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JOHN M. POTTER vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 83-001747 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-001747 Latest Update: Mar. 06, 1984

The Issue Whether petitioner should be removed from the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979, on grounds of ineligibility.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, a licensed attorney, practices law in Clewiston, Hendry County, Florida. Since at least September 1, 1970, he has continuously engaged in the private practice of law in Clewiston. On September 1, 1970, the Glades County School Board ("School Board" or "Board") hired him as the School Board attorney, a position which he continues to hold. This is a part-time position, since the Board has no need for a full-time attorney. The School Board is headquartered at Moore Haven, 16 miles northwest of Clewiston, in neighboring Glades County. The terms and conditions of petitioner's employment with the School Board have remained virtually unchanged since he was originally hired. Each year, the School Board sets his salary consisting of a monthly retainer or salary, plus a fixed amount per hour for any additional professional services or litigation required by the School Board. For the 1979-80 school year, the Board set his salary or retainer--terms which the School Board used interchangeably-- as shown by the Minutes of the July 11, 1979, meeting: 3. SALARY/SCHOOL BOARD ATTORNEY - 1979-80 Chairman Hilliard opened the floor for discussion on the salary for the school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. After some discussion between the board and Mr. Potter, the board proposed a retainer of $750.00 per month. (annual salary of $9,000.00) plus $50.00 per hour for additional pro fessional services or litigation required by the board. ON MOTION by Sapp, seconded by Johnson, the board approved this pro- posal for school board attorney for the 1979-80 school year. (Vote: Arnold, yes; Johnson, yes; Taylor, yes; Sapp, yes; Hilliard, yes.) His salary is paid from the School Board's regular employee salary account. But as the School Board's attorney, unlike other School Board employees, he does not accrue annual leave, sick leave, or pay during vacations, holidays or illness, though when he is sick or on vacation, there is no adjustment to his salary. He is reimbursed for work-related travel and meals at the rates provided by Section 112.061, Florida Statutes (1983), and is covered by the School Board's group health and life insurance, and Workers' Compensation. Since 1970, the Board has withheld his Social Security contributions from his fixed monthly salary payments; has paid the employer's Social Security contributions on his salary payments; and has annually reported his monthly salary payments on Internal Revenue Service Form W-2. To this extent, the School Board considered him an employee and treated him the same as it treated its other employees. The legal services which he furnished the School Board are described in his employment agreement and the School Board's job description for the position: TYPICAL DUTIES: Attend all regular Board meetings and such special meetings as deemed advisable by Board Chairman or Superintendent. Be available for routine telephone or personal consultations with Board Chairman, Superintendent and Staff members. Perform legal research. Prepare or approve leases or agreements prior to execution by Board. Prepare and prosecute law suits in behalf of Board and defend law suits against Board, including any actions against Superintendent, Staff or other school district employees allegedly arising etc., unless special counsel is deemed necessary by Board Attorney with Board's concurrence. Attend the quarterly seminars/meetings of Florida School Board Attorneys Association; and any other approved by Board. Represent Board and/or Superintendent in personnel matters where appropriate, as well as student discipline matters. School Board meetings, held monthly, last approximately one and one-half hours. Litigation, although described as a typical duty, is considered extra work, and an hourly rate is charged over and above the monthly salary. Petitioner agrees that he would not knowingly accept any new clients which would cause a conflict of interest with his School Board employment. Although he has been free to turn down work assigned by the School Board, he never has--at least through 1976. As explained by Mr. Strope, Superintendent of Schools from 1968 to 1976, although petitioner was free to turn down work, he "shouldn't have." Petitioner is not required to maintain any set office hours, and his monthly salary does not vary with the number of hours' work. He is not furnished office space by the School Board. The majority of his legal work for the Board is performed at his private law office, in Clewiston. The cost of operating his law office is not a budget item in the School Board's budget. Under his employment arrangement with the School Board, he furnishes all personnel, equipment, and facilities needed to perform his services. He is responsible for supervising the secretaries who work in his private office. Occasionally, when he is at School Board headquarters in Moore Haven he will ask a School Board employee to type a document. At his request, however, the School Board will furnish him pencils, legal pads, legal periodicals and stationery. It also pays for his travel; for per diem expenses incurred while attending legal seminars or meetings; and for long distance telephone calls made in connection with his School Board employment. He is neither responsible for, nor supervises, any employee of the School Board. The School Board does not furnish him any legal secretaries or part-time attorney assistants. He has not shown what percentage, or amount, of his working hours are devoted to performing legal services for the School Board, as opposed to legal services which he performs for his other clients. Other than assigning specific legal tasks, the School Board exercises no more control over the means, methods, and manner by which petitioner performs the legal work given him than is ordinarily exercised by any client over an attorney. Because of ethical constraints and the nature of legal work, petitioner must exercise independent professional judgment. Since September 1, 1970 2/, petitioner has been enrolled in the FRS. This was accomplished by his filling out a prescribed form which the School Board then filed with the Division. The Board then began reporting him on its employee rolls. There is no evidence that the initial FRS entry form, filed with the Division, described petitioner's work duties or the nature of his employment with the School Board. Both the Board and the Division enrolled him in the FRS, believing that he was eligible for membership. The Division did not question or investigate the nature of his employment relationship with the Board until 1983. From his initial enrollment until January 1, 1975, when FRS became a non-contributory system, petitioner contributed one-half of the the required FRS contribution, while the School Board contributed the other half. Since January 1, 1975, the School Board has contributed 100 percent of his contributions to FRS. During the 1970s petitioner's membership in the FRS prevented him from participating in any other tax sheltered retirement plan. 3/ Since July 1, 1979, the Division has, by rule, given notice that consultants and other professional persons contracting with public employers are, ordinarily, ineligible for membership in the FRS. All public employers, including the School Board, have been asked to remove such persons from their retirement payrolls. Since at least July 8, 1981, petitioner was on notice that his status as an employee, and his eligibility for continued membership in the FRS, were in question. Both the parties stipulate that part-time electricians, plumbers, painters, combustion engine mechanics, air conditioning mechanics, janitors or sewage plant operators (and even other occupations) employed in 1983 by the Glades County School Board on a year-round salary basis (i.e., at least 10 consecutive months), and paid out of the School Board's regular salary and wage account, would be mandatory members of FRS by statute. (Prehearing Stip., para. E. 6)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Division enter an order removing petitioner from membership in the Florida Retirement System, as of July 1, 1979; and That the Division return to petitioner and the School Board their respective FRS contributions, mistakenly made to his account. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 14th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 1984.

Florida Laws (4) 112.061120.57121.021121.051
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MONROE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs DAVID GOOTEE, 10-000497TTS (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Key West, Florida Feb. 01, 2010 Number: 10-000497TTS Latest Update: Apr. 18, 2025
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ROBERT L. WONSICK vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 76-000436 (1976)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 76-000436 Latest Update: Sep. 10, 1976

Findings Of Fact The ultimate issue to be decided is whether the Petitioner is eligible to transfer from Florida Teacher Retirement Plan A to Florida Teacher Retirement Plan E and if so, whether he should be allowed to do so at this time. Robert L. Wonsick, the Petitioner, served as a classroom teacher in the Pinellas County School System for approximately 19 years. He resigned from his employment as a school teacher on approximately June 14, 1972 which resignation was accepted by his employer. At that time, Petitioner advised duly the employer through its agent, Jerry J. Switts, Director of Elementary Placement and Retirement, that he was unable to return too work the 72-73 school year due to illness; therefore he opted to, void his Florida Retirement System Transfer Ballot which would have been effective July 1, 1972, and requested disability retirement under the Teacher's Retirement System Plan. Petitioner was advised by Switt's to submit a written request for final decision on his application filed for disability retirement. As indicated by his petition filed on or about March 5, 1976, Petitioner takes the position that he should be entitled to transfer from Teachers Retirement System (hereinafter referred to as TRS) Plan A to TRS Plan E. Petitioner attempted to elect to transfer to the Florida Retirement System (hereinafter sometimes referred to as FRS) in 1972, the effective date to be July 1, 1972. This was denied inasmuch as Petitioner had already resigned his employment and never worked under or contributed to FRS, since by his own testimony he resigned in August, 1972, on or about the second day of pre-school. Respondent therefore denied the application for transfer based on Section 121.051(2)(a) 3(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner submitted his transfer ballot which was received by Respondent along with numerous other employees in 1972. By letter dated September 8, 1972, Petitioner requested that his transfer ballot be cancelled. Upon learning that Petitioner had in fact not worked after July 1, 1972, the transfer ballot was forwarded for reasons previously stated by way of "Application for Retirement Acknowledgement Form" dated September 11, 1972. Petitioner was requested to supply certain information to Respondent and by that same form was advised that he might wish to transfer from TRS Plan A to TRS Plan B. By letter dated December 12, 1972, Petitioner was supplied with estimates of retirement benefits showing that his monthly benefits under Plan A would be approximately $129.00 per month and the benefits under Plan E would be approximately $260.00 per month with the caveat that in order to effectuate the transfer to Plan E (an option open to him at that time) it would be necessary for him to pay in approximately $2,550 in contributions. Said contributions were necessary to meet the statutory contribution rates for Plan E if Petitioner desired to become a member of said plan. Section 238.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was also notified that he would have to remit $228.47 if he wished to receive retirement credit for a leave of absence utilized by him during school year 1970-1971. Within the next few days i.e., December 15, 1972, Petitioner indicated without question that he intended to remain a member of Plan A and remitted the requested $228.47 in required contributions to receive retirement credit for the above mentioned leave of absence. During a hiatus of a considerable period, adequate medical evidence was provided to Respondent to demonstrate Petitioner's disability and he began receiving monthly benefits under his monthly benefit i.e., Plan A. Thereafter on September 12, 1973, Petitioner inquired of Respondent concerning difference in benefits available under Plan A and Plan E, and possibility of changing from one plan to the other. Respondent answered Petitioner's inquiry by letter dated January 4, 1974, informing him of his previous choice to remain in Plan A. In addition, Respondent informed him that inasmuch as he had chosen not to remit the additional $2,550 necessary to transfer to Plan E in 1972, there were no provisions under the law allowing a change in retirement plans to be made after an employee had elected to retire under another plan. It should be noted that Petitioner had been advised in December of 1972 of all options available to him prior to the time of his retirement and his subsequent choice of Retirement Plan was unequivocally made by him. Again, on May 9, 1974, Petitioner requested that his claim be reevaluated whereupon Respondent replied by letter dated May 20, 1974, advising that Respondent had followed his (Petitioner's) written instructions and had taken the action permitting him to retire under plan A per his request. He was again reminded of the status of the law which did not permit a change in retirement plans. He was reminded that assuming for the sake of argument that his account could be reopened and benefits be computed under the Florida Retirement System, it would be necessary for him too contribute more than $2,200.00 to his account which he had previously elected not to do when given the option. Accordingly, his request for reevaluation was denied by Respondent. Again, by letter dated June 5, 1974, Petitioner requested that he be credited with approximately $2,250.00 that he would have been eligible to receive had he retired under Plan E and requested that said amount be credited to his account in order to facilitate his transfer into Plan E. These requests were denied by Respondent by letter dated June 13, 1974. Thereafter, Petitioner wrote a series of letters to various state officials and agencies including federal agencies requesting reconsideration of Respondent's decision to decline his request to reevaluate his claim that he had not been afforded ample information to assist him in making an informed choice concerning his retirement benefits. Petitioner appeared and testified at the hearing and recalled the series of transactions entered into by him in transferring from the various plans. He testified that he was aware of the difference in benefits or that he became aware of the difference in benefits after he had made the decision to transfer from Plan E to Plan A. He voiced the opinion that he probably could not raise the additional $2,500.00 that would be required assuming that he was given the option of now transferring to Plan E. He indicated that he had received no public assistance and that his large family and the mental problems prevented him from making an intelligent choice at the time he made the election to retire under Plan A. During the hearing, he admitted that he had received full cooperation and assistance from Respondent but that it was his mental condition and other financial problems which hampered his ability to make an intelligent choice based on psychological problems, etc. Based on all the evidence presented in this case, it is clear that the Respondent afforded Petitioner all of the information requested and explained all the options available to him including the differences in the benefits of the various plans and his contributions for retirement in such plans. It is further clear that at each juncture, he was permitted to change his mind about enrolling in various plans when the change could be effectuated within the permissible guidelines under the law. With these facts in mind and inasmuch as there is no provisions in the law which permits a retiree from changing plans after his effective date of retirement, Petitioner's claim that he was wrongfully denied the opportunity to retire or to change his retirement plan to Plan E must fall as being unsubstantiated by the record evidence. I shall therefore recommend that his petition requesting permission to allow him to change from Plan A to Plan E be denied.

Recommendation Based on the above facts and conclusions of law, I recommend than the Petition filed herein requesting permission to retire from Plan A to Plan E be disallowed. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen S. Mathues, Esquire Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Lawrence L. Black, Esquire 152 8th Avenue, Southwest Largo, Florida 33540 Robert L. Wonsick 6260 Second Avenue, South St. Petersburg, Florida 33707

Florida Laws (2) 121.051238.09
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STEPHEN REID vs DEPARTMENT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE, 07-002208SED (2007)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida May 16, 2007 Number: 07-002208SED Latest Update: Apr. 18, 2025
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JOEY BAUTISTA vs STATE BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, 19-004819 (2019)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Lauderdale Lakes, Florida Sep. 12, 2019 Number: 19-004819 Latest Update: Apr. 18, 2025

The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.

Findings Of Fact From 1999 until 2017, Bautista was an employee of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (“MDPS”). On August 24, 2017, Bautista resigned from his position as principal of the Miami Jackson Adult Education Center, an office he had held since 2011. Bautista departed shortly after being arrested on charges of organized fraud, official misconduct, and grand theft. In the criminal Information leading to Bautista’s arrest, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleged, in summary, that Bautista had used his position as principal to misappropriate between $20,000.00 and $50,000.00 of MDPS’s funds for personal expenses, and had destroyed official payroll records to cover his tracks. On or about July 10, 2019, Bautista pleaded nolo contendere in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court to one count of official misconduct, a felony of the third degree pursuant to section 838.022, Florida Statutes, and to one count of grand theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes, also a third- degree felony. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed Bautista on community control, to be followed by probation. In addition, Bautista was ordered to pay restitution to MDPS in the amount of $41,798.22. SBA is an agency of the state of Florida whose jurisdiction includes the administration of the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan (the “Plan”). By letter dated August 14, 2019, SBA notified Bautista that his rights and benefits under the Plan are forfeit as a result of his pleas of no contest to the aforementioned criminal charges, which had arisen from acts allegedly committed by Bautista as an MDPS employee. SBA offered Bautista an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination, and Bautista timely requested a hearing. As grounds for opposing the forfeiture, Bautista claims that his former employer, MDPS, failed to provide him due process of law during the run-up to his forced resignation. He complains, as well, that “procedural irregularities” in the criminal prosecution likewise deprived him of due process. Next, Bautista notes that he never admitted guilt and insists that he is, in fact, innocent of the charges to which he pleaded no contest. Finally, Bautista argues that he was not “convicted” for purposes of forfeiture of retirement benefits, because the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the criminal charges against him. To be sure, if Bautista was not afforded due process or was otherwise victimized by prosecutorial abuse or inadequate legal representation, as he alleges, then Bautista might have suffered an injury for which the law affords redress. But this proceeding is not the vehicle, and DOAH is not the forum, for hearing such disputes. It does not minimize the seriousness of Bautista’s allegations to recognize that, even if true, none of them changes the undisputed facts that he pleaded nolo contendere to the crimes of official misconduct and grand theft, each of which is a “specified offense” under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Conviction of a specified offense results in the forfeiture of retirement benefits pursuant to the plain language of section 112.3173(3).1 Thus, the MDPS investigation and any “irregularities” in the criminal prosecution are irrelevant to the issues at hand, and the undersigned declines to make findings of fact concerning Bautista’s allegations in this regard.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order determining that Joey Bautista forfeited all his rights and benefits under the Plan, except for the return of any accumulated contributions, when he pleaded nolo contendere to “specified offenses” committed prior to his retirement from public service. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Soeurette Michel, Esquire The Michel Law Firm, LLC Post Office Box 245131 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33024 (eServed) Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Jonathon W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300

Florida Laws (9) 112.3173120.52120.569120.57120.68812.014838.022838.15838.16 DOAH Case (1) 19-4819
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RICHARD S. MITCHELL vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 03-000417 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Feb. 06, 2003 Number: 03-000417 Latest Update: May 22, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner is "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Prior to July of 2000, Petitioner worked on a permanent part-time basis as an adult education teacher for the Miami-Dade County School Board (School Board), accumulating 7.10 years of retirement credit. On Sunday, July 2, 2000, Petitioner was hospitalized because of a "blood disorder." Since his hospitalization on July 2, 2000, Petitioner has been under a doctor's care and has not been physically able to return, and therefore has not returned, to work. Petitioner was hospitalized again in 2001 and for a third time in 2002 for the same ailment. After each visit he has made to the doctor during the time he has been out of work, Petitioner has apprised the principal of the South Dade Adult Education Center (South Dade), where he had worked before his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, of his condition. It is now, and has been at all times following his July 2, 2000, hospitalization, Petitioner's intention "to return to work upon clearance from [his] doctor." Petitioner has not been paid by the School Board during the time he has been out of work. In April of 2001, Petitioner spoke separately with a representative of the United Teachers of Dade (UTD) and with a School Board staff member concerning his employment situation. The UTD representative advised Petitioner that Petitioner "was on an approved leave of absence." The School Board staff member told Petitioner that he "should be on an approved leave of absence"; however, she was unable to "find that authorization in the computer." She suggested that Petitioner go to School Board headquarters and inquire about the matter. Petitioner went to School Board headquarters, as the School Board staff member had suggested. The persons to whom he spoke "couldn't locate the [leave] authorization either." They suggested that Petitioner contact the principal of South Dade. Taking this advice, Petitioner wrote two letters to the principal inquiring about his employment status. He received no response to either letter. During the summer of 2001, Petitioner contacted the Division to ask about his eligibility to receive retirement benefits. Lisa Skovalia, a Benefits Specialist with the Division, responded to Respondent's inquiry by sending him the following letter, dated August 22, 2001: Our records indicate that you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date. As such, you must return to active employment, to earn one additional year of service credit, before you will be vested in the Florida Retirement System and eligible for retirement benefits. I have enclosed a copy of the FRS Retirement Guide for the Regular Class for your information. Please call or write if you have any further questions. In February of 2002, Petitioner again made contact with School Board personnel and "was told that [his] name [had been] removed from the computer (school records)." In July of 2002, Petitioner wrote United States Senator Bob Graham "seeking [Senator Graham's] assistance in helping [Petitioner] get [his] retirement form Miami-Dade Public Schools." Petitioner's letter to Senator Graham was referred to the School Board's Superintendent of Schools, who responded by sending the following letter, dated August 29, 2002, to Petitioner: Your letter . . . to Senator Bob Graham was referred to me for response. A review of our records indicates that your earnings as a part-time teacher ended in July 2000. As a part-time employee, you were not eligible for a Board-approved leave of absence. You were notified by letter (copy attached) dated August 22, 2001 from Ms. Lisa Skovalia, Benefits Specialist, State of Florida, Division of Retirement, that because ". . . you were neither actively employed (physically working and earning salary) as of July 1, 2001, nor on a school board approved leave of absence through that date," you would have to return to active employment and earn one additional year of service credit before being vested in the Florida Retirement System. The State of Florida Division of Retirement is solely responsible for developing rules and procedures for implementing changes in the retirement law. If you disagree with their determination, you may request an administrative hearing by sending a written request to the Bureau of Retirement Calculations, Cedars Executive Center, 2639 North Monroe Street, Building C, Tallahassee, Florida 32399. On September 12, 2002, Petitioner sent a letter to the Division's Bureau of Retirement Calculations (Bureau) "seeking [its] assistance in helping [him] get [his] retirement from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The Bureau responded to Petitioner's letter by providing him with the following Statement of Account, dated September 20, 2002: We audited your retirement account and you have 7.10 years of service through 07/2000. Please note that the vesting requirement for FRS members has been changed to 6 years of creditable service effective July 1, 2001 for those members who were actively employed on that date or on a board approved leave of absence. Former members with 6 years, but less than 10 years of creditable service who were not employed with a participating FRS employer on July 1, 2001, must return to covered employment for one year to become eligible for the six-year vesting provision. Per Maria Perez at the Miami-Dade County School Board you were not on a board approved leave of absence on July 1, 2001, nor were you eligible for a board approved leave of absence due to your position as a part time adult school instructor. Although your school may have allowed you to take a leave of absence, only board approved leaves fulfill the vesting requirements required by law. On November 15, 2002, Petitioner sent the Bureau a letter expressing the view that it was not "fair that, after all [his] efforts as a teacher, [he] should lose out [on his] retirement" and requesting "an administrative hearing concerning [his] efforts to get retirement benefits from Miami-Dade Public Schools." The State Retirement Director responded to Petitioner's letter by sending him the following letter, dated December 18, 2002: This is in response to your recent letter concerning your vesting and eligibility for retirement benefits. You currently have 7.10 years of retirement credit through July 2000, your last month of employment in a Florida Retirement System (FRS) covered position. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)1, F.S., states that "Any member employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, who completes or has completed a total of 6 years of creditable service shall be considered vested. . ." An FRS employer (Dade School Board) last employed you in a regularly established position in July 2000 and you were not granted a leave of absence to continue the employment relationship. Dade School Board has informed us that as a part-time teacher, you were not eligible for an approved leave of absence. Therefore, you do not meet the statutory requirement for coverage under the six year vesting provision. [Section] 121.021(45)(b)2, F.S., provides the vesting requirement for members who were not employed on July 1, 2001, as follows: "Any member not employed in a regularly established position on July 1, 2001, shall be deemed vested upon completion of 6 years of creditable service, provided that such member is employed in a covered position for at least 1 work year after July 1, 2001 (emphasis supplied). It is certainly unfortunate that you had to leave your employment because of your illness, but the current retirement law requires that you must return to covered employment and earn one year of service credit to be vested and eligible for retirement benefits. This letter constitutes final agency action. If you do not agree with this decision and wish to appeal this action, you must file a formal petition for review in accordance with the enclosed Rule 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C.) within 21 days of receipt of this letter. Your petition should be filed with the Division of Retirement at the above address. Upon receipt of the petition, you will be notified by the Division or the Administrative Law Judge of all future proceedings and hearings. If you do not file an appeal within the 21-day period, you will waive your right to request a hearing or mediation in this matter in accordance with Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. By letter dated January 2, 2003, Petitioner "appeal[ed]" the "final agency action" announced in the State Retirement Director's December 18, 2002, letter.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division issue a final order finding that Petitioner is not "vested," as that term is defined in Subsection (45) of Section 121.021, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2003.

Florida Laws (7) 112.021120.569120.57121.021121.091121.19057.10
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SARASOTA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD vs MARK COOK, 03-001958 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida May 27, 2003 Number: 03-001958 Latest Update: Mar. 08, 2004

The Issue The issues in this case are whether Petitioner provided reasonable notice to Respondent of its intent to suspend without pay and terminate Respondent's employment, and whether Respondent could unilaterally resign to retire while the Superintendent's pending recommendation to terminate Respondent was before Petitioner.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, the Sarasota County School Board, employed Respondent as a teacher and principal of Garden Elementary School in Venice, Florida, for 29 years. Respondent was employed under an annual contract throughout each year of employment, the last of which began July 1, 2002, scheduled to end June 30, 2003. In February 2002, Respondent was arrested and charged with seven counts of Sexual Battery by a Person over Eighteen (18) Years of Age upon a Child Eleven (11) Years or Younger. On March 5, 2002, Respondent was suspended with pay by Petitioner. While suspended with pay, Respondent's annual contract expired on June 30, 2002, and was renewed by Petitioner for the 2002-2003 school year. Respondent remained suspended with pay and did not perform any services for Petitioner during the 2002-2003 school year. On or about April 28, 2003, Respondent completed, but did not file, an application to retire from the Florida State Retirement System and executed a Durable Family Power of Attorney to his wife, Mrs. Cook. The power of attorney empowered Mrs. Cook to make decisions on behalf of Respondent for all personal, legal, and financial matters. On May 2, 2003, Respondent was found guilty of two counts of Sexual Battery by a Person over Eighteen (18) Years of Age upon a Child Eleven (11) Years or Younger by a jury in the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit, in and for Sarasota County, Florida. Respondent was immediately taken into custody and placed in the Sarasota County Jail. Three days later, on May 5, 2003, notwithstanding Respondent's incarceration in the Sarasota County Jail, Superintendent Hamilton misdirected a certified letter to Respondent's home address, attempting to advise him of her intent to recommend to Petitioner on the following day, May 6, 2003, that Respondent be suspended without pay. Hamilton's letter further sought to notify Respondent that she intended to recommend that he be terminated from his employment at the School Board meeting scheduled for May 20, 2003, due to his recent conviction. pay. On May 6, 2003, Petitioner suspended Respondent without On the following day, May 7, 2003, Mrs. Cook received Superintendent Hamilton's certified letter dated May 5, 2003, but did not open it nor become fully aware of its contents until a later time. Respondent was and remains incarcerated. There is no evidence that he ever received actual notice of the Superintendent's certified letter of May 5, 2003. In addition to the untimely and misdirected notice, the Superintendent's certified letter failed to advise Respondent that he could contest the proposed suspension without pay. Respondent's wife credibly testified that if she had received notice of Petitioner's intent prior to the School Board's meeting of May 6, 2003, she would have attended the meeting and attempted to submit Respondent's resignation. On May 7, 2003, Petitioner mailed a follow-up letter to Respondent's home address, via standard U.S. mail, attempting to notify him that the Board had suspended him without pay. Respondent remained incarcerated and did not receive this letter. It is unknown whether Mrs. Cook ever received the letter or when she became aware of its contents. On May 9, 2003, Mrs. Cook invoked her power of attorney on behalf of Respondent and submitted his resignation from employment to Petitioner, effective immediately, in order to retire. On that day, Mrs. Cook attempted to hand-deliver Respondent's retirement/resignation letter to Petitioner's personnel office, along with Respondent's previously executed retirement papers, however, the personnel office staff refused to accept the paperwork. Instead, Mrs. Cook was immediately directed to speak with Allen Wilson, Executive Director of Human Resources and Labor Relations for Petitioner, but he was unavailable. Later that same day, Mrs. Cook met with Mr. John Zoretich, Petitioner's Director of Instruction/Curriculum. Mr. Zoretich agreed to receive Respondent's letter of resignation/retirement from Mrs. Cook, but instructed her to deliver Respondent's executed retirement papers to the payroll department. Mrs. Cook complied, but again, payroll staff refused to accept the retirement papers and instructed her to contact Mr. Wilson. Mrs. Cook's repeated efforts to communicate with Mr. Wilson were unsuccessful. Petitioner's personnel and payroll departments refused to accept Respondent's executed retirement papers due to Petitioner's pending consideration of Superintendent Hamilton's termination recommendation. The parties agree that the amount of terminal pay at issue, based upon Respondent's effective daily rate of pay, is approximately $60,000.00. On May 12, 2003, Mrs. Cook forwarded Respondent's previously executed retirement application by facsimile and U.S. Mail to the Florida Retirement System. The Florida Retirement System acknowledged its receipt in correspondence dated June 18, 2003, indicating a date of receipt of May 13, 2003, an employment termination date of May 3, 2003, and a retirement date of June 2003.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter an order finding: Respondent has materially violated the terms of his employment contract. Petitioner has just cause to terminate Respondent's employment. Respondent's offer to resign has not been accepted by Petitioner and is ineffective until accepted or denied by Petitioner. Respondent is not entitled to terminal pay. Petitioner failed to provide Respondent with reasonable notice of its intent to consider the Superintendent's suspension recommendation at the public meeting, and Respondent was deprived his substantive right to contest the recommendation and the Board's determination. Respondent is entitled to remain on paid suspension from May 6, 2003, the date of the effective suspension, through May 20, 2003, the date of Petitioner's properly noticed public meeting to terminate him. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2004.

Florida Laws (6) 1012.231012.33120.50120.569120.57120.60
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LOIS K. BAUER vs DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 93-000404 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jan. 28, 1993 Number: 93-000404 Latest Update: Sep. 21, 1993

The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to purchase a retirement service credit for approximately three and one-half years pursuant to Section 121.011(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The record in this cause consists of all documents filed in this cause either with the Hearing Officer or with the Division of Retirement, including all documents received in evidence at the hearing as exhibits. After review of the record in this case, the Division accepts all the findings of fact as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order. However, the Division is unable to accept all of the conclusions of law as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order.

Findings Of Fact As a teacher with the Orange County School Board (the School Board") since 1967, Petitioner is a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was so employed in 1978 and was a member of the Florida Retirement System at that time. In January, 1978, Petitioner was on approved personal leave for her wedding. Her husband lived in Arkansas. Petitioner requested and was granted a leave of absence to join her husband in Arkansas for the balance of the school year. Petitioner and her husband intended to return to Orlando, Florida before the beginning of the next school year. Petitioner's husband intended to accept a position with a veteran's clinic in the Orlando area. Petitioner intended to resume employment with the School Board. On January 16, 1978, Petitioner properly submitted a written request for a leave of absence. The leave requested was limited to the remaining term of the school year which ended in June, 1978. The request asked for a teaching assignment in the event the request was denied. On February 14, 1993, the School Board granted Petitioner's request for a leave of absence. The School Board's written authorization was issued on a standard approval form used by the School Board for such authorizations. The one page form consisted of standard boiler plate language except for three blanks in the first paragraph stating the date of approval, the reason for the leave, and the expiration date for the leave. The boiler plate language in the standard form included the following statement: . . . A teacher who desires to return to employment at the expiration of the leave period must notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1 of the school year for which the leave was granted. . . . Petitioner notified the Superintendent in writing of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner's written request on January 16, 1978, was addressed to the School Board. The relationship of the School Board and Superintendent is that of principal and agent. Petitioner's written request expressly provided that the leave period was limited to the remainder of the school year and that Petitioner wanted a teaching assignment if the request for leave of absence was denied. The requirement for notice prior to March 1, 1978, was based on the Master Agreement, Article IX, Section L, entered into by the School Board and the teacher's union. No similar requirement appears in Respondent's rules. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-2.006(1)(a) requires only that: . . . A leave of absence must be authorized in writing by a member's employer prior to or during the leave of absence. Petitioner's leave of absence was authorized in writing by Petitioner's employer during her personal leave. Early in February, 1978, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Royce B. Walden, Associate Superintendent of the School Board, and informed him that she desired to return to her employment at the beginning of the next school year; in the Fall of 1978. Mr. Walden did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her intent to return to employment. Later in February, 1978, Petitioner traveled to Orlando. While in Orlando, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Walden and again stated her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. The Associate Superintendent did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her desire to return to employment. In May, 1988, Petitioner moved back to Orlando. Petitioner again telephoned Mr. Walden. Petitioner was informed for the first time during that telephone conversation that there may not be a teaching position available for her at the beginning of the next school year. The reason stated by the Associate Superintendent was that Petitioner had failed to notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner immediately wrote a letter on May 25, 1978, restating her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. On the same day, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner stating that the School Board would not automatically assign Petitioner to an employment position for the 1978-1979 school year. The reason stated in Mr. Walden's letter was that Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that she notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. On July 11, 1978, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner purporting to terminate her as an employee of the School Board. The reason given for the purported termination was that Petitioner had failed to give written notice to the Superintendent by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. The letter purporting to terminate Petitioner contained no notice of Petitioner's rights to challenge the School Board's proposed action, including the right to a proceeding under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. After informing Petitioner of the purported termination and the reason, the letter stated: . . . Should you wish to return as an employee with the School Board of Orange County, we invite you to communicate with us in the near future. Please accept our sincere appreciation for your contribution to the educational program for children in the Orange County Public School System. 1/ Shortly after July 11, 1978, the School Board sued Petitioner for repayment of funds allegedly advanced to Petitioner for a paid sabbatical in 1973. The litigation culminated in a settlement agreement and Petitioner's reinstatement to her employment for the 1981-1982 school year with credit for nine years of service. Petitioner has been continuously employed by the School Board since that time and has maintained her continuing contract status with no loss in seniority. The settlement agreement did not pay Petitioner any back compensation and did not address Petitioner's fringe benefits, including the right to purchase the retirement service credit for the period of January, 1978 through the date of her reinstatement. Petitioner must pay the total cost of providing the retirement credit into the Retirement System Trust Fund. The economic burden of the retirement service credit falls solely on Petitioner. Petitioner's purchase of the retirement service credit will not result in any adverse economic impact on the School Board, Respondent, or the State of Florida. The proposed purchase price for the retirement service credit is sound for actuarial purposes.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order allowing Petitioner to purchase the retirement service credit at the statutorily prescribed purchase price. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1993.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.57120.68121.011121.021121.031 Florida Administrative Code (1) 60S-2.006
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BEN L. BRYAN, JR. vs. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 82-003460 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-003460 Latest Update: Jun. 08, 1983

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Ben L. Bryan, Jr., has been a member of the Florida Bar since 1962 and has continually engaged in the private practice of law in Fort Pierce since 1965. His offices are located at 101 1/2 South Second Street, Fort Pierce, Florida. In January, 1971, Petitioner was retained by the St. Lucie County School Hoard to represent it in the capacity of school board attorney. He remained in that position until October, 1974. During that period of time he was a member in good standing of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and made the required contributions into the program. Bryan was credited with 3.83 years of service credit for that period. Since January 1, 1980, Petitioner has been retained by the St. Lucie County School Board as its attorney under a succession of written agreements which are substantially similar in form. He also re-enrolled as a participant in the FRS and began making the necessary contributions to the plan. On October 4, 1982, Respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, advised Petitioner by letter that because he failed to comply with current FRS membership requirements, he was being removed from FRS membership effective January 1, 1980. The letter prompted the instant proceeding. Under the written agreements of employment, Petitioner is generally responsible for the handling of all legal matters of the school board. He devotes approximately thirty to forty hours per month to school board work while the remainder of his time is spent in his private law practice. A part of the school board work is performed at its administrative offices; however, the majority is done at Petitioner's law office. He is paid from a regular salaries and wage account. Either the superintendent or the board controls Petitioner's hours by assignment of the work to be done, including requests for advice, research and opinions. The board determines which cases will be settled, defended or appealed. Bryan is required to accept any case or matter assigned, and does not reject assignments. He is furnished the Education Law Reporter and other materials, including stationery and envelopes, by the school board. Additionally, dues are paid to various professional associations on his behalf. Bryan receives no pay for vacations, holidays or illnesses. He is, however, reimbursed for traveling expenses, and is covered by the school's health and life insurance and workers' compensation.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Ben L. Bryan, Jr., be DENIED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben L. Bryan, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 3230 Fort Pierce, Florida 33454 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Cedars Executive Center 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207C, Box 81 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Nevin G. Smith, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (4) 1.04120.57121.021121.051
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ERIN MCGUIRE vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, 04-001674 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Panama City, Florida May 10, 2004 Number: 04-001674 Latest Update: Oct. 04, 2004

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444

Florida Laws (2) 120.569120.57
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