Findings Of Fact Respondents hold license 23-3237 COP and at all times here relevant were so licensed. On 7 November, 1977, Respondent, Juan Rodriguez, sold less than five grams of marijuana to Rocco Delio, an undercover policeman, on the licensed premises. Delio paid Rodriguez $11 for the marijuana and two beers. When arrested in December 1977 on a warrant charging him with the sale of marijuana, Rodriguez had an old lottery ticket in his possession as well as a list of numbers which the arresting officers thought to be lottery numbers. Rodriguez testified that the lottery ticket was an old one he bad obtained in Puerto Rico and that he had forgotten the ticket was in his wallet. He further identified the list of numbers as measurements he had taken for a building. Rodriguez denied ever selling any lottery tickets. At his trial on the charge of possession and sale of marijuana and possession of lottery paraphernalia Rodriguez pleaded guilty, upon the advice of counsel, to unlawful sale of marijuana, and adjudication of guilt was withheld. (Exhibit 1). Rodriguez testified that he paid a $300 fine and was told by his attorney that the plea and subsequent withholding adjudication of guilt would not affect his business. At this hearing Rodriguez denied selling marijuana to the policeman who had testified to the contrary. The Petitioner's witness is deemed a much more credible witness and it was this testimony, plus the guilty plea entered in Circuit Court that resulted in the finding that Respondent possessed and sold marijuana on the licensed premises. No evidence was submitted with respect to Counts 3, 4 and 7 of the Notice to Show Cause. The admissions of Respondent with respect to the facts alleged in Counts 5 and 6 were rebutted by Respondent's testimony, which was not contradicted by Petitioner's witness, that the lottery ticket was old and that the list of numbers found on Rodriguez' person was not a list of lottery numbers.
The Issue Whether the full amount of the lottery prize winnings (remaining after deduction of federal tax withholding) that Petitioner claimed (on behalf of herself and 13 other members of her "Lotto pool") should be used to offset the debt Petitioner owes the Department of Education, Office of Student Financial Assistance.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, including the factual stipulations of the parties,2 the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is in default on three student loans that OSFA, as guarantor, purchased (upon Petitioner's default) from the lender on December 27, 2001, and continues to hold. As of September 10, 2003, Petitioner owed OSFA $12,503.79 on these defaulted loans. In May of 2003, Petitioner participated in a "Lotto pool" with 13 other individuals. Pool members agreed to contribute equally to the purchase of Florida lottery tickets and to share equally in any winnings. Petitioner was assigned the task of purchasing the tickets on behalf of the pool. One of the tickets Petitioner purchased was a winner (having five of the six selected numbers). The amount of the prize, after making an appropriate deduction for federal income tax withholding, was $3,262.00. On behalf of the pool, Petitioner submitted the winning ticket, with her name on it, to the Florida Department of the Lottery to claim the prize. At the request of the Florida Department of the Lottery, she completed an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Form 5754. On the form, among other things, she identified the others in the pool with whom she intended to share the proceeds of the prize. On May 27, 2003, Olga Roca, a Program Specialist with OSFA, sent the following letter to the Florida Department of the Lottery: I hereby certify that the above referenced person [Petitioner] has an outstanding defaulted student[] loan. Under terms of § 24.115, F.S, I am requesting that lottery prize money won by that person be transmitted to the Florida Department of Education to be credited toward that debt. The balance due including interest accrued as of 6/11/03 totals $12,389.88. By letter dated June 2, 2003, the Florida Department of the Lottery advised Petitioner that, "[p]ursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, [it had] disbursed [her] winnings according to [Ms. Roca's May 27, 2003, letter]." A month later, on July 2, 2003, OSFA sent Petitioner a letter informing her that it "plan[ned] to apply the total amount of [her] $3,262.00 prize to [her] unpaid claim."3 It is this proposed agency action which is the subject of the instant controversy.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that OSFA take the action proposed in its July 2, 2003, letter to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of October, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 2003.
Findings Of Fact On September 20, 1977, Victor Sosa, at the time an employee of petitioner, and Leroy Patten, then as now a field agent for the Department of Commerce, visited respondent's premises. A Mr. Chavez told the investigators that Jose Isidro Guillamo, respondent's sole corporate officer, was not on the premises and could not be reached. In response to Mr. Patten's questions, Mr. Chavez said he was ignorant of details about respondent's workmen's compensation insurance. Mr. Sosa asked Mr. Chavez to produce invoices reflecting purchases of alcoholic beverages. Mr. Chavez replied that most of the invoices were at an accountant's office, but joined Mr. Sosa in looking for invoices behind a counter at which customers sat. In the course of the search, Mr. Sosa noticed a clipboard hanging from a nail. The clipboard contained guest checks used as lottery slips. Nearby drawers yielded paper napkins similar employed. The search never uncovered any invoices on the premises. At no time did petitioner give respondent permission to store invoices off the premises. On September 20, 1977, and continuously until March 20, 1978, respondent did not maintain in force workmen's compensation insurance for its employees. On September 20, 1977, no notice of workmen's compensation insurance coverage was posted on the premises.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondent's license for thirty days and thereafter until respondent shall secure compensation for its employees in accordance with Section 440.38 (1), Florida Statutes (1977). DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of June, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis E. LaRosa, Esquire The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 La Dominicana Corporation d/b/a La Dominicana Restaurant c/o Jose Isidro Guillama and Mario Cartas 1416 San Marco Coral Gables, Florida 33134
The Issue Petitioner, Carolyn A. Winston, alleges that Respondent, Department of the Lottery, has discriminated against her on account of her race in violation of Section 760.10, F.S. The issue for resolution is whether the violation occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Carolyn A. Winston, a black female, commenced her employment with the Florida Department of Lottery, a newly-created agency, on November 2, 1987. An active participant in Republican and minority organizations, Mrs. Winston was recruited by the agency after she submitted her resume for employment with the Martinez administration to Jeannie Austin, Chairperson of the Florida Republican Party. At the time that she was recruited, Ms. Winston was employed by AT&T and had approximately 9 1/2 years experience with AT&T as a manager/systems analyst. She had a BA degree in business administration/marketing from Rollins College in Winter Park, Florida. After an interview in Tallahassee, Carolyn Winston was hired by Michele Hayes, Director of Sales and Marketing, to be the Regional Manager for the Orlando Regional Office of the Lottery. Her salary, $41,300.00, was the maximum for the class. During the summer and fall of 1987, the Lottery was in the process of hiring approximately 700 employees. January 12, 1988 was targeted as the first date of sale of tickets and all sales staff were to be hired by November 16, 1987. Ms. Winston and the five other regional managers from offices in Orlando, Tallahassee, Jacksonville, St. Petersburg, Ft. Lauderdale, and Miami, reported directly to regional coordinators in the agency's Tallahassee headquarters. The general duties of the regional managers were to plan, organize and direct the sales activity of regional sales staff and district managers; to implement and interpret agency policies and procedures; and to protect the integrity of the Lottery. Two district managers reported to Carolyn Winston: Deborah Burkett (Orlando District) and Mike Steiber (Melbourne District). They had been hired prior to Ms. Winston and were engaged in hiring their sales staff in early November. In other regions, where district managers were not in place, the regional manager hired sales staff until the district managers could take over. There was no formal training established for regional or district managers when Ms. Winston was hired. She reported to work on her first day, November 2, 1987, in Tallahassee, where she met Dick Lepanen, the Regional Manager for Tallahassee, and Pam Allen, Regional Coordinator. She was given a limited briefing on her duties and a handbook describing the Lottery history and organization. Formal training for all regional and district managers, including Ms. Winston, was conducted in a three-day session in Tallahassee in November 10, 11 and 12, and again on November 30, 1987. The managers were given notebooks containing operational information and guidelines for performance of their duties. Ms. Winston was concerned about hiring qualified minorities for new positions with the Lottery and was able to assist her district directors, through the organizations with which she was connected, to locate applicants. In at least one instance Mike Steiber hired such an applicant after contacting Ms. Winston with his difficulty in recruiting through the local job services office. At the hearing Ms. Winston expressed pride at having the most qualified Lottery employees and more minorities than any other region. Despite the urgent need to train new employees and to meet the start up deadline, Ms. Winston's management concerns were related to form, rather than substance. She told the district managers that she wanted to conduct regional training and spent several hours of that training in Orlando explaining her background and management style and introducing staff and having them explain their backgrounds and styles. She then insisted that they all go to lunch together, with the result that substantive training was delayed until mid- afternoon. The sales representatives from the Melbourne office expressed concern to their manager, Dick Steiber, and requested additional training that evening back in their Melbourne office. On another occasion, in December 1987, Ms. Winston sent a memo to the district managers, without prior discussion, placing her own clerical assistant in charge of all clerical operations for the region and districts and stating that the regional manager would be conducting "skip level" meetings with subordinate district staff. On the afternoon before the first delivery of lottery tickets was due in the Melbourne district, Ms. Winston directed Mike Steiber to send his lead storekeeper to Orlando the next morning to observe how the Orlando tickets were laid out. He agreed this would be a good idea, but suggested that she come later as she needed to handle the ticket delivery. Ms. Winston insisted that she come as directed. Shortly thereafter, Mike Steiber requested a personal meeting with Ms. Winston to discuss his concerns. She gave him an 8:00 a.m. appointment in Orlando. Mr. Steiber travelled from Melbourne but Ms. Winston did not appear; she called her office about 30 minutes later to say that she would be unable to meet. The meeting was rescheduled for the next day and the same thing happened. After the third day and third unsuccessful trip to Orlando, the meeting was delayed indefinitely. In response to concerns expressed by Pam Allen, Regional Coordinator and Mrs. Winston's immediate supervisor, and by Deborah Burkett and Mike Steiber, Michelle Hayes asked Ms. Winston to come to Tallahassee to meet for a performance review. Feeling uncomfortable, Ms. Winston called Lt. Governor Bobby Brantley and told him she was being harassed. He replied that she should go to the meeting and consider it an opportunity to tell her story. Nonetheless, she sought legal counsel and brought an attorney with her to the meeting. Discussion of Ms. Winston's performance included failing to meet with the district managers to resolve problems at the regional level, presenting conflicting instructions, holding correspondence, lack of interest in learning agency operations, abbreviated work hours, and failing to leave forwarding phone numbers with support staff when absent during the workday. Ms. Winston considered the issues raised at the meeting to be lies generated by Deborah Burkett, and she responded to the meeting with a 6-page memorandum to Michele Hayes dated January 27, 1988. She also addressed a letter to the Lt. Governor the same day, enclosing her memorandum and stating, in part: * * * The lies can never be forgiven, but can be corrected. I suggest you remove the liar from my organization, District Manager Deborah Burkett, via termination not just for me; [sic] but for the good of the Orlando Region and encourage my Director to support the chain of command. * * * (Petitioner's Ex. #6) Copies were sent to Gov. Martinez, Jeannie Austin and Luther Smith, Esquire. Carolyn Winston viewed the meeting with her supervisor as an effort to get rid of her. She felt that both of her district managers were going over her head to get direction from Tallahassee or to report on her activity. Friction between Ms. Winston and Ms. Burkett severely affected morale in the office, and the employees felt uncomfortable at being required to take sides. Ms. Burkett had an aggressive management style, but was considered by her supervisors in Tallahassee to be very competent and knowledgeable about her job. Because she preceded Ms. Winston and had commenced hiring the staff on her own, some employees in the Orlando office perceived split loyalties. This was defined, in part, by race, as the black employees tended to "side" with Ms. Winston. Sometime in March 1988, Ms. Winston wrote to Secretary Paul requesting that Deborah Burkett be terminated for insubordination, stating that Ms. Burkett did not "respect the chain of command" and was unwilling to cooperate. (Respondent's Ex. #2) The request was denied, and Ms. Winston was offered a lateral transfer to a position in Tallahassee at no loss of pay. She declined. At Secretary Paul's request, Dick Lepanen, who was promoted to Lottery Sales and Distribution Manager, and the Lottery Personnel Director, Sandra Koon, visited the Orlando office on April 7, 1988 to counsel the two managers. Both Ms. Winston and Ms. Burkett appeared at the meeting with notebooks full of documents to support charges or rebuttals of each other's management problems. The meeting became a contest on each issue. Ms. Koon and Mr. Lepanen told the women that they needed to work together and that a unified management team concept had to be presented to the subordinate staff. The meeting ended on a positive note of resolution to make the Orlando region the best in the state. Ms. Koon's assessment of the problem was that both women were good managers and wanted to take control of the office. Still, friction continued, and a decision was made to transfer Deborah Burkett to a district manager position in Ft. Myers. Dick Lepanen telephoned Carolyn Winston to inform her of the decision on May 6, 1988, with a follow-up confidential memorandum. He asked her to not discuss the matter with anyone, to allow Ms. Burkett a chance to talk with her staff, and he said he had already informed Jody Spicola, the regional manager who would be Ms. Burkett's new supervisor. Jody Spicola called Ms. Winston on another matter the same day. Ms. Winston took the opportunity to discuss Ms. Burkett's work habits in unflattering and inflammatory terms, causing Mr. Spicola to call Mr. Lepanen to say that he was reconsidering his position on accepting Ms. Burkett in his region. Dick Lepanen called Ms. Winston and asked if she discussed Deborah Burkett with Jody Spicola. She denied it, and continued to do so until Sandra Koon, Dick Lepanen and Jody Spicola arrived in the Orlando office several days later to confront her directly. On May 16, 1988, Dick Lepanen issued Ms. Winston a written reprimand for insubordination, an infraction described in the Lottery personnel policies and procedures manual. Basis for the reprimand was her violation of the confidential information direction and her false denial. Ms. Winston refused to sign the reprimand, countering with a two-page memorandum dated June 2, 1988, stating that she was being discriminated against, that Deborah Burkett's character was no secret and that Ms. Burkett had lied for months. In the February 11-17, 1988, edition of the Daytona Times, a weekly newspaper addressing black readers, an article appeared with the headline, "Lottery Snubs Blacks". The article included a quote from Carolyn Winston, identified as regional director of the Lottery office, stating that "...minority participation in Lottery sales is 'not as good as it should be'", and urging that potential vendors write to the retailer application department at the Lottery office in Tallahassee. (Petitioner's Ex. #10) Secretary Paul addressed the regional managers and regional coordinators in a meeting on February 24, 1988, and made it clear that no one was to speak to the press about such matters except her and that further occurrences could result in termination. Ms. Winston apologized to Secretary Paul, through Michele Hayes, and gave a copy of Michele Hayes' brief written reminder on unauthorized press comments to her district managers with this handwritten notation: Please refer all press calls to Ed George. Any unauthorized comments to the press may well result in termination. Yes, she was serious. Will speak more on this at Wed's March 9th regional meeting. Carolyn (Respondent's Ex. #4) Ms. Winston took maternity leave from June through August 1988, but stayed in touch with the office. Mike Steiber was placed temporarily in her position, and later Jody Spicola was temporarily assigned to the Orlando region. Ms. Burkett's position was not filled, so the regional manager handled the Orlando district directly. On December 14, 1988, Carolyn Winston received her annual performance evaluation from Dick Lepanen. Based on his personal observation of her responses to him and how she handled issues that he referred to her, he evaluated her as "exceeds at least one standard", on a scale that includes "below standards", "achieves standards", "exceeds at least one standard", "exceeds most standards", and "sustained superior performance". He evaluated all of the managers in the same manner, that is, based on individual characteristics rather than on ability to meet sales quotas or on management style. Ms. Winston responded with a memorandum on her future goals and performance improvement plan which she asked to have appended to her evaluation. These goals included beginning her MBA, enrolling in workshops and seminars for advanced writers, and joining Toastmasters, as well as other general statements as to achieving "overall business objectives". (Respondent's Ex. #43) In December 1988, in a meeting in Tallahassee, Carolyn Winston reported to Sandra Koon and Dick Lepanen that there was discrimination in the Orlando regional office in the form of sexual harassment and anti-semitic remarks made about employees. The person allegedly primarily responsible for the discrimination was Ron Broadway, the warehouse manager. Ms. Winston was told that the behavior would not be tolerated by the department. She was given a video on sexual harassment to show at her normal weekly staff meeting and she was advised to have a frank discussion with the employees to let them know that sexual harassment was a serious concern. She was also counselled to meet individually with Mr. Broadway to assure that he understood that his comments and behavior would not be tolerated. Ms. Winston showed the video and followed up on the counselling, but the sequence of events is confused by a series of memoranda authored by Ms. Winston and referring to actions she took to investigate the complaints and to meet with the offending employee. Throughout those memoranda she refers to "anti-semitic and sexual harassment remarks", yet attached to her memorandum dated December 20, 1988, to Dick Lepanen is a 3-page outline of statements made by employees, identified by initials as "A" through "F", who alleged hearing Ron Broadway make explicit and highly offensive racial remarks at work, at softball practice and while setting up a lottery display at a civic event. These remarks included the term, "nigger", and derogatory comments about a black employee's baby. (Respondent's Ex. #44) Two memoranda from Carolyn Winston to Ron Broadway dated December 20, 1988, refer to an oral counselling session on December 12, 1988, regarding "anti- semitic and sexual harassment remarks". (Respondent's Ex. #5 and #6) Curiously, a memo dated January 31, 1989, from Carolyn Winston to Dick Lepanen, states: On January 30, 1989, I discussed and issued a copy of the December 20, 1988 memorandum entitled "Anti-Semitic and Sexual Harassment Remarks" to the employee Ron Broadway. Hopefully the matter has been resolved. Thank you for your assistance. (Respondent's Ex. #7) A copy was sent to Sandra Koon. At some point Ms. Koon and Mr. Lepanen determined that the charges involved racial comments, not anti-semitic comments or sexual harassment. They interviewed employees in the Orlando office and Ron Broadway. Something regarding the issue was placed in Mr. Broadway's personnel file, although not the memoranda Ms. Winston had prepared, and he was transferred to the Gainesville office in May 1989. Ms. Winston filed her first complaint of discrimination in May 1989, alleging that she was discriminated against in retaliation for reporting a white manager's "ethnic and sexual" remarks. Also in May 1989, Sandra Koon was involved in investigatory allegations made by three employees who had filed EEOC suits against the Department when their work stations were moved to the back of the office. The Tallahassee office had received complaints in writing, and by telephone, of rude treatment of Lottery participants by the Orlando regional office, by employees sitting near the public counter and answering the telephone. Dick Lepanen directed these employees be moved from public contact after Ms. Winston was given an opportunity to resolve the problem with no success. Her assistant had investigated the complaints, but they continued. These EEOC complaints were settled in July 1989, with a fact-finding conference at which the Department agreed that nothing would be placed in the employee's files, they would be considered for promotional opportunities and they would receive training in dealing with customers and other members of the public. After the initial start-up of the Lottery in early 1988, employees began to learn their jobs and to perform more efficiently. By spring 1989, after the Department's administrative operating expenses were reduced by the Legislature, Secretary Paul decided to streamline the agency, particularly as it related to sales. Part of the decision involved reducing the number of regions from six to three, creating a northern, central and southern region. The decision as to which of the six regional managers would be retained was based first on length of service in the class, and second on overall performance appraisals. Two regional managers were hired in 1988 and they were clearly eliminated. One regional manager, Jody Spicola, was hired October 21, 1987, and he was clearly retained. The remaining three managers, Carolyn Winston, Carlos Ribero and Edith Manning, were all hired effective November 2, 1987. Both Edith Manning and Carlos Ribero had annual performance appraisals in December 1988 of "exceeds most standards", one step above that of Ms. Winston. In the reorganization, therefore, Ms. Winston was demoted to district manager of the Orlando office, reporting to Jody Spicola in the Tampa regional office. Because her salary exceeded the maximum for the new class, she received a reduction in pay of approximately $3,000.00. Even with the reduction, her salary exceeded that of the two other regional managers who were demoted, as they had been hired at a lower level. Edith Manning, a regional manager who was retained, had been hired at $28,000.00. In the July 13-19, 1989 issue of the Daytona Times, Ms. Winston's photograph appeared on the front page with an article and headline, "Black Lottery Manager Claims Racial Bias". The article outlined Ms. Winston's allegations against the department with regard to herself, personally, but also included this statement: * * * One major issue raised by Winston, supported by other Blacks and minorities who play the lottery, had to do with the disproportionate ratio of Blacks winning the lottery when compared to the high rate of participation by Blacks, Hispanics and other minorities. * * * (Respondent's Ex. #9) On July 18, 19 and 20, 1989, a three-part interview with Ms. Winston aired on Channel 6 Television in Orlando, on the evening news. The interview contained several statements that a person's color was the most important consideration of the Lottery and that the agency was racially biased. On July 24, 1989, Ms. Winston was placed on administrative leave with pay in order to remove her from the office while the department assessed the impact of the publicity. She filed a second complaint with the Human Relations Commission. Additional newspaper articles appeared in the Daytona Times and in the Orlando Sentinel with the racial bias allegations and the fact that Ms. Winston was placed on leave. In a letter dated September 1, 1989, Michele Hayes notified Carolyn Winston that she was terminated effective 5:00 p.m. the same date, for the following reasons: Disruptive behavior displayed during the course of your employment which resulted in low employee morale and had an adverse impact on the operations of the Orlando office; Unsatisfactory work performance as a leader and manager of the Florida Lottery; and Disloyalty in general to the Florida Lottery and executive level management. (Respondent's Ex. #31) Ms. Winston filed her third complaint with the Human Relations Commission after her termination. Art Mobley, a black male was hired to replace Ms. Winston on December 1, 1989. He had originally been hired by Deborah Burkett, in November 1987, as a sales representative in the Orlando office. After several months he was promoted to an on-line coordinator in the on-line games unit in Tallahassee. When Ms. Winston's position was advertised he successfully applied and moved back to Orlando.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Carolyn Winston's petitions in these three consolidated cases be dismissed. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties. Neither party complied with the requirement of Section 22I-6.031(3), F.A.C., that proposed findings of fact be supported by citations to the record. This has made the task of accepting or rejecting proposed findings virtually impossible. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 3. Adopted in part in paragraph 5, otherwise rejected as unsupported by competent evidence. 3 - 5. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of evidence, except for reference to the racial epithet, which is adopted in summary in paragraph 22. 8 - 10. Rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in part in paragraph 11; the "insubordination" conclusion is unsupported by the record. Rejected as statements of Ms. Winston's position rather than findings of fact. That she felt discrimination does not prove the fact of discrimination. 13 - 15. Rejected as summary of testimony rather than findings of fact. 16 - 17. Adopted in paragraph 17. 18 - 19. Adopted in paragraph 20, except for the conclusion that the process deviated from "formal evaluation standards." 20. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 21 - 22. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 21 and 22. 23 - 28. Rejected as summary of testimony rather than findings of fact. 29 - 36. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 37. Rejected as irrelevant. 38 - 40. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings Adopted in paragraphs 1 and 5. Adopted in paragraphs 5 and 26. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraphs 8 - 10. Adopted in paragraphs 11 and 12. Adopted in paragraph 18. 10 - 11. Adopted in paragraphs 13 and 15. Adopted in paragraphs 16-17. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraphs 22 and 23, except that the memorandum was removed from Mr. Broadway's file and was replaced by another. Adopted in part in paragraph 23; otherwise rejected as immaterial. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24. 19 - 20. Adopted in part in paragraph 23; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 24. [no numbered paragraph 22.] 23. Adopted in paragraphs 25 and 26. 24. Rejected as unnecessary. 25 - 26. Adopted in part in paragraph 27. 27. Adopted in paragraph 28. 28. Adopted in part in paragraph 29. 29. Rejected as unnecessary. 30. Adopted in paragraph 31. 31 - 32. Adopted in paragraphs 28 and 29. 33 - 40. Rejected as argument, or unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Anthony Gomes, Esquire Authorized Representative c/o Carolyn A. Winston 515 Polaris Loop #101 Casselberry, FL 32707 Louisa H. Warren, Esquire Senior Attorney Florida Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, FL 32399-4011 Dr. Marcia Mann, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, FL 32301 General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, FL 32301 Dana Baird, General Counsel Fla. Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue The factual issues in this unadopted-rule challenge relate to whether Respondent, in connection with the administration of the state’s gaming laws, has formulated statements of general applicability that have the effect of giving each slot machine licensee the rights (i) to maintain and operate an outdoor live gaming facility for the conduct of pari-mutuel wagering activities, wherein slot machine gaming areas could not lawfully be located, so long as its slot machines are housed elsewhere, in an enclosed building; and (ii) to locate slot machine gaming areas in a separate, stand-alone building having no integral systems, structures, or elements, provided the building is located on the same parcel, and on the same side of the street, river, or similar obstacle, as the live gaming facility. If Respondent has developed such a statement or statements, then the ultimate issue is whether such statements meet the statutory definition of an unadopted rule.
Findings Of Fact PARTIES SCF is a Florida corporation whose principal place of business is located in Marion County. SCF has been in the business of breeding thoroughbred racehorses since 1996. The company also owns racehorses and, as an owner of racing animals, holds a Pari-Mutuel Wagering Business Occupational License, #PBU476648, from the Division. See § 550.105(2), Fla. Stat. As a licensed business owning racing animals, SCF is under the regulatory jurisdiction of the Division. In the three years preceding this action, SCF’s horses won approximately $120 thousand in purses from performing in race meets held at Florida pari-mutuel facilities.1 1 Although SCF is a licensed owner of racing animals, it is not a member of the Florida Horsemen’s Benevolent and Protective Association, Inc. (the “FHBPA”), a nonprofit corporation that advocates in support of Florida’s thoroughbred racing industry and represents the interests of the licensed owners and trainers who comprise its membership. This fact is relevant only to the question of whether SCF is precluded from maintaining this action, under the doctrine of administrative finality, by the Final Order entered in a case brought by the FHBPA in 2018 to challenge agency statements, similar to those at issue here, which the association alleged—but ultimately failed to establish—were unadopted Continued on next page... The Division is the state agency responsible for implementing and enforcing Florida’s gaming laws. It licenses and regulates pari-mutuel and slot machine gaming activities in Florida, as well as the professionals and businesses, such as SCF, that supply necessary goods and services to the gaming economy. The only places in Florida, in fact, where SCF’s thoroughbreds can legally perform in races upon which bets may be made are the several permitted pari-mutuel facilities, which are also subject to the Division’s regulatory jurisdiction; such tracks comprise the exclusive medium for live gaming activities. Calder is the holder of a pari-mutuel wagering permit and, in that capacity, owns a track called Calder Race Course, also known as Gulfstream Park West. As a permitholder, Calder must apply for an annual license to conduct pari-mutuel operations. See § 550.0115, Fla. Stat. This annual license gives the permitholder authority to conduct the pari-mutuel wagering activity authorized under its permit on the dates identified in the license. At all times relevant to this case, Calder has held a license to conduct thoroughbred horseracing performances, and SCF-owned horses have raced at Calder Race Course. In addition to its license to conduct pari-mutuel operations, Calder has held, at all times relevant hereto, a license to conduct slot machine gaming. SLOT MACHINE GAMING In 2004, voters approved an amendment to the Florida Constitution, which opened the door to the installation of slot machines at licensed pari- mutuel facilities in Miami-Dade and Broward counties. See Art. X, § 23, Fla. Const. During its next regular session, the legislature enacted chapter 551 to implement the constitutional amendment. Under the original definition of rules. For reasons discussed much later in this Final Order, the undersigned concludes that the previous Final Order, while favorable to the Division on similar issues, is not a bar to SCF’s claims in this proceeding, because SCF was neither a party to the FHBPA case, nor in privity with the FHBPA. “eligible facility” set forth in section 551.102(4), seven pari-mutuel permitholders potentially qualified for slot machine licensure; a later statutory amendment increased that number to eight. A slot machine license may be issued only to a permitted pari-mutuel facility. That is, to become and remain a slot machine licensee, an eligible facility must operate a pari-mutuel facility in accordance with the provisions of chapter 550, Florida Statutes. So, as a condition of initial slot-machine licensure, a permitholder must demonstrate its compliance with chapters 551 and, as applicable, chapter 550. § 551.104(4), Fla. Stat. To renew, which must be done annually, a slot machine licensee must “[c]ontinue to be in compliance with” chapter 551; “[c]ontinue to be in compliance with chapter 550, where applicable[;] and maintain [its] pari-mutuel permit and license in good standing pursuant to the provisions of chapter 550.” Id. In short, slot machine gaming is secondary to pari-mutuel wagering operations because it cannot exist, lawfully, in the absence of such operations. This means, among other things, that an applicant for a slot machine license is required to have a “current live gaming facility,” in which pari- mutuel wagering occurs in the physical presence of real-time races or games, and that a live gaming facility (“LGF”) must be maintained at the permitholder’s pari-mutuel facility during the life of the slot machine license, if issued. See § 551.114(4), Fla. Stat. In 2005, when chapter 551 was enacted, all seven of the facilities initially eligible for slot machine licensure had large existing grandstands or other buildings that created indoor, conditioned spaces; these “conditioned environments,” in other words, were separated from the outdoor elements and conditions (wind, rain, heat, cold, etc.) by sheltering walls and roofs. Simply put, each of these facilities had a building envelope or exterior shell and, thus, each such facility fell within the definition of a “building” under the common usage of that term. It is reasonable to infer, if not presume, that when section 551.114(4) was being written, the legislature, or at least the drafters of the legislation who coined the term “live gaming facility,” had in mind the buildings then currently in use as “live gaming facilities” at the relatively few eligible facilities that would be subject to the law. At the time chapter 551 took effect, moreover, the Division, in fact, considered these buildings to be the permitholders’ LGFs. A slot machine licensee must have a designated slot machine gaming area (“SMGA”) where “slot machine gaming may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of” chapter 551. §§ 551.102(2), 551.114, Fla. Stat. Section 551.114(4) specifies where the licensee is allowed to locate its SMGA: Designated slot machine gaming areas may be located within the current live gaming facility or in an existing building that must be contiguous and connected to the live gaming facility. If a designated slot machine gaming area is to be located in a building that is to be constructed, that new building must be contiguous and connected to the live gaming facility. For ease of reference, the term “slot machine building,” or “SMB,” will be used herein to refer to any building besides the LGF in which a licensee optionally locates its SMGA. As the statute makes clear, every SMB, whether previously existing, newly constructed, upgraded, refurbished, retrofitted, or freshly painted, must be “contiguous and connected to” the LGF. This will be called the “CCT Requirement.” THE DIVISION’S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE Over time as it implemented section 551.114(4), the Division interpreted the text in ways which SCF alleges constitute unadopted rules. The circumstances surrounding the development of these interpretations are interesting, and a good deal of evidence was adduced in this proceeding establishing them, but it is not necessary, for present purposes, to make detailed findings concerning these historical facts. Readers who would like to know more about the events leading to this rule challenge may read the Recommended Order (“Calder RO”) that the undersigned issued in The Florida Horsemen’s Benevolent & Protective Association, Inc. v. Calder Race Course, Inc., et al., DOAH Case No. 18-4997, 2019 Fla. Div. Admin. Hear. LEXIS 283 (Fla. DOAH May 24, 2019) (the “License Challenge”). If the undersigned were to make extensive findings of historical fact in this Final Order, such findings would be substantially the same as, if not identical to, the findings set forth in the Calder RO. The primary relevance, to the instant case, of the historical facts relating to the Division’s approvals of SMBs at Calder and another track (Pompano Park/Isle of Capri), respectively, would be to show that, despite the absence of rulemaking or other written evidence of its statutory interpretations, the agency has formulated (but not formally adopted) governing principles for making regulatory decisions—”nonrule policies,” in other words—whose existence and contents can be deduced from the agency’s actions, namely the issuance of slot machine licenses or renewals manifesting underlying determinations that this SMB or that one is compliant, as a matter of ultimate fact, with the provisions of chapter 551, including the CCT Requirement. Recently, however, on February 3, 2020, the Division issued the Calder FO, wherein the agency expressed very clearly not only its understanding of what the relevant words of section 551.114(4) mean (the semantic content), but also what law is made thereby (the legal content). It is, therefore, no longer necessary to deduce the Division’s statutory interpretations from its actions; that these statements exist, and have specific linguistic content, are matters now beyond genuine dispute, the statements having been communicated in writing by the agency itself.2 2 This is what the undersigned meant when he wrote in the Order Regarding Official Recognition that, based on the Calder FO, the Division’s interpretive statements relating to section 551.114(4) “appear to be not genuinely disputable.” In other words, to be clear, the existence and contents of the Division’s interpretive statements are now beyond reasonable Continued on next page... From the Calder FO, the Division’s interpretive statements can be fairly, accurately, and concisely described.3 The first statement of interest dispute, although there might be some relatively insignificant disagreements at the margins regarding the meaning of the agency statements. Independent of all that, the question of whether the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4) is the best interpretation, or even a reasonable one, is sharply disputed. While the correctness of the Division’s interpretive statements is a matter of continued conflict, that particular dispute need not be decided in this proceeding, whose focus, instead, is on whether the statements meet the definition of a rule, a question that has little to do with whether the statements reflect the best, or correct, reading of the statutory text. (A statement that expresses nothing but a literal comprehension of the statutory text, reflecting only such meaning as is readily apparent without reading between or beyond the lines of the codified language, is not a rule by definition; nor, however, is it an “interpretation,” strictly speaking. Such a literal paraphrase could be called “correct,” though, and so, to the extent a decision is required regarding whether a statement adds legal content to the underlying statute’s straightforward semantic content, some consideration must be given to the correctness, in this narrow sense, of the statement at issue.) 3 So that no one can misinterpret what the undersigned is doing here, let it be clear. First, the undersigned is not implying that the Calder FO is itself an unadopted rule. The Calder FO is, of course, an order, which determines the substantial interests of specifically named parties, subject to judicial review. The undersigned is saying, however, because it is indisputably true, that the Calder FO contains statements that communicate—expressly, unambiguously, and in specific language (not by implication or through interpretation)— the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4). In fact, the Calder FO includes a section titled “Interpretation of Section 551.114(4), F.S.” Thus, while the Calder FO is not, per se, an unadopted rule, it is evidence of the Division’s interpretation of a section 551.114(4); indeed, it is convincing evidence thereof. (The agency’s interpretive statements are not hearsay because what makes them relevant is their existence and contents, not the “truth” of the matters asserted. See § 90.801(1)(c), Fla Stat.) Further, the Division’s interpretation of the statute is, obviously, highly relevant because agency statements that interpret law fall within the definition of a rule when, as SCF alleges here, they do so in ways which give the law meaning not readily apparent from the raw semantic content of the statutory text being implemented. It should also be noted that it makes no difference where or how an agency communicates a statement of general applicability that meets the definition of a rule. There is no “final order immunity” that somehow shields statements contained in a final order from examination in a section 120.56(4) proceeding. We are concerned here with three basic questions: (i) does the statement exist; (ii) if so, what is the content of the statement; and (iii) does the statement’s content meet the definition of a rule? The Calder FO persuasively proves both the existence of the statements at issue and the contents of the statements issue. Second, in describing the Division’s interpretive statements, the undersigned is not attempting to summarize the entire Calder FO. Nor is he purposefully adding to, or subtracting from, the agency’s statements. This is not an exercise in straw-man argumentation. To the extent possible, the undersigned is using the agency’s exact words; his intent, again, is to express the Division’s statutory interpretation accurately and fairly. The Calder FO is available for anyone to read, and the undersigned invites everyone who is interested to do just that and decide for him or herself whether the descriptions herein of the Continued on next page... concerns the CCT Requirement. As the undersigned reads the Calder FO, the Division has interpreted the statute to mean that a licensee’s SMB is “contiguous and connected to” its LGF if the SMB and LGF: (i) “share a common boundary,” for which simply “being located on the same piece of property” is sufficient; (ii) are no more than a “short distance” from one another; (iii) are not on opposite sides of “a public roadway, waterway, or any [similar] barrier”; and (iv) are “connected” by a walkway between the two, for which an outdoor sidewalk is sufficient. In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, however, the Division stated that and (iv) “may not be required” in every instance and, thus, are not necessary conditions. In other words, the SMB and LGF might be farther than a “short distance” from each other and still be “contiguous”; and the two structures, if respectively self-contained, might be “connected” other than by a “walkway” between them. Making this correction, the agency statement becomes: A licensee’s SMB is “contiguous and connected to” the LGF if the SMB and LGF: (i) “share a common boundary,” for which “being located on Division’s interpretive statements are accurate and fair. (The Division expressed some minor disagreements with the undersigned’s original descriptions of the agency interpretations at issue, and these disagreements will be addressed in the text above.) Third, relatedly, the undersigned emphatically disclaims any intention of using unfair descriptions of the Calder FO to turn “narrow issues” into “more general” statements having a “broader scope of applicability” than the agency intends. The fact is, however, that there is nothing “fact-specific” about the Division’s interpretation of section 551.114(4), and the Division’s insisting otherwise will not make it so. This point will be discussed further above, but let it be emphasized in this footnote that a statement’s relative applicability is determined based upon the level of generality expressed by the statement’s language, that is, by the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the semantic content of the text. The more inclusive the statement, the more generally applicable it is. A statement of general applicability, so framed, is not rendered “fact-specific” simply because it has been applied to the facts of a specific case in determining the substantial interests of a particular party. the same piece of property” is sufficient;4 and (ii) are not on opposite sides of “a public roadway, waterway, or any [similar] barrier.”5 What cannot be disputed, bottom line, is that the Division, in its own words, interprets “the plain statutory language” of section 551.114(4) as “contemplat[ing]” that the SMB may be “a stand-alone separate building” from the LGF. See Calder FO at 42. From this interpretation, it follows logically that having structural elements in common with the LGF, or sharing integrated systems therewith (e.g., exterior envelope, HVAC, electric, and plumbing), is not a necessary condition of an SMB’s satisfying the CCT Requirement; that is, even without such integration, the SMB and LGF may be deemed statutorily “contiguous and connected to” each other, according to the Division. The undersigned will call this the “nonintegration principle.” The nonintegration principle is the Division’s seminal insight regarding the meaning of section 551.114(4); if the nonintegration principle were deemed false (incorrect), such determination would guarantee the falsity (incorrectness) of the Division’s statement that “the plain statutory language” of section 551.114(4) “contemplate[s]” that the SMB may be “a stand-alone separate building” from the LGF. This is because, to state the obvious, “a stand-alone separate building” is, by that description, a self- 4 Because it is necessary that all of the permitholder’s pari-mutuel facilities be located on the property “specified in the permit,” see section 550.0115, Florida Statutes, and because slot machines must be located “within the property of the [permitholder’s] facilities,” see sections 551.101 and 551.114(1), part (i) of the agency statement makes “shar[ing] a common boundary” practically a given, and certainly a gimme. 5 It is usually unhelpful to define anything by describing what the thing being defined is not, which entails a process of elimination. Saying that being “contiguous and connected” means being not separated by a public roadway, etc., tells us nothing that we didn’t already know; it is the answer to a question that no one would ask, akin to saying that the CCT Requirement prohibits a permitholder from locating its SMB in a different city or state from the LGF. Like part (i) of the agency statement, part (ii) imposes a “requirement” that is a gimme, if not a given. Taken together, the two parts, (i) and (ii), comprising the agency statement under consideration, come very close to eliminating the CCT Requirement altogether, reducing it to the ineffectual status of “requirement in name only.” As the Division sees it, the CCT Requirement has little practical effect, if any, other than ensuring that the SMB and LGF have the same address, which is already assured. contained structure that is not integrated with another structure. So, the Division’s statement that the statute allows the use of a nonintegrated SMB is true only if SMB/LGF integration is not a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement. In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, the Division states that the Calder FO “does not comment on whether it is ever necessary, to satisfy the [CCT] requirement, that the SMB and LGF ‘have any common structural elements or integrated systems, e.g., exterior envelope, HVAC, lighting, etc.’“ This is trivially true inasmuch as the Calder FO does not specifically describe the nonintegration principle as such. But the point is irrelevant because, as just explained, if section 551.114(4) permits locating an SMGA in a separate, stand-alone building, as the Division maintains, then the nonintegration principle must exist, and it must be true, regardless of whether the Division actually utters the words that communicate the concept. If the Division meant to say more, i.e., to imply that there might be an as-yet unrevealed exception or exceptions to the nonintegration principle, this possibility, whatever else might be said about it,6 does not negate the nonintegration principle itself. This is because the principle does not hold that nonintegration is a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; that is, integration does not guarantee failure. Nor does it hold 6 One thing that can be said if there exists an exception to the nonintegration principle is that an SMB’s “being located on the same piece of property” as the LGF would not be a sufficient condition for finding that the two “share a common boundary,” contrary to what the Division has said elsewhere. If there were an exception, then sometimes (when the exception applies) integration would be required in order for the two structures to share a common boundary and be deemed contiguous to one another. To explain, locating a self- contained SMB on the same piece of property as the LGF guarantees compliance with the “common boundary” requirement—i.e., is a sufficient condition therefor—only if the nonintegration principle has no exceptions. (The undersigned takes for granted that integration would never be required to meet the only other identified requirement, namely that the SMB and LGF not be separated by a public roadway, waterway, or similar barrier, because that condition would be so easily met by putting the two structures on the same side of the street or river.) that nonintegration is a sufficient condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; that is, nonintegration does not guarantee success. Rather, the nonintegration principle holds that integration is not a necessary condition of compliance with the CCT Requirement; or, put another way, that nonintegration is statutorily permissible. Why is this significant? Because if section 551.114(4) literally requires an integrated SMB/LGF in all cases where the SMGA is located outside the current LGF, then the Division’s interpretation of the CCT Requirement is not readily apparent from what is actually stated in the statutory text, even if it might conform to the legislature’s communicative intent,7 which would mean that the agency has declared what the law shall be (a legislative power), as opposed to applying the law as it is (an executive power). And, as we know, an agency is authorized to exercise delegated legislative authority only through formal rulemaking. The second statement concerns the meaning of the term LGF, which the Division defines as being any area, including an “open-aired, unenclosed place” or “space,” from which patrons can “view … and/or [be] within the physical presence of” contests occurring in real time, and at which they may engage in pari-mutuel betting on such contests using equipment designed to facilitate these “live gaming activities.” In its Response in Opposition to the Order Regarding Official Recognition, the Division asserts that the foregoing description of its definition of the term LGF is too narrow, because the Division defines LGF to include the racetrack as well. The undersigned accepts this assertion to be true, and revises his original description accordingly. 7 The legislature might have intended, for example, to communicate meaning beyond the plain semantic content of the statutory text, whose full linguistic content thus could not be understood without an appreciation of pragmatic considerations, such as programmatic goals, arguably better known to the agency than to the citizenry. If so, the necessary and proper, lawful agency response would be to take quasi legislative action and adopt a rule. The track, of course, is the “field of play” for live horse racing performances, analogous to the three-walled court (or cancha) on which jai alai players perform. Clearly, there can be no LGF without a track or cancha; this practically goes without saying. Including the live performance site, definitionally, as an element of the LGF, however, is inconsequential to this case because neither a track nor a cancha, by itself, could constitute an LGF; there must be something to accommodate patrons, who obviously cannot watch, or place wagers on, live contests while sitting or standing upon the track or jai alai court. The relevant question in this case is whether the statute literally requires that something to entail conditioned space within an enclosed building shell.8 Reduced to its undisputed essentials, the Division’s position is that while an LGF may be an enclosed building, it needn’t necessarily be. An open- air, unenclosed place or space will suffice, if properly equipped to facilitate wagering. It is this “open-air option” to which SCF objects as the instantiation of a policy that exceeds the raw semantic meaning of the term LGF and thus constitutes an unadopted rule. SCF alleges that the Division has formulated a third unadopted rule, extrinsic to the Calder FO, which is not interpretive in nature but rather is a prescriptive statement to the effect that certain ultimate facts are conclusively determinable as a matter of law if the basic facts are undisputed. To the point, SCF contends that the Division has decided that, if a hearing is requested to determine whether an SMB satisfies the CCT Requirement, the proceeding will be governed by section 120.57(2) unless the objective facts on 8 At times, the Division appears to imply that the LGF comprises entire pari-mutuel complex, so desirous is the agency to get across the idea that the term LGF must be read expansively. While warning of the dangers of defining LGF too narrowly, the Division seems unconcerned about the opposite problem, namely reading LGF so broadly that the term ceases to have relevant meaning. If the LGF is everything on the permitted premises, then it is nothing specifically identifiable. For the LGF to have discernible boundaries—a necessary condition of contiguity with another structure, by the way—there must be a limiting principle or Continued on next page... the ground are genuinely disputed. SCF contends that the Division is using this “gatekeeper mechanism” to deny SCF (and another party) the formal hearings they have requested, pursuant to sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), to challenge the renewal of Calder’s slot machine license, based on allegations that Calder does not have a statutorily compliant LGF and that its SMB fails to meet the CCT Requirement. The Division has not published a notice of rulemaking under section 120.54(3)(a) relating either to the open-air option, the nonintegration principle, or the gatekeeper mechanism. Nor has the Division presented evidence or argument on the feasibility or practicability of adopting any of these alleged statements of general applicability as a de jure rule. THE DIVISION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ALLEGED UNADOPTED RULES As mentioned above, the historical facts giving rise to the agency interpretations at issue are not only, for the most part, undisputed, but also, more importantly, largely irrelevant for purposes of determining the merits of this action under section 120.56(4). The Division’s implementation of the alleged unadopted rules does have some bearing, however, on the question of SCF’s standing, which is a hotly contested issue in this case. Therefore, an abridged history follows. Of the eight pari-mutuel facilities eligible for slot machine licensure, only Pompano Park/Isle of Capri (“PPI”) and Calder have chosen the option contained in section 551.114(4) to erect a new building in which to locate their respective SMGAs. All of the other eligible permitholders opted to locate their SMGAs within their current LGFs; these were buildings, enclosing conditioned environments, not open-air places exposed to the elements. Because Broward County satisfied the local referendum requirement before Miami-Dade County did, PPI’s application for slot machine licensure was the principles to delimit the definitional scope. The Division has been reluctant to commit to such limiting principles. first to require the Division’s decision as to whether an SMB that was to be constructed would meet the CCT Requirement. The physical configuration of PPI’s SMB, as planned and built, was not “contiguous” to its existing LGF under any ordinary understanding of the word “contiguous,” which denotes actual contact along a common boundary; the buildings were in “reasonably” close proximity, but they did not communicate in the sense of opening into each other. Nor was PPI’s SMB “connected to” its LGF in accord with the image that readily comes to mind when thinking about how two contiguous structures would be connected to each other. The two separate, stand-alone buildings were “connected,” not physically, through any sort of direct contact, but figuratively, by basic transport infrastructure—i.e., a covered walkway between them.9 This apparent departure from the plain meaning of section 551.114(4) resulted from the Division’s desire to give the eligible permitholders some “leeway” in satisfying the strict statutory requirement that an SMB be “contiguous and connected to” the current LGF, according to David Roberts, who headed the Division from 2001 through 2009, and who was involved in making the decision.10 After Miami-Dade County satisfied the local referendum requirement in 2009, Calder applied for its initial slot machine license. Because Calder, 9 They were connected, that is to say, in the same way Tallahassee is connected to Jacksonville via Interstate 10. 10 On October 17, 2019, the agency head of DOAH began systematically reviewing every final order and recommended order prior to, and as a prerequisite of, its issuance. Pursuant to this review, the director makes written “comments and suggested edits” on some, but not all, orders. Although the presiding officer is not required to accept the director’s suggested edits, he is not given the option of declining the director’s review. As a result, the undersigned received two comments, one on the paragraph above and the other on paragraph 30 of this Final Order, which are, at least arguably, “relative to the merits,” and hence which are, or might be, ex parte communications prohibited by section 120.66(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (no “ex parte communication relative to the merits” shall be made to the presiding officer by “[a]n agency head,” among others). Erring on the side of caution and disclosure, the undersigned hereby places on the record the director’s comment concerning paragraph 24: “This is the crux of Continued on next page... like PPI, intended to place its SMGA in a self-contained casino, which would be newly constructed, Calder sought and received the Division’s permission to build a separate, stand-alone SMB pursuant to the same informal policy that had relaxed the strict CCT Requirement for PPI. The Division’s issuance to Calder of its initial slot machine license manifested the Division’s determination that Calder’s SMB and LGF, as initially configured after construction of the new SMB, were compliant with all of the statutory requirements for slot machine gaming licensure, including the CCT Requirement. In 2016, Calder demolished its grandstand building; as of this hearing, Calder has not replaced its former LGF with a new building of any kind. The demolition of the grandstand was one of several actions taken in furtherance of a business decision by Calder to distance itself from live racing activities at Calder Race Course. Other actions included slashing the number of annual performances during the race meet, from an average of 250 performances per year to 40 performances per year; the entry into a contract with Gulfstream Park to operate and manage Calder’s abbreviated race meet; and a reduction in the number of stalls available for the stabling and training of racehorses. There is an ongoing dispute as to whether Calder, without an enclosed building for live gaming, has a legally sufficient LGF. See License Challenge. What is not disputed is that Calder lacks an LGF capable of housing an SMGA in compliance with chapter 551, because an SMGA must be housed in a building. Calder’s “LGF,” such as it is, currently consists of open-air viewing areas where patrons can watch, and place wagers on, live races. The primary viewing area is located in front of the final stretch of the racetrack, at a spot called the “apron.” There are some outdoor seats and tiki huts on the apron, and, during the race meet, Calder erects a collapsible canopy tent, your most defensible finding.” Any party desiring to rebut this communication shall be allowed to do so in accordance with section 120.66(2). which, despite the absence of walls, provides a bit of shelter for wagering machines, video screens, and, of course, patrons, for whom additional outdoor seating is provided. The casino is at least 100 yards from the temporary “big tent.” It is possible to walk from the casino to the big tent, and return, on a concrete walkway, but the walkway is only partially covered, which means, when it rains, that patrons cannot go back and forth between the SMB and the “LGF” without getting wet. The walls of the SMB do not touch or abut the areas where patrons can view the live horse races and place bets. Indeed, a patron can walk into the main entrance of the casino, play the slot machines, and then leave, without once seeing, or being within a football field’s length of, an area that allows the viewing of live horse racing. At the time of the hearing, Gulfstream Park’s general manager was William Badgett. (Gulfstream Park, recall, operates Calder’s race meet pursuant to contract.) Mr. Badgett testified as follows regarding the decline in attendance and wagering after the demolition of Calder’s grandstand: [W]hat I’ve seen is—it’s, pretty much, in black and white. The numbers over the year—year to year to year[—]have declined mostly because this is the best that we can offer at the facility without building a permanent structure. … When it rains the water comes down the hill and people just leave. And what I’ve seen from the owners is they’ll come to watch a race. After the race they’ll leave. … [I]t has declined year to year to year in the handle and the amount of people that we see there. When asked whether, based upon his many years of experience in the horseracing industry as a trainer and as a track manager, he believed that the lack of a grandstand and of any protection from the elements has negatively affected the amount of live handle at the race meets at Calder Race Course, Mr. Badgett answered, “Yes, absolutely.” Describing the experience of watching a race at ground level on the apron, Mr. Badgett testified: What we do is we put televisions in the tent because it’s not as—You, more or less, have to walk down the apron if you want to see it live. There’s a structure in the middle of the—of the in-field, which is the tote board, which doesn’t work anymore. So, it’s a little bit of an obstruction. You can see [the race], but you’re better off watching it on television. The undersigned credits Mr. Badgett’s testimony on these points. DETERMINATIONS OF ULTIMATE FACT It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that both the open-air option and the nonintegration principle have the effect of law because the Division, if unchecked, intends consistently to follow them in carrying out its responsibilities to administer chapters 550 and 551 generally, and section 551.114(4) specifically. Each statement creates rights (in the form of expanded locational options for SMBs and architectural options for LGFs) that are exercisable by slot machine licensees.11 While directly regulating the physical plant of a permitted pari-mutuel facility, these statements collaterally regulate live gaming licensees, including businesses owing racing animals such as SCF, whose licensed occupations require access to, and the use of, the permitholders’ LGFs and other pari-mutuel facilities. From the perspective of a licensed racehorse owner, the LGF (which it neither owns nor controls) is the environment for its audience, the spectators whose money (wagered on races) helps fund the purses and awards that compensate the licensee for its services. A law that allows an LGF to be an open-air place as opposed to a climate controlled 11 The undersigned hereby places on the record the director’s comment regarding paragraph 30: “Finding the agency’s future intent as a matter of fact is troubling.” Any party desiring to rebut this communication shall be allowed to do so in accordance with section 120.66(2). Continued on next page... building is detrimental to the interests of a business licensee whose success in a pari-mutuel occupation depends upon the continued presence of a large, paying audience, for the obvious reasons that an open-air place is unlikely to be as comfortable, or as amenity-rich, as a building; and, taken together, less comfort and fewer amenities, relatively speaking, are more likely to discourage potential customers from showing up.12 Similarly, the nonintegration principle negatively affects the interests of live gaming licensees such as SCF because it allows the permitholder literally to draw patrons away from the live gaming activities upon which the live gaming licensees depend, to a “nearby,” but physically separate and independent, SMB. The relative draw of the SMB, moreover, which must be an enclosed building, is enhanced if the LGF, pursuant to the open-air option, does not afford patrons a conditioned environment. That is, when the nonintegration principle works in tandem with the open-air option at the same pari-mutuel facility, the result is even more disadvantageous to live gaming licensees, because the disequilibrium in patron comfort, as between slot machine players and live game spectators, ratchets up as the LGF becomes more stripped-down. The bottom line is that the nonintegration principle and the open-air option are unadopted rules because, in the Division’s hands, they create legally protected opportunities for permitholders to design, configure, and construct their physical plants, in ways that predictably and substantially affect live gaming licensees. 12 The undersigned regards this as self-evident. Common, everyday experience informs the undersigned—who doubts that any reasonable person can genuinely deny—that an enclosed, dry, heated or cooled environment, separated from the outdoors, where a spectator can sit and watch a race without being exposed to direct sunlight, wind, or insects, is more attractive to potential customers, in the main, than an open-air place where the spectator might be uncomfortably hot or cold, windswept, and bitten by mosquitoes; thus, a building is a relatively stronger draw. Continued on next page... The gatekeeper mechanism, in contrast, while perhaps having some of the characteristics of a general principle, is primarily a quasi-judicial ruling, operative only in the context of a quasi-judicial administrative proceeding, and lacking any broad regulatory effect. While such a ruling plainly affects the interests of the party or parties to the particular proceeding, it is judicially reviewable without the mediation of yet another administrative proceeding (unlike an intended regulatory decision, which becomes final unless a hearing is requested).13 To be sure, the question of whether an agency statement to the effect that “formal hearings shall not be granted if the historical facts are undisputed, leaving for determination only the ultimate fact of compliance” (whose level of generality is somewhat higher than the gatekeeper mechanism at issue) could be deemed an unadopted rule is fairly debatable. Yet, even that apparently rule-like statement, which arguably “describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency,”14 would be actionable only as an interlocutory order in a quasi-judicial proceeding, because only such a proceeding would give the agency an opportunity to use the statement. It is hard, therefore, to distinguish between 13 In other words, if a party disagrees with the agency’s decision under section 120.569(2)(a) to deny the party’s request for a formal hearing, that party does not need to request another administrative hearing to contest the decision. The agency’s decision to deny a formal hearing and proceed under section 120.57(2) is a nonfinal order, which may be immediately appealed under section 120.68(1)(b), see United States Service Industries-Florida v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 383 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), or reviewed on plenary appeal from an adverse final order, see Spuza v. Department of Health, 838 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003). If the agency refuses to discharge its duty under section 120.569(2)(a), mandamus will lie. See Cmty. Health Charities v. Dep’t of Mgmt. Servs., 961 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). 14 See § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (definition of “rule”). “policy” and “reversible error” in this instance.15 Ultimately, the undersigned determines that the gatekeeper mechanism is not a rule by definition.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether Respondents are guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Notice to Show Cause; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: At all times material to the allegations in the Amended Notice to Show Cause, Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz, d/b/a Flor-Lidita Restaurant, held alcoholic beverage license number 23-4636. This license was a 2-COP license which authorized the sale of beer and wine for the premises known as Flor-Lidita Restaurant which is located at 4762 N. W. 183rd Street, Miami, Florida. In July, 1986, the FDLE began an investigation concerning an illegal gambling lottery commonly known as "bolita" which was believed to be operating in connection with the Flor-Lidita Restaurant. The investigation undertaken involved a surveillance of the restaurant together with undercover agents who were used to frequent the restaurant for the purposes of observing activities and placing bets with the restaurant personnel. An individual identified as Rafael Rosquete was determined to be a courier who would enter the restaurant, collect the gambling paraphernalia and returns, and deliver the items to a home located in Broward County. On July 9, 1986, a police officer, Hector Zeno, working undercover in connection with the FDLE, entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant and observed customers writing numbers on bolita slips. Officer Zeno also observed individuals placing bets with the owner, Julio Diaz. In turn, Zeno filled out a bolita slip and placed a $5.00 bet with the owner Julio Diaz. On July 16, 1986, Joyce Dawley and Jacqueline Sirven entered the Flor- Lidita Restaurant and observed customers placing bolita bets with the Respondents, Lida and Julio Diaz. These agents also observed another employee known to them as "Rolando" (later identified as Rolando Nunez) taking bets. Agents Dawley and Sirven placed $5.00 bets with Julio Diaz on this date and received carbon copies of their bolita slips. On July 22, 1986, Zeno returned to the restaurant for the purpose of observing the customers and again placed a $5.00 bet by completing a bolita slip and tendering money to Julio Diaz. During this visit Zeno observed Nunez and Lida Diaz taking money and bolita slips from other customers within the restaurant. On July 23, 1986, Dawley and Sirven returned to the restaurant and again placed two $5.00 bets with Julio Diaz. During this visit the agents observed other individuals inside the licensed premises place bets with Rolando Nunez and Lida Diaz. On July 24, 1986, Dawley and Sirven returned to the Flor-Lidita Restaurant for the purpose of picking up $70.00 in winnings which Agent Dawley was entitled to as a result of the bet she had placed the previous evening. On July 30, 1986, Dawley and Sirven went to the Flor- Lidita Restaurant and again placed two $5.00 bets. This time Lida Diaz took their money and the original bolita slips and gave them carbon copies of their bets. On July 31, 1986, Sirven entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant for the purpose of receiving $70.00 in winnings based on the prior day's bolita bet. On August 6, 1986, Dawley entered the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, received a bolita pad from Rolando Nunez and placed a $5.00 bet with Nunez in the present of Julio Diaz. On this visit Nunez showed Dawley a ledger which contained a list of dates together with numbers which indicated the winning numbers for the dates in question. On August 11, 1986, Dawley went to the Flor-Lidita Restaurant and observed Lida and Julio Diaz receiving bolita bets from persons within the restaurant. Dawley also observed Rolando Nunez taking bets. Dawley placed a $5.00 bet with Nunez on this date. After receiving a search warrant for the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, special agents of the FDLE entered the licensed premises on August 12, 1986 and searched the restaurant. During the search, agents took possession of various items of gambling paraphernalia which included bolita betting slips, Puerto Rican lottery tickets, blank bolita pads, currency and ledger books. Over $40,000 worth of U.S. currency and gambling paraphernalia was confiscated in connection with the police raid on the restaurant and the house in Broward County. In connection with the search of the licensed premises, Joseph Ogonowski seized an open bottle of scotch whiskey which was behind the counter at the restaurant. The scotch was not listed on the menu as a designated ingredient for any of the food items available for purchase at the restaurant. During the period of surveillance of the Flor-Lidita Restaurant, Rosquete was repeatedly observed by FDLE agents. Rosquete would routinely visit the restaurant, obtain items of gambling paraphernalia including betting slips and U.S. currency, and deliver the proceeds from the restaurant to a residence located in Broward County. The gambling activities conducted on the licensed premises were open, frequent, and included the active participation of the Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco enter a Final Order revoking license number 23-4636, series 2-COP, held by Respondents, Julio and Lida Diaz, d/b/a Flor-Lidita Restaurant. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of July, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-4620 Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1 and 2 are accepted. With the exception of the last sentence paragraph 3 is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as speculation. Paragraph 4 is accepted. Paragraph 5 is accepted. Paragraphs 6-20 are accepted. With the exception of the last sentence in paragraph 21, which is rejected as speculation, paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraphs 22-23 are accepted. The last two sentences of paragraph 24 are accepted. The first sentence is rejected as argument or a conclusion of law. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings of fact: Paragraphs 1-3 are accepted. Paragraphs 4 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mr. Ogonowski was qualified to and did identify the substance seized as scotch whiskey. Paragraph 5 is accepted but is unnecessary to the determinations reached by this Recommended Order. Paragraph 6 is rejected as irrelevant, immaterial and unsupported by the record in this cause having previously ruled the adjudications inadmissible. Paragraph 7 is rejected as unsupported by the record in this cause. COPIES FURNISHED: Katherine A. Emrich, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Rene Valdes 1830 N. W. 7th Street Miami, Florida 33125 Daniel Bosanko, Director Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000
