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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs FOX MARIANNE GUNN, D/B/A STARDUST LOUNGE, 09-001121 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 02, 2009 Number: 09-001121 Latest Update: Nov. 12, 2019

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent failed to comply with the requirements of its license under the beverage law. Specifically, Respondent purportedly violated the actions set forth in two counts, as follows: Count I--Respondent failed to "provide the required service area, seating and equipment to serve 200 persons full course meals at tables at one time as required by its license. [S]ections 561.20(2)(A)(4), within Section 561.29(1)(A), Florida Statutes"; and Count II--Respondent failed to "provide at least 4,000 square feet of area dedicated to the operation of the restaurant as required by its license. [S]ections 561.20(2)(A)(4), within Section 561.29(1)(A), Florida Statutes." Respondent has also raised the issue of whether Petitioner should be estopped from enforcement actions concerning the alleged violations.

Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency responsible for, inter alia, issuing and monitoring licenses to businesses within the state relating to the sale of alcoholic beverages. Respondent is the holder of an alcoholic beverage license, No. BEV46-261 Series 4-COP/SR (the "License"). An SR, or Special Restaurant, license is a unique kind of license which was issued by the Division prior to the establishment of quota licenses. Holders of SR licenses are allowed to sell beer, wine and liquor, package sales and sales by the drink on the premises. Quota licenses are issued based on a population ratio, i.e., no more than one license per 7,500 people in a given geographic area may exist. When Respondent obtained its SR license in 1979 (by way of transfer from the original owner of that license), the existing statutes mandated that the License be housed in a building of not less than 4,000 square feet with room in the building to seat at least 200 people at any one time. The statutes also required that food be served at all times the establishment was open. In 1979, when Respondent filed an application seeking to obtain the transfer of the SR license that had been issued in 1957, the application included an Affidavit from Marianne Gunn agreeing to a specific location (2704 Anderson Avenue, Fort Myers, Florida)1 for the business, which was to be known as the Stardust Lounge. The Affidavit affirmed Marianne Gunn's agreement to maintain the premises with the necessary equipment and supplies to seat 200 people at any one time. The Affidavit affirmed that the building housing Stardust Lounge would be at least 4,000 square feet in size. The License was then transferred to Respondent by the Division. Approximately one year after receiving the License and commencing operations, the Stardust Lounge burned down. Some undisclosed portion of the building remained, but no business could be operated on the site. It would have been difficult to rebuild the building under the then-current building codes. Further, the City of Fort Myers expressed its opposition to the existence of an alcoholic beverage establishment at that site. Some time after the fire, Respondent asked the Division to place the License in an inactive status (also known as placing a license in escrow). The request from Respondent asked that the License be placed in escrow for up to eight months. Respondent represented that it was in negotiation with the City of Fort Myers concerning a land swap to settle certain claims Respondent had against the city. Respondent estimated the negotiations would go on for approximately two months. Respondent advised the Division that if negotiations were successful, it would allow the License to be cancelled upon transfer of the premises to the city. If the negotiations were not successful, Respondent estimated it would need at least six months to sell the property at a private sale. It was Respondent's intent that the License be "taken care of" along with the land deal. "That's what that was all about," Fox testified at final hearing. Based upon Respondent's request, the Division apparently placed the License in escrow. There was no documentation presented at final hearing to substantiate this fact. However, the Division sent Respondent a bill each year to renew the License despite there being no physical site for operating a business by the licensee. Respondent dutifully paid the renewal fee each year. Eighteen years after the License was placed in escrow, the State of Florida commenced condemnation proceedings relating to a portion of the premises where the Stardust Lounge had formerly existed.2 During this nearly two-decade hiatus, Respondent continued to renew the License each year upon notice from the Division. Respondent's counsel sent a letter to the Division dated June 27, 2000, which said in pertinent part: We send you this letter at the request of our client, Mrs. Fox. . . . She has a liquor license in escrow with the Department. Due to the condemnation taking, she will not be able to utilize the license at this location and she has agreed that if this license can be moved to another location, it would not be an issue in the condemnation case. The letter did not address the issue of Respondent's prior representation that the License would be cancelled within eight months of its May 21, 1982, letter, some 18 years earlier. The Division responded to Respondent's counsel in a letter dated the very next day which stated in pertinent part: I am responding to the request of you and the licensee wanting to know if the liquor license that is held in the name of Marianne Gunn, DBA Stardust Lounge is movable. In the case of the property being taken by the state, the license may be moved one time and only one time. Providing that we have copies of all paperwork involved with the property condemnation taking. This license is not a moveable license unless in a case like this. The only thing that the licensee needs to understand is that it is changing location only one time. The Division's letter did not mention the escrow status of the License, either. The inartfully worded request and nebulous response added to the confusion concerning the status of the License. There is no evidence indicating whether any information concerning the condemnation was ever provided to the Division. Respondent could not say at final hearing when the condemnation actually occurred, how much land was taken, or how much was paid for the land. The License apparently remained in escrow at that time pending a move to some other location. Marianne Gunn Fox testified that the reason for her negotiations with the City of Fort Myers in 1982 was partly because the city did not want the bar located at the site where it had burned down. She testified that she had received insurance proceeds from the fire and intended to rebuild the lounge, but the city objected. That was the only testimony given as to why the lounge was not rebuilt during the 18 years it remained in escrow. Glen Fox testified that the original site of the Stardust Lounge would not be acceptable for rebuilding the structure after the fire due to certain building code issues. Both Mr. and Mrs. Fox testified that there was insufficient land available to build on site after the property condemnation taking. Fox testified that she owned three lots at the corner of Martin Luther King Boulevard and Cranford Avenue. Those lots were 50-feet-wide by 150-feet-deep (for a presumed total lot size of 150-feet-wide by 150-feet-deep). Fox does not know the size of the lots after the condemnation proceeding. It has long been the policy of the Division, pursuant to its interpretations of the Beverage Law set forth in statute, that SR licenses could not be moved from their original location. In 2005 or 2006, a licensee who was operating a business in American Beach filed a lawsuit against the Division seeking to move his SR license to a different location. As a result of the lawsuit, the Division changed its existing policy to allow for such a change. The new policy was posted on the Division's website for review by SR license holders. There is no evidence that SR license holders were notified about the change in policy by any other means. Respondent does not remember receiving any notice whatsoever regarding the change in policy. Within four to six months, and as a result of further legal research by Division attorneys, the Division once again altered its policy concerning the transfer of SR licenses. The newly-revised policy established the current Division position, i.e., that no SR license could be moved for any reason. Further, the policy states that all licensed premises must be in continuous operation or else the license would be forfeited. Again, the Division posted the new policy on its website and notified all SR license holders by way of letters to their establishments (or, in the case of Respondent, to the last known address). It is unclear from the record whether the letter was ever sent to or received by Respondent, although the Division obviously had Respondent's address because it sent renewal notices there each year. Some time after the change in policy, the Division determined that Respondent's license must be terminated or revoked. At that time, there were no premises associated with the License. The last time the License was in operation was 1979 or 1980, some 28 years prior to the Administrative Action being filed. The official address of the premises on the License during each of the renewal periods since 1980 had been "Escrow." That is, there was no site address associated with the License. There was obviously some address associated with the License, however, since Fox received annual billing statements from the Division. In November 2007, the Division issued an Administrative Action against Respondent concerning the License. The Administrative Action alleged that Respondent had not complied with the requirements of the License, i.e., size of premises and on-going operations. The Division indicated that it would sanction the License, including, but not limited to, revocation. Respondent does not dispute the fact that it is not complying with the requirements for an active license, but maintains that its escrowed license is exempt from those requirements. The License, despite being inactive for 28 years, is still apparently valid at this point in time (based on the Division's acceptance of Respondent's renewal payments each year). The License may have some monetary value, but there was no competent, substantial evidence presented at final hearing as to what the value might actually be. Marianne Gunn Fox testified that she did not know how much the License was worth, only that "nothing is worth as much as it used to be." Fox cannot remember how much she paid for the License when it was transferred to her. She cannot remember how much she asked for the License when she offered it for sale. She cannot remember how much was offered for the License as part of the condemnation sale. Fox does know that she paid an annual fee each year for renewal of the License. She does not know what the fee was each year, but "I paid whatever the state told me was due." (The Division testified that the annual fee was $1,820.00. Presuming 28 years of payments, the total paid to-date would be approximately $50,960.) When suggested to Fox by her counsel that the License was worth $300,000, she agreed with that amount, but could not substantiate why that amount was valid. Fox testified that she would like a "reasonable time" to market the License for sale. She did not express what a reasonable time might be, but has not been able (or willing) to sell the License for over 28 years. Respondent put the License "out for feelers" three or four years ago, but did not include an asking price for the License. About seven months ago, someone told Fox that the License was worth approximately $326,000, but there is no support for that estimate. Patrick Roberts, former law enforcement major with the Division, opined that he would have handled Respondent's case differently had it come across his desk. He opined that the requirement for 4,000 square feet and seating for 200 people should only apply to an existing business, not one in escrow. Roberts agreed that only quota licenses are allowed escrow status by statute. Roberts did not express any opinion as to the requirement that a business be on-going at all times. Roberts agreed that an SR license should not be placed in escrow, but said he'd try to negotiate a settlement, rather than file an Administrative Action. He did concur that an Administrative Action might be necessary if all else failed. Roberts did not opine that an Administrative Action was improper, only that it wasn't his first choice of action.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco, revoking Respondent, Fox Marianne Gunn, d/b/a Stardust Lounge's, License No. BEV46-261 Series 4-COP/SR. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 2010.

Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57120.68186.901561.20561.29
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. SAUNDRA MORENE, T/A AGEL GROCERY, 81-001822 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001822 Latest Update: Aug. 07, 1981

Findings Of Fact Respondent is the holder of Beverage License No. 26-751 permitting the sale of alcoholic beverages from her store at 1155 Jessie Street, Jacksonville, Florida. This business is a convenience store known as Agel Grocery. Respondent's husband has been co-owner of this business since the outset, and participates in its operation and management. When the Morenes applied for an alcoholic beverage license in June, 1980, they believed Frank Morene was ineligible and intentionally omitted his name from the application.

Recommendation From the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is That Respondent be found guilty of filing an incorrect application in violation of Subsection 561.17(1), Florida Statutes (1979). It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's Alcoholic Beverage License No. 26-751 be suspended until Respondent files and secures approval of a correct application or demonstrates that any direct or indirect interest of Frank Morene in the licensed business has been removed. DONE and ENTERED this 7th of August, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: James N. Watson, Jr., Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mrs. Saundra Morene c/o Agel Grocery 1155 Jessie Street Jacksonville, Florida 32206

Florida Laws (1) 561.17
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs 201 WEST,% INC., T/A %CENTRAL CITY, 90-004814 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Aug. 03, 1990 Number: 90-004814 Latest Update: Jun. 28, 1991

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. Respondent is 201 West, Inc., d/b/a Central City, who is the holder of alcoholic beverage license number 11-00259, Series 4-COP, a "quota license." Respondent's licensed premises is located at 201 West University Avenue, Gainesville, Alachua County, Florida. Craig Cinque is Respondent's sole director and corporate officer. Joseph Cinque, Craig Cinque's father, was formerly Respondent's sole director and corporate officer. Prior to becoming the owner of Central City, Craig Cinque managed the licensed premises on behalf of his father. During this period of time, the Division filed ten separate Notices to Show Cause against Respondent, alleging multiple sales to and consumption of alcoholic beverages by underaged persons. On August 29, 1989, the licensed premises was closed by an Emergency Order of Suspension. The administrative charges arising therefrom were resolved by a Stipulation and Consent Agreement, wherein the Respondent in that case admitted substantially to all of the violations. Craig Cinque individually executed the agreement, admitted responsibility for previous violations, and acknowledged that future violations of a similar nature could result in suspension or revocation of the alcoholic beverage license. The agency has issued numerous Notices to Show Cause against Respondent since the entry of the consent order. However, unproven Notices to Show Cause and unproven counts within any Notices to Show Cause are only unproven accusations, and as such are not probative herein even for purposes of showing "aggravation." Beverage Law Institute is an "approved trainer" under the Responsible Vendors Act, having been approved by the Petitioner as such. Petitioner certified Respondent Central City as a certified Responsible Vendor under the Act, on April 13, 1990. See, Subsections 561.701-561.706 F.S. Of the 483 nondistributor alcoholic beverage licensees in Alachua County, only 94 have been certified by Petitioner as Responsible Vendors. Of those 94, only 13 hold "4-COP" licenses, the category of license held by Respondent, which permits liquor, beer, or wine for consumption on premises or in a sealed container. Prior to the events of the instant Notices to Show Cause, and continuing through the 14-month period of the Notices to Show Cause and beyond, Respondent was engaged in a voluntary program designed to teach employees not to serve alcoholic beverages to underaged persons. Many of the materials therefor were provided by Beverage Law Institute. The training program and procedures involved multiple ID checkers at the front door. Also at the front door, wristbands to signify and quickly identify patrons of legal drinking age were issued. Once snapped on a customer's wrist, the band itself was stamped at a right angle across the customer's wrist to prevent or at least inhibit the wristband's transfer to an underage patron and to prevent a patron bringing in a counterfeit or "ringer" wristband. All patrons, regardless of age, received a stamp directly on the wrist to identify that they had paid their admission fee. Security personnel circulated inside the licensed premises checking drinks and wristbands, and waitresses were also instructed to check on drinks already purchased by customers. The training programs and procedures also involved Respondent's policy manual regarding IDs, extensive training and testing of employees, frequent oral reminders to employees concerning the law and concerning licensee policy, sporadic staff meetings regarding policy, videotaped instruction programs, provision of and instructions to employees to use an "ID Checking Guide" at the front door and at every internal bar within the licensed premises, confiscation of fake or questionable IDs at the door, 1/ and use of warning handbills given out to customers. Upon receipt, the handbills proclaiming the licensee's "of age only" policy were usually immediately discarded by customers. Some employees looked upon their training with more enthusiasm than others. Some employees considered the policy and training all for show. Most employees complied regularly with the requirements for training, review, and instructions. A few were lax in their compliance and had to be urged to attend staff meetings or to retest. In addition to all this, from the time the Responsible Vendor tests were available, all employees except two cashiers were tested according to the requirements of the Responsible Vendor Act and within the time frames provided therein. Every underage operative who testified admitted she or he had been "carded" at the door and that none had been issued wristbands. The parties stipulated that all of the individuals named in the four Notices to Show Cause (except for those alleged to have sold or given alcoholic beverages) were under the legal drinking age on the dates indicated by the respective Notices to Show Cause and that although each of these individuals "was actually in possession of alcoholic beverages as plead (sic), there was no evidence that any of the alcoholic beverages were obtained from Respondent's employees, agents, or servants." The stipulation listed the underage persons of the Notices to Show Cause but did not employ the term "consumption" which was specifically used only in the second Notice to Show Cause (GA11890496). Petitioner put on no witnesses as to "consumption." Likewise, Petitioner did not have admitted in evidence any confiscated alcoholic beverages alleged to have been sold by Respondent's agents/employees, nor did Petitioner present any laboratory reports to establish that any substance sold was alcohol. The only evidence of alcohol content is discussed infra. With regard to Craig Cinque's attitude and Central City's compliance with the Responsible Vendors Act, the testimony of Eileen Tenly and of William Cooter has been weighed and considered. Ms. Tenly is a totally noncredible witness whose testimony demonstrates an "axe to grind," and whose candor and demeanor is unpersuasive of anything except her animosity for Mr. Cinque. Petitioner's Investigator William Cooter, however, testified credibly that after having numerous conversations with Mr. Cinque on the subject of underage sales, Mr. Cinque stated that he was not worried about losing his alcoholic beverage license because he could get another one in his mother's name. On the other hand, Mr. Cooter, by his own testimony, has been invited by Mr. Cinque to instruct and has, in fact, instructed Mr. Cinque's employees on how to prevent underage drinking. The evidence as a whole, but most particularly that of Prince Miles, Respondent's janitor, who is a credible witness, is persuasive that patrons sometimes smuggle alcoholic beverages onto the licensed premises and that each time the establishment closes, commercial alcoholic beverage containers which are not part of the inventory sold by Respondent must be swept out. Since this smuggling activity must substantially reduce Respondent's profits, it is a logical inference that such smuggling is contrary to Respondent's policy and that Respondent does not encourage or condone it, whether done by adults or minors. I. Notice to Show Cause GA11890374; September 16, 1989 through February 9, 1990; sale to Toombs, Kittles, Goldtrap, and Ormsbee by Green, Halladay, Howell, and Grimes and possession by Peters, Conf, Kelly, Garcia, Fernandez, Shiskin, Brejhanan, Benz, Yawn, and Plettner All of the violations charged in Notice to Show Cause GA11890374 arose prior to Respondent's becoming a certified Responsible Vendor on April 13, 1990. On September 16, 1989, Ryan Conf and Alejandra Peters were each under the age of 21 and in actual possession of alcoholic beverages inside the licensed premises as pled. On September 19, 1989, Central City bartender David Green sold the Division's underaged operative, Bridgette Toombs, a liquid beverage in a long- neck, factory-produced 12-ounce bottle labelled "Michelob Dry." At that time, the licensed premises was not busy and Mr. Green noted that Ms. Toombs had no wristband. He therefore checked Ms. Toombs' underage ID and instructed her that since she was old enough to drink, she should go get a wristband. This transaction was observed by Petitioner's agent, Ms. Pendarakis, but Ms. Pendarakis did not overhear the conversation. After delivering a sample of the liquid beverage to Ms. Pendarakis in the ladies' room, Ms. Toombs crossed in front of Mr. Green's bar on her way to exit the licensed premises. Mr. Green sent word to Ms. Toombs by another Central City employee that he wanted to see her. Ms. Toombs complied with Mr. Green's request and showed him her underage ID once more. At that point, Mr. Green recognized his error in thinking that Ms. Toombs was 21 or over and called over several other Central City employees, all of whom viewed the ID showing Ms. Toombs was actually two months short of 19 years old. Mr. Green was not arrested until after the ID was passed around, so it may be inferred that his recognizing his mistake was not the result of any confrontation with Petitioner's agents or law enforcement officers or due to his perception that he had been "caught." Indeed, Petitioner's witness, Ms. Toombs, attributed Mr. Green's illegal sale to her as a mistake in subtraction. Mr. Green had previously successfully passed all tests required under the licensee's policy in existence before the Responsible Vendor tests were available. On October 20, 1989, Charlotte Kelly and Alezandro Garcia, who were under the age of 21, were each in the actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On October 21, 1989, Cesar Fernandez, who was under the age of 21, was in possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On the same date, underage operative Megan Kittles was inside the licensed premises. She was not wearing a wristband, and her hand was stamped indicating that she was under 21. She first approached a white male bartender who checked her and refused to serve her. She then ordered a rum and coke from Respondent's bartender, Craig Halladay. Mr. Halladay did not check Ms. Kittles' ID and served her a liquid beverage which Mr. Szabo of the Division testified that he had identified by smell as containing alcohol. No one saw the drink mixed, and Mr. Szabo admitted that he did not know what kind of alcohol the drink contained. He stated that he "would not swear it was rum." Mr. Szabo also was not aware until formal hearing that Respondent sold any nonalcoholic mixed drinks. Although the evidence is weak, it is persuasive that Ms. Kittles was served alcohol. Mr. Halladay successfully passed the licensee's policy test before this incident and the Responsible Vendor test afterwards. Also on October 21, 1989, Matthew Goldtrap, another underage operative, ordered a "Budweiser" and obtained a 12-ounce bottle labelled "beer" from a floor waitress named Shannon Howell. Mr. Goldtrap had no wristband but did have a stamp on his wrist. He gave the container to Investigator Smith. Mr. Szabo then took both of Respondent's employees into custody. Mr. Goldtrap does not drink alcohol. Investigator Smith did not testify, but it is inferred from the description of the beer bottle and the circumstances of the transaction as a whole that Mr. Goldtrap was served an alcoholic beverage. Ms. Howell successfully passed the licensee's test prior to this incident. On January 19, 1990, Scott Shiskin, Michael Brejhanan, and Carolyn Benz, who were under the age of 21, were in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On February 9, 1990, Central City bartender Steve Grimes sold Petitioner's 19-year old operative Octavia Ormsbee a liquid beverage. Ms. Ormsbee, who had no wristband on, was first denied a sale of alcoholic beverage at the downstairs back bar after Respondent's bartender there checked her underage ID. Ms. Ormsbee then went to an upstairs bar and ordered a "Bud Light." She was told by Mr. Grimes, a bartender at that bar, that they were out of "Bud Light," and by agreement, a beer bottle labelled "Budweiser" was substituted. Ms. Ormsbee does not drink alcohol and did not testify that what she received from Mr. Grimes was alcohol. The bottle purchased by Ms. Ormsbee was turned over to Officer Byrd of the Gainesville Police Department. Officer Byrd, who is familiar with alcoholic beverages through his own education, training, practice, and experience, identified the contents of the bottle purchased by Ms. Ormsbee as being "beer." Officer Byrd turned the bottle over to Petitioner's agent Cooter. Also on this occasion, Preston Yawn and Eric Plettner, who were under the age of 21, were each actually in possession of alcoholic beverages inside the licensed premises. Mr. Grimes had successfully passed the licensee's policy test prior to this incident. All of the underaged operatives who testified concerning this Notice to Show Cause testified that Petitioner's adult operatives forbade them to drink (consume) what they were sold and that they did not consume any. Also, absent evidence to the contrary, one may assume that possession of alcoholic beverages in a bar by the minors actually named in the Notice to Show Cause constituted their intent to consume, but contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the inferred intent to consume does not constitute actual "consumption" by the named minors. In light of Finding of Fact 14 supra, mere possession does not necessarily constitute Respondent's "allowing or permitting to consume." Therefore, consumption by the minors named in this Notice to Show Cause has not been proven. 2/ Therefore, Petitioner has only established that on September 19, 1989 Respondent's bartender sold an alcoholic beverage to Petitioner's underage operative Bridgette Toombs; that on October 21, 1989, Respondent's bartender sold an alcoholic beverage to the Petitioner's underage operative Megan Kittles; that also on October 21, 1989, Respondent's floor waitress sold Petitioner's underage operative Matthew Goldtrap an alcoholic beverage; and that on February 9, 1990, Respondent's bartender sold the Division's underage operative Octavia Ormsbee an alcoholic beverage. One of these sales was clearly a mistake and two other operatives had to go to two bartenders each before an illegal sale was made. II. Notice to Show Cause GA11890496; June 8, 1990 through June 16, 1990; sale to Wearner by Edge and to Seligman by Lemberger and Bergine and possession by Tetstone, Lockey, Klug, Skipper, and Bissell On June 8, 1990, Jennifer Tetstone and Amy Lockey, who were under the age of 21, were in actual possession of alcoholic beverages inside the licensed premises. On June 16, 1990, Ann Klug, Shana Skipper, and Michael Bissell were in actual possession of alcoholic beverages inside the licensed premises. Also on June 16, 1990, Central City bartenders Michael Edge, Michael Bergine, and Robert Lemberger, respectively, sold each of the Division's underage operatives Kathy Wearner (who did not testify but who was stipulated to be underage) and Charles Seligman an alcoholic beverage. Neither underaged operative wore a wristband or was requested to produce an ID for purposes of the respective sales. As of date of formal hearing, the Respondent continued to employ these same bartenders. All of these bartenders had successfully completed the Responsible Vendor test before these incidents. Mr. Edge also had passed the licensee's earlier policy test. The underaged operative, Kathy Wearner, asked Michael Edge for "a Budweiser" and was sold liquid in a "Budweiser" beer bottle inverted in a drinking glass. Officer Rockey of the Gainesville Police Department convincingly described the liquid that came out of the bottle as beer, an alcoholic beverage. He turned the materials confiscated over to an unnamed agent of Respondent and has not seen them since. On the same date, Central City bartender Robert Lemberger sold a 12-ounce bottle labelled "Budweiser" to 18- year-old operative Charles Seligman. Mr. Seligman was at all times without a wristband and bearing a stamp on his hand. Mr. Seligman delivered the bottle he received from Mr. Lemberger to Officer Posey of the Gainesville Police Department who had watched the entire transaction. Mr. Seligman later purchased a 12-ounce bottle of "Budweiser" from Mr. Bergine and delivered that bottle to Officer Posey. Mr. Seligman purchased a third 12-ounce bottle of "Budweiser" from Mr. Bergine and delivered that bottle to one of Petitioner's agents, Ernest Wilson. Mr. Seligman does not drink alcohol. Agent Wilson does drink alcohol and testified that the bottle Charles Seligman handed him was, in fact, beer. Although Agent Wilson also testified that Mr. Seligman's first name was "Tom" and that Mr. Seligman had purchased a rum drink, nonetheless, Mr. Wilson was convincing that the bottle handed him by Mr. Seligman did, in fact, contain beer, an alcoholic beverage. Officer Posey convincingly described the first bottle he received from Mr. Seligman as containing beer, an alcoholic beverage, and upon all the circumstances, the undersigned infers that the second bottle given Officer Posey also contained beer. All the underaged operatives who testified on this Notice to Show Cause testified that they were forbidden to drink (consume) what they were sold and did not do so. Also, absent evidence to the contrary, one may assume that possession of alcoholic beverages in a bar by the other minors actually named in the Notice to Show Cause constitutes their intent to consume, but contrary to Petitioner's assertion, the inferred intent to consume does not constitute actual "consumption" by the named minors. In light of Finding of Fact 14 supra, it does not necessarily constitute Respondent's "allowing or permitting to consume." Therefore, consumption by the minors named in this Notice to Show Cause has not been proven. 3/ Therefore, Petitioner has established only that on June 16, 1990 Respondent's personnel sold one alcoholic beverage to the Petitioner's underage operative Wearner and three alcoholic beverages to the Petitioner's underage operative Seligman. III. Notice to Show Cause GA11900209; September 22, 1990 through September 29, 1990; service to, or consumption by Stanton, Coody, Willis, and, Torres On September 22, 1990, Amy Stanton and Janet Coody, who were under the age of 21, were in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage in the licensed premises. On September 29, 1990, Betty Willis and Jose Torres, who were under the age of 21, were in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage in the licensed premises. Absent evidence to the contrary, one may assume that possession of alcoholic beverages in a bar by minors constitutes the minors' intent to consume, but contrary to Petitioner's assertion, that intent to consume does not constitute actual "consumption" by the named minors. In light of Finding of Fact 14 supra, it does not necessarily constitute Respondent's "allowing or permitting to consume." Therefore, consumption by the minors named in this Notice to Show Cause has not been proven. 4/ IV. Notice to Show Cause GA11900254 October 19, 1990 through November 16, 1990; 9 counts possession by Harriett, Ortega, McKinney, Nelson, Smith, Winter, Joyner, Cooke, Sammon; "giving" by Blackwell and Strawser On October 19, 1990, Steven Harriett, who was under 21, was in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On October 21, 1990, Jamie Ortega, who was under the age of 21, was in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On October 20, 1990, Brian McKinney, who was under 21, was in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On November 15, 1990, Karen Nelson, Hollie Smith, Michael Winter, and Julia Joyner, all underage, were in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. On November 16, 1990, Denise Cooke and Teresa Sammon, who were under the age of 21, were in actual possession of an alcoholic beverage inside the licensed premises. Absent evidence to the contrary, one may assume that possession of alcoholic beverages in a bar by minors constitutes the minors' intent to consume, but contrary to Petitioner's assertion, that intent to consume does not constitute actual "consumption" by the named minors. In light of Finding of Fact 14 supra, it does not necessarily constitute Respondent's "allowing or permitting to consume." Therefore, consumption by the minors named in this Notice to Show Cause has not been proven. 5/ No evidence was introduced to establish the allegations of Counts 4 and 6 of Notice to Show Cause GA11900254, alleging "giving."

Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Division of Alcoholic and Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order dismissing Notices to Show Cause GA11900209 and GA11900254; finding Respondent guilty as specified above for four violations under Notice to Show Cause GA11890374, imposing a total of $1750 in civil fines therefor; and finding Respondent guilty as specified above for four violations under Notice to Show Cause GA11890496, imposing a total of $2000 in civil fines therefor. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of June, 1991.

Florida Laws (9) 120.57561.29561.702561.705561.706562.11562.111775.082775.083
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EMILIO AND WILMA BETH TORO, T/A THE PLACE IN BET vs. DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO, 79-001576 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001576 Latest Update: Jan. 16, 1980

The Issue This case concerns the entitlement of the Petitioners to be granted a Series 2-COP beverage license from the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners, Emilio and Wilma Beth Toro t/a The Place In Between, are currently the holders of a Series 1-COP beverage license issued by the State of Florida, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco. That series of license allots the Petitioners to vend beer for consumption on the premises which is located in the incorporated city of Fernandina Beach, Florida. On April 25, 1979, the Petitioners applied to the Respondent for an increase in series of license from a Series 1-COP to a Series 2-COP. A Series 2-COP license allows for the sale of beer and wine and for the consumption of those beverages on the licensed premises. On May 22, 1979, the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco denied the application for an increase in series. The sole ground given for such denial is that the issuance of such a license would be contrary to Chapter 57-1601, Laws of Florida (1957), in that the provision of law prohibits the issuance of such a license. This subject law limits the number of licenses that may be issued by the Respondent in the incorporated areas of Nassau County, Florida, to the extent that only one license, of any kind or nature, shall be issued for each 4,000 persons within any incorporated city or town lying in the said county where beverages containing alcohol of core than 14 percent by weight are being sold. The population measurement is based on the last preceding Federal Census. Within Nassau County, Florida, the Federal Census indicates that the following incorporated cities or towns are recognized in 1970. Those communities are: Boulogne City, Callahan Town, Hilliard Town, and Fernandina Beach City. Of those incorporated communities, only Fernandina Beach City exceeded the 4,000-person threshold. Fernandina Beach City had a population of 6,955 persons as reflected in the 1970 Federal Census. (See page 7 of the Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 admitted into evidence, which is a copy of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, "1970 Census of Population" for the State of Florida.) An affidavit submitted by the Respondent shows that on May 7, 1979, the records of the Respondent indicated the existence of four quota liquor licenses (Series 8-COP) and twenty-one wine licenses (Series 2-APS and Series 2-COP) within the limits of the incorporated areas of Nassau County, Florida.

Recommendation It is recommended that the Director of the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco deny the Petitioners' request for a Series 2-COP beverage license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Emilio & Wilma Beth Toro 2019 Atlantic Avenue Fernandina Beach, Florida 32034 Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 564.01
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. FRANK D. AND ESTELLA S. BYERS, T/A BIG B RESTAURANT, 84-000328 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000328 Latest Update: May 09, 1984

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, alcoholic beverage license No. 26-01841, Series No. 2-APS, was issued to Respondents, Frank D. and Estella S. Ryers, for their establishment known as the Big B Restaurant, located at 5570 Avenue B, Jacksonville, Florida. A 2-APS license permits the package sale only of beer and wine. It does not permit the consumption on the premises of beer, wine, or liquor. On March 27, 1983, Investigator Wendell M. Reeves conducted an undercover operation directed against the Big B Restaurant predicated upon reports received by Petitioner that Respondents were conducting sales of alcoholic beverages not permitted by the license at the licensed premises. In furtherance of that operation, Reeves utilized another beverage agent, Van Young, in an undercover capacity to make a controlled buy of an improperly sold substance from the licensees. Prior to sending Young into the licensed premises, Reeves searched Young to ensure that he, Young, had no alcoholic beverage or money in his possession. Satisfying himself that that was the case, he gave Young $15 in U.S. currency and sent him into the licensed premises to make the buy. Young entered the Big B Restaurant at 1:00 p.m. and came out 17 minutes later. When he came out of the licensed premises, Young came over to where Reeves was waiting and turned over to him a sealed 200 ml bottle of Fleishman's Gin. Young told Reeves that he had purchased the gin in the licensed premises from a black male whose description matched that of Respondent Frank D. Byers which is contained on Respondent's application for license. Respondent Frank Byers denies making the sale. On balance, however, there is little doubt it was Respondent who made the sale, especially in light of the fact that this same licensee was issued a letter of warning by the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco in October 1981 for possession on the premises of an alcoholic beverage not permitted to be sold under the license. Young also stated that he purchased a second bottle which he consumed on the premises with another black male. However, this evidence was in the form of Reeves' report of what was told him by Young. As such, it is clearly hearsay and can be used only to corroborate or explain other admissible evidence. Therefore, as to the allegation regarding the consumption of the gin on the premises, since it is the only evidence of that offense, it cannot be used to support a finding of fact on that allegation. It may, however, be used to explain how Young got the bottle with which he was seen by Reeves to come out of the licensed premises. Several days later, on March 30, 1983, Reeves again entered the licensed premises, where he told Respondent Estella Byers he was there to inspect the site. She opened the cooler for him and he inspected the beer inside and the cigarettes. While he was doing that, however, he noticed her take a cloth towel and drape it over something behind the bar. He went over to it, removed the towel, and found that it covered a bottle of Schenley's gin. Mrs. Byers immediately said she thought it was her husband's, Respondent Frank Byers, but another individual present at the time, Sharon Thomas, said she had taken it from her brother, who was drunk, and had put it there. Again, as to Ms. Thomas' comments, they, too, are hearsay and can only serve here to explain or corroborate other admissible evidence. In any case, after Ms. Thomas made her comment, she was immediately contradicted by Respondent Estella Byers, who again indicated she thought the bottle was her husband's. In any case, at the hearing, Respondent Estella Byers contended she did not know it was there. On balance, Mr. Reeves' testimony that she covered it with a towel while he was inspecting and the evidence of the prior warning for an identical offense tend to indicate she did know it was there and that it was unlawful for it to be there. There is, however, no evidence to establish sufficiently the reason for its being there.

Florida Laws (2) 562.02562.12
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DIVISION OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO vs. RODDE, INC., D/B/A TANGA LOUNGE, 81-002566 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-002566 Latest Update: Jul. 26, 1982

Findings Of Fact The Tanga Lounge, operated by Respondent Rodde Inc., is located at 6333 West Columbus Avenue, Tampa, Florida. This facility has been licensed by Petitioner at all times relevant to these proceedings. Respondent's records show Mr. Joe Redner as the sole stockholder and corporate officer of Rodde, Inc., which is the holder of alcoholic beverage license No. 39-738. Case No. 81-2566 contains three counts of begging or soliciting for alcoholic beverages by employees of Respondent on August 6, 1980. Testimony by former Beverage Officer White established that the solicitations of three drinks by two employees were made as charged in the Notice to Show Cause. White purchased the drinks as requested by these employees, who received a "ticket" for each of the drinks purchased for them by White. Case No. 81-2567 contains 44 counts of begging or soliciting drinks by various employees of Respondent and 44 counts charging that Respondent conspired with these employees for the purpose of soliciting drinks. These charges are primarily based on the investigations of Beverage Officers Gary Hodge and Michael Freese. The period of their investigation was October 17, 1980 through May 15, 1981. Count 52 was based on a solicitation of Detective Phil Mickel of the Tampa Police Department, who was in the licensed premises in an undercover capacity on November 6, 1980. At the request of dancer-employee Cathy Andrews, Mickel purchased a "double" for her and observed that she received two tickets from the waitress. 5 Former Tampa Police Department Detective Nick Haynes was in the licensed premises on November 6, 1980, and was approached by the dancer-employee, Cheryl Jonas, who requested that Haynes purchase a drink for her. He did so. This transaction occurred as charged in Count No. 51. Beverage Officer Freese individually and in conjunction with Beverage Officer Hodge, accounted for 38 solicitation charges (Counts 53-57, 59-63, 66, 68-88, and 163-167) . The solicitations charged in Counts 53, 55, 71-80, 83, - 84, 88, 163, 166 and 167 occurred as alleged and involved direct requests for the purchase of drinks ("Will you buy me a drink," or words of similar import) . Freese observed employees receive tickets for these drinks from the bartender or waitress in most instances. The solicitations charged in Counts 54, 56, 57, 59-63,66, 68-70, 81, 82, 164 and 165 were not supported by evidence of direct requests for the beverage purchases by employees of Respondent. At a meeting held about December 17, 1980, Beverage Officers Freese and Hodge were instructed by their supervisor to require that dancers request drinks before ordering. This procedure was adopted to avoid situations where the beverage officer was not asked to buy a drink, but eventually received the bill for the dancer's drink. In implementing the instructions, Freese used these or similar words: "If you want a drink, ask for it.", This statement possibly misled the dancers to believe that Freese was inviting them to order whenever they wanted drinks. The date when Freese first used this statement was not established, but it was subsequent to the mid-December meeting. It was noted that Freese was not solicited during the first two months of the investigation. Therefore, all or substantially all of the solicitation charges involving Freese took Place after he first issued the "invitation." Beverage Officer Hodge individually testified as to solicitation Counts 58, 64, 65 and 67. Counts 58, 65 and 67 did not involve a direct request for beverage purchase. Count 64 occurred as alleged and was based on a direct request for beverage Purchase ("Why don't you buy me one now?"). This request was made during the early morning of January 13, 1981. Although this was after the December meeting which Hodge attended, it was not shown that he made any statement which could have been interpreted as an "invitation" by any employee of Respondent. The fact that customers regularly Purchased drinks for the dancers was well known to the management as evidenced by the tickets issued to employees for drinks purchased in their behalf. These tickets were redeemable by the dancers for one dollar each. Thus, employees were rewarded and implicitly permitted to solicit drinks. Respondent's announced policy was, however, to reprimand or discharge any employee who was caught begging or soliciting drinks. This policy was attested to by bartenders; former employees and dancers. Although it cannot be found that Respondent actively encouraged its employees to solicit drinks, it did encourage socializing with customers to a degree which would elicit offers to purchase drinks for them. Respondent has since discontinued the practice of issuing tickets or other employee incentives to obtain customer purchased drinks. Counts 127 through 161 involve drug charges. Purchases were made by Beverage Officer Freese and Hedge, individually and together. Their testimony and that of Florida Department of Law Enforcement Crime Lab personnel established that controlled substances were purchased from dancer-employees of Respondent on the licensed premises as charged in Counts 127 through 137, 156 and 158. The transactions which-were established to have been carried out involved cocaine, methaqualone and cannabis deliveries by dancer-employees Margie Wade, Janie Marsie, Lori Basch and Lisa Scibilia on February 21, 24, 27; March 2, 9, 13, 17, 23; May 13, 15, 1981. It should be noted that Counts 136 and 137 actually involved one transaction where Hodge and Freese split the delivery. Count 161 concerned a transaction outside the licensed premises and this count, as well as Count 158, involved an employee of another establishment. Petitioner's Exhibit 43 and the supporting testimony concerned a transaction for which there was no charge. Counts 138 through 151, 154 and 159-161 alleged conspiracies to deliver controlled substances corresponding to other counts which alleged actual deliveries. There was testimony on the involvement of third person (not shown to be associated with the Respondent) only as to Counts 134, 146, and 147, which essentially covered a single transaction. No other evidence of conspiracy was presented. On one occasion, Redner was in the Tanga Lounge and within about 15 feet of the beverage officer and the dancer when the delivery took place. However, there was no evidence that Redner was involved or that he had any knowledge of the transaction. Testimony by a former employee that Redner participated in drug use was lacking in credibility and was not corroborated. Counts 3 through 30 and 33 through 50 are charges of lewd dancing by employees of Respondent on the licensed premises. The charges cover 46 dances on 12 separate dates between October, 1980, and February, 1981, performed by 11 different dancer-employees. The acts complained of in these counts were witnessed and attested to by Beverage Officers Hodge and Freese and Tampa Police Department Detective Mickel. The alleged lewd conduct included exposing of the breasts, vagina and anus by dancers during their on-stage performances. Typically, the dancers received dollar tips which customers placed in their bikini bottoms. Some dancers allowed customers to reach inside the bikinis in order to touch their pubic areas. On several occasions the dancers squatted and picked up the dollar bills with their exposed genital areas. On December 11, dancer Cathy Andrews rubbed her vagina, then rubbed the genital area of Beverage Officer Freese, who was observing the dance. Mr. Redner was present during much of the alleged lewd conduct. Although Redner testified that "flashing" was acceptable, the exposure of sexual organs as attested to was not limited to brief "flashes," but was prolonged. Further, Respondent's contention that dancers receiving tips tried to avoid contact by customers is not credible. Rather, the testimony of the officers established that dancers frequently encouraged customers to place their hands against the dancers pubic areas when offering tips. Respondent's, lounge is advertised as an adult entertainment facility and is generally known to include nude dancing. There was no competent evidence as to community standards for this type of conduct in the Tampa area, nor was there any evidence that these acts shocked or offended anyone present other than the investigating officers. Detective Mickel conceded that about five other bars he has visited offer this type of entertainment. Counts 31 and 32 concern an offer of prostitution by one of the dancer-employees to the beverage officers. Their testimony established that the offer was made as charged. This was, however, a single incident and there was no evidence that such offers were recurring or that Respondent had knowledge of this transaction. Counts 1 and 2 of Case No. 81-2567 allege that Robert Rodriguez holds an undisclosed interest in the licensed premises. Such interest, if any, was not reflected in the license transfer application submitted on April 23, 1976. Rather, Joseph Redner and Joe DeFriese were identified as the sole stockholders with no direct or indirect interest held by any other person. Rodriguez previously owned an interest in Deep South Plantation Foods, Inc., whose alcoholic beverage license was revoked by Petitioner. Redner was at one time employed by Rodriguez as manager of Deep South Petitioner asserts that Rodriguez became ineligible to hold an interest in an alcoholic beverage license as a result of the revocation, pursuant to Section 561.15, Florida Statutes, and that he and Redner therefore concealed Rodriguez's subsequent interest in the Tanga Lounge. Respondent contends that Rodriguez is the manager of the Tanga Lounge, but holds no direct or indirect interest therein. Rodde, Inc., was organized on April 19, 1976, and a $2,000 down payment deposit on the contract for purchase of the Tanga Lounge and liquor license was made on April 20, 1976, pursuant to contract signed by DeFriese and the prior owners on that date. This $2,000 check was issued by Robert Rodriguez against his own account. Petitioner produced this cancelled check (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) and numerous other documents which establish that Rodriguez participated in all aspects of Rodde, Inc., management and financial operations since its inception. Rodriguez has unrestricted authority to withdraw funds from corporate accounts and has signed or cosigned for loans and credit purchases. Rodriguez also utilized a Rodde, Inc., credit card to pay personal expenses on a vacation to Las Vegas in 1979. There was no evidence of reimbursement or other accounting to the corporation for these expenditures. The testimony of the Rodde, Inc., employees did not corroborate Redner's testimony that Rodriguez is manager of the Tanga Lounge. Rather, these employees believed Rodriguez was somehow associated with the business, but regarded Redner as the manager and their only supervisor. Rodriguez issued two checks for $1,408.05 on December 1, 1979, one payable to himself and the other to Redner (Petitioner's Exhibit 32) . These checks each carried the notation "bonus $1500", with a further notation apparently accounting for $91.95 in withholding tax. In view of Rodriguez's duties and functions within the corporation, this "bonus" can only be considered a participation in profits. Redner's credit rating and financial management skills are poor. Therefore, Respondent contends that a manager with strength in these areas was needed to ensure business success. However, Rodriguez's unlimited authority in dealing with corporate funds, the investment or loan of his personal funds, his participation in business profits and the absence of any apparent supervisory duties are inconsistent with the employee theory held out by Respondent.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of the charges contained in Counts 1, 2 and 3 of the Administrative Complaint/Notice to Show Cause in Case No. 81-2566. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of the charges contained in Counts 1, 2, 31, 32, 51, 52, 64, 127-137, 156, and 158 of the Administrative Complaint/Notice to Show Cause in Case No. 81-2567. It is further RECOMMENDED that all other charges be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent's Alcoholic Beverage License No. 39-738 be revoked. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1982 at Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1982.

Florida Laws (12) 408.05561.15561.17561.29562.131562.23775.082775.083796.07847.011893.03893.13
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