originally licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order which finds Respondent not guilty of the violation alleged in the Administrative Complaint and dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of June, 1990. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1990.
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction by Todd P. Resavage, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Petitioner’s Notice Of Voluntary Dismissal, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby Filed April 17, 2014 10:51 AM Division of Administrative Hearings ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. DONE AND ORDERED this \ \p day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, °. Florida. Julie er, Chief Bureau of Issuance Oversight Division of Motorist Services Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A338 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motorist Services this | ( fa) day of April, 2014. NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. JB/jde Copies furnished: R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Brandes, LLP 800 North Calhoun Street, Suite 1B Tallahassee, Florida 32303 cspickard@kb-attorneys.com Andrew Archer Warth, Esquire Neal & Harwell, PLC 150 Fourth Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37219 awarth@nealharwell.com Todd P. Resavage Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building : 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SCHUMACHER AUTO GROUP, INC., d/b/a SCHUMACHER BUICK GMC, Petitioner, vs. Case No. 13-4575 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Respondent. / ese ORDER CLOSING FILE AND RELINQUISHING JURISDICTION This cause having come before the undersigned on Petitioner's Notice of Voluntary Dismissal with Prejudice, filed April 11, 2014, and the undersigned being fully advised, it is, therefore, ORDERED that the file of the Division of Administrative Hearings is closed with prejudice. Jurisdiction is relinquished to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of April, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Art TODD P. RESAVAGE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of April, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) R. Craig Spickard, Esquire Kurkin Brandes, LLP Suite 1B 800 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 (eServed) General Motors, LLC General Motors Audit Services 300 Renaissance Center Mc 482 C18 B76 . Detroit, Michigan 48265 Andrew Archer Warth, Attorney Neal & Harwell, PLC 150 Fourth Avenue North Nashville, Tennessee 37219 (eServed) STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS SCHUMACHER AUTO GROUP, INC., d/b/a SCHUMACHER BUICK GMC, Petitioner, vs. Case No.: 13-4575 GENERAL MOTORS, LLC, Respondent. nn NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL LA eee Petitioner, Schumacher Auto Group, Inc., d/b/a Schumacher Buick GMC, files this Notice of Voluntary Dismissal and hereby dismisses with prejudice the “Petition Pursuant to Section 320.699(1), Florida Statutes, Requesting Proceeding and Administrative Hearing” filed in this matter on November 14, 2013. DATED this 11th day of April, 2014. s/ R. Craig Spickard R. Craig Spickard Kurkin Forehand Brandes LLP 105 West 5th Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32303 (850) 391-5060 Fax (850) 391-2645 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been served via email on April 11, 2014 to i) Andrew Warth (awarth@nealharwell.com), Neal & Harwell, PLC and ii) Jennifer Clark (jenniferclark@flhsmv.gov), Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. s/ R. Craig Spickard
Conclusions This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order upon submission of an Order Closing File by Elizabeth W. McArthur, Administrative Law Judge of the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to the Petitioner’s Notice of Voluntary Dismissal With Prejudice, a copy of which is attached and incorporated by reference in this order. The Department hereby adopts the Order Closing File as its Final Order in this matter. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that this case is CLOSED. Filed October 1, 2010 10:23 AM Division of Administrative Hearings. DONE AND ORDERED this DW ~day of September, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. arl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this _ 32s) day of September, 2010. Nalini vane. bea ‘Administrator NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS Judicial review of this order may be had pursuant to section 120.68, Florida Statutes, in the District Court of Appeal for the First District, State of Florida, or in any other district court of appeal of this state in an appellate district where a party resides. In order to initiate such review, one copy of the notice of appeal must be filed with the Department and the other copy of the notice of appeal, together with the filing fee, must be filed with the court within thirty days of the filing date of this order as set out above, pursuant to Rules of Appellate Procedure. CAF/vlg Copies furnished: Mark L. Ornstein, Esquire Killgore, Pearlman, Stamp, Ornstein & Squires, P. A. Post Office Box 1913 Orlando, Florida 32802 Virginia Gulde, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough LLP 3600 Maclay Boulevard South, Suite 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 Elizabeth W. McArthur Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Nalini Vinayak Dealer License Administrator
