Findings Of Fact The Respondent was hired by the City on July 25, 1977, as an electrician in the Electrical Department. Shortly thereafter he was transferred to the Traffic Engineering Department as an "electronics technician helper." The position of "electronics technician helper" is an entry level position in the Traffic Engineering Department. The helpers are responsible for performing technical electronics work, primarily in the area of traffic signal control devices and systems. The Respondent had ample qualifications, including education and experience, to qualify for the position. Up to and including the date of the final hearing, the Respondent remained employed with the City as an "electronics technician helper." During the time that he has been employed with the City, the Respondent has received regular periodic written evaluations. The City utilizes a "performance rating form" for these evaluations. An employee's performance is evaluated in several different areas on a rating system that ranges from a high rating of "satisfactory" to "exceeds standard" to "improvement needed" to a low rating of "unsatisfactory." In all of the evaluations of the Respondent, his "overall performance rating" was rated as needing improvement. In the important areas of "performance of assigned tasks," the Respondent has received consistently satisfactory ratings only in his ability to complete work on schedule. He has been evaluated as needing improvement or as unsatisfactory in areas designated "work completed meets requirements," "performs assigned tasks without close supervision," "uses tools and equipment properly," and "work does not have to be redone." The Respondent has also been evaluated as unsatisfactory or as needing improvement in the area of "technical knowledge." It is very unusual for the City to continue to employ persons in its Traffic Engineering Department for as long as the Respondent has been employed, without the employee ever receiving a satisfactory evaluation. The evaluations of the Respondent appear to reflect the opinions of the Respondent's supervisors that he is able to accomplish the job, but that he does not apply himself to the work at hand, and makes many mistakes. Several examples of deficiencies in the Respondent's work were established at the hearing. On one occasion, the Chief Traffic Signal Engineer explained to the Respondent step by step how to do a particular rewiring operation that involved three wires. The Respondent was also provided with a book that explained the procedure. The procedure was a simple one, and although it was explained to the Respondent on a Friday, he needed to have it reexplained to him the following Monday. On another instance, a number of three-wire cords, in which each of the cords were a different color, were to be wired with the black wire on a specific prong of a socket. The work was so repetitious that some mistakes would be expected. The Respondent wired half of them wrong. On another occasion, the Respondent was asked to reglue a "faceplate" that had been broken. The Respondent accomplished this task, but west on to bend and virtually destroy another faceplate so that he could remove it just to reglue it. On another occasion, the Respondent was asked to cut a cord in half and to install sockets on each end. He cut the wire in three pieces. Generally, the Respondent's work is so deficient that his supervisors will not let him work on equipment that could cause a hazard. As a part of his duties, the Respondent is occasionally "on call" to make emergency repairs on traffic control equipment. When he is called upon to make such repairs, the Respondent is responsible for preparing and submitting "time slips" which reflect the location and nature of the work, and the amount of time that it took to complete it. These cards are used to determine the Respondent's appropriate overtime pay, and also in many instances to establish whether or not equipment was working for litigation purposes. On March 8 and 9, 1980, the Respondent was called upon to make several emergency repairs. In his time slips and reports, the Respondent miscategorized some of the equipment that he utilized in making the repairs, specifically light bulbs; submitted reports that were mutually inconsistent as to the amount of time for which he was seeking overtime pay; did not reflect whether the repairs were accomplished in the "a.m." or "p.m."; and in one instance, they contained an overlap of time which would show the Respondent as being in two locations at the same time. The Respondent submitted the reports and time slips on March 10, 1980. It is not uncommon for there to be errors on the forms, and clerical employees typically correct them without returning them to the person who performed the work. There were so many errors, however, in the Respondent's forms that they were returned to him. The Respondent resubmitted the forms to the clerical staff, but they wore again deficient, and needed to be returned to him. After having some of the forms returned to him three times, the Respondent finally completed them adequately. While errors on the forms are common, the number of errors in the Respondent's forms is extraordinary.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.
Findings Of Fact In 1976 an outdoor advertising company named Outdoor Media applied to the Department to have permits issued for a sign that had been built in 1971 on the north side of I-4, 1.42 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441 (Orange Blossom Trail) inside the city limits of Orlando. Permit numbers 2259-12 and 2260-12 were issued by the Department to Outdoor Media for the west face and the east face of this sign. In 1978 the Respondent, Peterson Outdoor Advertising, Inc., purchased this sign from Outdoor Media. A request for replacement tags was made and granted, and tag number 2259-12 was replaced by 7553-12, and tag number 2260-12 was replaced by 7554- In April of 1984 the Respondent again requested replacement tags, and tag number 7553-12 was replaced by AM 267-12, and tag number AM 7554-12 was replaced by AM 268-12. Sometime after April, 1984, this sign was removed, and the Respondent erected a new sign, a monopole, at a location on the north side of I-4, 1.5 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441 (Orange Blossom Trail). This is approximately 200 feet west of the place where the old sign had been located. The Respondent affixed tag numbers AM 267-12 and AM 268- 12 to the new monopole structure, but these tags were not issued for this sign. They had been issued for the old sign which was removed. The city limits of Orlando are such that the location of the new monopole is outside the city; while the location where the old sign had been was inside the city limits. The county allows a taller sign than may be built inside the City of Orlando, and the Respondent wanted to enhance the visibility of its sign by raising its height. The Respondent obtained a variance from Orange County to extend the height of the monopole sign to a total of 65 feet. The monopole sign at 1.5 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441 percents adjacent to the ramp leading onto I-4 and is less than 1,000 feet from the nearest permitted sign. The distance between these signs is 898 feet as measured by the Department's inspector using a measuring wheel. The Department's inspector has more than 11 years of experience. He has measured signs, sites and locations over 1,000 times. He is familiar with the state and federal requirements for calculating point to point measurements between signs, and he followed them in making the measurements in this case. The Department's inspector measured the distance between the Respondent's new monopole and the nearest permitted sign three times with the same result. Be ran the measuring wheel along the right-of-way of I-4 at right angles to the two signs. Five of the Respondent's witnesses also measured the distance between these signs with results ranging from 955 feet to 1,016 feet. However, none of these witnesses had any experience in making measurements between signs pursuant to state and federal requirements, and some of these distances were obtained by measuring along the ramp instead of along the side of the highway. Thus, the testimony of the Department's inspector is found to be the credible evidence supporting the finding that the two subject signs are 898 feet apart. The Department's evidence relative to when the new monopole was erected is vague and imprecise, and thus not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact on this issue. The Respondent presented evidence to show that the monopole was erected in April of 1984, and it contends that it applied for the county variance in preparation for relocation and reconstruction of this sign. However, the Respondent's evidence that the monopole was erected in April of 1984 is self-serving, and not corroborated. Even the variance notice indicates that it was applied for on October 4, 1984. Thus there is likewise insufficient credible evidence to support the Respondent's contention relative to when this sign was actually constructed. Nevertheless, the Respondent erected its new monopole structure at the point on the north side of I-4, 1.5 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441, without having first obtained a state sign permit for this location. The Respondent's manager and its president both admit that tags numbered AM 267-12 and AM 268-12 were issued for the sign at 1.42 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441. Peterson Outdoor Advertising is a licensed outdoor advertising company. The firm's manager has been in the business for 27 years. The company president has been engaged in the business of outdoor advertising for more than 25 years, and he claims to have a familiarity with the law. From these facts, and from all inferences that can be drawn therefrom, there is not sufficient evidence to support a finding that this experienced outdoor advertising company was misled into moving its sign 200 feet westward without a permit by the Department's approval of its request for replacement tags for the old sign structure.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-4, 1.5 miles west of U.S. 17/92/441, in Orange County, Florida, be removed. And it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AM 267-12 and AM 268-12 be REVOKED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 26th day of February, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Finding of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Replacement tags are not outdoor advertising sign permits. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence, or irrelevant. Last sentence is accepted. Rejected as irrelevant. Lost tag application is not an application for outdoor advertising sign permit. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial intent. Rejected as irrelevant, except for raising the height of the sign to 65 feet which is accepted. Rejected as irrelevant or not supported by competent substantial evidence, except for the granting of a variance and the building permit which are accepted. Rejected, as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected, as not supported by competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32801-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether the permit for sign installation previously issued by the Department of Transportation is still valid to authorize Petitioner’s sign located on State Road 60 in Pinellas County.
Findings Of Fact The parties entered into two stipulations of fact which are accepted and incorporated herein. Stipulation of Fact #1 reads: The off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida, owned by Allan J. Stowell was lawfully erected under the applicable provisions of the City’s ordinances in the fall of 1981. The City issued building permit number 6361D, dated September 3, 1981, to Stowell to erect the billboard in issue. On August 25, 1985, the City of Clearwater adopted sign regulations which required, among other things, uniformity among signs. City Code Section 44.55(3)(b), required that all billboards on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, east of Highland Avenue, be brought into conformance with the Code provisions by January 19, 1996. On January 19, 1989, the City adopted Ordinance No. 4753-88, regulating signs on Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard. Pursuant to that ordinance, the billboard in issue became non-conforming due to its size. Mr. Stowell was allowed a seven-year amortization period which expired on January 19, 1996. By letter dated August 30, 1994, the City advised Mr. Stowell that the billboard in issue would have to be brought into compliance with the provisions of the City’s sign ordinance by January 19, 1996. As a result of the sign regulations adopted by the City in 1985, the billboard in issue was classified thereafter as a legal non-conforming sign, and it was such on November 25, 1995. Stipulation of Fact #2 reads: State Road 60 means that segment of roadway, also known as Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard, which is located within the City of Clearwater and is east of Highway 19. The effective date of the national highway system was November 28, 1995, and all references in stipulated exhibits, stipulations, transcripts of depositions, correspondence or other documents which erroneously refer to November 25, 1995, shall be amended to read November 28, 1995, for the purposes of this administrative proceeding. Any reference in this administrative proceeding to the “subject sign,” “billboard,” “off-premise outdoor advertising structure,” “sign,” or other similar designations shall mean the off-premise outdoor advertising billboard structure owned by the Petitioner and located at 2815-2817 Gulf-to-Bay Boulevard (State Road 60). On May 22, 1974, State Road 60 was designated a Federal- Aid Primary. On July 1, 1976, State Road 60 was re-designated from a Federal-Aid Primary to a Federal-Aid Urban. Allan J. Stowell was licensed by the Florida Department of Transportation as an outdoor advertiser pursuant to license number 19848, dated October 2, 1981. On or about October 1, 1981, Allan J. Stowell was issued state sign permit numbers AF307-10 and AF308-10, by the Florida Department of Transportation, for the construction, maintenance and operation of the two sign facings on the subject billboard structure. At this point, State Road 60 was not part of the Federal-Aid Primary Highway System within Florida. After 1988, the Department discontinued billing Mr. Stowell because State Road 60 was not a Federal-Aid Primary, Interstate, or a part of the State Highway System outside a municipality. State Road 60 became a part of the national highway system on November 25, 1995. Petitioner, Allan J. Stowell, purchased the property on which the sign in issue is located in 1972. At that time, a sign owned by Foster and Kleiser (F&K), an outdoor advertising firm, was situated on the property. After Petitioner purchased the property, he entered an amended lease agreement with F&K for the use of his property. At that time, the existing sign was permitted by the state. Subsequent to the execution of the amended lease, because he wanted to develop the land and put up his own sign, Mr. Stowell requested that F&K remove their sign from his property, and an agreement to do that was received on August 3, 1981. During his research in preparation for the request for removal, Mr. Stowell spoke with Mr. Andre DeVetter of the Brandon office of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Mr. DeVetter advised him the sign was located adjacent to a Federal Aid Primary Highway, that the property on which the sign was to be located was properly zoned for that purpose, that after removal of the existing sign, Stowell could apply for and receive a permit for a new sign, and that under the terms of the Federal Highway Beautification Act (the Act), Mr. Stowell could not be required to take the sign down without compensation therefor. Based on these assurances, Petitioner borrowed $35,000, placing his home as collateral for the loan, which he used for the construction of the new sign. Before starting construction, however, Mr. Stowell went to the City of Clearwater for both a permit for the construction and a variance to exceed the normal size limitations because his proposed sign was to be bigger than the code calls for by more than 100 square feet. He requested and obtained a permit to construct a 10 by 40-foot sign. The variance was initially denied by the city’s sign approval board, but a subsequent action by the Board of Adjustment granted the variance. Though the minutes of the pertinent meeting of the Board of Adjustment cannot now be found, Mr. Stowell has a letter dated August 21, 1997, from DOT in which the Department agrees that a variance was granted. He also obtained an occupational license to conduct the outdoor sign business. Mr. Stowell constructed the new sign which was permitted by the Department as promised in 1982. He thereafter obtained renewals of the permits for the sign from DOT for calendar years 1983 and 1984 - one for each face. Over the succeeding years, Mr. Stowell did not receive annual renewal notices for the years 1985, 1986, or 1987, and the fees for those years were not initially paid. However, he received a letter in 1988 indicating he was delinquent in certain costs and fees for the permits. When he received that letter, Mr. Stowell sent in a check for the delinquent costs and fees in the amount of $308.00, which covered all delinquent permit fees and a 10 percent delinquency penalty, and believed his delinquencies had been brought current. The Department issued permits to Mr. Stowell for the sign in 1981 and 1982. After the delinquencies were brought current in 1988, Mr. Stowell did not hear anything further from the Department, other than the previously mentioned letter, which noted the sign was now on the Federal Highway System and he needed to obtain permits for it. Since he had previously been issued permits for the sign in 1981 and 1982, and since he had never received any notice that those permits had been revoked, he mistakenly believed his status was acceptable. When Mr. Stowell received the variance from the city for the 14 by 48-foot sign prior to its installation, he advised Mr. DeVetter at the Department’s Brandon office of its granting and was told his status was acceptable. After the City later sent him a letter indicating that the sign had to come down due to a change in the City ordinance, instead of planning to amortize the cost of the sign over the succeeding seven years, he started research into what he needed to do to obtain compensation for the taking as is required by the FHBA. In response, he received a copy of a certificate of sign removal from Reginald N. Millian, the Department’s Outdoor and Property Advertising Inspector, indicating that the sign had been removed by the owner, and that this determination was made based on a personal visit to the site. This was patently in error. The sign had not been removed and, in fact, had been operated and maintained, structurally unchanged, continuously since its construction in 1981. After the Department advised Mr. Stowell of his delinquency in permit fees in September 1988, even after the fees were paid up, due to the change in jurisdiction status, the Department inactivated his permits for this sign, dropped his permit numbers from its permit billing inventory, and did not issue and further billings to him for the previously issued permits. However, the Department did not issue a notice of intent to revoke the two permits, AF307-10 and AF308-10, nor did it in any way advise Mr. Stowell that his permits were no longer valid. Mr. Stowell mistakenly assumed that his sign was validly permitted, even after the City notified him of its status in 1994. After the Department reassumed jurisdiction, by letter dated June 21, 1996, the Department’s District Administrator, Property Management/ODA, Susan L. Rosetti, advised Mr. Stowell that his sign was not permitted and that the sign’s two faces required permits. At this point Mr. Stowell was provided with application forms for the permits and a set of instructions. After receipt of the June 21, 1996, letter, Mr. Stowell contacted Kenneth M. Towcimak, the Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, to request assistance in obtaining the required permits. In response, Mr. Towcimak advised Mr. Stowell that the permits had been inactivated by the Department, and that because State Road 60, on which the sign was located, was now under the Department’s jurisdiction, he had to obtain a new state permit by January 1, 1997. Towcimak contacted the City to determine the appropriate status of the sign, and as a result of this inquiry, advised Stowell in writing on November 6, 1996, that the Department was precluded by Florida Statute from approving any application for a permit which was not accompanied by a statement from the appropriate local government that the sign complies with all local government requirements, and that the local government will issue a permit upon approval of the application by the Department. Thereafter, On December 31, 1996, Mr. Stowell filed an application with the Department by certified mail. The document reflects it was date stamped in the Department on January 1, 1997, at 4:31 p.m., and again on January 3, 1997, at 1:07 p.m. Since the application Mr. Stowell filed was to reinstate the previously issued permits and not for new permits, he failed to complete a number of the information blocks on the form. On January 21, 1997, the Department issued a Notice of Denied Application for the permits to Mr. Stowell. The denial form reflected the reason for denial was that Mr. Stowell had failed to provide proof of ownership of the billboard, and had provided incorrect information on the application form. The evidence of record indicates that Mr. Stowell did provide the requested proof of ownership of both the billboard and the property on which it is located in his application. One of the City’s previously existing sign ordinances was declared unconstitutional by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals on March 23, 1993. Since that time, the City has not enacted a comprehensive sign ordinance, but in 1989 it enacted an ordinance, No. 4753-88, which relates to signs located on SR 60 and which requires those signs on that road which are non- conforming to be brought into conformance or removed within seven years. This provides affected sign owners an opportunity to either bring the sign into conformity with the requirements or amortize the cost of the sign over seven years. Mr. Towcimak, Director of the Department’s Office of Right-of-Way, indicated that when the national highway system under ISTEA came into effect in November 1995, the Department had no inventory of existing signs. As a result, it did not provide notice to the owners of effected signs, and instructed its district offices to accept applications for sign permits through January 1, 1997. The operations of the Department of Transportation are decentralized with policy being set at the headquarters, but the day-to-day operations being determined at each of the eight districts. As to outdoor advertising enforcement, however, while each district handles enforcement, accounting is handled in the central office. In doing so, the Department follows the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which specifies that all permits expire on January 15 of each year. In practice, the advertiser is billed by October 1 of each year and is furnished a list of all permits shown by the Department records to be held by that permittee, along with a bill for all fees owed. If the Department records do not reflect an active permit for a particular sign, no billing will go out for that sign. Petitioner’s instant application for permit reflects it was timely received in the pertinent Department office. It is general practice within the Department for the District Outdoor Advertising Administrator to review the application and decide whether to grant or deny the permit. Thereafter, the application is forwarded to the central office for final check prior to issuance of the metal tag. It is Department practice to issue or deny the permit within 30 days of receipt of the application, as mandated by statute. When an application for a permit for an outdoor sign is received by the Department it is agency practice to review it for completeness. If the application is complete, a decision is made whether to approve or disapprove the application. If the application is incomplete, it is returned to the applicant without decision. However, if an application is incomplete, but it is apparent that, even if complete, the application would not be approved, that application will be returned “denied” rather than “incomplete.” There are several requirements which must be satisfied before an application may be approved. One of these is that the applicant submit a statement from the local government that the proposed sign would comply with local sign regulations, as required by Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes. If an application is received by the Department without this element being present, the Department may either return the application as incomplete or, if it appears the sign does not comply with local sign regulations, deny the application. The “Harmony of Regulations” provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, prohibits the state from issuing a permit where local government does not approve the sign, and prohibits local governments from issuing a sign permit where the Department does not approve. Consistent with that direction, when Petitioner contacted Mr. Towcimak to request guidance in the permitting process, and outlined his problem regarding the City’s position, Mr. Towcimak contacted the City to find out where that entity stood. On two separate occasions, the City advised the Department in writing that Petitioner’s existing sign was illegal and it would not grant permission for the Department to issue a sign permit. When that information was received by the Department, Petitioner was advised of the City’s position and that the permit would not be issued as a result.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order denying Petitioner permits for the maintenance of the signs in issue, and denying compensation for their removal. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Livingston & Associates, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Andrea V. Nelson, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: Diedre Grubbs 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, C-Sand Company, was issued permit number AE315-10 on May 8, 1981. This permit authorized the erection of a sign to be located approximately 1.8 miles west of SR 267 in Gadsden County, Florida. This location is in an unzoned area and the permit was granted because of its proximity to a nearby commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries. Prior to submitting an application for this permit to the Department, the owner of the Respondent company contacted the Department's inspectors in the Chipley district office to determine where a sign could be legally erected. He did this in order to locate a site which would be permittable before entering into a lease on the property. The Department's district supervisor met the Respondent's owner in April of 1981 in Quincy. The two of them drove I-10 for a couple of hours looking for a sign site which would be permittable. The Department's district supervisor informed the Respondent that only two locations could be issued a permit, one of these being the site which is the subject of this proceeding. Based upon this representation, the Respondent entered into a lease for this site, subject to issuance by the Department of a permit to erect a sign thereon. After all of this had transpired, on May 4, 1981, the Respondent completed the permit application and submitted it to the Department. Prior to the Department's issuance of the subject permit, one of its inspectors whose duty is to observe a proposed sign site and determine if it is as represented in the application and if it meets the requirements of the statutes and rules, field inspected the proposed site of the subject sign. Based on this inspection he recommended the issuance of the permit upon his determination that this area was unzoned commercial, that the sign site was within 800 feet of a commercial activity known as Imperial Nurseries, and that this commercial activity was within 660 feet of the right of way of I-10, and visible from the main traveled way of I-10. There is sufficient credible evidence in the record of this proceeding to support a finding of fact that the subject area was as the field inspector found it to be. The area in question is rural in nature and generally suitable for agricultural activities. However, the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries in 1981 was the growing of ornamental evergreens primarily for distribution in Northern markets. These ornamental evergreens were grown in containers on top of the ground, and shipped by truck. The cuttings were grown, then rooted, and planted in containers until mature. Between 1,500-2,000 yards of potting material was hauled in by truck each year from Tennessee, Georgia and Canada. This material consists of pine bark, peat moss and sand, which is mixed on the premises. The entire nursery is irrigated by an impact sprinkler system. There are 260 acres under irrigation. Approximately 1,400 tons of liquid fertilizer are mixed each year, and delivered via this irrigation system. There has been a weather shed on the property since before 1981, and this is within 660 feet from I-10. Portable toilets are located in various places on the property to accommodate the nursery employees. Beyond 660 feet from I-10 is a potting station and a loading area. Further away is an office building, two lunch rooms, and two storage buildings for fertilizer and peat moss. Nevertheless, parts of the overall operation of conducting the business of this nursery are situated 660 feet and less from I-10. Imperial Nursery ships its mature evergreens via truckers and brokers. Nursery employees assemble the shipments in the field, and they are brought to a central location for loading onto the trucks. These trucks are 40-45 foot refrigerated tractor-trailers. Approximately 400 truck loads of cuttings are shipped each year to an area from Washington D.C. to Canada The operation of Imperial Nurseries is the same now as it was in 1981. The field inspector's recommendation to approve the site as a permittable location was joined in by his supervisor after the supervisor had also conducted a field inspection of the area. Both of them based their approvals on the weather shed, the portable toilets, and the activities observed by them such as the employees moving the potted plants around, the loading and unloading of material taking place, and the employee activity throughout the area but particularly in the vicinity of the weather shed. The site where the Respondent proposed to erect his sign was within 800 feet of the various locations on the Imperial Nurseries property where its loading, unloading, or other activities took place. The assertion of the Respondent on his sign permit application that the proposed location was within 800 feet of a business was not false or misleading. The Department's inspector and his supervisor concurred in this characterization of the area. Neither has the Respondent violated any of the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. All of the facts were set forth on his permit application, and these facts were verified by the Department after the area was inspected to determine their accuracy. The policy of the Department leaves the determination of what is and what is not an unzoned commercial area to the field inspector, with the approval of his supervisors. In this case, the determination was made that the activities of Imperial Nurseries were commercial in nature, and the permits were granted on the basis of this determination, not on the representation of the Respondent. In the summer of 1984, the subject site was inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator, who determined that the business being conducted by Imperial Nurseries was agricultural, and not commercial in nature. Although Imperial Nurseries has an agricultural exemption on its property and its employees are classified as agricultural for withholding tax purposes, the facts support a finding that Imperial Nurseries is a commercial activity. There is no statutory definition of "agricultural" and the Department has not defined the term by rule. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, Second Edition, defines "agriculture" as the cultivation of the ground, the art of preparing the soil, the tillage or the culture of the earth. These are not the activities of Imperial Nurseries. Pursuant to the issuance of the sign permit by the Department, the Respondent's lease on the property where the sign was erected became effective, and this lease continues to date.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department's violation notice seeking removal of the Respondent's sign on the north side of I-10, approximately 1.8 miles west of S.R. 267 in Gadsden County, Florida, be dismissed; and that permit number AE 315-10 remain in effect as a permit for a non-conforming sign. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 10 day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: Respondent Charley O. Young & Sons Trucking, Inc. (Company) is engaged in the business of hauling United States Mail between various United States Postal Service's post offices in the State of Florida, and is an employer as that term is defined in Section 760.10(7), Florida Statutes. Charley O. Young (Young), president of the Company, has been involved in the business of hauling United States mail for over 35 years. The mail which the Company hauls from post office to post office comes from places throughout the United States and the world. Such mail is considered to be in a continuous flow in interstate commerce from the moment it is mailed until it reaches its ultimate destination. Petitioner Dennis Bonville has been employed by the Company from time to time as an employee and as a subcontractor. Petitioner's last employment with the Company was as an employee driving a truck hauling mail from Tampa, Florida to Ruskin, Florida. The Company hired Petitioner with the full knowledge and understanding that Petitioner had a handicap known as monocular vision (vision capacity in one eye). Notwithstanding his handicap, Petitioner had been granted medical certification and was qualified to operate a commercial motor vehicle in the State of Florida in intrastate commerce in accordance with Section 316.302(2)(j), Florida Statutes. The position held by Petitioner was created as a result of the Company being awarded an emergency mail hauling contract between Tampa, Florida and Ruskin, Florida by the U. S. Postal Service beginning February 10, 1990, for an indefinite period. At the time Petitioner was hired, he understood that his employment with the Company was indefinite since the contract for the Tampa to Ruskin run with the U. S. Postal Service was for an indefinite period. On or about April 27, 1991, the Company was audited by the United States Department of Transportation, Office of Motor Carrier Safety, Florida Division (USDOT). The USDOT agent reviewed, among other things, the personnel and medical files of all the Company's drivers. During the audit, the agent discovered that Petitioner had monocular vision. The contract for the Tampa to Ruskin mail run required the Company to comply with all state and federal regulations, including those promulgated by the USDOT. Under USDOT rules, monocular vision disqualified Petitioner from driving a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce. The agent demanded that Young immediately remove Petitioner from the Tampa to Ruskin run since it involved operating a commercial motor vehicle in interstate commerce. However, since Young had no qualified driver to relieve Petitioner, the agent agreed to allow Petitioner to complete the run for the day with the understanding that the Petitioner would be relieved upon his return. The agent then advised Young that he would return the next day to complete the audit, and if the Petitioner had not been relieved, he had the authority to, and would, put a padlock on the door and shut down the Company's business. It was the agent's position that the Company was engaged in interstate commerce due to its hauling mail that was in interstate commerce, notwithstanding that the Company's vehicles never left the State of Florida. Therefore, the Petitioner's monocular vision rendered him unqualified to drive a commercial motor vehicle operating in interstate commerce under the USDOT rules which governed drivers under mail contracts. When the Petitioner returned that night to the Company's office, Young informed the Petitioner that due to the agent's position and his threat to shut down the Company's business if Petitioner continued to make the Tampa to Ruskin run, he had no alternative but to relieve the Petitioner of the Tampa to Ruskin run. When the agent returned to complete the audit the next day, the Petitioner had a heated discussion with the agent concerning the agent's position and its effect on the Petitioner's employment. The agent maintained his position that Petitioner was not qualified to drive the vehicle being used in the Tampa to Ruskin mail run which was considered to be in interstate commerce. At the conclusion of the audit, the Company was issued, among others, citations for violating 49 C.F.R. 391.11(b)(6), using a physically unqualified driver, and was fined $6,000. At this time, the Company had no other positions which it could offer the Petitioner that would accommodate his handicap. Therefore, as a result of the audit and the agent's threat to "shut down the business", the Petitioner was terminated by the Company effective April 27, 1991. At the time Petitioner was terminated he was earning $11.19 per hour and working 40 hours per week. Petitioner's job performance was not an issue in the Petitioner's termination. The Company's bid for the renewal of the Tampa, Florida to Ruskin, Florida contract was unsuccessful, and on April 30, 1991, the Company's contract for the Tampa to Ruskin mail run expired. Petitioner was replaced by a Company employee who was qualified under the USDOT rules to operate the vehicle used on the Tampa to Ruskin run for the three days remaining on the contract. After Petitioner's termination, sometime around October, 1991, the Petitioner was offered employment with the Company driving a van, which Petitioner was qualified to drive, delivering special delivery mail. However, this employment offered less money than Petitioner's previous employment with the Company and was turned down by the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition For Relief filed by the Petitioner. RECOMMENDED this day 29th of August, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1994.
The Issue Whether at least one of three signs located in the area of subject sign is in violation of state and federal law. Which signs, if any, are in violation. Whether the subject sign is in violation of the spacing regulation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact There are three signs standing on a strip of land adjoining U.S. 19, a Federal Aid Primary Road approximately six (6) miles North of S.R. 60. The spacing requirement is that there must be at least 500 feet between signs. Copy on the sign advertising "Parkview Terrace by U.S. Home" is a two-faced sign with one side blank and is located between two signs which have a permit to advertise although the spacing between the three signs standing is not the required 500 feet. The cited sign presently advertising "Parkview Terrace by U.S. Home" was formerly in a location owned by Artcraft which company did not apply for a permit and which Artcraft informed Complainant was going to be removed. The Complainant did not prosecute for permit violation inasmuch as the inspector was told the sign would be removed and when removed the other to signs involved herein would be eligible for permits. The site was abandoned but Respondent erected another sign in approximately the same location without a permit.
Findings Of Fact An application for an opening of a public at-grade rail/highway crossing by new roadway construction was submitted by Bay County, Florida, through its agent R. M. Myers, Administrative Assistant. The proposed crossing is across the tracks of the U.S. Air Force (C/O Warner Robins Air Force Base) presently leased to the Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railroad Co., railroad mile post N M.P. 2.34. The local popular name of the street as extended is Palo Alto Avenue. Traffic on the railroad as it now exist is two trains per day carrying fuel. The speed of the train is 15 miles per hour. The cost of installation is to be charged to the City of Lynn Haven, Florida and the cost of annual maintenance is to be charged to the City of Lynn Haven, Florida. The opening of the proposed crossing would serve a growing subdivision which at present has only one means of egress and ingress. If a permit is granted and the proposed crossing constructed, the route would carry some 16 school buses and would divert much of the existing northbound traffic on route 77 between the hours of 7:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. A need for the proposed crossing has been established. There is a growing subdivision which would use the crossing as a second exit and entrance; when the proposed roadway crosses the track, school buses will have a more direct access to the school and will use the proposed route; traffic from route 77 will use the proposed road as a convenience; the representatives of both the City of Lynn Haven and the county of Bay state that the area is a fast growing area and that the proposed crossing is needed. The parties at the hearing, which included the City, the County and the Railroad Company, reached an agreement as to the proper signalization of the crossing, the proper road devices necessary to insure safety before the crossing was reached and an assurance that property would be available so that there would be no sight blockage through the growth of vegetation in the future. Plans for the proposed crossing were submitted to the Hearing Officer and marked "A". An easement for visibility purposes at the proposed crossing was submitted to the Hearing Officer and marked "B". These exhibits were approved by the City, the County and the Florida Department of Transportation.
Recommendation Grant the permit. DONE AND ORDERED this 1st day of February, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Les W. Burke, Esquire Post Office Box 2260 Panama City, Florida J. W. Cunningham, Vice President Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Railway Co. Post Office Box 669 Panama City, Florida 32401 Mr. Robert Miller Tyndall Air Force Base Panama City, Florida William V. Kinsaul, City Manager Lynn Haven, Florida Mr. G. S. Burleson, Sr., P.E. Assistant State Utility Engineer Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s applications for a State sign permit should be granted.
Findings Of Fact No dispute exists that DOT is the State agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the State Highway system, interstate, or federal-aid primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Mr. Monsalve wishes to place two advertising signs within 660 feet of Interstate 95 and visible to Interstate 95. The advertising signs require a permit. On or about June 16, 2008, Mr. Monsalve filed two applications, completing DOT’s forms titled “Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit” (Application), with DOT for outdoor advertising signs. The two applications indicated the same location for the outdoor advertising but with different height, width, and total square feet: one was a height of 4 feet, width of 60 feet, and 240 total square feet, and the other was a height of 12 feet, width of 12 feet, and 144 total square feet. The two Applications were assigned Application numbers 57196 and 57197, respectively. The location for the proposed outdoor advertising signs is 299 Southwest 17 Road in Miami, Florida, near Interstate 95, North of Southwest 3rd Avenue. Mr. Monsalve owns the property on which the advertising signs are to be located. The Application contained a section titled “Local Government Permission.” The section provided that it was to be completed by the appropriate local government official or that a “written statement indicating that the sign complies with all local government requirements” may be submitted or, “for a proposed sign location, a copy of the building permit issued by the local government may be submitted.” The section was neither completed by the local government official nor was a written statement submitted indicating that the signs comply with all local government requirements. However, Mr. Monsalve submitted a 1999 building permit from the local government. The local government was the City of Miami. The 1999 building permit was issued by the City of Miami on July 13, 1999, to Hampton Inn for a commercial painted wall sign, located at 299 Southwest 17 Road. The building permit was issued Permit Number SG 99-5011166. The Folio Number, i.e., Property ID Number, on the 1999 building permit is No. 01-4138-002-0020. Mr. Monsalve owns the property for which the 1999 building permit was issued for the advertising sign. The property is the same property identified on his Application, assigned Application number 57197. DOT requires that, in order for a building permit to constitute “local government permission,” the permit must have been issued within six months of the date of an application for an outdoor advertising sign. The 1999 building permit submitted by Mr. Monsalve was beyond the six-month time period of the date of Application number 57197. Furthermore, by letter dated June 25, 2008, the City of Miami notified DOT that the 1999 building permit no longer had legal status due to the City of Miami changing its laws regarding billboards and that Mr. Monsalve did not have local government permission.3 The evidence demonstrates that the 1999 building permit did not constitute local government permission. The evidence failed to demonstrate that Mr. Monsalve had obtained local government permission. In March 2004, DOT issued a permit to the Hampton Inn for an outdoor advertising sign on Mr. Monsalve’s property. The permit was issued Tag Number CA179, and the sign was built on August 19, 2004. The permit information provides, among other information, that the location of the outdoor advertising sign was located 0.040 miles North of Southwest 3rd Avenue and that the sign was 144 square feet. Hampton Inn and Mr. Monsalve entered into an agreement/contract for Hampton Inn to lease outdoor advertising space from Mr. Monsalve at 299 Southwest 17 Road, Miami, Florida. A Second Lease Agreement between Mr. Monsalve and the Hampton Inn indicates in provision numbered one that the lease agreement was extended until March 31, 2007. The evidence demonstrates that, subsequent to March 31, 2007, the lease of the space by the Hampton Inn continued on a month-to-month basis and that the last time that Mr. Monsalve received payment for the monthly lease was in March 2008. The location for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 is the same location of Mr. Monsalve’s proposed outdoor advertising sign in Application number 57197. In June 2008, the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was transferred from Hampton Inn to Outlook Media using DOT’s form titled “Outdoor Advertising Permit Transfer Request.” The permit is considered by DOT to be currently active. The location for Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 is currently permitted to Outlook Media due to the transfer of outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179 to Outlook Media. The distance between the proposed sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57196 and the space in the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, is less than 1500 feet. The evidence demonstrates that the sign in Mr. Monsalve’s Application number 57197 conflicts with the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, in that the two are the same location. Mr. Monsalve believed that he, as the property owner, owned the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, as well. He did not agree for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve was not aware that the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, had been transferred by Hampton Inn to Outlook Media. The evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he owned or did not own the permit or that his permission was required for the permit to be transferred. Mr. Monsalve did not agree to lease the space for the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. Mr. Monsalve notified DOT that a problem existed between him and the City of Miami regarding obtaining local government permission and requested DOT to put his Application on “Hold” in order to provide him with time to resolve the problem. He also notified DOT regarding his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media. DOT is unable to place applications on hold but is required to act on applications within 30 days. Also, Mr. Monsalve notified the City of Miami, among other things, of his dispute with the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, to Outlook Media, and that he did not give Outlook Media permission to erect a sign on his property for which the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179, was issued. By Notice of Denial issued on July 3, 2008, DOT notified Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reason: Other: No statement from the appropriate local governmental official indicating that the agency or unit of local government will issue a permit to the applicant upon approval of the state permit application by the Department (Section 479.07(3)(b), Florida Statutes). On July 15, 2008, DOT issued an amended Notice of Denial, notifying Mr. Monsalve that his Applications were denied for the following reasons: Sign does not meet spacing requirements (1500’ for interstates . . .) s.479.07(9)(a)1.&2., FS In conflict with permitted sign(s), tag #(s) CA 179 held by Outlook Media of South Florida, LLC . . . Sign/location does not comply with all local government requirements . . . s.479.07(3)(b), FS Other: The building permit submitted with the application is not in compliance with local governmental requirements. No evidence was presented to demonstrate that a determination had been made as to what Mr. Monsalve’s legal rights are as the owner of the property regarding his lease agreement/contract with the Hampton Inn and the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179; and regarding the transfer of the outdoor advertising sign permit, Tag Number CA179.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Andres Monsalve’s application for an outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2008.
