Findings Of Fact Some time prior to July 1, 1973, and apparently during the latter part of April, 1973, an application was filed by Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc. with Respondent for a certificate of need to construct a hospital in the Englewood area of Sarasota County, Florida. The name given the proposed hospital was Lemon Bay Hospital. The state law respecting certificates of need did not become effective until July 1, 1973. (See: Florida Statutes 391.493, et seq.). The application was filed in accordance with the Federal Certificate of Need Law, Public Law 92-603, and at the time that the application was filed, Respondent was administering only the Federal Statute. Rules and Regulations regarding procedures for issuance of certificates of need were not formally promulgated until August 17, 1974. (See: Florida Administrative Code, Chapter 101). On November 5, 1973, the Respondent advised Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc. that the West Central Florida Comprehensive Health Planning Council (now the Southwest Florida Comprehensive Health Planning Council) had recommended that a certificate of need be issued. At that time Respondent did not consider applications for certificate of need to be completed until proof of ability to finance the project, including, if necessary, irrevocable loan commitments, were submitted by the applicant. As of November 5, 1973 the Respondent permitted applicants for certificate of need an additional ninety (90) days in order to secure financing. The Respondent granted such an ex- tension to Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc., and indicated in correspondence that no other applications for review of proposed facilities in the area of the proposed Lemon Bay Hospital would be submitted by the Respondent to the local planning council before the expiration of the ninety day period. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 1). An additional extension of time was granted to Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc., and the applicant was permitted to have until July 1, 1974, to secure adequate funding. No new applications for similar construction in the area of the Lemon Bay Hospital would have been considered by the Respondent during that period. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 6). Information sufficient to satisfy the Respondent as to the financial ability of the applicant was received on June 17, 1974. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 8). Then, and not before, the Respondent considered the Lemon Bay Hospital application complete. A certificate of need was issued on July 9, 1974. The certificate was for a six-month period, and by its terms terminated on January 9, 1975. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 7). In January, 1975, the certificate was extended for an additional six-month period. Respondent had no discretion to deny this six-month extension. With the extension, the certificate of need for the proposed Lemon Day Hospital would have terminated on July 8, 1975. On approximately May 23, 1975, the Petitioner, Health Facilities Research, Inc., filed an application for certificate of need with the Respondent. Petitioner plans to construct a hospital facility in the City of North Port, Florida, and is seeking a certificate of need in connection with that project. The hospital proposed by the Petitioners would be located approximately twenty miles by automobile from the Lemon Bay facility. A major criteria which is applied in determining whether a certificate of need should be granted is the availability of other facilities in the general area of a proposed facility. [See: Florida Statutes sec. 391.494(5)(c)] . Whether the certificate of need requested by Petitioner will be granted is likely to be effected by the existence vel non of the Lemon Pay Hospital. If the Lemon Bay Hospital is constructed, the likelihood for the certificate of need for the Petitioners' hospital being granted would be decreased. If the Lemon Bay Hospital is not constructed, the likelihood for the certificate of need for the Petitioners' hospital being granted would be increased. Although either hospital could be constructed with or without a certificate of need, it is much less likely that either would be constructed without a certificate of need. The Petitioner, City of North Port, is a municipality which would be served by both the Lemon Bay Hospital and by the facility proposed by the Petitioners. On June 20, 1975, Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc. requested an additional six- month extension of the certificate of need. (See: Agency Exhibit 1). Upon receipt of the request, Respondent communicated with the area wide planning council, the Southwest Florida Comprehensive Health Planning Council, Inc. soliciting its comments and recommendations. (See: Petitioner's Exhibit 10). Respondent outlined the following criteria to be considered: whether a site had been secured; whether firm financing had been secured; whether construction plans and specifications had been prepared; whether it could reasonably be expected that a general construction contract will be signed within the requested additional six months; and any other documentation by the applicant indicating sincere efforts toward placing the project under construction. A committee of the area wide planning council, the Sarasota County Comprehensive Health Planning Council Facilities Committee wet on June 30, 1975 and recommended that the extension be approved. Another committee, the Sarasota Comprehensive Planning Executive Committee, met on July 10, 1975, and recommended that the extension be approved. A special executive committee of the area wide planning council met on July 17, 1975, and recommended that the extension request be denied. The area wide council indicated that firm financing had not been secured, that construction plans and specifications had not been adequately presented, and that it was not likely that a construction contract would be signed within the additional six months. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 11). Respondent was not satisfied with the amount of information provided by the area wide council, and was aware that there were strong differences of opinion among members of the council. The Respondent requested that additional information be provided by the applicant, and this information was received under cover of a letter dated July 25, 1975. (See: Petitioners' Exhibit 13). Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc. had been frustrated in securing a site for its proposed hospital on account of the bankruptcy of the seller. Nonetheless, the site had been secured. Firm financial arrangements had not yet been completed for the project; however, arrangements for selling tax free bonds had been made, and Sarasota County had resolved to serve as an Internal Revenue Service bond sponsor in order to permit the sale of bonds. Considerable monies had been spent in securing architectural plans, and although no final plans were submitted, it is apparent that negotiations were well under way. No general construction contract had been issued; however, in view of the monies that had already been expended by the applicant, and the applicant's assurance, it was reasonable to conclude that the construction contract would be signed within the additional six months requested. Lemon Bay Hospital, Inc. had expended time, effort, and money in attempting to construct the Lemon Bay Hospital. There is reason to believe that the applicant could have moved more rapidly in securing financing and signing a construction project; however, it is apparent that attention had been given these things. On August 5, 1975, the Respondent granted the requested extension. With this action the certificate of need would expire on January 8, 1976. The petition herein was filed with the Respondent on or about September 16, 1975, more than one month after the extension of the certificate of need was retroactively granted by the Respondent.
The Issue Whether respondent's license as a nursing home administrator should be disciplined on charges of fraud or deceit, negligence, incompetence, or misconduct in the practice of nursing home administration and willful or repeated violation of the laws and rules regulating the operation of nursing homes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Leonard Cordes, is a licensed nursing home administrator in the State of Florida, having been issued license no. 0001041. (Stipulation) He has been continuously licensed since November, 1974. For a brief period prior to 1974, he also held a six-month provisional license. He is an experienced nursing home administrator and a Fellow of the American College of Nursing Home Administrators. He was elected and served as president of this national organization for two years, beginning in 1980. The Florida Chapter has 170 members, all of whom are licensed nursing home administrators. He is also a chartered public accountant, having completed several years of training in Canada. The charges at issue relate to respondent's performance as an agent for the owners or the administrator of Golden Isles Nursing Home (a/k/a Hallandale Rehabilitation Center), Hallandale, Florida, and as the court-appointed receiver of Pasco Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, Dade City, Florida. I. Pasco Nursing and Rehabilitation Center On July 17, 1980, respondent became the court-appointed receiver of Pasco Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, (Pasco) , a licensed nursing home facility located at 447 North Fifth Street, Dade City, Florida. He remained in that capacity until July 31, 1981. (Stipulation; R-6) Pasco had severe financial difficulties. The previous operator, Murray Stitsky, had abandoned the facility. Payroll checks were not being honored. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("DHRS") was considering closing the facility and transferring the patients elsewhere. James Beymer, the owner of the real property, contacted respondent and asked if he would serve as receiver until such time as the nursing home was rehabilitated. Respondent agreed to do so. He immediately deposited $15,000 of his own corporation's money into an operating account in order to cover Pasco's outstanding checks. When respondent was appointed receiver of the Pasco nursing home, Gerald Struckhoff was the administrator of record and remained so throughout the receivership. At no time did respondent take over the duties of, or hold himself out to be, the administrator of the nursing home. When respondent was appointed receiver, he had no knowledge of Mr. Struckhoff or his qualifications. (A short time before respondent became receiver, Mr. Struckhoff had been hired as administrator solely on the basis of a telephone call from Mr. Stitsky.) At all times during the Pasco receivership, Mr. Struckhoff was charged with and carried out the day-to-day operations of the nursing home, subject to respondent's review and oversight. Mr. Struckhoff had sole responsibility for, and signatory power over, the patient trust fund checking account. Upon respondent's appointment as receiver, the court ordered him to take responsibility for the overall financial operation of the facility and ordered employees of the nursing home to surrender to him the books and records necessary to carry out his responsibilities. In addition, the court ordered the opening of a savings account into which all nonessential operating funds could be placed during the pendency of the receivership. Respondent promptly carried out these orders. (R-6) He immediately took possession of those books and records necessary for him to carry out his receivership responsibilities, and instituted procedures that would allow him to control the fiscal affairs of the nursing home and review the actions of Mr. Struckhoff and other employees. Respondent approved the opening of four bank accounts. The first was a payroll account into which he deposited money to cover each payroll period; Mr. Struckhoff had signatory power over that account. There was also a patient trust fund account over which Mr. Struckhoff had sole signatory power. In addition, there was a general operating account, over which respondent had sole signatory power, and a savings account. Money was routinely transferred between the general operating account and the savings account. Respondent kept only the amount necessary for the day-to-day operation of the nursing home in the checking account; if the account ran low, additional money was transferred from the savings account. At first, transfers were authorized by telephone; later respondent authorized automatic transfers. The Pasco nursing home in Dade City was many miles from respondent's home office in Hollywood, Florida. In order to maintain strict control over the funds coming into the facility, he instituted a procedure whereby all incoming funds were automatically deposited in the general operating account. If all or any portion of the incoming funds was to go to a patient, that patient's trust fund ledger card was immediately credited with the appropriate amount. At the end of each month, Mr. Struckhoff would compile a list of all patient trust fund moneys that had been deposited to the general operating account during the month and asked respondent to transfer (or deposit) the total of such funds to the patient trust fund account. Normally, there was an approximate two week turn around period. Mr. Struckhoff would transmit his request to respondent during the first week of the succeeding month and the requisite amount would be deposited to the patient trust fund account within approximately two weeks of transmittal. There were isolated instances, however, where six or seven weeks elapsed between the nursing home's actual receipt of the incoming funds and ultimate transfer (or deposit) of the funds to the patient trust fund account. (R-7, R-8, P-9, R-10) The moneys credited to the patient trust account ledger cards were carried as a liability of the nursing home. If any patient, at any time, had sought an accounting of his funds in the patient trust fund, the correct amount of funds would have been available to him. There were always sufficient funds in the patient trust account to satisfy the requests of any patient. The depositing of all incoming funds into a nursing home's operating account, and simultaneously earmarking funds due patients for transfer at the end of the month, was a method of accounting commonly used by nursing homes in Florida and was considered acceptable by DHRS. But a lapse of six to seven weeks between receipt of incoming funds and subsequent deposit of the earmarked funds into the patient trust fund account deviated from generally accepted accounting principles, was not consistent with nursing home practice, and did not comply with the procedure for handling patient trust funds which respondent had established upon becoming receiver of Pasco. He now acknowledges that, normally, a six or seven week delay between receipt of incoming funds and deposit to the patient trust fund account would deviate from acceptable standards of accounting practice. (TR-493) At all times there was sufficient money in the operating accounts of the nursing home to cover the sums credited to the patient trust accounts. At no time was patient trust money used to pay operating expenses of Pasco. On July 25, 1980, shortly after respondent became receiver, the nursing home received a $500 check purporting to be an inheritance due a patient. Upon being told this by Mr. Struckhoff, respondent instructed him to forward the necessary documentation so that he (respondent) could determine whether the money should be credited to the patient's trust account or the general operating account. Respondent acted reasonably in deciding to investigate prior to authorizing transfer of the $500 to the patient trust fund. If this money belonged to the patient, and increased his assets beyond $1,500, he (the patient) would have become ineligible for Medicaid. Respondent needed to check this carefully because, if the patient had lost his eligibility, the state would have required repayment from the nursing home of any moneys expended on his behalf when he was ineligible. As court-appointed receiver, respondent also had a duty to collect all moneys due the facility and it was necessary for him to determine whether, in fact, the patient owed this money to the facility. That the patient owed money to the facility was not a remote possibility. The ledger card of the patient showed that just prior to the nursing home's receipt of this money, approximately $156 was transferred from his trust fund account to the general operating account for moneys due the nursing home, leaving a zero balance in his trust fund account. Therefore, it was quite possible additional moneys were owed. Mr. Struckhoff did not send respondent a written request to place the $500 in the trust account until November, 1980, by which time respondent had investigated and determined that the money should be transferred to the patient's trust fund account. The transfer took place in December, 1980. On April 9 and 10, 1981, DHRS conducted a survey of Pasco nursing home. Although DHRS was aware that respondent was receiver for the nursing home, he was not notified that a survey would take place. During the survey, various alleged deficiencies were found by DHRS relating to the financial affairs of the nursing home. Respondent was not timely notified of these alleged deficiencies and given an opportunity to respond. Because he was unaware of the survey, respondent was not present at the exit conference when the deficiencies were discussed. If he had been, he would have been able to answer some of DHRS' questions, and thereby remove at least some of the asserted deficiencies. The adverse survey report was confirmed in July, just a few days before respondent's receivership was to end. There was sufficient time to review and correct any of the deficiencies relating to financial matters prior to termination of its receivership. When respondent was appointed receiver, there were two interest- bearing patient trust accounts in existence at the nursing home. Murray Stitsky, the previous owner, and Mary Love, a previous administrator, were the signatories on those bank accounts. The patients to whom these accounts had belonged were deceased. Pursuant to his receivership duties, respondent took possession of the bank books for these accounts and, at the time of the DHRS survey, was the process of working with the bank to transfer signatory power to himself, or Mr. Struckhoff, so that funds remaining in the accounts could be transferred as required by state law. At the time of the DHRS survey, Mr. Struckhoff was apparently unaware that respondent had removed the bank books and was working toward transferring the accounts. Patient trust fund accounts are required to be covered by a surety bond. But the Department has not proven that the required surety bond was not in place. Even if this was proven, it was Mr. Struckhoff's responsibility, as the nursing home administrator, to obtain the required surety bond. Contrary to the conclusion of the DHRS survey, on March 31, 1981, the patient trust fund bank account did reconcile. Reconciliation requires a consideration of all outstanding deposits or deposits in transit. Mr. Struckhoff, at all times, had adequate information available to show the amount of moneys he had asked respondent to transfer from the general operating account to the patient trust account. By balancing the checkbook with the checks received, and adding this amount, the facility's patient trust account balanced. As receiver for the nursing home, respondent was able to effectively rehabilitate the facility. At the close of his receivership, it was making a profit. II. Golden Isles Convalescent Center Golden Isles Convalescent Center, also known as Hallandale Rehabilitation Center, is located at 2400 East Hallandale Beach Boulevard, Hallandale, Florida. (Stipulation) At all times material to the charges respondent acted as agent or managing director for the owner of Golden Isles Convalescent Center ("Golden Isles"). At times, he also acted as administrator of the facility. The Department accuses him of unlawfully conditioning the admission or maintenance of various Medicaid patients upon the receipt of contributions (or donations) from the patients' families or relatives. Patient Rose Hodes In 1975, Rose Hodes became a private (non-Medicaid) patient of Golden Isles and, except for brief periods of hospitalization, remained there until November, 1978. (Stipulation) In early 1977, Terri Lubin, sister of Rose Hodes, approached respondent, then the administrator of Golden Isles, and told him that Rose Hodes' funds were being depleted and that she was concerned for her sister's continued well-being. She asked respondent if the nursing home would be willing to accept Rose Hodes' remaining $10,000 in exchange for its agreeing to care for Ms. Hodes for the rest of her life. After obtaining the owner's approval, respondent agreed and told Ms. Lubin that when her sister's assets were reduced to $1,500, the maximum assets allowed by Medicaid, he would assist Ms. Lubin in applying to the Medicaid program for Ms. Hodes. At that time, Ms. Hodes was an Intermediate II patient. An Intermediate II patient requires the minimal amount of care which is reimbursable under the Medicaid program. Respondent realized that Ms. Hodes might not become, or remain, Medicaid eligible but that -- under the agreement with Ms. Lubin -- the facility would be required to provide nursing care to her for the remainder of her life without further payment. The agreement between Ms. Lubin and respondent, on behalf of Golden Isles, was reduced to writing, notarized, and signed by both on February 15, 1977. The document, with addenda, provided that $10,000 would be turned over to Golden Isles on that date; that the money would be used for room and board at the rate of $36 per day for the private room then occupied by Ms. Hodes; that Medicaid would be applied for when the funds were reduced to $1,500; that the family would pay for laundry and medication; that the agreement would be binding on any succeeding owners of the facility; that, when Ms. Hodes became a Medicaid patient, her Social Security checks would be turned over to the facility as part of the program payment; that the family would make voluntary contributions of $150 per month when Ms. Hodes became a Medicaid patient; that the deposit was non-refundable; that limited funds could be drawn upon for medical expenses; and that Ms. Hodes would be provided nursing care, in Golden Isles without further charge, for the rest of her life. (P-2) When Ms. Lubin signed this contract document, she appeared to be satisfied with its terms. She never expressed any concern to Golden Isles employees regarding payment of moneys under the contract for the treatment of her sister. The $10,000 advance payment received from Ms. Lubin exceeded the cost of providing care to Ms. Lubin's sister for a six-month period. Patient Joseph Troll In 1975, Joseph Troll, a Medicaid patient, was admitted to Golden Isles and resided there until he died in December, 1976. (R-1, R-10) When he resided at Golden Isles, his son, Wendell Troll, made monthly contributions of $100 per month. On August 5, 1975, Wendell Troll signed a form stating that his contribution was to be used by the nursing home for the benefit of all. (R-1) It has not been established that respondent was the administrator of Golden Isles when Joseph Troll was first admitted and arrangements were made for the monthly contributions. When Wendell Troll agreed to make the monthly contributions, he spoke to an unidentified "tall blond woman"; no one else was privy to the conversation. (TR-29) This female employee told him that Golden Isles would admit his father if he agreed to pay a $100 per month donation. As explained to him, this contribution would make up for the difference between what Medicaid paid the nursing home and what private patients paid for similar care. All monthly contributions paid by Wendell Troll were identified on the facility's financial records as donations to the facility. Wendell Troll, however, believed that the monthly contribution was to be used to provide nursing care to his father. Joseph Troll died before DHRS published and distributed contribution disclosure forms which nursing homes were required to file. Patient Irene Sakman From December, 1977, to November, 1981, Irene Sakman was cared for at Golden Isles as a Medicaid patient. Prior to her admission, she had resided at Washington Manor Nursing Home. Washington Manor had advised her daughter, Magdalene Preston, that her mother would not be admitted unless a monthly donation was made. When Washington Manor stopped accepting Medicaid patients, Magdalene Preston arranged for her mother to be admitted to Golden Isles. An unidentified Golden Isles male employee told her that he understood she had been making a donation at Washington Manor, and asked if she would continue such a donation at Golden Isles. She replied, "Yes, I will as long as I can." (TR-114) The Golden Isles employee did not tell her that her mother would not be admitted unless a donation was made. She later signed a document indicating that her donation was voluntary and for the benefit of all patients at Golden Isles. Her mother was admitted to Golden Isles and Magdalene Preston thereafter made monthly donations of $100 during the time her mother resided there. She does not know respondent and does not recall having ever discussed her mother with him. The Department has not shown that respondent was administrator of Golden Isles in December, 1977, when Irene Sakman was admitted to the nursing home and the conversation concerning a monthly donation took place. Patient Dora Jalomstein Dora Jalomstein was admitted to Golden Isles in May, 1976, and remained there until she died in June, 1977. Her daughters, Ray Thim and Nettie Rubin, handled her financial affairs. Although Ms. Thim testified that her sister, Nettie Rubin, told her that Golden Isles wanted her to give a $75 monthly donation, Ms. Thim had no firsthand knowledge that such a donation was requested or required. Ms. Thim never spoke to anyone at Golden Isles concerning her mother's care or the monthly donation. No one told her that her mother would have to leave the nursing home if the contribution was not made. It has not been shown that respondent was administrator of Golden Isles when Dora Jalomstein was admitted or when any member of her family may have discussed the subject of donations with a Golden Isles employee. The admission documents for Ms. Jalomstein were signed by Fran Orkin and Sybil Webber, on behalf of Golden Isles. (R-11) Dora Jalomstein died before DHRS completed and distributed contribution disclosure forms to nursing homes in Florida. Patient Frank Gibiser In May or June, 1978, Frank Gibiser was admitted as a Medicaid patient to Golden Isles and resided there until he died in December, 1978. Several months after Frank Gibiser's admission, he lost his eligibility for Medicaid assistance. Theresa Deluca, his daughter, was told by an unidentified Golden Isles male employee -- not respondent -- that Mr. Gibiser would be kept at the nursing home as a Medicaid patient if she agreed to make a monthly payment of $250. She agreed, but Mr. Gibiser died before any payments were made. Employees of Golden Isles prepared a contribution form concerning her proposed monthly contributions. This form, which she signed, stated that her contributions were voluntarily made. Ms. Deluca does not know respondent and did not recognize him at hearing. Further, it has not been shown that he was administrator of Golden Isles when the conversation concerning donations took place or when Frank Gibiser was a patient. Admission documents for Mr. Gibiser were not signed by respondent. Patient Regina Aaron Regina Aaron, was admitted to Golden Isles in 1972. She left the facility six months later and returned in 1974. She remained there until she died in 1980. During the time that Ms. Aaron was a patient at Golden Isles, Rose Swatt, her daughter, contributed $100 per month to the nursing home. In 1972, after talking with an unidentified Golden Isles employee, Ms. Swatt formed the impression that a monthly contribution was required in order to assure her mother's admission. Later, Ms. Aaron left the facility and was readmitted in 1974. Ms. Swatt, again, discussed donations with employees of Golden Isles, and was told that a contribution was necessary in order to have her mother admitted because "Medicaid did not pay for all of it." (TR-573) On several occasions, however, Ms. Swatt signed sworn statements, on forms furnished by the nursing home, indicating that her contributions were voluntary and for the benefit of all patients. It is uncertain whether she understood the meaning and effect of the statements. All contributions made by Ms. Swatt were recorded in the books and records of Golden Isles. No attempt was made to conceal them. Immediately preceding or during September, 1977, Ms. Swatt was told by a female employee of Golden Isles, identified as "Fran," that her mother would have to go to another nursing home because of her mother's behavior problems. Ms. Swatt did not want her mother transferred to another nursing home and became upset. She then spoke with respondent, who acknowledged that her mother would have to leave; however, after she agreed to increase her monthly donation to $150, he reversed his position and allowed her mother to stay. The content and circumstances of this conversation support a conclusion that, at that time, respondent was acting as administrator of Golden Isles. It is further concluded that respondent, implicitly if not explicitly, conditioned the maintenance of Ms. Aaron, a Medicaid patient, upon Ms. Swatt's agreement to make a monthly donation of $150. This action deviated from his announced policy that contributions were not to be made a condition to admission or maintenance of a patient. Patient Gussy Ketay In November, 1976, Gussy Ketay was admitted to Golden Isles and resided there until her death in January, 1978. It has not been shown that respondent was administrator of Golden Isles at the time she was admitted as a patient. The contribution notice prepared by Golden Isles employees for signature by Ms. Ketay's family was signed not by respondent, but by Stuart Itkin, as nursing home administrator. Neither has it been shown that anyone agreed to make contributions to Golden Isles on behalf of Ms. Ketay. Patient Lillian Kopp In January, 1978, Lillian Kopp, a Medicaid patient, was admitted to Golden Isles. She was transferred from Washington Manor, a nursing home which had requested contributions from its Medicaid patients. (R-14) Stuart Itkin was administrator of Golden Isles when Ms. Kopp was admitted. It has not been shown that any contributions were made to Golden Isles on behalf of Ms. Kopp. Even assuming that $100 monthly contributions were made, no evidence has been presented to establish that these contributions were not made freely and voluntarily. Neither has it been shown that such contributions were a condition of admitting or maintaining Ms. Kopp as a patient at Golden Isles. At all times material to the charges, respondent served as agent for the owners of Golden Isles. He was responsible for the financial arrangements, bank loans, and accounts payable at Golden Isles. He was the managing director, and visited the nursing home regularly. Since 1974, there have been numerous licensed administrators in charge of Golden Isles: Robert Hoffman, Terry DeCarlo, Stuart Itkin, Marvin Hand, and Paul Bladick. Respondent served as administrator, intermittently, when an administrator had left and Golden Isles was recruiting for a replacement. The patient intake functions were performed by the nursing home administrators and other Golden Isles employees. Contributions or donations were accepted at Golden Isles. Respondent had announced a requirement that all perspective donors be told that contributions were voluntary and were for the benefit of all patients at the nursing home. He helped devise a form which donors were required to sign, acknowledging that their contributions were voluntary and made for the benefit of all patients. There is no evidence that any patient was ever asked or required to leave Golden Isles because of inability, refusal, or failure to make a contribution to the nursing home. Many families and relatives of Medicaid patients at Golden Isles did not make contributions. Although the law requiring that providers receiving contributions file contribution forms with DHRS became effective in 1976, it was not until late 1977 or early 1978 that the contribution forms were required by DHRS. This was because DHRS encountered lengthy delays in devising and distributing the requisite contribution form. During the time that nursing homes were awaiting the DHRS forms, they were told by DHRS that they could utilize their own contribution forms or wait until the final DHRS form was completed, at which time they could have the forms signed retroactively. Golden Isles chose to prepare its own contribution forms. And in early 1978, when DHRS forms were finally distributed, Stuart Itkin, the Golden Isles administrator, attempted to have the DHRS forms signed retroactively. He was, however, unsuccessful in obtaining the signatures of all past donors on the new forms. (P-3) At all times, all moneys collected as contributions from Medicaid families were recorded on the books of Golden Isles. There is no evidence that any attempt was made to conceal these contributions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That all charges against respondent be dismissed for failure of proof. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of September, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September, 1983.
The Issue Whether the Palm Beach Health Department (Respondent) committed an unlawful employment practice by failing to reasonably accommodate the alleged disabilities of DeLores Boatwright (Petitioner). Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice by discriminating against Petitioner based on Petitioner’s age.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to section 20.43, Florida Statutes, and an employer within the meaning of section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes (2012). Petitioner was employed by Respondent between January 3, 2002, and January 31, 2013. On January 31, 2013, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment for cause. Petitioner worked as an HIV counselor, which required her to provide both pre-test and post-test counseling to clients interested in HIV testing. Counseling performed by Petitioner involved her sitting in an office setting with the door closed to discuss with clients risks for contracting HIV and methods to reduce those risks. HIV counseling sessions are typically conducted face to face. There was a dispute in the record as to how much computer input is necessary while conducting a counseling session. The greater weight of the credible evidence established that any notes would typically be taken by hand and that any computer input would typically be made after the counseling session had been completed. Counseling sessions typically lasted approximately 15 to 20 minutes. Due to privacy and HIPPA considerations, counseling sessions were conducted in a private office with the door closed. Petitioner was directly supervised by Robert Scott from 2005 until December 2011. In October 2009, Petitioner was rear-ended in a car accident while working. This accident prompted a workers’ compensation claim. Petitioner advised Mr. Scott that she had hurt her neck, upper back, and right shoulder. Initially, Petitioner had work restrictions of no lifting, no driving for the job, and no bending. As of October 27, 2009, Petitioner’s work restrictions were lifted, and no other work restrictions were placed on Petitioner. On January 28, 2010, Petitioner was referred to Dr. Edward Chung, an orthopedic specialist. Dr. Chung placed no work restrictions on Petitioner. On February 3, 2010, Dr. Chung determined Petitioner had reached maximum medical improvement and gave her an impairment rating of zero percent. During the remainder of her employment, Petitioner had no on-going impairment rating or work restrictions as a result of her automobile accident. Petitioner worked at the West Palm Beach Health Center, which is Respondent’s primary care medical clinic. This clinic, located on 45th Street in West Palm Beach, is generally known as the 45th Street Clinic. The majority of the rooms in the 45th Street Clinic are examination rooms with an examination table, a small sink, and a small desk for use by the nurse or doctor. The 45th Street Clinic has a limited number of consultation rooms, which are typically small interior offices with a desk that separates the counselor and client with counter space behind or to the side of the counselor for computer work. For a year and a half between 2004 and 2005, Petitioner conducted her counseling sessions in Room 104 of the 45th Street Clinic. Room 104 is a relatively small office with no windows. At the end of 2005, Petitioner’s office assignment changed to Room 102, which is also an interior office with no windows. This move was at Petitioner’s request when the room became available due to the retirement of a colleague. Room 102 is slightly larger than Room 104. Petitioner remained in Room 102 until the beginning of 2010. While she was assigned Room 102 and Room 104, Petitioner kept her door closed, even when she was not seeing clients. This practice was problematic because other staff members were unable to determine when Petitioner was available to counsel patients. Mr. Scott discussed with Petitioner on numerous occasions the need for her to keep her office door open when she was not with a client. Petitioner informed Mr. Scott that she kept the door closed because of a sinus problem that felt better when the door was closed. Petitioner never provided medical documentation of her alleged sinus problem, and there was no credible explanation why keeping her office door closed would improve a sinus condition. In early 2010, Petitioner’s room assignment was changed from Room 102 to Room 107. This reassignment was necessary because Respondent needed to make Room 102 available for another, legitimate business use. Room 107 was an exterior office with a window. Its furniture was in an “L” shape attached to a wall. The office contained a desk and a counter for a computer. During counseling sessions, the counselor and client would sit face-to-face on opposite sides of the desk. The computer was to the counselor’s side, which required the counselor to turn or swivel her chair away from the client to access the computer. In December 2010, Petitioner complained to Mr. Scott that the furniture arrangement in her office was causing her neck and back pain. Petitioner attributed that pain to turning to access her computer or turning to talk to a client while on the computer. In response to Petitioner’s complaint of pain, Mr. Scott requested that Michial Swank, Respondent’s risk manager, perform an ergonomic evaluation of the furniture in Room 107. Such an evaluation is a service that requires no medical documentation and is offered by Risk Management to any employee. Mr. Swank determined that if the furniture could be reconfigured, it should be so that Petitioner did not have to twist to look from a client to the computer or vice versa. Mr. Swank provided his assessment to Respondent’s General Services Department to determine whether the furniture could be reconfigured. Respondent’s General Services Department determined the furniture could not be reconfigured because it was modular furniture custom-made for the office and bolted together. Around March 2011, Dr. Cook, the director of the 45th Street Clinic, proposed that Petitioner change rooms with another HIV counselor located in Room 104. Mr. Swank performed an ergonomic assessment on Room 104 and determined the furniture and computer location to be ergonomically correct for counseling a patient while on the computer. Respondent offered Petitioner the option of moving from Room 107 into Room 104, but she refused that offer and opted to remain in Room 107. Petitioner cited her sinus problems as the reason she did not want to move back to Room 104. Despite her decision to remain in Room 107, Petitioner attempted to persuade Helen Bonner, a nurse, to switch offices with her. This attempt was without the knowledge or permission of Mr. Scott or any other administrator. Ms. Bonner’s room was set up for clinical use for patients with seizure disorders. When Yankick Gribikoff, the nursing supervisor, heard of Petitioner’s effort to have Ms. Bonner swap offices, Ms. Gribicoff immediately squelched the idea. Ms. Bonner’s office had specialized equipment, including specialized telephone equipment and refrigerators. Ms. Gribicoff had valid reasons to end Petitioner’s efforts to swap rooms with Ms. Bonner. In the fall of 2011, two of Respondent’s clinics were closed due to budgetary constraints. Certain personnel were moved from those closed clinics into the 45th Street Clinic. At that time, Rooms 104 and 107 were the only two rooms in the 45th Street Clinic available for HIV counseling. It became necessary to use Room 107 for both HIV and STD (sexually transmitted disease) counseling. Because of its location and proximity to other services, Respondent had a valid reason to select Room 107 over Room 104 as the room for HIV and STD counseling. While Petitioner had had some training in STD counseling, she had difficulty with that type of counseling. An expert in STD counseling was among the personnel being moved from one of the closed clinics to the 45th Street Clinic. Respondent had a valid reason to select the expert to occupy Room 107. Respondent reassigned Petitioner to Room 104. Petitioner agreed to the reassignment and moved into Room 104 on October 3, 2011. Petitioner kept the door to her office closed even when she was not counseling clients. In early November 2011, Mr. Scott received a complaint about the physical condition of Room 104 from someone who used that office while Petitioner was away. The complaint centered on the room’s lack of cleanliness. On November 18, 2011, Mr. Scott met with Petitioner to discuss certain concerns he had. It was during that meeting that Petitioner told Mr. Scott, for the first time, that she was claustrophobic in Room 104. Petitioner referred to Room 104 as being a “closet” and stated that she could not stay in that room. Petitioner brought to Mr. Scott a doctor’s note dated November 23, 2011, that reflected that Petitioner was experiencing claustrophobic symptoms and could not stay in a small, closed space for 15 to 20 minutes. Upon receiving the doctor’s note, Mr. Scott notified Human Resources of the doctor’s note. Arrangements were made to provide Petitioner a larger room in another clinic. Due to the merger of the two closed clinics with the 45th Street Clinic, no room at the 45th Street Clinic, other than Room 104, was available for Petitioner’s use as an HIV counselor. A larger office was found in the Lantana Clinic. The targeted Lantana office was being used by another HIV counselor. To accommodate Petitioner, Respondent arranged to have the Lantana counselor transferred to the 45th Street Clinic and Petitioner transferred to the Lantana Clinic. Petitioner was advised of this change in location and agreed to move around December 18, 2011. She never advised or stated she could not drive to the Lantana Clinic. Petitioner called in sick on December 18, the day she was scheduled to move to the Lantana Clinic. On December 19, 2011, Petitioner reported for work at the 45th Street Clinic instead of the Lantana Clinic. Petitioner stayed at work at the 45th Street Clinic for a few hours, but left because she was not feeling well. On December 19, 2011, Petitioner suffered a stroke1/ and went on medical leave. In May 2012, Petitioner told Mr. Scott that she was ready to return to work. For legitimate business reasons, the Lantana Clinic office was no longer available. Jacqueline Lester is the equal opportunity manager for the Florida Department of Health. Ms. Lester reviews requests for reasonable accommodations with the authority to approve or reject a request. Ms. Lester first became aware of Petitioner as a result of Petitioner’s accommodation request dated December 15, 2011. Petitioner asked to stay at the 45th Street Clinic in a larger office with a furniture arrangement not requiring her to turn her neck. That request was not processed because Petitioner soon thereafter went on medical leave for an extended period. On June 19, 2012, a second request for accommodation was received from Petitioner. In this request, Petitioner asked for a reasonably-sized office, which Petitioner described as being at least 10’ x 10’, with a window. She also asked that the office be within close distance to her home in Palm Beach Gardens due to her inability to drive or sit for “any great length of time.” Petitioner also requested that she start back to work on a part-time basis. Petitioner’s request included notes from two doctors. This medical documentation did not state that Petitioner could not drive due to a neck and back disability. After reviewing the request and medical documentation, Ms. Lester, whose office is in Tallahassee, talked with Respondent’s personnel in Palm Beach County. Ms. Lester decided to accommodate Petitioner’s request. The accommodation was an office located in Respondent’s clinic in Delray Beach. The office was 10’ x 10’ with a window. Although the Delray Beach Clinic was a substantial commute from Petitioner’s home in Palm Beach Gardens, the accommodation included permission for Petitioner to stop as needed while traveling to work without being penalized for late arrival at work.2/ The accommodation also provided that Petitioner could return to full-time schedule at the Delray Beach Clinic “upon release from her medical providers.” Petitioner refused the offer of the office at the Delray Beach Clinic. On January 31, 2013, Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment for cause based on Petitioner’s refusal to return to work. Petitioner presented no meaningful evidence that Respondent discriminated against her based on age or because of her perceived disabilities. Petitioner filed her Complaint of Discrimination with the FCHR on September 5, 2012. FCHR issued its “Notice of Determination: No Cause” and “Determination: No Cause” on May 21, 2013. Petitioner filed her Petition for Relief on June 12, 2013.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order adopting the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Recommended Order. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order dismiss the Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of August, 2014.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations set out in the Administrative Complaint, Licensee held a valid license issued by the State of Florida to operate the Roseland Park Adult Care Center, at 4137 Badger Road, West Palm Beach, Florida. Rose land Park Adult Care Center is a Type II facility, as defined by the rules of the Department. A Type II adult care center is one that is equipped to provide a greater degree of assistance to and observation of its residents ,than the Type I facility, and the requirements for resident supervision are more stringent. Both types of facility are subject to various periodic inspections by representatives of the Department's licensing staff and other agencies. Whenever an inspection is accomplished, the reason for an inspection is announced to representatives of the facility. When the inspection has been completed, an out-briefing is conducted. Inspections are normally done once a year by the Department either for initial licensing or prior to relicensing. In addition, there is usually one additional off-cycle inspection per year. When complaints are received about a facility by the Department or a report of patient abuse, inspections are also done. The Licensee's facility was first licensed in 1980 for six residents. Since March, 1981, to the date of the hearing, the Department's local office has received six or seven complaints as to patient care at this facility. One came from a former resident, one from the daughter of a resident, one from Dr. Crews, and several anonymous complaints. Of the approximately 20 other facilities of similar size in this general geographic area, Licensee's facility gets a much higher incidence of complaints than the others. According to Ms. Cook, a supervisor for Aging Adult Services for the Department (specialist), some complaints, such as personal care of the residents, are repeats, even after having been previously brought to the attention of Licensee. On or about June 30, 1982, Dr. Crews, a physician, notified the Department of his concerns about one particular resident of Licensee's facility, a Mrs. Opal Russell, a 76-year-old woman who was a resident of Licensee's facility since April 1, 1981, and who had been a patient of his. Mrs. Russell had been brought to his office by Licensee on several occasions, the last of which was that same date, when she was brought in for a checkup, not a full physical. When she came into the office, she was walking under her own power and was responsive to the nurse. Licensee was not present when the vital signs were taken. The nurse noticed bruises on Mrs. Russell, and when she asked what had happened, Mrs. Russell replied that they were mean to her, without indicating who "they" were. During this visit, the Licensee indicated to the doctor that Mrs. Russell had been falling a lot. Dr. Crews indicated his concern that Mrs. Russell appeared to have seriously deteriorated in condition since he had last seen her on May 20, 1981, and he questioned the level of care she was receiving. Mrs. Russell had extensive bruising on her face, chest and upper forearm, and he felt she needed more care than she could get in a facility such as Licensee's. He advised Licensee of this fact and suggested she be moved to a hospital, but she was not. When he questioned Licensee about the bruises, she replied that Mrs. Russell was falling a lot. The facial bruises appeared to be about five days old and the other bruises somewhat more recent. The physician's certificate justifying keeping this patient on the premises was not filed with the Department as required by Rule 10A-5.18(1)(d), F.A.C. Ms. Loehndorf went back for a follow-up visit on July 7, 1982. When she arrived at mid-morning, it was naptime, and almost every resident was in bed resting, but only Mrs. Russell was in what appeared to be a very deep sleep. During the entire half hour Ms. Loehndorf was there, Mrs. Russell did not move. When Ms. Loehndorf again visited the facility on July 9, 1982, shortly after Mrs. Russell was admitted to the hospital, Licensee told her that Mrs. Russell had been in a coma for 36 hours prior to admission to the hospital, and when she asked if there had been any recent trauma or falls, Licensee replied there had not been. Barbara Trigg came to work at Licensee's facility on July 1, 1982. When she first started working there, Mrs. Russell appeared to be fine, considering her age. Her speech was somewhat incoherent, but she could feed herself and watch television, etc., though she had to be helped to go to the bathroom. Ms. Trigg noticed a deterioration in Mrs. Russell over the period of time she worked there. She noticed several bruises on Mrs. Russell's head, but does not know how they got there. She never saw Mrs. Russell fall. When she left work on July 6, Mrs. Russell appeared to be well. When she returned the next time, at 11:00 a.m. on July 9, 1982, she immediately noticed that Mrs. Russell was not the same. She was still in bed and appeared to be drowsy. At the request of Licensee, she helped her take Mrs. Russell to the kitchen, where Licensee unsuccessfully tried to get Mrs. Russell to drink some coffee. Then, Licensee directed Ms. Trigg to help her try to walk Mrs. Russell around outside. This amounted to no more than dragging her, as Mrs. Russell could neither walk nor support herself. Ms. Trigg advised Licensee's husband when he got home that Mrs. Russell should be in the hospital. Mr. Willis replied, as had Licensee on several occasions, that Mrs. Russell "got that way" sometimes. Ms. Trigg, who was often left alone in the facility with the residents, is not trained in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). She would have had a very difficult time in saving the residents in case of a fire or other emergency. When Licensee and her husband returned from dinner and checked on Mrs. Russell, she noticed Mrs. Russell had developed a deep, yellow color which alarmed her, as did Mrs. Russell's vital signs. Licensee immediately called Dr. Daisey Mercy, who had treated some of the residents in Licensee's facility and who advised Licensee to immediately take Mrs. Russell to the hospital. Licensee admits that she did not call the doctor earlier on July 8 or 9 when Mrs. Russell would not eat or when she could not walk, but justifies that inaction on the basis that her condition had changed back and forth before, and this did not appear to be significantly different. She began to believe something out of the ordinary had happened when she and Ms. Trigg were walking Mrs. Russell around outside, but even then she did not call because she did not think there was any reason to do so. Licensee also called Mrs. Russell's son, reaching him after some difficulty, who directed Licensee to take his mother to JFK Hospital. When they got there, Licensee told the admitting nurse that Mrs. Russell had been comatose for 36 hours. She also made this statement to Ms. Loehndorf and Ms. Cook later that day when they came to the facility, though she does not recall saying that and now states she used the term "comatose" without knowing what it meant. I find, however, that she used the term as indicated by the witness and that in fact Mrs. Russell was comatose at the time of admission to the hospital. Licensee's use of the term was accurate. Dr. Albert Auld, a neurological surgeon, saw Mrs. Russell on July 10, 1982, after her admission to the hospital. At that time, she was comatose. A CAT scan revealed that she had a large subacute subdural hematoma on the left side of her brain, which he subsequently removed. The hematoma was classified as subacute because the clot had already begun to form out of the mass of blood that had collected, usually as the result of an injury to the head. The clot had already begun to the on a black, oily a black, oily consistency, which indicated the causing injury had taken place up to 12 days to two weeks previously. In the case of subdural hematomas, by the time they are subacute, the bleeding has already stopped. The blood that has gathered breaks down and absorbs fluids from the body, which makes it bigger. The trauma causing the injury may be rather trivial as opposed to significant, and the older the patient is, the less trauma it may take to cause a subdural hematoma. It usually stops bleeding the day of the injury, but with the absorption of body fluids, it gets bigger. This does not necessarily result in an immediate comatose state. In fact, there may be few symptoms for several days or several months, and as the clot becomes larger and larger, the patient becomes lethargic and sleepy, and gradually ingresses to a comatose condition, and death follows. In the case of Mrs. Russell, there was bruising around the left eye, which is consistent with a subdural hematoma on the left side as she had and which in the opinion of the doctor could have been caused prior to June 28, 1982. Mrs. Russell improved considerably after the operation, though Dr. Auld could not get her to talk. This absence of speech could have been volitional or as the result of the subdural hematoma. She was released from the hospital to a nursing home on August 8, 1982, and died sometime thereafter. At no time, either prior to or subsequent to June 28, 1982, did Licensee obtain and/or forward to the Department a signed statement, from Mrs. Russell's physician, Dr. Crews, or any other physician or person identified by the rule, as required, that Mrs. Russell should remain in Licensee's facility. Licensee categorically denied any knowledge of any falls or blows subsequent to June 8, 1982, the date of the injury that was the subject of the last report to the Department and which, according to Licensee, caused the bruise around the eye. Investigation by the Palm Beach County Health Department of Licensee's facility on several occasions and specifically on June 28, 1982, revealed the continued use of butcher paper on the beds, the storage of vitamins with food stuffs and the fact that the residents' beds were not made by 11:30 a.m., both of which facts had previously been brought to the attention of Licensee, but on the latest visit were found to be still in evidence. There was also evidence of the use of restraints that were lockable and bedside toilets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services' revocation of Mary E. Willis's revocation of Mary E. Willis's license to operate the Roseland Park Adult Care Center dated July 16, 1982, be sustained and a final order of revocation be entered. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Bruce J. Daniels, Esquire Lesser, Daniels & Shalloway, P.A. 909 North Dixie Highway West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Mr. David H. Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice based on his disability by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Fresenius Medical Care, provides dialysis treatment to end-stage renal disease patients. During the time relevant to this proceeding, Respondent operated 11 clinics in the Northwest Florida and South Alabama area. The Florida clinics were located in Pensacola, Navarre, Destin, Fort Walton Beach and Crestview. The South Alabama clinic was located in Andalusia. “Dialysis” is the cleansing of the body of unwanted toxins, waste products, and excess fluid by filtering the blood of patients through the artificial membrane of a dialysis machine. Purified water and dialysate are used during the process. Dialysis treatment is necessary when a patient’s kidneys are inadequate or no longer capable of acting as a filter to remove waste and fluids from a patient’s blood. While the frequency of treatment can vary for each patient, patients typically received dialysis at Fresenius’ clinics three times a week for four hours. The treatment requires piercing the skin and blood vessel so that each patient is intravenously attached to a dialysis machine. Because dialysis involves piercing the skin and blood vessels, as well as the removal and replacing of a person’s blood, patients are at an increased risk of infection. In order to protect patients from infection, proper maintenance, testing, and sanitation of the equipment used during dialysis is of primary importance. As such, dialysis is highly regulated by state and federal agencies responsible for health, safety, privacy, and reimbursement for health care. In order to fulfill its obligations to its patients and regulators, Fresenius maintained a Code of Business Conduct that outlined policies and procedures which every employee was required to follow. These policies and procedures were based on federal regulations enforced by the Centers for Medicare and Medical Services (CMS). The Code required that maintenance, sanitation, and tests for contaminants be regularly performed according to the schedules established for such procedures. The Code of Business Conduct also required all of Respondent’s employees to maintain accurate and complete records. In particular, biomedical equipment technicians were required to maintain logbooks of all the maintenance and tests done on each piece of equipment used in the dialysis process. Documentation was required to ensure that state and federal reporting requirements for maintenance and testing on dialysis machines was done. Documentation of every task performed by a biomedical technician was also required for review by Respondent’s internal and external auditors. Failure to perform these functions could subject Respondent to fines and other government actions, including loss of its Medicare certification and a shutdown of its clinics. Respondent also maintained a “Continuous Quality Improvement” (CQI) program which was designed to review indicators of the quality of treatment Respondent’s patients were receiving. These quality measures were reviewed by a CQI committee. The CQI committee was an interdisciplinary team consisting of the Medical Director, the doctor responsible for overseeing the medical care provided in a clinic; the Area Manager, the person responsible for managing all aspects of a clinic’s operations; the Clinical Manager, the registered nurse responsible for nursing care and technical services at a clinic; and the Biomedical Technician, the person responsible for maintaining, sanitizing, and testing the dialysis equipment at a clinic. Periodic meetings were held by the CQI committee to review all aspects of dialysis at a clinic. The periodic meetings included a review of machine maintenance, machine sanitation, and culture tests done on dialysis machines at a clinic, as well as a review of logbooks maintained by the biomedical technician, if necessary. The periodic meetings also included a review of all adverse events and all patient incidents that occurred at a clinic. Additionally, to ensure quality dialysis services, all of Respondent’s employees received initial and annual compliance training, which addressed relevant changes to Respondent’s policies, as well as state and federal laws. Petitioner, David J. Normandin, was a certified Biomedical Equipment Technician and nationally certified Biomedical Nephrology Technician. Petitioner received extensive training as a Biomedical Technician, including training on national standards for nephrology technicians and national protocols for testing, maintenance, and documentation of these efforts. Additionally, Petitioner received both initial and annual on-the-job training from Fresenius regarding required maintenance, sanitation, and record-keeping responsibilities. Petitioner worked for Respondent on two separate occasions. Initially, he worked at one of Respondent’s clinics in North Carolina, where he was a Chief Technician. Later, Petitioner moved to Florida and was employed by Renal Care Group as a Biomedical Technician. Eventually, Renal Care Group was purchased by Respondent in April 2006. After the purchase, Petitioner remained employed with Respondent as a Biomedical Technician until his termination on February 6, 2008. As a Biomedical Technician, Petitioner was assigned responsibility for three clinics. Petitioner’s responsibilities included providing preventive maintenance, troubleshooting, repairing, cleansing, and disinfecting of the clinic’s dialysis machines and water treatment equipment. His responsibilities also required taking water cultures and testing the water systems to ensure that the equipment and water were free from bacterial growth and pathogens. Without such maintenance, sanitation, and tests, it was dangerous for a patient to be intravenously hooked up to a dialysis machine that had not been properly tested or maintained. Every patient with whom the dialysis equipment might come into contact would be affected. Indeed, the consequences of not performing required routine testing, sanitation, maintenance, and record-keeping tasks were serious. At Fresenius’ clinics, Biomedical Technicians worked independently and were assigned to specific clinics. However, Biomedical Technicians assigned to other clinics sometimes helped other technicians when needed to complete their required duties. Such help only occurred if the foreign technician was available and not busy with meeting responsibilities for their own clinics. Petitioner admitted that the other technicians were usually “slammed” with the work at their own clinics and not generally available to help at Petitioner’s clinics. Indeed, the evidence did not demonstrate that other qualified technicians were generally or routinely available to assist Petitioner in his job duties. Similarly, the evidence did not demonstrate that it was reasonable for Respondent to hire additional technicians to help Petitioner perform his job duties. Petitioner was required to provide a monthly summary or technical report to the CQI committee for each clinic to which he was assigned. As part of the report, Petitioner was required to self-report what maintenance and tests were completed, and what maintenance and tests remained to be completed at each clinic. Petitioner was also required to self- report if he was behind in the performance of his routine job duties so that help might be provided, if it was available. If Petitioner failed to properly report any compliance deficiencies, such deficiencies would not normally be discovered until the Regional Technical Manager, Todd Parker, conducted an internal audit of the clinic or an unannounced CMS survey was performed. When he was initially hired by Respondent, Petitioner was responsible for the clinics in Fort Walton Beach, Crestview and Andalusia. At times, Petitioner assisted in or was responsible for the maintenance of two additional facilities in the area. These additional assignments generally occurred when Respondent was understaffed or training new staff. However, by April or June 2007, Petitioner was only responsible for the three clinics in Fort Walton Beach, Navarre, and Destin. The evidence did not show that Petitioner was responsible for more clinics than any other Biomedical Technician. Joan Hodson was the Clinic Manager for Respondent’s Fort Walton Beach clinic. As of April 2007, Petitioner’s direct supervisor was George Peterson, who in turn reported to Mr. Parker. Joan Dye was the Area Manager. Petitioner testified that he informed his employer in 2003 that he had a bad back. Petitioner admitted that he continued to perform his job duties without significant difficulty. There was no evidence that demonstrated his complaints were more than ordinary complaints about a sore back or that such complaints rose to the level of or were perceived as a handicap by his supervisors. However, sometime in 2007, Petitioner was diagnosed with two herniated discs and began having difficulty keeping up with his job duties. In March 2007, Petitioner was the on-call technician for emergency calls from the clinics in the area. He did not respond to several calls from the area clinics. These clinics complained about the missed calls to Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker during the March CQI meeting in Pensacola. As a consequence, Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker called Petitioner into the office to discuss the missed calls and to address the issue that his work was falling behind. They asked Petitioner if there was a problem. At the time, Petitioner was not under any medical restrictions from a healthcare provider. Petitioner informed Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker that he was on medications for his back which caused him to sleep very deeply and not hear the phone ring when clinics called. He also told them that he was having a hard time keeping up with his work because of the pain from his back. As a result of the meeting, Petitioner was taken off “call” duty and was no longer responsible for responding to other clinics’ calls for assistance. Petitioner was also informed that he would be provided help when it was available so that he could catch up on his assignments. Additionally, Petitioner was asked to provide a doctor’s note concerning his back condition and any limitations he might be under due to his back. This meeting was the first time Petitioner informed his employer that he had a serious back problem. On April 24, 2007, Petitioner provided Respondent with a doctor’s note concerning his back. The doctor’s note stated that for two months Petitioner was not to lift over 30 pounds, and was not to engage in repetitive bending, stooping, or kneeling. Petitioner was released to full duty on June 24, 2007. This is the only doctor’s note Petitioner ever provided to Respondent. Importantly, these restrictions did not impair Petitioner’s ability to document all of the jobs he had performed or to accurately self-report when specific maintenance and tests were not done or were behind. On October 3, 2007, Mr. Parker performed a technical internal audit of the Navarre clinic which was assigned to Petitioner. At the time, Petitioner was responsible for the Navarre clinic. The audit revealed that Petitioner had performed no dialysis and end toxin testing for the clinic during the year. These tests were required to be performed every six months. Moreover, Petitioner failed to disclose to anyone that he had not performed these tests even though he had the opportunity to self-report during CQI meetings or at any other time. Again, Petitioner met with Mr. Parker and Ms. Dye. When asked to explain why the tests had not been performed at the Navarre clinic, Petitioner told Mr. Parker and Ms. Dye that he “did not know” he had to do them, and that he had simply “misunderstood” the requirements. Petitioner’s claim was not credible. His supervisors found Petitioner’s explanation to be suspect, since he had previously completed dialysis and end toxin testing at both Navarre and the other clinics he was responsible for. In a memo he later prepared as to why he had not conducted the tests, Petitioner wrote: “so much to do, so far behind.” Petitioner never mentioned his back as an excuse for why he had not performed the tests in his meeting with Ms. Dye and Mr. Parker. At the hearing, Petitioner admitted that he simply “forgot” to conduct the dialysis tests. Clearly, Petitioner’s failure to perform his duties was not related to his back. Similarly, his failure to self-report with any specificity was not related to his back. Ms. Dye instructed Petitioner to complete the test samplings for the clinic that day. Ms. Dye also instructed Petitioner to maintain samplings per the policies at all of his clinics going forward. Petitioner also was instructed by Ms. Dye that he had to immediately test all of the machines at the Fort Walton Beach and Destin clinics for which he was responsible. Petitioner asked Mr. Parker for assistance in catching up on the dialysis testing at the Navarre clinic. Mr. Parker came to the clinic and performed half of the tests, while Petitioner performed the remainder. In November 2007, Petitioner saw a surgeon for his back and, for the first time, was specifically informed by a physician that he would need back surgery. It was anticipated that the surgery would be performed sometime after the first of the year. Petitioner told his employer about his need for surgery. They encouraged Petitioner to do whatever he needed to do to take care of his health, and take any necessary time off. Petitioner chose to continue to work. A CQI committee meeting for the Fort Walton Beach clinic was scheduled for Thursday, January 24, 2008. Prior to the meeting, Joan Hodson, the Clinical Manager for the clinic, asked Petitioner to meet with her early in the morning to review the clinic’s dialysis culture logbook. Petitioner missed the meeting and arrived after noon, with no explanation. He told Ms. Hodson that all cultures were good. Later, at the CQI committee meeting, Petitioner reported to the Medical Director, Dr. Reid, that all the cultures looked good. In reviewing, the printout report for the cultures, Dr. Reid noticed that one of the samples was high and asked that it be redrawn. Petitioner told Dr. Reid and the committee that he had already performed a redraw. He left the meeting to go get proof of the redrawn results. Petitioner’s claim that he did not tell the committee that he had already redrawn the culture and had the results is not credible. Petitioner left the CQI meeting and never returned. Later, Petitioner admitted he had not redrawn the sample. He was instructed to redraw the sample immediately. The day after the CQI meeting, Ms. Hodson called Petitioner asking for the redraw results. Petitioner still had not performed the redraw claiming that he was “too busy.” He was again instructed to immediately perform the redraw. Ms. Hodson called Petitioner the following day, inquiring about the redraw, but did not receive a return call. That weekend, Mr. Parker also called Petitioner to ensure that the redraw was done or would be performed immediately. During the call Mr. Parker informed Petitioner of the seriousness of his failure to redraw the culture immediately as he had been instructed to do and the inappropriateness of his actions regarding the culture before, during, and after the CQI meeting. Mr. Parker also instructed Petitioner to call Ms. Dye about the redraw results. Petitioner again did not perform the redraw as instructed. Ms. Dye also left Petitioner a voicemail to call her about the redraw. Petitioner never called Ms. Dye back. Petitioner’s repeated and willful failure to comply with his supervisors’ instructions was not related to his back. On January 30, 2008, as a consequence of Petitioner’s failure, Petitioner was relieved of his duties for the Destin clinic. He was also given a written warning in a Corrective Action Form (CAF), based on the incidents from January 24, 25, 26, and 28, 2008. The CAF specified “Expectations for Change,” which identified problems with Petitioner’s performance. Ms. Dye reviewed the CAF with Petitioner and instructed him that these problems had to be addressed immediately. These expectations included: Perform all culture draws according to FMC Technical Manual and review this with the Clinical Manager. Immediately report any cultures that are outside the FMS limits and any redraws to the CM. . . . When Dave is at the clinic, he will be expected to redraw any culture that day, if necessary; At CQI monthly meetings, will ensure that all cultures are reported correctly and proper protocol is followed. A Technical CQI summary monthly report and a Spectra monthly summary culture report must be presented to the CM and MD for review and signature; Implement a basic monthly schedule and submitted to his CM’s by the 1st day of each month, will ensure that if he is not at a specific location according to his schedule, he will contact the CM or the Charge Nurse of that clinic to inform them of his location. If called or paged by any clinic, or a member of management, he must respond within 15 minutes from the time he received the call or page; Will follow a more systemic time schedule and will incorporate his time with his monthly schedule. Will make himself readily available to be present, if one of his clinics develops a problem in the early morning hours, if necessary; and When on-call, the 15-minute rule also applies. If not on-call, no matter which clinic calls, will return the call or page and assist the clinic, inform them who is on-call and/or attempt to resolve the problem over the phone. That same day, January 30, 2008, Petitioner received a Developmental Action Plan from Mr. Peterson. Five goals and an Action Plan were identified that Petitioner had to meet within time frames set during the next 90 days. Goals in the Plan included incorporating all of his monthly cultures into the FMC (Fresenius Medical Care) logbook and developing a basic monthly preventive maintenance culture and disinfect schedule for all facilities. By March 31, 2008, the Technical Manager would evaluate and review the goals accomplished by Petitioner to determine if further action was necessary. Petitioner admitted that although he had been obligated to self-report all of the deficiencies in the Corrective Action Form at the CQI meeting in January 2008, he failed to do so. Petitioner testified that he told Ms. Hodson that he was “very much behind” on performing his job duties. He also admitted that he never provided her with any specifics as to the tasks he had not performed. Additionally, he admitted that, “I don’t even know all of the things that I was behind on” and “I don’t know which [logbooks] I’m missing.” The internal audit at the Fort Walton Beach clinic and Petitioner’s actions regarding the redraw of the culture caused Ms. Dye to be concerned about the integrity of the job Petitioner was performing at all three of his clinics. Based on Petitioner’s lack of honesty with the CQI committee, Ms. Dye was legitimately concerned that Petitioner was covering up his failure to do his work and that the safety of patients was at risk. As a result, Mr. Parker performed an audit of the Fort Walton Beach clinic on February 6, 2008. The audit revealed that no dialysate cultures had been performed since October 2007; two out of 31 machines lacked proper documentation of any preventive maintenance having been performed; no preventive maintenance logs were available for the building maintenance and ancillary equipment; two new machines had no documentation; and no electrical and safety checks had been performed since April 2007. All of these tasks were required to have been completed by Petitioner, and Petitioner’s failure to complete them was a serious violation of his job duties. Indeed, these deficiencies placed the Fort Walton Beach clinic in immediate jeopardy of being fined and shut down by CMS. A shutdown would have left 80 of Respondent’s patients without dialysis treatment and placed them at risk for illness and possibly death. The audit also uncovered that the written summaries Petitioner had submitted to the CQI committee in October, November, and December 2007, and the verbal reports he had given to the committee at those monthly meetings, indicating that the preventive maintenance logs were up to date, were in fact incorrect. Again, Petitioner’s failure to document was a serious violation of Petitioner’s job duties and was not related to his back condition. By this time, Ms. Dye had legitimately lost all faith in Petitioner’s honesty. She suspected that Petitioner had falsified certain records because he could not produce various records when he was asked to produce them and only later did the requested records appear. In short, Petitioner’s supervisors had lost faith in Petitioner and could no longer trust him to self-report or to inform others when his duties were not being performed. On February 6, 2003, Ms. Dye presented Petitioner with a second Corrective Action Form, noting the issues generated by the internal audit and suspending Petitioner from work. The CAF was reviewed and signed by Petitioner. Based on what was discovered from the Fort Walton Beach clinic audit, Ms. Dye ordered an audit of Petitioner’s other clinics, Navarre and Destin. The same issues and deficiencies were discovered at those clinics: 1) the dialysate cultures at the Navarre and Destin clinics had not been performed since October 2007; 2) no safety checks had been performed on four out of 18 machines at the Navarre clinic, and none had been performed at the Destin clinic since July 2007; and 3) preventive maintenance was late on five machines at the Navarre clinic and six at the Destin clinic. The audit confirmed once more that Petitioner had misled the CQI committee members during the January CQI meetings for those clinics by not reporting in his written summary or verbal report any deficiencies. In addition, although Ms. Dye had instructed Petitioner just the week before to immediately perform dialysate cultures at all of his clinics, Petitioner had failed to perform any of those cultures and ignored the instructions of his supervisors. Petitioner was given a final Corrective Action Form by Ms. Dye on February 8, 2008. Ms. Dye reviewed the audit results with Petitioner, as well as the Corrective Action Form, which he signed. Petitioner was terminated the same day. Petitioner was fired after being on the Developmental Action Plan for one week because he had misled the CQI committee in his reports, failed to self-report the extent of the job duties he had not performed to the committee, and had not performed any testing of his dialysate cultures and electrical safety checks or reported that he could not perform those tasks. Such reporting was not related to Petitioner’s back condition. Moreover, misleading the CQI committee was not related to any back condition Petitioner had. Both were egregious and terminable offenses by Petitioner. After Petitioner was terminated in February 2008, he applied for unemployment compensation and for multiple jobs. He never informed any prospective employer that he was disabled or needed an accommodation. Once he ultimately had surgery in March 2008, Petitioner told Respondent that he was better and could work, and he asked for his job back. Eventually, Petitioner went to massage therapy school, obtained his license, and worked sporadically as a massage therapist. Prior to the hearing, Petitioner completed work as a team leader with the Census Bureau. These facts demonstrate that Petitioner’s back condition was not a handicap. There was no evidence that Petitioner was terminated for a handicap or a perceived handicap, and the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard N. Margulies, Esquire Jackson Lewis 245 Riverside Avenue, Suite 450 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 R. John Westberry, Esquire 7201 North 9th Avenue, Suite A-4 Pensacola, Florida 32504 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Larry Kranert, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue presented is whether Petitioner's application for a certificate of need to establish a hospice with a six (6) bed component to be located in Dade County, Florida, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Since 1975, Petitioner, Comprehensive Home Health Care, Inc., has been serving the elderly population of Dade County, primarily working with the Hispanic community to provide skilled nursing services and the services of physical therapy, speech pathology, occupational therapy, home health aide and medical social services. Petitioner currently provides its services as a home health care agency licensed by the Department. Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department), is a state agency which is responsible for administering Section 381.701 through 381.715, Florida Statutes, the "Health Facility and Services Development Act", under which applications for certificates of need (CON) are filed, reviewed and either granted or denied by the Department. Petitioner currently does not participate in an approved hospice program. Two hospice programs are licensed by the Department to serve Dade County: Catholic Hospice, Inc., and Hospice, Inc. Neither entity chose to intervene in the instant proceeding. The Application On or about March 27, 1989, Petitioner filed an application with the Department for a CON to implement a six (6) bed hospice service in Dade County, Florida, with no capital expenditure. The application was designated as CON Number 5871. No public hearing was requested. After the submittal of an omissions response, the Department deemed the application complete on May 16, 1989. The application was reviewed as the sole applicant in its batching cycle After review of the application, the Department issued its intent to deny the application in its state agency action report (SAAR) on June 29, 1989. In the application, Petitioner proposes to establish a not-for-profit, full service hospice which includes a six (6) bed inpatient component with beds to be located in the Northwest, Central West and Southwest Dade County, Florida, in three of the following hospitals: AMI Kendall Regional Medical Center Coral Gables Hospital North Gables Hospital Palmetto Hospital Pan American Hospital Westchester Hospital In addition to relying on its application as meeting pertinent statutory and rule criteria- Petitioner asserts that the application demonstrates mitigating and extenuating circumstances which would allow the approval of the application even if the numeric need prescribed by rule were not demonstrated by the application. Further, the application states that Hospice, Inc., as the only provider in Dade County, has a monopoly on the market in Dade County. Petitioner also intends to concentrate on providing service to the Hispanic population and those individuals suffering from AIDS. The application was not presented in the format which the Department usually receives applications for certificate of need. The usual format was not made part of the record in this proceeding. However, the application, as supported at hearing, shows Petitioner's desire to provide hospice services to the residents of Western Dade County. The witnesses testifying on behalf of Petitioner were Teresa Corba Rodriguez, Roger Lane and Rose Marie Marty. Ms. Rodriguez is an experienced registered nurse who worked for Hospice, Inc., from November, 1987, through June, 1989. She is currently employed at Victoria Hospital. Mr. Lane is the director of information and referral at Health Crisis Network in Miami, and Ms. Marty is the Vice President of Petitioner. The Department's primary bases for issuance of its intent to deny the application were the lack of need for additional inpatient hospice beds, and the failure to document sufficiently certain statutory and rule criteria, as discussed in the following paragraphs. The Department offered the testimony of Elizabeth Dudek, who is an employee of the Department, and is an expert in health planning. Compliance with Statutory Criteria In its proposed recommended order, the Department acknowledged that only six statutory criteria in Section 381.705(1), Florida Statutes (1987) are at issue, in addition to Rule 10-5.011(1)(j), Florida Administrative Code. State Health Plan Although the State Health Plan was not offered into evidence, the Department through testimony and the SAAR indicates that the Application conforms to the State Health Plan. Local Health Plan The applicable Local Health Plan is represented by the plan entitled, "1988 District XI Certificate of Need Allocation Factors", adopted on March 3, 1988. This plan, as it relates to hospice services, is composed of a Subsystem Description, a statement of Issues and of Recommendations. The SAAR chose to base its determination of Petitioner's compliance with the local health plan on an evaluation of whether the application fulfilled the several preferences within the recommendations portion of this plan. In so doing, the Department determined in its SAAR that the Petitioner was in partial compliance. The first preference reads as follows "Preference should be given to applicants having a workable plan for training and maintaining a corps of volunteers." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by utilizing volunteers who are bilingual and who will assist in performing the clerical, visitation, counseling, public relations and community awareness aspects of the program. Petitioner also intends to rely on the volunteer efforts of the servicing hospital, churches, schools, community functions, educational efforts and media to enhance community awareness about the program. The second preference reads as follows, "Preference should be given to those applicants who propose to provide care for the indigent and medically needy." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by proposing to provide ten (10) percent of its total patient day for Medicaid recipients, and five (5) percent of its total patient days to the medically indigent, at least, during the first year of operation. The third preference reads as follows, "Preference should be given to those applicants who propose a commitment to serving persons with AIDS." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by stating both in the application and through the testimony of its witnesses that it intends to serve the ever-increasing number of patients diagnosed with AIDS. Further, it is one of Petitioner's long range objectives to seek funding sources and grants to provide additional services to AIDS patients. The fourth preference reads as follows: "Preference should be given to those applicants who can demonstrate or have entered contractual agreements with other community agencies to ensure a continuum of care far those in need." Petitioner's application is consistent with this preference by its claim that the hospitals set forth in paragraph 6 intend to participate in the program, and should supplement the home health care system which Petitioner currently maintains. However, no competent proof was offered in support of the proposed arrangements. The fifth preference reads as follows: "Preference should be given to those applicants who have developed specialized innovative services to special sub-population in need within the District." Petitioner demonstrated its partial consistency with this preference by showing its intent to service patients with AIDS, the elderly and the Hispanic sub-populations of Dade County. However, Petitioner failed to show that the service it would provide was different from the service provided by the existing hospices in Dade County, other than the intended geographical location of Petitioner's proposal. Siting in Western Dade County on its own was not shown to be a specialized, innovative offering. The sixth preference reads as follows: "Preference should be given to those applicants who will address specific needs of the culturally diverse minority populations in the District." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by showing that it intends to serve the elderly, ethnic minorities, victims of AIDS, and the indigent populations of Dade County. Each of the groups Petitioner has singled out are indeed minority population groups within Dade County, and are elements of, and contribute to the cultural diversity of the area. The seventh preference reads as follows: "Preference should be given to those applicants who propose to have health care personnel on call during night and weekend hours." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by showing its intent to provide for home care up to24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to control its patients' symptoms and respond to emergencies as needed. The eighth preference reads as follows: "Preference should be given to applicants who build quality assurance methods into the proposed program." Petitioner demonstrated its consistency with this preference by expressing its plan to install a quality assurance program which will include clinical records review by a registered nurse, ongoing clinical record review, and utilization review. On balance, the Petitioner's application is consistent with the Local Health Plan. Availability, Accessibility and Extent of Utilization Currently there are two hospices that serve the District. The two are located in the Eastern portions of the County. Petitioner intends to locate its beds in the Northwest and Southwest portions of Dade County, whereas the existing beds are housed in the Northeast and Southeast parts of the County. Thus, Petitioner's proposed beds are more geographically accessible to the residents of Western Dade County, which the application asserts is the fastest growing area of the County. By providing beds in the Western portion of the District, and in locations different from the existing beds, Petitioner would make the hospice services in the District more geographically accessible. Hospice, Inc., is currently licensed for twenty- five (25) beds, of which only between fourteen (14) to sixteen (16) are operable. The record is silent as to the availability of the thirty (30) beds approved for Catholic Hospice, Inc. The record does not indicate why the approved beds are not in service, or how the beds requested by Petitioner would improve the availability of hospice service in the District. Quality of Care, Efficiency, Appropriateness and Adequacy The Application suggested that patients suffering from acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) are underserved, and that Petitioner will fulfill that need. Testimony offered by Petitioner sought to establish that some patients suffering from AIDS, and those of Hispanic origin, had been refused service by the existing hospices, and made vague reference to some credit problems which Hospice, Inc., had experienced If proven, the statements might impact on the quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness and adequacy; however, without a more direct showing this testimony is not considered, substantial, or credible. As to other references concerning the quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness and adequacy, the record is again silent. Availability and Best Use of Resources Petitioner currently operates as a home health care agency. The hospice program would be an extension of the existing service offered by Petitioner and targeted to serve the Hispanic, elderly and terminally ill patients within the District, utilizing existing and voluntary personnel. Without demonstrating more about the current operations, and proof of the market demand for the proposed services, a determination of the best use of resources cannot be made. Financial Feasibility The application projects a financially sound forecast in the short-term through 1991 starting with $75,000 available. The Department through testimony and in the SAAR recognized the short- term financial feasibility of the project. However, the record is silent on financial projections past 1991. Accordingly, a determination of the long-term financial feasibility of the proposal has not been shown. Effects on Competition Petitioner asserted that eligible patients were not being served by the existing facilities, as discussed in above paragraph 24. To the extent these underserved patients exist and were to be provided for by the proposed program, the offering might have an impact on the costs of providing health services in the District. However, as discussed in paragraph 24, the evidence presented did not support Petitioner's claim. Compliance with Rule Criteria Rule 10-5.011(1)(j), Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the Department's methodology for calculating the numeric need for hospice services within a particular service area. Dade County is the pertinent service area for the evaluation of the application. The methodology provides a formula by which the total number of hospice patients for the planning horizon, in this case January, 1991, are to be estimated. The formula takes the cancer mortality rate in the district, and factors in a certain percentage to allow for any other types of deaths, and then factors in considerations of both long-term, and short-term hospital stays to yield the projected number of beds which will be needed in the horizon year. For the batching cycle in which Petitioner's application was reviewed, the projected bed need is fifty-nine (59). From that figure, the number of approved beds is subtracted. At the time Petitioner submitted its letter of intent, the inventory of licensed beds in the District indicated that Catholic Hospice, Inc. was approved for thirty (30) beds, and Hospice, Inc., for twenty-five (25) beds. In other words, the inventory of licensed approved beds applicable to this application is fifty-five (55) beds. Thus, the numeric need for the pertinent batching cycle is four (4) beds. As referenced in paragraph 5, Petitioner requested approval for six (6) hospice beds. The application contains no request for approval of less than six (6) beds, nor did Petitioner raise the issue of a partial award. The Department does not normally approve an application when numeric need is not met unless, in the instance of a request for hospice services, mitigating and extenuating circumstances are proven by demonstrating the following: (1) documentation that the population of the service area is being denied access to existing hospices because the existing hospices are unable to provide service to all persons in need of hospice care and service, and, (2) documentation that the proposed hospice would foster cost containment, discourage regional monopolies and promote competition for all providers in the health service area. Hospice Inc., frequently maintains a waiting list for its hospice beds; however, the reason or reasons for the list was not demonstrated. The census of the hospice beds at Catholic Hospice, Inc., was not discussed at the hearing, or in the application. All of Petitioner's witnessed testified that they believed that the existing hospices were unavailable to potential patients in need of hospice service who lived in the Western portion of the District because the existing hospices were located in the Eastern portion of the District. The travel time from the Southern portion of the District to the Northernmost existing facility can require up to two and one-half hours. The witnesses asserted that the patients and their families do not wish to travel for that period of time to receive the services or to visit patients in the existing hospices. However, no patient or family member testified that the travel time or location of the existing hospice were a hindrance to care. The testimony presented concerning the patients and their families is not competent or corroborated by competent evidence. Further, Petitioner's witnesses asserted that doctors who had treated patients eligible for hospice service had told the witnesses that the physicians hesitated to refer the patients to the existing hospices because the doctors might not have staff privileges at the hospitals which house the existing beds. Again, no physicians were available to corroborate the statements of the witnesses or offer competent testimony in support of these assertions. Although Hospice, Inc., is Licensed for twenty- five (25) beds, it has chosen to operate only between fourteen (14) to sixteen (16) of those beds. The reasons Hospice, Inc., has chosen not to operate all of its licensed beds were not offered in the record. The District has the largest number of AIDS diagnosed cases of any county in Florida. The number of cases in the District is doubling, more or less on a yearly basis. The incidence of AIDS cases adds to the number of person in need of hospice care in the District. Rule 10-5.011(1)(j) does not single out AIDS-related deaths in its calculation; however, deaths from other than cancer are factored into the formula. Again, no competent testimony was presented that the existing hospices were unable to serve patients suffering from AIDS. The methodology set out in Rule 10-5.011(1)(j) determines the initial need for hospice within the District. Once a hospice has been approved, it can increase the number of beds that it has without certificate of need approval as long as the hospice keeps a patient mix of twenty (20) percent inpatient to eighty (80) percent outpatient. The factors asserted in findings 33-37 would go to show mitigating and extenuating circumstances, if proven by competent substantial proof. However, from the evidence presented, it cannot be determined that the existing hospices are unable to provide service to those in need of hospice care. The evidence presented to document that the proposal would foster cost containment, discourage regional monopolies, and promote competition is discussed in paragraphs 25-28 above, and is lacking in substance to show the premise raised here.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services issue a Final Order which denies CON Application Number 5871. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida,, this 13th day of February, 1990. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of February, 1990.
The Issue Whether any or all of the following Certificate of Need ("CON") applications for projects in southeastern Duval County, health services planning Subdistrict 4-3, should be approved by the Agency for Health Care Administration: St. Luke's Hospital Association d/b/a St. Luke's Hospital's CON Application No. 9483 to construct at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus on San Pablo Road a new 214-bed replacement hospital to take the place of St. Luke's Hospital; St. Vincent's Medical Center, Inc.'s CON Application No. 9484P for the establishment of a new 135-bed acute care hospital to be located at the site of the existing St. Luke's Hospital; and Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc.'s CON Application No. 9482 to establish a new 92-bed satellite acute care hospital at the intersection of Old St. Augustine Road and Interstate 95 just north of St. Johns County by transferring 92 beds from Baptist Medical Center in downtown Jacksonville?
Findings Of Fact The Mayo Foundation and its Facilities The Foundation The Mayo Foundation ("Mayo" or the "Mayo Clinic") is considered to be one of the world's preeminent providers of health care services. Although its clinical practice is entirely in this country, Mayo's service area is international; from around the globe it draws patients impressed by the high regard in which its health care services are held. Here at home, Mayo's reputation is not lost on the American populace. Among the nation's many outstanding providers of health care services to the medically complex patient, certainly one of the most recognized, if not the most recognized, is the prestigious "Mayo Clinic." Founded in Rochester, Minnesota toward the end of the 19th Century, with hospital affiliations added eventually in a number of Midwestern states, the Mayo Clinic is the first multi- specialty medical group practice in the United States. Its mission is to provide the highest quality health care by medical professionals practicing all of the known specialties and sub- specialties of medicine in a clinical, unified, multi-campus setting that incorporates medical education and research. Reflective of its status as a physician-led organization, and as important and as essential as they are to the Mayo mission, medical education and research are secondary to Mayo's clinical practice. In the mid to late 1980's, the Mayo Clinic expanded its multi-campus setting to the nation's sunbelt. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville was founded by Mayo in Florida in 1986; the following year, Mayo Clinic Scottsdale was founded in Arizona. Today, Mayo successfully delivers health care services of the highest quality at its two facilities in Florida and Arizona as well as at its principal location in Rochester. Much of its success is due to its approach to health care. An Integrated Approach As a natural outgrowth of its multi-specialty group practice and consistent with its mission, Mayo's model of health care is an integrated team approach. Under the approach, specialists and sub-specialists from a variety of medical disciplines interact for the benefit of the patient. When a patient enters the Mayo system as an outpatient, for example, the patient is assigned a primary physician who serves as "a captain of the ship," so to speak. "[T]hat captain of the ship is responsible for the initial outpatient assessment, establishing what consultations are needed through the course of the patient's visit." (Tr. 80). The primary complaint physician, after initial evaluation "will order consultations with whatever specialists and sub-specialists are perceived as needed in the care of that patient's case." (Tr. 80). In the case of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, the team will attempt to get the patient through the system in a maximum of five days. Whether outpatient or inpatient, the patient is accompanied by a single medical record through all phases of care by all physicians who participate in the patient's care: primary, treating or consulting. Utilizing consolidated protocols and practice standards, the "integrated" and "team" aspects of the approach enhance Mayo's capability for delivering to the patient comprehensive, coordinated medical care. The Mayo model of care founded on the integrated approach affords greater continuity of care than traditional models. It is especially effective with the patient who has complex medical conditions requiring the services of more than one physician specialist. The reverse of a university setting where "physician focus . . . is primarily on research; second, education; and then, lastly, patient care[,]" (tr. 78), patient care is the primary mission of the Mayo Clinic. Like the providers of care in a university setting, however, Mayo is organized to conduct clinical care, medical education and medical research at the same time. Education and research, therefore, although both secondary to patient care under the Mayo model, remain essential elements of the Mayo mission. There is another aspect of the Mayo model of care that enhances the quality of the health care it provides. Mayo refers to it as an "alignment of interests." Alignment of Interests Mayo has achieved an alignment of its interests, as expressed in its mission statement, with those of its physicians and the facilities at which they practice. There are approximately 2,000 Mayo employed physicians; 1,400 or so are at Mayo Clinic Rochester. The remaining 600 or so are split fairly evenly between Mayo Clinic Jacksonville and Mayo Clinic Scottsdale. They practice all medical specialties and sub-specialties on a fixed salary with direct employment by Mayo. Just as in the case of their employer, Mayo physicians seek principally to provide patient care services consistent with the Mayo mission. Like their employer, too, Mayo physicians aspire to the provision of patient services in an environment that includes teaching and research. Virtually all two thousand Mayo physicians participate in medical education activities and research. Mayo also owns the hospitals that are utilized by the multi-specialty group practices in its various locales. Mayo's control of the scope and direction of the multi- specialty group practice is crucial to the success of the Mayo model. Direct employment of physicians is fundamental to achieving the goals of the Mayo Clinic. So is Mayo ownership and control of the hospitals at which the multi-specialty group practice takes place. For purposes of patient and physician schedules alike, Mayo must be able to control the allocation of hospital resources, such as the availability of beds, operating rooms, and ancillary/support services. Many Mayo patients, for example, travel significant distances to receive services at a Mayo campus. Mayo's control over hospital resources is central to meeting its goal of providing hospital-based services, including surgery or admission, in as short a time frame as possible for the benefit of the patient and the patient's family, and to otherwise best achieve the benefits of integrated, comprehensive care. Closed Staff Facilities The governance of both physicians and facilities used in the Mayo model works best in a "closed-staff" environment, meaning that only Mayo physicians admit patients to, and otherwise practice at, the hospital. Mayo's preference to operate its affiliate hospitals in a "closed staff" environment is based on a number of factors. Mayo physicians practice in a uniform fashion, agreeing as to what the standard of care should be, and following the same protocols and other practice standards. (Non-Mayo physicians in a hospital setting do not practice with the same uniformity, employing approaches to medical care and standards used in that care that may vary.) Variances in practice styles affect how nursing and other hospital support staff conduct their daily responsibilities with regards to both physician and patient interactions. When Mayo physicians practice medicine under uniform protocols and standards and the remainder of the hospital's medical staff practice medicine in their various and different individual ways, confusion among staff is a common result. The difficulties met by nurses, for example, in knowing precisely what to do from one patient to the next is avoided in a Mayo closed staff setting. In a service where quality and safety concerns are paramount, it is important to Mayo to reduce the variation of practice among physicians and staff alike. In an open-staff setting, the ability of the hospital's governing body to control variation, to enforce standards, and to drive standards to the highest level of excellence is much more difficult than in a closed-staff integrated group practice setting. Mayo cannot forge with non-Mayo physicians the alignment of interests it has with Mayo-employed physicians. An open staff setting, moreover, requires that Mayo's administration deal with the struggles of control and politics that are not uncommon in open-staff hospitals. In an open-staff setting, Mayo's ability to control the scope and direction of its integrated group practice, including the ability to timely schedule admissions and surgeries, is subject to interference because of the need to address the needs of non-Mayo physicians. Free of meeting non-Mayo physician needs, the integrated group practice has the opportunity to achieve the high quality of care of the medically complex patient for which it is designed. Mayo Clinic facilities in Rochester and Mayo Clinic Scottsdale are closed staff facilities. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, for reasons explained below, is not. It is the only "open-staff" facility among Mayo's clinical facilities. Mayo Clinical Facilities and Medical Education/Research Programs In 1987, shortly after the expansion of Mayo operations to Jacksonville through the establishment of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville the year before, St. Luke's was acquired by Mayo. The purpose of the acquisition was to provide the inpatient component for Mayo's Jacksonville operations. Also in 1987, Mayo expanded its operations to the Phoenix-Scottsdale area of Maricopa County, Arizona through the establishment of Mayo Clinic Scottsdale. Similar to the arrangement in Jacksonville, Mayo Clinic Scottsdale has an affiliate hospital nearby. The affiliate is in Phoenix. In keeping with the Mayo-preferred approach, the Phoenix affiliate uses a closed staff. Mayo activities in the three locations require more than 37,000 employees. Mayo personnel comprise several hundred scientists, over 500 clinical and research associates and fellows, over 33,000 administrative and allied health personnel, and over 1,500 medical residents in addition to the more than 2,000 physicians. On a system-wide basis, Mayo has $3.3 billion in annual operating expenditures. Approximately $300 million annually is dedicated to medical research expenses, and approximately $130 million annually is dedicated to medical education expenses. Mayo's medical education activities include the Mayo Medical School for medical students, and the Mayo Graduate School of Medicine, which offers graduate medical education in more than 100 specialties and sub-specialties. Further, the Mayo Graduate School offers Ph.D. programs in several different medical-related areas. Medical research within the Mayo system includes bench research, that is, research primarily in a laboratory. In keeping with the primacy of patient care under the Mayo model, Mayo's medical research also includes clinical research involving direct interaction with patients. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville Located approximately 10 miles east of St. Luke's, Mayo Clinic Jacksonville sits on 400 acres of land that was donated to Mayo. The campus is on San Pablo Road about one-half mile from the road's intersection with J. Turner Butler Boulevard, another half-mile or so to the west of the Intracoastal Waterway flowing between the mainland and the barrier island that is Jacksonville Beach. The campus contains numerous facilities that support clinical, medical education, and medical research activities. Also located on the campus are two hotels for the convenience of patients, their families, and their friends. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville vigorously participates in Mayo's medical education activities, with approximately 155 residents and 65 fellows from the Mayo Graduate School of Medicine, covering numerous specialties, on-site. At the time the St. Luke's application was filed, Mayo Clinic Jacksonville participated in 12 accredited graduate medical education programs and was in the process of adding two more. Mayo Clinic Jacksonville is actively involved in a wide range of both clinical research and bench research programs. All specialties and sub-specialties found within the Mayo system as a whole are represented on the medical staff of over 300 physicians. With the exceptions of some anesthesiologists, family practitioners and transplant physicians who are located at St. Luke's, Mayo Clinic Jacksonville physicians are based at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. Approximately 50% of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's outpatients reside in Agency District 4, which includes Baker, Nassau, Duval, Clay, St. John's, Flagler, and Volusia Counties. Approximately 25% of its outpatients come from the remainder of the State of Florida, 22% from the remainder of the United States, and 3% from foreign countries. When Mayo Clinic Jacksonville was established, the campus obtained Florida Development of Regional Impact ("DRI") approval. That DRI approval, effective until 2020, includes approval for a 900-bed hospital to be located on the campus. Mayo's Acquisition of St. Luke's It has long been Mayo's intention to consolidate its hospital operations on the campus of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville. The intention, in fact, had been fully formed at the time Mayo Clinic Jacksonville was established in 1986. Nonetheless, Mayo Clinic Jacksonville did not pursue initially the development of hospital services on campus for two reasons. The first was a regulatory obstacle; CON regulation requires establishment of need for the construction and operation of a hospital in Florida. The second was a logistical opportunity; Mayo was presented with the chance to purchase St. Luke's Hospital at its facility on Belfort Road to which St. Luke's had relocated from the Northside of Jacksonville west of the St. John's River only a few years before. Mayo took advantage of the opportunity with the acquisition of St. Luke's Hospital in 1987. Prior to its affiliation with Mayo, St. Luke's was a local community provider. More than two-thirds of its patients originated from Jacksonville and Duval County. Few patients originated from beyond northeast Florida. Its only tertiary service was adult open-heart surgery. In recognition of its importance as a community provider, the seller of St. Luke's conditioned Mayo's acquisition on the requirement that an open staff be maintained for five years after purchase. St. Luke's acquiesced. St. Luke's Hospital, therefore, promised to be "open-staffed" at least until 1992. With the end in 1992 of the open-staff requirement imposed at sale, concern over community access continued. To address the concern, Mayo committed to continue to keep the staff open at St. Luke's as long as it remained operationally feasible to do so. In keeping with that commitment, today St. Luke's has approximately 700 non-Mayo physicians or community physicians on staff in addition to 300 or so Mayo physicians. The Parties AHCA The Agency for Health Care Administration is the state agency with the authority to review applications for certificates of need and issue certificates of need in Florida. Section 408.034(1), Florida Statutes. St. Luke's Hospital Association St. Luke's Hospital Association, d/b/a St. Luke's Hospital ("St. Luke's") is a private, not-for-profit corporation that operates a general acute care hospital located in AHCA Health Care Planning District 4. Of its 289 beds, 10 are Level II Neonatal Intensive Care ("NICU") beds added to the facility in February 2001. A controlling interest in St. Luke's has been held by Mayo since the 1987 acquisition. Immediately off Interstate 95 near its intersection with J. Turner Butler Boulevard in Duval County, St. Luke's campus is on Belfort Road in southeast Jacksonville. The area, bounded as it is to the west and the north by the St. John's River, is referred to locally as "Southside." Originally founded in 1873 by three women concerned about health care for the destitute in the Jacksonville area, St. Luke's Hospital is the oldest hospital in Florida. Over the years, St. Luke's Hospital has changed locations several times. It moved to its current location in 1983. Since Mayo's acquisition of a controlling interest in St. Luke's, the primary role of St. Luke's in the Mayo organization has been to provide the inpatient component for Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's clinical practice, including the provision of tertiary and quaternary services. With all of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's inpatient practice at St. Luke's Hospital, all Mayo Clinic teaching components that are related to inpatient care also take place at St. Luke's, as does inpatient-related research activities. St. Vincent's St. Vincent's is a not-for-profit corporation that owns and operates St. Vincent's Hospital and St. Catherine Laboure Manor, a 240-bed long-term care facility. Unlike all the other hospitals operated by parties in this proceeding, St Vincent's Medical Center is not located in Subdistrict 4-3. It is located in Subdistrict 4-2, on the west side of the St. John's River and across the river from "Southside." Vincent's has a three-part mission. The first is to serve the community by providing quality patient care services with special emphasis on care to the poor and vulnerable. Second, St. Vincent's believes in a holistic approach to health care in which the spiritual needs of the patient are just as important as the physical and emotional ones. Third, St. Vincent's mission includes an obligation to advocate and speak on behalf of the poor. St. Vincent's Medical Center is a 528-bed hospital located on Riverside Avenue in Jacksonville. It has a significant obstetrical practice. Among the tertiary services it provides are Level II neonatal intensive care services. It also provides adult open heart surgery and interventional cardiology services. Its staff is closed for diagnostic and interventional catheterizations. St. Vincent's Hospital was established by the Daughters of Charity, a Catholic religious organization, in 1916; its mission then as now to care for the poor. St. Vincent's moved to its current location in 1927. Today, St. Vincent's is associated with Ascension Health, the largest Catholic health care system in the United States and the largest not-for-profit health care system in the United States. Ascension Health has over fifty hospitals in twelve states and a dozen nursing homes. It provides St. Vincent's with various support services such as capital financing, insurance and risk management services, group purchasing and management of the pension program for all employees. Consistent with its mission, St. Vincent's provides a significant amount of care to the uninsured and underinsured. St. Vincent's operates a large family practice residency program staffed by 60 family practice residents and 10-12 faculty members. The family residency program sees about 30,000 patients per year, and approximately 65% of them are either Medicaid or Medicaid-eligible individuals. The family residency program results in approximately 750 inpatient admissions per year to St. Vincent's. In addition to the family residency program, St. Vincent's operates a number of outreach programs, including services to migrant farm workers that work in St. John's and Flagler Counties. These individuals have no means of transportation, are moved from farm to farm by buses, and without St. Vincent's, would have limited access to health care. St. Vincent's has two mobile vans that visit the migrant farm workers. Essentially physician offices on wheels, the vans, the size of large Winnebagos, include a laboratory draw station and radiology unit. Any person who seeks medical care at the vans is provided with medical care. The vans also visit sites accessible to the urban poor. If a patient seen by a physician in one of these vans needs hospitalization, arrangements are made to admit the patient to St. Vincent's. None of the other hospitals in the Jacksonville area have a mobile outreach program similar to St. Vincent's. At the time of hearing, St. Vincent's has been selected to receive an award from the American Hospital Association in recognition of the work of its mobile health ministry. St. Vincent's also operates a parish nurse program in over 50 different churches, the majority of which are low-income and non-Catholic. This program assigns a nurse to a church. When a member of the church is unable to obtain care for a health problem, the nurse arranges for the person's care. Baptist Southern Baptist Hospital of Florida, Inc., d/b/a Baptist Medical Center ("Baptist") is a not-for-profit corporation. It is part of the Baptist Health System, a major healthcare system serving Northeast Florida. Baptist Health System is comprised of three licensed acute care hospitals including Baptist Medical Center ("BMC"), Baptist Medical Center Beaches in Jacksonville Beach ("Baptist Beaches") and Baptist Medical Center Nassau, located in Fernandina Beach. At the time Baptist filed its application, BMC was licensed for 591 beds at its downtown Jacksonville campus. Of these, 455 are acute care beds, 33 are Level II NICU beds, 15 are Level III NICU beds, 63 are adult psychiatric beds, 19 are child/adolescent psychiatric beds and 6 are adult substance abuse beds. Through its three hospitals, Baptist Health System offers a full range of services for medical/surgical patients (including intensive care, open-heart surgery and stem cell transplantation), obstetrical and newborn services (including NICU Level II and III) and psychiatric services. Baptist Medical Center is located in downtown Jacksonville at 800 Prudential Drive. It has an excellent reputation in the community as a provider of high-quality health care services. Founded in 1955, it is committed to providing accessible, affordable health care of high quality to the Jacksonville community. Today, it is a Medicaid disproportionate share provider, second only to Shands Jacksonville in terms of providing Medicaid services to the local community. It operates the largest not-for-profit home health agency in the area. Not currently affiliated with any religious order, the mission of Baptist remains grounded in its faith-based heritage. The distinct nature of its organization within the Jacksonville community is based on four factors. It is faith-based; it is mission-driven to serve the local community rather than owners or shareholders; it is community-focused serving Jacksonville and the five surrounding counties; and finally, it is locally governed. Wolfson Children's Hospital ("Wolfson") operates under Baptist's license. It is a regional tertiary hospital serving northeast Florida and southeast Georgia. It provides all tertiary services for children except for burns. Wolfson provides major pediatric oncology and cardiovascular services. Wolfson is affiliated with Nemours Children's Clinic, located on the other side of I-95 from Baptist Medical Center. The two are connected by a walkover. Nemours is funded in large part by a trust from the DuPont family. It offers 65 specialists and sub-specialists in pediatric medicine surgery. Wolfson houses major educational services for pediatric practitioners. Every nurse trained in Jacksonville receives his or her pediatric training at Wolfson. All the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville family practitioners in pediatrics, as well as University of Florida family program in pediatrics, train at Wolfson. Further confirming Wolfson's role as a regional children's hospital, a new Ronald McDonald House with room for 20 patient families is now under construction in close proximity to the hospital. Baptist's mission is to continue a healing ministry to the community. It is more than just caring for people when they are ill. Baptist emphasizes the promotion of health through preventive measures. It operates a primary care network of more than 60 physicians at 15 sites to serve the community. It also has a mental health network that provides mental health counselors and psychologists throughout the City of Jacksonville. Baptist partners with a multi-service center for at- risk youth in which it helps to see that over 400 children are fed every night. Baptist also partners with a homeless shelter in Jacksonville to provide medical services. Memorial Memorial is a tertiary level care provider of hospital services. It offers a full array of acute care including open heart surgery, interventional cardiology, and Level II Neonatal Intensive Care ("NICU"). Memorial's licensed bed complement consists of 343 acute care beds and 10 Level II NICU beds. Located on University Boulevard in "Southside" Jacksonville, in the same quadrant of the city as St. Luke's Hospital, Memorial is slightly more than 2 miles northwest of St. Luke's. During the 12-month period of July 2000 to June 2001 (the time frame for the January 2002 Hospital Bed Need Projections applicable to the relevant batching cycle), Memorial had an occupancy of 70% for its 343 acute care beds. For the same time period, the occupancy rate for its Level II NICU beds was 55.86%. In order to ensure patient comfort, privacy and satisfaction, Memorial typically will not place two patients in its two-bed semi-private rooms. The practice diminishes the use of the hospital's functional acute care bed capacity. To increase functional capacity, Memorial is in the process of creating a new 32-bed unit consisting entirely of private rooms. The new 32-bed unit is but one aspect of an ongoing multi-phase, two-year expansion project at Memorial at a cost of $67 million. Critical care beds will be increased from 21 to 30. Forty-one semi-private rooms will be converted to private rooms. Memorial's emergency department will be expanded from 20 to 35 bays. The number of operating rooms ("ORs") will be increased from 18 to 20. The cardiac catheterization labs will be increased from 2 to 4. A new special imaging room will be added. The telemetry capability of the hospital will be increased from 117 units to 149 units. There will be substantial addition of new technology and equipment; the addition of a third open heart operating room; the addition of a 2-story 235 space parking garage; and replacement and improvement of roofing, air handling and mechanical systems. These projects will significantly enhance operational efficiencies and acute care functionality and capacity at Memorial. Memorial is under a contract with the Department of Corrections whereby 28 acute care beds are reserved for the care of prisoners. These beds are not available to the general population. The contract expires in April 2003. No evidence was presented as to whether the contract would be renewed or not. For now, the life of the contract presents only the possibility that the 28 beds will become available in the spring of 2003 for the general populace. Memorial recently commissioned the Sullivan Group to evaluate the necessity of adding acute care beds at its facility through the CON application process. The Sullivan Group found that Memorial's current occupancy of 70% did not justify the filing of a CON application for additional beds. It recommended that Memorial continue to expand and improve the hospital. The Sullivan Group also recognized that if its occupancy levels continued their present rate of increase, Memorial would be able to add acute care beds in the near future without CON review. Under a statutory provision, addition of a certain number of beds exempt from CON review is triggered by achievement of an 80% annual occupancy rate. If Memorial experiences such an occupancy rate, it will be able to add 35 beds under the exemption. As part of its ongoing projects, Memorial constructed new square footage for a short stay area. The area was also constructed to accommodate a 3-floor wing of 30-35 beds per floor. The strategy of expanding a facility's licensed bed capacity via the statutory exemption is consistent with the Agency's encouragement of the use of the exemption in preference to CON review. District 4 and Subdistrict 3 District 4, one of eleven "health service planning" districts defined by the Legislature for the State of Florida, is composed of Baker, Nassau, Duval, Clay, St. Johns, Flagler, and Volusia Counties. Section 408.032(5), Florida Statutes. The district is split into five subdistricts by Agency rule. The first three, Subdistricts 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 contain parts of Duval County as well as at least one other county. Of the hospitals that are parties to this proceeding, only St. Vincent's is not in Subdistrict 4-3. It is located in Subdistrict 4-2, composed of Baker and Clay Counties and certain zip codes in Duval County referred to in Rule 59C- 2.100(3)(a)d.2., Florida Administrative Code, as "southwestern" Duval County. The St. John's River separates Subdistrict 4-2 from Subdistrict 4-3. This proceeding is concerned mainly with Subdistrict 4- 3 in that all three of the proposed projects are to be located in Subdistrict 4-3. Subdistrict 4-3 consists of St. Johns County and "the southeastern portion of Duval County lying within ZIP codes 32207, 32211, 32216, 32217, 32223, 32224, 32225, 32228, 32233, 32246, 32250, 32256, 32257, 32258, 32266, and 32277." Rule 59C-2.100(3)(a)d.2., Florida Administrative Code. There are no major geographic access issues in District With the exception of Baptist Beaches, the hospitals are all in the center core of the county. The roadways and infrastructure in Duval County are well situated for access to existing hospitals. Nonetheless, in Subdistrict 4-3, access to certain services will be enhanced for residents of southern Duval County by the approval of Baptist's application. There is no complaint of financial access issues in this case. Consistent with no financial access problem, Baptist and St. Luke's have not conditioned approval of their applications on the provision of care to a percentage of Medicaid and charity patients. The acute care occupancy rate for all District 4 hospitals was 58.69% for the twelve-month period from July 1, 2000, through June 30, 2001. In Subdistrict 4-3, the rate was 67.57% for the same period. For the last six months of the period, January 1 through June 30, 2000, the acute care occupancy rate of Subdistrict 4-3 was 71.49%, much higher that projected occupancy rate for District 4 of 60.46% and for the State of 55.49%. For medical-surgical beds, a subset of acute care beds, for the first six months of 2001, the occupancy rate for Subdistrict 4-3 was over 73%. These rates reflect a trend nationwide for the last few years of increased occupancy rates and in the Jacksonville area "some hefty increases in patient volumes and user rates over the last few years." (Tr. 2160). Richard Baehr, health planning expert for Memorial, predicts that this trend will naturally subside to the point that "use rates will be fairly stable going forward and utilization, as a result will continue to grow with population." (Tr. 2161). Using these occupancy rates and subtracting the beds not occupied plus beds added in the district and subdistrict between July and December 2001, from a weighted average of licensed acute care beds from July 1, 2000, to June 30, 2001, there were 1,718 acute care beds unused in District 4 and 477 unused in Subdistrict 4-3. Subdistrict 4-3 is expected to experience a 1.8% annual compound growth through rate 2006. At this rate, the aggregate growth rate through 2006 equals 11%. In 2000, there were 175,546 acute care hospital admissions in District 4 with a population of 1,625,780. The use rate, therefore, was 107.98 per 1,000 population. The average length of stay for District 4 hospitals based on acute care admissions is 4.6 days. District 4 hospitals experienced an average daily acute care census of 2,206 patients with an acute care bed capacity according to a December 31, 2001, inventory of 4,068. Assuming an 11% population growth, District 4 will experience an incremental population increase of 162,642 persons in 2006 and 190,142 persons in 2007 above the 2000 population. District 4 hospitals are projected to experience a projected incremental increase of 220 patients in 2006 and 258 patients in 2007. This increase assumes that the district use rate remains constant at 107.68 (a rate adjusted to a 365-day year since the year 2000 was a leap year) and the average length of stay is held constant at 4.6. Based on the population analysis, above (and in consideration of the 34 psychiatric bed at St. Vincent's approved for conversion to acute care beds), the District 4 acute care bed occupancy will be 59.2% in 2006 and 60.1% in 2007. In 2000, District 4 hospitals experienced an additional 45.9 average daily census from patients outside the District. Assuming a constant 45.9 immigration rate through 2007, the District-wide occupancy rate is projected to be 60.3% in 2006 (leaving a surplus of 1,629 beds) and 61.2% in 2007 (a surplus of 1,592 beds). District 4 hospitals, therefore, can accommodate future growth based on current licensed and available beds in the absence of the proposed projects. Even if all three projects at issue in this proceeding are approved, however, there would only be a 5% increase in the number of beds in Subdistrict 4-3 at the same time there is expected to be a population increase of 11%. By the time these projects come on line, if approved, there will likely be adequate demand to support all of the hospitals in Subdistrict 4-3. Still, the five Subdistrict 4-3 hospitals (Memorial, Baptist, Baptist Beaches, St. Luke's, and Flagler) are also well positioned to accommodate future growth based on current licensed beds in the absence of the proposed projects unless seasonality is considered. On the other hand, during the winter season, from time- to-time, it can be difficult to obtain a bed at any of these hospitals. Recent approvals may help. Baptist has recently been approved to add 30 acute care beds, Baptist Beaches eight, St. Luke's four and Flagler 31. Based on 50,300 admissions from a population of 537,182 in 2000, Subdistrict 4-3 realized a use rate of 93.38 per 1,000 population. Utilizing the same analysis as presented above with respect to District 4, Subdistrict 4-3 is projected to achieve an incremental increase in average daily census of 72.6 in 2006 and 85.8 in 2007. When this incremental increase is applied to the current Subdistrict 4-3 acute care complement of 1,398 beds, Subdistrict 3 hospitals will experience a 51.4% occupancy rate (leaving 679 surplus beds) in 2006 and a 52.3% occupancy rate (666 surplus beds) in 2007. In 2000, patients from outside the service area accessing District 4 hospitals accounted for an additional 229.6 patient days of Subdistrict 4-3. Holding in-migration constant, Subdistrict 4-3 is expected to have an occupancy rate of 67% in 2006 and 68% in 2007. These rates would be higher, however, if in-migration grows. Approval of the three applications at issue will not result in any change in the district-wide acute care bed inventory. Since none of the applications at issue in this case would result in an increase in the acute care bed inventory of the district, AHCA took the position that numeric need for the acute care beds was not an issue in any of the applications. Memorial disputes the Agency's position on this point at least with regard to St. Vincent's. Unlike the St. Luke's and Baptist's applications (both of which increase neither the bed inventory of the district nor of Subdistrict 4-3), St. Vincent's application will increase the bed inventory of Subdistrict 4-3. If St. Vincent's application is granted the bed inventory of Subdistrict 4-3 will be increased by 70, the 70 beds St. Vincent's hopes to transfer from its facility in Subdistrict 4-2 to the new St. Luke's. The issue is important. If AHCA is correct, St. Vincent's need not demonstrate "not normal" circumstances to support its application; if numeric need is an issue with regard to St. Vincent's then it is required to demonstrate such circumstances because numeric need for the subdistrict is zero. Events Related to the Stipulation in the Comparative Review Cases Case No. 02-0447CON ("Memorial's Case") was initiated by Memorial in its status as an existing provider of acute care hospital services. Its purpose is to challenge AHCA's approval of St. Vincent's partial application. It does not take issue with the approvals of the St. Luke's and Baptist's applications. Unlike Case No. 02-0447CON, the other three cases in this consolidated proceeding were filed by applicants: Baptist, St. Vincent's or St. Luke's. The three cases initiated by the applicants each seek comparative review of the applications. For example, in Case No. 02-0971CON, St. Luke's requests the relief that both St. Vincent's and its applications be granted in lieu of Baptist's. The three cases filed by the applicants, Case Nos. 02- 0882CON, 02-0943CON, and 02-0971CON, (the "Comparative Review Cases") were consolidated with Memorial's case, but Case No. 02- 0882, having been originally assigned to an administrative law judge other than the undersigned, was not consolidated with the rest of the cases until May 3, 2002. On April 22, 2002, Memorial filed a petition to intervene in each of the Comparative Review Cases. On May 3, 2002, the petition was granted subject to Memorial's presentation of proof of standing at final hearing. The Stipulation in the Comparative Review Cases Prior to Memorial's intervention in the Comparative Review Cases, all of the parties to those cases entered a pre- hearing stipulation (the "Stipulation in the Comparative Review Cases.") With the exception of the issues contained in Memorial's Case, the Stipulation in the Comparative Review Cases was ruled binding on Memorial and to have extinguished all issues it settles except for those raised in Memorial's case. The stipulation follows: The parties [AHCA, St. Luke's, St. Vincent's and Baptist] agree that each application, as a matter of fact and law, satisfies the following statutory and rule criteria: Each application was timely filed, complete and satisfies the provisions of Section 408.037, Florida Statutes. CON application 9483 is a replacement application. c. Section 408.035(3), (4), (5), (6)(except for availability of health personnel and management personnel), (8), (10) (including architectural design, movable equipment, and fixed equipment), (11). Section 408.035(12) is not at issue. Rule 59C-1.038(6)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code. f. Rule 59C-1.030(2)(a)-(d). (Case Nos. 02-0882CON, 02-0943CON, and 02-0971CON, Joint Pre- hearing Stipulation, 1st Attachment.) Although Memorial did not join in this stipulation, the stipulation preceded Memorial's intervention in the three cases in which the stipulation was entered. In consideration of Memorial taking the cases in which the stipulation was entered as it found them at the time of intervention, the stipulation was ruled to be binding on all parties to the four consolidated cases, including Memorial, although its effect in the consolidated cases was limited because the petition in Memorial's Case was not subject to the stipulation. The issues raised by Memorial's Case that the stipulation extinguished in the Comparative Review Cases, therefore, survived in the consolidated cases by virtue of the petition in Memorial's case. The remainder of the issues (those not raised by Memorial's Case) that were subject to the stipulation were extinguished by the stipulation for purposes of the consolidated cases. Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation A pre-hearing stipulation entered by all parties, including Memorial, contains the following: St. Vincent's application 9484P was timely filed, complete and satisfies the provisions of Section 408.037, Florida Statutes. St. Vincent's and Memorial each have a history of providing high quality of care for inpatient hospital services and have the continued capability of providing high quality of care. Accordingly, the quality of care provided by these parties is not at issue in this proceeding. Additionally, the parties agree that St. Vincent's would be able to provide quality care at St. Luke's Hospital if its application 9484P is approved. St. Vincent's CON application 9484P satisfies the criterion contained in Section 408.035(3), Florida Statutes. The parties agree that St. Vincent's has available management personnel and funds for capital and operating expenditures and therefore satisfies those specific portions of Section 408.035(6), Florida Statutes. The letter contained in CON application number 9484 from Charles J. Barnett, Senior Vice President for Ascension Health to John J. Maher, Chief Executive Officer of St. Vincent's, can be admitted for the truth of the matters asserted without further proof. Also, the letter dated October 12, 2001 for James M. Corrigan, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of St. Vincent's, to Jeffrey N. Gregg can be admitted for the truth of the matters asserted without further proof. The parties agree that St. Vincent's has a history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent (Section 408.035(11), Florida Statutes). However, Memorial does not agree that St. Vincent's can meet the levels of charity care proposed in CON Application No. 9484P. Section 408.035(12) is not at issue. (Joint Pre-hearing Stipulation.) Growth at St. Luke's, Mayo's Options The transplant programs at St. Luke's have far exceeded original expectations for the number of patients to be treated. For example, the CON application for the liver program projected 15, 30, and 45 transplants over the first three years of operation. The first liver transplant at St. Luke's occurred in February 1998, and within the first twelve months 75 transplants had taken place at St. Luke's. Last year, 176 liver transplants were performed at St. Luke's making it the fourth largest liver transplant program in the country. Volumes in the kidney, pancreas and lung transplant programs have also greatly exceeded expectations. The increase in volume has generated more competition between community and Mayo physicians for St. Luke's hospital resources and has increased the friction between these two distinct segments of the St. Luke's medical staff. One example of the logistical and political problems that exist at St. Luke's because of the two segments of physicians that practice there is allocation of operating rooms. Somewhere between 65% and 70% of the patient days at St. Luke's are generated by Mayo physicians. Community doctors generate the remainder of patient days (30 to 35%). In settlement of the competition for operating room ("OR") time, ORs at St. Luke's are divided into those dedicated to Mayo Clinic physicians (currently 14 in number) and those dedicated to community doctors (currently 4 in number). When compared to percentages of patient days, the divide in ORs favors Mayo Clinic physicians. Approximately 78% of the ORs are dedicated to Mayo physicians; only 22% to community physicians. A determination of equity in the OR divide is more involved, however, because of the level of acuity of Mayo patients and the level of service provided by Mayo physicians when compared to community doctors. Nonetheless, conflict between community and Mayo physicians over the availability of ORs persists. It is likely to grow worse as inpatient utilization and surgical volume at St. Luke's increases. For the last six years, inpatient utilization at St. Luke's has grown 10% per annum. In addition to this sustained growth, with the increase in the number of transplant programs, St. Luke's is also experiencing a notable increase in the acuity of its patients. Admissions to St. Luke's are affected by seasonality. The first three or four months of the year are the busiest. During that time of year, St. Luke's has experienced occupancies in excess of 100% in its critical care units. As a result of occupancy pressures at St. Luke's there are Mayo patients that are seen at the Mayo Clinic who are not being admitted in a timely fashion. Mayo physicians have had to either delay those admissions or send the patients home or to another facility for treatment. St. Luke's is taking stop-gap steps to limit further growth at St. Luke's because of the growth in patient census. It has recently amended its medical staff bylaws to eliminate courtesy staff privileges. More significantly, St. Luke's is in the process of capping the size of its medical staff, and not allowing any new physicians (Mayo or community) to join the medical staff until such time as another physician leaves the staff. The plan to cap the size of its medical staff in response to that growth has resulted in heightened tensions between the Mayo physicians and the community physicians over their competition for space and resources at St. Luke's. Mayo has examined a number of options for a permanent solution to the problems created by growth. One option considered was expanding the size of St. Luke's so that it can accommodate not only more inpatients but also more space for the teaching and research components of Mayo's mission. Problems with this option include concurrency restrictions associated with further expansion on the St. Luke's site and basic hospital infrastructure limitations related to a facility originally designed and built as a community hospital and not the quaternary or research facility now required. Expansion is not practical. Even if it were practical, expansion does not accomplish consolidation of Mayo's inpatient and outpatient services needed for the Mayo Model to work at an optimal level. Faced with ever-increasing capacity constraints at St. Luke's, the option Mayo has chosen the one proposed by its application: the 214-bed replacement hospital on the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. The approach is supported by St. Vincent's companion application in which it proposes to establish a 135-bed hospital at the Belfort Road location. Under these two applications, most of the Mayo physicians would move their inpatient practices to the replacement hospital while community physicians would continue to admit patients to the hospital on the present St. Luke's site. If these applications are not approved, Mayo will be forced to close the medical staff at St. Luke's to Mayo-only physicians. Elimination of the "community" side of St. Luke's hospital is less than ideal from the Agency's point of view as explained by Jeffery N. Gregg, Chief of AHCA's Bureau of Health Facility Regulation: [The Agency is] aware of the traditional position of St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville. It's a very old provider. It's . . . widely recognized as an important part of the community. It has a long tradition and . . . it inspires a considerable degree of . . . affection and loyalty among people who live in Jacksonville. . . . [O]ne of the things that . . . we like about this proposal is that it preserves a spot for an ongoing role for the institution of St. Luke's. If Mayo were to close the staff at the current St. Luke's, what greater Jacksonville has traditionally known as St. Luke's would disappear, in that, . . . it would become the Mayo hospital; the community component would go away. It would have to relocate to other places, and . . ., that would not be an ideal solution . . . . (Tr. 1398, 1399). Closing the staff at St. Luke's would have another aspect besides elimination of the "community" side of the hospital that would be less than ideal. It would not solve the inefficiencies that arise from Mayo physicians having to split time between two different campuses. Consultation among Mayo physicians and comprehensiveness of care in a single setting is facilitated by physician proximity to each other and to shared information systems. Ten miles from the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus, the location of St. Luke's presents difficulties for Mayo Clinic physicians and the inpatient care and research components of Mayo's mission. The great majority of the offices of Mayo Clinic physicians are at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. Mayo physicians see outpatients at their offices but must leave for St. Luke's to treat inpatients. The split between the site of inpatient practice and Mayo Clinic Jacksonville is not merely inconvenient but inefficient. When required to see an inpatient, the typical Mayo Clinic physician must leave the Clinic office, walk to the parking lot, drive the ten miles between the two campuses, re-park, and walk to the hospital. The trek easily takes 20 minutes one way and, depending on traffic, can take as much as half an hour. The thoroughfare that runs between St. Luke's and Mayo Clinic Jacksonville is J. Turner Butler Boulevard. Traffic congestion on the corridor is severe. Approval of St. Luke's application for a replacement facility at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus will eliminate these efficiencies. It will give Mayo Clinic physicians quicker access to inpatients. Conversely, it will give inpatients treated by Mayo Clinic Jacksonville physicians in all their specialties and sub-specialties more efficient treatment from the physicians. While St. Luke's is a modern, well-maintained facility, it was designed as a community hospital and not as a teaching or research institution. The physical plant limits the teaching component of Mayo's mission. For example, while the patient rooms at St. Luke's are sufficient for providing patient care, they are not large enough to properly accommodate teaching rounds by Mayo residency training teams. There is another option for Mayo with regard to St. Luke's: build a replacement facility on the campus of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville and sell St. Luke's to St. Vincent's. Proposed Acquisition of St. Luke's by St. Vincent's St. Vincent's and Mayo have entered into an agreement for the sale of St. Luke's by Mayo and its acquisition by St. Vincent's. The proceeds from St. Vincent's purchase of St. Luke's will provide the majority of the funding for the building of the replacement hospital. The balance of the construction costs for the replacement hospital will come from philanthropic donations that Mayo has largely already secured. A new St. Luke's will also be the result: St. Luke's operated by St. Vincent's rather than by Mayo. The agreement, contingent upon final approval of the St. Vincent's and Mayo CON applications at issue in this proceeding, contemplates two closings. At the Phase I closing, St. Vincent's will purchase the land and the St. Luke's buildings from the Mayo Foundation for $102 million. At the time of the Phase I closing, St. Vincent's will lease back to Mayo the buildings on St. Luke's campus. The leaseback will enable Mayo to continue to operate at St. Luke's while the replacement hospital is under construction. In addition to the $102 million payment, St. Vincent's will reimburse Mayo for capital improvements to be made at St. Luke's Hospital during the term of the lease up to total of $48 million. During the lease period, Mayo will construct the replacement facility on the campus of Mayo Clinic Jacksonville. Upon completion of the construction, a Phase 2 closing will take place. In the fashion of a turnkey operation, St. Vincent's will become the license holder and operator of St. Luke's Hospital at the Phase 2 closing and Mayo will commence hospital operation at the replacement facility. The Phase 2 closing should not cause any interruption to the delivery of services at St. Luke's to the patients of community physicians. Nor should there be any time during any transition from Mayo's operation of St. Luke's to St. Vincent's when St. Luke's is forced to close because of the Phase 2 closing. The agreement between Mayo and St. Vincent's includes a provision for a contingent payment from St. Vincent's to Mayo in 2012 if the net patient revenues of St. Luke's exceed a certain amount in 2011. The contingent payment is not properly considered a project cost required to be listed on Schedule 1 of St. Vincent's CON application. It is speculative as to whether on not a 2011 payment will be required. (Under St. Vincent's forecast, the 2011 net patient revenue projection is below the payment threshold.) If a payment were required, moreover, it would be an operational expense incurred in 2012 rather than a Schedule 1 project cost incurred over the period of construction. Such a payment would not constitute a cost incurred in order to make the hospital operational or a cost to place an asset into service, the kind of cost listed on Schedule 1. Prior to entering into the agreement, St. Vincent's hired Solomon Smith Barney ("Solomon"), one of the world's largest investment banks, to review its terms and help determine an offering price by St. Vincent's. Under the agreement, St. Vincent's is purchasing the entire St. Luke's campus. This includes two medical buildings as well as St. Luke's Hospital. Mayo, moreover, is currently undertaking major construction projects at St. Luke's, including a $7 million expansion of the Emergency Department and a $15 million three-story addition and renovation project. Both are scheduled for completion prior to the Phase 2 closing. As part of its analysis, Solomon visited St. Luke's, looked at comparable transactions and current market values, and attended the negotiating sessions between Mayo and St. Luke's. Afterward, Solomon issued an opinion letter that the purchase price was fair. St. Vincent's entered into the agreement with Mayo because it saw the opportunity to extend its mission into Southside Jacksonville and to enhance the ability of both organizations to fulfill their respective missions. Approval of St. Vincent's application will improve access to care by the poor. While Mayo treats uninsured and underinsured at St. Luke's, its mission and focus are not directed toward service to the poor. St. Vincent's mission and focus, on the other hand, is its charity care policies and programs. They will be implemented at St. Luke's. Implementation of those policies and programs at the new St. Luke's to be operated by St. Vincent's will allow expansion of the geographical area served by St. Vincent's outreach programs. While many of the area's poor are located on the north side of Jacksonville, there are pockets of uninsured and underinsured throughout Duval County. Migrant farms in north St. John's County now served by St. Vincent's two mobile vans are closer to St. Luke's than St. Vincent's. Approval of St. Vincent's application will allow those migrant workers in need of hospitalization to be transported to and treated at St. Luke's rather than the more distant St. Vincent's. Community doctors practicing at St. Luke's support both Mayo's plans for a replacement hospital and St. Vincent's application for a new hospital at St. Luke's. Approval of the applications will open additional space at St. Luke's for the community doctors and allow more of that group to practice at St. Luke's. Approval of the St. Luke's and St. Vincent's applications will significantly further both Mayo's and St. Vincent's distinct missions. Approval of the St. Luke's application will allow Mayo to achieve its long-awaited goal of a Mayo Clinic Jacksonville hospital on the Mayo campus with a closed staff and otherwise specifically designed to accomplish the Mayo mission. Approval of St. Vincent's will ensure the continuation of a full-service community hospital at St. Luke's that is committed to and skilled at serving all patient populations including the poor consistent with the mission of St. Vincent's. It will return St. Luke's to its historical community roots and increase its accessibility to Medicaid patients and other underserved populations. The Proposed Projects St. Luke's The Agency has never previously reviewed or approved an application to establish a replacement hospital where the replaced facility continues to operate as a hospital. Nonetheless, prior to Memorial's intervention into the three cases in which it intervened, the parties stipulated that St. Luke's application is for a replacement hospital. It is clear, moreover, that the hospital St. Luke's seeks to construct on Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's campus is to replace the hospital at St. Luke's for the use of Mayo physicians. The Agency takes the position that the hospital proposed by St. Luke's is a replacement hospital. The St. Luke's replacement hospital will be a state- of-the-art tertiary/quaternary hospital located on the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus in eastern Duval County specifically designed to accommodate Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's mission. The total cost of the replacement hospital will be $207 million financed through philanthropic contributions and the sale of the St. Luke's Belfort Road campus. With the exception of obstetrics and Level II NICU, the services presently at St. Luke's will be transferred to the replacement hospital. The outpatient transplant services will also be transferred to the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus in order to support the relocated inpatient transplant programs. If the CON application for the replacement hospital and for St. Vincent's to establish a new hospital at Belfort Road are approved and become final with all appeals exhausted, St. Luke's will sell the Belfort Road property, plant, and equipment to St. Vincent's. St. Vincent's will then lease the Belfort Road campus to St. Luke's while the replacement hospital is constructed. When the replacement hospital is completed, in simultaneous actions, the license will be issued for the St. Luke's Replacement Hospital to begin operations at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. At no time will hospital operations at St. Luke's on Belfort Road cease. St. Luke's and St. Vincent's have constructed the agreement so that services provided to community patients by community physicians at Belfort Road should not be interrupted. The 214 beds proposed for the replacement hospital will be adequate to support the demand for Mayo Clinic Jacksonville services at least for the first few years of operation. The design of the replacement hospital and the lack of any site constraints at the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus will easily allow for expansion of the replacement hospital if the need arises. If approved, the replacement hospital will be fully constructed by late 2005. St. Vincent's St. Vincent's seeks authorization to establish a 135- bed hospital at the site of the existing St. Luke's Hospital. The hospital will continue to be known as St. Luke's Hospital. As described earlier, St. Vincent's will become the licensee and operator of St. Luke's at the precise moment in time that Mayo receives its license and begins operations at the replacement hospital, an event expected to occur sometime in 2006 or 2007. The 135-bed hospital proposed by St. Vincent's would be a community hospital. All of the transplant programs now provided at St. Luke's by Mayo would be transferred to the replacement hospital being built at the Mayo Clinic site. In addition to those quaternary programs, the existing adult open heart program at St. Luke's would also be moved to the replacement hospital. Mayo does not plan to offer obstetrical services at the replacement hospital. The obstetricians and the majority of the associated nursing and other support staff for obstetrics and Level II NICU services would remain at the Belfort Road location after the Phase 2 closing. (Whether the Level II NICU program will continue is dependent, however, on the outcome of a separate CON application by St. Vincent's challenged by Memorial in DOAH Case No. 02-0457CON.) St. Luke's is currently licensed for 289 beds. If its application is granted, the transfer of 214 beds will leave 65 acute care and 10 NICU beds behind. In addition to the 65 beds to be de-licensed by Mayo, St. Vincent's proposes to transfer 70 additional beds from St. Vincent's to the "new" St. Luke's Hospital to make up the 135-bed hospital. St. Vincent's is well utilized. The transfer of the 70 beds is therefore, criticized by Memorial as "unwise." (Tr. 2166). St. Vincent's, however, has devised a number of strategies to accommodate the transfer. First, St. Vincent's has recently received approval to convert 34 psychiatric beds to acute care beds, and is in the process of implementing the project. Second, St. Vincent's now uses 35 licensed beds as a pre-ambulatory and post-ambulatory surgical holding area. It is in the process of making those licensed beds available for inpatients. Third, St. Vincent's is building 20 additional examination and holding rooms in its emergency department, and is also building a 20-bed pre-holding and post-holding area for cardiac catheterization patients. These projects will free up licensed beds for inpatients at St. Vincent's. Fourth, St. Vincent's is in the process of implementing a case management program that is focusing on reducing lengths of stay. It is estimated that this program will reduce the average stay by half a day. Such a reduction will make 35 beds available. Fifth, on average, St. Vincent's currently sees 30 patients per day that come from the zip codes that surround St. Luke's. After the Phase 2 closing, St. Vincent's plans to encourage its specialty physicians to care for those patients at St. Luke's and anticipates redirecting 75% of those patients, or 22 patients per day, from St. Vincent's to St. Luke's. This redirection will further increase the number of beds available at St. Vincent's. Should St. Vincent's experience high occupancies following the Phase 2 closing despite implementation of these strategies, St. Vincent's will have the space for additional beds left by the 70 transferred beds. St. Vincent's could add up to 45 beds pursuant to a statutory exemption from CON review provided it meets the statutory threshold for triggering the exemption of annual occupancy at 80% or more. This last approach is not exempt from criticism: "[T]o take beds out of service and get to 80% [occupancy rate so as to trigger the statutory exemption] and say, therefore, I need to get beds back, that seems to be in a sense a certain gaming of the system." (Tr. 2166). St. Vincent's plans to implement the other strategies first, however. Taking advantage of the statutory exemption is a fall-back position should all else fail not a method to take advantage of the system in the first place. In any event, St. Vincent's application does not contemplate any construction by St. Vincent's at St. Luke's in order to implement its proposal. The application contemplates a seamless turnkey transition in which St. Vincent's simply takes over operations at St. Luke's at the Phase 2 closing. Baptist's Baptist proposes to construct a new 92-bed satellite hospital at the intersection of Old St. Augustine Road and I-95 in southern Duval County, just north of the St. Johns County line at a total project cost of $84.4 million. Baptist will transfer 92 acute care beds from its downtown campus to the satellite hospital. The transfer will result in the addition of no new beds to Baptist's license and no new beds to the acute care bed inventory of Subdistrict 4-3. The goal of the project is two-fold: to provide easily accessible, affordable health care to a rapidly growing population in southern Duval and northern St. Johns' Counties and to "decompress" Baptist Medical Center's existing campus in order to allow for modernization and to make it more efficient. The proposed satellite hospital will provide general medical/surgical and obstetrical services. It will offer an active and convenient emergency room and serve patients regardless of ability to pay. The new hospital will be family- focused, with large private rooms where a patient's family can be involved with patient care. Baptist's proposed hospital will pay special attention to the environment, both external and internal, with an emphasis on a healing library available to patients and their families. The 92-bed facility will be comprised of 72 med/surg beds, 8 ICU beds and 12 labor/delivery/recovery beds ("LDR beds") for obstetrical services. The facility will be an attractive five-story building. Although housing only 92 beds, it will have the presence of a larger hospital. Baptist has a contract to purchase a 32-acre parcel of land for the new facility. The purchase is contingent on final approval of its CON application in this case. The proposed site is part of a 900-acre DRI development called Grand Park of Jacksonville. This site has already met all regulatory approvals to build a new hospital, including zoning, land use studies, and DRI requirements. Unprecedented The net effect of approval of St. Luke's, St. Vincent's and Baptist's applications is for three different hospitals to come on line in Sub-district 4-3 at a cost of more than $400 million dollars. Approval of three hospital CON applications in one sub-district at once, as Memorial points out, is unprecedented. The associated costs, moreover, are considerable. On the other hand, a characterization of this proceeding as involving three "new" hospitals is not entirely accurate. While implementation of an approved St. Luke's application will require Mayo to build a "new" hospital, it will be a replacement hospital. Implementation of the approval will simply move an existing volume of business to a new physical plant. St. Vincent's hoped-for situation is, in part, the opposite. The transfer of 70 beds at St. Vincent's to join 65 beds and an existing facility will not entail the building of a new physical plant. Nor will it necessarily entail the capture of a significant number of new patients. The aim is to retain at St. Luke's the volume of its pure community cases and treat at the new St. Luke's facility up to 75% of the patients now treated at St. Vincent's that originate in St. Luke's primary service area. While the hospital will be "new," the facility will not; it will be a facility that has existed for more than 20 years and that continues to be put to its highest and best use. Nor will there be anything new about the treatment of community patients since for those who chose to use it there will not be a break in service at the facility during the shift of its control from St. Luke's to St. Vincent's. Baptist's project is not simply a new hospital either. It will be a satellite of an existing facility from which all its beds will be transferred. It will require a new physical plant, but it will operate under the same license to accommodate patients in the district, some of whom, it might have served at the main campus, had the satellite not been built, in the beds now intended for transfer. The usual aim of the CON law, to prevent the unnecessary duplication of services within a health care planning district will not be defeated by approvals any of the applications. The inventory of beds in District 4 will not increase through approval of the two CONs proposed by St. Luke's and St. Vincent's. Approval of the two, moreover, will allow Mayo to focus on the quaternary health care services, and medical education and research in which it specializes while St. Vincent's will be able to carry on the traditional community hospital care services that have long been provided at St. Luke's. Nor will Baptist be duplicating services since it is doing no more than transferring services within the subdistrict to a satellite sited more advantageously than the original site of the transferred beds. Certainly, there are factors present in the applications that are drawbacks, at least at first blush. With regard to the application for the replacement hospital filed by St. Luke's, there are no Medicaid or charity conditions. Historically, St. Luke's has only provided 1.57% of its patient days to Medicaid patients and has failed to meet indigent care conditions in the past. For fiscal year 2000, St. Luke's only provided slightly less than 9/10th of 1% of gross revenues to charity care patients. Part of the problem is that St. Luke's is located in an area with a population that is relatively affluent with the potential for few Medicaid and indigent patients since St. Luke's does not employ the outreach practices of St. Vincent's. Nonetheless, the Agency agrees with Memorial that the "weak point of the [St.Luke's/]Mayo application is indigent care." (Tr. 1437). Indigent care, however, is not an aspect of health care that Mayo has ever aspired to generally. Its mission is not to treat economically disadvantaged patients in favor of other patients or to treat certain percentages of indigent patients. Its mission is to offer health care services and medical treatment not ordinarily available at most local providers in an environment of research and medical education. As Mr. Walters explained at hearing with respect to Mayo's contribution to health care of the economically disadvantaged: Mayo can provide advances in science in our research initiatives. So as we deal with neuro-degenerative diseases and Alzheimer's, as we deal with finding the cures of cancer, these are advances in science that we believe are going to benefit all people, regardless of their ability to pay. (Tr. 241). Furthermore, St. Vincent's purchase of St. Luke's, with St. Vincent's dedication to serving the poor and history as a disproportionate share provider of Medicaid services offers the potential for the record of service to the indigent at the new St. Luke's to improve over St. Luke's historical record. The potential is enhanced by St. Vincent's practices of reaching out to the poor and the underserved. However one views the lack of indigent care conditions in St. Luke's application, there are certain drawbacks of the three applications. Baptist, for example, projects relatively low occupancy rates of only 37.8% and 48.37% in year 2005 and 2006, respectively. Obstetrics and Level II NICU services will not be provided at the replacement facility. For the Level II NICU services to continue to be provided at the new St. Luke's, if St. Luke's application and St. Vincent's application in this proceeding are granted, a separate CON will have to be approved for St. Vincent's at St. Luke's facility. That CON is subject to a separate proceeding under DOAH Case No. 02-0457CON. Approval of the St. Vincent's application, moreover, will have an impact on Memorial, an existing provider. Before addressing the drawbacks as well as the need for each of the proposals, there is one aspect of the case that must be clearly understood: the linkage between St. Luke's application and St. Vincent's. Linkage With regard to St. Luke's and St. Vincent's application, the issues regarding each must be viewed in the context of the interdependency of the two applications. If St. Luke's is denied, St. Vincent's project, whether approved or not, will not be able to proceed. There can be no sale to St. Vincent's of St. Luke's if the Mayo physicians do not have the facility on the Mayo campus. Likewise, if St. Vincent's application is denied, the effect on St. Luke's, whether its CON is approved or not, is that its project will not go forward. The St. Luke's project depends on the sale of St. Luke's to St. Vincent's for financing the construction of Mayo's replacement hospital. Without the funds from the sale of St. Luke's, the replacement hospital will not be built under the terms of St. Luke's CON application. The two projects are linked and interdependent; neither one can proceed without the way having been cleared for the other. The unusual aspect of the linkage of the St. Luke's and St. Vincent's applications is of central consideration in this case. That aside, as in any CON proceeding, the drawbacks to approval must be weighed and balanced against factors that favor approval within those statutory and rule criteria applicable in CON proceedings to allow a determination as to "need." Need for the Mayo Replacement Hospital Since the affiliation between St. Luke's and Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, St. Luke's, through a number of CON approvals, has added several adult tertiary services - bone marrow transplant, liver transplant, kidney transplant, pancreas transplant, heart transplant, and lung transplant. St. Luke's has also added community service obstetrics. The addition of obstetrics led to further service intensification through CON approval for another tertiary service at St. Luke's - a Level II NICU. The addition of these hospital services coupled with Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's capabilities and patient draw makes St. Luke's a tertiary/quaternary facility. Approximately 65% of the patients admitted to St. Luke's by Mayo physicians come from Duval County and elsewhere in District 4. Eighteen percent of the patients admitted by Mayo physicians come from the remainder of the State of Florida, and 17% come from elsewhere in the United States or from foreign countries. St. Luke's also serves as a teaching hospital in support of Mayo Clinical Jacksonville's medical education activities and by providing the inpatient training for the residency programs. St. Luke's achieved formal recognition as a teaching hospital in 1995, when it was accepted into the Counsel of Teaching Hospitals of the Association of American Medical Colleges. Some Mayo physicians are based at the St. Luke's campus. Those physicians are anesthesiologists, some family practice physicians, and the physicians involved in the solid organ transplant programs. St. Luke's is a modern facility in excellent shape. It has been accepted into the Council of Teaching Hospitals of the Association of American Medical Colleges. Although no evidence was adduced of physical plant requirements for such acceptance, the physical plant limitations of St. Luke's certainly did not impede its acceptance. St. Luke's is in the process, moreover, of seeking designation by the state as a teaching facility. As of the time of hearing that designation had not yet been achieved. Despite the quality of the facility, its recognition as an educational facility and the attempt by St. Luke's to achieve a "state" teaching hospital designation, the simple fact remains: St. Luke's was designed to be a basic community hospital. It remains adequate to support traditional community- focused non-Mayo programs. It has been adequate to support the transplant programs and the Mayo teaching mission and will continue to be so if Mayo closes the staff to Mayo physicians. It was not designed, however, with sufficient space, facilities, and other physical infrastructure to support the presence of both the contingent at its present size of community physicians and the Mayo physicians' rapidly growing clinical practice plus the vigorous medical education and research programs required of a Mayo hospital. St. Luke's is already experiencing capacity problems, with pressure on both its acute care beds and supporting acute care infrastructure produced by an average compound growth rate of 10% per annum over the past five years. St. Luke's will be at full capacity by the time the replacement hospital becomes operational if one uses a conservative growth rate of 5% per year. As Health Planner Mark Richardson put it at the hearing using the conservative 5% rate, "[t]he bottom line is that through the year 2006 and 2007, the expectation is that St. Luke's Hospital will not have enough beds to meet its needs." (Tr. 465). Mayo Clinic Jacksonville cannot maintain the status quo putting St. Luke's at a crossroad. The capacity problems must be addressed. One alternative to a replacement hospital would be closure of the medical staff at St. Luke's. It is not a desirable remedy. It would result in a significant adverse impact to the community physicians and their patients who have supported St. Luke's since its affiliation with Mayo in 1987. It ignores, moreover, St. Luke's original design as a community hospital. While it may be adequate for service as Mayo's clinical component to its Jacksonville base, it was not designed to meet the needs of the tertiary/quaternary facility it has become, nor as a hospital designed to support Mayo's vigorous medical teaching and research. Closure of the medical staff at St. Luke's will inhibit realization of the optimal service delivery approach favored by the Mayo Clinic integrated group practice model and used by Mayo Clinic Jacksonville physicians. Thus, closure of the staff at St. Luke's would have the dual effect that would serve neither the needs of community physicians now at St. Luke's nor Mayo physicians as well as they would be served by the approval of CON 9483. A substantial re-build of St. Luke's is not a practical means to keep the Mayo and community practices together at the hospital or even as a means to provide adequate facilities if the staff at the hospital were closed to Mayo physicians. Physical site restraints and significant local permitting obstacles such as planning and zoning regulations place substantial limitations on significant addition or renovation. Renovation falls short of the realization of the numerous efficiencies and other benefits that will accrue from consolidation of hospital operations on the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. Even if other obstacles were to be overcome, renovation would be inordinately expensive. On balance, "rebuild" dollars would be better spent by preserving St. Luke's as a community hospital operated by St. Vincent's and by addressing Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's needs in the most optimal manner by construction of the Replacement Hospital. The solution proposed by CON application 9483 provides a number of benefits. It resolves the bed and support space limitations at St. Luke's Belfort Road campus. It will provide improvement in the coordination of care achieved by consolidation of all clinical and administrative operations on the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus and establishment of a physical plant specifically designed to accommodate Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's mission and growth. Operational efficiencies will be enhanced. At the same time, the transfer of beds proposed by St. Vincent's avoids the abandonment of St. Luke's Belfort Road facility and significant capital invested there if St. Vincent's proposed project is approved with the added benefit of approval of providing an innovative financing mechanism for the replacement hospital. Current staff at St. Luke's is adequate for the staffing of the replacement hospital. If staffing vacancies occur, nonetheless, Mayo should do better than the industry as a whole in filling those vacancies. District 4 Health Plan Preferences St. Luke's gains credit under some of the District 4 Health Plan Preferences. It will meet identified needs by providing services that meet commonly accepted quality standards in the most economical manner in terms of capital and operating expenditures. St. Luke's has access to an adequate supply of appropriate manpower. The replacement hospital with the continued operation of St. Luke's by St. Vincent's will provide a full array of acute care services. St. Luke's has a patient transfer agreement with Duval County Health Department's Primary Care Program. And the transfer of beds to the replacement hospital is necessary to maintain an improved quality of care and is more cost efficient than renovation and an expansion of the existing St. Luke's facility. Mayo: No Longer a Participant in Medicare, Part B A Change in Mayo's Medicare Policy At the time of hearing, Mayo Clinic Jacksonville participated fully in Medicare. It accepted from Medicare patients assignment of all their Medicare claims including those for services provided by Mayo Clinic Jacksonville physicians to them at St. Luke's and for all clinic services provided them on the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville campus. On June 21, 2002 (the day after the conclusion on June 20 of the final hearing), Mayo Clinic Jacksonville announced in its weekly newsletter provided to Mayo Clinic and St. Luke's Hospital staffs an "[u]pcoming change in Medicare billing." (See Exhibit 1 to Memorial's Motion to Reopen the Record Based Upon Newly Discovered Evidence and to Schedule an Evidentiary Hearing.) The announced upcoming change was the decision of the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's Board of Governors that the Clinic would not participate in Medicare Part B effective January 1, 2003, a change in Mayo's Medicare Policy (the "Medicare Policy Change.") The Medicare Policy Change was the result of at least two factors. First, payment rates for physician services under Medicare Part B have been reduced by the Health Care Financing Administration. Further reductions are expected. Mayo suffers financial losses in the care of Medicare patients as it is. Mayo regards Medicare reimbursement to be inadequate and fears deeper financial losses. Non-participation in Medicare Part B allows Mayo to bill more for physician and clinic services and the possibility of not only staving off financial loss in the treatment of Medicare patients but achieving financial gain. Second, Medicare business, as percentage of all Mayo business, is increasing. In a letter dated July 3, 2002, the Medicare Policy Change and its effects on the Medicare patient were explained by Denis A. Cortese, M.D., Chair of the Board of Governors: Dear Medicare Patient: I'm writing to give you advance notice of an important billing change that will effect all our Medicare patients next year. As you know, Mayo Clinic in Jacksonville accepts payment from Medicare directly on your behalf for Medicare Part B services at the clinic and St. Luke's Hospital. Effective Jan. 1, 2003, Mayo Jacksonville will switch to another Medicare-approved billing system and fee structure. This change means that Medicare will send payments directly to you, and you will be responsible for paying Mayo. You will also pay more out of pocket for our services. This switch concerns only professional and outpatient services covered by Medicare Part B medical insurance, not hospital facility services covered by Medicare Part A hospital insurance. * * * We value your confidence in us, and we realize these billing changes will require adjustments on both out parts. Mayo Clinic is a not-for-profit organization, and our ability to continue to provide quality patient care, education and research rests on prudent financial management. This year, Medicare cut payments to doctors by 5.4 percent, the steepest across-the-board cut in the program's history. Additional cuts totaling 14.2 percent are planned from 2003 through 2005. Continuing to accept such inadequate reimbursement is not responsible business practice and would seriously jeopardize our ability to sustain Mayo- quality services. It's important to note that: Medicare will send payment directly to you. It will be your responsibility to pay Mayo. You may be asked to pay some out- of-pocket expenses at the time of service. Mayo will continue to submit claims to Medicare for you. However, you will have to submit a claim form and necessary paperwork to any supplemental policies you have. * * * (Exhibit 10, attached to Memorial Ex. 54, Deposition of Mary Hoffman). In its September 2002 Practice Team Newsletter, St. Luke's reiterated the news about the Medicare Policy Change: . . . Effective Jan. 1, 2003, we will switch to a different billing system and fee structure, meaning we will no longer "accept assignment." This means that Medicare will send payments directly to patients who will be responsible for paying Mayo. Patients will also pay more out of pocket for these services. This switch concerns only professional and outpatient services covered by Medicare Part B medical insurance, not hospital facility services covered by Medicare Part A hospital insurance. Also excluded from the change in billing procedure are anesthesia, pathology and radiology services provided by Mayo physicians at St. Luke's Hospital for community patients and Emergency Department services for both community and Mayo patients. (Exhibit 14, attached to Memorial Ex. 54, Deposition of Mary Hoffman). On August 2, 2002, Memorial moved to reopen the record in the case and to schedule an evidentiary hearing. The motion was based on the assertion that the Medicare Policy Change poses the potential of reducing the volume at St. Luke's and "significantly impacts the ability of St. Luke's, and in particular, community physicians, to treat patients covered by the Medicare program." Memorial's Motion to Reopen the Record, etc., filed at DOAH Aug. 2, 2002, p. 3. The motion further asserted that "[t]his change could have a profound impact on St. Luke's argument that it needs to relocate its operations to its proposed replacement hospital . . . Memorial should be permitted discovery to ascertain the impact of St. Luke's and Mayo Clinic's decision not to accept assignment for Medicare patients." Id., at 4. The motion was granted. Memorial was permitted to conduct discovery and an evidentiary hearing took place on September 27, 27 and October 8, 2002. Part A; Part B In general, Medicare Part A payments are provided to hospitals for hospital services including skilled nursing care. Payments are made for some additional services, for example, in the case of the disabled, there are payments for some disability services. Medicare Part B payments are for services provided by physicians to the patient, whether as an inpatient in a hospital setting or an outpatient. Medicare Part B payments are also for all services, physician and otherwise, rendered by clinics (such as Mayo Clinic Jacksonville.) Medicare Part B payments also cover the portion of outpatient hospital services attributable to the hospital. For simplicity's sake and for purposes of understanding the issues in this case it makes sense to think of Medicare Part B payments as covering physician and clinic services and Medicare Part A payments as those covering hospital services other than the portion of those services attributable to a physician. As Richard Baehr, Memorial's health planning witness, testified, "And for . . . outpatient services, if . . . in a hospital, there is a facility component which is actually covered by Part B, but it's a hospital service, so there is no[] change as a result of what's going on here." (Tr. 2940). There is a technical component and a professional component to Medicare payments. The technical component covers expenses associated with the technicians, the equipment, the facility and the overhead. The professional component covers none of these. It covers the fees associated with the professional services of the physician. If a service is performed on the campus at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, because Medicare Part B covers all services of a clinic, both technical and professional, then Mayo bills Medicare Part B for the entire procedure including both components, technical and professional. "It's called a global fee." (Memorial Ex. 54, p. 40). If a Mayo physician is involved in a service performed at St. Luke's then the billing is split. Mayo bills Medicare Part B for the professional services of the physician only. It does not bill for any of the technical services associated with the facility. To use an example, if an MRI is conducted on campus at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville for a Medicare patient, then Mayo bills Medicare Part B for the global fee covering both the technical components attributable to the facility and the professional components attributable to the interpreting imaging specialist. If the same MRI is conducted at St. Luke's, then Mayo bills Medicare Part B for the interpreting physician's fees but not for the technical component. The technical component is covered by Medicare Part A for the MRI conducted at St. Luke's. Impact to Medicare Patients at St. Luke's There is a definite impact of the Medicare Policy Change to St. Luke's patients of Mayo physicians. As Dr. Cortese informed Medicare patients, for Mayo physician services provided at St. Luke's "there will be now a different rate of payment and a different method of payment." (Tr. 2940). That impact did not exist before the change. Prior to adoption of the change, St. Luke's under assignment of the patient's right to the Medicare payment would have billed Medicare and any co-insurer directly for the Mayo physician's services at the payment rate acceptable to Medicare for the service. The patient would never see a bill. Once the patient assigned Medicare benefits to the participating physician, there would be no impact to the patient, either in terms of having to file additional paperwork with Medicare or in terms of having to pay out-of-pocket expenses. After the effective date of Mayo's decision to no longer participate in Medicare Part B, there is a two-fold impact to the Mayo physician's patient at St. Luke's. First, there is a paperwork burden. The patient must seek Medicare reimbursement for the non-participating physician's fees by filing the necessary forms with Medicare. Second, there is an expense burden. The patient will be left with an additional out-of- pocket expense not covered by Medicare or co-insurance. Medicare reimburses 80% of a Medicare Allowed Amount to the claimant (the patient or, in the case of an assignment, the assignee who files the claim for Medicare reimbursement). In the case of assignment, the assignee can also bill the remaining 20% of the Allowed Amount for participants from the patient's co- insurer. The assignee is capable of being paid 100% of the Medicare Allowed Amount for participating physicians. This arrangement satisfies entirely the Medicare patient's responsibility for the charge. The patient with co-insurance need file no paperwork with Medicare and suffers no out-of-pocket expense. For the patient of non-participating physicians, the double impact will occur. The Medicare Allowed Amount for non- participating physicians is set at 95% of the Medicare Allowed Amount for participating physicians. In the absence of an assignment, a non-participating physician can send a Medicare patient a bill up to 15% higher than the Allowed Amount for a service by non-participating physicians. For a non-participating physician who chooses to maximize the allowable billing for a Medicare patient, then, the bill sent to the patient is higher than the total amount that would have been claimed from Medicare and any co-insurer under assignment by a participating physician. To illustrate the financial impact if Mayo's Medicare Policy Change to a Medicare patient of a non-participating physician, Memorial's Health Planner, Richard Baehr gave an example of a physician service for which $100 is set by Medicare as the Allowed Amount for a participating physician: In the past [prior to Mayo's decision to not participate], [Medicare] would have paid 80 percent of that [$80], and 20 percent would have been [covered] by co-insurance [$20, for a total of $100, the Allowed Amount for participating physicians]. * * * [After the Medicare patient receives health services from a participating Mayo physician,] [t]he Mayo Clinic physicians accept assignment. They are participating [in Medicare Part B]. And what happens is the patient has a service and basically goes home. Everything is billed by the physician, both for the $80 [to be paid by Medicare under Medicare Part B] and [for] the $20, [the physician] bill[s] the insurance company. As a result of this change [Mayo's decision to no longer participate], instead of $100 being the amount that Mayo could charge for the physician component, it is now $109 roughly. [To be precise, it is $109.25, $95 (95% of the Medicare Allowed Amount of $100 for participating physicians) plus $14.25 (115% of the Allowed Amount of $95 for non- participating physicians.)] But Medicare now recognizes only $95 as the [Allowed] [A]mount because [Mayo] is nonparticipating. * * * So the difference between $95 and $109[.25] is now patient responsibility. Before [the decision not to participate, patient responsibility] . . . would have been zero. Now it is $14[.25]. So you can multiply . . . if the bill is $2000, then [the patient's responsibility] is 20 times that $14[.25, i.e., $284]. (Tr. 2945, 2946). Non-participating physicians have the option of choosing to accept assignment for any particular patient. If assignment is accepted, the non-participating fee schedule or Allowed Amount (95% of the participating fee schedule or Allowed Amount) is still applicable to the non-participating physician's services. In the case of an assignment, however, the non- participating physician cannot bill the patient for anything beyond the 20% of the amount Medicare pays even if the charge is the maximum. The patient does not have the additional out-of- pocket expense incurred from the billing of a non-participating physician who does not accept assignment. Drawing on Mr. Baehr's example, for a non- participating physician who accepts assignment, the charge may be $109.25. The Medicare payment will be $76 (80% of $95, the Allowed Amount for a non-participating physician) and the patient or the co-insurer will only have to pay the physician $19 (20% of $95). The remainder of the $109.25 charge ($14.25) cannot be billed to the patient because the non-participating physician (or clinic) has chosen to accept assignment of the patient's Medicare claim. Affected Patients at St. Luke's At St. Luke's, Mayo's Medicare Policy Change will affect mainly those patients admitted by Mayo physicians. The impact to patients admitted by community physicians will be slight. After the effective date of the change, a patient admitted by a community physician and treated exclusively by community physicians will not be affected. A patient admitted by a community physician and treated by a Mayo physician rendering services in four specialties of medicine (radiology, pathology, anesthesia or emergency) will not be affected. Mayo will accept non- participating assignment for its physicians with regard to those patients. It chose to accept assignment for non-participating physicians in these four areas with the hope of minimizing the effect of the Medicare Policy Change on patients admitted by community physicians. The only community physician admitted patients who will be affected by the Medicare Policy Change are those that involve a consultation by Mayo physicians in specialties other than the four for which non-participating assignment is accepted. The impact was explained by Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's Chief Financial Officer: [Mayo has] looked into the number of occurrences where a request is made for a Mayo physician to consult on the community patient. Our statistics show that this is a relatively . . . small number of requests. . . . [T]hose occurrences approximate 110 times for all patients, with Medicare patients being approximately half of that. So on an annual basis we're talking about 50, 60 patients [who are Medicare beneficiaries]. And we have various options available to continue to evaluate so that we can fully support the community practice. * * * One of those options is for us to take assignment on those handful of consults. If we do that, there will no financial impact or balance billing occurring for those Medicare patients. If upon our further evaluation we determine that we want to bill those as a nonparticipating physician and balance bill, we have looked at our fees for consultations, . . . level five is the highest level that we can bill for consultation. For the Medicare program that fee approximates $200. So for those 50 to 60 [community physician admitted] patients, . . . they would incur an additional out-of- pocket expense of approximately 20 to $30. (Memorial Ex. 54, p. 46, 47). The decision had not yet been made as to whether to accept assignment in the case of these patients. Whatever the decision, this segment of Medicare patients will experience the paperwork burden of filing with Medicare. The Medicare Policy Change will impose the paperwork and financial burdens on patients admitted to St. Luke's by Mayo physicians for the physician components of those services. The Medicare Policy Change is likely to have some impact on the volume of Medicare business at St. Luke's because the added paperwork and financial burdens will likely discourage some number of the Medicare patients admitted by Mayo physicians (however small that number may be) from using St. Luke's. Memorial presented a sensitivity analysis showing the effect on patient day volume at St. Luke's using two assumptions deemed by its health care planner to be realistic reductions in Medicare volume as a result of the Medicare Policy Change: 10% and 20%. There were three bases for the selection of 10% and 20%: first, analysis in a Mayo Task Force report; second, a reference to expected impact made by Mayo Clinic Jacksonville's Chief Financial Officer in deposition testimony; and third, "the nature of the state, the nature of the population affected and the unique nature of this change . . . ." (Tr. 3001). 1. The Task Force Analysis. Mayo conducted a "Net Revenue Sensitivity Analysis" for 2001 showing dollar increases or decreases with Medicare volume reductions of 1%, 2.5%, 5%, and 10%. The analysis appears twice in the Mayo Clinic Jacksonville Medicare Participation Task Force Report and Recommendations, May 2002. (See I. A. p. 9 and D. p. 4 of Exhibit 8 attached to Memorial Ex. 54, Deposition of Mary Hoffman). The Task Force Report also showed that the impact on revenue would be neutral at a 4% reduction in Medicare volume. It would lead to an increase of $3.7 million in net revenue to the clinic and the hospital with a 10% loss of Medicare volume if there was 100% replacement of the lost volume with patients with commercial or managed care health insurance. Because of the use of 10% by Mayo in the report, Memorial's health planner adopted 10% as the minimum volume reduction. There is no evidence, however, that Mayo projected that there would be a 10% reduction (or any other reduction) in Medicare volume in the wake of the Medicare Policy Change. Mr. Baehr, himself, recognized as much. With the caveat, that "hospital management doesn't always provide the worst-case scenarios to hospital boards," (tr. 3037), Mr. Baehr agreed that he didn't think the "unique purpose [of the analysis] was to identify a specific point estimate of what was likely to be the negative impact . . . on number of Medicare patients." (Tr. 3036). The Task Force reveals only the effect on net revenues if certain reduction up to and including 10% were to occur. To the contrary of projecting an estimate of a 10% loss of Medicare patients, in fact, the Task Force Report concluded that dropping Medicare assignment should not significantly reduce the demands for complex tertiary care and may not reduce the use of primary and secondary care. The task force was concerned about minimizing negative media responses to the Medicare Policy Change and patient perceptions that might arise to media reports and the change, itself. It concluded, however, at p. 4 of the Executive Summary in Part B, "Marketing Report-Focus Groups", after conducting and analyzing focus group responses: If the situation is explained well to patients, dropping Medicare assignment is unlikely to have a dramatic impact on Medicare patient volumes at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville. In fact, after patients saw an example of the financial impact that the change would have on them, very few, if any, of the patients in the focus groups would leave Mayo Clinic Jacksonville. Rather than shopping around when they require expensive procedures, some patients might consider seeing another physician if they had a cold or for other primary care needs, but most would not even consider doing that. Several of the patients mentioned that they chose to live in Jacksonville because Mayo Clinic is located there. It will take more than this change to cause them to seek care elsewhere. (Ex. 8 attached to Memorial Ex. 54, Deposition of Mary Hoffman.) While the Task Force's expectations of de minimis impact may be wishful thinking or the product of not providing worst-case scenarios to the Mayo Board of Governors as alluded to by Mr. Baehr, it is not in Mayo's interests to misjudge the impact to Medicare volumes. Levels of volumes are required to sustain many of the tertiary and quaternary procedures provided by Mayo, the procedures that have driven the demand at St. Luke's that supports Mayo's case for need for the replacement hospital in the first place. As the Task Force recommended, it was essential prior to the Medicare Policy Change that Mayo "[f]eel comfortable that dropping Medicare assignment will not significantly reduce Medicare patients' demands for complex, tertiary care . . . ." (Id., at p. 6 of B.) The Task Force analysis does not support Mr. Baehr's selection of 10% or any higher percentage as a reasonable reduction in volume. To the extent that the Task Force attempted to project a volume reduction it concluded that there was not likely to be significant reduction. The use of 10% in the sensitivity analysis showed only what the financial impact of such a reduction would be; it did not project that such a reduction would occur. 2. The Testimony of MCJ's CFO Ms. Mary Hoffman is the Chair for the Department of Financial Services at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville, the clinic's Chief Financial Officer. Financial activities at both the clinic and at St. Luke's are within the scope of her duties. Before assuming the position she had occupied a similar position at Mayo Clinic Scottsdale for 10 years. She served as the point person for the Task Force that reviewed Mayo's Medicare policies and made recommendations that led to the Medicare Policy Change. When asked why the Task Force Sensitivity Analysis used a range of 1% to 10% reduction in Medicare volume, Ms. Hoffman answered, "Our assessment is the majority of the Medicare patients will continue to seek care at Mayo Clinic Jacksonville." (Memorial Ex. 54, p. 126). Ms. Hoffman did not testify as to what constituted a "majority" in terms of a percentage. Ms. Hoffman went on to explain that "if" (id.,) there were Medicare patients that "may" (id.,)consider not coming it would be those with primary care needs. Those with specialty care and ultimately hospitalization, she opined, were likely to seek services at St. Luke's. Mayo, moreover, she asserted, did not believe that there would be a significant reduction in volume and if there were any reduction it would ultimately be filled by growth in non-Medicare volume. There is nothing in Ms. Hoffman's testimony to suggest that she thought there would be a minimum reduction in Medicare volume of 10% or that any analysis by a qualified expert had been undertaken to project such a percentage reduction. Her testimony cannot serve as a basis for the conclusion that there would be a reduction of 10% or higher. The Nature of Things The third basis for Memorial's health planner's selection of a 10 to 20% reduction is "the nature of the state, the nature of the population affected and the unique nature of this change." Florida is a state with a significant population of Medicare beneficiaries. The Duval County Medicare population is not affluent generally. Mayo's Medicare Policy Change is unique, "nobody else in the state has done this." (Tr. 3001.) As Mr. Baehr testified, "[t]his is a situation where you're going from A to B. The impact is unknown. How significantly the reaction will be by Medicare patients, by community doctors, that's an unknown. All right. I can't specifically tell you that I think the number will be X. What I can say is because of the nature of the change, and the nature of the population affected, and the fact that demographically this is not a generally affluent Medicare community, the potential impact is more severe here than it might be in some other community where the population, the Medicare population was more affluent, where a smaller percentage of the patient population was served in the local community. (Tr. 3001, 3002). There is no expectation in Memorial's analysis that there will be any refill of Medicare patients lost as the result of the Medicare Policy Change. In the time frames shown in the application, any Medicare patients lost could be refilled by additional demand. Need for St. Vincent's Proposal Occupancy St. Vincent's projected that it would have an 84% occupancy for the first year of its operation at St. Luke's. The projection was overstated because of error in the analysis, however. It employed a base population of 511,089 in 2000 to project population growth when it should have used 537,182 as the base population for the year 2000. There is a second error in the St. Vincent methodology for projecting first year occupancy. It included psychiatric and substance abuse cases among the number of patients originating in Subdistrict 4-3 that use St. Vincent's in Subdistrict 4-2 for hospital services. The new St. Luke's will not provide psychiatric and substance abuse services. St. Vincent's was also criticized by Memorial for inflating the number of normal newborn admissions by double counting the mother and the baby as separate cases. Ms. Sharon Gordon-Girven adjusted for the errors and the criticism in testimony. In so doing, she discovered that zip codes for St. Johns County had been inadvertently excluded from the St. Vincent's analysis. Adjusting for the errors, the exclusion and the criticism reduces the average daily census for the hospital proposed by St. Vincent's from 114 to 108. An average daily census of 108 in a 135-bed hospital constitutes an 80% occupancy rate. St. Luke's is conveniently located near the intersection of two major highways in Jacksonville. Its emergency department is a busy one. At the time of hearing, an ER expansion project was underway to increase the size and number of the bays so the hospital could accommodate more patients. It is reasonable to assume the one-half of the ER volume currently associated with Mayo physicians would remain at St. Luke's because it will remain the closest facility for many patients. Currently, a significant number of patients leave Subdistrict 4-3 to go to St. Vincent's in Subdistrict 4-2. They utilize St. Vincent's primarily because of a referral to a specialty physician practicing at St. Vincent's. After the Phase 2 closing, St. Vincent's will encourage these specialty physicians to join the medical staff of St. Luke's and to see and care for patients who reside in Subdistrict 4-3 at St. Vincent's at St. Luke's. It is reasonable to assume that St. Vincent's will be able to direct 75% of these patients to St. Luke's after the Phase 2 closing. There is an adequate basis for Ms. Gordon-Girven's opinion that there is a need based on projected occupancies to retain a community hospital at St. Luke's Belfort Road campus. Staffing The parties stipulated that the staffing projections contained in St. Vincent's application were reasonable with two exceptions: the reasonableness of the projected salaries for nurses and St. Vincent's ability to recruit staff for the new hospital. The salary projections for nurses in St. Vincent's application were based on the midpoint of St. Vincent's pay grade for nurses at the time the application was prepared plus an estimated inflation factor of 3% per year. The midpoint represents the middle of the pay grade, not the average salary. The average salary is typically lower that the midpoint, and new staff are not hired near the midpoint salary unless they have considerable experience. St. Vincent's salary projections are reasonable. There is a shortage of skilled nurses and allied professionals in District 4. St. Vincent's has been successful in combating the shortage. St. Vincent's vacancy rate for nurses is lower that the state and national average. The lower rate is due, in part, to St. Vincent's effort to recruit and retain nurses. St. Vincent's has four nursing recruiters. It has recruited nurses from overseas, including four nursing schools in the Philippines, and has the ability to recruit from other hospitals in Ascension Health's national network. In addition, it sponsors a number of internship programs for other allied health professionals, including pharmacy interns, radiology technologist, a nuclear medicine program, and an ultrasound school. St. Vincent's is also involved in a number of educational initiatives, including relationships with high schools and local community colleges. Finally, St. Vincent's emphasizes a strong connection between employees and their immediate supervisors to create a nurturing environment for new staff. At the time of hearing, St. Vincent's had a zero- vacancy rate for pharmacists and respiratory therapists and only a single opening for a physical therapist, a position not difficult to fill. St. Vincent's established that it would be able to staff St. Luke's after the Phase 2 closing. First, Mayo will have more staff at St. Luke's that it will need for operation of the replacement hospital. After Mayo staffs the replacement hospital, there will be additional Mayo staff available to work for St. Vincent's at St. Luke's. While the replacement hospital will no doubt be an appealing place to work for many of the current St. Luke's staff, it is reasonable to assume that some staff currently at St. Luke's will prefer to remain at St. Luke's under St. Vincent's. Second, some existing staff at St. Vincent's now will be available for recruitment for any additional staff that St. Vincent's needs for St. Vincent's at St. Luke's. Third, both Mayo and St. Vincent's will be able to achieve efficiencies if both projects are approved. Mayo will achieve efficiencies through the location of all staff on one campus. St. Vincent will be able to achieve staff efficiencies because some supervisory roles can be filled by one individual overseeing staff at both St. Luke's and St. Vincent's. Fourth, St. Vincent's has a history of successful recruitment and retention of staff even through the recent nursing shortage; there is nothing to suggest that its efforts in the past will not continue to succeed. Finally, none of the applicants are proposing the addition of any new beds to the District. Statutory and Rule Criteria Section 408.035(1) - District Health Plan Section 408.035(1) addresses the need for the project being proposed in relation to the applicable district health plan (the Plan). The Plan contains five generic preferences and seven preferences specific to acute care services. The first generic preference is for applicants who demonstrate they will meet identified needs by providing services which meet commonly accepted quality standards in a most economical manner in terms of capital and operating expenditures. St. Vincent's ability to provide quality care at St. Luke's was stipulated to by the parties. That St. Luke's Hospital is already licensed, functional, and in excellent condition for a community hospital will permit St. Vincent's to initiate operations at that facility with efficiency. In addition, there are various operational efficiencies that will be realized by a two-hospital system with the hospitals in proximity to each other. Senior staff, educational programs, PRN staff and other operational systems can be shared by both hospitals. The Plan's second generic preference is for applicants who demonstrate that they can alleviate a current or potential geographic access problem. The closure of St. Luke's staff will not create a geographic access problem. Nonetheless, if these applications are not approved, the closure of St. Luke's medical staff to Mayo-only physicians would severely limit St. Luke's Hospital as a community resource and reduce choice for access of physicians and patients to hospital facilities. St. Luke's excellent location enhances access to hospital services. The third preference is for applicants who demonstrate that the proposed service has access to an adequate supply of appropriate health manpower. St. Vincent's will be able to obtain the necessary manpower for its project. The fourth preference is for applicants who demonstrate that new or expanded bed capacity will not have a significant negative impact on other health care facilities. For the reasons stated below regarding consistency with Section 408.035(2), approval of the Mayo and St. Vincent's applications will adversely affect Memorial although the weight of that impact is slight. The fifth preference, which is for applicants who commit to maximizing service to rural county residents, is not applicable. As noted above, the Plan also has seven preferences specific to applications for acute care beds. The first of these is for applicants who propose to convert licensed unused beds or use existing space rather than new construction. St. Vincent's application clearly meets this preference. While St. Vincent's is proposing to establish a new hospital, the application does not propose any new construction, but rather the use of the existing St. Luke's facility. Beds are also being "left behind" by Mayo and "transferred" from St. Vincent's. The second preference is for applicants who demonstrate that they provide a full array of acute care of services, including medical-surgical, intensive care, pediatric and obstetrical services within the market for which they are applying. St. Vincent's application proposes a full array of services; therefore, its application meets this preference. The third preference is for existing facilities where the number of beds to be awarded is 50 beds or less. The applicant's proposal meets this preference because it is not proposing the addition of any new beds to the district. The fourth preference is for applicants proposing to acquire or consolidate facilities where it can be demonstrated that services will be improved and costs to the public will be reduced. Costs to the public will not be reduced but services will be improved over what they would be without approval. The fifth preference is for applicants who submit in their CON application copies of their current written transfer agreements with the county health department primary care program. St. Vincent's did not submit written transfer agreements. Still, St. Vincent's routinely works with the county health unit to provide access to care, including prenatal care, obstetrical services, primary care and children's care, along with prevention, education and health promotion. For example, St. Vincent's works with the Duval County Health Department to identify where its mobile vans should go to provide its mobile health services to the urban poor. In addition, St. Vincent's hires physicians arranged through various county departments of health for its family practice residency program. The sixth preference is for applicants who demonstrate that the transfer of beds is necessary to maintain or improve care. The transfer of the beds from St. Vincent's will maintain a substantial part of the care now provided by community physicians at St. Luke's. St. Vincent's application meets this preference. The seventh preference is for applicants that demonstrate that the transfer of beds is more cost efficient than the renovation and expansion of an existing facility. St. Vincent's application meets this preference because it proposes the transfer of beds from St. Vincent's without any need to expand or renovate the existing St. Luke's Hospital campus. The Plan's last preference is for an applicant that proposes to locate transferred beds in an area that would improve access to Medicaid and indigent patients. In its application, St. Vincent's has committed to significantly expand the volume of Medicaid and indigent care provided at St. Luke's. Although the population in the primary service area of St. Luke's is an affluent one, given its mission, history and outreach programs to Medicaid and charity care patients, approval of St. Vincent's application will increase access for Medicaid patients, indigent patients and underserved populations. Section 408.035(2) - Availability, Accessibility, and Extent of Utilization of Existing Facilities The dual character of St. Luke's as a national and regional referral center for Mayo Clinic Jacksonville and as a community hospital to serve the local population cannot continue indefinitely. Unless the Mayo and St. Vincent's applications are approved, Mayo will be forced to close the medical staff at St. Luke's to Mayo-only physicians and the community physicians and their patients will be forced out of that facility. If this is allowed to occur, the accessibility of St. Luke's to the local community will be significantly diminished. Section 408.035(3) - Quality of Care By stipulation of the parties, it was agreed that St. Vincent's has a demonstrated history of providing quality of care and the ability to do so at St. Luke's. Sections 408.035(4) & (5) - Need for Special Services; Needs of Education and Research Institutions The parties stipulated that Mayo's application satisfies the statutory criteria contained in Sections 408.035(4) and (5). St. Vincent's application does not itself propose special services that are not available in adjoining areas. As to Section 408.035(5), St. Vincent's provides continuing medical and professional training, and otherwise meets the criteria contained in that statute. Section 408.035(6) - Availability of Resources In the Prehearing Stipulation, the parties agreed that St. Vincent's has sufficient management personnel, and funds for capital and operating expenditures to accomplish the proposed project. At final hearing, the parties further stipulated to the reasonableness of the full-time employees ("FTEs") projected in the application. While the parties did not stipulate to the salary projections, based on the greater weight of the evidence the salary projections are reasonable. Although evidence was presented as to the current nursing shortage, St. Vincent's demonstrated that it has the ability to recruit the necessary staff for its proposed facility. Section 408.035(7) - Enhancing Access Approval of St. Vincent's application will enhance access to health care for all residents of District 4. St. Vincent's is committed to serving all residents, including but not limited to Medicaid patients, Medicare patients, and charity care patients. The community doctors are also committed to St. Luke's 135-year tradition of providing care that is accessible to all members of the Jacksonville Community. If St. Vincent's application is denied, the accessibility of St. Luke's for these groups will be reduced because Mayo will be forced to close the medical staff of the facility to community doctors, and the "community" portion of St. Luke's dual character will be lost. Approval of the application, on the other hand, will ensure that Florida's oldest hospital founded out of concern for care of the poor remains open, committed to its original mission. Subdistrict 4-3 has experienced and is projected to continue to experience significant population growth. Approval of St. Vincent's application will enhance access for this growing population. Section 408.035(8) - Financial Feasibility The parties stipulated that St. Vincent's has the available funds for capital and operating expenditures. The applicant demonstrated the immediate financial feasibility of the project. St. Vincent's demonstrated the long term financial feasibility by the greater weight of the evidence. The projected payor mix was reasonably estimated based upon the patients in the primary service area (excluding those services that will not be provided at St. Luke's). St. Vincent's volume projections are reasonable. Likewise, its projections of revenues and expenses are also reasonable and conservative. The applicant has reasonably projected a profit beginning with the first year of operation. The evidence demonstrated long term financial feasibility. Section 408.035(9) - Fostering Competition The impacts of competition will not have any negative effect on quality of care or cost effectiveness of any existing provider including Memorial. Even if all three applications at issue in this proceeding are approved, Memorial will continue to prosper. There was no evidence to suggest that approval would cause Memorial to close, or affect its ability to operate efficiently. On the other hand, if Mayo closes the medical staff of St. Luke's Hospital, Jacksonville would lose a community hospital that offers competition to Memorial and the other providers in the subdistrict and district. St. Vincent's accepts a wide range of payors, including both managed care providers and traditional indemnity. For this reason, approval will not only preserve but increase choice for both physicians and patients. Section 408.035(10) - Costs and Methods of Construction Memorial characterizes the expenditures for the acquisition of St. Luke's and the construction of the Mayo hospital as separate costs and an exorbitant amount. However, the same dollars used to buy one hospital are also used to build the other. This can also be viewed as a creative use of limited resources. Memorial's financial witness contended that code upgrade costs of up to $80-Million should have been included as part of St. Vincent's projected project costs. However, since code upgrades are not required, (see "Construction Code Issue" Section, below,) those costs will not be incurred and therefore were properly excluded by St. Vincent's. St. Vincent's does not propose any construction or renovations being made to St. Luke's. Therefore, the criteria contained in Section 408.035(10) are satisfied. Section 408.035(11) - Provision of Indigent Care The parties stipulated that St. Vincent's has a demonstrated history of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Therefore, there is no question about its commitment to providing services to the poor and disadvantaged. The proposed commitment to charity patients contained in the application (7.37% of patient days to self-pay, 6.68% to Medicaid patients) is reasonable. It is based on the assumption that St. Vincent's at St. Luke's would realize the average payor mix of all hospitals in Subdistrict 4-3. It would not have been appropriate for St. Vincent's to assume that its payor mix would realize the payor mix of any one hospital in Subdistrict 4-3. For example, St. Luke's has provided 2.26% of its patient days to self pay (including charity/indigent patients) and 1.57% of its patient days to Medicaid patients, relatively low percentages. St. Vincent's with its superior history of care to the medically indigent is likely to provide much higher percentages. Given the variability among hospitals in the subdistrict, it was reasonable for St. Vincent's to propose commitments based on the average payor mix of all hospitals in the district. Rule Criteria There are two rule criteria that relate to this application. They are Rule 59C-1.038, acute care bed priority considerations, and Rule 59C-1.030, additional review criteria. Under the Rule 59C-1.038 there are two priorities, only the first of which (documented history of providing services to medically indigent patients or a commitment to do so) is applicable. St. Vincent's application satisfies this priority. The criteria in Rule 59C-1.030 generally address the extent to which there is a need for a particular service and the extent to which the service will be accessible to underserved members of the population. Approval of St. Vincent's application will increase the accessibility of St. Luke's to underserved groups. Approval of St. Vincent's application will promote access to health care. It will ensure that a community hospital in existence since 1873 and at its current location since 1983, will continue. When Mayo opens the replacement hospital, there will be an average daily census of approximately 90 "community" patients left behind who will continue to need "community" hospital care. Approval will ensure that the community physicians currently practicing at St. Luke's will be able to continue at the Belfort Road facility without interruption. This option is foreclosed if Mayo closes the staff at St. Luke's. St. Vincent's has a significant number of contracts with different managed-care providers, both HMOs and PPOs, and traditional indemnity providers. St. Vincent's at St. Luke's will provide the community with a wider array of payors from which to chose. Approval will foster competition and give patients greater choice. Given St. Vincent's mission and historical record of care, approval should also increase access for Medicaid patients and other traditionally underserved groups. Construction Code Issue St. Vincent's application and St. Luke's application are predicated upon a condition related to the building and life safety requirements applicable to the construction of a new hospital (and a new NICU, the subject in DOAH Case No. 02- 0457CON). The requirements will not be imposed by AHCA on St. Vincent's licensure and operation at St. Luke's provided that there is no break in hospital operations at St. Luke's hospital between the time of St. Luke's operation of the hospital to the time that St. Vincent's commences operations there. The State Agency Action Reports ("SAARs") on CON Applications Nos. 9484P (St. Vincent's) and 9481 (St. Luke's) provide as follows: CONDITIONS * * * (6) provided there is no break in licensure, the building requirements associated with the establishment of a new hospital shall not be imposed by AHCA. St. Luke's Exhibit 18, p. 90; St. Vincent's Exhibit 5, p. 34. St. Vincent's application does not involve the construction of a new facility. Nor does it call for the conversions of one type of facility to another. St. Vincent's application does not call for designing, constructing, erecting, altering, modifying, repairing or demolishing a hospital as part of its application. The application proposes that the condition be met; it proposes no break in operation at the facility when control is transferred from St. Luke's to St. Vincent's. Need for Baptist's Proposal Baptist targeted the extreme southern part of Duval County to site its proposed project as an area in need of emergency services and with potential for growth of outpatient services. The proposed site is at the center of where development is occurring, where jobs are going and where homes are being built. Today, approximately 3500 people work in the Grand Park commercial development. A number of other job centers are moving to southern Duval County. The population base and the employment base are moving south from central Duval County. The 2001 population for Baptist's proposed service area, unchallenged in this proceeding, was over 121,000 and is projected to exceed 147,000 by 2010. The proposed site will be at the center of significant highway expansion that already exists or is presently underway in the area. The site is visible from Interstate 95. The interstate is six-laned through the southern part of the county to the St. Johns County line. A new interchange has been approved and all funding committed for this site. The site is proximate to the I-295 Beltway, with a connector road known as 9- A under construction. A second connecting road, 9-B, will be constructed just south of the new site. This road has been funded and construction will commence in the near future. Old St. Augustine Road, on which the hospital will be located, will be expanded to four lanes from Interstate 295 to Interstate 95. The funding for this project is part of the Better Jacksonville Plan, a $2.2 billion long-term plan already approved by area voters and funded through a half-penny sales tax. The hospital proposed by Baptist is needed to support the healthcare needs of a dynamically growing service area. There is a vacuum of hospital services in the area; the closest hospital is 25 miles away. The proposed project will be operated under the same license as Baptist downtown from which its 92 beds will be transferred making it a satellite hospital. There will be significant integration of services so as to avoid duplication of such areas as information service management, human resource management, materials management and supply handling, laundry and others. Prior to filing its application, Baptist evaluated the bed capacity of the downtown campus and determined it could safely transfer 92 beds without creating a drain on the resources of that facility. There is no dispute that Baptist has the excess capacity to transfer the 92 beds as proposed. At 92 beds, the proposed Baptist hospital is almost identical in size to the 90-bed Baptist Beaches hospital. While Baptist Beaches serves a different market with different demographics, the Baptist System has experience in successfully operating this size hospital in an area served by a similar population volume. Baptist already operates a life flight helicopter transport as a part of Baptist Health System. The proposed new hospital will have a helipad in order to provide rapid movement of patients needing tertiary services offered at the downtown campus. Prior to pursuing this application, Baptist retained experts in architecture and construction to advise the hospital of its options with regard to these same 64 beds. All parties reached the conclusion that replacing the 64 beds at the downtown campus was not a viable option. If its application is not approved, it will be difficult for Baptist to bring the 64 beds back on line due to a lack of space and the fact that construction costs will be very expensive. Baptist's experts have advised the costs will not be significantly more to build a new 92-bed hospital than to bring the 64 beds back on line at the downtown campus. Baptist has been unable to find a way to replace the 64 beds without making a congested situation even worse. AHCA's decision to approve Baptist's proposal was based on several key factors. Baptist is a traditional urban Medicaid disproportionate share provider that has an aging physical plant and finds itself with excess capacity at its downtown campus. Baptist seeks to relocate beds to an area projected to experience significant population growth. The proposal will allow Baptist to more efficiently use existing beds to support the overall indigent care mission of the hospital. In general, it is good health planning to support a disproportionate share provider seeking to move existing beds that are underutilized at its current urban location to a suburban location so that the project will enable that provider to continue the fragile, safety-net mission that it has historically provided. Baptist is such a provider. Baptist has a 27% market share of the proposed new service area. This fact amply supports its projected fill rate. Overall, occupancy of acute care beds in Subdistrict 4-3 is quite high at 71.5%, compared with the statewide average of 55%. At the same time, the number of beds per 1,000 population is lower in Subdistrict 4-3 compared with either the state average or the average in District 4 as a whole. As such, Subdistrict 4-3 experiences a higher use rate of acute care services but has a lower supply of beds. With the exception of Baptist Beaches, the remaining hospitals in Duval County are concentrated in the center core of the county. St. Johns County's only hospital, Flagler Hospital, is located in the southern part of the county, almost 25 miles from the Duval County line. Approval of Baptist's application will enhance access to certain acute care hospital services for residents of south Duval County. Growth in Baptist's proposed new service area is significant. The area's population is already approximately the same size as that surrounding Baptist Beaches. The nearby Mandarin area is a large-scale residential development that is already built out. Its population is approximately 45,000. The area surrounding the proposed site contains a number of Development of Regional Impact (DRI) projects. The DRI process involves a needs analysis that must be done in each case to demonstrate that the population projections that are shown for a particular planning area are consistent with the supply of residential and commercial activity to be provided. Each DRI is required to submit an annual monitoring report that lists all activity, all housing starts, school starts, and population growth, both actual and projected. DRI projects have projected build-out populations as follows: Bartram Park (4,000), Julington Creek (15,000), World Golf Village (15,000 to 20,000), Marshal Creek (5,000), West Born and East Born (10,000 to 12,000), and Nocatee (36,000). The majority of these projects are family-oriented, residential communities, which means children will live there and need convenient access to emergency services. At this time, it often entails less congestion for area residents to drive south 25 miles to Flagler Hospital than it is to travel north to Jacksonville to hospitals half that distance. Likewise, the proposed site will be easier to access for the residents of Mandarin than the existing providers to the North. The proposed site falls between two interstate roadways and is adjacent to two arterial roadway systems. The current and near term transportation network surrounding this area allows for very efficient access to the hospital site. The combination of the unprecedented growth in this area coupled with the transportation network, both existing and planned, provides an extremely efficient access to the medical services proposed by Baptist. The Jacksonville area economy is doing well. Jacksonville was recently named the hottest market in America for business relocation and expansion by Expansion Management after it conducted a survey of 75 site location consultants across the nation. Baptist has received strong support from a broad spectrum of the local community in support of this project. Dozens of letters of support from community physicians, local governmental leaders, the Chamber of Commerce and major area businesses were filed as part of Baptist's application. In addition, Baptist conducted a survey of its medical staff and found there was a remarkably positive response for the satellite hospital. Significantly, Baptist received a letter of support from Flagler Hospital System in St. Augustine, which operates Flagler Hospital, the only hospital in St. Johns County. Orange Park Medical Center, an HCA hospital located in Clay County, is not a reasonable alternative in terms of access to the service area Baptist seeks to serve in southern Duval County, including the Mandarin area. Orange Park is located on the opposite side of the St. Johns River, which serves as a natural barrier to health care access. Approval of this application will have a positive impact on BMC and its mission to provide medical services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Hospitals in Duval County are well utilized, and continue to grow. According to a recent study done on behalf of Memorial, it has experienced a significant increase in utilization of beds over the past three years. Its occupancy is approaching 80%. There is also continued growth in the Jacksonville market that will place additional demands on the bed capacity of Memorial. Availability of Health Personnel and Management There are a number of public and private sector initiatives being undertaken to address the problem of the heath care staffing shortage. On the public side, the Florida Legislature recently passed HB 519 to promote increased recruitment and retention of nurses. Local governments are also providing incentives to attract more interest in the nursing profession. On the private side, providers have come forward with innovative proposals to assist in dealing with this problem. Baptist has undertaken a number of projects to address the staffing shortage. Hugh Greene, CEO of Baptist, sponsored an initiative to bring together other hospital CEO's in the community to partner with the University of North Florida to establish additional capacity for nursing students. The area hospitals have committed to collectively contribute over one million dollars for this project. Annually, this program will add 50 nurses to the nursing pool. Baptist projects it will have to hire less than 100 new employees to staff its new hospital. Relocating existing staff from other Baptist facilities will fill the remainder of the proposed staff needs. Given the time to open their respective facilities, the three hospital proposals will each have an opportunity to ramp up to meet staffing needs. Based on the applications filed, the three hospital projects would be phased in over several years, with Baptist's project coming on-line in approximately two years and the St. Vincent's/St. Luke's projects taking almost four years to open their doors. The increased demand for staff, especially nursing staff, if all three applications are approved, will have some impact on other hospitals within the community. The issue is not unique to Jacksonville. Nor will it affect Memorial any more than other hospitals in the area. Notwithstanding the issue of a healthcare staffing shortage, overall, the three proposals at issue should have a positive impact on the community. Each of the parties to this proceeding conducts extensive, ongoing recruitment of nurses. It includes international recruiting, recruitment at job fairs and local schools, and proactively seeking to work more closely with local technical programs. Baptist is also very involved with the local Chamber of Commerce and its strategic initiatives to enhance education and training of potential healthcare work force. The Jacksonville Chamber has six full-time staff dedicated to work force development including healthcare. The Chamber is actively involved in recruiting not just companies, but employees, too. It is working with a company called NationJob, which has a national website system to help fill local job needs. No nursing shortage is permanent because the nursing labor market behaves like any free market. Ultimately, supply and demand are managed in a free market by offering higher wages and increasing other benefits to address the profession. Baptist has developed a variety of strategies for recruiting, training and retaining nurses. It plans to use these at the facility it proposes in its application. Strategies include local open houses at the hospital, emphasis on regional and national market searches, using the Internet, and targeting military-trained nurses through job fairs. Baptist offers scholarships and has helped the local school board create an academy for students interested in health careers, as well as partnered with the DuPont Foundation and the Ounce of Prevention to create a model for mentoring. Baptist offers these young people jobs in the summertime in some healthcare arena to encourage them to enter the healthcare field. Baptist has followed a multi-pronged approach to recruiting new healthcare workers while at the same time maintaining an environment to retain the staff it already has. An adequate, qualified workforce is a key strategic goal for Baptist. In 2001, Baptist was voted one of Jacksonville's top 25 family-friendly companies in a poll taken by Jacksonville Magazine. In 2000, Baptist commissioned research on the subject of its workforce and developed a leadership model called the "Spirit of Caregiving," which is an initiative to work closer with staff and attempt to prevent burnout which has become a problem in the industry. It also established "Flex Choice," a means to address compensation, scheduling, intensity of work and relationship with management as the four key drivers for maintaining nurse satisfaction. Baptist also created its own flex team to replace the need to use local staffing agencies to staff its hospitals. Baptist has established a relationship with H*Works, which is a consulting arm of the Healthcare Advisory Board, a national think tank research-based program headquartered in Washington, D.C. An extensive research effort was undertaken by Baptist to determine how best to recruit and retain its employees. Implementing this program has reduced Baptist's turnover and vacancy rates in nursing. Other proactive programs instituted by Baptist include developing a relationship with Lutheran Social Services to employ displaced individuals who have moved to the Jacksonville area from Bosnia. As yet another example of how it has made efforts to be proactive in staffing, Baptist changed its model for how pharmacists interact with the medical staff, allowing them to have more interaction with the clinical staff in terms of patient care. This change has been well received. While some staffing will need to be duplicated at the proposed facility due to the need for core staff at both campuses, there are a number of counterbalancing efficiencies. For example, efficiencies flow from sharing the same governing board and some of the managerial staff, in such areas as human resources, risk management, accounting functions and quality improvement functions. Approval of the new facility could actually have a slight positive effect on the staffing issue. One of the main reasons nurses leave their profession is to seek a less physically demanding one. Modernization of facilities to make them less physically demanding can help to keep some nurses in the profession. Granting Baptist's application will lead to two modernized facilities: a renovated Baptist Medical Center campus and a brand new Baptist South facility. Baptist South will be staffed by first offering existing staff at its other two hospitals in Duval County the opportunity to transfer to the new satellite facility. Over 900 current Baptist staff who work at the downtown campus were identified as living in the area surrounding the proposed site. Not all employees who transfer from the downtown facility will need to be replaced at their former workplace, as Baptist projects that a number of current patients will be redirected from the downtown campus to the Baptist South location, given its proximity to their places of residence. As previously noted, the three hospitals at issue will be phased in over several years. This will allow adequate time for the applicants to ramp up in meeting the staffing needs of their new projects without necessitating a sudden increase in patients. Memorial's expert acknowledged that as a brand new facility, it would take Baptist South several years to get established in terms of building up its patient census. Each of the applicants, while acknowledging the challenge, demonstrated the commitment to attract and maintain competent staff to run the three proposed hospital projects at issue. The average age of the work force in Jacksonville is relatively young compared to the rest of Florida. Jacksonville is more a working area than a retirement one, with strong working-age demographics compared with other parts of the state. It is reasonable to expect Baptist will be able to staff its proposed project with an impact on Memorial that Memorial can sustain. When a hospital does not have sufficient staff to take additional EMS patients, it has to go on "advisory status." In 2002, Memorial has been on advisory status proportionately less than in 2001 because it has been utilizing more creative measures to staff beds than in previous years. Baptist already has a management team in place to operate properly and effectively the proposed satellite facility once approved. As previously noted, the Baptist Health System already operates BMC, which includes the Wolfson Children's Hospital, as well as Baptist Beaches and Baptist Nassau. In addition to its existing management team, Baptist has identified Ron Robinson as the administrator who will oversee the day-to-day operation of the new hospital. He presently is employed by Baptist Medical Center as a vice president. Mr. Robinson holds a master's degree in health administration and has experience as the chief operating officer of a community hospital. Enhanced Access Accessibility is a key part of Baptist's mission. Enhancing geographic distribution of beds to an area it believes is underserved is obviously consistent with its mission. Baptist is there for the community and seeks to provide care closer to where people live. The key to access is the ability to get to a facility or service. Baptist sought a proposed site that would be easily accessible to the residents of southern Duval and northern St. Johns Counties. The Interstate 95 interchange at Old St. Augustine Road is ready to be bid and will have an 18-month construction schedule, allowing it to open prior to the commencement of operation at the new hospital, if approved. Approval of Baptist's application will address what is currently an unmet need in the area, ready access to medical services. Cost-Effectiveness The estimated cost of construction to replace the 64 beds off-line at the downtown campus is $275 per square foot. The cost to construct the proposed 92-bed satellite hospital is $190 per square foot. As noted above, there will also be savings from operating the proposed facility as a satellite of the downtown campus. Accreditation and Quality of Care BMC scored a 97 on its most recent JCAHO accreditation survey, and currently holds an Accreditation and Commendation from the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations. Baptist's laboratory is accredited by the Commission on Laboratory Accreditation of the College of American Pathologist. Over a number of years, BMC has been chosen as the consumers' choice preferred hospital for Jacksonville, based on research by the National Research Corporation. Similarly, BMC was voted Best Medical Center in Jacksonville Magazine's 2001 pool. Decompression of Downtown Campus Notwithstanding the awards and accreditation for its operational excellence, Baptist's downtown campus' location is fraught with problems. The campus is bounded by four barriers. To the south is I-95; to the east, railroad tracks and bridges; to the west, the St. Johns River; and, to the north, Prudential Drive. Prudential Drive includes the corporate offices of Aetna Insurance in a large commercial office building. Although essentially landlocked, Baptist was recently able to purchase a small parcel of land (less than two acres) on the north side of Prudential Drive. While it will offer some relief, it is too small and has building height restrictions such that it is not a viable alternative to address all the space needs of the downtown campus. There are currently 64 beds that are off-line; another 88 beds need to be replaced in order to have enough room for Wolfson Children's Hospital to expand. One of the benefits of choosing to decompress by relocating beds to the south is that all the main campus renovations can then be sequenced so the hospital is not severely disrupted during renovation. This is critical, as Baptist is expecting to see nearly 90,000 patient visits in its emergency room this year alone. Baptist has sought to alleviate the congestion on its main campus by moving outpatient programs to nearby properties. Baptist's Regional Cancer Institute provides radiation therapy and chemotherapy for oncology patients, and the Baptist Eye Institute houses eye surgery and diagnostic services. Also housed off-campus is a diagnostic center with CT scans and MRI, as well as orthopedic surgery. Further expansion is precluded by the lack of available land on or near the site. The absence of space on the campus currently requires Baptist to lease space off-campus for various non-clinical support functions, such as accounting and bookkeeping. The downtown campus also has infrastructure problems. Several of the buildings on Baptist's downtown campus are nearly 50 years old. The "main building" was built in 1955. The inpatient areas in this building have shared bathrooms. It has significant mechanical and electrical problems. The life span for this building has expired and something must be done now to address how it will be replaced. The "One Southeast Building," also on the downtown campus, was built over 20 years ago as a temporary building, but has never been replaced. A critical problem at the downtown site is inadequate parking. As part of its ongoing patient satisfaction program, Baptist routinely takes surveys of its patients. The number one complaint from patients, their families and physicians on staff is the lack of adequate parking at the downtown hospital. To help alleviate this problem, Baptist has purchased off-site parking and runs a shuttle service for over 500 employees so that patients and visitors can better access on- site-parking. Redirecting existing patients who reside closer to the new satellite facility will contribute to relief of parking inadequacy downtown. Memorial contends Baptist's proposed hospital is premature. Baptist counters that it must take action to either relocate the 64 off-line beds or find a way to bring them back on-line at the main campus. While they are off-line, it makes more sense from a health planning perspective to relocate the beds to an area where there is population growth rather than simply bring the beds back on-line at the congested downtown campus. Establishment of the satellite hospital will decompress the downtown campus and serve the dynamic growth in southern Duval and northern St. Johns Counties. Relocation Need Criteria Although AHCA has a rule to determine the need for new or additional beds, it does not have a rule specifying a methodology for evaluating a proposal to relocate existing licensed beds within the subdistrict. The acute care bed calculation methodology in Rule 59C-1.038(4), Florida Administrative Code, therefore, is not applicable to Baptist's application. Rule 59C-1.038(6)(a), Florida Administrative Code, contains a preference for applicants proposing a capital expenditure on acute care beds that have documented a history of providing services to medically indigent patients. The Agency interprets subpart (6)(a) to be applicable to acute care bed relocations. Baptist's proposal earns this preference. Baptist Medical Center has the lowest average occupancy of the subdistrict hospitals on a licensed bed basis, and can easily afford to transfer 92 beds to its proposed south project. Baptist's proposal will enhance competition. While there will likely be some competitive impact to local area hospitals if approved, it will not materially compromise the operations of any other hospital in Duval or St. Johns Counties. In fact, officials at Flagler Hospital, located in St. Johns County, submitted a letter of support for this project. Local Health Plan Preferences Baptist is deemed to meet the first general preference relating to meeting identified needs by providing quality services in an economical manner. Baptist is deemed to meet the second general preference by addressing potential geographic access problems, especially access to emergency room services. Baptist meets the third general preference in terms of demonstrating that it has access to an adequate supply of health manpower. Baptist's application sets forth a well thought-out proposal to address the issue of staffing. The fourth general preference concerning adverse impact to existing providers does not apply to Baptist as it is not adding beds or a new service. The fifth general preference focuses on maximizing services to rural county residents. Duval County is not a rural county and this provision is really not applicable to any of the applicants in this case. While Baptist's proposal will not significantly enhance access to Medicaid and indigent patients in southern Duval County, approval of the project does enable Baptist to maintain its mission as a disproportionate share provider of Medicaid and indigent services. Baptist consciously chose not to condition this application on a set Medicaid percent. It is historically on record as providing both charity/indigent care and Medicaid services as a disproportionate share provider. Baptist will continue to provide health care services regardless of ability to pay. In addition to general preferences, the local health plan also contains preferences that relate specifically to acute care beds. The first acute care preference gives priority to proposals to convert licensed, unused bed space rather than undergo new construction. This preference applies to projects seeking "new" beds and is not applicable to what Baptist is proposing. The second acute care preference concerns applicants who demonstrate that they will provide a full array of acute care services. Baptist meets this preference. The third and fourth preferences are not applicable to Baptist's proposed project. The fifth acute care preference relates to applicants who have written patient transfer agreements with the county health department. Baptist does not technically meet this preference; nonetheless, as in the case of St. Vincent's, it complies with the spirit of the concern. Baptist is a disproportionate share provider and provides access to indigent patients. The sixth acute care preference speaks to applicants who demonstrate that the transfer of beds is necessary to maintain or improve care. Baptist meets this both by decompressing its downtown campus and by enhancing accessibility to acute care and emergency services to the southern county residents. Baptist meets the seventh acute care preference in that it is more cost-efficient to transfer the beds than to add to the congestion of its landlocked downtown campus. Finally Baptist meets the eighth acute care preference to the extent that approval of the transfer of these 92 beds will enable Baptist to continue its mission of providing health care to Medicaid and medically indigent patients. On balance, Baptist's proposal is clearly consistent with the preferences of the local health plan. Impact on Memorial 1. From St. Luke's and Baptist's Memorial is a financially strong provider, as its parent company, HCA. It will continue to grow and do well if all three applications are approved. Memorial's acute care beds are highly utilized. In the first six months of 2001 the occupancy rate was over 73%. It is projected to reach 80% occupancy before 2006. On an operating basis, Memorial is highly profitable, both historically and as projected. Memorial's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization ("EBITDA") approximated $58 million in 2001 and $49 million the year before. Approval of St. Luke's application, alone (that is, without consideration of St. Vincent's application and its linkage with St. Luke's), will not have an adverse impact on Memorial. The replacement hospital will not be a community hospital but a tertiary/quaternary facility specifically designed to further all three components of Mayo's mission, unique within the health services planning district. The replacement hospital's unique character, its closed physician staff, the absence of obstetrical services and its regional, national and international draw will result in few local residents going to the facility for routine acute care hospital services offered at Memorial. In addition, the replacement hospital will be located approximately 10 miles east from St. Luke's, and thus further away from Memorial than St. Luke's is now. The approval of Baptist's application is not likely to have an adverse impact on Memorial. At final hearing, Memorial acknowledged that Baptist's approval would have the least consequence on its operations. Memorial calculated that the impact of approval of Baptist's application on its operations would be a net margin contribution loss in a range between $619,000 and $1.5 million. Such an impact does not weigh heavily in favor of denial of Baptist's application given Memorial's EBITDA of approximately $49 million in 2000 and $58 million in 2001. In making its analysis, moreover, Memorial did not assume any growth in its operations between 2201 and Baptist's projected second year of operation. Memorial's analysis did not take into consideration the location of the satellite hospital. In fact, the impact of approval of Baptist's application will have less of an impact on Baptist than leaving at Baptist's downtown campus the 92 beds to be transferred to the satellite hospital. The impact on Memorial from approval of either or both St. Luke's (without consideration of its linkage to St. Vincent's) and Baptist's application is so slight as to be not meaningful. 2. From St. Vincent's If zip codes making up at least 1% of admissions are used to define "primary service area," there is significant overlap between the primary service areas of Memorial and St. Vincent's at St. Luke's. If St. Vincent's application is approved, the St. Vincent's at St. Luke's primary service area will directly overlap with those zip codes from which Memorial receives the majority of its patients. The St. Vincent's at St. Luke's proposed primary service area is also concentrated within fewer zip codes than St. Luke's existing primary service area. St. Vincent's at St. Luke's will need to aggressively draw patients from its proposed primary service area in order to meet volume projections of 84.21% in 2006 and 86.52% in 2007. Financial Impact If the St. Luke's application to consolidate the Mayo operations on one campus stood alone, Memorial's health planner would not find the application "that problematic." (Tr. 2253). In fact, he agreed during cross-examination that the collocation of Mayo's clinical services with its other services creates an advantageous opportunity to share resources and achieve economies that would constitute "not normal" circumstances weighing in favor of approval of the St. Luke's application in the absence of numeric need. (Id.) Nonetheless, Memorial's health planner objected to the approval of St. Luke's application in conjunction with approval of St. Vincent's application for among other reasons the financial impact to Memorial when the two are considered together. St. Luke's projects 54,677 patient days for the St. Luke's at Mayo facility during the second year of operation (2007). St. Vincent's projects 42,632 patient days for the new St. Vincent's at St. Luke's facility during 2007 for a total projected patient days of 97,309 generated by the two new hospitals. Absent approval of its application, St. Luke's projects it will experience 70,139 patient days at the existing St. Luke's during 2007. Accordingly, there will be a net increase in patient days of 27,170 in the Subdistrict as a result of approval of the St. Luke's/St. Vincent's projects. An increase of 27,170 patient days divided by 365 days yields an incremental average daily census increase of 74.4 in 2007 in the Subdistrict that would otherwise be served by existing hospitals absent approval of the two new hospitals. Memorial experiences a 22.7% market share for non- tertiary services in Subdistrict 3. When the 22.7% market share is applied to the 74.4 incremental increase in the average daily census, Memorial can expect a loss of 6,167 patient days and a loss in average daily census of 16.9 patients during 2007. Memorial can be expected to lose 1,259 cases during the second year of operation of the new St. Vincent's at St. Luke's and the new St. Luke's at Mayo when the total lost 6,167 patient days is divided by Memorial's 4.9 average length of stay for non-tertiary services. The existing St. Vincent's projects it will treat 3,093 total patients from Subdistrict 3 in 2007 absent approval of the St. Vincent's at St. Luke's project. Therefore, St. Vincent's contends 10,695 patient days and 2,320 cases will be redirected from the existing St. Vincent's to the St. Vincent's at St. Luke's new facility based on the assumption it will capture 75% of the total volume bypassing St. Luke's to access St. Vincent's. This translates to an average daily census of 29.3 patients when the 10,695 patient days expected to be captured by St. Vincent's at St. Luke's is divided by 365 days a year. With St. Vincent's at St. Luke's capturing 75% of the subdistrict volume currently accessing St. Vincent's, the 74.4 incremental increase in average daily census projected above will be reduced by the 29.3 average daily census remaining in the St. Vincent's system. This yields a 45.1 net incremental average daily census increase in the subdistrict. Memorial will lose an average daily census of 10.2 patients per day applying Memorial's 22.7% market share to the incremental increase of 45.1 average daily census that other existing hospitals would otherwise treat assuming St. Vincent's meets the 75% transfer rate. A 10.2 loss per day multiplied by 365 days a year equates to a loss at Memorial of 3,739 patient days. Divided by Memorial's 4.9 average length of stay yields a potential loss of 763 cases in 2007. Mr. Beiseigel performed an impact analysis calculating a range of financial impact Memorial will incur assuming both 1,259 and 763 lost cases. Memorial will suffer a $3,092,775 net contribution margin loss assuming 1,259 lost cases in 2007. Assuming 763 lost cases, the contribution margin loss is $1,874,335 for 2007. The financial impact suffered by Memorial will more likely approach $3,092,775. This loss does not include losses in subsequent years. Memorial may benefit financially by the capture of some community physician open heart surgery and interventional cardiology volume due to the discontinuation of open heart surgery at the St. Vincent's at St. Luke's facility. But the benefit is not likely to be substantial. Memorial has experienced a decline in adult open heart surgery volume at its facility due in part to approvals of two new open heart programs in Georgia. Additionally, Flagler Hospital has also been approved for an adult open heart surgery program which is likely to result in lost open heart surgery and cardiology volume at Memorial. Any incidental cardiology volume realized by Memorial as a result of moving the open heart program to St. Luke's at Mayo is not likely to significantly offset the adverse impact to Memorial should the St. Vincent's, and St. Luke's projects be approved. Managed Care St. Vincent's at St. Luke's is also likely to take a significant level of managed care volume from Memorial. Managed care (HMO/PPO) accounts for 40.41% of Memorial's patient days compared to 20.7% at St. Luke's and 26% at St. Vincent's. St. Vincent's at St. Luke's projects that 40.42% of its patient days will be attributable to managed care. St. Vincent's at St. Luke's would be compelled to target managed care payors that currently contract with Memorial in order to meet its managed care projections. There currently exists adequate competition for managed care contracts within the District. Memorial has recently lost a managed care contract with United resulting in a 10 patient drop in Memorial's daily census. St. Vincent's at St. Luke's aggressive pursuit of managed care contracts as reflected in their projections will have an impact on Memorial.
Recommendation In consideration of the statutory and rule criteria, on balance, all three CON applications at issue in these consolidated cases should be approved by AHCA. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building Three, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Kathryn F. Fenske, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 8355 Northwest 53rd Street Miami, Florida 33166 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Sean M. Frazier, Esquire Greenberg Traurig, P.A. 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Thomas W. Konrad, Esquire Rutledge, Ecenia, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 420 Post Office Box 551 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551 Stephen C. Emmanuel, Esquire Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0391 R. Terry Rigsby, Esquire Law Office of R. Terry Rigsby, P. A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 505 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Broad and Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence presented the following facts are found: Petitioners each made application for a certificate of need under the provisions of Sections 381.493 through 381.497, Florida Statutes, 1975, which applications were submitted to the Bureau of Community Medical Facilities and accepted as complete by the bureau. Each application seeks a certificate of need for a third generation computerized axial tomography scanner (whole body unit) hereinafter referred to as a CAT scanner. There is presently in Jacksonville a head scanner installed at St. Vincent Hospital in November, 1975, and a whole body scanner at St. Luke's Hospital which has been in full operation since January, 1976. All three Petitioners are located in Jacksonville, Florida. The applications were processed by the appropriate Health Systems Agency. After due consideration the Health Systems Agency recommended that each of the three applications be granted. At the request of the Bureau of Community Medical Facilities, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the State Hospital Advisory Council reviewed the applications and upheld the Health Systems Agency's determination that the three applications should be granted certificates of need. After consideration of the applications, the Health Systems Agency's recommendation the State Hospital Advisory Council's recommendation, Mr. Art Forehand, Administrator, Office of Community Medical Facilities, Respondent herein, notified each of the three Petitioners that their applications were not favorably considered. Mr. Forehand's notification set forth three reasons for the unfavorable consideration. Those were (1) lack of demonstrated need for the requested scanner, (2) failure of each application to demonstrate positive action toward containment of cost for services rendered to the public, and (3) lack of demonstrated unavailability, unaccessability, and inadequacy of like services within the Jacksonville area. At the time of his decision Mr. Forehand had no material or information available to him which was not available to the Health Systems Agency or the State Hospital Advisory Council at the time of their decision. At the time the three applications were denied Mr. Forehand felt that there did exist a need for one additional scanner in the Jacksonville area but he did not feel that he should bear the burden of deciding which one of the three applications should be granted and therefore all three were denied. Except for those matters set forth in Mr. Forehand's denial and noted above, none of the parties to this proceeding disputed that the criteria for determining need found in Section 101-1.03(c), F.A.C., were met. A study of computerized axial tomography with suggested criteria for review of certificate of need applications was conducted by the staff of the Health Systems Agency of Northeast Florida relative to the Duval County area. This study was published in April of 1976 and its findings appear to have been accepted by the Health Systems Agency. As one of its suggested criteria for determining need it found that a hospital or applicant should have a potential case load of at least 1,000 CAT scans per year. The study went on to project a potential case load for the three Petitioners herein. That projection for Baptist Memorial Hospital shows a a potential case load of 2,512 scans per year. The study noted that Baptist Memorial projected 1,300 scans for the first year during start up operations and 2,080 scans during the second and third years of their forecast. The study found that Riverside Hospital has a potential case load of 1,196 scans per year compared to their own projections of 1,432 scans per year. The study finally found that the University Hospital has a potential case load of 1,558 scans per year compared to their projection of 2,904. Testimony on behalf of the Respondent shows that in the opinion of Respondent full use of a CAT scanner is 10 scans per day on a 20-day work month working five days a week. As shown by unrebutted testimony the existing scanner at St. Luke's Hospital in Jacksonville is presently averaging 10 scans per day, five-days a week. Further, according to the evidence presented by Respondent, the existing scanner at St. Vincent is being utilized to at least 85 percent of its capacity. Respondent took the position at the hearing that when existing scanners are being used to 85 percent or more of their capacity a need exists for more equipment. Thus, it appears that using the criteria of utilization adhered to by Respondent, the existing CAT scanners in Jacksonville are being utilized to the extent that there is a need for additional scanners. University Hospital has 310 licensed beds and is the community hospital in Duval County with the responsibility of serving the indigent on an emergency and short term basis. It is the trauma center of the city and has the most active emergency room. It is also the major teaching hospital in Duval County. Respondent agrees that it has the greatest need of any hospital in Duval County for a CAT scanner. The University Hospital has approximately 300 visits per month to its emergency room. In the four months prior to the date of final hearing the hospital did 586 skull x-rays due to trauma. In the case of acute trauma patients frequently may not be moved from one hospital to another for the purpose of a CAT scan nor, in some cases, should other dangerous invasive techniques be used for diagnosis. Baptist Hospital has 567 licensed beds and is a major oncology center or cancer center and does a large amount of surgical cancer work in additional to radiation therapy. With the possible exception of University Hospital, Baptist Hospital is the largest pediatric hospital in the area. According to the testimony of the administrator of the hospital it would take 14 to 18 months after receipt of a certificate of need to have a CAT scanner in service. Riverside Hospital has 183 licensed beds. The hospital has been a specialty hospital since its establishment in 1908 and serves the Riverside Clinic. The hospital has approximately 200 specialized physicians, all board certified, on-staff. Riverside is a unique hospital because of its degree of specialty and its relationship to Riverside Clinic. Riverside Hospital does 100 percent of the Riverside Clinic's radiology work. Riverside Hospital has been known as an established diagnostic center. Witnesses for Riverside Hospital testified that if they were not able to have a CAT scanner their reputation and ability to provide first class service would be seriously diminished. CAT scanners represent a significant development in diagnostic medicine. They reduce the need for many dangerous, painful and costly injections of dye, air and radioactive isotopes required by some of the more traditional diagnostic procedures. The three most common tests displaced by CAT scanners are pneumoencephalography, angiography and radioactive isotope scanning. The first two of the foregoing are particularly expensive procedures and require hospitalization. At present, patients at the three Petitioner hospitals have to be transported to another facility in order to use a scanner. The transfer of an inpatient to another hospital for a scan may effectively consume the better part of a patient's day and may require an extra day of hospitalization. The cost of transportation, increased hospital stay and ancillary matters increase the actual cost to the Patient. Patients suffering from severe trauma or otherwise in a critical state, may not be transported out of a hospital to a scanner. All three of the Petitioners have an active neurological and neurosurgical staff and qualified radiologists. The unrebutted testimony indicates that, although CAT scanners are a new development whose potential has not yet been fully explored and whose development may not yet be final, they nevertheless have become an essential diagnostic tool of regular use.
