The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Raymond Howard Hildebrand, Jr., telephoned A. C. "Art" Murph in response to a newspaper ad, and, on November 17, 1981, signed an agreement with Mr. Murph under which, in exchange for title to and possession of the Hildebrands' 1979 Dodge Leisure Craft, Mr. Murph agreed to make specified monthly payments to Pen Air Federal Credit Union (PAFCU) until he could sell the recreation vehicle, and to satisfy the PAFCU lien with the sale proceeds, when it was sold. Under their agreement, Mr. Murph was to retain any sale proceeds in excess of what was needed to satisfy PAFCU's lien, as a commission on the sale. Mr. Hildebrand left the recreation vehicle with respondent on November 17, 1981. When the December payment on the loan PAFCU had made to the Hildebrands, the loan respondent had undertaken to repay, was overdue, Mr. Hildebrand got a notice to that effect. He got a similar notice in January. Respondent made these payments belatedly. On December 10, 1981, respondent sold the Hildebrands' vehicle to a third party who at that time paid respondent, in full, a price that exceeded the amount owed PAFCU by almost $2,000. Mr. Hildebrand happened to see the motor home parked at a neighbor's house on January 25, 1982, and, on inquiring, learned of the preceding month's sale. In a conversation with respondent on January 27, 1982, he was told everything would be straightened out in 10 to 14 days. Respondent told him somebody else had written respondent a bad check so that he needed the proceeds of the sale of the Hildebrands' motor home for some other purpose. Only after the Hildebrands engaged counsel and incurred legal fees did respondent pay PAFCU what was owed, more than a year later. It took that long for the new owner to receive title, as well. Sylvia Galloway's parents placed a motor home with respondent on consignment last May, and respondent sold it in June of 1982. Also in June, Ms. Galloway's parents received a check representing their agreed share of the sale proceeds. Only several months later, however, did the financing institution receive the moneys owed it, and it was Christmas before the new owners got title.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to institute judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr. Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Art Murph and Art's Motor Homes 6813 Pine Forest Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Curtis Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent, Michael L. Pappas, Jr., should be granted permission to purchase 20 percent of the stock in Plaza Dodge, Inc., and be recognized as executive management thereof, or whether the purchase should be rejected because of Mr. Pappas's prior conviction of a felony and alleged bad character.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Chrysler was a motor vehicle manufacturer licensed to do business in Florida; Plaza was a motor vehicle dealer licensed by the state; and Michael L. Pappas, Jr. was an individual seeking to purchase an ownership share in Plaza Dodge. He has been general manager of Plaza Dodge since January, 1993. On May 9, 1994, Plaza notified Chrysler that Mr. Pappas intended to purchase a 20 percent ownership interest in its shares and become executive manager of the dealership. The existing dealership agreement between Chrysler and Plaza reflects Mr. Pappas' father, Michael L. Pappas, is the sole owner and manager of the dealership. This agreement is not assignable without the consent of Chrysler Corporation. In his application submitted to Chrysler, Mr. Pappas indicated he had been convicted in 1987 of several felony counts dealing with his sale and possession of cocaine in 1985. As a result of that conviction, Mr. Pappas was sentenced to four years in prison, fined $50,000, and placed on five years probation. After he had been incarcerated for approximately six months, Mr. Pappas was placed in to a work release program for five months and then released to serve his five years probation. There is some indication this early release was effected because of prison crowding. The probation was terminated in July, 1991, earlier than scheduled. There is no evidence he has been pardoned. Mr. Pappas' civil rights were restored in August, 1992, through the simple process of applying for it. As was previously stated, he has been serving as general manager of Plaza since January, 1993. Since he has been serving in that capacity, Chrysler has been aware of his position and has not complained. In fact, he has, without objection, attended official functions put on by Chrysler in his capacity as the representative of Plaza Dodge. He was identified as an officer of the dealership when it applied to the state for licensure, and revealed his conviction on the licensure application. The application was approved by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Chrysler has rejected Mr. Pappas' application to purchase an ownership share in the dealership and his proposed executive management thereof citing as grounds for its rejection his prior felony convictions as evidence of his bad character. Chrysler contends that Mr. Pappas' conviction would adversely impact on the public confidence in the dealership and would have an adverse effect on sales. It sells and services vehicles only though its dealers and relies upon its dealerships to project its corporate image. Chrysler is also concerned that, since it accepts warranty claims at face value from its dealers, it must be able to rely on the character and integrity of those dealers to insure the warranty service was performed and the vehicles sold as claimed. No evidence exists to indicate this would not be the case here. The only evidence of the potential for problem came in the testimony of Chrysler's own official in explanation of its policy regarding dealership owners was presented and no indication of any dealership misconduct by Plaza under Mr. Pappas' stewardship was shown. Chrysler has adopted a policy prohibiting approval of anyone for ownership of a dealership who has "a prior felony conviction or other derogatory personal or character reputation or background which could be detrimental to or otherwise harm the image of Chrysler, the dealership, other Chrysler dealers of Chrysler products." Chrysler has attempted to enforce that policy uniformly and has taken the position that the conviction of a felony, by itself, will have a detrimental impact on the image of Chrysler Corporation. The evidence of record in this case does not seem to support that position, however. All during the time of his incumbency as Plaza's general manager the dealership's customer relations, as reflected by sales and service performance, has been rated as good, and those ratings have reflected an improvement over previous years. At no time has Chrysler objected to Mr. Pappas' presence at the dealership until now, and Chrysler presented no evidence of a lack of customer satisfaction with dealership performance or of its dissatisfaction with Plaza's share of the market. By the same token, the financial stability of Mr. Pappas or the dealership was not brought into issue. The evidence of record, through the testimony of others including an area Chrysler dealer, indicates that Mr. Pappas is well versed in the intricacies of operating an automobile dealership and has a good reputation for ability as well as character and integrity in the auto sales and service community. In addition to his employment in the management of a popular family restaurant Mr. Pappas has been involved in several other business partnerships and his partners speak well of his character and his business acumen. Mr. Pappas also appears to have earned the confidence of the community at large. Former law enforcement officials who were in office at the time of his arrest indicated there was no evidence of any serious misconduct on his part aside from that for which he was convicted. In the opinion of the former Tarpon Springs Police Chief, he appears to have been rehabilitated. In addition, Mr. Pappas appears to be a concerned parent and is active in community affairs. He shows remorse for his former misconduct and desires to have another opportunity to prove himself. At the time of his arrest, and during the period prior thereto, when he had been heavily into the use of cocaine, Mr. Pappas, along with his two cousins, was employed in the family restaurant in Tarpon Springs and had advanced to a position of responsibility. The three cousins were soon to assume some ownership interest in the establishment, but because of his conviction, Mr. Pappas was determined to be ineligible to be an officer in a corporation which held a liquor license. While using cocaine, Mr. Pappas periodically had it in his possession at work in the restaurant and was using it at least six days a week. He was involved at the time with a woman, Ms. Gleason, a drug and alcohol addict, to whom he supplied cocaine more than half of the times they were together. He sold cocaine to both Ms. Gleason and to others in order to support his own habit. Many of his sales were of large amounts bringing him several thousands of dollars at a time. Even after he was married in 1983, he continued to use cocaine even though he told his wife he had stopped. There is no evidence of his use or possession of cocaine any time after his release from prison, however.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that Michael L. Pappas, Jr. is shown to be of good moral character and is qualified to be an equity owner and executive manager of Plaza Dodge, Inc. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-3869 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. - 9. Accepted and, as appropriate, incorporated in this Recommended Order. 10. - 15. Accepted. 16. - 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. 22. - 26. Accepted and incorporated herein. 27. & 28. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 37. Accepted. 38. Accepted and incorporated herein. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Respondent has listed two paragraphs 5 in his Recommended Order. Therefore, all reference to Proposed Findings of Fact numbered 6 and after related to the paragraph numbered one less in the proposal. - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. 5. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. 7. - 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 17. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Dean Bunch, Esquire Cabaniss & Burke, P.A. 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edward Weeby, Esquire Senior Staff Counsel Chrysler Corporation 12000 Chrysler Drive Highland Park, Michigan 48288-0001 Daniel E. Myers, Esquire Walter E. Forehand, Esquire Myers & Forehand 402-B North Office Plaza Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Marie L. Demarco, Esquire D. Scott Douglas, Esquire MacFarlane, Ausley, Ferguson and McMullen 400 Cleveland Street Clearwater, Florida 34615
The Issue As to Case No. 96-5539, whether the Respondent, Dynotech Automotive, Inc., committed the violations alleged in the administrative complaint dated October 22, 1996; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. As to Case No. 96-5463, whether Supertech Automotive, Inc. (the alleged successor to Dynotech) is entitled to registration as a motor vehicle repair shop under the provisions of Section 559.904, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in this matter, Respondent Dynotech was a motor vehicle repair shop registered under the provisions of Section 559.904, Florida Statutes, located at 2240 North Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida. At all times material to the allegations of this matter, Respondent Supertech was an applicant for registration as a motor vehicle repair shop charged with doing business without being appropriately registered, which was also located at 2240 North Military Trail, West Palm Beach, Florida. The Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating and disciplining motor vehicle repair shops under Florida law. At all times material to the allegations in this matter, Theodore (Ted or Teddy) Russo was the president and manager of Dynotech. Mr. Russo’s home address is listed as 1604 Hollyhock Drive, Wellington, Florida. Prior to June 18, 1996, the Department commenced an investigation of Dynotech based upon suspected acts in violation of Chapter 559, Florida Statutes. In furtherance of the investigation the Department sent investigators with three vehicles to West Palm Beach for use in the operation. One vehicle driven by Investigator Tony Golino went to the Dynotech premises on June 18, 1996. After giving Mr. Russo a story about having just inherited the vehicle and being on the way back to New York, Investigator Golino requested an oil change and Dynotech’s free air conditioner inspection. Immediately prior to taking the vehicle to Dynotech, Investigator Golino’s vehicle had been thoroughly evaluated by a certified mechanic for any repair which might be needed to the air conditioning system. The vehicle, a 1989 Buick, checked out with no problems. On June 19, 1996, when Investigator Golino returned to Dynotech to pick up the vehicle, he was charged $358.94 for the requested oil change, the free air conditioner inspection, and for an evac and recharge together with an “acculmater.” Of the foregoing work, only a charge of $14.95 was required for this vehicle (the oil change cost). Investigator Golino had been verbally advised that if the evac and recharge were necessary the cost for same would be approximately $105.00 or $110.00. No estimate was given to him for the “acculmater” which was charged. Investigator Golino had not been given any written estimate for the work which was to be performed on the Buick. When the Buick was returned for inspection by the Department, Mr. Bullard found that the oil had been changed and that a new accumulater had been installed. Donald Bullard is a certified mechanic with 30 years of experience. An evac and recharge of the air conditioning system is appropriate if the system is not performing within acceptable standards. The evac and recharge is the process of cleaning the freon in order to allow it to do its work more efficiently. The freon is removed from the vehicle (evac), run through a machine for cleaning, then returned to the vehicle (recharge). This process takes less than an hour. An accumulator is a device which takes moisture out of the vehicle. The Buick driven by Investigator Golino did not need a new accumulator. On June 20, 1996, Jack Hill, another investigator with the Department, took a Plymouth van to Dynotech for an oil change and free air conditioner inspection. This vehicle had also been inspected beforehand and had been fully repaired so that it was in proper working order prior to being driven to Dynotech. Dynotech billed Investigator Hill $95.45 for the work performed on the van and alleged that it had added freon to the air conditioning system. No cost should have been billed for the van as a coupon for a free oil change was used. Additionally, the van did not require an evac and recharge nor freon. A third vehicle, a Ford Tempo, was taken to Dynotech by the Department’s investigator Fred Barnsdale on June 19, 1996. Like the others, prior to being driven to Dynotech the Tempo was inspected and evaluated by Mr. Bullard. The air conditioning system worked properly and did not require an evac and recharge. With regard to the Tempo, Dynotech billed for an evac and recharge which were unnecessary. Glen Eakin, Louis Vincent Zauss, and Michael David Baranowsky are certified mechanics formerly employed by Dynotech. All were hired and supervised by Mr. Russo. During their employment with Dynotech, each was instructed by Mr. Russo to perform work which was unnecessary. In some instances customers were billed for work which was not performed. In some instances customers who were to receive free services were advised work had been performed which was not done. Dynotech paid mechanics a flat hourly rate based upon service work performed. Mechanics did not receive compensation for parts sold in connection with repairs. Dynotech billing was reviewed and approved by Mr. Russo. Mr. Russo was aware of the work performed or not performed by Dynotech’s mechanics. Johnni Angel began working at Dynotech to help Mr. Russo out. Ms. Angel came on board as the receptionist/secretary for the company. She resides with Mr. Russo and decided to incorporate Supertech one day after Dynotech was suspended from doing business by the Department. Ms. Angel intended to operate Supertech from the same business location and retained Mr. Russo to continue the management of the premises. All of the mechanics formerly employed by Dynotech now worked for Supertech and continued to answer to Mr. Russo regarding the day-to-day activities of the business. Ms. Angel is the sole owner of Supertech, she obtained a new tax identification number for the business, and opened new bank accounts. All other aspects of the business operation remained as it had when under the Dynotech name. Ms. Angel filed an application for registration as a motor vehicle repair shop with the Department on November 7, 1996. Estimates and invoices from Supertech established that the company had been operating without being registered as required by law. The invoice forms used by Supertech did not contain a statement indicating what, if anything, was guaranteed in connection with the repair work. Such forms also did not contain the time and mileage period for which the guarantee was effective. Supertech’s written motor vehicle repair estimate and disclosure statements did not contain the proposed work completion date; the customer’s intended method of payment; the name and telephone number of another person who may authorize repair work, if the customer desired to designate such person; a statement allowing the customer to indicate whether replaced parts should be saved for inspection or return; or a statement indicating the daily storage charge for the customer’s vehicle after the customer had been notified that the repair work had been completed. Supertech’s application for registration did not contain a State of Florida tax identification number.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter final orders confirming the suspension and revoking the registration for Dynotech, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $3,000.00, and denying Supertech’s application for registration as a motor vehicle repair shop. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Davis Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 James R. Merola, Esquire JAMES R. MEROLA, P.A. 11380 Prosperity Farms Road, Suite 204 Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 508 Mayo building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents committed the offenses described in an Administrative Complaint entered by Petitioner on or about January 10, 1997.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, The Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department is charged with responsibility for enforcing the Florida Motor Vehicle Repair Act, Sections 559.901-559.9221, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Respondent, Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as "Adam's Street Muffler"), is a dissolved Florida corporation. Adam's Street Muffler is located at 1401 South Adam's Street, Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Adam's Street Muffler is registered with the Department under the Act as a motor vehicle repair shop. The Department has assigned registration number MV-15484 to Adam's Street Muffler. Respondent, Tim Tanner, is the owner and operator of Adam's Street Muffler. At the time that Adam's Street Muffler register pursuant to the Act, a registration packet, including a copy of the Act, was provided to Adam's Street Muffler. On July 24, 1995, Robert Dan Drake, an investigator with the Department's Bureau of Motor Vehicle Repair, went to Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake performed a compliance audit to determine whether repair estimate statements and invoices for services were in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. A copy of the repair invoice provided by Adam's Street Muffler personnel to Mr. Drake was determined not to be in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. See Petitioner's Exhibit 9. Mr. Drake discussed the requirements of the Act pertaining to repair estimates and invoices with Peggy Folsom, the secretary for Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake also provided an On-Site Inspection Report/Citation (Petitioner's Exhibit 7), and a Compliance Checklist/Citation (Petitioner's Exhibit 8), to Ms. Folsom. These forms described the deficiencies with the repair estimate and invoice form being used by Adam's Street Muffler. Adam's Street Muffler was given thirty days to correct the repair estimate and invoice. A revised form was submitted to the Department. See Petitioner's Exhibit 10. The corrected form was accepted by the Department. On July 1, 1996, Mr. Drake returned to Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Drake discovered that the repair estimate and invoice used by Adam's Street Muffler for a complaining customer was the same form that he had found to be deficient on July 24, 1995. See Petitioner's Exhibit 12. Mr. Drake issued a second On-Site Inspection Report/Citation to Adam's Street Muffler as a result of the July 1, 1996 visit. Petitioner's Exhibit 11. The report again described the specific deficiencies with the repair estimate and invoice form being used by Adam's Street Muffler. On October 1, 1996, Mr. Tanner paid a $300.00 fine for violating Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. On December 1, 1996, two months after Mr. Tanner paid the fine, and approximately six months after the second violation of the Act, Dan Keller, an employee of the Department, visited Adam's Street Muffler. Mr. Keller examined forms titled "Repair Orders" in the files of Adam's Street Muffler. The forms discovered by Mr. Keller were determined not to be in compliance with Sections 559.905 and 559.911, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5. The forms copied by Mr. Keller on December 1, 1996, were used as repair estimates and invoices for services performed. The evidence failed to prove when the vehicles at issue were brought to Adam's Street Muffler, that they were not brought to Adam's Street Muffler by person other than the owner, or that Adam's Street Muffler did not notify the customer pursuant to Section 559.909(1), Florida Statutes. None of the owners of the vehicles to which Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 relate have filed a complaint with the Department concerning work performed by Adam's Street Muffler. The repairs evidence by Petitioner's Exhibits 1-5 were for repair work costing in excess of $50.00. The forms taken from Adam's Street Muffler on July 24, 1995, July 1, 1996, and December 1, 1996 are incorporated into this Recommended Order by reference. On or about January 10, 1997, the Department entered an Administrative Complaint against Adam's Street Muffler and Mr. Tanner. The Administrative Complaint contains two counts against Respondents: one for alleged violations of Section 559.905, Florida Statutes, and one for alleged violations of Section 559.911, Florida Statutes. Both counts relate the forms obtained by the Department in December of 1996.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc., a Florida Corporation, and Tim Tanner, individually and as Director of Adam's Street Muffler Shop and Service Center, Inc., violated Section 559.911, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint entered January 10, 1997. IT IF FUTHER RECOMMENDED that Respondents be required to pay an administrative fine of $1,000.00 within thirty days of the date that the Final Order becomes final and the motor vehicle repair shop registration, MV-15484, issued to Respondents be suspended for a period of two weeks. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence J. Davis, Senior Attorney Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Room 515, Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 J. Joseph Hughes, Esquire 1017-A Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6221 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Bureau of Licensing and Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue Whether Respondent violated certain provisions within chapter 520, Florida Statutes (2010),1/ as alleged in Petitioner’s Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Sam’s Car is a motor vehicle retail installment seller based in Pensacola, Florida, and is governed by chapter 520. Mirza Ahmad is the president and 50-percent owner of Sam’s Car. Between January 7, 2009, and December 31, 2010, Sam’s Car held license number MV0902721 enabling it to conduct business as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. In other words, Sam’s Car could offer financing so that its customers could purchase vehicles through installment payments. At some point in 2010, Mr. Ahmad decided to convert the sole proprietorship named Mirza Aftab Ahmad, d/b/a Sam’s Car, into a corporation named Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. If a sole proprietorship licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller wishes to convert to a corporation, the new corporation must file a new application to be licensed as a motor vehicle retail installment seller. Accordingly, Mr. Ahmad filed an application in December of 2010 for a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license on behalf of Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. Mr. Ahmad did not renew license number MV0902721, and the license went into inactive status on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car could not enter into retail installment contracts with an inactive license. OFR ultimately issued license number MV9905731 to Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car, and that license became effective on March 16, 2011. Sam’s Car never moved to re-activate license number MV0902721, and OFR deemed that license to have retroactively expired on December 31, 2010. Sam’s Car was not licensed to enter retail installment sales contracts between January 1, 2011, and March 15, 2011. OFR licenses motor vehicle retail installment sellers such as Sam’s Car and is responsible for ensuring that licensees comply with chapter 520. OFR may conduct examinations and investigations to determine whether any provision of chapter 520 has been violated. In March of 2014, OFR contacted Mr. Ahmad and notified him that OFR would soon be conducting an on-site examination of Sam’s Car. During an on-site examination, OFR examiners visit a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s office, identify themselves, and examine various records in order to verify that the licensee complied with chapter 520 during the time period in question. OFR examiners arrived at Sam’s Car on March 19, 2014, and spent approximately six hours examining and scanning particular records of Sam’s Car. The examiners began by requesting that the office manager of Sam’s Car provide them with all the motor vehicle installment contracts that Sam’s Car had entered into in 2011 and 2012 (“the examination period”). Some of the requested records were at Mr. Ahmad’s home rather than at Sam’s Car. Accordingly, one of the examiners returned to Sam’s Car on April 9, 2014, to scan those documents after they had been retrieved from Mr. Ahmad’s home. The examiners reviewed 20 to 25 records from Sam’s Car and determined that several of the sales contracts utilized by Sam’s Car were not the form contract that had been approved as an industry standard by the Florida Independent Auto Dealer Association. There was a period of time during the examination period when Sam’s Car was utilizing a sales contract that it had essentially created from scratch. The examiners determined that the sales contracts in question did not have several of the items required by chapter 520. On September 5, 2015, OFR issued an Administrative Complaint alleging that Sam’s Car violated four provisions within chapter 520. In Count I, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07, Florida Statutes, by failing to ensure that all motor vehicle retail installment contracts executed by Sam’s Car during the examination period satisfied all of the requirements of section 520.07. The contracts reviewed by OFR allegedly failed to contain the “Notice to Buyer,” the “total amount of payments,” and a specific statement that liability coverage is not included. OFR further alleged in Count I that several of the contracts failed to ensure that the contract had been signed by the buyer and the seller. Finally, OFR also alleged in Count I that there were two instances in which Sam’s Car failed to ensure that the contract was completed before it was signed. OFR alleged in Count II that several of the reviewed contracts violated section 520.07(6) by enabling Sam’s Car to collect delinquency/collection charges or late fees in excess of five percent of the installment payment due. In Count III, OFR alleged that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(3), and Florida Administrative Code Rules 69V- 50.001 and 69V-50.002 because there were instances in which Sam’s Car had failed to document that it refunded or credited title charges collected from the buyer that exceeded the actual charges. Finally, OFR alleged in Count IV that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1) by selling motor vehicles on installment payments between January 1, 2011, and March 16, 2011, without an active license. The following findings are based on the documentary evidence and testimony received at the final hearing conducted on March 11, 2016. OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the notice to buyer required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not have the specific statement about liability insurance coverage required by section 520.07(1)(b). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 1 through 20 do not set forth the “total of payments” as required by section 520.07(2)(c). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 6 through 8, 11, and 14 through 18 were not signed by the seller as required by section 520.07(1)(a). OFR proved by clear and convincing evidence that the retail installment sales contracts in OFR Exhibits 18 and 20 were not complete prior to being signed as required by section 520.07(1)(a). In sum, OFR proved all of the allegations in Count I of its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence. With regard to Count II, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 6, 7, and 21 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.07(6) by collecting a delinquency/collection charge in excess of five percent of each installment. As for Count III, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 1 and 14 that there were two occasions during the examination period when Sam’s Car did not refund the overcharges on the estimated title, tag, and registration fees. Accordingly, OFR proved that Sam’s Car violated rule 69V-50. With regard to Count IV, OFR proved by the clear and convincing evidence set forth in OFR Exhibits 22, through 25 that Sam’s Car violated section 520.03(1), by entering into retail installment contracts with four separate buyers during the period when Sam’s Car did not have a motor vehicle retail installment seller’s license (i.e., January 1, 2011, through March 15, 2011). Even though OFR proved the allegations in its Administrative Complaint by clear and convincing evidence, there was no indication that those responsible for Sam’s Car’s operations intentionally committed the aforementioned violations. Instead, the testimony presented at the final hearing demonstrated that the violations resulted from inadvertence and/or an incomplete understanding of chapter 520’s requirements.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Office of Financial Regulation enter a final order imposing a $1,000 administrative fine on Sohail Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sam’s Car. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2016.
Findings Of Fact At the time this matter was called for hearing, counsel for all parties stipulated and agreed that probable cause existed for proceedings in circuit court. There was no stipulation as to the accuracy of the factual allegations of the administrative complaint, but there was agreement that there was no impediment of any kind to circuit court proceedings.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to institute judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of October, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 James Fletcher Fleming, Esquire Post Office Box 1831 Pensacola, Florida 32598 Carey D. Bearden, Esquire 717 St. Charles Avenue New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether Petitioner was discriminated against in employment by Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, Respondent, Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc., operated a specialty tire and wheel assembly facility in Plant City, Florida. Petitioner was employed by Tredit at that facility. On October 10, 1995, Ronald Pike, Tredit’s vice- president for operations, paid a routine visit to Tredit’s Plant City facility. Somewhat concerned over the apparent inadequate level of production and higher costs being experienced there, Mr. Pike called a meeting of the entire 15-member staff. During the course of the meeting, in an attempt to determine, if possible, the reason for the deficiency, Mr. Pike asked questions of each member of the staff. Mr. Lee, who recalls he had nothing to say at the time, claims Pike’s insistence on his participation in the discussion constituted "picking on him." Mr. Pike denies picking on Petitioner. He contends he was trying to get some input from the hourly employees, and insists he questioned all of them even-handedly. He asked each for input, indicating their jobs would not be jeopardized by their answers. During the meeting Pike advised the associates that both their attitudes and their production must improve. Though Petitioner denies it, Mr. Pike indicated that Petitioner claimed at that time there was not enough work to give him a 40-hour week, and he was stretching out his jobs in order to make them take long enough to ensure he could work a 40-hour work week. Mr. Bauer, also a Tredit executive, is of the opinion this manipulation is neither necessary nor possible, considering the facility’s work practices. Tredit creates wheel assemblies for specialty vehicles, utilizing tires and wheels manufactured by others. Though its Florida business is high volume, due to the nature of the product and the intense competition, the profit margin is low, and the company has to react to order cycles which require immediate response. However, Mr. Bauer opined there was always enough to do to make sure the hourly employees were always productively employed. No independent evidence was presented in support of the position taken by either party on this point, however. Once the meeting was completed, Mr. Pike and Mr. Bauer left. The facility was being managed at the time by Carol Suggs. At the end of the day after Mr. Pike held his meeting with the staff, Ms. Suggs called for Petitioner to meet with her. The request was communicated through Mr. Longo. According to Ms. Suggs, Petitioner was admonished about his working habits and warned regarding his attitude on the job. She claims he then became disrespectful and quit. A short while later, a payroll accounting document was prepared reflecting Petitioner had been discharged on the day of the conference with Ms. Suggs. Petitioner categorically denies having quit the job as Ms. Suggs indicates in her sworn affidavit of August 22, 1996. He claims to have taken pride in his work and to have been so upset by his termination that he actually cried as a result. Ms. Suggs, on the other hand, contends that Petitioner did not put forth appropriate effort on the job. She claims that not only were the hourly employees getting a full 40-hour week, but also performing overtime, and yet the required amount of material was not being produced. Petitioner rebuts this contention, claiming adequate inventory was prepared. Nonetheless, as a result of what she perceived as Petitioner’s attitude and performance shortcomings, on October 11, 1995, at her meeting with Petitioner the day after Mr. Pike’s visit, Ms. Suggs gave him a written employee warning notice. Petitioner admits to having signed this notice as indication he received it, but denies he agreed with its contents. No other notice of dismissal action was executed by Ms. Suggs except the payroll change notice reflecting Petitioner’s dismissal on October 13, 1995, two days following the meeting she had with Petitioner. Because this earlier action, the warning, does not reflect Petitioner was terminated, but within two days thereof he was taken off the payroll, and because Ms. Suggs’ testimony was credible, it is found that Petitioner’s reaction to the warning was as described by her and was the basis for his dismissal. Tredit had 15 employees at the Plant City facility when Petitioner was employed there. Of this number, four were female and eleven were male. Two of the males were black. After Petitioner was terminated, the employee census was the same except for one fewer black employee. At the time of the hearing, Tredit employed four individuals in the Plant City facility’s office, all of whom were white; and nine warehouse employees, of whom four were white, one black, and two Hispanic. No evidence was presented to establish that Petitioner’s termination from employment with Respondent was the result of his race.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Raymond T. Lee’s Petition for Relief filed against Tredit Tire & Wheel Co., Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ramon T. Lee, pro se 832 Augusta Street Lakeland, Florida 33805 Antonio Faga, Esquire 375 Twelfth Avenue South Naples, Florida 34102 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 249 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Initially the issue was, whether Respondent, Sunshine Auto Mart, discriminated against Petitioner, Dorothy Scott, on the basis of her disability, and, if so, what remedy should be ordered. However, at the beginning of the hearing, the parties agreed that the hearing would be limited to the question of whether Respondent met the definition of “employer” under the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a used automobile dealership. John Connell is the sole proprietor of Respondent. Petitioner was hired by Respondent in 2007. Petitioner started working for Respondent as a secretary and later became Respondent’s general manager. She would work in different areas of the dealership, as needed, but she maintained a steady work schedule. Petitioner received notification that her employment was terminated on July 28, 2014. Petitioner was unable to provide competent details of when and how long each alleged employee worked for Respondent. Some of the alleged employees worked a few hours each week and could come and go as they wanted. At the final hearing, Respondent presented Employer’s Quarterly Federal Tax Returns for 2013 and 2014, and the Florida Department of Revenue Employer’s Quarterly Reports covering 2013 and 2014. Each report shows that Respondent employed fewer than 15 employees for each quarter covered by the report. These reports, supported by Mr. Connell and Ms. Riggs’ testimony, constitute competent substantial evidence that Respondent employed fewer than 15 full-time employees for each working day in the 52 calendar weeks in 2013, and in the 28 calendar weeks in 2014, the period preceding the alleged discrimination. Petitioner did not present any competent substantial evidence to counter or rebut this evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 4 day of November, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4 day of November, 2015.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, certified by Petitioner as a law enforcement officer. Until his retirement in January 2008, Respondent served in excess of 20 years as a sworn police officer in the Tampa Police Department (TPD). At the time of his retirement, he was a corporal. At all times material to the instant case, including January 4, 2007, in addition to working full-time as a TPD police officer, Respondent owned an automotive parts and service business (Adkins Enterprises) and the seven-acre property at 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue in Tampa (including the improvements thereon) where the business was located. Until April 2005, when its Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (HSMV)-issued motor vehicle dealer's license expired, Adkins Enterprises also sold used vehicles at this location. The business had approximately 25 employees. Respondent left the day-to-day operations of the business to his managerial employees. He would stop by when he was off-duty to check on how things were going and to help out, particularly with the paperwork. At a meeting held in 2004 (2004 Meeting), TPD Captain Robert Lovering introduced Respondent to three brothers-- Roynauth "Sham" Sahdeo (Sham), Seewchand "Blacks" Sahdeo (Blacks), and Deonauth "Prim" Sahdeo (Prim)--all of whom worked at a business on 15th Street in Tampa (S & S Auto) which did automotive repairs and paint and body work, as well as provided towing services.2 Respondent understood Sham to be the "main brother," under whom the other two brothers worked. Sham, in fact, at that time, did own the business (which, unlike Adkins Enterprises, was not a Florida-licensed motor vehicle dealer). Blacks and Prim did not then have any ownership interest in S & S Auto. It was verbally agreed, at the 2004 Meeting, that Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto would go into the auto parts and scrap metal business together, with the auto parts and scrap metal to be sold by the joint venture coming from vehicles purchased at motor vehicle auctions using Adkins Enterprises' dealer license.3 (Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, provided then, as it still does, that only licensed dealers could purchase vehicles at these auctions.) Respondent also agreed to rent out space to S & S Auto at Adkins Enterprises' 4709 East Hillsborough Avenue location (Adkins' Location). Sometime in or around 2005, Sham sold his interest in S & S Auto to his two brothers, Blacks and Prim. As far as Respondent understood, however, Sham continued to act on behalf of S & S Auto.4 Also in or around 2005, S & S Auto applied for and obtained a motor vehicle dealer license from HSMV. Because Adkins Enterprises no longer had its dealer license (it having expired in April 2005), S & S Auto's dealer license was used to purchase (at auction), not only the vehicles it sold as a licensed motor vehicle dealer, but also the vehicles from which the parts and scrap metal for the joint venture between Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were obtained. After they were purchased at auction, the vehicles were transported to Adkins' Location on a tow truck operated by Blacks. Space was set aside at Adkins' Location for S & S Auto to conduct motor vehicle sales operations. Insofar as Respondent knew, Dale Marler was in charge of these operations. Sham helped Mr. Marler out, but most of Sham's time at Adkins' Location (where he had a regular presence) was devoted to the auto parts/scrap metal joint venture in which Adkins Enterprises and S & S Auto were participants. (It was at Adkins' Location where the vehicles purchased for the joint venture were stripped and crushed, and the salvaged auto parts were sold.) When he had the time, as a favor, Respondent would take tag and title paperwork to the HSMV local office for Mr. Marler and/or Sham. As of January 4, 2007, Sham and Mr. Marler were still working out of Adkins' Location and engaging in the business activities described above. On that day, Respondent agreed, at Sham's request, to go to the local HSMV office and purchase temporary tags for S & S Auto's motor vehicle sales operations at Adkins' Location. In addition to the money to make the purchase, Sham provided Respondent with S & S Auto's HSMV- assigned Personal Identification Number (PIN), which Respondent had to give to the HSMV clerk in order to initiate the transaction. Respondent went to the local HSMV office, as Sham had requested, later that same day (January 4, 2007). He told the clerk that he was there to purchase 25 temporary tags for S & S Auto, and he gave her S & S Auto's PIN. The clerk inputted the information Respondent had provided her into the HSMV computer system and produced a completed HSMV Form 83090, which represented S & S Auto's application for 25 temporary tags (S & S Auto's Application). The clerk printed out copies of S & S Auto's Application, and Respondent signed the "agency copy" on the "Authorized Representative for Dealership" signature line. At the clerk's request, he showed her his driver's license, and she wrote down his driver's license number next to his signature on the application. Respondent left the office with 25 temporary tags (numbered Q415821 through Q415845), for which he paid $53.00. Respondent did not knowingly provide any false or misleading information in obtaining these tags. He honestly believed that he was acting as the "Authorized Representative" of S & S Auto in this transaction, as he represented by placing his signature on the "agency copy" of S & S Auto's Application. When he returned to Adkins' Location, Respondent put the 25 temporary tags that had been purchased at the local HSMV office in a file for Mr. Marler and Sham to use. He had nothing further to do with the tags.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission issue a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 2011.
