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JOEANN F. NELSON vs SUNRISE COMMUNITY, INC., 00-002657 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 29, 2000 Number: 00-002657 Latest Update: Feb. 12, 2001

The Issue Did the Respondent engage in a discriminatory employment practice by suspending the Petitioner from work?

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Joeann F. Nelson, is a Black female. In 1997, she was employed as an aide working with developmentally disabled persons at Sunrise Community, Inc. The Respondent, Sunrise Community, Inc. (hereafter “Sunrise”) is an employer within the meaning of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. On or about April 24, 1997, the Petitioner was suspended from her employment for a number of days by Sunrise. The Petitioner filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (hereafter “the Commission”) on May 8, 1997, alleging that her suspension was racially motivated, and a violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. The staff of the Commission investigated the complaint, and issued its Determination of No Cause on May 16, 2000. At the same time, the Commission gave the Petitioner notice of her right to an administrative hearing on the Commission’s findings. The Petitioner, while employed by the Respondent, was asked by her immediate supervisor to participate in taking residents of the facility to their group home. The Petitioner refused to take the residents complaining that another co-worker was scheduled to take the residents on the day in question. The supervisor told the Petitioner that the person who was scheduled to take the residents was too old to handle that job, and the Petitioner got into an argument about this matter. As a result of this refusal to take the residents and the argument, the Petitioner was suspended for a number of days. The refusal to follow the directions of her supervisor regarding her work and the confrontational argument with the supervisor over being asked to do a specific task that was within her job duties generally were sufficient cause for discipline. The Petitioner did not show that she was singled out or treated differently because of her race, either in being asked to perform the task or in being suspended for refusing to do the task. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a second complaint with the Commission on June 30, 1997, and raised additional issues regarding her discharge when she asked for her formal hearing on the Commission’s determination of no cause on the original complaint. However, the only matter properly before the undersigned in these proceedings is her suspension.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the complaint upon a finding that there was no cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: JoeAnne Nelson Post Office Box 76 Crawfordville, Florida 32326 Steven M. Weinger, Esquire Kurzban, Kurzban, Weinger, Tetzeli, P.A. 2650 Southwest 27th Avenue Second Floor Miami, Florida 33133 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (1) 760.10
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JOSE A. DIAZ vs OHIO DISPOSAL SYSTEMS, INC., 01-003866 (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Oct. 04, 2001 Number: 01-003866 Latest Update: Aug. 19, 2002

The Issue Whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact For many years Mark Dunning Industries, Inc. (MDI), held the contract for trash removal and processing for Naval Air Station, Pensacola, Florida (NAS Pensacola). In the summer of 1995, the contract for these services, for a period beginning January 1996, were the subject of a bid solicitation. The apparent winner of the bid was Ohio Disposal Systems, Inc (ODSI). This bid was contested by MDI. Ultimately, ODSI prevailed in the bid contest and was selected to perform the contract. Performance was to begin on January 1, 1996, however, ODSI was not informed that it was to be the contractor until early December 1995. Petitioner was born on July 12, 1922. He is a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico, and of Hispanic origin. Petitioner first came to be employed by MDI in the summer of 1994. Petitioner worked on the "hill," which is an elevated portion of the trash dump on board NAS Pensacola. It was his job to weld broken equipment. He also operated two kinds of equipment: a Bobcat, which is a small front-end loader, and a backhoe with a dozer blade mounted on the front. Petitioner was paid about $16.00 per hour as a welder. Victor Cantrel, Petitioner's friend, commenced employment with MDI in July 1995. He worked on the "hill" and also drove the Bobcat and the back-hoe. He would utilize this equipment to push trash into a compactor. In trash-handling parlance, he was known as a "hill man." He was not a welder. He worked closely with Petitioner. Mr. Cantrel was born on June 25, 1972, and is Anglo- American. He was paid about $9.00 per hour. The supervisor of Petitioner and Mr. Cantrel, during the latter months of 1995 while they were working for MDI, was Thomas Lucky. The principal of ODSI was Vince Crawford. On or about December 28, 1995, at the end of the workday, Mr. Lucky informed the employees, including Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, and a number of trash truck drivers, that there was to be a meeting in the company office near the "hill." Present at the meeting in the office, which commenced around 6:30 p.m., was Petitioner, Mr. Cantrel, Mr. Lucky, several truck drivers, Mr. Crawford, and his wife Cathy. Mr. Crawford informed the assembled employees that he was bringing in all new equipment; that because there would be new equipment, the new employees of ODSI would be able to work 40 hours per week; and that due to the requirement to get his company in shape in time to meet the January 1, 1996, deadline, many of the employees of MDI would be offered jobs with ODSI. After revealing these preliminary matters, Mr. Crawford asked a man named Lee what he did at MDI; this man said that he was a truck driver. Mr. Crawford told him that he was hired with the new company. Then he asked Mr. Cantrel what he did; he said he drove the Bobcat. Mr. Crawford said, "Recycle, huh. You are hired." Mr. Cantrel subsequently filed an employment application. However, he knew that after the announcement at the meeting, he was going to work for ODSI. When Mr. Crawford inquired of two more people, they both responded, "truck driver," and Mr. Crawford informed them that they were hired. When he asked Petitioner, Petitioner said, "Welder." Mr. Crawford then said, "We don't need no welders here." This was the first and last encounter Petitioner had with Mr. Crawford. The next day Petitioner arrived at work at the usual time and was informed that he no longer was employed at that facility. On January 2, 1996, Petitioner presented an employment application to the office at ODSI seeking employment as a "Welder and/or Heavy Equip. Opr." He never received a response. No evidence was adduced that at that time there were job openings for a "welder and/or heavy equipment operator." Additionally, according to Petitioner, no one from ODSI informed Petitioner that he was not qualified. No evidence was adduced at the hearing which indicated that Mr. Crawford noticed that Petitioner was 73 years of age, or that he was a Puerto Rican, or that he was of Hispanic origin. The unrebutted evidence demonstrated that Petitioner was not hired, at the time jobs were available, because Mr. Crawford was bringing in new equipment. New equipment does not require frequent welding and, therefore, Mr. Crawford did not need a welder.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered finding Respondent committed no unlawful employment practice. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of March, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of March, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Committe, Esquire 17 South Palafox Place, Suite 322 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 H. William Wasden, Esquire Pierce, Ledyard, Latta, Wasden & Bowron, P.C. Post Office Box 16046 Mobile, Alabama 36616 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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BENJAMIN D. LOVE vs ESCAMBIA COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 17-000564 (2017)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jan. 24, 2017 Number: 17-000564 Latest Update: Aug. 17, 2017

The Issue Whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to an unlawful employment practice on the basis of religion; or in retaliation to his engagement in a lawful employment activity, in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Escambia County, is a political subdivision of the state of Florida that is authorized to carry out county government, pursuant to section 125.01, Florida Statutes (2016). Escambia County is an employer as that term is defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act 1992. Petitioner, Mr. Love, was employed by Blue Arbor, Inc., a staffing agency. Blue Arbor had a contract with Escambia County for temporary labor services. Blue Arbor assigned Mr. Love to a temporary job with Escambia County, Public Works Department, Office of Engineering and Construction, as an engineering project coordinator. The assignment was for one year. Petitioner was assigned to the job from May 26, 2014, until his termination. On January 26, 2015, Escambia County terminated Petitioner’s temporary employment contract. Petitioner was an employee of Escambia County as that term is defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Mr. Love is a Christian. Petitioner timely filed a complaint with the Commission alleging Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner on the basis of his religion. As an engineering project coordinator, Petitioner’s job responsibilities included: management of complex projects, ability to prioritize work, and ability to exercise good interpersonal skills with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. Mr. Love earned a Bachelor of Science in Engineering Technology and Construction degree in December 2013. Mr. Love had no prior drainage or roadway experience before working for Escambia County. Mr. Love began working for Escambia County following a storm that was declared a disaster. Due to the disaster, staff was expected to be flexible and able to perform job duties without refusal or hesitation. Respondent asserts that it terminated Petitioner’s contract due to his inability to perform job responsibilities without objection or hesitation, work performance, and disruptive behavior. Mr. Love had multiple supervisors during his eight month tenure at Escambia County. While working at Escambia County, Mr. Love’s supervisors had issues with his work performance and his behavior. Mary Bush, a construction manager, supervised Mr. Love in 2014. Ms. Bush had issues with Mr. Love’s file storage practices and behavior. Ms. Bush testified that Mr. Love saved all his work on a personal computer and was told several times to save his work in the shared folder. Mr. Love refused to save his work on the shared drive on the basis that the documents were his work. During the time Ms. Bush supervised Mr. Love, she experienced two incidents with Mr. Love involving outbursts. On one occasion, Mr. Love was in Ms. Bush’s office seeking review of Mr. Love’s work. Mr. Love stated in a raised voice, “you need to review the report so I can do my job.” On another occasion, Ms. Bush directed Mr. Love to identify his documents using a certain description and explained the importance of the practice. Mr. Love objected on the basis that the practice was an asinine process. Mr. Love was reassigned to another supervisor due to the outbursts involving Ms. Bush. At no point did Mr. Love state that his objection to following directions was based on his religion. Chris Curb, an engineering manager for stormwater, also supervised Mr. Love during his tenure at Escambia County. Despite the direction from Ms. Bush, the file-sharing issue continued. On December 30, 2014, Chris Curb notified Mr. Love by email that his file saving was a “problem.” Mr. Curb advised Mr. Love that his file folder was not a standard subfolder and he needed to save all files in the proper shared subfolders. He explained that file sharing is important so Escambia County could comply with state regulations and records requests. He further explained that Mr. Love was not the sole owner of a project record because other employees would need access to the work. He concluded his email with instructions for Mr. Love to use designated file folders. A third supervisor, Jim Duncan, also had issues with Mr. Love’s work performance and behavior. Similar to his practice under prior supervisors, Mr. Love refused to save his files to the shared file folder. Mr. Love also repeatedly refused to attend mandatory meetings without a direct command. For example, on multiple occasions Mr. Love’s supervisor had to locate and direct him to attend the weekly department meetings. Mr. Love testified that he was reluctant to attend the meetings because he believed they “were unproductive and take up too much time.” Similar to other supervisors, Mr. Love engaged in an outburst with Mr. Duncan. Mr. Duncan was a construction manager when he supervised Mr. Love and thus, was responsible for directing Mr. Love to advance projects from conception to completion. One such project was ENG Flood 414-85, which was also referred to as the Beulah Road at Helms Intersection project (“Beulah-Helms project”). Mr. Love was the project coordinator for the project. In October 2014, Roads, Inc., a construction company, submitted a bid for the Beulah-Helms project. Brett Moylan is the vice-president and chief operating officer of Roads, Inc. The project was a pricing agreement contract. Pricing agreement contracts are contracts where prices are established for a period of one year and are adopted by the Escambia County prior to the award of any specific pricing agreement contract. Pricing agreements have a blackout period and bidding process that also takes place prior to acceptance of the pricing agreement. In December 2015, Mr. Love was in the final stages of the procurement process for the Beulah-Helms project. Roads, Inc. was the lowest bidder on the project. Mr. Love corresponded with Mr. Moylan regarding the documents necessary to approve the project. Mr. Love requested a construction schedule and MOT plan for the project before the work order could be approved. Mr. Moylan asserted in an email that the construction schedule would begin after the purchase order is issued. Mr. Moylan later submitted the MOT plan and signed the work order. On January 22, 2015, Mr. Love sent an email to Mr. Moylan requesting the construction schedule and another signed work order with the appropriate dates. Mr. Love advised Mr. Moylan that he would not begin the project until Mr. Moylan submitted the construction schedule. Although Mr. Moylan explained that he usually did not submit a construction schedule, he ultimately provided the construction schedule to Mr. Love indicating that the project would begin the following Monday and “be substantially complete within 60 days of commencement, and have a completion date within 90 days.” The construction schedule provided by Mr. Moylan was an acceptable schedule. For a reason that was not addressed at hearing, Mr. Love asked Mr. Moylan for the construction schedule again, despite receiving it. Mr. Moylan advised Mr. Love to accept the next lowest bidder. As a result of the email exchange with Mr. Moylan, Mr. Love planned to send Mr. Moylan a follow-up email about accepting the next highest bidder, which would purportedly cost Escambia County an additional $20,000 for the project. Before Mr. Love drafted the email, he called Mr. Moylan to discuss the issues referenced in the email. Mr. Love testified that before he called Mr. Moylan he “drove around the block a couple of times, before he could call Mr. Moylan because [he] knew that the conversation was going to get heated.” Mr. Love described the conversation as heated, and they “cut each other off” during the conversation. Mr. Moylan contacted Mr. Duncan to complain about Mr. Love’s behavior related to the Beulah-Helms project. Mr. Duncan approached Mr. Love to discuss the exchange between Mr. Love and Mr. Moylan. Mr. Duncan directed Mr. Love to award the Beulah-Helms project to Roads, Inc. Mr. Love objected to awarding the contract to Roads, Inc. He testified that his objection was based on his religion because “[he] had an obligation to utilize his moral and ethical judgment which is inherent to [his] religion.” Mr. Love stated that the religious accommodation was based on his request for additional information before he could feel comfortable awarding the project to Roads, Inc. Mr. Love testified that he told Mr. Duncan that he refused to award Roads, Inc., without the construction schedule “based on a matter of principal.” Mr. Love did not say he refused to approve the project based on his religion. He did not say he needed an accommodation for his religion. Mr. Duncan directed Mr. Love not to take any further action until they discussed Mr. Love’s objection with the department manager, Joy Jones. During the conversation, Mr. Love became angry and yelled at Mr. Duncan. Sharon Johnson, a project coordinator, witnessed the exchange between Mr. Love and Mr. Duncan. Specifically, Ms. Johnson observed Mr. Love and Mr. Duncan having the discussion about the Beulah-Helms project. Ms. Johnson described Mr. Love’s demeanor as unhappy and upset. She testified that he raised his voice and yelled at Mr. Duncan. At the same time, Mr. Duncan attempted to calm Mr. Love. Ms. Johnson could not recall the substance of the discussion, but she testified without hesitation that Mr. Love did not mention anything about his religion. Ms. Johnson’s testimony is found to be credible. On January 26, 2015, Escambia County terminated Petitioner’s contract. Joy Jones, the Engineering Department manager, made the final decision to terminate Mr. Love’s contract. Although Ms. Jones did not directly supervise Mr. Love, she was aware of the issues concerning his work performance and behavior through complaints from her staff who directly supervised Mr. Love. After several complaints of angry outbursts, difficulty meeting deadlines, failure to save critical documents to the shared drive, inability to move projects in the process without reluctance, and inability to work with several supervisors, Ms. Jones made the decision to terminate Mr. Love’s contract. Based on the evidence, Respondent has demonstrated that Mr. Love’s termination was based on a legitimate business decision due to poor work performance and disruptive behavior. Approximately one year after his termination, Mr. Love sent an email to the Escambia County Administrator, Jack Brown. The email complained of perceived damage to Mr. Love’s reputation, credibility, and career. Mr. Love did not mention any complaint of religious discrimination or retaliation. In his response to Mr. Love, Mr. Brown explained that “in the project coordinator position staff must examine and thoroughly understand applicable process. Refusal and hesitation to perform job duties affect production, grant reimbursement deadlines, and citizen expectations.” Mr. Love did not explicitly mention anything about his religion or religious discrimination to any of his supervisors before he was terminated from Escambia County.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner’s discrimination complaint and Petition for Relief consistent with the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of this Recommended Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 2017. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Benjamin David Love Post Office Box 1132 Gonzalez, Florida 32560 (eServed) Meredith D. Crawford, Esquire Escambia County Board of County Commissioners Suite 430 221 Palafox Place Pensacola, Florida 32502 (eServed) Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed)

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (7) 120.569120.57125.01760.01760.02760.10760.11
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. BENITO TORTORA, 88-000573 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000573 Latest Update: May 20, 1988

Findings Of Fact Respondent is and at all material times has been a registered sheet metal contractor in the State of Florida. In fact, Respondent qualified in aluminum fabrication and erection. He holds license number RS 0025757. From 1984 through September, 1986, Respondent owned and operated Robinsons Aluminum Products, Inc. The company, which was located in Tampa, sold and erected aluminum screen enclosures. Respondent was the qualifying agent for the company. On August 19, 1986, Margaret Haden entered into a contract with Robinsons Aluminum Products, Inc., signed by Respondent as representative, for the construction of a screen room and slab, roof, and door for the room. The total contract price was $1575. Mrs. Haden paid a $550 deposit by check dated August 21, 1986, and the remainder was due on completion. Shortly after entering into the contract, Respondent prepared drawings and sketches for the job. He then submitted these drawings and sketches to the homeowners' association, whose approval was required before Respondent could obtain a building permit or begin the work. The homeowners' association did not immediately respond to the request for approval. After seven to ten days, Mrs. Haden called Respondent to find out why work had not begun. Respondent called the homeowners' association and learned that they were changing offices and everything was in disarray. Two to three weeks after the date of the contract, Respondent received verbal approval from the homeowners' association, but was unable to get written approval. At about this time, Mrs. Haden fired him, hired a new contractor, and demanded her $550 back. Respondent refused to return the deposit.

Recommendation In view of the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint. ENTERED this 20th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-0573 Treatment Accorded Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4. Adopted in substance. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unsupported by the evidence. 7-9. Rejected as legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Bryant, Reeves & Deer 220 East Madison Street Suite 530 Tampa, Florida 33602 Benito Tortora 2516 Gresham Drive Orlando, Florida 32807 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 3299-0750

Florida Laws (3) 120.57489.117489.129
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PRESTON PAMPHILE vs FEDEX, 10-010018 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Nov. 02, 2010 Number: 10-010018 Latest Update: Nov. 03, 2011

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice pursuant to chapter 760, Florida Statutes, by terminating Petitioner for allegedly using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Preston Pamphile ("Petitioner") worked for Respondent as a driver/courier at its Tallahassee station from 2006 until his termination in May 2010. Petitioner is African- American. Respondent, Federal Express Corporation ("Respondent" or "FedEx") is an express delivery company. The Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed by Petitioner alleges discrimination based upon race/color. Specifically, the Discrimination Statement reads as follows: I am an African American. I was subjected to different terms and conditions and discharged because of my race. I worked for Fedex as a Driver. I was falsly accused of talking/texting on my cell phone while operating a company vehicle. I tried to tell my supervisor (Tony Henderson) that I was not using my phone. I offered to show him my phone bill. Mr. Henderson said “I know what I saw.” On May 6, 2010, I was terminated. However, a white employee (Robert Fitzsimmons) was reported by another employee for talking on his cell phone while operating a company (vehicle) and he was not disciplined. I believe I was terminated because of my race. In addition to the claim of race discrimination, the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission also asserts a claim of retaliation. In Petitioner's written statement accompanying the Petition for Relief, Petition explains the basis for the retaliation claim: I feel that he retaliated because when I came to work at 2:50 a.m., I saw him in the back of the building with a female employee. The same female employee I saw him in back of the building with is his employee that is under his management. And I feel that Tony Henderson is trying to protect his marriage because of me seeing him in back of the building with the female employee. FedEx's "Three-Strikes You're Out" Policy At all relevant times during his employment with Respondent, Petitioner was aware of FedEx's Acceptable Conduct Policy. Under this policy, an employee who receives any combination of three warning letters and/or performance reminder letters during a twelve-month period is subject to termination. Petitioner conceded that this policy was uniformly applied by Respondent, and Petitioner did not contend that Respondent committed any unlawful conduct in applying this policy. On February 5, 2009, Petitioner received a warning letter for failing to report traffic citations he received while operating his personal vehicle. The warning letter reminded Petitioner that "3 notifications of deficiency (i.e., any combination of warning letters and/or reminders) received within a 12-month period" would result in his termination. On September 1, 2009, Petitioner received a second warning letter for crossing a moving conveyor belt during a morning sorting operation. This letter stated: "This is your second deficiency notification within 12 months. If you receive a third notification within 12 months, regardless of the type, you will be terminated." On January 6, 2010, Petitioner received a third warning letter for failing to report a traffic citation he received while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner was informed that this was his "third disciplinary letter within 12 months." Petitioner acknowledged that he could have been terminated at that point pursuant to the “Three Strikes” policy without issue. However, rather than immediately terminating his employment, Petitioner was given another opportunity by Respondent. In Petitioner's words, two managers "stuck their necks out" for Petitioner and gave him "another shot." Petitioner was clearly warned in the January 6, 2010, warning letter, however, that "If you receive another [disciplinary letter], whether a warning letter or performance reminder, within 12 months, you will be terminated." The letter went on to state that Petitioner's employment with FedEx was "precarious," and that one more warning letter or performance reminder at any time during the next 12 months would result in his termination. FedEx's Prohibition on Use of Cell Phones Respondent's Safety Manual Policy 4-5 strictly prohibits drivers/couriers from using electronic devices while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner acknowledged he was fully aware of Respondent's policy about using electronic devices while operating a vehicle. Indeed, Petitioner received and signed an Electronic Devices Memorandum, authored by the district manager responsible for the Tallahassee station. The memorandum specifically lists cellular telephones as a type of electronic device that may not be used while a driver is operating a FedEx vehicle. The memorandum further provides: "If you carry a cellular phone or Nextel with you when you are on the road, you MUST keep it in the rear cargo area of your vehicle so that you are not tempted to use it while operating the vehicle," and "You are NOT to have your phone on your person while on the clock." (Emphasis in original) The memorandum also prohibits the use of "I-POD type products" and "any other device or activity that would cause distraction while operating a vehicle." The memorandum concludes with the admonition that: "Violations of this policy will be addressed by management using Policy 2-5 of The People Manual (Acceptable Conduct). Violations may result in disciplinary actions up to and including termination." The Mahan Drive Delivery On May 6, 2010, Petitioner made a delivery to the building complex at 2727 Mahan Drive in Tallahassee. Petitioner had his cell phone with him in the FedEx vehicle, and was using the phone to listen to music. Respondent's operations manager, Tony Henderson ("Henderson"), was present at the complex that morning and was parked in the parking lot. As Petitioner was pulling into the complex, Henderson personally observed Petitioner operating his cell phone while driving the FedEx vehicle. Petitioner pulled up to a building in the complex, delivered his packages, and then left the complex. Henderson attempted to follow Petitioner in his vehicle, but was unable to keep up with him. Henderson then proceeded to the Tallahassee station, where Petitioner arrived approximately one hour later. Upon his arrival at the station, Henderson confronted Petitioner and asked whether he had been using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. Petitioner responded that he was not talking or texting on his cell phone, but rather had been changing the radio station on the phone. Petitioner was thereafter placed on paid suspension pending an investigation into whether he had violated Respondent's policy by using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. Two days later, on May 8, 2010, Henderson issued a warning letter to Petitioner for violation of the policy prohibiting the use of electronic devices while operating a FedEx vehicle. This was, again, Petitioner's third warning letter within a 12 month period. Consistent with Respondent's Acceptable Conduct Policy, as well as the prior warning to Petitioner, Respondent terminated Petitioner's employment. On May 17, 2010, Petitioner wrote a statement concerning the events of May 6, 2010. In that statement, Petitioner admitted to using his cell phone to listen to music while operating a FedEx vehicle.1 Allegations of Disparate Treatment Petitioner has alleged that he was subjected to different terms and conditions because of his race, and that white employees that violated Policy 4-5 were treated less harshly than he. Petitioner cited two instances of cell phone usage by FedEx employees in support of this claim. On or about January 29, 2010, Henderson personally observed FedEx courier Dan Workman operating a FedEx vehicle. Workman is white. Judging by what he saw, Henderson believed Workman might have been engaged in a conversation on a cell phone while operating the FedEx vehicle. Henderson contacted another FedEx operations manager, Sam Karvelas, and asked him to confront Workman about using a cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle. When confronted by Karvelas, Workman admitted that he had been talking on his cell phone while operating the vehicle. On February 1, 2010, Workman received a warning letter for using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. On October 15, 2008, Henderson personally observed FedEx courier Elizabeth Christian talking on a cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle. Christian is white. On that same day, Christian received a warning letter for using an electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. At hearing, Petitioner testified that a white FedEx employee, Blake Fitzsimmons, had recounted to Petitioner that he had been observed by Henderson using a cell phone while operating his FedEx vehicle, and had not received any form of discipline. However, Henderson's testimony on this issue was that prior to Petitioner's termination from FedEx, Henderson had never personally observed Fitzsimmons using a cell phone or electronic device while operating a FedEx vehicle. On cross- examination, Petitioner admitted he had no personal knowledge of whether Henderson has ever shown preferential treatment to white employees over black employees. Basis for the Retaliation Claim Approximately three to four months before Petitioner received the warning letter for using his cell phone while operating a FedEx vehicle, Petitioner claims he saw Henderson alone with a female FedEx employee. Petitioner testified he arrived at the Tallahassee station at 3:00 a.m., and saw Henderson leaning over the driver's side door of a truck. Petitioner testified "I can't say what I saw, but I saw him -- when they saw me, they parted ways." Petitioner further testified, "Pretty much he leaned over in the driver's side door and whatever they did, if they kissed, they kissed. I'm not sure what they did, but, yes, that's what I saw at three in the morning." Petitioner told several of his friends and co-workers what he had seen but did not report the incident to anybody in management or Human Resources.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 2011.

USC (1) 42 U.S.C 2000e Florida Laws (4) 120.569120.68760.10760.11
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LAKEYTA GIVENS vs U S MORTGAGE, INC., 03-003590 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 02, 2003 Number: 03-003590 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 2004

The Issue Whether the Respondent engaged in employment practices in violation of Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Lakeyta Givens, is a black female, and was first employed by the Respondent on February 6, 2001. The Petitioner had no experience in the business of re- financing real property; however, the Petitioner was trained by the Respondent, and was given one promotion and a pay-raise. She became sufficiently knowledgeable and productive that she was tasked to train other employees. After she had been with the company for nearly two years, her supervisor wanted to step down for personal reasons. This opened up a position with greater responsibility and increased pay. The Respondent was a closely held corporation owned and operated by Anthony and Rachel Catanzeriti. Anthony Catanzeriti was the manager of the office and was there daily. His wife, Rachel, was the president of the corporation and was not there on a daily basis. She did, however, exercise primary control over the company. Anthony Catanzeriti asked the Petitioner if she would be interested in moving into the supervisor's position at a salary of $15.00 per hour, a raise of $5.00 per hour. The Petitioner indicated that she would be pleased to make the move. Mr. Catanzeriti indicated that his wife would have to approve the promotion, and that he would talk to her about the promotion. There was no action on the promotion for a long time. The Petitioner was concerned about the status of her promotion. The Petitioner heard during this time that Rachel Catanzeriti had stated that she "would not have a nasty nigger work in the company." The Petitioner asked to speak about her promotion with Mr. and Ms. Catanzeriti, but because of various mutual indispositions a meeting was delayed. On February 3, 2003, Rachel Catanzeriti came in to do some personnel work, and a meeting was arranged at which Mr. Catanzeriti was not present. From the content and progression of this meeting, it was clear that the Petitioner was concerned that she was not being promoted because of her race. The Petitioner immediately confronted Ms. Catanzeriti about the purported racial slur. Ms. Catanzeriti denied having made such a remark; however, she immediately became angry. The meeting never addressed the promotion because of Ms. Catanzeriti's anger. In an effort to de-escalate the situation, the Petitioner walked out of the office. Ms. Catanzeriti followed the Petitioner out of the office and between buildings continuing the heated exchange. The Petitioner asked her to discuss the racial epithet, and Ms. Catanzeriti, replied, "Let's talk about your big fat ass." Very shortly after this comment and within the same argument, Ms. Catanzeriti fired the Petitioner. Subsequently, the supervisor's position was filed by a white female, whom the Petitioner had previously trained. The Petitioner's work record was good, and her attendance was regular. She was unable to find employment until April 2004. After the Petitioner had been fired, U S Mortgage, Inc., was closed by the Office of the State's Attorney. The Petitioner reported that Mr. Catanzeriti was currently imprisoned out of state, and Ms. Catanzeriti was living in Texas.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter its final order directing that the Respondent desist from discriminatory employment practices and awarding the Petitioner $4,800.00 in damages for lost wages. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lakeyta Givens Post Office Box 293 Sanderson, Florida 32087 U S Mortgage, Inc. 28 West Macclenny Avenue, Suite 14 Macclenny, Florida 32063 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 760.11
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CAROLYN SIMMONS vs INVERNESS INN, AND MR. CRETKO BLAZEVSKI, 93-002349 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Inverness, Florida Apr. 28, 1993 Number: 93-002349 Latest Update: Nov. 15, 1993

The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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WILLIAM C. EAGLE vs S. R. PERROTT, INC., 95-001788 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Daytona Beach, Florida Apr. 12, 1995 Number: 95-001788 Latest Update: Aug. 18, 1995

Findings Of Fact Based on all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a claim by petitioner, William C. Eagle (petitioner or Eagle), that in February 1994 he was denied employment as a delivery helper by respondent, S. R. Perrott, Inc., on account of a real or perceived handicap. According to the complaint, at the time the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, petitioner was suffering from a "soft tissue injury" from a "work related accident with his former employer." Because the evidence shows that in February 1994 petitioner did not enjoy in some measure the full and normal use of his physical facilities, he was a handicapped person, at least temporarily, within the meaning of the law. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Respondent is a beer distributor in Ormond Beach, Florida. Whether respondent employs "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" so as to be subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, is not of record. In February 1994, petitioner learned of an opening for a delivery helper at respondent's plant. The position required that the employee unload beer kegs weighing 167 pounds from a delivery truck onto a dolly and then push the dolly into the business establishment. At that point, the employee would have to bend over and lift the keg off of the dolly to a waist-high position and place it in the desired location. Empty kegs would then be loaded onto the dolly and taken back to the truck and loaded. Since a truck would typically make up to 30 to 40 stops per day, the helper was required to engage in repetitious bending, twisting and lifting of heavy objects. After filing an application with respondent, petitioner was interviewed by respondent's general manager, Gary Connors, on February 23, 1994. During the interview, petitioner failed to disclose that he had suffered a back injury on a previous job, he was receiving worker's compensation benefits, he was then being treated by a doctor, and because of the injury, he was, at least arguably and temporarily, a handicapped individual. Without these undisclosed facts, Connors believed Eagle was qualified for the job and told him to report to work the next morning as a delivery helper. Like every other applicant, however, Eagle was also told that the job was contingent on his successfully passing a pre- employment physical examination. On the same morning that petitioner began work, or February 24, 1994, Connors contacted the office of Dr. James W. Bennett, a local chiropractic physician who conducted employment physicals for respondent, to set up an appointment for Eagle. During his telephone conversation with Dr. Bennett, Connors learned that Eagle was being treated by Dr. Bennett for a back injury suffered on his previous job, and that he had been examined by Dr. Bennett on February 14, 1994, or ten days earlier. Dr. Bennett accordingly saw no need to re-examine Eagle, and he advised Connors that Eagle could aggravate "an existing, active injury," and that he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Based on this information, Connors immediately spoke with the plant manager, Richard Shaffer, and instructed him to recall Eagle from his route and terminate his employment. In making this employment decision, Connors was not motivated by discriminatory animus, but rather he made the decision solely because of Eagle's inability to pass a pre-employment physical examination, a prerequisite for employment for all job applicants. Indeed, at that time, while Connors knew that Eagle had a pre-existing back injury through conversations with Dr. Bennett, he neither knew, or had reason to believe, that the injury constituted a handicap under the law. Shaffer recalled Eagle from his route and discharged him around noon on February 24, 1994. Since Shaffer did not know the reason for the termination, he told Eagle to check back in a few days and he would find out the specific reason for his discharge. A few days later, Eagle returned and met with Connors who told him that he was discharged because he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Several months later, Eagle filed his charge of discrimination. At hearing, Eagle denied that he was handicapped and asserted that as of February 1994 he "felt fine" physically. Indeed, he described in some detail the type of heavy manual labor he had performed with another employer up to the time he applied for the position. He also contended that the injury was minor and would not interfere with a delivery helper's tasks. But testimony from Dr. Bennett established that as of February 24, 1994, Eagle had "a current, precarious injury," namely, moderate chronic lumbar sprain strain, that work restrictions with his former employer had been recommended, and that Eagle was "highly likely" to worsen that injury should he engage in the job activities required of a delivery helper. This testimony was not credibly contradicted. Although Eagle was later discharged from Dr. Bennett's care on April 1, 1994, Eagle could not pass the pre-employment physical examination on February 24, 1994, when the employment decision was made, and thus he did not qualify for the job. Eagle further suggested at hearing that, assuming he was handicapped, respondent failed to take reasonable steps to accommodate his disability. But Eagle made no request for accommodation either at the time he sought the position or after he learned the reason for his termination. Even if Eagle had requested accommodation, respondent had no positions in the business that did not require some heavy lifting except for a secretarial slot, for which Eagle was not qualified. Moreover, respondent's general manager did not know, or even believe, that Eagle was handicapped and thus may have required accommodation. Then, too, in order to accommodate Eagle, respondent would have had to make fundamental alterations in its work program or even create a new job. Eagle did not rebut this showing at hearing, and he failed to respond with any evidence regarding his individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations by respondent within the restrictions imposed by Dr. Bennett. There is no evidence regarding the compensation Eagle would have received as a delivery helper. The record also fails to establish his compensation since that time, and thus there is no basis on which to make a finding as to lost wages. Whether petitioner seeks reinstatement as a delivery helper is also not of record.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1788 Petitioner: Petitioner filed an "order" with nine unnumbered paragraphs containing a mixture of proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5 and 8. 6-8. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. 9. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence or a conclusion of law. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the more credible evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Daniel Williams, Esquire P. O. Box 1007 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Winston K. Borkowski, Esquire P. O. Box 1725 Ormond Beach, Florida 32175 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149

Florida Laws (3) 120.57760.10760.11
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CURTIS A. GOLDEN, FIRST JUDICIAL CIRCUIT STATE vs. ART`S MOTORHOMES AND A. C. "ART" MURPH, 83-001441 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001441 Latest Update: Aug. 24, 1983

The Issue Whether there is probable cause for petitioner to bring an action against respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?

Findings Of Fact Raymond Howard Hildebrand, Jr., telephoned A. C. "Art" Murph in response to a newspaper ad, and, on November 17, 1981, signed an agreement with Mr. Murph under which, in exchange for title to and possession of the Hildebrands' 1979 Dodge Leisure Craft, Mr. Murph agreed to make specified monthly payments to Pen Air Federal Credit Union (PAFCU) until he could sell the recreation vehicle, and to satisfy the PAFCU lien with the sale proceeds, when it was sold. Under their agreement, Mr. Murph was to retain any sale proceeds in excess of what was needed to satisfy PAFCU's lien, as a commission on the sale. Mr. Hildebrand left the recreation vehicle with respondent on November 17, 1981. When the December payment on the loan PAFCU had made to the Hildebrands, the loan respondent had undertaken to repay, was overdue, Mr. Hildebrand got a notice to that effect. He got a similar notice in January. Respondent made these payments belatedly. On December 10, 1981, respondent sold the Hildebrands' vehicle to a third party who at that time paid respondent, in full, a price that exceeded the amount owed PAFCU by almost $2,000. Mr. Hildebrand happened to see the motor home parked at a neighbor's house on January 25, 1982, and, on inquiring, learned of the preceding month's sale. In a conversation with respondent on January 27, 1982, he was told everything would be straightened out in 10 to 14 days. Respondent told him somebody else had written respondent a bad check so that he needed the proceeds of the sale of the Hildebrands' motor home for some other purpose. Only after the Hildebrands engaged counsel and incurred legal fees did respondent pay PAFCU what was owed, more than a year later. It took that long for the new owner to receive title, as well. Sylvia Galloway's parents placed a motor home with respondent on consignment last May, and respondent sold it in June of 1982. Also in June, Ms. Galloway's parents received a check representing their agreed share of the sale proceeds. Only several months later, however, did the financing institution receive the moneys owed it, and it was Christmas before the new owners got title.

Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner find probable cause to institute judicial proceedings against respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr. Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Art Murph and Art's Motor Homes 6813 Pine Forest Road Pensacola, Florida 32504 Curtis Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501

Florida Laws (6) 120.57501.201501.203501.204501.207812.014
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CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD vs. MARTIN FRANCIS MANN, 84-003834 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003834 Latest Update: Aug. 13, 1985

Recommendation In consideration of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter its final order: Finding the Respondent guilty of Count One of the Administrative Complaint by (a) violating section 489.129(e), Fla. Stat. (1981), by aiding and abetting an uncertified and unregistered person to evade the licensing provisions of the Contracting Act, and (b) by violating section 489.129(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (1981), by knowingly combining and conspiring with an unregistered and unlicensed person with intent to evade the provisions of the Contracting Act. Finding the Respondent not guilty of the allegations in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint. For the violations of Count One, imposing a fine of five hundred dollars ($500). DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of May, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Martin F. Mann 2216 Bayshore Garden Parkway Bradenton, Florida 33507 Simon Rosin, Esquire Pflugner, Rosin & Hendricks Post Office Box 1918 Sarasota, Florida 33578 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board P.O. Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee,, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57489.129
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