The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent, Department of Corrections (“DOC” or the “Department”), engaged in discriminatory practices against Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, on the basis of his disability; and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a 53-year-old Caucasian male. From approximately November 19, 2004, until August 4, 2016, Petitioner was employed by the Department as a Correctional Officer. He was promoted to the rank of Correctional Officer Sergeant on July 28, 2006. At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was working at the Annex section of the Lowell Correctional Institution (“Lowell”) located in Marion County. Lowell is a maximum security prison for female inmates; it has an average daily count of approximately 2,800 prisoners. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida, created pursuant to section 20.315, Florida Statutes, and is responsible for, inter alia, hiring and monitoring all employees engaged in operations at a state prison. Petitioner was separated from his employment with DOC due to the fact that he could not “perform the essential functions of his job.” That determination was based on a report from Petitioner’s therapist, Mrs. Robinson, and her opinion that Petitioner could not effectively perform his duties in the presence of inmates. Inasmuch as all Correctional Officer Sergeant positions require contact with inmates, DOC terminated Petitioner’s employment. The facts leading to the ultimate termination of Petitioner’s employment are anything other than ordinary. A discussion of those facts follows. In October 2014, a female inmate at Lowell was found dead in her cell. Petitioner was named as a suspect in the death, despite the fact that at the time of death he was on vacation with his family, i.e., he was not working at the prison. Local and national news outlets began reporting about the death, and Petitioner was named numerous times as a suspect and possible participant. Apparently, Petitioner’s name had been provided to the inmate’s family prior to her death as someone who had been harassing her. Nonetheless, Petitioner’s character and reputation were impugned by the news stories. Petitioner was placed on administrative leave pending further review by the Department. Meanwhile, the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (“FDLE”) commenced its own extensive investigation into the death of the inmate. The investigation focused quite heavily on Petitioner and one other correctional officer, but FDLE ultimately concluded that there was no evidence to prove either of the men had taken part in the inmate’s death. The inmate’s death, in fact, was ruled to be from natural causes.1/ The FDLE investigation was concluded on January 21, 2015. The Department did not issue a particular statement concerning Petitioner’s vindication, nor did it publish a notice about the FDLE findings. Petitioner takes great umbrage at this perceived failure by DOC, but cited to no requirement that the Department do so. The Department acknowledges that it did not make any effort to make public the findings of the FDLE investigation. During the FDLE investigation and while Petitioner’s alleged involvement in the incident was being broadcast by the news services, Petitioner began receiving threats against his life and the lives of his family members. Who made such threats or why such threats may have been made was not made clear at final hearing. Whether it was family and friends of the inmate, concerned citizens who perceived Petitioner as some kind of monster, or someone else making the threats, Petitioner was concerned for his safety. He was especially worried for his daughter, who had been living part-time with Petitioner on a split schedule with his ex-wife. When the news stories began to appear, the ex-wife refused to allow the daughter to visit with Petitioner. While he wanted to see his child, Petitioner knew that it was better for her to stay away from him until the situation improved. As a result of the publicity, the threats, and the stress on him and his family, Petitioner developed PTSD. The Department approved Petitioner for participation in EAP on March 6, 2015. EAP paid for counseling sessions with Petitioner’s chosen therapist, Mrs. Robinson. Petitioner had about 12 sessions with Mrs. Robinson while he was covered by EAP. After his EAP coverage expired, Petitioner met with Mrs. Robinson for two more sessions paid for as part of his FMLA leave. Mrs. Robinson identified Petitioner’s condition at the beginning of their sessions as quite extreme. He suffered from nightmares, crippling fear, paranoia, and unwillingness to leave his home. He had dark circles under his eyes and was obviously distraught. Mrs. Robinson began to work with Petitioner to help him view his fears and concerns differently. She taught him to utilize mindfulness meditation techniques. He was shown how to perform activities of daily life without being reminded of the trauma he had experienced. The number of sessions he spent with Mrs. Robinson was not sufficient for her to fully address his needs, however. She was able to diagnose his PTSD and began treatment for that condition, but their relationship ended before she could do much for him. By the time her treatment of Petitioner was concluded, they were working toward Petitioner’s acceptance of some inmates in his workplace, as long as they were not “general population inmates.” Ms. Robinson reiterated that Petitioner should not work within the prison compound, i.e., within the perimeter, at this time. She believed that with further assistance, Petitioner may one day be able to do so. By letter dated March 13, 2015, Mrs. Robinson notified the Department that, concerning Petitioner, “It is recommended that he does not return to work until further notice due to the hostility he has faced from the public, his co-workers and other inmates that he would be responsible for which could trigger further de-compensation and contribute to greater emotional disturbance. Mr. Quercioli is open to learning positive coping skills for improved feelings management as well as the treatments necessary for recovering from PTSD.” For about three months, the Department attempted to determine whether Petitioner would be able to return to work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. On June 9, 2015, DOC notified Petitioner that his FMLA leave had been exhausted and he needed to talk to his supervisor, Major Patterson, about when he could come back to work. Mr. Patterson contacted Petitioner and basically said he would need to come back to work at the Lowell Annex, i.e., return to his old job. Meanwhile, the Department, by letter dated June 16, 2015, asked Mrs. Robinson for her opinion regarding whether Petitioner could work as a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The parties to this matter characterize the tone of that letter quite differently. It is therefore quoted here in its entirety for the purpose of objectivity: Dear Mrs. Robinson: The above employee [Petitioner] is a Correctional Office Sergeant with the Florida Department of Corrections at Lowell Correctional Institution. Your opinion regarding Mr. Quercioli’s medical status while working in a potentially dangerous environment will assist management in their decision to retain Mr. Quercioli in his current position. In order for us to determine whether or not Mr. Quercioli can safely perform his duties as a Correctional Officer Sergeant, we request that you complete this questionnaire as to his ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of a Correctional Officer Sergeant to full capacity. Please bear in mind that Correctional Officer Sergeants must be able to work split, rotating or fixed shifts, weekends, holidays and overtime possibly without notice as required. Overtime may include double shifts and working on off duty days. In order to assist you in making this determination, I am enclosing a position description and a list of essential functions for the Correctional Officer Sergeant position held by Mr. Quercioli. Also, please bear in mind that Mr. Quercioli’s job does require that he be able to possess a firearm. Furthermore, he could at any time be placed in a situation where the use of physical force, including deadly force may be necessary, to control violent inmates or prevent imminent threat to life. We ask that you provide information regarding how Mr. Quercioli can treat and control his condition in a correctional environment. In addition, we need to know what precautionary measures are required to ensure his physical condition is not exacerbated when he is involved in a highly dangerous situation with inmates or volatile situations with supervisors and/or co-workers. In rendering your opinion, if you determine Mr. Quercioli can perform some duties but not others, please specify which duties cannot be performed and the reason why. Additionally, if there is anything that can be done to allow him to perform these duties, please provide this information. In the letter making this request, the Department included a job description and a brief questionnaire to be filled out by the therapist. The questionnaire asked, “After reviewing the position description of Correctional Officer Sergeant, can Mr. Quercioli perform the duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant with no restrictions?” The questionnaire went on to ask for any reasons that the question was answered in the negative. Mrs. Robinson replied that “No,” Petitioner could not perform the duties without restrictions. She went on to say that, “With 100% supervision of inmates as his primary duties and his constellation of PTSD symptoms, Mr. Quercioli would be at risk of decompensation. A job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future.” Mrs. Robinson had previously, in response to a Medical Certification request from FCHR, listed a few alternative jobs that Petitioner may be able to do, including: “administration away from inmates; staff security away from general population inmates; key keeper or arsenal maintenance away from general population inmates.” The evidence is unclear as to whether the Department was aware of her suggestions regarding those potential jobs for Petitioner. At final hearing, Ms. Robison reiterated her concern about Petitioner being asked to work in an area where general population inmates might be present. Her testimony, in part, was as follows: Q: “[W]ould he have been able to perform the required functions of his employment position based on what you read in his personnel description, the essential functions of his position, had the department considered or approved any request for accommodations Mr. Quercioli made on the department? A: The current job description, position description for a sergeant as a correctional officer, he couldn’t do that job. Q: Could he do others? A: He could do other jobs and we were working towards limited, you know, his acceptance and, you know, with the cognitive behavioral therapy helps you think different about things and he was opening up to the idea that yes, there will be inmates around but they’re at a lower level of risk, and so he was open to that and for trying to work in a different position. * * * Q: So, earlier or a few moments ago when you said he couldn’t perform under [sic] the position of a correctional sergeant, that’s not a hundred percent accurate, correct? A: Right, that was the job description, that is what he was doing in general population, supervising inmates. He can’t supervise inmates and that has a hundred percent by it, supervision of male or female inmates. That what he -- the part of his job that he couldn’t do. Q: Uh-huh, but with an accommodation, he could do that? A: Yes. In another job, other than supervising his primary one hundred percent duties of supervising male or female inmates. Tr., pp. 48-50. Exactly what duties Petitioner could perform without difficulty is unclear. It is certain he could not supervise inmates 100 percent of the time. Whether he could work around inmates in an environment separated from the prison compound is not certain. Whether he could respond to an emergency situation inside the compound is extremely doubtful.2/ Petitioner’s attorney submitted a letter to DOC dated June 26, 2015. The letter requested accommodations that might make it possible for Petitioner to perform one or more jobs at Lowell. The letter suggested part-time or modified work schedules, job restructuring, and other possibilities. The letter also stated, in part, “Instead of requiring Sergeant Quercioli to once again re-live the nightmares arising from his previous duty in the Lowell Annex, the Department could instead assign him to a less stressful desk job.” DOC responded that a less stressful desk job is not a feasible accommodation because a person in that position would not be able to perform the essential duties of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. The attorney responded to the Department that his previous request for an accommodation was not meant to be limited to a “desk job” only; he meant to include any reasonable accommodations. Though the two conversants used different terminology, it is obvious they were both addressing alternative jobs that did not require Petitioner to work within the prison compound, whether that meant literally sitting at a desk or not. Petitioner intimated, but did not conclusively prove, that there were certain jobs in the administration offices, i.e., outside the compound, that he might be capable of filling. No evidence was presented concerning the exact nature of those jobs, the responsibilities attached thereto, or Petitioner’s qualifications to fill them. Following the exchange of letters between DOC and Petitioner (through his attorney), the Department notified Petitioner via letter dated July 9, 2015, that a “personnel action” was being contemplated by DOC which could result in his dismissal from employment. The basis for a personnel action was that Petitioner’s therapist said he was “currently unable to perform the duties of . . . a Correctional Officer Sergeant.” Petitioner was given the opportunity to attend a pre- determination conference with DOC personnel to provide oral or written statements in regards to the personnel action. A conference was held on July 23, 2015. The Department was represented by Warden Gordon and Colonel Edith Pride. A teamster representative, Michael Riley, accompanied Petitioner to the conference. Petitioner’s attorney, Mr. Bisbee, attended the conference via telephone. Petitioner did not bring his therapist, Ms. Robinson, to the meeting because “it never crossed my mind” that she should attend. At the conference, Petitioner reiterated his desire to return to work, but stated he would rather not interact with inmates, even though he believed he might be able do so. His belief was inconsistent with his therapist’s determination and contrary to his attorney’s representations. It is unclear whether DOC could have assigned Petitioner to a position that did not involve some contact with inmates. There were a few jobs mentioned that take place in the prison’s administration building, outside the perimeter. Some of the “trustee” type inmates working within the administration building may have been much less threatening to Petitioner than general population inmates. But because every Correctional Officer Sergeant is deemed to be on call to attend to disturbances within the prison compound, regardless of their job or workplace, Petitioner could be subject to having close contact with the general population inmates. Petitioner identified one specific job in administration that he thought he might be able to handle despite some inmate contact. That job, in the area of training, was filled by another Correctional Officer Sergeant. Petitioner did not ever formally apply for the job. Subsequent to the predetermination conference, the Department issued a letter to Petitioner advising him that “You will be dismissed from your position as a Correctional Officer Sergeant effective August 4, 2015.” The letter gave Petitioner the right to grieve the action or to appeal it to the Public Employees Relations Commission. Petitioner did not avail himself of either of those options. Instead, he filed a claim with FCHR, resulting ultimately in the present action. DOC based its decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment on the fact that his own therapist had opined that he could not perform the essential functions of a Correctional Officer Sergeant. That is because persons in that position–-no matter what duties they were performing--must be able at a moment’s notice to react personally to any emergency situation that may arise within the inmate population. A correctional officer working in the motor pool, for example, may have to drop what he is doing, pick up a firearm, and rush into the compound to quell a disturbance. A sergeant who is performing training for other officers may have to cease her training and immediately report to duty inside the compound to respond to inmate unrest. There is no job under the Correctional Officer Sergeant umbrella that is immune from contact with inmates at any given time. There was, in short, no reasonable accommodation the Department could offer Petitioner. Two pertinent quotes from the record explain concisely the basis of the Department’s position in this case: As a general rule, we don’t “accommodate” correctional officers because the accommodations requested generally include exemption from the essential functions. We provide alternate duty for those officers who are temporarily unable to perform the duties of their position because of a work related injury. However, while on alternate duty, they do not wear a uniform, nor do they perform the duties of a [Correctional Officer]. * * * Quercioli’s therapist, Beth Robinson, stated he was not able to perform the duties of his position, although a job with no inmate contact may be possible in the future. There are no correctional officer positions, regardless of rank, whose essential functions do not include dealing with inmates. Exhibit 4 to Petitioner Exhibit 1, email from Patricia Linn, human resources analyst. It is not unusual for employees to request so-called “accommodations” from DOC relating to their duties as correctional officers. Such requests may include exceptions to the dress code, a need for ergonomic chairs, leave extensions, parking space changes, alternate work schedules, and the like. Each request is reviewed on its own merits and some are granted, some are denied. In fact, Petitioner alluded to the fact that after the inmate death incident, he had been reassigned to alternate duties not having to do with inmate monitoring. His duties were related to assisting applicants for jobs at Lowell to fill out their applications. Petitioner intimated that he did not enjoy that position. Petitioner asserts that DOC made no effort to contact him to discuss possible accommodations. He did not cite to any existing policy or rule which would require the Department to do so, however. Further, Petitioner admitted that he did not attempt to initiate such conversations with the Department, either. Since losing his job at Lowell, Petitioner has been unable to obtain gainful employment. Of the scores of internet applications for employment (and one in-person interview), not a single position came to fruition. As a result, Petitioner cashed out his state retirement plan, using the money to pay bills and provide for his daughter’s needs. Petitioner presented no evidence in this case that persons with disabilities were treated any differently by the Department when they requested accommodations.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued by the Florida Commission on Human Relations, determining that the Department of Corrections had legitimate cause for the dismissal of employment of Petitioner, Patrick Quercioli, and that there is no evidence of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of May, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since August 10, 1988, certified by the Commission as a correctional officer. He holds certificate number A86-502-07. Respondent has spent his entire career as a correctional officer with the Metro-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department (hereinafter referred to as "Metro"). He currently holds the rank of corporal. On June 26, 1989, Respondent was a Correctional Officer I and assigned to the third floor of Metro's Pre-Trial Detention Center, which is also known as the Main Jail. He worked the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift that day. During the eight month period prior to June 26, 1989, Respondent served as the acting supervisor of the third floor of the Main Jail during his shift. June 26, 1989, was Corporal Darlene Beasley's first day as the Main Jail's new third floor supervisor during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift. Respondent was one of the officer's under her supervision that day. On June 26, 1989, the third floor of the Main Jail housed approximately 220 inmates in three separate wings, "A" Wing, "B" Wing and "C" Wing. John Breedlove was one of these inmates. Breedlove was 19 years old. His height was approximately five feet, eight inches. His weight was approximately 210 pounds. Breedlove had the privilege of being a trustee. Consequently, his cell was in "B" Wing, which housed all of the trustees on the floor. Trustees are inmates who are given various tasks to perform in and around the Main Jail. They perform these tasks under the supervision of a Labor Supervisor and receive monetary compensation and gain time for their services. As a general rule, trustees are accompanied to and from their work assignments by their Labor Supervisor, who signs them out when he or she takes them from the floor and signs them back in when he or she returns them to the floor. Sometimes, however, a staff member other than a Labor Supervisor will assume the responsibility of escorting trustees to and from their work assignments. Escorting trustees to and from their work assignments lessens the likelihood that they will be successful in any efforts they may make while they are out of their cells to obtain contraband and distribute the contraband to other inmates at the facility. On June 26, 1989, Breedlove was assigned trustee duty in the rear lobby of the Main Jail, which is located on the first floor of the facility. The work was to be performed during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift that day under the supervision of Labor Supervisor Ricardo Gibson. Gibson signed Breedlove out at the beginning of the shift and escorted him to his work assignment on the first floor. Sometime thereafter Breedlove asked Gibson if he could return to the third floor to get a haircut and take care of some laundry. Gibson replied that Breedlove could do so, but only after he had completed his work assignment. Later that day, after he had done some, but not all, of the work he had been assigned, Breedlove encountered Beasley, who was on the first floor to obtain information concerning the whereabouts of certain inmates assigned to her floor. Breedlove told Beasley that he had completed his work assignment and requested that she escort him to the third floor. Beasley complied with Breedlove's request. Respondent had just finished giving the inmates in "A" Wing their dinner meal when he noticed Breedlove sitting on a bench outside the attorney interview rooms located on the third floor. Respondent asked Breedlove what he was doing there. Breedlove responded that he had returned to the floor to get a haircut and to do his laundry. Respondent admonished Breedlove for being on the floor and instructed him to return to his work assignment. Respondent thereupon continued his feeding of the inmates on the floor. After he had delivered to the inmates in "B" Wing their dinner meal, Respondent again saw Breedlove outside the attorney interview rooms. Respondent asked Breedlove what he was still doing there and reminded him that he had been told to return to his work assignment. Gibson then arrived on the scene. He too admonished Breedlove for leaving his work assignment. After Gibson arrived, Respondent continued his feeding of the inmates on the floor. After he finished feeding the inmates in "C" Wing, Respondent observed that, notwithstanding his and Gibson's prior admonishments, Breedlove was still on the floor. Respondent approached Breedlove and asked him why he had not followed his instructions to leave the floor and return to his work assignment. Breedlove's response was that Beasley had brought him back to the floor. Respondent then went to speak about the matter with Beasley, who was doing paperwork in the control booth on the floor. The control booth is a secure enclosed area situated adjacent to the third floor lobby where the elevators are located. It is constructed of concrete, concrete block, one quarter inch thick polished wire glass and steel mesh. Manning the control booth is a Correctional Aide, who from his vantage point in the front of the booth can look through the glass and observe activity that is taking place in the lobby area of the floor as well as on the corridors of all three wings of the floor. Correctional Aide Harold McCartney was manning the control booth during the 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. shift on June 26, 1989. Beasley was seated at a desk behind McCartney. Respondent walked up to Beasley and asked her if she had brought Breedlove back up to the floor. Beasley indicated that she had. Respondent and Beasley then discussed the matter further. The discussion resulted in Beasley agreeing to take Breedlove back downstairs to the rear lobby to finish his work assignment. She thereupon retrieved Breedlove. She then walked to the elevators on the floor. Breedlove followed behind her. Correctional Aide Gregory McKenzie was also waiting for an elevator to go downstairs. The elevator stopped and McKenzie and Beasley walked on. Just as Breedlove was about to walk on to the elevator, he uttered, in an irritated tone of voice, some profanity. Respondent heard Breedlove. This was the final straw as far as Respondent was concerned. He believed that Breedlove was no longer deserving of the privilege of being a trustee. Respondent therefore told Breedlove that he was "busted." In jail parlance, "busted" means removed from trustee status. Any correctional officer in the Main Jail has the authority to "bust" a trustee. Respondent ordered Breedlove to get off the elevator and to go to his cell to pack his belongings. Breedlove got off the elevator and appeared to be headed in the direction of his cell in "B" Wing when he stopped, turned around and just stared at Respondent. Respondent reacted by repeating his order that Breedlove go to his cell. Breedlove, however, did not move. Respondent then started walking towards Breedlove. Breedlove then turned his back to Respondent and made an obscene remark directed at Respondent. Given Breedlove's defiance, Respondent reasonably felt that he needed to take control of the situation and physically guide Breedlove to his cell. He thus walked up to Breedlove, who was somewhere between two to eight feet from the front of the control booth, and put his hand on Breedlove's shoulder to lead him to his cell. As Respondent grabbed Breedlove by the shoulder, Breedlove suddenly started to pull away. Respondent followed after Breedlove, grabbing him by the back of his pants while trying to maintain the grasp he had on his shoulder. The struggle ended abruptly when Respondent fell on top of Breedlove and they both went to floor. Before hitting the ground, Breedlove struck his face on one of the glass panels of the control booth, breaking the glass as well as the wires inside the glass. Although it may have appeared otherwise to those who witnessed the incident, Respondent did not intentionally push or shove Breedlove into the control booth glass. The only force that Respondent purposely used against Breedlove was that which was reasonably necessary to overcome Breedlove's physical resistance to Respondent's directives that he return to his cell. Breedlove started to bleed profusely after hitting the glass. Blood was streaming down his face and onto to his shirt. Respondent was more fortunate than Breedlove. He did not come in contact with any glass. He was startled by the breaking of the glass, but uninjured. After falling to the ground, he got off of Breedlove and backed away to regain his composure. He stood by as Beasley rushed to Breedlove's aid. Beasley helped Breedlove to his feet and took him to the jail clinic to receive medical assistance. Although Respondent did not offer any assistance, his help was not needed inasmuch as Beasley had the situation under control. Breedlove suffered multiple lacerations on his right cheek as a result of the incident. At the jail clinic, bandages were wrapped around his face to control the bleeding. Because of the nature of the injury, Breedlove was referred to Jackson Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as "Jackson") for further treatment. At Jackson, Breedlove was seen by a nurse practitioner. A small piece of glass was removed from his right check and he received six stitches. After taking Breedlove to the clinic, Beasley went to the office of the shift commander, Lieutenant Francie D'Erminio, to report what had happened between Respondent and Breedlove. A short time thereafter, Respondent arrived at D'Erminio's office to tell her about the incident. D'Erminio ordered that the matter be investigated. An internal investigation of the incident was conducted. Following the completion of the internal investigation, Respondent was given a 15 day suspension by Metro. Respondent successfully appealed his suspension. He subsequently was promoted to corporal.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order (1) finding the evidence insufficient to prove that Respondent is guilty, as charged, of having failed to maintain "good moral character" in violation of Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, and (2) based upon such a finding, dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against him. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 13th day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1993.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Lester Bishop, was employed as a Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution from March 20, 1981, to April 1, 1986. Union Correctional Institution (UCI) is a facility which houses inmates ranging in custody levels from minimum to close. In December of 1981, the Respondent was given a copy of the rules of the Department of Corrections. At this time he acknowledged that he was responsible for compliance with these rules. In late March and early April, 1986, the Respondent was scheduled to work the first shift at UCI beginning at 12:00 midnight and ending at 8:00 a.m.. The supervisor for this shift was either Lieutenant R. L. Weiland or Lieutenant S. E. Stafford, depending upon the day of the week. On March 23, 1986, the Respondent called Lieutenant Weiland at Union Correctional Institution at 12:30 a.m., requesting and receiving sick leave for the remainder of this shift. On March 24, 1986, the Respondent did not report to work, and he did not contact the shift supervisor to request leave. As a result, he was placed on unauthorized leave without pay status for this day. On March 25, 1986, the Respondent called his supervisor, requesting and receiving eight hours sick leave for this day. On March 26 and 27, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. March 28 and 29, 1986, were the Respondent's regularly scheduled days off. From March 30 until April 2, 1986, the Respondent neither called his supervisor nor reported for work. He was given unauthorized leave without pay status for these days. On April 2, 1986, the Superintendent of Union Correctional Institution, T. L. Barton, sent the Respondent a letter informing him that he had abandoned his position at Union Correctional Institution, and that he was dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order terminating the employment of the Respondent, Lester Bishop, from his position as Correctional Officer at Union Correctional Institution, for abandonment, pursuant to Rule 22A 7.010(2), Florida Administrative Code, effective March 25, 1986. THIS Recommended Order entered on this 9th day of December, 1986, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Gilda H. Lambert Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louie L. Wainwright, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 1986. Ernest A. Reddick, Esquire 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Lester Bishop, in pro per Box 1341 Starke, Florida 32091
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, William Joel Keel, is an inmate at the correctional institution in Raiford, Florida. The Union Correctional Institution is a confinement facility operated by the Respondent, Department of Corrections. Section 945.091, Florida Statutes, permits the Respondent to adopt rules and regulations which modify the limits of an inmate's confinement under specified conditions. In January 1986, the figures of the statistics of the Department of Corrections reflect that there were approximately 1300 new commitment intakes per month. As the year 1986 progressed up through the months of April and May, this rate went up to approximately 1400 to 1600 per month, and in June, the figure stood at 1680 new commitment intakes; a new record. This record, however, has been broken since that time with a monthly intake of 1700. This large number of intakes created a terrible strain on the system which at the time had reached the federal standards and the state cap on inmate strength of 98 percent. These caps are placed on inmate strength as an effort to reduce the extreme safety and security problems created by inmate overcrowding. Because there was no new staff assigned to the Department of Corrections during the period of this increase, the staff/inmate ratio decreased as the hot summer months approached with the pressure that the climate imposes. Both interior and perimeter security of the various institutions within the Department of Corrections became more and more strained. The stress on staff caused an increase of absenteeism and illness. In addition, during this period of increased temperature and the concomitant stress related thereto, assaults and escapes become a greater and greater problem. In June 1986, the inmate population in the Florida prison system went up to 99 percent, a figure approved by the Florida Legislature due to a change brought about by an automated accounting system for prisoners. The achievement of the 99 percent plus prison population constituted an "emergency" due to overcrowding. As a result, it became obvious that there was a need to increase the number of inmates eligible for pre-expiration of sentence release. Consistent therewith was the need to establish a fair and objective way of placing inmates into this pre-release program that would protect the public. It was determined necessary to screen out from participation in the program certain prohibited types of inmates such as sex offenders unless they have been cleared and determined to be harmless. Up to the point of this determination, there appeared to be no substantial or valid guidelines. Another intent of the framers of this emergency rule was the desire to set up a procedure to remove inmates placed into the pre-release program from the program for cause in accordance with due process and constitutionality. It was deemed necessary to make clear within the parameters of the program and within the instructions for the program what had to be done and how it was to be accomplished. Nonetheless, the overriding consideration which constituted the "emergency" situation was the overpopulation in the prison system. As a result, the Department of Corrections in July 1986 promulgated and published its Emergency Rule 33ER 86-3 dealing with supervised community release which rule was to take effect upon being filed with the Department of State. This rule provided that all inmates who are within 90 days of their release date will be eligible for placement on supervised community release if they meet certain specified requirements. The emergency rule listed as the basis therefor, "this emergency rule is necessary to protect the health, safety and welfare of the people of the State of Florida by providing criteria that the inmates to be placed in supervised community release must meet to help assure the safety of the public." It goes on also to indicate that the rule is necessary to prescribe appropriate sanctions for inmates within the program in the event they violate the terms and conditions of the release agreement. The program provides that the initial process is for the staff within the Department of Corrections to screen all inmates within 90 days of the end of their sentence. It was envisioned as an extension of the work release program already existing. It is for that reason that only those on or eligible for work release can participate in this new program. This is consistent with the statutory mandate to include in pre-release programs only trustworthy inmates. Inmates are also screened to ensure that they have demonstrated this trustworthiness by performing well in the more restrictive work release program. Other methods of demonstrating trustworthiness and eligibility is for the inmate to invest time in self-improvement projects such as the GED Program and to have through his past practice, shown that he will return to the prison setting at night. This screening is done monthly of all inmates with a temporary release date of 120 days in the future. By so doing, this gives the staff 30 days to develop a plan for the individual inmate to ensure a stable environment for the inmate to go to. Prior to the implementation of Chapter 86-46, Laws of Florida, the statutory authority for the current program, there was no provision for the program in issue. As soon as this law was passed the legal staff within the Department of Corrections prepared the instant emergency rule as soon as possible. Had they not been able to do an emergency rule and had the regular rulemaking process been necessary, it is most likely that they would not have had established criteria and guidelines to apply to those who had to be released due to the fact that the prison population had reached the statutory cap. In fact, it was shown that state attorneys would not cooperate with the Department of Corrections and process violations of the program unless there were specific guidelines contained therein, and, since it was necessary to reduce the inmate population, it was therefore necessary to utilize the emergency role process. With that in mind, the safety of the public into which these inmates would be released was the primary concern and generated the need to ensure that only qualified and safe inmates were released. Under the new statute and the emergency rule, 1125 inmates have been released as of the date of the hearing. Approximately 750 inmates are in the program at any given time. As a result of the implementation of this program, the prison population has dropped and remained within the new 99 percent of capacity state cap. Experience with the programs so far has shown that the inmates in the program have been guilty of only minor violations such as assault on witnesses, DWI, simple assault, and larceny. And all of these offenses came up after implementation of the emergency rule. In the case of misconduct by a released inmate which does not result in immediate charges and incarceration, such as leaving the county where placed or the state, the disciplinary team from the Department of Corrections will evaluate the inmate and impose the penalty. These penalties could include removal of gain time while still remaining within the program up to removal from the program and loss of gain time. Conditions of enrollment in the program include, as to the inmate, that he (a) stay in the area where assigned; (b) refrain from the use of drugs; (c) comply with instructions given; (d) pay court costs imposed; and (e) pay a $30 a month fee to the Department of Corrections to cover administrative costs. Though the emergency rule appears to be working satisfactorily, the Department of Corrections is in the process of regular rulemaking to adopt a permanent rule identical to the emergency rule in issue here.
The Issue Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included for retirement purposes in the Special Risk Class (SRC) from July 1, 1981 through October 24, 1985? Should Respondent Division of Retirement grant Petitioner's request to be included in the Special Risk Administrative Support Class (SRASC) for the period October 25, 1985 until January 1, 1998?
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Alachua County employed a jail facility Director who had overall supervision of correctional officers and special risk employees and who was ultimately responsible for restraint of inmates. Petitioner was continuously employed by the Alachua County Department of Corrections at the Alachua County Jail from the date of his initial employment as a Correctional Officer I on April 22, 1974, to his lay-off as Assistant Director of the Alachua County Jail on January 1, 1998. Political opponents of Petitioner raised the issues of his eligibility for SRC and SRASC classification and the validity of his correctional officer certification beginning approximately in 1996. Petitioner began work April 22, 1974, as a Correctional Officer I (uniformed line officer) and was recommended by his employer Alachua County and approved by Respondent for SRC membership, effective April 22, 1974. Respondent reviews applications for SRC and SRASC for completeness with no audit beyond the certification by the member and the employer. Respondent may approve, retroactive to the date specified in the application. If at any time it is determined that a member is not eligible for inclusion in a particular retirement category, the member is removed, retroactive to the date of ineligibility. Petitioner was certified as a correctional officer by the Council of Correctional Standards on July 1, 1974. Petitioner was promoted to an Administrative Assistant I position, effective May 18, 1981. The Administrative Assistant I position did not require certification as a correctional officer. On May 18, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Effective July 1, 1981, the Florida Legislature merged the Council of Correctional Standards, which had certified Petitioner on July 1, 1974, with the Law Enforcement Standards Council, to form the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC), an arm of the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE). In so doing, the Legislature provided Section 943.19(3), Florida Statutes, to "grandfather-in" certain correctional officers' certifications. On July 1, 1981, Petitioner was a certified correctional officer in a position that did not require certification. Sometime later in 1981, the newly-formed CJSTC requested that Alachua County send the CJSTC a list of all certified correctional officers in its employ. Such a list was prepared by Alachua County personnel and forwarded to the CJSTC. The list prepared by the County did not include Petitioner's name, presumably because at that time, as an Administrative Assistant I, he was not serving in a position requiring certification as a correctional officer. Petitioner was promoted to the position of Administrative Operations Supervisor, effective March 22, 1982. This position also did not require correctional officer certification. Although Petitioner was employed as an Administrative Assistant I beginning May 18, 1981, and as an Administrative Operations Supervisor beginning March 22, 1982, he did not make application for inclusion in SRASC until March 17, 1986. On April 23, 1986, Alachua County recommended Petitioner's SRASC classification. Kim Baldry, Director of Personnel for Alachua County since 1983, signed off on a form stating that Petitioner: Was employed for training and/or career development . . . and is subject to reassignment at any time to a position qualifying for special risk membership. Respondent approved Petitioner's SRASC membership retroactive to October 25, 1985. Petitioner's November 13, 1987, application for inclusion in SRC as "Assistant Director/Administrative Support," was neither recommended by Alachua County, nor approved by Respondent. In July 1994, the Administrative Operations Supervisor position was reclassified, without any change in job description or duties, as Assistant Director/Administrative Support, and Petitioner served in that capacity until his lay-off in 1998. The position never required a correctional officer certification. Petitioner was not employed as a uniformed correctional officer from May 18, 1981, to his lay-off in 1998. Petitioner did not hold a position for which the minimum requirements included certification as a correctional officer from May 18, 1981, until his lay-off in 1998. Kim Baldry testified that although Petitioner had many job titles during his 1981 to 1998 employment, his actual duties from 1981 to 1998 were consistently over personnel, budget, and fiscal matters; that he primarily supervised fiscal assistants and accounting clerks; and that he was never a jail "supervisor" as such. She did, however, concede that she had dealt with him over correctional officer discipline from 1983 to 1998. Petitioner and Ms. Baldry concurred that from 1981 to 1998, his duties remained basically the same, and that at various times, he was known as "Acting Assistant Director" and "Assistant Director" and when the Director was out of town, Petitioner served as "Acting Director." Petitioner testified without refutation that from 1981 to 1998, his duties always included personnel oversight of line correctional officers; overseeing payroll leave and timecards for such officers; and screening, interviewing, and processing applications for new correctional officers. One of his job descriptions confirms this. Petitioner also testified that he had daily contact with inmates of the Alachua County Jail in the commissary, medical services area, and food preparation area, and with trustees in support services, and that he regularly appeared before the County Commission concerning budget, jail crowding, and the need for more correctional officers. Petitioner's daily primary duties and responsibilities after May 18, 1981, were neither the direct custody, nor the physical restraint, of prisoners or inmates at Alachua County Jail. His daily primary duties were fiscal, budgeting, accounting, and personnel administration in nature. He was not a line officer on the floor with special risk officers and inmates on a daily basis, although he did consult with some line and special risk correctional officers on personnel matters, including disciplinary matters. Actual discipline went through correctional officer captains and lieutenants. Petitioner stated that when he was an Administrative Assistant I, he was subject to reassignment as a line correctional officer at any time and that when he was Administrative Operations Supervisor, there were two other supervisors who oversaw work release and jail supervision, respectively, on a day-to-day basis. At some point, one position was eliminated and one was assigned to the court system. From 1994 to 1995, when Petitioner was Assistant Director, there was one other Assistant Director. Both Assistant Directors reported directly to the Director of Alachua County Jail, who had total oversight of the jail operation. However, when both the Director and the other Assistant Director were out of town, or later, when Petitioner was the sole Assistant Director, the Director delegated his duties to Petitioner for the interim, and Petitioner was left directly in charge of all functions, including security, supervision of correctional officers, and supervision of inmates. When questions concerning his certification and retirement status arose in 1996, Respondent requested that Alachua County personnel look into the matter because he considered it to be his employer's problem and not his own. Alachua County formally requested review by the Respondent of Petitioner's retirement designation, indicating that it did not believe that Petitioner should continue in SRC or SRASC, because he was serving the employer in an administrative capacity. After considerable correspondence back and forth, FDLE, the agency that houses the CJSTC which has the responsibility and authority to certify correctional officers, advised Alachua County by a May 24, 1996, letter that: . . . A review of the files in the Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training indicates that Mr. Krank was a certified correctional officer with the Corrections Council. That council was merged with the Law Enforcement Standards Council to form the Criminal Justice and Training Commission (CJSTC) in 1981. Officers employed in correctional officer positions were "grandfathered" into the CJSTC at that time. Mr. Krank was not employed as a correctional officer at the time of the merger, and, therefore, was not grandfathered into the CJSTC. It is suggested that if Mr. Krank requests more specific information concerning the grandfather clause in the statute, that he contact the State Department of Corrections. I have enclosed a copy of the 1983 Florida Statutes reference [sic] the "Saving Clause." However, it does not go into any detail as to what the process was at that time. (Joint Composite Exhibit 5) (Emphasis supplied.) Respondent received a May 21, 1998, letter from FDLE, stating: After a thorough search of the Automated Training and Management System (ATMS2), historical databases, and records stored on microfiche, there is no record of Mr. Krank working as an officer in Florida. Citing Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, first enacted in 1994, FDLE went on to say that it considered Petitioner to be a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years after the last date of separation, who therefore needed to reactivate his certification. (Joint Exhibit 10). The undersigned's research shows that Rule 11B-27.0023, Florida Administrative Code, new in 1982, provided that a certified correctional officer separated from employment and not re-employed within four years must reactivate his or her certification and that Rule 11B-27.0026, Florida Administrative Code, cited in FDLE's letter, actually explains how to reactivate certification. In reliance on FDLE correspondence, Respondent removed Petitioner from the SRC and SRASC classifications. Subsequent to being laid-off by Alachua County in 1998, Petitioner accepted a job as a correctional officer trainee with the Florida State Prison on February 2, 1999. Petitioner was hired as a correctional officer trainee at Florida State Prison, pending resolution of the instant case. Petitioner's arrangement with Florida State Prison personnel was that he would attend training from February 22, 1999, through May 25, 1999, after which he would have to pass a test administered by FDLE on June 29, 1999, in order to become a certified correctional officer and continue in the correctional officer position for which he had been hired.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Retirement enter a Final Order removing Petitioner from SRC and SRASC classification from July 1, 1981 to October 24, 1985, and from October 25, 1985 to January 1, 1998, respectively. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1999.
Findings Of Fact At all times materiel hereto petitioners were inmates et Lake Correctional Institution (LCI) and were subject to discipline for failure to obey orders. Piccirillo was disciplined for failure to comply with an order to report to the infirmary or sick call. Piccirillo was aware that his name was posted on the bulletin board directing him to report to the medical department and et the time specified he failed to so report, was disciplined, and he lost gain time. A doctor visits LCI twice per week and inmates with medical problems can be seen by the doctor on these days. No patient is required to undergo medical treatment for minor ills if he so elects. Because of the limited time a doctor is available to LCI it is necessary that those inmates so designated see the doctor at the scheduled time. Inmates who do not understand an order may request clarification. If the inmate cannot read he is not punished for failure to obey written orders. Prior to disciplinary action being taken against an inmate for disobedience of orders, the disciplinary report is investigated and, after the investigator finds the charge to be true, discipline may be administered. Additionally, the inmate has a grievence procedure he may follow after the investigator recommends disciplinary action be taken. Occasionally, inmates are given orders by correctional officers which are unlawful. The inmate may obey the order and say nothing, he may obey the order and file a grievance, or he may refuse to obey he order and successfully defend the disciplinary report for failure to obey the order. It is not an offense for an inmate to refuse to obey an unlawful order.
The Issue Did Respondent commit the offense alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, should Respondent's Correction Certificate No. 101468 be revoked, suspended, or otherwise disciplined?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Beverly A. Morris was a certified correctional officer, having been certified by the Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission on October 13, 1986, and issued Correctional Certificate No. 101468. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was employed by the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Respondent was assigned as supervisor in "A" Dormitory at the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Inmate Richard Lloyd was assigned to, and a resident of, "H" Dormitory at the DeSoto Correctional Institution. At all times material to this proceeding, Correctional Officer Mark McFry was employed in security with the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Officer McFry was assigned to east side patrol on the perimeter road. On October 20, 1996, between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., Officer McFry observed Respondent with Inmate Richard Lloyd. During this same period of time, Officer McFry also observed Respondent repeatedly touch Inmate Richard Lloyd by rubbing her hand on his stomach, chest, and back. Officer McFry did not report the incident immediately but waited until October 25, 1996, some five days later to report the incident. At all times material to this proceeding, Officer Richard Wuest was employed in security with the DeSoto Correctional Institution. On October 20, 1996, Officer Wuest was assigned to west side patrol on the perimeter road. On October 20, 1996, between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 7:30 p.m., Officer Wuest observed Respondent with Inmate Richard Lloyd. During this same period of time on October 20, 1996, Officer Wuest also observed Respondent repeatedly touch Inmate Lloyd by rubbing her hand on his stomach, chest, and back. Officer Wuest did not report the incident but was named as a witness in Officer McFry's report. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent advised Inmate Lloyd that she was not going to take a polygraph, notwithstanding the testimony of Darron Duval which I find lacks credibility. Subsequent to this incident, Inmate Lloyd was transferred from DeSoto Correction Institution to Hardee Correctional Institution. Respondent wrote Inmate Lloyd a letter dated July 7, 1997, and enclosed a photograph of herself and her daughter which was intercepted by the officials at Hardee Correctional Institution. There was no evidence that any other prior violation had been committed by the Respondent or that any other prior disciplinary action had been taken against the Respondent by the Commission. There was no evidence presented as to what, if any, disciplinary action had been taken against the Respondent for this incident by the DeSoto Correctional Institution.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and a review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances set out in Rule 11B-27.005(6), Florida Administrative Code, it is recommended that the Commission suspend Respondent's Correctional Certificate No. 101468 for a period of one year and, upon being reinstated, that Respondent be placed on probationary status for a period of six months subject to terms and conditions imposed by the Commission. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Karen D. Simmons Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Beverly A. Morris 1811 Southwest Hendry Street Arcadia, Florida 34266
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent knowingly obtained or used, or endeavored to obtain or use, the property of another valued at $300 or more with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the right to the property, or a benefit therefrom, or to appropriate the property to his own use, or to the use of any person not entitled thereto, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and other substantive and material evidence of record, the following findings of fact are made: At all times material to this cause, Respondent was a certified Correctional Officer, having been certified on or about April 2, 1991, and issued Correctional Officer Certification No. 92406. On October 8, 2000, Respondent, in the company of two other persons, Steven Smith and Henry Fox, went to a business named "Four Star Refinish" located at 898 County Road 621, Lake Placid, Florida. David Trobaugh is the owner of Four Star Refinish and the compressor at issue in this proceeding. The building housing Four Star Refinish had been largely destroyed by fire before October 8, 2000, and the compressor, valued at more than $300, was located outside the building, undamaged. On October 8, 2000, at the business site of Four Star Refinish, Respondent, Steven Smith, and Henry Fox, agreed to take the compressor and together removed the compressor from the premises and transported it to the residence of Steven Smith. On October 12, 2000, Respondent gave a statement to Robert Neale, Highlands County Sheriff's Department, admitting that he, Steven Smith, and Henry Fox loaded the compressor onto a trailer and together transported it to Steven Smith's residence. Respondent, after his admission, assisted Deputy Neale in recovering the compressor by contacting Steven Smith by telephone, who then provided the location of the compressor. At the location provided by Steven Smith, the compressor was located and recovered by Deputy Neale, identified by the owner, David Trobaugh, and returned to him. Respondent, with knowledge of the unlawful taking of the compressor, with knowledge of the parties who unlawfully removed the compressor, and with knowledge of the compressor's whereabouts, concealed his participation in the aiding and abetting in the commission of a felony by Steven Smith and Henry Fox, when initially approached by law enforcement. As a direct result of the foregone and on April 1, 2001, in the case of State v. Jerry E. Lambert, the State Attorney entered a nolle prosequi, in Highlands County Circuit Court Case No. CF00-00685A-XX, under which Respondent was charged with one count of Grand Theft in Excess of $300, with the stated ground for the nolle prosequi listed as "Case Referred to CDS (Citizen Dispute Settlement). An Agreement was reached and restitution and fees paid." Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent, without permission of the owner and without legal right to obtain, did in fact obtain and remove an air compressor valued at more than $300 from the site location of the lawful owner. Respondent's admitted participation in the commission of a felony offense evidenced his intentional failure to maintain good moral character and proves his failure to maintain qualifications required of a certified correctional officer. Respondent offered no mitigating evidence.
Recommendation Based on the forgoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order revoking Respondent's Correctional Officer Certification No. 92406. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of February, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of February, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry E. Lambert 126 East Royal Palm Avenue Lake Placid, Florida 33852 Joseph S. White, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rod Caswell, Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
