The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified correctional officer and a certified instructor, committed the offenses alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued November 16, 2004, and, if so, the penalties that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was certified by Petitioner as a correctional officer and as an instructor. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) at its Indian River Correctional Institution (IRCI) with the rank of Major. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Ken Torres was employed by the DOC at IRCI with the rank of Lieutenant. On June 11, 2003, Tvaris Burch, Errol Whiley, and Keith Conley were inmates at IRCI. At no time did any of these three inmates have authorization to be in Respondent’s office at IRCI. The only door to Respondent’s office opens to a long hallway. This door is normally locked. At approximately 6:15 p.m. on June 11, 2003, Respondent entered his office at IRCI and was followed by Lt. Torres. Respondent and Lt. Torres saw three inmates on the floor attempting to hide under Respondent’s desk. Each inmate attempted to conceal his identity by pulling his tee shirt up over his head. It is undisputed that both Respondent and Lt. Torres ordered the three inmates to come out from under the desk and the inmates refused those orders. It is also undisputed that the inmates came out from under the desk after Respondent threatened to order Lt. Torres to spray them with chemical agents. What happened next is the center of the dispute in this proceeding. Petitioner alleged that Respondent kicked one of the inmates and that he kicked and punched another inmate as they came out from under his desk. Petitioner also alleged that Respondent failed to file a mandatory Use of Force Report and that he lied to an investigator (Mr. Glover) in a sworn statement. Respondent asserted that he did not kick or otherwise use unauthorized force against any of the three inmates, that he had no reason to file a use of force report, and that he did not lie to the investigator. In support of its allegations, Petitioner presented the testimony of inmate Burch, Mr. Glover, and Lt. Torres. In addition, Petitioner presented the investigative report prepared by Mr. Glover and certain affidavits gathered by Mr. Glover during the course of his investigation. The following facts are not in dispute. After the three inmates came out from under the desk and were on their feet, they were ordered to remove the tee shirts from their heads and were identified as being inmates Burch, Whiley, and Conley. They were stripped searched by Respondent and Lt. Torres and contraband was removed from them. Additional security was called and took the three inmates to the prison nurse for a pre-confinement physical. This type medical examination is mandatory for an inmate about to be confined for disciplinary purposes. The inmates did not complain to anyone that they had been injured or mistreated by Respondent or by anyone else. The nurses noted no injury on any of the inmates. The three inmates were then confined for disciplinary reasons. An incident report was written and a Disciplinary Report was filed for each of the three inmates. Neither Respondent nor Lt. Torres filed a Use of Force Report, which is a mandatory report after physical force is used against an inmate. On June 12, 2003, approximately 24 hours after the incident in Respondent’s office, both inmate Burch and inmate Whiley declared a medical emergency. Both inmates were promptly taken to the medial unit and examined by prison nurses. Inmate Burch told nurse Rhea Harris that he had been injured by being kicked in the head, but he would not identify the person who kicked him. At the final hearing, inmate Burch testified that Respondent kicked him in the head as he was coming out from under the desk and in the knee when he tried to stand up. He further testified that the blow to the knee caused him to fall to the floor, which broke his glasses. Ms. Harris observed a bump on the side of inmate Burch’s head that could be consistent with inmate Burch’s being kicked.5 Inmate Whiley was seen by Nurse Debra Barriner on June 11 and June 12, 2003. On June 12, 2003, inmate Whiley told Ms. Barriner that he had a sore neck and a sore area on his face on the left cheek. Ms. Barriner observed areas of slight swelling and discoloration that were consistent with inmate Whiley’s complaints. Inmate Whiley refused to tell the nurse what caused his neck and left cheek to become sore. In an affidavit subsequently secured by Mr. Glover, inmate Whiley alleged that Respondent had kicked him as he was coming out from under the desk and hit him in the stomach after he stood up. In an affidavit secured by Mr. Glover, inmate Conley stated that he was not struck by Respondent on June 11, 2003, but that he saw Respondent strike inmates Burch and Whiley. Approximately a week after the incident in Respondent’s office, corrections officers intercepted a note being passed from the cell of inmates Burch and Whiley to the cell of inmate Conley. This note was turned over to Lt. Torres, who was the shift supervisor, who testified that he threw the note away and could not recall its details. Lt. Torres did recall that the note made a reference to his being promoted as a result of the allegations that had been made against Respondent. In a sworn interview given to Mr. Glover, Lt. Torres stated that he saw Respondent kick inmates Burch and Whiley. He repeated that statement at the formal hearing. On closer examination, Lt. Torres testified that he did not witness Respondent make physical contact with any of the inmates, but that he saw him making kicking motions in the directions of the inmates. On further examination, the following exchange occurred between Petitioner’s counsel and Lt. Torres beginning at page 85, line 22 of the Transcript: Q. Let me ask you this: If you did not see Major Passino actually strike an inmate, why then did you feel that it was necessary to report such an incident.[6] A. Why did I feel that? That’s my responsibility. Q. At the time that this incident occurred, why did you consider that there had been a use of force. A. Why? Q. Yes. A. Only because of what the inmates said, that they were injured, did I suspect that there was a use of force. Q. And that was only after the inmates had declared a medical emergency – A. Yes, sir. Respondent’s testimony that he did not use unauthorized force against inmates Burch and Whiley is found to be credible. The conflict in the evidence is resolved by finding that Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent battered inmate Burch or Whiley.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order dismissing all counts of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of, June, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2005.
The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0084(1)(i)1 and 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?
Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck and Mike Ramadanovic, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules at issue in this proceeding. The rules at issue in this proceeding govern the treatment of inmates while in "disciplinary confinement." At the time of the formal hearing, neither of the Petitioners were in disciplinary confinement. Both Petitioners have, however, been in disciplinary confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing the rights of inmates, inmate conduct, inmate discipline and all other aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. C. Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code. The Petitioners have challenged Rules 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), and 33- 3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Challenged Rules"). Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: (4) . . . . Inmates in disciplinary confinement status shall not be allowed to prepare legal documents and legal mail while in that status except under the following conditions: When there is a time limitation on the filing of legal material with a court and it reasonably appears necessary for the inmate to prepare the same while in confinement status in order to get the same filed within the required time. When the inmate wishes to prepare legal material to file with a court for the purpose of testing the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315, 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 944.09 and 944.11, Florida Statutes. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in pertinent part: 1. Legal materials shall be accessible to inmates in disciplinary confinement provided such use of legal material is for the purpose of challenging such confinement or in the event there are time restrictions on filing court papers. The specific statutory authority for Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Section 944.09, Florida Statutes. The law implemented by, Rule 33-3.0084, Florida Administrative Code, is Sections 20.315 and 944.09, Florida Statutes. Chapter 33-22, Florida Administrative Code, titled "Inmate Discipline", specifies what constitutes prohibited conduct for inmates, the procedures for determining if an inmate has violated the rules establishing prohibited conduct and the maximum punishment which may be imposed if an inmate violates the rules establishing prohibited conduct. The "Rules of Prohibited Conduct" and the maximum punishment for an infraction of these rules are contained in Rule 33-22.012, Florida Administrative Code. Among other things, an inmate who violates the Rules of Prohibited Conduct, may be placed in "disciplinary confinement" for specified periods of time. The length of time an inmate may be placed in disciplinary confinement for is not to exceed 60 days for any one infraction. "Disciplinary confinement" is defined in Rule 33-22.002(3), Florida Administrative Code, as: (3) Disciplinary Confinement -- Confinement which includes the loss of privileges normally afforded other inmates and is effected only after procedures outlined in this chapter have been fully complied with. Although the maximum term of disciplinary confinement is 60 days, it is possible for an inmate to be placed in disciplinary confinement for longer periods of time: (1) an inmate may be convicted of more than one violation of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct and be sentenced to multiple 60-day (or less) sentences to be served consecutively; (2) an inmate may commit another infraction(s) (including a violation of the Challenged Rules) while in disciplinary confinement, resulting in additional disciplinary consecutive confinement sentences; and (3) an inmate may commit an infraction soon after release from disciplinary confinement and be returned to disciplinary confinement. It is also possible for an inmate to serve less than the full term of his sentence to disciplinary confinement. Being placed in disciplinary confinement is a direct result of the actions of an inmate in failing to follow the established rules of conduct of the Respondent. At least one inmate has been in disciplinary confinement for periods of up to two and one-half years. An inmate would have to commit a minimum of fifteen infractions to be sentenced to disciplinary confinement for two and one- half years. The evidence failed to prove that the one inmate that has been in disciplinary confinement for two and one-half years was in disciplinary confinement continuously without any break. The inmate could not recall. The number of inmates in disciplinary confinement for more than one year was not proven. At best, it was proved by the Petitioners that one inmate (Charles William Bowe, Jr.) has served more than one year in disciplinary confinement. Even the evidence concerning Mr. Bowe, however, did not prove that his time in disciplinary confinement was continuous and without any break. Based upon an estimate of the Respondent, it is likely that no more than 1% of the inmate population (less than 460) is in disciplinary confinement for more than one year. Although the evidence did not prove that any inmate has actually been in disciplinary confinement for more than two and one-half years, it is not impossible that an inmate could be in disciplinary confinement for an unlimited period of time, as long as the inmate continues to commit violations of the Respondent's Rules of Prohibited Conduct. Although it may be unlikely, it is not impossible for an inmate to be in disciplinary confinement for the entire term of his sentence. The purpose for placing an inmate in disciplinary confinement and the purpose of the Challenged Rules is to attempt to correct an inmate's demonstrated negative behavior; to eliminate "privileges" inmates normally are given. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is prohibited from instituting any new litigation (other than a challenge to the decision to place the inmate in disciplinary confinement or litigation which must be instituted within a specified time period) while the inmate is in disciplinary confinement. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.005(4)(a) and (b), Florida Administrative Code, an inmate who is placed in disciplinary confinement is generally prohibited from preparing legal documents and legal mail unless the inmate is required to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. When an inmate is placed in disciplinary confinement, all of the inmate's legal materials are confiscated and impounded. Access to an inmate's legal materials may be obtained while in disciplinary confinement pursuant to the exceptions of the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to an inmate' legal materials if the inmate can show the necessity for those materials through: (1) a court order that requires the inmate to take some action in a pending matter; (2) any other source, i.e., a rule of the court, indicating that the inmate must meet some procedural or other requirement of the court; or (3) if the inmate indicates a desire to prepare a challenge to the legality of his disciplinary confinement. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials is as follows: The inmate makes a request to an institutional counselor assigned responsibility for the inmate; The inmate must indicate to the institutional counselor why one of the exceptions provided in the Challenged Rules allowing access to his legal materials applies; If the institutional counselor is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the inmate's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The procedure followed at Florida State Prison if an inmate convinces an institutional counselor that access to his legal materials should be allowed is as follows: The institutional counselor retrieves the inmate's legal materials and brings them to the inmate's cell; In some instances the institutional counselor may give the legal materials to the inmate or require the inmate to describe to the counselor, and convince the counselor of, what materials he actually needs to meet the deadline or to challenge his disciplinary confinement; and The institutional counselor, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he then must convince the counselor of what additional materials are needed. If an inmate is denied access to his legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision of the institutional counselor by filing a grievance. Based upon the experiences of the inmates who testified in this proceeding, requests for access to an inmate's legal materials may be granted or denied, and when granted, an inmate may be given the whole file, he may be denied materials, he may be asked "is this it" and he may get only the materials he actually needs. Institutional counselors may even make more than one attempt to find the requested materials. Pursuant to Rule 33-3.0084(1)(i)1, Florida Administrative Code, an inmate may not have access to any legal materials except to the extent necessary for the inmate to meet a time limitation in an existing legal matter or if the inmate intends to test the legality of his disciplinary confinement. Access to legal materials in the library may generally be obtained by inmates. Such access is not, however, without limitation. There are limitations on the procedure which must be followed to obtain access to the library and the amount of materials which may be obtained at any one time. An inmate in disciplinary confinement is further limited as to when and how he may access library resources pursuant to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, access is allowed to library legal materials only if an inmate can show the necessity for those materials in the same manner an inmate may obtain access to his own legal materials as explained in finding of fact 26. The procedure followed at Florida State Prison for an inmate in disciplinary confinement to obtain access to library legal materials is as follows: The inmate must make a request in writing to the librarian; The inmate must indicate to the librarian why one of the exceptions to the lack of access to library legal materials applies; If the librarian is convinced that one of the exceptions applies, access to the library's legal materials is allowed. If not, no access is allowed; The librarian, based upon the inmate's description of the materials he needs, makes the final determination of what materials may actually be given to the inmate. If the inmate does not get the materials he needs, he may make additional requests. If an inmate is denied access to library legal materials or is not provided with the materials he needs, the inmate may challenge the decision by filing a grievance. Institutional counselors and librarians are not required to have legal education or training. The evidence failed to prove that any inmate has been totally denied access to the courts by the proper application of the Challenged Rules. The evidence proved that the Challenged Rules are inconvenient and aggravating to some inmates who have experienced the procedures which must be followed in order to obtain access to the inmate's legal materials or library legal materials. The procedures can be a hinderance to an inmate's pursuit of litigation to the extent that the procedures are one more step an inmate must follow that the inmate would not otherwise have to follow if he were not in disciplinary confinement. The evidence proved that, although inconvenient, some of the inmates who testified were able to pursue litigation even though they have been in disciplinary confinement at times. There was some aggravation and frustration caused those inmates who testified because of the Challenged Rules, but the evidence failed to prove that any of the inmates who testified or any other inmates were actually prevented from pursing litigation: Inmate Bowe, who has served two and one-half years of disciplinary confinement (although it was not proved whether the time was without interruption because of Inmate Bowe's memory lapse), had several court proceedings (Florida and federal) pending at the time of the formal hearing and did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the Challenged Rules; Leonard Bean, another inmate who testified, has served 140 to 150 days in disciplinary confinement for multiple infractions. Although Inmate Bean testified that his co-defendant's conviction had been reversed (in February, 1991), the evidence failed to prove that Inmate Bean's conviction would have also been reversed but for his disciplinary confinement or, more importantly, would have also been reversed but for the Challenged Rules. Although Inmate Bean was released from disciplinary confinement in May, 1991, he still had not filed for habeas corpus as of the date of the formal hearing; Jimmy Stephens, another inmate who testified, has served 240 days of disciplinary confinement for four infractions during the past two years. Although inconvenienced by the limitation on library legal material use, Inmate Stephens did not indicate that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Carl Watts, another inmate who testified, served 180 days in disciplinary confinement prior to being transferred to Florida State Prison and another 60 days after arriving at Florida State Prison. Inmate Watts' testimony concerning a possible habeas corpus action failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Ramadanovic has served up to 100 days in disciplinary confinement. Although he filed two grievances dated August 22, 1990, concerning his efforts to file a brief in an appellate court proceeding, his disciplinary confinement ended August 23, 1990, and therefore, he failed to prove that he was prevented from filing a brief or any other pleading in any case pending while he was in disciplinary confinement. The evidence also failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue; Petitioner Van Poyck failed to prove that he has missed any court ordered or procedural time limit or that any case has been dismissed because of an inability to prosecute his cases caused by the rules at issue. As long as an inmate is in disciplinary confinement, that inmate may not file an action for federal habeas corpus. An inmate in disciplinary confinement may also not file an action for habeas corpus in the State courts until some, unspecified date, which the Respondent determines is close enough to necessitate preparation of the pleadings in order to meet the time limitations on habeas corpus in Florida.
Findings Of Fact At all times materiel hereto petitioners were inmates et Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) and were subject to discipline for failure to obey orders. Piccirillo was disciplined for failure to comply with an order to report to the infirmary or sick call. Piccirillo was aware that his name was posted on the bulletin board directing him to report to the medical department and et the time specified he failed to so report, was disciplined, and he lost gain time. A doctor visits LCI twice per week and inmates with medical problems can be seen by the doctor on these days. No patient is required to undergo medical treatment for minor ills if he so elects. Because of the limited time a doctor is available to LCI it is necessary that those inmates so designated see the doctor at the scheduled time. Inmates who do not understand an order may request clarification. If the inmate cannot read he is not punished for failure to obey written orders. Prior to disciplinary action being taken against an inmate for disobedience of orders, the disciplinary report is investigated and, after the investigator finds the charge to be true, discipline may be administered. Additionally, the inmate has a grievence procedure he may follow after the investigator recommends disciplinary action be taken. Occasionally, inmates are given orders by correctional officers which are unlawful. The inmate may obey the order and say nothing, he may obey the order and file a grievance, or he may refuse to obey he order and successfully defend the disciplinary report for failure to obey the order. It is not an offense for an inmate to refuse to obey an unlawful order.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, James R. Endress, is an inmate at the New River Correctional Institution. The Respondent is the Department of Corrections, an agency of the State of Florida. The Petitioner has challenged an alleged non-rule policy pursuant to which he was allegedly denied continued visitation with Deborah L. Crews, a former employee of the Respondent. The Petitioner has alleged that the challenged non-rule policy was issued by the Superintendent of the New River Correctional Institution. New River Correctional Institution is not an "agency" of the State of Florida. The Petitioner has not alleged that the Respondent has established and applied the alleged non-rule policy on a general basis.
The Issue This is a rule challenge proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. In his original petition the Petitioner sought to challenge several rules of the Department, as well as certain Department policy and procedure directives and internal operating procedures of Florida State Prison. At the hearing the scope of the issues was narrowed by agreement of the Petitioner to challenges to the following: Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code; Department of Corrections Policy and Procedure Directives 4.07.06 and 4.10.51; and Florida State Prison Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony at the final hearing and on the exhibits received in evidence, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Ervin J. Horton, is an inmate in the custody of the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner is presently confined at Florida State Prison. At the time of the hearing in this case, the Petitioner was on confinement status and he has been on confinement status in the past. Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, has been adopted by the Department of Corrections. The title of the rule is "Legal Documents and Legal and Privileged Mail." The general subject matter of the rule concerns the preparation, mailing, and receipt of legal documents and legal mail by inmates. The rule is applicable to the Petitioner. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06, which is titled "Preparation And Processing Of Legal Documents And Legal Mail." This directive is for the most part a restatement of many of the provisions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. The directive also includes a provision requiring each prison Superintendent to issue an institutional policy memorandum to effectuate the provisions of the directive. The Department of Corrections has adopted Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.10.51, which is titled "Law Libraries." The directive is in part a restatement of portions of Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code. However, for the most part it sets forth the Department's policies regarding the establishment, operation, and maintenance of prison law libraries. Portions of the directive contain limitations on the time, place, and manner in which inmates may use the law libraries. The Superintendent of Florida State Prison has adopted Institutional Operating Procedure No. 4-86.04, which is titled "Preparation Of Legal Documents By Inmates." This is an institutional policy memorandum required by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. IOP No. 4-86.04 addresses the same general subject matter as is addressed by Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06. The IOP includes additional specific details for implementation of Policy And Procedure Directive Number 4.07.06 and Rule 33-3.005, Florida Administrative Code, at the Florida State Prison facility. As a result of his status as an inmate at Florida State Prison, the Rule, the Policy And Procedure Directives, and the Institutional Operating Procedure described above are applicable to the Petitioner to the extent they regulate his activities within the scope of those documents. The documents described above in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of these findings of fact are the only documents to which this rule challenge proceeding is addressed. The testimony at the hearing consisted largely of anecdotal testimony regarding a long series of Petitioner's alleged individual problems within the State correctional system. Some of his problems have been real; others appear to probably have been imaginary. All of the problems described by Petitioner were largely irrelevant to the issues raised in the petition. And to the extent portions of Petitioner's testimony were relevant to the general subject matter at hand, the testimony did not tend to demonstrate that the challenged documents were invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The exhibits offered by Petitioner were of the same general tenor as his testimony.
Findings Of Fact Douglas L. Adams is an inmate at Union Correctional Institution. On August 26, 1985, he was awakened early in the morning and brought before a disciplinary hearing for an alleged violation of institutional rules and regulations. Prior to the hearing, he was advised by a correctional officer to pack up all his personal property and to bring it with him to the hearing. Mr. Adams took with him as much as he could which included his clothing and other personal effects, but he was unable to carry all he owned with him at one time. He did not ask for either help in carrying his property or a cart to carry it in prior to leaving his cell area to go to the hearing. When he arrived at the movement center where the hearing was to be held, he advised the authorities there that he did not have all his property with him. At that point, he asked for help or the use of a cart to go get the rest of his property but he was refused because no cart was there. As a result, he went to the hearing leaving some of his property in his cell area and while in the hearing, contends he was required to leave his property in the control center. This property was secured in a storage room behind the control center which, while not locked, was not available for access to other inmates unless they were accompanied by a corrections officer. When the hearing was over and Mr. Adams, who had been directed to administrative confinement requested to go back to his former cell area to get the rest of his property, his request was refused. His property was inventoried by UCI personnel at that time, but because in his opinion the inventory was not complete, Mr. Adams refused to sign the form. When he was released from administrative confinement he claims he did not get all his property back. He relates that he was told he had forfeited whatever property he had not brought to the hearing. As a result, he filed a complaint on September 16, 1985, which was subsequently denied. Petitioner has been incarcerated in 7 or 8 institutions within the Department of Corrections including Florida State Prison, River Junction Correctional Institution, Baker Correctional Institution, Polk Correctional Institution, Old Unit, the Reception and Medical Center, and DeSoto Correctional Institution. At each one of these institutions a rule similar to this one was in existence. At Baker Correctional Institution, the inmate was required to bring his mattress as well. Robert Craig has been in prison for a total of 27 years and has been incarcerated in almost every major penal institution in the State of Florida that was built prior to the last five years. At Avon Park Correctional Institution he underwent a disciplinary hearing and was told at the time to bring all his personal property with him to the hearing. While in the hearing, he was required to leave all his property outside in the hall. At Cross City Correctional Institution the guards took him to the hearing without his property, bringing his property along afterwards. In essence, at all the institutions where he was incarcerated, there was some variation of the same procedure regarding his personal property. He either had to bring it to the hearing or it was packed up prior to the hearing. At no institution was his property inventoried prior to the hearing. As a result, he has lost personal property including a calculator for which he was subsequently reimbursed by the institution. According to Mr. Craig, if the inmate does not bring his personal property with him he either is given a deficiency report or is precluded from going back to get it when the hearing is over. Sgt. Denmark has worked for approximately 8 1/2 years with the Department of Corrections, all at UCI, where he formerly worked at the movement center. One of the functions he performed there was to handle prisoners coming for a disciplinary hearing. The rule as explained to him regarding the inmates' personal property is that the inmate is required to bring all of it with him to the hearing. Once the property is brought with the inmate to the hearing, the inmate is free to either take it into the hearing with him or to leave it in the storage room in back of the movement center during the hearing. If the inmate is sentenced to disciplinary confinement as a result of the hearing, in that case, and at that point, the inmate's property is inventoried. If the inmate is not sentenced to disciplinary confinement, the property is returned to the prisoner who is returned to his area. In the instant case, Mr. Denmark heard the Petitioner tell Sgt. Howe, when he arrived at the movement center, that he had left some of his property in his cell. However, when Adams went into his hearing, he neither took his property with him nor requested that it be secured. According to Mr. Cunningham, the Chief Classification Supervisor, the Union Correctional Institution Policy, (85-52.9 B1) requires inmates to bring all their property to disciplinary hearings. It is an old policy, and the reason for it is to protect the property from theft. In a disciplinary hearing, there is a chance that an inmate might not get back to his old cell to retrieve his property after the hearing. For security reasons, institution officials prefer not to take a prisoner back to his old cell after a hearing because, at that point, he is often angry as a result of the hearing and disruptive. All Department of Corrections' institutions in the region incorporating UCI, except Florida State Prison, have a similar policy. Inquiry of corrections personnel at the agency headquarters in Tallahassee reveals that most major DOC facilities have a similar policy. There are a total of 33 other facilities which hold less than 100 inmates each. These smaller institutions do not, generally, have a similar policy and Florida State Prison has a different situation because of the different security problems. It is the needs of the institution, however, which determine the use of the policy. Mr. Cunnningham is aware of Mr. Adams' hearing and the complaint filed as a result thereof. Upon inquiry it was determined that Mr. Adams had failed to establish a loss and the complaint was denied. Mr. Cunningham does not know whether there was an investigation into the loss of the property left in the cell. It is Mr. Cunningham's understanding that if the witness cannot carry all his property at one time, normally, if the inmate asks for permission to do so, he will be allowed to go back and get the balance before the hearing. This is not in the procedure approved by DOC, however, nor in the IOP at UCI. Corrections Officer Howe is also aware of the fact that Mr. Adams had a hearing on August 26, 1985. He, in fact, was called to the movement center to escort several prisoners, including Adams, to the confinement barracks after the hearings. A part of this duty involves inventorying the prisoners property. Howe told Adams to get his property and bring it in for inventory. At this point, after the hearing Adams said he did not have all his property with him and asked to be taken back to his old cell to get the rest. Howe declined to do this and explained the security reasons for his decision to Adams. He did advise Adams, however, that he would call down to Adams' old cell area and have his property packed which, in fact, he did. It is standard practice at UCI, according to Howe, that if an inmate has a large amount of property, he can request the use of a cart or wheelbarrow which is assigned to each housing area for carrying this excess property. This cart will be returned by a runner who can also help carry the excess. To his knowledge, inmates are not denied the use of these carts. Howe declined to return Adams to his old cell area after the hearing because, at the time, Adams was belligerent and unstable and presented a security risk in his opinion and also, because Adams had previously been advised to bring all his property with him and had failed to do this even though there was a way for him to accomplish it.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of failure to maintain good moral character, as required by Subsection 943.13(7), Florida Statutes, and whether disciplinary action should be taken as a result.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Petitioner on February 5, 1993, and was issued Correctional Certificate No. 134881. The Petitioner is charged with the administration of criminal justice standards and training for all law enforcement officers, corrections officers, and correctional probation officers throughout Florida, pursuant to Sections 943.085 - 943.255, and is authorized to discipline individuals licensed thereunder who violate the law. On November 28, 2002, Lake City Correctional Facility Correctional Officer Martha Escobar was approached by Inmate Aaron Smiley concerning his allegations of having fallen down the stairs the previous day as the result of his having been forced by the Respondent to carry six chairs up and down the stairs as a disciplinary measure. The alleged incident had taken place nearly 24 hours before Inmate Smiley reported it to Officer Escobar. Officer Escobar reported the statement on an incident report that she gave to her supervisor. Officer Escobar believed that Inmate Smiley was telling the truth about the incident. Inmate Smiley confirmed the facts previously stated to Officer Escobar to Captain Ruth Shaw who also completed a supervisory report. Lake City Correctional Facility Inspector Paul French interviewed numerous correctional officers under oath and prepared a written report concerning the alleged chair-carrying incident. Inspector French’s report covered the investigation of two charges: that the Respondent threatened Inmate Smiley with bodily harm if he told anyone about the alleged incident; and that the Respondent was untruthful in his responses as to what occurred during and following the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. No inmates who were listed as witnesses by Inspector French in his report were present to testify at the hearing. Officer Escobar had personally witnessed inmates carrying chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary purposes under the Respondent’s watch in the past. Officer Escobar did not personally witness the alleged incident concerning Inmate Smiley. Officer Escobar had never reported to her supervisors in the past that inmates had been forced to carry chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary reasons. Correctional Officer Joyce Joseph, who serves as a “mini warden” supervising the unit in which the alleged incident took place and another unit, spoke with the Respondent on one occasion about an incident involving an inmate under his watch carrying chairs up and down the stairs for disciplinary purposes. Officer Joseph neither reported the chair-carrying incident involving the Respondent to her superiors nor did she personally write-up the Respondent for the incident. Officer Joseph did not personally witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Travis Smith, the Lake City Correctional Facility Recreation Director, had been told in the past by an inmate that the Respondent had ordered him to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Mr. Smith never reported to his superiors the inmate’s statement that he had been disciplined by having been forced to carry chairs up and down the stairs. Mr. Smith did not personally witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Captain Ruth Shaw received a report from her lieutenant, Phillip Mobley, that had been made by Officer Escobar concerning the alleged incident with Inmate Smiley on November 27, 2002. Captain Shaw has a close personal relationship with the Respondent. Captain Shaw had never witnessed the Respondent ordering inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Captain Shaw did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Captain Shaw reported that Inmate Smiley told her he had tripped and fallen over chairs while carrying them up and down the stairs. Correctional Officer Maurice Gardner had previous discussions with the Respondent concerning the Respondent’s disciplining of inmates by requiring them to carry chairs up and down the stairs. Officer Gardner does not discipline inmates by having them carry chairs up and down the stairs. Officer Gardner had witnessed inmates in the past carrying chairs up and down the stairs for discipline when he came on his shift immediately following the Respondent’s shift in the correctional facility. Officer Gardner did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. Officer Gardner and the Respondent were friends when they worked together at the correctional facility. Sometimes inmates report incidents that are not true. Inspector French interviewed the Respondent once not under oath and a second time under oath. Under oath, on December 31, 2003, the Respondent stated to Inspector French that he had never ordered inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. The Respondent was well respected at the Lake City Correctional facility prior to the alleged incident. If the Respondent had been found to have ordered inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline he most likely would have received a PSN, a “problem solving notice,” which is a mild form of discipline. The Respondent had never received a PSN or any form of discipline for having required inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline since no such incidents had ever been reported as to the Respondent in the past. The Respondent and all correctional officers at Lake City Correctional Facility had received instruction in the past about the importance of not lying under oath. The senior staff at the correctional facility instruct the correctional officers concerning how serious an infraction the Florida Department of Law Enforcement considers lying under oath. The Respondent had never been untruthful to Inspector French in the past. Sergeant Donna Murphy was aware that Officer Escobar went from cell to cell after the alleged incident of November 28, 2002, seeking statements about the incident from inmates. Inmate Smiley is a small individual who would have had a difficult time carrying six chairs up and down the stairs. Sergeant Murphy had never witnessed the Respondent requiring inmates to carry chairs up and down the stairs as a form of discipline. Sergeant Murphy did not witness the alleged incident of November 27, 2002. The Respondent believes that the witnesses who testified against him were forced to make the statements concerning his past disciplinary practices. The Respondent and Officer Escobar have experienced working relationship problems in the past. During his tenure at the Lake City Correctional Facility, the Respondent received one of the highest officer’s evaluations for 2002, and he was recommended for and completed four instructor’s courses: firearms instructor, defensive tactics instructor, instructor techniques, and chemical agents instructor. The Respondent has suffered personally as the result of losing his position at Lake City Correctional Facility. He has been forced to take a low-paying position as a youth counselor at a local community center in order to keep up with his child support payments and living expenses.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order as follows: The Respondent violated Section 837.02(1), Florida Statutes, and, as a result, failed to maintain good moral character, as required by Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes; That his certification be suspended for two years from January 16, 2003. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of February, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of February, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Laurie B. Binder, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael A. Kelly Route 7, Box 517 Lake City, Florida 32055 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice in the case of Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Rippy commenced her employment with the Department on June 30, 2000, as a correctional officer, at the Florida State Prison Work Camp at Starke, Florida. She was terminated on June 19, 2001. The Department of Corrections is a state agency that is charged with providing incarceration that supports the intentions of criminal law, among other things. The Florida Commission on Human Relations administers the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. When Ms. Rippy was hired as a correctional officer on June 30, 2000, she, and the Department, believed she was subject to a one-year probationary period. During that time, the parties believed she could be terminated without cause. Subsequent to her employment she had unscheduled but excused absences on as many as 15 occasions. On June 12, 2001, Ms. Rippy requested that her supervisor, Lt. J. L. Oliver, approve leave for her to commence Sunday, June 17, 2001. Lt. Oliver did not approve this request because to approve the request would cause the staffing level at the facility to recede below permitted limits. On Saturday June 16, 2001, at 6:00 p.m., Ms. Rippy called Sergeant K. Gilbert, Third Shift Control Room Sergeant, and told him that she was taking medication prescribed by a doctor that she had seen that day and that she would be sleeping and that as a result, she would be unable to report to work on her shift which began at midnight, June 17, 2001. She also volunteered that she would bring in a doctor's note excusing her absence. On Monday, June 18, 2001, Lt. Oliver asked her if she had a doctor's note explaining her absence on June 17, 2001. She replied that she had not been ill as reported to Sergeant Gilbert, but had in fact attended a party. She told him that she had not seen a doctor, was not on medication, and had attended a "bachelorette party" on June 17, 2001. In other words, she admitted that she had lied about the reason for her absence. She admitted this, under oath, at the hearing. Lt. Oliver informed her that it was his intention to charge her with unauthorized absence without pay, and possibly to take other disciplinary measures. Subsequently, persons higher in the chain-of-command decided to terminate Ms. Rippy. This decision was made because she had excess absences and because she had lied to persons in authority. This occurred 11 days before everyone believed she would have attained the status of permanent career service. On June 21, 2001, Correctional Officer Corey M. McMurry (Officer McMurry), a white male, was arrested in Starke, Florida, for driving under the influence of alcohol. As a result, on July 11, 2001, he was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to twelve months supervised probation, and suffered other court-ordered sanctions. Officer McMurry, at the time of his arrest, was a probationary employee. He was served a written reprimand because of his conviction of driving under the influence on December 19, 2001. Ms. Rippy testified, without foundation, that Officer McMurry's probation terminated on November 15, 2001, and that the Department did not learn of his arrest until December 2001. Ms. Rippy's testimony provides a plausible explanation for why more than five months expired from the time of his conviction until the issuance of the written reprimand. Ms. Rippy believes that the circumstances surrounding her offense were substantially similar to those of Officer McMurry. However, the chronic absenteeism of an employee, including unexcused absences, is more likely to disturb the good management of a correctional facility than an employee being convicted of driving under the influence on one occasion. Assistant Warden Doug Watson believes that correctional officers should be trustworthy. He believes that the credibility is critical and that lying is an extremely serious offense, when committed by a correctional officer. Ms. Rippy was paid $13.30 per hour and received substantial fringe benefits when she worked for the Department. Following her termination she was unemployed until January 2002, when she began working for a Wendy's restaurant for $5.75 per hour. In April 2002, she obtained employment with a private security company named Securitas. She started at $6.40 and received an increase to $7.00 per hour at a subsequent unknown date, and she continues to be employed with the company.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is Recommended that a final order be entered which dismisses Ms. Rippy's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark Henderson, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blairstone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Juliette C. Rippy 1622 Northeast 19th Place Gainesville, Florida 32609 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Derick Daniel, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William F. Reid, is currently and has been at all times pertinent to the issues herein, an inmate at UCI, having been committed to the custody of the DOC for an offense committed prior to July 1, 1978. At the time of filing of the Petition, he was in administrative confinement at UCI but, at the time of the hearing, had been released and was not in that status. Petitioner concedes that even during the period of his administrative confinement, he was awarded basic gain time as provided for since he was committed prior to July 1, 1978. However, due to the fact that he was unable to work while in administrative confinement, he did not receive any incentive gain time during that period. Work opportunities for inmates in administrative confinement status are extremely limited. This is because of the security and manpower problems involved in providing adequate supervision of this category of inmate during a work detail. Rule 33-3.081, Florida Administrative Code, allows the placing of an inmate in administrative confinement then disciplinary or criminal charges are pending against him and his presence in the general prison population would present a danger to himself, to others, or to the security and order of the institution. It is also authorized when an investigation is pending and the inmate's presence in the prison population might tend to interfere with that investigation. If, for medical reasons, an inmate's remaining in the prison population would create a health or safety risk, administrative confinement is also authorized. Another reason justifying administrative confinement is when the inmate is alleged to have committed misconduct and there is concern that because of that, his safety is at risk. The rule does not provide any maximum length of time for administrative confinement and the reason for this is that the investigations supporting it are of varying complexity and take differing lengths of time. Petitioner and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all of whom have been in administrative confinement in the past, all denied that they had received the required informal hearing called for under the rule. At best, they were told by the officer placing them in administrative confinement generally why this action was being taken. However, they contend they were never given any opportunity to submit anything to a senior official or a classification officer and they are of the opinion that at no time was there an emergency situation involved. The impression that the inmates have is that a corrections officer can have an inmate confined or released for any reason whether there is adequate justification or basis for the action. Clifford Towbridge has been an inmate at UCI since December, 1983. When he was placed in administrative confinement he was advised of this fact by a corrections officer who told him to pack his things and who put him in administrative confinement status without telling him why. He contends he got no hearing but was ultimately told he was being confined because a confidential informant advised that his life was in danger. Approximately two to three weeks later, he was released when he signed a paper indicating that his life was not in danger. At no time was he told who had made the allegation against him and he was not given a hearing either before confinement or before release. Curtis Mangram had an experience with administrative confinement at his prior incarceration at Belle Glade Correctional Institution. At that time he was given no hearing nor was he brought before a review board. When he left administrative confinement at Belle Glade he was assigned to UCI and remained clean until August 4, 1984 when he was placed in administrative confinement there. It appears that his name was mentioned in connection with the rape of a prisoner and he was placed in administrative confinement for several weeks pending investigation of that incident. One day after his release he was again placed in administrative confinement for possession of contraband wine. He was given no hearing prior to being placed into administrative confinement nor was he initially given a reason for this action. However, he wrote several letters to officials within the DOC to determine why this action was taken. The first response he got indicated he was being placed in for evaluation but regardless of the reason, he is sure he was not given a hearing. On neither occasion of his being placed in administrative confinement, in his opinion, was there any emergency reason for precipitous action. From first hand and from what he has seen and heard, it is his opinion that prisoners are placed in administrative confinement solely on the uncorroborated allegations of other prisoners and when this happens, there is no hearing prior to she placement nor within a timely period thereafter. As was stated previously, the witness was placed in administrative confinement on August 4 and was released on August 28. At that time he was told the reason for him having been placed in administrative confinement (the alleged rape) was resolved. The following day, August 29, he was placed back in administrative confinement and was told by a corrections officer that the action was being taken because Lt. Dixon, an investigator, wanted him back in. Later on, Officer Ward, Dixon's assistant, read him his rights and asked him some questions after which the witness was returned to administrative confinement. The witness admits that he had the wine which he subsequently found out was the basis for his second administrative confinement but he was never punished for the wine nor was he ever charged with the rape. He was in administrative confinement for a total of four months at UCI and had he been punished for the unlawful possession of the wine, it is his opinion he would have been placed in disciplinary confinement for fifteen or thirty days, a period much shorter than the entire period of his administrative confinement. Inmate Edwin Paul has been placed in administrative confinement for investigative reasons twelve or thirteen times during the two and a half years he has been an inmate at UCI. He relates that when he is placed there, the corrections officer comes up to him and tells him to pack his things but never gives him a reason for this action. The response to his inquiry is always that someone will tell him. It is his experience that at UCI, regardless of what the rule requires, no review is done and the inmate is not told anything until he files a grievance. That generally takes approximately ninety days to resolve and during this time, the inmate is in administrative confinement earning no incentive gain time. According to Paul, his requests for information as to the reason for his status are met with various answers such as "you're a menace," "none of your business," or "I don't know." It is his opinion that administrative confinement can be imposed on an inmate at the whim of a correctional officer. He contends that in all of his periods of administrative confinement either no charges were preferred against him, or he was found not guilty of the allegation that was laid, but during all that period, he has not received any gain time that he would have earned had he not been placed in administrative confinement. This has affected his status in that had he not been placed in administrative confinement, his sentence would have been up after forty months confinement. Because of his inability to earn gain time, he is not serving the fiftieth month of his period of confinement. Petitioner was placed in administrative confinement on March 17, 1985. He was not then nor has he since that time been given an informal hearing by a correctional officer, he states. He claims he was placed in administrative confinement by a corrections officer - and was not given an opportunity to sign anything regarding this action. On this occasion he was in for two and a half months. In a prior period of administrative confinement, he claims he was not told why he was there officially. Only through the information given him by a friendly corrections officer two weeks after the fact was he advised why he was incarcerated. Never has a senior corrections officer ever held a hearing with him, he states, nor has he ever been told how long the investigation on which his administrative confinement status is based will take. He has not seen any investigative report nor has he even been given any assistance in finding out the reason for his status. Even a personal interview with the superintendent of UCI has not changed this process, he says. Reid and the other inmates who testified on his behalf all contend that the implementation of the rule regarding administrative confinement creates great stress for them because of, (1) the loss of incentive gain time, (2) the inability to get appropriate exercise, and (3) the impact that the status has on the ability to receive visitors, and all agree that being afforded a hearing or being told why the administrative confinement action was being taken would tend to reduce that stress. Petitioner admitted that he does not have much of a problem with the rule except for the fact that it does not put any time limit on the length of the investigation. His complaint is primarily with the way the rule is followed by UCI. Mr. Tabah, the classification specialist at UCI, related that there is no formal board hearing when inmates are placed in administrative confinement. The inmates' case is reviewed by the chief correctional officer and this review is termed a hearing. This action, however, is itself reviewed by the classification team within 72 hours of the hearing. At the inmates' hearing, a form DC4-318 is prepared by the chief correctional officer on which the reason for the administrative confinement action is listed. The bottom half of this form is subsequently filled out by the classification team during its review as to its concurrence or non-concurrence and the team's recommendation for action. The inmate is given a copy of this review and has an opportunity to make comment thereon. Both the recommendation of the team and the comments of the inmate, if any, are referred to the superintendent. Every inmate in administrative confinement is reviewed weekly. Each inmate is usually advised of the reason for his being placed in administrative confinement either at the time or immediately thereafter. Only in emergency cases can the inmate be placed in administrative confinement without review/hearing by the chief correctional officer. In that case, the hearing is held within forty-eight hours. Review of the files on both Mangram and Towbridge reveal that, as to Towbridge, the inmate was advised by the corrections officer placing him in administrative confinement on February 13, 1985 as to the reason therefor. The chief corrections officer approved the actions of the corrections officer thereafter and the following day, the classification team reviewed the action and furnished the inmate with a copy of their recommendation. As to Mangram, the records reflect that he was placed in administrative confinement on August 18, 1984. An informal hearing was held that same day and the action was reviewed by senior corrections officer Bryant at 4:00 P.M. the same day. Mr. Mangram was retained in administrative confinement because of the belief that the safety of the institution required it. It was felt that Mangram was a potentially violent inmate who posed a clear danger to others. As to Mr. Paul, the file reflects that the two times he was in administrative confinement he was advised of the reasons and given a hearing. As to Petitioner, the record reflects that on January 24, 1985 he was placed in administrative confinement and given the reasons therefor by corrections officer Brown. The reviewing corrections officer supervisor Bryant concurred.
