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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs STEVEN A. FIELD, 97-005039 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Oct. 29, 1997 Number: 97-005039 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 2000

The Issue The issue presented for decision in this case is whether Respondent should be subjected to discipline for the violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued by Petitioner on April 24, 1997.

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Florida, pursuant to Section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 458, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 20.43(3), Florida Statutes, Petitioner has contracted with the Agency for Health Care Administration to provide consumer complaint, investigative, and prosecutorial services required by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance, councils, or boards. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, having been issued license no. ME 00276678. At the time of Patient R.M.’s treatment, Respondent practiced orthopedic medicine. Respondent voluntarily ceased his orthopedic surgery practice in December 1994. He is currently employed as an assistant professor in the Department of Occupational Medicine at the University of South Florida College of Public Health. On July 28, 1993, Patient R.M., a 41-year-old female, presented to Respondent for an evaluation of right knee pain. Patient R.M. told Respondent that on November 1, 1992, she twisted her knee at home and heard a pop. Prior to this event, she had no knee problems. She told Respondent that she went to the emergency room at Brandon Hospital and was evaluated by the emergency room physician. The emergency room physician prescribed pain medication and placed her in a knee brace, gave her crutches, and advised her to see an orthopedic physician. Patient R.M. told Respondent that she had continued to experience swelling, occasional locking and giving-way of her knee over the intervening months. Respondent examined Patient R.M.'s right knee. He noted no obvious effusion or swelling, but did note tenderness over the medial joint line. Respondent noted that the right knee had a "full ROM" (range of motion), but his records did not quantify the patient's range of motion. Respondent noted a "markedly positive" McMurray's test. McMurray's test evaluates the stability of the knee meniscus. A positive McMurray's test is consistent with injury to meniscal structures. Respondent's records indicated that X-rays of the knee revealed no abnormalities. Respondent did not record the details of the X-rays, such as which planes were pictured or whether the X-rays were of the patella femoral joint or a standing lateral view of the knee. Respondent's records indicated to no examination or testing of the patella femoral joint. Dr. Harry Steinman, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, opined that patella femoral problems can masquerade as meniscal problems in some situations, and that it is thus "mandatory" for the orthopedist to examine the patella femoral joint to rule it out as the locus of pathology. On the basis of his examination and Patient R.M.'s subjective complaints, Respondent's diagnostic impression was a tear of the medial meniscus, and his recommendation was an arthroscopic examination to evaluate and repair the tear. Respondent discussed his examination findings and treatment recommendation with Patient R.M. and explained the surgical procedure, including possible risks, complications, and alternatives. Patient R.M. subsequently signed a surgical consent form acknowledging that Respondent explained the necessity of the surgery, its advantages and disadvantages, its possible complications, and possible alternative modes of treatment. On August 6, 1993, Respondent performed an arthroscopic repair of the meniscus of Patient R.M.'s right knee. Respondent placed two sutures within the body of the meniscus, attaching it to the posterior medial capsule. Respondent made a second incision in the posterior medial aspect of the right knee. The posterior incision allowed Respondent to expose the capsule of the knee joint so that he could directly view the sutures as he passed them from the inside to the outside of the knee capsule, where he tied down the sutures and repaired the torn meniscus. This direct visualization was designed to ensure that any neurovascular structures were not impinged by the sutures. On August 11, 1993, Patient R.M. returned to Respondent for her first post-surgery examination. Respondent noted that the patient seemed to be doing well and her wounds were healing without difficulty. Respondent prescribed a Bledsoe brace, an articulated brace that allows for various ranges of motion, and advised Patient R.M. that she could begin partial weight-bearing with the use of crutches. Respondent advised Patient R.M. to return in three weeks for re-evaluation. Less than two weeks later, on August 23, 1993, Patient R.M. returned, complaining of numbness on the medial side of her right calf. On this visit, Patient R.M. was examined by Respondent's partner, Dr. Stuart Goldsmith, not Respondent. Dr. Goldsmith noted no effusion, redness, inflammation, or signs of infection. Dr. Goldsmith noted that Patient R.M. was wearing the Bledsoe brace "significantly tight," which could explain the numbness in the medial side of her calf. He advised the patient to loosen the straps on the brace, continue with range of motion exercises, and return to see Respondent in one week. Patient R.M. understood and agreed with Dr. Goldsmith's advice, and indicated she would return in one week. On September 1, 1993, Patient R.M. returned to Respondent for evaluation. She complained of decreased sensation along the medial side of her calf. Respondent noted that his evaluation revealed "what I determine to be almost normal sensation." Respondent also noted that he wondered whether Patient R.M. had a little irritation of the infrapatellar branch of the saphenous nerve at the site of the anterior medial stab wound. Respondent recommended that Patient R.M. begin range of motion exercises without the Bledsoe brace and commence physical therapy. He advised her to return in three to four weeks for re-evaluation. Patient R.M. returned two weeks later, on August 15, 1993, complaining that she heard a pop in the knee the night before. She told Respondent that she had not commenced physical therapy, but had been doing quite well prior to hearing the pop. Respondent noted that "sensation has apparently returned to normal." Respondent noted some tenderness along the medial aspect of the knee joint. He noted no effusion and a full range of motion, though again his records did not quantify the range of motion with numeric values. Respondent concluded that Patient R.M. had pulled apart some mild scar tissue, and again recommended commencement of physical therapy. He advised her to return in about one month for re-evaluation. On October 11, 1993, Patient R.M. returned to Respondent for evaluation. She continued to complain of decreased sensation along the anterior medial aspect of her right calf. She told Respondent that she had sensation, but that it was "different." Respondent noted that he wondered if the cause of this complaint might be that a portion of the infrapatellar branch of the saphenous nerve was nicked during surgery. Patient R.M. complained of pain extending from the inferior pole of her patella distally. Respondent noted that this pain was alleviated by bringing the patella medially, and that he had ordered a brace that he hoped would offer relief. Respondent advised Patient R.M. to continue therapy at home and to return in a couple of months. Patient R.M. never returned to Respondent's office. On November 16, 1993, Patient R.M. presented to Dr. John Okun, an orthopedic surgeon, for a second opinion. Dr. Okun took her history and performed an examination, including pinprick and light touch tests, and Tinel's sign, which indicates irritability of a nerve. Respondent testified that he had also performed these tests, but did not note them in his records. Dr. Okun suspected that a branch of the saphenous nerve had either been transected or caught in a suture during Respondent's operation, and believed that Patient R.M. would be best served by an exploration of the posterior aspect of the knee to see if anything could be done to restore nerve function. Dr. Okun noted that he discussed the situation at length with Patient R.M., advised her of the options, and received her assurance that she would consider the options and call him with any problems or changes. On December 3, 1993, Dr. Okun performed a surgical exploration of the nerve. He identified a loop of suture wrapped around the saphenous nerve. He removed the suture and freed the tissues surrounding the nerve. Dr. Okun followed Patient R.M.'s progress until March 1995. She generally reported improvement, but continued to complain of paresthesia and showed positive Tinel's signs in her lower leg. On March 8, 1994, Dr. Okun noted persistent nerve symptoms, and further noted that this was not surprising considering the degree of nerve compression. On May 5, 1994, Dr. Okun noted probable permanent damage to the nerve, but advised waiting another six months to one year before concluding that she had reached maximum improvement. Dr. Okun testified that, during his course of treatment, he never identified a significant patella tracking problem with Patient R.M. Dr. Okun also testified that Patient R.M. had a definite medial meniscus tear, and that "it looks like it was repaired fine" by Respondent's arthroscopic procedure. Dr. Steinman agreed at the hearing that there was a tear of the medial meniscus, and noted that Patient R.M. no longer complained of swelling, giving-way, or locking after the arthroscopic procedure. The evidence at hearing established that the surgical procedure performed by Respondent was within the standard of care. Respondent repaired a tear of the medial meniscus. The experts agreed that impingement of the saphenous nerve by a suture is a known and relatively common complication of the procedure performed by Respondent, despite the precaution of making an incision in the posterior aspect of the knee to visualize the posterior capsule. The experts further agreed that such impingement of the nerve during this procedure does not, of itself, establish that Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Petitioner's allegations thus relate to Respondent's actions prior to and after the surgical procedure itself. The Complaint alleges that, prior to surgery, Respondent failed to perform an appropriate initial examination, failed to appropriately diagnose Patient R.M.'s condition, and failed to attempt conservative therapy prior to performing surgery. Dr. Steinman testified that Respondent should have examined the patella femoral joint in order to rule that out as a cause of the patient's symptoms. While conceding that Patient R.M.'s symptoms were all consistent with meniscal pathology, and that Respondent arrived at the correct diagnosis, Dr. Steinman opined that the patient was entitled to a full examination irrespective of the final outcome, and that the standard of care required an examination of the patella femoral joint. Dr. Steinman's testimony is credited on this point. However, the impact of his critique is lessened by that fact that Respondent's diagnosis was correct, the fact that Dr. Richard Goldberger examined the records and concluded that the patient was not suffering from a patella femoral joint problem, and the fact that Dr. Okun, who actually treated Patient R.M. for more than a year, also found no reason to believe that Patient R.M. had a patella tracking problem. Dr. Goldberger further observed that Patient R.M.'s only complaint regarding patellar pain was made after the surgery, not before. Under the circumstances, the worst that can be said of Respondent is that he went directly to the true cause of Patient R.M.'s complaint without affirmatively ruling out another possible cause. The evidence established that Respondent discussed a conservative course of therapy with Patient R.M. The evidence also established that a conservative course of therapy would have accomplished no tangible improvement in the tear of the medial meniscus. Dr. Richard Goldberger testified that physical therapy was not indicated for this patient. Dr. Goldberger testified that the only reason he would recommend physical therapy in this situation would be for the peace of mind of the patient, to assure a reluctant candidate for surgery that all conservative avenues had been exhausted. Even Petitioner's expert, Dr. Steinman, agreed that he would have discussed arthroscopy with the patient after the first visit, given her stated history and examination results. Dr. Steinman testified that after the initial examination, he would not have been convinced the patient had a meniscal tear, and would have recommended other treatments to confirm the diagnosis. However, he also stated that if Respondent was firm in his diagnosis of a meniscal tear, then diagnostic arthroscopy is what orthopedic surgeons generally would recommend. Respondent noted that Patient R.M.'s right knee showed a normal range of motion, though he did not note numeric values for the range of motion. This was not a deviation from the standard of care because loss of range of motion was not related to Patient R.M.'s pathology. Under the circumstances, it was sufficient for Respondent to note that range of motion was observed and found to be normal. Respondent failed to describe the X-rays he examined in reaching his diagnosis. Again, this was not a deviation from the standard of care because the information to be found in an X-ray was unrelated to the soft tissue injury that Respondent diagnosed in Patient R.M. Under the circumstances, it was sufficient for Respondent to note that X-rays were taken, examined, and found to be normal. In summary, Petitioner failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent failed to meet the standard of care as regards his pre-operative treatment of Patient R.M. As to post-operative care, Petitioner alleges that Respondent failed to perform testing on the saphenous nerve when Patient R.M. complained of medial side numbness in the lower right leg, and failed to refer Patient R.M. to a neurologist for evaluation of a possible saphenous nerve injury. As noted above, Respondent employed a surgical technique by which he made a posterior incision in the knee, exposed the knee capsule, passed the suture from the inside to the outside of the knee, tying the suture under direct visualiztion. Respondent contended that use of this technique allowed him reasonably to assume that no injury to the saphenous nerve had occurred due to a suture being tied directly on it. This assumption explains why Respondent's post-surgery notes record his suspicions of a problem with the infrapatellar branch of the saphenous nerve. Respondent's technique would not have allowed him to observe an injury to the infrapatellar branch, because that injury would have occurred during placement of the surgical port on the medial aspect of the knee. Dr. Steinman testified that Respondent's observations were inconsistent with Patient R.M.'s complaints. He stated that the infrapatellar branch comes off the medial kneecap and travels in a medial to lateral direction. If the infrapatellar branch was interrupted, the area of numbness or abnormal sensation would have been on the lateral aspect of the patella, whereas the patient's complaints were along the anterior or medial aspect of the calf and ankle, outside the autonomous area of this nerve. Dr. Steinman testified that Patient R.M.'s complaints could lead only to the conclusion that the sartorial branch of the saphenous nerve had been jeopardized in some way. Dr. Steinman observed that Respondent appeared aware that there was a nerve problem, but that he was in error as to which nerve. Dr. Steinman testified that Respondent should have commenced some form of testing for a saphenous nerve problem no later than the October 11, 1993, visit, when she reiterated her complaints of decreased sensation along the medial aspect of her right calf and Respondent noted for the second time his suspicions regarding a saphenous nerve problem. Dr. Okun testified that if he had performed a meniscus repair and the patient presented these symptoms, he would probably have gone back into the knee and tried to snip the suture or at least explore the incision. However, he also testified that if he were comfortable that he had done everything properly and there was not a very high chance that he had trapped a nerve, he would wait for a period of three to six months to see if the problem would resolve on its own. Dr. Okun was unsure whether a definite standard of care could be stated for this situation. Dr. Okun also testified that whatever damage the nerve sustained was probably done at the time of the initial surgery, and would not get worse from having the constriction of the suture around it. He stated this was another reason why he might wait to perform a second procedure. Dr. Steinman strongly disagreed that the surgeon's degree of confidence in his work should play any role in his post-surgical treatment. The fact that the patient has complained of symptoms in a problematic area is evidence enough that there may be a problem, particularly where the complication is as common as this one, regardless of the surgeon's conviction that his suture missed the nerve. Dr. Goldberger testified that Respondent met the standard of care. Respondent was aware of the complaints of numbness and mentioned them and their severity in his notes. Dr. Goldberger stated that the saphenous is a sensory nerve and is not considered vital. Because the nerve has no motor function, the physician must rely on the subjective complaints of the patient regarding the symptoms. Some patients accept the symptoms and do not feel they are impaired by them. Dr. Goldberger testified that it was reasonable for Respondent to observe the patient's clinical course and pay attention to her complaints, without taking aggressive action. The weight of the evidence leads to a finding that Respondent might have been more aggressive in treating what he suspected was a saphenous nerve problem, and might have referred Patient R.M. to a neurologist to rule out a systemic problem, but that Respondent did not clearly deviate from the standard of care in choosing a more conservative course or failing to make a referral. Dr. Steinman severely criticized Respondent's post- surgical records in their failure to thoroughly document the sensory tests that Respondent testified he performed on Patient R.M. Respondent was not charged with failure to maintain adequate medical records. Thus, it is not necessary to address the merits of Dr. Steinman's critique of Respondent's medical records.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Health, Board of Medicine, enter a final order dismissing the April 24, 1997, Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Steven A. Field, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: John E. Terrel, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Christopher J. Schulte, Esquire Shear, Newman, Hahn, Rosenkranz, P.A. 201 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 2378 Tampa, Florida 33601-2378 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Tanya Williams, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.5720.43455.225458.331
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PAUL A. MEIER vs ALARM SYSTEMS CONTRACTOR, 89-005209 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 20, 1989 Number: 89-005209 Latest Update: Feb. 26, 1990

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is entitled to a passing grade on his examination for certification as an electrical contractor.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner took the electrical and alarm system contractor examination in January, 1989. Petitioner failed the examination. Petitioner timely challenged one question of relevance. The question that Petitioner challenges is question 34. If he were to receive a passing grade on this question or if the question were discarded, Petitioner would pass the examination. The challenged question is: All cut ends of rigid nonmetallic conduits shall be inside and outside to remove rough edges. trimmed reamed shaped sanded Petitioner answered "(B)." The answer for which Respondent gave credit is "(A)." The National Electrical Code describes the finishing processes for rigid nonmetallic conduit and rigid metal conduit as follows: Section 347-5. Trimming. All cut ends shall be trimmed inside and outside to remove rough edges. Section 346-7(a). Reamed. All cut ends of conduits shall be reamed or otherwise finished to remove rough edges. The National Electrical Code also uses the phrase "reamed or otherwise finished" with respect to intermediate metal conduit and electrical metallic tubing. Sections 345-8 and 348- 11. The first article of the National Electrical Code is devoted to definitions. Under Article 100, the scope of the definitions article is explained as follows: Scope. Only definitions of terms peculiar to and essential to the proper use of this Code are included. In general, only those terms used in two or more articles are defined in Article 100. . . . Part A of this article contains definitions intended to apply wherever the terms are used throughout this Coded. . . Article 100 contains no definition of "trim" or "ream," although the term "ream" is used in two or more articles: namely, Articles 345, 346, and 348. The term "ream" is the word commonly used in the relevant industry to describe the process by which a person eliminates the rough edges on the cut end of a rigid; nonmetallic conduit. The term "ream" is so used by, among others, practicing professional electrical and alarm system contractors. The term "ream" is also so used by manufacturers of "conduit reamers," which are packaged and labelled under that name. These "conduit reamers" are obviously designed for use with PVC and other rigid nonmetallic conduit. By contrast, the term "trim" is rarely used to describe this deburring process.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Professional Regulation enter a Final Order assigning Petitioner a passing grade on the January, 1989, electrical and alarm systems contractor' s examination. ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26 day of February, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Robert S. Hayes 437 W. Vine Street Kissimmee, FL 34741 Jack L. McRay, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Pat Ard, Executive Director Electrical Contractors Licensing Board Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792

Florida Laws (3) 120.57455.217489.511
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs HAL M. TOBIAS, 10-009318MPI (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port St. Lucie, Florida Sep. 28, 2010 Number: 10-009318MPI Latest Update: Oct. 31, 2013

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner can prove Medicaid overpayments to Respondent and, if so, how much Petitioner is entitled to recoup.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is a licensed physician with an office in Stuart. He is Board-certified in neurology and pain medicine. During the audit period and until recently, Respondent was an enrolled Medicaid provider. The audit in this case involved 237 claims on behalf of 30 recipients. Of these 237 claims, Petitioner determined that 59 were overpayments. After determining the total of these 59 overpayments, Petitioner referred the file to a statistician, who extended these 59 overpayments to the total overpayment shown in the Final Audit Report. The statistician based the extension on generally accepted statistical methods that he explained, at the hearing, to everyone's satisfaction, as evidenced by the fact that no one asked to hear more. During the statistician's testimony, the parties agreed that, if the overpayments in the Final Audit Report are altered in the Final Order, Petitioner will refer the new determinations to a statistician for another extension, based again, of course, on generally accepted statistical methods. Recipients will be identified by the numbers assigned them in Petitioner Exhibit 7. The only recipients addressed are those for whom Petitioner has determined overpayments. Nine billings are at issue with Recipient 1. On March 8, 2007, Respondent saw Recipient 1 and billed a CPT Code 99245 office consultation. Petitioner downcoded this to a CPT Code 99244 office consultation and generated an overpayment of $20.39. The CPT describes these office consultation codes as follows: 99244 Office consultation for a new or established patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of moderate complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99245 Office consultation for a new or established patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of high complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 80 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Recipient 1 was the victim of a severe beating at the hands of her husband in July 2006. Petitioner's determinations concerning this case partly arose out of the failure of its consultant to find in Respondent's medical records a date of incident, but Respondent provided this information at the hearing. Recipient 1 suffered fractures of the skull and orbital bone from the spousal battery. Continuously since the incident, she had suffered headaches; vertigo, especially when blowing her nose; memory loss; and a complete inability to use her left hand. The initial office consultation was on March 8, 2007, and Respondent billed it correctly, given the complexity of the medical decisionmaking. She had five diagnoses, and Respondent gave her 11 recommendations. Considerable time and effort were required of Respondent to address her case at this initial office consultation, for which there is thus no overpayment. On March 20, 2007, Recipient 1 underwent an MRI of the brain, for which Respondent billed a CPT Code 70553, which is for brain MRIs with and without dye or contrast. Petitioner downcoded this to a CPT Code 70551, with a reduction of $76.59, because Respondent had ordered only an MRI of the brain without dye. Respondent produced at hearing a copy of the prescription, which cryptically states: "MRI Brain c /o contrast." The "c" and the "o" have dashes over them. The "c" with a dash is a traditional abbreviation of cum, so it means "with." The meaning of the dash over the "o" is unclear. Lacking a conjunctive symbol in the space between the letters, it appears that the combination means "without," rather than "with" and "without." The downcoding is appropriate, and the overpayment is $76.59. On the same date, Recipient 1 underwent an MRI of the neck and spine without dye. Petitioner denied this billing, which was for $233.47, for lack of medical necessity due to the absence of appropriate pain symptoms, especially radiating pain. At the hearing, Respondent explained that Recipient 1 suffered from moderate to severe stenosis, and he needed to rule out neck involvement in the patient's inability to use her left arm. The neck and spine MRI was medically necessary, so there is no overpayment for this test. On May 2, 2007, Recipient 1 underwent a muscle test, one limb--billed as CPT Code 95860; a sense nerve conduction test--billed as CPT Code 95904; and a motor nerve conduction test--billed as CPT 95903. On the next day, she underwent the identical tests--all billed under the identical codes. Petitioner denied all of these, and generated overpayments of $40.81, $73.05, $65.60, $40.81, $73.05, and $65.60, respectively. Petitioner denied these tests because Respondent had not ordered them. This does not seem to have been inadvertent on Respondent's part. None of these tests appeared to be part of Respondent's treatment plan for this patient. Petitioner thus determined correctly that these six sums are overpayments. Five billings are at issue with Recipient 3. The first is an office consultation on April 9, 2008. Petitioner has downcoded this from CPT Code 99245 to CPT Code 99244 due to a lack of complexity of decisionmaking. This generates an overpayment of $20.18. Respondent testified that Recipient 3 was a 63-year- old patient with "total body pain." Respondent testified that the patient complained of neck pain, low back pain, and chronic pain, all emanating from a bicycle accident five years earlier that had necessitated the placement of a titanium rod in the patient's leg. However, the eight diagnoses and 18 recommendations do not, on these facts, merit the complexity of decisionmaking claimed by Respondent in his billing. Petitioner has proved an overpayment of $20.18. Recipient 3 raises the issue of the reimbursability of an sNCT administered by Respondent. On April 21, Recipient 3 underwent two procedures billed as sense nerve conduction tests under CPT Code 95904 at $143.70 each. Two days later, Recipient 3 underwent two procedures billed under the same name and CPT Code at $141.70 and $143.70. Petitioner has disallowed all four of these billed amounts. CPT Codes 95900-95904 describe nerve conduction tests that measure the nerve's response to an electrical stimulation in terms of speed, size, and shape. CPT Code 95904 is "nerve conduction, amplitude and latency/velocity study, each nerve; sensory." A procedure meeting the definition of CPT Code 95904 must measure the nerve's response in terms of amplitude and latency/velocity. Amplitude is a measure of size. Latency is a measure of time of travel, so, provided travel distance is known, as it typically is, velocity, or speed, may be derived from latency. The device used by Respondent for all of the sense nerve conduction tests that he billed as CPT Code 95904 was an Axon II device. The inventor of the device testified at the hearing and explained how conventional sense nerve conduction tests, which were developed during World War II, are appropriate for the detection of gross injuries because they detect damage in the large nerve fibers. Fifty to 100 times smaller than these large fibers are the small nerve fibers, which transmit pain. Among these fibers are the fast-transmitting A-delta fibers and the slow-transmitting fibers are C-fibers. The Axon II focuses on the activity of the A-delta fibers. Originally, the witness produced a neurometer that relied on patient response to the application of increasing voltage to the point that the nerve produced a response in the form of a stimulus. Seven years later, in 2002, the witness added a potentiometer, or voltage meter, to allow what he terms a psychophysical assessment of a sensory nerve conduction test that applies electricity and records amplitude, but not latency or velocity. The witness claims that the A-delta fibers are too small for a useful test of latency or velocity. Among A-delta fibers, the only useful parameter for measurement is amplitude. He added that, similarly, the shape of the signal emanating from the nerve is also irrelevant when dealing with the smaller A- delta fibers. Whatever larger issues of medical necessity that may attach to the Axon II device, the issue in this case is whether it may be billed under Florida Medicaid law, which reimburses only those services designated in Chapter 2, Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook. Pursuant to this requirement, Respondent billed the sNCTs that he performed with the Axon II device under CPT Code 95904. But, as noted above, this code requires at least a measure of latency and possibly measures of latency and velocity, and the sNCTs do not provide latency or velocity data. Respondent thus miscoded all of the sNCT procedures that he performed in this case. The sNCTs performed with the Axon II device are described by CPT Code 95999, which is assigned to unlisted neurological diagnostic procedures, and Code G0255, which is a unique code for sNCTs. If the sNCTs performed in this case were properly coded only under CPT Code 95999, another issue would emerge because the fee schedule for this code in the Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook bears an "R" code. This means that the provider performing a procedure falling into the residual category of CPT Code 95999 may submit "either documentation of medical necessity for the procedure performed. . . or information . . . in order to review and price the procedure correctly." Physician Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, p. 3-3. It is unnecessary to determine whether Respondent complied with the "by-report procedure" established for procedures classified within CPT Code 95999, or whether, consistent with the de novo nature of the proceeding, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, Respondent could first present such evidence at hearing. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) created CPT Code G0255 for sNCTs because it determined that the devices producing this data were not medically necessary, and Medicare and Medicaid would not reimburse claims for these procedures. On March 19, 2004, CMS revised its National Coverage Determinations Manual regarding sNCTs. Noting that these procedures are different from the assessment of nerve conduction velocity, amplitude, and latency, section 160.23 of the manual states that providers may not use codes for tests eliciting nerve conduction velocity, latency, or amplitude for sNCTs. CMS has clearly expressed its intent that, although falling within the residual CPT Code 95999 procedures, sNCTs are ineligible for reimbursement, even by the "by-report procedure." Petitioner thus correctly disallowed the four procedures performed on April 21 and 23, 2008, because they were miscoded and are ineligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Recipient 3 raises another recurring issue. This one concerns an H-Reflex Test, CPT Code 95934. For Recipient 3, it was billed on May 8, 2008, for $27.49. Petitioner properly disallowed the billing because the procedure was not done. Respondent concedes that he never performed an H-Reflex Test on an upper extremity and explains that an inexperienced office worker misconstrued a handwritten mark indicative of a negative to mean that the test had in fact been ordered and conducted. The issue on the H-Reflex Test is not whether Respondent was initially entitled to reimbursement--it was not. The issues are 1) whether this overpayment may be extended to the larger total overpayment determined in this case and 2) whether Respondent has already reimbursed Petitioner for this overpayment of $27.49, if not considerably more. The answer to the first question is no, and the answer to the second question is probably not. The bottom line is that Petitioner may add $27.49 to the total overpayment, but may not include this sum in the extension calculations due to Respondent's timely correction of this billing error. Respondent discovered that his office had wrongly billed this procedure on 28 different occasions, but he (or his wife/office manager) informed Petitioner of this fact prior to the audit. Among the 30 patients randomly selected for the audit, four of them had these incorrect billings for an H-Reflex Test on an upper extremity. For obvious reasons, corrections after the start of an audit may not be allowed, but a timely correction remedies the overbilling, as though it had never taken place. Respondent contends that the situation is even more complicated. Respondent's wife testified that she voided the claims on Petitioner's automated electronic claims paying process, which is the proper procedure, but, for some reason, all other procedures performed on the same day as the procedure date reported for the H-Reflex Tests were also voided. If so, it would mean that Respondent has already reimbursed Petitioner for the $27.49 erroneous billing, and Petitioner must credit Respondent--and possibly extend the credit--for any other allowable procedures performed on the same date. For Recipient 3 on May 8, 2008, for instance, this would amount to a direct credit of $107.78 for the two other allowable procedures performed on the same day that the H-Reflex Test was reported as performed. Respondent's wife failed to detail these wrongfully aggregated voids, nor did anyone on Petitioner's side of the hearing room have any idea what she was talking about. On this record, it is impossible to credit the testimony so as to require Petitioner to restore the value of other procedures billed on the same date as the H-Reflex Test (here, $107.78), extend this value to a much higher credit, or even restore the value of the H-Reflex Test itself ($27.49). Three billings are at issue with Recipient 6. Two of them are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on February 27, 2008. They were billed at $141.70 and $143.70, respectively. For the reasons discussed above, these are miscoded and are ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The third issue involves an office visit on April 3, 2008, which Respondent billed under CPT Code 99211. Respondent admitted at the hearing that he lacked documentation for this office visit, so Petitioner properly disallowed the $12.48 associated with it. One billing is at issue with Recipient 7. It is a brain MRI with and without dye, which is billed on May 23, 2007, under CPT Code 70553. Petitioner properly disallowed the entire $410.85 because it was obviously double-billed, and Petitioner allowed the "other" procedure. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 9. On November 2, 2007, Respondent billed a neck and spine MRI without dye as CPT Code 72141 and a lumbar spine MRI without dye as CPT Code 72148. On November 13, 2007, Respondent billed a head angiography without dye as CPT Code 70544. Citing a lack of medical necessity, Petitioner denied all of these items, which amount to $233.47, $236.65, and $300.09, respectively. At the time of the procedures in question, Respondent had been seeing this 37-year-old patient for only one month. Another physician had referred the patient, who, for three months, had been suffering from headaches in the right frontal temporal area. The pain was severe enough to cause the patient to go to the hospital emergency room three times. Finally, the emergency room physicians instructed the patient not to come to the emergency room, and they referred him to a neurologist--who had been dead for two years at the time of the referral. The emergency room physicians had prescribed Dilaudin, but the patient, who was also on a blood thinner, presented to Respondent with the need for a full neurological workup. He was a construction worker and needed to return to work. Respondent ordered the angiography to rule out vascular malformation, which could have caused the headaches and could be fatal. Respondent ordered the MRIs to assess significant anatomical problems and rule out metastatic disease. These three procedures were medically necessary, so there is no overpayment due in connection with them. One billing is at issue with Recipient 11. On January 10, 2007, Respondent billed an office consultation under CPT Code 99243. Petitioner allowed only an office visit, not an office consultation, resulting in an overpayment of $15.33. Respondent has not contested this adjustment, which appears to be correct. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 15. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on March 4, 2008, and two procedures done on March 24, 2008. Two of the procedures were billed at $141.70 and two were billed at $143.70. For the reasons discussed above, these are miscoded and are ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 16. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on January 22, 2008, and two procedures done on March 5, 2008. They are billed the same as those described in the preceding paragraph. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 17. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for one procedure done on March 17, 2008, and two procedures done on March 19, 2008. They are billed at $141.70 for two procedures and $143.70 for the third procedure. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 20. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done one June 24, 2008, and two procedures done on June 30, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Six billings are at issue with Recipient 21. Four are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on February 20, 2008, and two procedures done on February 28, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The other two billings are for H-Reflex Tests of upper extremities--one on March 25, 2008, and one on April 2, 2008. As noted above, Respondent never performed these tests, but corrected the misbilling prior to the audit. The $27.49 billed for each of these tests may not be extended in determining the total overpayment, but Petitioner may add $54.98 to the total overpayment determination, and Petitioner is not required to credit Respondent for additional sums due to claimed problems in voiding these billings. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 25. They are sNCTs billed under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on June 5, 2008, and two procedures done on June 10, 2008. They are each billed at $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. One billing is at issue with Recipient 26. On February 15, 2007, Respondent billed an office visit under CPT Code 99205, which Petitioner reduced by $16.64 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99204. The CPT Manual describes these office visit codes as follows: 99204 Office or other outpatient visit of the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of moderate complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 45 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. 99205 Office or other outpatient visit of the evaluation and management of a new patient, which requires these three key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; Medical decision making of high complexity. * * * Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate to high severity. Physicians typically spend 60 minutes face-to-face with the patient and/or family. Recipient 26 is a 43-year-old with migraines. She has suffered three headaches weekly since fourth grade. An MRI of her lower back in 2004 revealed a herniated disk, and she has pain in her right leg and foot numbness, if she drives too long. The medical decisionmaking was no more than moderately complex, so Petitioner properly downcoded this office visit, resulting in an overpayment of $16.64. Four billings are at issue with Recipient 27. On January 15, 2008, Respondent billed an office visit under CPT Code 99205, which Petitioner reduced by $18.64 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99204. Recipient 27 was referred by her obstetrician and saw Respondent two and one-half months post-partum. She was unable to lift her right arm. She had pain in her right outside shoulder. Her fingers were numb. Based on a physical examination, Respondent detected nerve damage in the axilla, and she reported cervical radiculopathy. The constellation of symptoms suggested three or four problems that obviously required immediate attention to facilitate her caring for her newborn. The medical decisionmaking was highly complex, so there is no overpayment for this office visit. Respondent billed two sNCTs under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on January 24, 2008, for $143.70 each. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. Respondent billed an H-Reflex Test under CPT Code 95934 on February 7, 2008, for $27.49. As noted above, Respondent never performed this test, but corrected the misbilling prior to the audit. The $27.49 may not be extended in determining the total overpayment, but Petitioner may add $27.49 to the total overpayment determination, and Petitioner is not required to credit Respondent for additional sums due to claimed problems in voiding these billings. Petitioner conceded error in its disallowance concerning Recipient 28, for whom Respondent billed $41.00 under CPT Code 95860 for a muscle test conducted on February 21, 2008. See Petitioner's proposed recommended order, paragraph 21. This is therefore not an overpayment. Three billings are at issue with Recipient 29. On February 7, 2007, Respondent billed an office consultation under CPT Code 99245, which Petitioner reduced by $46.24 by downcoding it to CPT Code 99205, which is for an office visit. This was an office visit, not an office consultation, as billed by Respondent, so the downcoding was correct, and there is an overpayment of $46.24. On February 16, 2007, Respondent billed for a neck and spine MRI without dye under CPT Code 72141 and a chest and spine MRI without dye under CPT Code 72146--twice each. Petitioner properly disallowed $357.60 and $305.18 for one pair of these procedures, which obviously were double-billed, so there are overpayments of these amounts. Two billings are at issue with Recipient 30. Respondent billed two sNCTs under CPT Code 95904 for two procedures done on April 14, 2008, for $141.70 and $143.70. They are miscoded and ineligible for reimbursement, so they are overpayments. The Final Audit Report claims that the audit cost $5658.09, but Petitioner failed to produce any evidence on these costs.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner submit the file to a statistician for an extension, using generally accepted statistical methods, of the redetermined overpayments, as set forth in the Findings of Fact, to a total overpayment determination. Petitioner issue a Final Order determining that Petitioner is entitled to recoup the total overpayment determined in the preceding paragraph, statutory interest on this sum from the date of the Final Order, and a $4,000 administrative fine for multiple violations of Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-9.070(7)(e). DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: George Kellen Brew, Esquire Law Office of George K. Brew 6817 Southpoint Parkway, Suite 1804 Jacksonville, Florida 32216 L. William Porter, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Monica Ryan, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jeffries H. Duvall, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Justin Senior, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57409.913
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs ALFRED OCTAVIUS BONATI, M.D., 12-004141PL (2012)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 26, 2012 Number: 12-004141PL Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024
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KERRY CULLIGAN AND MARY PUESCHEL STUDSTILL vs ESCAMBIA COUNTY UTILITIES AUTHORITY AND DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, 00-004047 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Oct. 02, 2000 Number: 00-004047 Latest Update: Jan. 26, 2001

Conclusions An Administrative Law Judge with the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH") submitted his Recommended Order of Dismissal to the Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP") in these consolidated administrative proceedings. The Recommended Order of Dismissal indicates that copies thereof were served upon counsel for the Co-Respondent, Escambia County Utilities Authority (“Authority”), and upon pro se Petitioners, Kerry Culligan (*Culligan’ ) Mary Pueschel Studstill (“Studstill’), and Chris Englert Cnglert. A copy. of the Recommended Ofder of Dismissal i is attached hereto as s Exhibit A The matter is now "before the Secretary o of DEP for final agency action. a | BACKGROUND The Authority owns and operates a public water system in Escambia County, Florida. These consolidated cases involve an application fi fi led with DEP seeking a permit to construct fluoridation treatment facilities at six of the Authority’s potable water a supply wells. On September 5, 2000. DEP executed an Intent to Issue and draft permit . } 4 F tor the Applicant’ fluoridation treatment construction project. The Petitioners then fi led “similar petitions with DEP contesting the issuance of the permit to the Applicant and requesting formal administrative hearings. The Petitions, which were forwarded to : r appropriate proceedings, basically questioned the safety and effi icacy of oe DOAH fc fluoridation i in their drinking water. Administrative Law w Judge, Donald R. Alexander, AL, was assigned to “~ insuffi cient to state a cause ofa action for relief f against DEP under the controling ‘provisions of Rule 62- 555. 328, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 62- 555. 325 establishes conditions and requirements for the issuance by of permits to public oO Bo yee ee water systems for the installation and operation of fluoridation treatment equipment. _ sad The ALS J recommended that DEP center a fi ina alorer dismissing, with prejudice, t the wale) eh as ed squares sas chante és antes? CONCLUSION The case law of Florida holds that parties to. formal administrative proceedings ‘must alert agencies to any perceived defects in DOAH hearing procedures or in the findings of fact of administrative law judges by filing exceptions to the DOAH recommended orders. See Couch v. Commission on Ethics, 617 So.2d 1119, 1124 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993); Florida Dept. of Corrections v. Bradley, 510 So.2d 1122, 1124 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). The ALJ ruled in his Recommended Order of Dismissal that Petitioners’ allegations were legally insufficient to state a cause of action warranting denial of the construction permit for Applicant's proposed fluoridation treatment facilities. Nevertheless, no exceptions were filed by any of the Petitioners objecting to this critical adverse ruling or objecting to the ALJ’s ultimate recommendation that DEP enter a final order dismissing the three petitions with prejudice. Having considered the Recommended Order of Dismissal and other matters of record and faving | reviewed the applicable law, | concur with the rulings and ultimate recommendation of the ALJ. Itis therefore ORDERED: A. The ALJ’s Recommended Order of Dismissal is adopted in its entirety and is incorporated by reference herein. - B. Culligan’s amended petition for administrative hearing and the initial petitions for administrative hearings of Studstill and Englert are dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a cause of action upon which a final order can be entered denying the Authority’s requested permit to construct the fluoridation treatment facilities. seals Lae eee es i x A a Mk ii i ie aL C. DEP's Northwest District Office shall ISSUE to the Authority the construction permit for the fluoridation treatment facilities, subject to the terms and conditions of the draft permit issued in DEP File No. 0083021 -001 -WCIMA. Any party to these proceedings has the right to seek judicial review of this Final : pursuant “to Rife 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, ‘with the clerk of the Department in the Office of General Counsel, 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, MS. 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000; and by filing a copy of the Notice of Appeal accompanied by the applicable fi iling fees with the appropriate District Court of Appeal. The Notice of ‘Appeal must be fi led within 30 days from the date ‘this Final Order is fi led ; with the clerk of the Department. -DONE AND ORDERED this Z day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Florida. bn STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT . OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION LS DAVID B. STRUHS Secretary Marjory Stoneman Douglas Building AOS OSU ue SAAS ai head. te 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard ; Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 moun i}76lo1 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Final Order has-been sent by United States Postal Service to: Kerry Culligan Mary Pueschel Studstill 814 North 13" Avenue 414 North Guillemard Street Pensacola, FL 32501 Pensacola, FL 32501 Chris Englert Robert W. Kievet, Esquire 4121 West Avery Avenue Kievet, Kelly & Odom Pensacola, FL 32501 15 West Main Street Pensacola, FL 32401 Ann Cole, Clerk and Donald R. Alexander, Administrative Law Judge David S. Dee, Esquire Division of Administrative Hearings John T. LaVia, Ill, Esquire The DeSoto Building Landers & Parsons, P.A. 1230 Apalachee Parkway Post Office Box 271 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Tallahassee, FL 32302 and by hand delivery to: Craig D. Varn, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection . . 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35 ° “~~~ Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 this LStkd ay of January, 2001. STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION : “TERRELL WILLIAMS Assistant General Counsel ate ) Mhea 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., M.S. 35 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 “Telephone 850/488-9314 ce it 1a ea

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DARALL JEROME MOORE vs. BOARD OF PODIATRY, 87-001725 (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001725 Latest Update: Jul. 10, 1987

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Darall J. Moore, graduated from the Ohio College of Podiatric Medicine in 1983 with a D.P.M. degree. T. 10. The Petitioner took the podiatry examination in July 1986, and did not receive a passing grade. On October 1, 1986, the Petitioner conducted a review of his examination. He arrived at 8:30 a.m. and left the review session at 1:30 p.m. R. Ex. 1. The review was conducted pursuant to the procedures outlined in P. Ex. 1, a copy of which was provided to the Petitioner by the Respondent before the review took place. The purpose of the review was to give the Petitioner an opportunity to examine the answer key and the questions asked on the examination, and to note in writing (on challenge sheets provided) his objections to the grading of particular questions by number. The procedure for examination review also provided that: Candidates may not copy any material provided for the review. No reference materials or electronic recording or photographic equipment may be brought into the review. No material may be taken out of the review. All reviews are subject to Departmental security requirements in order to insure the integrity of the examination. The review session on October 1, 1986, was conducted in a small room. The room was used by other people as well, and during the review there were conversations of people, phones ringing, and people coming in and out. Nonetheless, there does not appear to be any direct evidence that these distractions substantially impaired the Petitioner's ability to review his examination. During the review, the Petitioner submitted challenges to 20 examination questions by number. R. Ex. 1. Each of these written challenges identifies the examination question by number and provides a space for comments concerning the challenge. The procedure for examination review and challenge provides in part that "[a]ll objections must be submitted within sixty (60) days from the date of your request for a review. Objections will be analyzed by a committee of the Board of Podiatry and you will be notified of any decision." P. Ex. 1. (E.S. in original.) Before the review took place, the Petitioner was informed that he had a right "to appeal" from the "results" of his examination review. The "appeal" was to be initiated within thirty (30) days of his "receipt of . . . examination review results." The "appeal" was to contain specific reasons for the challenge, including why the Petitioner was "appealing," "what actions of the examiner(s) were unfair, and any objections made at your review." P. Ex. 1. (E.S. in original.) The Petitioner timely requested a formal administrative hearing. At the formal administrative hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence concerning five examination questions. T. 30. None of this evidence was by expert testimony, but the Petitioner referred to expert treatises in the field. The first question was to state the nerve located around the neck of head of the fibula. T. 30. Petitioner contends that his answer to the question, the common peroneal, is correct. Id. This question is not discussed or objected to in the written exam item challenges prepared by the Petitioner at the review session on October 1, 1986. R. Ex. 2; T. 71. The second question challenged at the hearing by the Petitioner was "what dorsal cutaneous nerve communicates with the sural nerve." T. 44, 45. The Petitioner contends that the correct answer to this question, his answer, is the lateral dorsal cutaneous nerve. Id. This question is not discussed or objected to in the written exam item challenges prepared by the Petitioner at the review session on October 1, 1986. R. Ex. 2; T. 71. The third question challenged by the Petitioner at the hearing was "what is the largest reservoir of blood in the body." T. 46. The Petitioner contends that his answer, the veins, is the correct answer. T. 47. This question is not discussed or objected to in the written exam item challenges prepared by the Petitioner at the review session on October 1, 1986. R. Ex. 2; T. 71. The fourth question challenged by the Petitioner at the hearing was what is the characteristic of metatarsus adductus. T. 48. The Petitioner contends that his answer, "styloid process, prominent styloid process, based on the concave in the concavity being reversed," is the correct answer. T. 49. This question is not discussed or objected to in the written exam item challenges prepared by the Petitioner at the review session on October 1, 1986. R. Ex. 2; T. 71. The fifth question challenged by the Petitioner at the hearing was never clearly stated by the Petitioner, but concerned "pathopneumonic of gouty arthritis." T. 49. The Petitioner never clearly identified the answer that he gave, but contended that his answer was partially right and that there was no other answer that he could have chosen. T. 49-50. It appears that this question was discussed and objected to in the written exam item challenges prepared by the Petitioner at the review session on October 1, 1986. R. Ex. 2, question 88. However, since the Petitioner never clearly demonstrated what the question was, or what the answer was, the testimony of the Petitioner was too unclear for there to be a finding that the answer he gave to the question was correct. The Petitioner admitted that during the review session (see R. Ex. 2) he did not provide the Respondent with all of the questions to which he had objections. T. 38. The Petitioner did not provide the Respondent with written objections to the first four questions discussed above within sixty (60) days of the review, and indeed, did not provide any such notice to the Respondent until the formal administrative hearing began. There is no evidence that the Petitioner would have passed the examination if the Respondent accepted his answer to the fifth question. The Petitioner testified that his ability to prepare for this hearing was impaired because he was not allowed to take anything into the review session and was not permitted to take anything out of the review session. He states that he could not adequately prepare for the hearing because he did not have references during the review session, and did not have a copy of the questions objected to in the review session or a copy of the examination for use at the hearing. The Petitioner represented himself without representation of a lawyer. There is no evidence that the Petitioner knew about the procedures for conducting discovery prior to a formal administrative hearing, and there is no evidence that prior to the hearing he sought any discovery of the written objections he made during the review session or of the examination questions.

Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Podiatry, enter its final order finding that the Petitioner, Darall Jerome Moore, has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his 1986 examination for licensure as a Podiatrist was improperly graded, that the procedures for review of his examination were unfair, or that he should be given a passing grade on the 1986 examination. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of July, 1987. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NUMBER 87-1725 The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties, by number, which have been rejected. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: 1. The record does not contain evidence (testimony or exhibits) to allow any conclusion as to the numerical grade received by the Petitioner. Thus, the finding proposed that the grade was 71.9 is rejected. There is insufficient evidence that the distractions during the review in fact substantially impaired the ability of the Petitioner to review the examination. The Petitioner did not testify that the noise or traffic caused him to be unable to concentrate or to fail to review the entire exam. See T. 28-29. The Petitioner completed twenty objections and left at 1:55 P.M., three hours before 5:00 P.M. The first sentence is rejected as not relevant. The Petitioner did not present any evidence to show how he was caused to be unable to prepare his case due to the scheduling of the hearing. It is officially recognized that the case was set for final hearing to commence August 10, 1987, by an order dated and entered May 1, 1987, and that the hearing date was changed to June 8, 1987, at the request of an attorney, Marc A. Tenney, received May 4, 1987. For these reasons, the second sentence is also rejected. Rejected for the reasons set forth in conclusions of law 2-4. The finding that it was very difficult to prepare for final hearing is rejected in finding of fact 19 and conclusion of law 6. Rejected in finding of fact 19 and conclusion of law 6. These findings are rejected in finding of fact 19 and conclusion of law 6. Rejected in findings of fact 11 through 14. Rejected in findings of fact 11 through 14. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 2. The second sentence is rejected for lack of evidence in the record. COPIES FURNISHED: Marcelle Flanagan Executive Director Board of Podiatry Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Van Poole, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darall Jerome Moore, D.P.M. 5455 27th Street South, Apt. 87 St. Petersburg, Florida 33712 Chester G. Senf, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750

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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF MEDICINE vs LEONARD ABRAHAM RUBINSTEIN, M.D., 09-005270PL (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Sep. 25, 2009 Number: 09-005270PL Latest Update: Nov. 09, 2011

The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Respondent violated sections 458.331(1)(t), 458.331(1)(m), and 458.331(1)(n), Florida Statutes (2004), and section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006), and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine in Florida pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes (2010), and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2010). At all material times to the Administrative Complaints, Dr. Rubinstein was licensed as a medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME37720. He is an otorhinolaryngologist, meaning he is a specialist in ears, nose and throat, and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. He also treats allergies. On November 7, 2003, Dr. Rubinstein and the Department entered into a Consent Agreement, related to the following Administrative Complaints filed against Dr. Rubinstein: Case No. 2001-07091, Case No. 1999-5773, and Case No. 2000-02195. Based on the Consent Agreement, a Final Order, DOH-04-0020-S-MQ, was filed by the Board on January 7, 2004, imposing a fine of $25,000; imposing 60 hours of community service; requiring Dr. Rubinstein to submit to a two-day evaluation at the Institute for Physician Education (IPE); requiring Dr. Rubinstein to comply with the recommendations resulting from the evaluation at IPE; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for five years. On August 6, 1993, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (DPR) and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement to resolve DPR Case Nos. 90-06221, 91-06043, 91-08800, 91-12051, 92-00308, 92-11650, 92-11763. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $10,000 fine and probation for five years. The Consent Agreement was adopted by a Final Order of the Board filed August 23, 2009. On May 11, 1993, DPR and Dr. Rubinstein entered into a Consent Agreement relating to DPR Case No. 92-13503. The Consent Agreement provided a stipulated disposition of a $5,000 fine, a reprimand, and requirement that Dr. Rubinstein review section 458.331, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 21M. The Consent Agreement was adopted as a Final Order by the Board on June 8, 1993. On August 24, 1992, the Board entered a Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 0081610, 8906844, 8903225, 109405, and 8907280 finding Dr. Rubinstein guilty of violations of subsections 458.331(1)(d), (k), (m), (n), (t), and (x), Florida Statutes; imposing a $15,000 fine; reprimanding Dr. Rubinstein; prohibiting Dr. Rubinstein from initiating contact with patients or their families for the purpose of persuading them to agree to his treatment recommendations; and placing Dr. Rubinstein on probation for one year. On June 8, 2005, a Determination and Order was entered by the State of New York, Department of Health, State Board for Professional Medical Conduct, BPMC No. 05-115, revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license to practice medicine in New York, based on the disciplinary actions by the Board in the Final Order in Case DOH-04-0020-S-MQ. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL At all times material to this Administrative Complaint, Dr. Rubinstein did not hold hospital staff privileges for any hospital in the Sarasota, Florida, area. On January 11, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein's office, seeking the following medical procedures: a breast lift or augmentation; possible liposuction on her hips; and a tummy tuck. J.D. completed a form during the office visit. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that J.D. have a breast augmentation; liposuction of hips, outer and inner thighs, and knees; and an abdominoplasty (tummy tuck). During the January 11, 2005, visit, Dr. Rubinstein told J.D. that he could help her with the dark circles under her eyes with some allergy testing. J.D. had not gone to Dr. Rubinstein for diagnosis, help, or treatment for any other conditions other than her request for cosmetic surgery. On January 11, 2005, J.D. was provided with a cost estimate for the surgical procedures of $29,550. These costs included a tummy tuck at $8,900; liposuction of the abdomen at $3,800; liposuction of the hips at $2,800; liposuction of the waist at $2,400; liposuction of the lateral thighs at $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs at $1,800; liposuction of the knees at $800; operating room for $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and lab work for $250. The cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation. The surgical cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." J.D. took the cost estimate and discussed them with her husband, who felt that the costs were too much. J.D. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and advised that the cost was too high, and she could not have the surgeries for that price. Dr. Rubinstein revised his surgical cost estimate as follows: abdominoplasty $8,900; breast augmentation $4,200; implants $1,400; liposuction of the abdomen $0; liposuction of the hips $2,800; liposuction of the waist $0; liposuction of the lateral thighs $3,400; liposuction of the medial thighs $0; operating room at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; anesthesia at $300 per hour for a total of $2,700; and pre-op lab work $250. There was no mention of liposuction of the knees in the revised cost estimate. The revised cost estimate stated: "It is estimated that your operating and recovery time will be 9 hours." The revised cost estimate was signed by J.D. on January 14, 2005. Both the original and revised cost estimates contained the following: "The Anesthesia and operating room charges are based on operating and recovery time. Consequently, if a surgical procedure turns out to be more or less lengthy than was expected, both fees will be correspondingly increased or decreased." J.D. went to Dr. Rubinstein's office on January 14, 2005, for a pre-operative visit. A history was taken, and a physical examination was done. Frank Steig, M.D. (Dr. Steig), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, and plastic and reconstructive surgery, testified as an expert on behalf of the Department. He was of the opinion that the history and physical met the basic criteria. His opinion was based on a review of the medical records. Some of the forms used by Dr. Rubinstein in recording the information concerning J.D. were forms that are more suitable for an otolaryngology physician's use. However, no evidence was presented that the information listed on the forms did not meet the basic criteria for medical records or that the use of a certain form fell below the standard of care. Although J.D. was seeing Dr. Rubinstein for cosmetic surgery, she was asked to fill out a questionnaire concerning allergies. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein gave Patient, J.D., a cost estimate for allergy testing totaling $3,565.00. On or about January 14, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein directed J.D. to go to Lab Corp for pre-operative testing, which included a CBC with Differential/Platelet, Complete Metabolic Panel, Urinalysis, Prothrombin Time, and Partial Thromboplastin Time. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for the decided cosmetic procedures. Based on Dr. Rubinstein's operative report, he performed the following procedures on J.D. on January 19, 2005: abdominoplasty; liposuction of lower lateral abdomen, hips, waist, lateral thighs, medial thighs, and knees; and augmentation of breasts. Based on the surgical and anesthesia notes, the anesthesia began at 9:15 a.m. and ended at 11:55 p.m. There was some difficulty in finding a vein on J.D. that would be suitable to deliver the anesthesia. Eventually the anesthesia was administered through the jugular vein. Surgery was begun at 11:45 a.m. and was completed at 11:20 p.m. The breast augmentation took three hours and 35 minutes. The liposuction took one hour and 55 minutes. The abdominoplasty took six hours and five minutes. At the final hearing, Dr. Rubinstein testified that he would have predicted that the breast augmentation would have taken approximately two to two-and-a-half hours. He would have estimated that the liposuction would have taken one hour and 55 minutes. He would have estimated that the abdominoplasty would have taken three to four hours. Given these estimates, the planned surgery time at a maximum would have been eight hours and 25 minutes. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony contradicts his estimate of the surgical time as reflected on the surgical cost estimates, which were done prior to the surgery. The first cost estimate did not include the breast augmentation; therefore, the planned surgery for liposuction and the abdominoplasty was eight hours as reflected on the cost estimate. In the revised cost estimate, he added the breast augmentation, which he estimated to be between two and two-and-one-half hours. Thus, the planned time for the three surgical procedures would have been between ten and ten-and-one-half hours. No explanation was given by Dr. Rubinstein why there was no adjustment between the planned time for surgery as reflected in the cost estimates. On or about January 19, 2005, J.D. was taken to the recovery room at 11:55 p.m. and released to return home at 1:00 a.m. on January 20, 2005. Based on the anesthesiologist's assessment, J.D. met the discharge criteria of Dr. Rubinstein's surgical facility, which was accredited as a Level III surgical facility. J.D.'s husband, Mr. J.D., was called to Dr. Rubinstein's office to take J.D. home. He testified that after he arrived at the facility, he was told that there would be an additional fee of $4,900; however, he stated that the discharge of J.D. was not conditioned on the payment of the additional fee. The evidence is conflicting concerning when Mr. J.D. actually paid the additional $4,900 by credit card. Mr. J.D. testified that he paid by credit at the time of J.D.'s discharge on January 20, 2005. The computer credit card receipt, which was signed by Mr. J.D., shows that the payment by credit card was made at 1:01 p.m. on January 20, 2005. The evidence shows that the credit card payment was made in the afternoon of January 20, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein's operative report did not include the amount of tissue that was removed during the abdominoplasty or the tightening of J.D.'s abdominal wall. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, did not testify that the standard of care required that such information be included in the operative report. He said that generally such information is included. Douglas Dedo, M.D. (Dr. Dedo), expert witness for Dr. Rubinstein, opined that the standard of care did not require Dr. Rubinstein to document the amount of tissue removed during the abdominoplasty or to document the tightening of the abdominal wall. Dr. Dedo's testimony is credited. Dr. Rubinstein belongs to the International Trade Exchange (ITEX), which is a corporation that serves as a network for businesses to do business with each other using an alternative currency system called trade dollars. In other words, businesses can barter with one another. Dr. Rubinstein suggested to J.D. that she might want to become a member of ITEX, and it could be a way of paying for procedures. J.D. and her husband own a tour guide service. One of Dr. Rubinstein's employees, Judy Trapani (Ms. Trapani), was interested in bartering a trip to Italy for procedures performed by Dr. Rubinstein. Based on the testimony of Mr. J.D., it appears that conversations concerning bartering a trip to Italy for surgical procedures occurred between Ms. Trapani and Mr. J.D. The evidence is not clear and convincing that Dr. Rubinstein was trying to barter the surgical procedures for a trip for Ms. Trapani. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL On March 22, 2005, B.L. first presented to Dr. Rubinstein, accompanied by her mother, C.L., for complaints of severe acne. C.L. filled out a general patient questionnaire and was also asked to fill out a form concerning allergies. It is not clear why a form relating to allergies would need to be completed prior to the initial examination when B.L. was being seen for severe acne. On the general questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had asthma or other respiratory problems, chronic bronchitis, and ear infections. The allergy questionnaire was to determine the cause of the patient's allergy symptoms. However, B.L. was not seeing Dr. Rubinstein for allergy symptoms, and C.L., understandably, thought that the allergy questionnaire related to past symptoms. On the allergy questionnaire, C.L. indicated that B.L. had had trouble with her skin; hives; trouble with ears popping and itching, hearing loss; frequent sore throats with drainage; itching eyes; thick/colored discharge from her nose; sniffles, and sneezing. Other than trouble with her skin, B.L. did not have any of these symptoms when she presented to Dr. Rubinstein. On examination, Dr. Rubinstein noted that B.L.'s turbinates were engorged and pale and that she had hypoplastic lymphoid tissue. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed B.L. with cystic acne. Cystic acne occurs when an obstruction of the hair follicle inflames the sebaceous gland and the inflammation rises to the surface. Allergies do not cause cystic acne. However, Dr. Rubinstein told C.L. and B.L. that food allergies could affect the inflammatory component of B.L.'s cystic acne. On one of the questionnaires, C.L. had indicated that B.L. had problems with sugars and carbohydrates. From this information, Dr. Rubinstein deduced that B.L. must have a problem with yeast and put her on a yeast-free diet. It is not understood why B.L. was put on a diet eliminating yeast, since sugar and carbohydrates also occur in foods other than foods containing yeast. Dr. Rubinstein put B.L. on a yeast-free diet before any testing was done to determine whether she had an allergy to yeast. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended blue-light therapy for the inflammation. He recommended allergy testing and the Obagi Nu-Derm System (Obagi) products. The Obagi program consists of topical products that are applied to the problem area. A prescription is required for the Obagi products. He prescribed an antibiotic, Minocycline. He also prescribed Nystatin for B.L. During the initial office visit on or about March 22, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered 1000mg of Erythromycin to B.L. by mouth prior to performing a deep pore facial cleansing on her. B.L. was also given a facial mask. B.L. suffered severe stomach pains and diarrhea from the Erythromycin. C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and told him about the stomach problems, and he told C.L. that was a normal reaction. On or about March 28, 2005, B.L. and C.L. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment. Dr. Rubinstein documented in the medical records that B.L.'s complexion appeared improved. He continued B.L. on Nystatin and Minocycline. Dr. Rubinstein continued to recommend the allergy tests and the Obagi program. C.L. purchased the Obagi program products for $1,200. B.L. and her mother returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office on April 4, 2005, for a follow-up visit. Dr. Rubinstein continued the Minocycline and reviewed the progress in the Obagi program. C.L. authorized the allergy tests. The charge for the allergy tests was $2,821. One of the allergy tests which Dr. Rubinstein had performed was IgG testing. Such testing is not done by mainstream allergists, and it is below the standard of care to use such testing. On the evening of April 11, 2005, B.L. ate a piece of cake at her grandmother's birthday party. On the morning of April 12, 2005, B.L. went to school at 7:30 a.m., and, by 8:20 a.m., she was experiencing hives, swollen joints, problems catching her breath, and problems moving her fingers, bending her knees, and bending her feet. B.L.'s joints were visibly swollen. C.L. took B.L. to see Dr. Rubinstein on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein noted in his records on April 12, 2005, that B.L. had hives, but he did not mention that B.L.'s joints were swollen. He opined that the hives were caused by eating cake. B.L. had eaten cake at times before the ingestion of cake on April 11, 2005, and had not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. B.L. has eaten cake since the ingestion of the cake on April 11, 2005, and has not experienced the symptoms that she had on April 12, 2005. Dr. Rubinstein had the results of the allergy tests to foods on April 12, 2005. None of the tests showed that B.L. was allergic to baker's yeast or gluten. One of the tests showed that B.L. might be allergic to candida albicans, which is a yeast that is usually found in babies with thrush and people whose immunity system is compromised. An allergy to candida albicans is not the same as an allergy to baker's yeast. However, Dr. Rubinstein continued the yeast-free diet. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein administered a 6mg dose of Decadron to B.L. for an acute allergic reaction. Decadron is a steroid used to treat conditions such as arthritis, blood/hormone/immune system disorders, allergic reactions, certain skin and eye conditions, breathing problems, certain bowel disorders, and certain cancers. B.L. had an adverse reaction to the Decadron, resulting in vomiting, stomach pains, and diarrhea. Dr. Rubinstein placed B.L. on another round of Minocycline. He suggested to C.L. that he might want to have B.L. switch to tetracycline because it may be more effective and cheaper than the Minocycline. C.L. told Dr. Rubinstein the price that she was paying for the Minocycline, and he told C.L. that if she could get the Minocycline for the price she stated that B.L. could stay on the Minocycline. During the office visit on April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein lanced and drained four extremely inflamed cysts located on B.L.'s forehead and cheek. On April 12, 2005, Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. go on a Rotation Elimination Diet to eliminate positive allergic foods. B.L. was to continue abstaining from eating yeast. The cost of the diet was $100. On April 12, 2005, after the office visit with Dr. Rubinstein, C.L. called Dr. Rubinstein and advised that B.L. was still not improving. Dr. Rubinstein made a note of C.L.'s telephone call. He continued to opine that the rash was caused by the ingestion of cake. He noted that the allergic reaction may be caused by the medication, but he still did not discontinue the medication. Although, Dr. Rubinstein had just examined B.L. that day, he requested that B.L. be seen again for re-evaluation. On or about April 14, 2005, C.L. went to see Dr. Rubinstein without B.L. to obtain the results of B.L.'s allergy tests. C.L. indicated that B.L.'s hives were worse. Dr. Rubinstein suggested that B.L. present to him again, after having seen B.L. two days prior, and that she may need antihistamines and medrol dose packs. He did not tell C.L. to discontinue the Minocycline. C.L. no longer trusted Dr. Rubinstein. On April 15, 2005, B.L.'s symptoms had not improved, and C.L. took B.L. to see B.L.'s pediatrician. The pediatrician referred B.L., to Hugh H. Windom, M.D. (Dr. Windom), a board-certified allergist. Dr. Windom saw B.L. on April 15, 2005, for hives, joint pain, and some swelling of her hands and lower arms. On examination, Dr. Windom found that B.L. had cystic acne, raised blanching, a red rash on her lower arm, mild nasal mucosal edema, and swelling in the joints on both hands and that B.L. was dermatographic. B.L. told Dr. Windom that she had been prescribed Minocycline by Dr. Rubinstein and had been taking it since sometime in March 2005. B.L. advised Dr. Windom that she did not take the Minocycline on April 14, 2005, and that her symptoms had improved some. Dr. Windom suspected that the hives, joint pain, and swelling were allergic reactions to drugs. He discontinued B.L.'s use of Minocycline and Nystatin. Within 24 hours after her visit with Dr. Windom, B.L.'s symptoms were gone. Dr. Windom referred B.L. to a dermatologist for her acne. Michael Pacin, M.D. (Dr. Pacin), is a board-certified allergist and testified as an expert for the Department. Dr. Pacin was of the opinion that there is no connection between allergies and acne. Acne is not an allergy symptom. He is also of the opinion that the prescription of a yeast-free diet when the physician does not know if the patient has an allergy to yeast is below the standard of care. Dr. Pacin's testimony is credited. C.L. paid Dr. Rubinstein $100 for the Rotation Diet, and $2,821 for allergy testing. Facts Relating to DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL On July 17, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints that he had a rash on his face and that it was itching. R.A. thought that he might have an allergy, which is why he sought out an allergy specialist. R.A. had not gone to see Dr. Rubinstein for any nasal problems. R.A. felt that, when he mentioned that he thought he might have allergies, "it just locked in with [Dr. Rubinstein] that he had nasal problems." R.A. filled out a questionnaire on the first visit concerning his current problem. He advised Dr. Rubinstein that he had prostate cancer in 1999, and his prostate had been removed. He also stated that he had had nasal problems and had gone to the Silverstein Institute1/ in October 2005. In December 2005, he had surgery at the Silverstein Institute. Part of the surgery had been for the removal of polyps. R.A. had been going to the Silverstein Institute for follow-up visits and felt that his nasal and sinus issues were clearing up. Dr. Rubinstein recommended that R.A. have a CT scan done. Dr. Rubinstein asked R.A. to get his medical records from the Silverstein Institute. R.A. requested his medical records, including a CT scan of his sinuses, from the Silverstein Institute, and those records were provided to Dr. Rubinstein. On July 18, 2006, a CT scan was performed on R.A. The physician who interpreted the CT scan had the following impression of the CT scan results: Surgical alteration includes bilateral superior and middle turbinate removal. Opacificaton of the anterior ethmoidal air cells present bilaterally extends into the frontal sinuses where there is mild mucoperiosteal thickening. The right sphenoid sinus is completely opacified. There is mention in the history of a possible nasal bone fracture however, fractures are not identified. The CT Scan did not show a deviated septum to the extent that surgery would be needed. The physician who prepared the report on the CT stated: "Nasal septum is not significantly deviated." The medical records from the Silverstein Institute showed that in 2005 that R.A.'s septum was intact in midline. The CT scan report stated: "Mucoperiosteal thickening exists in the left maxillary sinus in a relatively mild fashion with probable polyp formation of the anterior ethmoidal air cells." The CT scan did not conclusively state that polyps were present. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, reviewed the CT scan image and opined that the CT scan did not show nasal polyps, but instead showed polypoid changes which may or may not have been associated with the presence of polyps. Polypoid changes can be caused by mucosal irritation or suctioning. The polypoid changes in the CT scan were on the mucosa on the lateral wall. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. On or about July 19, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein called R.A. to discuss the CT scan results and told R.A. that the CT scan results were abnormal. Dr. Rubinstein diagnosed R.A. with chronic allergic rhinitis, chronic sinusitis, nasal septal deviation with moderate obstruction, recurrence of nasal polyps, loud snoring, and dry mouth secondary to mouth breathing. Dr. Rubinstein felt the redness on R.A.'s face was a form of rosacea. Dr. Rubinstein's treatment plan consisted of reviewing the CT results, providing R.A. with supplements, in vitro allergy testing, and providing allergy medication if needed. On July 24, 2006, R.A. underwent in vitro allergy testing, using IgE blood testing for inhalants and IgG blood testing for food. On or about July 27, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment, complaining of a number of symptoms bothering him since his previous appointment the week before. R.A. complained of symptoms on his skin, a stuffy nose, sore throat, body ache, and watery eyes. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein performed an endoscopy on R.A. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the polyps that had been removed at the Silverstein Institute had grown back. He further told R.A. that his septum was crooked and that the physician at the Silverstein Institute had not done a good job and needed to be reported. Dr. Rubinstein advised R.A. of the results of the allergy testing. The allergy test, which Dr. Rubinstein requested for food allergies, showed that R.A. was allergic to all foods tested except for sunflower seeds. The food allergies were tested by Commonwealth Medical Labs in Warrenton, Virginia. The test used was called an IgG test. The laboratory report stated: "This test is For Investigational Use Only. Its performance characteristics have not been cleared or approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration." Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that the allergies could be treated with homeopathic vitamins, supplements, acupuncture, and a Rotation Elimination Diet. Dr. Rubinstein sold R.A. a lot of homeopathic vitamins and supplements from Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein also recommended that R.A. get some treatments from an acupuncturist, who worked out of Dr. Rubinstein's office on a case-by-case basis. Some of the treatments included injection of some homeopathic medications. The acupuncturist was supposed to help with the rash on R.A.'s face and the allergies. On July 27, 2006, Dr. Rubinstein ordered a sleep apnea test for R.A. The method of testing was a home test, which R.A. rented from Dr. Rubinstein. R.A. often woke during the night to urinate since he had his prostate removed. The results of the test showed that R.A. had significant snoring and mild obstructive sleep apnea. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he suffered from sleep apnea that was very serious and that R.A. had almost died three to four times during the test. Dr. Rubinstein told R.A. that he needed surgery immediately to treat the sleep apnea. The sleep apnea test did not show severe sleep apnea. The sleep could and should have been treated using positive pressure ventilation via a mask. Dr. Rubinstein's testimony that he suggested the use of a mask and R.A. rejected the idea is not credited. It is clear from R.A.'s testimony that he was led to believe by Dr. Rubinstein that his sleep apnea was life- threatening and that he needed immediate surgery. On or about July 29, 2006, R.A. returned to Dr. Rubinstein's office. Dr. Rubinstein discussed the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On or about August 1, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a follow-up appointment with complaints of a stuffy nose and dry mouth. Dr. Rubinstein noted that a culture from R.A. was positive for staph aureus and prescribed the antibiotics, Septra and Gentamicin nasal spray. On or about August 4, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein with complaints of inability to breathe through his nose at night. Dr. Rubinstein reviewed the progress of the Rotation Elimination Diet with R.A. On August 8, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein complaining of bilateral congestion. Dr. Rubinstein prescribed Allegra-D, an antihistamine decongestant, and Nasonex, a cortical steroid. Dr. Rubinstein presented R.A. with a surgical plan that included: endoscopic sphenoidoscopy and debridement; septoplasty; radiofrequency inferior turbinates; radiofrequency soft palate; radiofrequency base of tongue; and bilateral intranasal endoscopic ethmoidectomy revision. Dr. Steig, the Department's expert, is of the opinion that the recommended surgeries were unnecessary and that Dr. Rubinstein should have tried medical treatment before resorting to surgery. Dr. Steig's opinion is credited. On or about August 11, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Rubinstein for a pre-operative appointment to take a history and physical examination. Dr. Rubinstein discussed EKG results with R.A., stating that the results were borderline and that Dr. Rubinstein would ask another physician to review the results. On August 14, 2006, R.A. called Dr. Rubinstein's office and left a message that he was cancelling the surgery. R.A. went to see Howard B. Fuchs, M.D. (Dr. Fuchs), on August 14, 2006, to get a second opinion. Dr. Fuchs is board- certified in pediatrics and allergies. On August 14, 2006, R.A. presented to Dr. Fuchs with chronic rhinitis, which is a chronic inflammation of the nasal tissues. He wanted to find out whether he had allergies. R.A. told Dr. Fuchs that he had been tested for allergies when he was Dr. Rubinstein's patient. R.A. did not bring any of the allergy test results with him to the office visit. Dr. Fuchs told R.A. to stop taking antihistamines and scheduled R.A. for skin testing ten days later. On August 24, 2006, Dr. Fuchs performed allergy skin tests, and the results were negative. R.A. did not have any allergies. Dr. Fuchs changed the Allegra-D to doses twice a day and continued R.A. on Nasonex. The Allegra-D was for congestion and to shrink the tissues in R.A.'s nose. Dr. Fuchs diagnosed R.A. with vasomotor rhinitis, which is non-allergic. Vasomotor rhinitis is triggered by things like smoke and chemical fumes. Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. again on September 14, 2006. R.A. said that he was better, but the medication made him jittery. Dr. Fuchs changed the medication. The last time that Dr. Fuchs saw R.A. was on October 13, 2006, and R.A. said that he was doing well. On August 16, 2006, Jack J. Wazen, M.D. (Dr. Wazen), who is board certified in otolaryngology, head and neck surgery, saw R.A. for the first time. Dr. Wazen is employed at the Silverstein Institute, but had not treated R.A. when R.A. had been a patient at Silverstein Institute before August 16, 2006. R.A. was seeking a second opinion concerning Dr. Rubinstein's plan for nasal surgery. Dr. Wazen did a physical examination of R.A., including an endoscopic nasal examination, which revealed the septum to be in the midline with no obstructive deviation. There were no polyps, and the sites on which R.A. had had surgery looked well-healed. Dr. Wazen also reviewed a CT scan, which R.A. had provided. Based on his examination and evaluation, Dr. Wazen told R.A. that he did not have polyps and that there was no clinical benefit to be derived from surgery. R.A. presented with complaints of nasal congestion, stuffy nose, and hives. Dr. Wazen diagnosed R.A. with allergic rhinitis. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that surgery should not have been recommended for the sleep apnea or the chronic allergic rhinitis or chronic sinusitis without first trying other medical treatments such as a mask for the sleep apnea. He opined that the rhinitis and sinusitis could have been treated by the avoidance of a known cause of the rhinitis or sinusitis and continuation of nasal steroids and antihistamines. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited. Dr. Steig was of the opinion that the recommended surgery was not justified by the medical records. There were no polyps present and the septum was not deviated to the extent that surgery was necessary. The sleep apnea was moderate and did not warrant surgical intervention. Dr. Steig's testimony is credited.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered as follows: DOAH Case No. 09-5267PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2004); Finding that Dr. Rubinstein did not violate sections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(n); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine; DOAH Case No. 09-5269PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated sections 458.331(1)(m), 458.331(1)(n), and 458.331(1)(t); Requiring Dr. Rubinstein to pay C.L. $2,921 for the allergy testing and the Rotation Diet; Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and e. Imposing an administrative fine of $10,000. DOAH Case No. 09-5270PL Finding that Dr. Rubinstein violated section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2006); Revoking Dr. Rubinstein's license; and Imposing a $10,000 administrative fine. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2011.

Florida Laws (8) 120.569120.57120.6820.43456.072456.50458.331766.102
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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, BOARD OF RESPIRATORY CARE vs RENE RIVERA, 03-004231PL (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Nov. 10, 2003 Number: 03-004231PL Latest Update: Jul. 05, 2024
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