Findings Of Fact I The Parties Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc., (Charter) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation, founded in Macon, Georgia in 1969. The parent corporation operates approximately 92 hospitals throughout the country, including Florida. Most of its hospitals are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Orlando Regional Medical Center (ORMC) is a 1,119- bed, nonprofit medical system comprised of four divisions. In downtown Orlando it operates a 630-bed tertiary care hospital and a 255-bed Arnold Palmer Hospital for women and children. A Sand Lake campus is located 10 miles southwest of Orlando, off I-4, and includes medical/surgical beds and 32 licensed short-term psychiatric beds. ORMC's St. Cloud Campus in Osceola County, south of Orlando, includes 84 medical/surgical beds. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency responsible for implementing and enforcing the certificate of need program pursuant to Sections 381.701-.715, F.S. Psychiatric Institute of Orlando, Inc., d/b/a Laurel Oaks Hospital, (Laurel Oaks) is a subsidiary of P1A Psychiatric Hospitals, Inc., which is a subsidiary of National Medical Enterprises (NME). P1A owns approximately 50 psychiatric hospitals throughout the county, including (30-bed Laurel Oaks, in southwest Orange County, a short-term psychiatric and substance abuse facility for children and adolescents Health Management Associates, Inc., (HMA) is a health management company which owns or operates 16 hospitals in the southeastern United States, including four psychiatric hospitals in Florida. HMA's Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a 100-bed free-standing psychiatric hospital in northeast Orange County. Its 60 adult beds and 40 adolescent beds opened in January 1989 as a licensed long-term facility, but it has been operating continually as a short-term facility. The Applications Charter proposes to develop a new free-standing 60- bed psychiatric hospital (40 beds for adults, 10 beds for adolescents and 10 beds for children). It plans a wide range of treatment modalities utilizing a multi-disciplinary team approach, tailored to the age and needs of the patient. Although no specific site has been selected, several have been identified in southwest Orange County. Charter anticipates the total cost for the project will be $7,783,000. Charter's patients will be primarily commercially insured (71%), with 15% Medicare and 4% indigent. Charter has committed to serve this share of indigent for the first two years of operation. As a specialty hospital, Charter is not eligible to accept Medicaid patients. ORMC proposes to build a 60-bed free-standing facility on a 7.2 acre site within 40 acres it already owns at Sand Lake and adjacent to its existing Sand Lake Hospital, for a total project cost of $6,678,935. No new licensed beds are required as ORNC will transfer its 32 short term beds from the sixth floor of the Sand Lake Hospital and will convert 28 of its licensed medical/surgical beds from its downtown hospital. The 60 beds will consist of 30 adult and 30 adolescent short term beds. Since the existing 32 beds are primarily adult beds, ORMC's project will be adding adolescent beds to the inventory in District 7. Proximity to Sand Lake Hospital will facilitate shared services, including engineering, dietary and laundry. ORMC also expects the joint use of therapists at its psychiatric facility and its existing brain injury rehabilitation unit at Sand Lake. Because the facility will be added to ORMC's general hospital license, it can and will accept Medicaid patients. ORMC has committed to serve 20% Medicare, 8% Medicaid and 8% indigent patients. ORMC will likely seek an outside management firm to operate its psychiatric facility. The Review On August 23, 1988, HRS published a need for 140 short-term psychiatric beds in District 7. Its SAAR issued in January 1989, recommended approval of a total of 137 beds. When the SAAR was amended in March 1989, to include the Charter approval, the total surged to 197 approved beds. Even after First Hospital withdrew its application for 55 beds, the total approved exceeded the published need for the 1993 horizon year by two beds. Numeric Need The short-term psychiatric bed need rule is found at Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) , F.A.C. "Short-term" is defined as an average length of stay of 30 days or less for adults, and 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. A favorable need determination will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to sub-paragraph (1)(o)4 of "the rule". Rule 10-5.011(1)(0)4, F.A.C. provides as follows: Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. 20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district shall be projected 5 years into the future based on the most recent available January or July population estimate prior to the beginning to the respective batching cycle. The projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District under Paragraph 10-5.011(1)(m). The net need for short term psychiatric beds shall be calculated by subtracting the number of licensed and approved beds from the number of projected beds. The population estimates are based on population projections by the Executive Office of the Governor. Occupancy Standards. New Facilities must be able to project an average 70% occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60% for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80% occupancy rate for adult beds and 70% for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75% for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70% for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75% or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. The parties do not dispute that application of the formula yields a need for 140 beds, the total published in the applicable fixed need pool. Nor do the parties dispute that the occupancy standard was met, since HRS uses the lower standard of 70% as a threshold for determining whether need should be published. The parties agree that approval of both Charter's and ORMC's applications results in an excess of two beds over the published need. There is substantial dispute as to whether that excess is justified, and as to the composition of the beds as "speciality hospital" or "general hospital" beds. The only provision in agency rules or policy for exceeding bed need calculations is when "not normal" or "special" circumstances exist in the District. HRS' Policy Manual for the Certificate of Need program, dated October 1, 1988, provides in Section 9-6 B. (3): If a qualified applicant exist but the proposed project exceeds the beds or services identified in the fixed need pool, the department may award beds or services in excess of the pool when warranted by special circumstances as defined in rule 10- 5.011(1)(b), 1-4, F.A.C. and, specifically for nursing homes Rule 10-5.011(1)(K)2.j. F.A.C. (Laurel Oaks Exhibit #10, P. 9-2) The referenced sections of Rule 10-5.011(1)(b), F.A.C., relate to the enhancement of access--primarily economic access and access by underserved groups. Access is addressed in Part VII, below. No evidence was presented regarding special problems of access in District 7. Rather, HRS asserts that its excess approval was based on "rounding up" the numbers of beds, and on the favorable occupancy rates in the district. In its SAAR, HRS calculated the following occupancy rates by age cohort in the district: Adult 75.8% Child/Adolescent 74.8%; and in Orange County: Adult 57.4% Child/Adolescent 100. The adult rate is therefore slightly above the 75% minimum in the district, and substantially below the minimum in Orange County. The child/adolescent rate is above the 70% minimum in both the district and county. HRS appropriately does not utilize occupancy in beds other than licensed short term psychiatric bed in calculating its rates as it would be difficult to compute the number of available beds (medical/surgical, long term psychiatric, etc.). The rule specifies that a minimum of .15 beds per 1000 population "should" be allocated to hospital1s holding a general license and that .20 beds per 1000 population may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. Of the 140 beds needed in District 7, 75 may be located in a speciality hospital under this formula. 30 speciality beds were awarded to West Lake and are unchallenged. The Charter application for 60 speciality beds exceeds by 15, the 45 speciality beds left to be allocated. The State and Local Health Plans The State Health Plan is dated 1985-1987. Goal 1 is the only portion of the plan that is relevant in this review. It essentially reiterates the need methodology described above, regarding the .35 beds per 1000 population and the 70% and 75% annual occupancy thresholds. The applicable local health plan is the 1988 local health plan for District 7. This plan divides the district into "planning areas": Brevard, Osceola, Seminole and Orange -- the four counties within the district. Planning areas, unlike subdistricts, are more in the nature of guidelines and do not carry the same legal weight as subdistricts. Both applicants are committed to submit data to the local health councils, as provided in recommendation #2. Both applicants have committed to provide a fair share of care to the underserved, although ORMC's commitment is substantially greater and has a proven record to support it. Recommendation #5 provides that no new short-term psychiatric or substance abuse beds shall be approved until all existing beds in the planning area are operating at or above 75% occupancy for the most recent twelve months for which data is available from the local health council. This criteria is barely met when adult and children/adolescent occupancy is combined, and is not met by the occupancy rate for adult beds in Orange County. Financial Feasibility The pro formas of both applicants, which are no more than best guess estimates, are generally reasonable, based upon the experience of the applicants' existing programs. Charter's proposal makes no provision for management fees, although such fees are remitted to the parent company by its subsidiaries and are reported to the Health Care Cost Containment Board. Charter anticipates that it would not incur additional corporate overhead to support this facility if it is built. In recent years ORMC's psychiatric unit has lost money in its operation when overhead is factored into the cost. Its Program Director, Jeffrey Oppenheim, reasonably anticipates the new facility will make a profit, as it will serve a better mix of age cohorts and will offer a more desirable setting than its limited facility now located on the sixth floor of a medical/surgical hospital. The financial feasibility of both applications depends on the programs' ability to attract patients. That ability is not seriously questioned. Both applications have substantial experience in operating financially efficient health care programs. Quality of Care and Accessibility No evidence was presented to challenge either applicant's ability to provide quality care. Nor, however, was the quality of care of existing alternative programs at issue. Geographic access in District 7 is not a problem, and none suggests that the access standard in Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.g., F.A.C., is not met (travel time of 45 minutes or less for 90% of the service area population). Charter's inability to provide Medicaid services and its time-limited commitment to serve even 4% indigents amount to only minimal contribution to the economically underserved population. In the past, ORMC has been a receiving facility for Baker Act patients and it anticipates it will again when the psychiatric program has its new quarters. It is only one of two hospitals in Orange County eligible to provide Medicaid services and is the fifth highest provider of charity and Medicaid in the State of Florida, according to Medical Health Care Cost Containment Board data. Impact on Existing Facilities and Competition Positive competition among providers already exists in District 7. There are eleven existing short term psychiatric programs in the four-county area, including both speciality and general hospitals, and adult, children and adolescent programs. Only three obtained an occupancy rate of more than 75% for the fiscal period ending June 1988. The Availability of Health Manpower There is a shortage of nurses, qualified social workers and counsellors in District 7. HMA has experienced problems in recruiting staff at its Orlando facility. Competition for these staff has caused salaries to rise, and consequently the cost of providing services has risen. Turnover results when staff are attracted to new facilities, causing training problems and affecting quality of care. Charter has the corporate resources to conduct effective recruiting, but has no experience recruiting in the Orlando area. ORMC, a large diverse facility, with good opportunity for lateral and upward mobility, has experienced few problems staffing its programs. The Availability of Alternatives Eight of eleven District 7 short term psychiatric facilities have operated below 75% occupancy in the last two years. These under-utilized facilities are plainly alternatives for new projects proposing the same services. Neither applicant is proposing novel or innovative services in psychiatric care. That licensed long term psychiatric facilities such as HMA, are operating short term programs does not justify the approval of new short term beds, but rather suggests these programs could be converted, with little or no capital outlay, into short term programs. Conversion of under-utilized acute are beds to short term psychiatric beds is also an alternative in District 7. Acute care bed occupancy rates in each county of District 7 failed to reach 60% in the most recent 12-month period of available data. The criterion of Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)5.f., F.A.C. favors the conversion of under-utilized beds in other hospital services unless conversion costs are prohibitive. There has been a trend in the last several years away from inpatient care and toward less restrictive treatment modalities. Both applicants acknowledge this trend with their inclusion of partial hospitalization programs in their plans. ORMC has no reasonable alternative to building a new facility if it is to maintain its inpatient psychiatric program. There is an increasing demand for the medical surgical beds it currently occupies on the sixth floor of Sand Lake Hospital. There is no appropriate space in its downtown facilities. Balancing the Criteria Comparative Review and Summary As reflected above, not all of the relevant statutory and rule criteria have been met by these applicants. There remains, however, the planning horizon numerical need for additional short term psychiatric beds. While that need could likely be met with the utilization of beds that are not licensed for the provision of short term care, such a solution frustrates state licensing requirements. Three alternative dispositions exist: to deny both ORMC and Charter applications, leaving an unmet need in this cycle for 86 beds; to grant one application only; or to approve both and exceed the need by two beds. HRS argues that the two-bed difference is of little consequence and that the excessive number of specialty beds if Charter is approved is irrelevant, as no general hospital is currently competing for the beds. It is not possible to conjecture that appropriate general hospital applicants will participate in a near future cycle, but it is certain that if those beds are awarded in this cycle to a specialty hospital, they will not be available in a future cycle. Nothing requires that all beds identified in a fixed pool must be awarded in that cycle. The converse follows when, as here, other considerations weigh against approval of additional beds. Between the two applicants, ORMC more consistently meets the rule and statutory criteria. Although it still proposes a substantial capital outlay, (ORMC) relies on conversion of existing licensed beds and results in less impact on other existing programs. Its contribution to the underserved population is more substantial; it proposes more needed adolescent, rather than adult beds; and it does not violate the .15/.20 general hospital, specialty hospital bed balance. That balance needs to be maintained in this case to insure competition among Medicaid providers. In summary, the evidence supports approval of ORMC's application and denial of Charter's.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED That a Final Order be entered denying CON number 5691 to Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc.; and granting CON #5697 to Orlando Regional Medical Center. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 15th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASES NO. 89-1358,89-1366.89-1368,89-2039 & 89-2041 The following constitute rulings on the findings of fact proposed by each party: Charter Medical of Orange County, Inc. Adopted in substance in paragraph 1. Adopted in substance in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. 6.-17. Adopted in statement of the issues. 18. Adopted in paragraphs 6 and 7. 19.-36. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 6. 37. Addressed in paragraph 30. 38.-5O. Rejected as unnecessary, except as summarized in paragraph 36. 51.-57. Rejected as unnecessary, except at summarized in paragraph 7. 58.-6I. Adopted in paragraph 16. 62.-69. Rejected as unnecessary and contrary to the methodology in the rule. 70. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 71.-77. Rejected as unnecessary. 78. Rejected as contrary to the evidence and law. "Not normal" does not include high occupancy rates in several facilities. 79.-8I. Adopted in summary in paragraph 21. 82.-83. Rejected as immaterial. The evidence in this case supports maintenance of the balance, notwithstanding past practice. 84. Adopted in paragraph 15. 85.-103. Rejected as unnecessary. 104. Rejected as contrary to the law and evidence. 105. & 106. Adopted in paragraph 22. 107.-109. Adopted in paragraph 23. 110. & 111. Rejected as unnecessary. 112. & 113. Adopted in paragraph 24. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 25. 116.-149. Rejected as unnecessary. 150. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 26 and 29. 151.-161. Rejected as unnecessary. 162.-164. Adopted in substance in paragraph 27. 165.-171. Rejected as unnecessary. 172. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 173.-180. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 181. Adopted in paragraph 5. 182.-190. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 43. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 193.-198. Rejected as unnecessary. 199. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 200.-206. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 8. 210.-213. Rejected as unnecessary. 214. Adopted by implication in paragraph 33. 215.-218. Rejected as unsupported by the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. & 221. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. 222. Adopted in summary in paragraph :28. 223.-238. Rejected as unnecessary. Orlando Regional Medical Center Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 9. 3.-7. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 42. Adopted in summary in paragraph 12. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as ummaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 15. Addressed in the preliminary statement. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. 22.-24. Adopted in summary in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 15 and conclusion of law #7. Adopted in substance in paragraph 21. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as unnecessary. 29 & 30. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 22. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 23. Adopted in paragraph 23. 36 & 37. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 11 and 33. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 11. 41 & 42. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 25. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 26. 48.-52. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 10. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence (the finding as to no alternatives). The finding regarding Park Place is unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 42. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 36. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 30. 63.-66. Rejected as unnecessary. 67. Adopted in paragraph 47. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1. & 2. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in paragraphs 6. and 9. Adopted in paragraph 24. Adopted in paragraph 20. Adopted in paragraph 36. 7.-9. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 26. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraph 33. Adopted in substance in paragraph 32. Adopted by implication in paragraphs 30 and 34. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in summary in paragraph 13. Adopted in paragraph 15. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The policy is found in HRS' Policy Manual. Rejected as immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. 26 & 27. Adopted by implication in 23. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Rejected as immaterial. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 33 & 34. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in summary in paragraph 46. Rejected as contrary to the evidence, and immaterial (as to the ratio). Rejected as contrary to the definition "not normal" and immaterial. 38 & 39. Rejected as argument. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraph 20. Rejected as unnecessary. 43 & 49. Rejected as argument. Laurel Oaks Hospital Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. Adopted in paragraph 4. Adopted in paragraph 5. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 13. & 9. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. 10. Adopted in paragraph 18. 11.-21. Rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 8. Adopted in paragraph 7. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 14. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. The term is "should", not "shall". Adopted in paragraph 15. 36 Adopted in paragraph 13. 37.-40. Adopted in paragraph 16. 41 & 42. Adopted in paragraph 18. 43 & 44. Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. 45.-47. Rejected as argument and unnecessary. 48 & 49. Adopted in paragraph 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 16. 52 - 54. Rejected as unnecessary. 55 & 56. Adopted in summary in paragraph 20. 57.-61. Rejected as unnecessary or argument. 62.-65. Adopted in summary in paragraphs 20 and 23. 66 & 67. Adopted in paragraph 22. 68. Adopted in paragraph 23. 69.-72. Rejected as unnecessary or cumulative. 73 & 74. Adopted in substance in paragraph 24. 75. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 76.-78. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Adopted in paragraphs 30 and 31. Adopted in paragraph 37. 82.-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86. Adopted in paragraph 30. 87 & 88. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 34. Adopted in paragraph 41. Adopted in paragraphs 38 and 39. 92.-95 Rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Adopted in substance in paragraph 39. Adopted in paragraph 35. Adopted in paragraph 30. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. 101-112. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 27. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 35. 116-121. Rejected as cumulative or unnecessary. Health Management Associates1 Inc:. (HMA) 1. & 2. Adopted in paragraph 6. Adopted in paragraph 1. Adopted in paragraph 6. 5.-6. Rejected as unnecessary. 7.-11. Adopted in paragraph 9. Adopted in paragraph 10. Adopted in paragraph 12. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 15 and 23. Adopted in paragraph 25. Adopted in paragraph 16. Adopted in paragraphs 16 and 18. 20 Adopted in paragraph 19. Adopted in paragraph 15. Adopted in paragraph 21. 23 & 24. Rejected as unnecessary. 25 & 26. Adopted in paragraph 5. 27.-51. Rejected as unnecessary. 52. Adopted in paragraph 35. 53.-55. Rejected as unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 James M. Barclay, Esquire Cobb, Cole & Bell 315 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates 225 East Robinson Street Orlando, FL 32802 Edgar Lee Elzie, Esquire MacFarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly First Florida Bank Building, Suite 804 Tallahassee, FL 32401 C. Gary Williams, Esquire R. Stan Peeler, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor 227 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Brennan, Jr., Esquire Bonner & O'Connell 900 17th street, Suite 1000 Washington, D.C. 20006 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Haben & Culpepper 306 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 John Miller, General Counsel HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. R. S. Power, Agency Clerk HRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations 3/ and admissions of the parties, the exhibits received in evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact: FIRST HOSPITAL's address is the World Trade Center, Suite 870, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. CHARTER GLADE HOSPITAL is a freestanding psychiatric hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. CHARTER GLADE has (80) licensed psychiatric beds, and twenty-four (24) licensed substance-abuse beds. The service area served by CHARTER GLADE includes Collier, Lee, and Charlotte Counties. The address of HRS is 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. HRS is responsible for the administration of the "Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act," Section 381.493, et seq., Florida Statutes (the Act), and has implemented its provisions through the adoption of rules set forth in Chapter 10, Florida Administrative Code. FIRST HOSPITAL applied to HRS for a certificate of need (CON) for the establishment of a freestanding specialty hospital in Naples, Florida. Pursuant to the Act, a CON is required before FIRST HOSPITAL can establish its specialty hospital. FIRST HOSPITAL's application was denied by HRS. FIRST HOSPITAL appealed the denial of its application to the Division of Administrative Hearings, DOAH Case No. 84-1835. CHARTER GLADE has intervened in DOAH Case No. 84-1835. In this proceeding, Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rule 10- 5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, asserting that the rule is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid. By virtue of the fact that CHARTER GLADE is an existing facility located in the same service area in which Petitioner proposes to construct and operate its facility, and further by virtue of its participation in DOAH Case No. 84-1835, at least in part, on the basis of the provisions of Rule 10 15.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, CHARTER GLADE is substantially affected by the issues presented for determination in this cause and should be allowed to participate as a party. The Act contemplates rule adoption by HRS of specialty bed-need methodologies for psychiatric services. See, e.g., Subsection 381.494(8)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). Toward this end, HRS has adopted Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 10-5.11(25), cited as the basis for denying FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application, addresses need for short-term psychiatric beds; Rule 10-5.11(26) purports to address need for long-term psychiatric beds. FIRST HOSPITAL's substantial interest in establishing its proposed specialty hospital has been determined by both of these rules. In particular, Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, was applied by HRS in the denial of FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application. In addition, FIRST HOSPITAL alleges that Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) combined fail to assess the need for intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services, one of the types of psychiatric services proposed by FIRST HOSPITAL. FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application proposes intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services. Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, were adopted in early 1983. The adoption process began in the summer of 1982 when HRS assigned to one of its employees, Elfie Stamm, the task of developing a bed-need rule for psychiatric services. Ms. Stamm, at that time, was a planner in the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning of HRS. Ms. Stamm has been a planner with HRS for several years and had been responsible for the development of the State Health Plan and for the development of various rules used in the CON process. She had also been employed in the Mental Health Program Office of HRS, where her responsibilities included the development of a state plan with regard to alcoholism and mental health. She was also responsible for monitoring statewide mental health programs. Upon being assigned the task of developing the subject rules, Ms. Stamm made a thorough review of all information available to HRS with regard to the number of existing psychiatric beds and programs throughout Florida. She also evaluated all available local health plans and spoke with various individuals who had been involved in health planning, particularly those with interest in mental health planning. Ms. Stamm surveyed the available literature on health planning emphasizing mental health planning and bed-need methodologies for psychiatric beds. Ms. Stamm wrote the initial draft of Rule 10-5.11(25) based upon her collection and evaluation of data regarding existing and approved psychiatric beds in Florida and her review of literature, both Florida specific and national. A primary feature of the drafts, as well as of the adopted version, of Rule 10-5.11(25) is a fixed bed-to-population ratio of .35/1000, meaning that normally there should be no more than .35 short-term psychiatric beds for each 1,000 persons. Ms. Stamm was instructed to develop rules to assess the need for inpatient psychiatric services. As finally adopted, short-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(25) as care not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and 60 days or less for children and adolescents, and long-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(26) as care averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Neither rule defines the term "intermediate care." The documents contained in HRS Composite Exhibit IX and reviewed by Ms. Stamm are a representative sample of the literature available in the field and the level of knowledge among health planners as of the date of the promulgation of the subject rules. The documents are a reasonable cross-section of the literature available in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment. In terms of the literature that was available at the time of the rule adoption in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment, there is nothing missing from these documents which would have been important to a health planner in developing a psychiatric bed-need methodology. There is discussion in those documents of all the basic methodologies for determining psychiatric bed need. After reviewing all of the available materials, the HRS established a range of from .35 to .37 beds per 1,000 population and from that point made a policy decision to establish a figure of .35 to use in the bed-need formula. In promulgating the subject rules HRS invited and received comment from a broad cross-section of the public, with particular emphasis on those persons and organizations with special knowledge and interest in the provision of mental health services and the determination of psychiatric bed need. HRS conducted a workshop to which it invited a broad cross-section of individuals and organizations with particular knowledge about psychiatric bed need, including representatives of the Florida Hospital Association, Florida Psychiatric Association, Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Florida State Association of District Mental Health Boards, Florida League of Hospitals, Florida Association of Voluntary Hospitals, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. The comments and results of the workshop were considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS in the promulgation of the subject rules. In response to several requests, HRS conducted a public hearing in accordance with Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes, to receive comments from interested persons on the subject rules. More than fifteen (15) people representing various hospitals and organizations concerned with psychiatric services entered appearances and made comments at the public hearing. In addition to the oral comment presented at the public hearing, various persons and organizations submitted numerous written comments expressing their opinion with regard to the proposed rules. The comments, both oral and written, were all considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS prior to the promulgation of the subject rules. The process engaged in by HRS, primarily through Ms. Stamm, in the development of the subject rules was extensive and reasonably calculated to invite substantive public comment and to procure the knowledge on the part of HRS necessary to write workable and rational rules concerning psychiatric bed need. The knowledge acquired by HRS through this process with regard to the assessment of psychiatric bed-need methodologies was reasonably sufficient to allow it to knowledgeably draft and promulgate the subject rules. Consideration of this substantive public comment led to several changes in the subject rules as originally drafted. As originally promulgated, Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) were challenged pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, in various petitions filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. In settling these proposed rule challenges, HRS modified the rules to provide for even greater flexibility in their application. HRS Composite Exhibits I through XII constitute all written matters considered or produced by HRS in the rule adoption process with regard to the subject rules. All of those documents and papers have been maintained in the records of HRS since the promulgation of the subject rules. The statutory criteria for reviewing CON applications are set out in Sections 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes. Rule 10-5.11, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the rule criteria against which CON applications are evaluated. Subsections (1) through (12) and (25) of Rule 10-5.11 are the rule criteria against which applications for CONs for short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Subsections (1) through and (26) of Rule 10-5.11 are rule criteria against which applications for CONs for long-term psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Rule 10-5.11(25) sets forth certain criteria specifically for the evaluation of CON applications for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services. Short-term services are in part defined as services averaging a length of stay of thirty (30) days or less for adults and a stay of sixty (60) days or less for children and adolescents under eighteen (18) years. Rule 10- 5.11(25) in its adopted form provides in relevant part as follows: Short Term Hospital Inpatient Psychiatric Services. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services means a category of services which provides a 24-hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services may be provided in specifically designated beds in a hospital holding a general license, or in a facility holding a specialty hospital license. Applications for proposed short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services will be reviewed according to relevant statutory and rule criteria. A favorable need determination for proposed general acute care psychiatric inpatient services will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to paragraph (25)(d) of this rule. A favorable Certificate of Need determination may be made when the criteria, other than as specified in (25)(d), as provided for in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, and paragraph (25)(e) of this rule, demonstrate need. Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health problems. These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. .20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district five years into the future shall be calculated by subtracting the number of existing and approved beds from the number of beds calculated for year x based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for year and based on latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general and acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District established in Rule 10-5.11(23). Occupancy Standards. New facilities must be able to project an average 70 percent occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60 percent for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80 percent occupancy rate for adult beds and 70 percent for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 2 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. Other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a Certificate of Need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds are as follows: . . . . 7. Access standard. Short term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's population. There are three basic types of methodologies generally accepted in the field of health planning as valid for determining the need for psychiatric hospital beds. The first type is a need-based methodology which evaluates the need for services. The second is a demand or utilization-based method, which utilizes current or projected utilization statistics for a particular service. The third is a fixed-ratio method which involves the use of a ratio, or rate, of service to population to determine projected need for that service in the future. All three of these methodologies are generally accepted and utilized by health planners throughout the United States. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but all are valid. The fixed ratio methodology is that which HRS has employed in Rule 10 5.11(25). The ratio of .35 beds per thousand population is a reasonable ratio with a rational basis in fact. It is not arbitrary and capricious as a measure of short-term psychiatric bed need. The National Institute of Mental Health developed draft guidelines in the late 197Os suggesting a range of .15 beds to .40 beds per thousand population as an appropriate fixed-bed ratio program for psychiatric short-term acute-care programs. At least four other states presently or in the past have utilized a fixed bed-need ratio in planning for health care needs. They are Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan and Georgia. Some of those states used fixed-bed ratios less than .35 per thousand. Ms. Stamm, in developing this rule methodology for HRS, considered and balanced the different approaches relating to the establishment of need. One of her concerns on behalf of HRS, in developing the methodology was to strike a proper balance between need and demand since not everyone who needs psychiatric care will choose to seek that care or can afford to seek that care. In 1982, during the time of the rule adoption process, the ratio of existing short-term psychiatric beds per thousand population in Florida was .29 per thousand. Ms. Stamm selected .35 per thousand, in part, to allow for growth in the number of psychiatric beds for reasons other than just population growth. The current rate of existing licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Florida in 1985 is .28 beds per thousand. However, the ratio for currently existing short-term psychiatric beds, plus CON approved beds not yet licensed in 1985, is .39 beds per thousand. The fact that the existing and approved inventory of psychiatric beds is greater than the .35 ratio specified in the rule demonstrates that HRS has applied Rule 10-5.11(25) in a flexible manner as envisioned by the "not normally" language in the rule. A theoretically ideal way to determine psychiatric bed need would be for HRS to go into each community and conduct epidemiological surveys to identify the people who actually need mental health care. While such a survey, properly conducted, might produce momentarily reliable date, it is not a realistic method for statewide planning purposes because of several problems attendant to such a methodology. Such a survey would be very expensive and very time-consuming and is not practical for use on a statewide basis in a state the size of Florida. Because of the time-consuming nature of such a methodology, if applied on a statewide basis, some of the data would be stale before all of the data was gathered. Further, the rapidly changing population in Florida would require that such a survey be continually updated. The allocation of short-term beds between general and specialty hospitals set forth in subsections (d)1 and 2 of Rule 10-5.11(25) has a rational basis in fact and is not arbitrary. There are many patients who simultaneously need medical as well as psychiatric care. To have those patients located in a specialty hospital, away from a general hospital, would be inappropriate. There are also patients who have acute episodes of psychiatric illness and who need to be treated very rapidly. Because there are many more general hospitals than there are freestanding psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to ensure that psychiatric beds are available to general hospitals to fill the particular episodic acute needs. Further, there are many patients in Florida who can afford health care only through Medicaid. Because Medicaid does not provide funding of mental health inpatient services in psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to include in the methodology an incentive for the location of some psychiatric beds in general hospitals where psychiatric services can be funded by Medicaid. The specific allocation of the .35 per thousand bed need ratio set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)(1) and (2) is that .15 beds per thousand "should" be associated with general hospitals and .20 beds per thousand "may" be associated with specialty hospitals. This allocation was designed to be flexible so that, in any given circumstance, an allocation other than the .15 and .20 guideline could be applied. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10 5.11(25) specify that normally, additional beds should not be approved unless the average occupancy of all existing beds in a service district exceeds 75 percent for adults and 70 percent for children and adolescents. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10- 5.11(25) were not arrived at in an arbitrary fashion and are reasonable in themselves. The occupancy rates are designed to ensure that a reasonable number of beds in each facility are filled. Hospitals with a substantial number of empty beds are not cost effective. Therefore, it is reasonable to project occupancy rates in the range of those projected in the subject rule. Indeed, the occupancy rates in the rule are liberal in terms of minimum occupancy levels, compared with those in the past and those recommended by others in the industry. With regard to the travel access standard in the rule, the Task Force for Institutional Care recommended a 60 minute travel standard for 90 percent of the population in the district. The 45 minute standard is reasonable. The rule does not exclude from within the travel standard area other facilities providing the same service. At the time of the final hearing, there were sixty five (65) existing hospital facilities in Florida which had psychiatric bed services. Of those sixty-five (65) facilities, sixty-one (61), or 93 percent, had more than fifteen (15) psychiatric beds, and fifty-five (55), or 84 percent, had more than twenty (20) psychiatric beds. In the exceptional event that the average occupancy rate for a particular district did not accurately reflect the availability of beds, the language of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, which says that no additional beds shall "normally" be approved unless the occupancy rates are met is sufficiently flexible to account for the exceptionality. The methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25) is designed to identify and express a need for short-term psychiatric inpatient beds for the overall population of Florida. The rule was intended to be sufficiently flexible that, when balanced with the other criteria set forth in Rule 10-5.11(1) through (12), it would allow substantive input from the district and community levels with regard to the need for beds by subpopulation groups such as child, adolescent, adult, and geriatric. The "national guidelines" referred to by Ms. Stamm were proposed hut never adopted. They recommended fixed bed ratios between .15/1000 and .40/1000. The guidelines were based on a 1978 survey by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which indicated that .15/1000 was the 25th percentile and .40/1000 was the 75th percentile of 1978 existing short-term psychiatric beds nationwide. The NIMH report stated that selection of an appropriate ratio for a particular state depended on the development of the state's mental health system and recognized that special consideration was necessary for traditionally underserved groups such as children, adolescents, and geriatrics. In the context of inpatient psychiatric care, there has been a trend over the last twenty years, and more particularly over the last five years, toward the development of specialty treatment programs, separately planned for children, adolescents, adults, and geriatrics. In recent years in Florida there has also been a trend toward the provision of alternatives to inpatient psychiatric services in facilities such as residential care. In 1982, Ms. Stamm considered evidence that children, adolescents, and geriatrics were not being adequately served by Florida's mental health facilities. Nevertheless, she did not plan for these subgroups in the rule because in her judgment decisions about allocation of services to subpopulation groups were best made at the district level by the local health councils.
The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004 (27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained to the client at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staff person Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004 (27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision-making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parent) in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7)
Findings Of Fact A not for profit 520-bed acute care hospital in Pensacola, Baptist primarily serves not only residents of Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties, within Florida's HRS Service District I, but also patients from Escambia and Baldwin Counties in Alabama. The other two counties in District I, Okaloosa and Walton, lie outside Baptist's primary service area, but within a secondary service area, as does Covington County, Alabama. Baptist proposes to convert twelve medical/ surgical beds to a children's psychiatric service, to complement an existing 38-bed psychiatric service housed in the Behavioral Medical Center across the street from Baptist's main campus. On average, eighty percent of Baptist's existing psychiatric beds are occupied at any one time. Of four separate, psychiatric treatment programs Baptist now offers, all accredited by the Joint Commission on Accreditation for Health Care Organizations, none is designed for children below the age of 13. Seldom, and only in an emergency, has a child below this age been accepted into Baptist's program for adolescents, which is operated separately from any adult treatment program. Baptist has treated indigent and medicaid patients in its psychiatric programs, as well as patients for whose treatment it has received greater remuneration. Hospital-wide, Baptist has had "medicaid utilization" of between six and nine percent. "Baptist was willing to do Baker Act patients." Farr deposition, p. 17. Rollins deposition, p. 30. Other Resources Pensacola and Escambia County have extensive outpatient psychiatric services for children, offering a broad range of options, short of inpatient care in a treatment facility. Rollins deposition, pp. 15-16. Lakeview Community Health Center offers outpatients treatment, as do a number of private providers. The Children's Intervention Project System conducts home visits. Day care and therapeutic foster homes are also available. Professionals distinguish between "crisis stabilization" which does not "focus on treatment" and even short-term psychiatric care. Lakeview Community Health Center has a 31-bed crisis stabilization unit, which was full as of the week before the hearing. Ten of the 31 beds are reserved for children, aged 9- 17, but children's beds are not segregated from beds for adolescents. Treating children and adolescents together (if not stabilizing their crises in the same facility) is inappropriate. They have different needs and require different structures. Adolescents require more autonomy; children need more supervision. See deposition of Cruz. Farr deposition, p. 21. Rollins deposition, p. 22. Only Harbor Oaks, a free-standing facility more than 45 minutes from Pensacola and Gulf Breeze, accepts children as psychiatric patients. Harbor Oaks has 19 children's beds but does not accept medicaid patients. The children's unit at Harbor Oaks experienced an occupancy rate of approximately 74 percent in 1988. Occasionally, girls were put on waiting lists. University hospital does not accept children as psychiatric patients. It rarely accepts adolescents. West Florida Hospital, which has a program for adolescents, refuses child psychiatric patients admission. West Florida Community Center accepts no children. Nor does Humana Hospital in Ft. Walton. Play Therapy Rather than convert a part of an existing medical or surgical ward to a children's psychiatric ward, Baptist proposes to spend $565,660 to construct a facility abutting but distinct from its Behavioral Medical Center. Lakeview Medical Health Center is nearby. Farr deposition, p. 32. The parties have stipulated that "the costs and method of proposed construction, including ... energy provision and the availability of alternative, less costly or more effective methods of construction" are not in dispute, and that "the facility design schematic is reasonable and appropriate." Baptist would hire a child psychiatrist to head up to the children's psychiatric unit. Treatment teams for existing programs also include psychologists, psychiatric social workers, occupational therapists, certified recreational therapists, and nursing staff. Dr. DeMaria recommends that "somebody in the creative arts therapy," (T.99) be hired for the children's unit, as well. The parties agree that "the availability of resources, including health manpower, management personnel, and funds ... are not at issue." The plan is to create a homelike environment where children will sleep two to a room and eat together family style in a dining room. A living room, at least one classroom, a playroom and a playground out of doors are to be the situs of art, dance, music and play therapy, individual, group, and family, all in a "therapeutic milieu." Baptist intends that the children's psychiatric unit be the least restrictive inpatient facility for children possible and has given assurances that the same rigorous review now taking place in its existing psychiatric programs would see to it that children are discharged to a still less restrictive environment as soon as their conditions permitted. In large part, Baptist is counting on medical staff at the Lakeview Community Health Center, all of whom have admitting privileges at Baptist, to identify children who will need inpatient care but cannot afford to pay. Baptist has committed to reserve two beds in the proposed unit for patients who are indigent, or eligible for medicaid benefits. Baptist has also undertaken "not [to] turn away patients," Farr deposition, p. 49, needing psychiatric care. Baptist has agreed to accept a requirement that it honor this commitment, as a condition to any certificate of need it obtains. Less than 20 percent of the children seen by 19 of the 55 child psychologists practicing within Baptist's service area who responded to a survey seemed to require inpatient care, but only 60 percent of this group actually received such care. Baptist's Exhibit No. 30. A survey of referral agencies indicated some 80 children in Baptist's service area needing inpatient psychiatric care in 1988 did not receive it. Projected daily charges of $390 in Baptist's second year of operating the children's psychiatric unit are less than the $450 a day now charged by Harbor Oaks. The parties stipulated that "the pro forma income and expense statement relating to the children's short-term psychiatric beds is reasonable and requires no further proof except for validation of the number of patients days." Assuming admission rates comparable to elsewhere in the South, children in Baptist's service area would keep ten children's psychiatric beds at 70 percent average occupancy. Baptist's Exhibit No. 26. Twelve beds would make it economically feasible to serve the medically indigent as well as other children needing inpatient care. The first seven days following a child's admission staff would devote to evaluating the child. Children not discharged to a less restrictive situation by the end of the evaluation period, Baptist projects, would have an average stay totalling 28 days, as compared to the 35- to 40-day average length of stay harbor Oaks has reported. Not Normal District I has a total of 240 short-term psychiatric beds. According to the state agency action report, short-term psychiatric bed utilization was 88.9 percent at Harbor Oaks for 1987, 73.5 percent at Ft. Walton's Humana Hospital, 59.4 percent at University Hospital and 58.1 percent at West Florida. Baptist's recent experience of psychiatric bed utilization in excess of 80 percent dates to January of 1988, and is a substantial increase over the 55.8 percent reported for the period July 1986 to June 1987. Baptist's Exhibit No. 9. Projected 1993 population for District I is 601,559. Baptist's Exhibit No. 23. The parties agree that the formula set out in Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o), Florida Administrative Code, for determining "numeric need" for acute care, short-term, general psychiatric beds does not indicate a need for additional acute care short-term general psychiatric beds in District I. But 53 percent of the District's population resides in Escambia County where no treatment facility has any children's psychiatric beds. A significant number (compare Baptist's Exhibit No. 23 with T. 133) of Baptist's psychiatric admissions are patients who reside in Alabama. Although Escambia County has 52 percent of the District I population, between ages 1-12, it has none of the children's psychiatric beds. More than half the District's population lives more than 45 minutes travel time from Harbor Oaks, complicating arrangements for family therapy, often essential in these cases, Rollins deposition, pp. 28-29, and for other conferences, including discharge conferences, where parents and community-based professionals work out details necessary to effect a smooth transition from inpatient to something less restrictive. The District I Health Plan, approved on June 1, 1988, provides: The following policies and priorities are to be used in CON review in tandem with the bed need numbers on the preceding pages. POLICIES AND PRIORITIES FOR PSYCHIATRIC AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE BEDS Psychiatric or substance abuse beds which are not used by residents of the District shall not be included in the resource inventory count of the District. [NOTE: There have in the past, been facilities in another district treating patients originating solely from outside of that district. The facility's intake policies precluded the treatment of "local" district residents. In addition, the facility's marketing effort was directed entirely out- of-state. A local marketing effort plus treatment of patients originating within the district can easily be demonstrated.] Priority will be given to applicants who can demonstrate that all existing short term inpatient psychiatric beds in the subdistrict have had an average annual occupancy rate equal to or greater than 70% for the preceding year. Priority will be given to applicants who can demonstrate that all existing short term inpatient substance abuse beds in the subdistrict have had an average annual occupancy rate equal to or greater than 80% for the preceding year. Proposals for new facilities, expansions, conversions and additional services will be given priority for applicants who agree to continue or enter into Baker Act, Medicaid, Medicare and other medically indigent contracts for the provision of services to qualifying patients. Among the goals, objectives, and recommended actions set out in the 1985-1987 State Health Plan, now expired but not replaced, is a goal that short-term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds not exceed .35 per thousand population. HRS Exhibit No. 1. In requiring that .15 (of a total of .35) short-term psychiatric beds per 1,000 population be located in general hospitals eligible for medicaid reimbursement, HRS's rules do not distinguish between children and adults. But no children's psychiatric beds in Distract I are located in a facility that accepts medicaid patients. If the ratio prescribed for psychiatric beds generally applied specifically to children's psychiatric beds, District I would already have at least eight such beds: Multiplying the 19 existing beds by .15/.35 yields 8.14. Applying the rule's .15 beds per 1,000 population methodology to the 111,211 children projected to be in District I by 1993, see Baptist's Exhibit No. 23, yields a need for 16.68 children's psychiatric beds in facilities that accept medicaid patients.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That HRS grant Baptist's application for certificate of need No. 5669, on condition that Baptist honor its commitments to care for medically indigent and medicaid-eligible children in need of inpatient psychiatric care. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 8 through 21, 28 through 35, 40, 44, 45, 47 through 50, 60, 61, 64, 69, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79, 81 and 82 have been adopted in substance as fare as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, either a music therapist or an art therapist is contemplated. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 22, children in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties can go to Harbor Oaks. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23 through 26 here not established by the evidence. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 27 at least one eleven-year-old was also admitted. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 36 and 37 are immaterial. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 37, 39, 42, 43, 46, 51 through 59, 62, 63, 65, 67, 70, 71, 74, 77 and 80 relate to subordinate matters. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 41, the evidence did not show that everybody living in Escambia and Santa Rosa counties was more than 45 minutes from Harbor Oaks. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 66 is properly a proposed conclusion of law. Respondent's proposed findings oil fact Nos. 1, 2, 5 through 8, 11, 14 and 15 have been adopted in substance insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 3, the petitioner's stipulation further narrowed the issues. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4 and 17 are properly proposed conclusions of law. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 9, 10, 21, and 23 have been reject in whole or in part as unsupported by the evidence. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 12, 13, 16, 18, 20 and 22 pertain to subordinate matters. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 19, whether institutionalizing of children is ever a good idea is not at issue in this proceeding. The question is whether services available to others should also be available to indigent patients. COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Power Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Gregory Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Stephen A. Ecenia Roberts, Baggett, LaFace, and Richard 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Richard A. Patterson Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, FL 32308 =================================================================
The Issue Whether Respondent's license to practice medicine should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined, for alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, as set forth in the Administrative Complaint, dated April 17, 1981, and Administrative Complaint, dated September 15, 1981, as amended on January 15, 1982. This proceeding commenced with Petitioner's filing of an Administrative Complaint on April 17, 1981, alleging that Respondent should be disciplined under Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, (1975)(1979) as a result of his alleged misconduct in 1974-75 whereby he engaged in sexual intercourse with one Sally Burton which resulted in her pregnancy and subsequent abortion. The Complaint also contained eleven counts involving the alleged prescribing of Schedule II controlled substances in 1980 by Respondent without a DEA registration certificate authorizing him to do so. Additionally, one count involved the alleged issuance by Respondent of a prescription to himself for a Schedule II controlled substance. Respondent thereafter requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, and the case was referred to this Division for appointment of a Hearing Officer. Notice of Hearing was issued on July 14, 1981 for a hearing to be held on September 22-23, 1981 at Tampa, Florida. Petitioner filed a motion for continuance of the hearing on the ground that a second administrative complaint had been issued against the Respondent on September 16, 1981, and that the two complaints should be consolidated for the purpose of hearing. The motion was granted and the hearing indefinitely continued. Petitioner filed its Second Administrative Complaint, dated September 15, 1981, with the Division on October 22, 1981, together with a motion to consolidate the two complaints. Respondent requested a Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes, hearing as to the matters alleged in the complaint. The cases were consolidated by Order, dated November 13, 1981, pursuant to Rule 28-5.106, Florida Administrative Code. Notice of Hearing for the consolidated cases was issued on November 13, 1981 for a hearing to be held on February 15-16, 1982 at Tampa, Florida. Thereafter, Petitioner moved to amend Counts IV and VI of the Second Complaint and said motion was granted by Order dated February 5, 1982. As amended the Second Complaint alleged violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, during various periods from 1967 to 1981. In general terms, it was alleged that Respondent had provided improper treatment to a patient suffering from alcoholic depression and anxiety, and that he employed the patient as a "co-therapist" in group sessions which had a negative impact on the patient's mental health as well as members of the group. The complaint further alleged that Respondent had engaged in activities of a sexual nature with a female patient, Emily Garrett, in 1968 which resulted in her emotional upset and harm. Finally, discipline was sought against Respondent as a result of his conviction in the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida on June 10, 1981 of manslaughter pursuant to Section 482.07, Florida Statutes, in connection with the death of Sally Burton. On February 5, 1982, Respondent filed a Motion for Continuance of the hearing due to a conflict in the schedule of one of his legal counsel, and due to the then pending appeal of Respondent's conviction before the Second District Court of Appeal. The motion was orally denied prior to hearing, but was renewed at the commencement of hearing on February 15, 1982. At that time, Respondent gave consent to the withdrawal of his current counsel, and a conditional appearance was entered by Frank Ragano, Esquire who conditioned such appearance on having an opportunity to familiarize himself with the facts and law of the case. The renewed motion was denied for lack of good cause, but Respondent was afforded the opportunity to proceed with his counsel who was then present, William S. Lancaster, Esquire, during presentation of Petitioner's case, at which time a continuance would be granted to afford additional time for Mr. Ragano to assist in preparing Respondent's defense. Mr. Lancaster requested that he be permitted to withdraw due to his stated inability to fully represent the Respondent at the hearing. Respondent consented to the withdrawal, and declined to proceed in the manner suggested by the Hearing Officer, and thereupon left the hearing room. Accordingly, the proceeding commenced in the absence of Respondent and his counsel. After the testimony of seven witnesses of Petitioner had been received, Respondent and Mr. Lancaster reentered the hearing room and agreed to participate in the proceeding provided a continuance would be granted at the conclusion of Petitioner's case. Respondent's counsel then cross-examined three of the witnesses who had previously testified. The hearing was continued on February 16, 1982 until April 20, 1982, and was concluded on April 22, 1982, except for the submission of late-filed exhibits in the form of depositions of four rebuttal witnesses and letter from the Drug Enforcement Administration. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of thirteen witnesses, including the Respondent. Respondent called thirty-three witnesses and testified in his own behalf. Petitioner submitted twenty-two exhibits in evidence. Those exhibits which were received provisionally at the hearing are now admitted. Respondent submitted nine exhibits, but withdrew Respondent's Exhibit 3, and Respondent's Exhibit 6 was rejected. Respondent's Exhibit 9 "A Guide for the Individual and Group Psychotherapy" was erroneously stated at the hearing to be Respondent's Exhibit 8, and has been renumbered. Late filed exhibits consisted of a letter from the Drug Enforcement Administration (Respondent's Exhibit 11), and the depositions of Dr. Joseph Lupo (Respondent's Exhibit 8), Shirley Heflin (Respondent's Exhibit 10) Emily Garrett (Petitioner's Exhibit 23), Captain R. W. Poindexter (Petitioner's Exhibit 24), and Janice Simmons (Petitioner's Exhibit 25) A Proposed Recommended Order filed by Petitioner has been fully considered, and those portions thereof not adopted herein are considered to be unnecessary, irrelevant, or unsupported in law or fact. Respondent has requested that this Recommended Order be delayed pending action by the Supreme Court of Florida on Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the criminal proceeding. This request is denied.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Louis John Tsavaris has been licensed to practice medicine in Florida since August 15, 1956. He received his medical degree at the University of Miami School of Medicine in 1956, interned at the Cornell Medical Center, and attended the University of Michigan where he was an Assistant Resident and Junior Clinical Instructor. He began his practice as a psychiatrist at Tampa in 1962 and has continuously practiced in that capacity. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 19). Pierce H. Brereton, Jr. became a patient of Respondent in 1967. He was a homosexual who suffered from depression and a severe character disorder, together with an alcohol and drug problem. Brereton had had several prior hospitalizations for schizophrenia. Respondent prescribed Antabuse for the patient to control his drinking, but Brereton discontinued its use after several months. He participated in group therapy sessions conducted by Respondent until 1978 when he terminated his patient relationship. Although Brereton soon resumed his drinking habits after discontinuing Antabuse, he attempted to hide the fact from Respondent. As early as 1974, and off and on throughout the following years, Respondent prescribed Valium for Brereton's depression and anxiety. About 1974, Respondent opened another office in Siesta Key and employed Brereton to run errands and to do janitorial work at that location. Respondent then utilized Brereton as a "co-therapist" in psychiatric group therapy sessions for a fee of approximately $100 per week. Brereton had had no formal training or qualification as a therapist, but several years later commenced graduate courses in Gestalt therapy at the University of South Florida. Another "co- therapist", Kathryn Von Schmidt, who had been a patient of Respondent since 1973, was employed by him to assist at group sessions commencing in 1974. She was unqualified at the time, but received a Master's Degree in Counselling in December, 1975. She continued in her capacity as a co-therapist until the end of 1976. Also, Marian Klein, who held a Master's Degree in Psychology and had been Respondent's patient since 1973, became a co-therapist from 1975 to 1979. Brereton worked as co-therapist with both Von Schmidt and Klein during) the period 1974-1978. Klein found that his ability as a therapist varied from excellent to disruptive. Breretons appearance and general manner improved substantially during the years that he served as a co-therapist. Several of the group patients testified at the hearing that his presence caused a deterioration in their condition because he was unqualified to conduct therapy sessions. However, a number of other patients who attended the sessions seemed unaware that Brereton actually had any kind of "official" capacity, and regarded him merely as loquacious and as a "roll-taker". Respondent was either present or readily available during virtually all of the sessions in which co-therapists were assisting in the conduct of group sessions. Respondent employed Brereton as a co-therapist ostensibly to provide him with a reference for future employment and in the belief that such activity would be therapeutic for him. Brereton testified that his drinking had continued during the years when he was employed by Respondent, and that Respondent frequently drank alcoholic beverages with patients, including Brereton, before and after therapy sessions. He claimed that Respondent frequently came to his (Brereton's) residence with a bottle of liquor which they drank. The weight of the evidence shows that Brereton hid his drinking from Respondent and other patients, and that they were virtually unaware of his continuing alcohol problem. Respondent occasionally would join a group for dinner at a restaurant and have a drink with them, but did not make a practice of it. The evidence is insufficient to show that he either drank frequently with Brereton or otherwise made liquor available to him. In 1978, Brereton became irrational and abusive and came to therapy sessions on occasion when he had been drinking. At such times, Dr. Klein would send him home. She finally informed Respondent about his actions on one occasion. Respondent then warned Brereton of the dangers of taking Valium when he had been drinking. The patients in the groups were aware of his drinking in 1978 and were disturbed by his conduct. Brereton had considered Respondent to be "as infallible as the Pope" during his early years as a patient, but after the death in 1975 of Cassandra "Sally" Burton, who had been another of Respondent's patients, and Respondent's subsequent indictment for her death with consequent publicity of that fact, Brereton harbored hostile feelings against Respondent. He has filed a malpractice suit against Respondent and urged other patients to do so. Expert opinion holds that, although a "co-therapist" or other assistant at group therapy sessions should have appropriate credentials in counselling or psychology, an unqualified patient's presence in come leadership capacity would not necessarily impair his or her mental health, or that of the other patients if the group is structured with a qualified therapist or psychiatrist present at the sessions. It is found that insufficient evidence has been presented to establish that Brereton's activities as a co-therapist had a negative or deleterious impact on either his mental health or that of other patients. (Testimony of Respondent, Brereton, Crumpler, Speck, Ramirez, Burdette, Gonzalez, Stenberg, Prince, Adams, Putney, Melton, Albano, Brown, Barker, Burns, Von Schmidt, Buckman, Wheatley, Silverman, Jones, Carlton, Gardner, Arrifaht, Lancaster, Klein, Petitioner's Exhibits 4-5, 7-8). In 1962, Emily Garrett, then approximately 15 years old, became a patient of Respondent for several months. She suffered from depression and was autistic. She returned for treatment with Respondent in 1965 or 1966 and continued as a patient until 1970. She testified by deposition at the hearing that on either April 6 or 13, 1968, Respondent requested that she come in his office after a group therapy session where he proceeded to unbutton her blouse and fondle her breasts, and sought to have her perform an oral sex act upon him. She claimed that her depression was increased as a result of Respondent's sexual advances, thus precipitating a suicide attempt on April 19th by taking a large quantity of Valium prior to a group therapy session. After the session, when Respondent learned of her ingestion of the drug, he had several of the group members take her to the hospital where her stomach was pumped out. She returned home and then took some other drugs and was returned to the hospital where she remained for several days. Garrett further testified that on May 28, 1968, Respondent again fondled her breasts in his office after a group session had terminated. Garrett continued as Respondent's patient until October, 1970 when she changed psychiatrists and became a patient of a Dr. Vesley. This was due to the fact that she was unable to continue private sessions with Respondent because he was commuting between Tampa and New Jersey in order to teach at a medical college. In April, 1981, she became aware of publicity surrounding Respondent and voluntarily contacted Petitioner's investigators, at which time she related to them her allegations concerning Respondent's misconduct. Although she testified that she had told her sister about the incidents several years after they had occurred, and had also related them to Dr. Vesley, neither of those individuals testified at the hearing. Garrett testified that she did not report or otherwise complain about Respondent at an earlier time because of her feelings of dependence and sense of loyalty to him. Respondent denied Garrett's allegations and claimed that she had come to his office several times after her discontinuance as a patient and wanted him to become romantically involved with her. Although experts in the field of psychiatry agree that it is clearly unethical and a deviation from acceptable standards of practice for a psychiatrist to have sexual contact with a patient, it is also common for female patients to fantasize about their relationships with their psychiatrist. It would be unusual for a patient to continue treatment with a psychiatrist after he had committed a sexual assault against her. It is found that insufficient credible evidence has been presented to establish that Respondent committed the acts alleged by Garrett. (Testimony of Garrett (Depositions-Petitioner's Exhibits 17-18, 23), Respondent, Gonzalez, Warren, Afield, Gardner). Cassandra "Sally" Burton became a patient of Respondent in 1974. He diagnosed her condition as paranoid schizophrenia in partial remission with a drug addiction problem. She had previously been treated by psychiatrists and had been hospitalized. She had been a patient of Dr. Joseph Lupo, a Tampa psychiatrist, in 1969 when she was 18 years old. His tentative diagnosis of her condition was depression. After several months treatment in the fall of 1969, he admitted her to the psychiatric unit of Tampa General Hospital in January, 1970 based on her stated intention to commit suicide by overdosing on medication. He found her to be manipulative in her personal relationships and seductive in nature. She was discharged from the hospital after six days confinement at the insistence of her father. Dr. Lupo recommended to him at the time that she be continued in psychotherapy because she needed long-term treatment. She had shown signs of a manic depressive disorder. Such a disorder is a form of psychosis, which means loss of touch with reality and disorganization of thoughts, with impaired judgment. Based on psychological testing and observation, Dr. Lupo found that she was inclined to dramatize events in order to get attention, or as a manner of looking for help and being rescued. It was his opinion that she was capable of fabricating a story about having sexual intercourse, or a sexual affair with her treating psychiatrist. At the time that Burton became Respondent's patient, she told him that she had had syphilis and herpes. He treated her for gonorrhea and referred her to a gynecologist. In 1972, she had been hospitalized for several weeks for herpetic vaginitis. In August, 1974, Respondent referred the patient to Dr. Lawrence H. Ricker, a clinical psychologist, for testing and evaluation. He found that she was sexually disturbed with a severe personality disorder involving hysterical personality with underlying paranoid schizophrenic tendencies. His recommendation was a conservative therapeutic approach which considered her to be psychotic with support reality testing in the present rather than exploring the past. He further found that she had a propensity for self dramatization and tended to exaggerate, which exhibited a need for attention. Cassandra Burton was employed with A law firm as a legal secretary in Tampa in the fall of 1974. According to Jennifer Ross, a fellow employee, Respondent telephoned Burton at her office several times a week at which times they discussed when they were next going to see one another. The only time Ross saw Respondent and Burton together was at a dinner party at Ross' boy friend's house. On that occasion, Respondent and Burton arrived separately. Two of Respondent's former patients testified that they had had sexual relations with Burton. In one of these instances, the patient met Burton at Respondent's office and she asked him to take her home. This occurred about December, 1974. The other patient testified that he had observed her in bed with other men on several occasions. On March 5, 1975, Dr. Charles Mastin of Indian Rocks Beach performed an abortion on Burton. Respondent accompanied her to Mastin's office. After the abortion was performed, Burton embraced Respondent and they left the office together. The last charge made to Burton by Respondent's office for professional services was in December, 1974. Although she did not thereafter participate in group therapy sessions, Respondent's office records show that she made approximately 51 telephone calls to Respondent at his office from December, 1974 through April, 1975. On one occasion, she was involved in an automobile accident and came to Respondent's office where he examined her and referred her to an orthopedist. On April 19, 1975, at 11:24 p.m. Deputy Sheriff William Daggett of the Hillsborough County Sheriff's office was dispatched to assist fire and rescue personnel at Burton's residence in the Castellano Apartments. When he arrived at the apartment, rescue personnel were working on Cassandra Burton who was unconscious. Another Deputy Sheriff and Respondent were also present. Daggett proceeded to obtain information concerning the matter from Respondent, who was not under suspicion at the time. Respondent said that Burton had called him at 10:50 p.m., and told him that she had fallen down in the bathroom and was not feeling well. At that point, according to Respondent, the phone went dead as if it had been dropped. He decided to go to her apartment and arrived there about 25 minutes later, after stopping to purchase and eat an ice cream cone. He related that when he arrived at the apartment he found Burton sitting in a chair with the telephone cord around her throat area and that he could not tell whether she was breathing. He then called fire/rescue for assistance and commenced giving her artificial respiration. Respondent told Deputy Sheriff Daggett that although he had been Burton's doctor approximately a year before, he was presently seeing her only socially. A few days after Burton's death, Respondent called Jennifer Ross and said that he wanted to explain what had happened to Sally Burton. He told her that she had died from fibrillation of the heart, which was connected with some diuretic pills that she had been taking. Ross asked him if her death had anything to do with the abortion and he said "no". He asked her not to mention the abortion or his "relationship" with Burton to the police. On June 25, 1975, Respondent was indicted in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court for the premeditated murder of Cassandra (sic) Ann Burton, a/k/a Sally Burton, on April 19, 1976, by strangling her to death by means unknown, contrary to Florida Statutes, 782.04. On June 10, 1981, Respondent was found guilty of the crime of manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for fifteen years. Respondent testified at the hearing that he had terminated his physician-patient relationship with Burton in December, 1974 when he determined that she was seriously ill, not functioning well in group therapy, and needed long-term treatment. He recommended that she secure inpatient treatment and suggested that she see Dr. Arturo D. Gonzalez for this purpose. However, she did not wish to do so. On several occasions in 1975, Respondent let Burton borrow his car while he was out of state. He conceded that he had seen her after terminating her as a patient and decided to talk to her on occasions. He testified that he had induced her to attend a Bible class that he had been attending since the early 60's and that he would speak to her briefly once a week before the class. He denied ever having sexual intercourse with her and said that one of the reasons for his terminating her as a patient was due to the fact that she had vaginal herpes, which was always contagious in his opinion, and that he had had to treat several of his male patients who had been involved with her for urethral discharge. He claimed that she would pick up these patients at his office, and take them home with her. Respondent further testified that although he had arranged for Burton's abortion and accompanied her to the doctor's office for that purpose, he had not caused the pregnancy and did not pay for the abortion. Periodically in the past, he had referred patients who became pregnant to physicians in the locality for abortions and maintained an office file listing physicians who performed this procedure. Respondent testified that on the evening of April 19, 1975, he was conducting a group therapy session in his office and finished about 10:50 p.m. He later received several telephone calls from Burton from which he gained the impression that she might have taken some medication and could be physically ill, or that she was trying to get him over to her place to try to seduce him. He asked another patient, Christine Carlton, to accompany him to Burton's apartment to ascertain her condition, but she declined to go with him at that time. Respondent testified that he had asked Burton to call a cab or an ambulance, but she insisted that he come over to her apartment, stating that she was "too dizzy" to drive out herself. He testified that he then proceeded to her apartment after stopping to buy an ice cream cone, since he had not eaten all day. He did not believe there was a genuine emergency because of Burton's history of "rescue" fantasies and, in any event, thought he would have several hours if she had actually taken an overdose of drugs. When he arrived at Burton's apartment, he found her in a chair facing the door, and she did not respond to his greeting. He saw blueness in her legs and took her pulse, and patted her on the face. He picked her up, put her on the couch and checked her corneal reflex, and then started artificial respiration. He called the emergency squad while administering artificial respiration. He testified that when he heard the approaching sirens of the rescue squad, he went out on the apartment landing and saw a man ducking behind the bushes. He also testified that he had seen someone running down the stairs when he first arrived at the apartment. He denied strangling Burton. Dr. Joan Wood, Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, testified that, although the medical examiner, Dr. Feegel, had originally determined that Burton's death was caused by strangulation, he modified his opinion in his testimony at Respondent's trial to include the possibility of accidental death. Dr. Wood has reviewed all of the medical reports concerning thee deceased, and is of the opinion that the pathological studies and reports are insufficient upon which to determine the cause of death within a reasonable medical certainty. As a result of the foregoing findings, the following additional findings are made: Insufficient competent evidence was presented to establish that Respondent had a sexual relationship with Cassandra Burton and that he caused her pregnancy. Although the evidence shows that Respondent's association with Burton was of such a nature as to greatly exceed the bounds of a normal psychiatrist-patient .relationship, it was generally in keeping with his compulsive personality which, as described by Dr. Warren, the examining psychiatrist, involved a tendency to try and please women, particularly hysterical ones. Other expert and lay testimony showed him to be an individual who became excessively involved with his patients. At the time of the death of Cassandra "Sally" Burton on April 19, 1975, for which Respondent was thereafter found guilty of manslaughter, Respondent was acting in the role of a psychiatrist or physician, as evidenced by the deceased's request to him for medical assistance and his attempted response thereto in such capacity. (Testimony of Respondent, Burdette, Freeman, Daggett, Ross, Adams, Wood, Silverman, Jones, Carlton, Mezrah, Thomas, Gardner, Ricker, Petitioner's Exhibits 12-16, 21, Respondent's Exhibits 4-5, 8). It was the practice of Respondent to have his secretary, Jean Jones, prepare his yearly applications to the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, for renewal of his registration to dispense controlled substances pursuant to Federal law and regulation. She customarily prepared the application which was signed by Respondent and, in years prior to 1980, he had obtained registration to dispense Schedule II through V controlled substances. His application for renewal of registration which expired on November 30, 1979 was prepared by a different secretary due to Jones' absence, and the application signed by Respondent inadvertently reflected a request for renewal of authority to dispense only Schedule III and IV substances. Respondent was unaware that his registration renewal did not include authority to dispense Schedule II drugs. During the period March 6 through October 31, 1980, Respondent prescribed Class II controlled substances without proper registration to Lileen Dunn for Mepergan Fortis and Percodan, Anne Pizzo for Dexedrine, William Gray for Ritalin, Nick Douzanis for Desoxyn, Patty Crist for Amytal, Elio Alvarez, Jr. for Quaaludes, John Adams for Dexedrine, Harold Wyatt for Quaaludes, Karen Berrian and Janet Anifant for Dexamyl. On October 2, 1980, Respondent prescribed Noctec for himself which was filled at a Tampa pharmacy. Noctec is a Schedule IV controlled substance. Thomas Rowley had taken his wife to Respondent for treatment in the summer of 1980 and such treatment continued into December of that year. Although Respondent had provided Rowley with some samples of Noctec for his wife, and prescribed medicine for her in Rowley's name to prevent Mrs. Rowley from taking an overdose of medicine, Rowley had never received or obtained Noctec on a prescription which named Respondent as the patient. Respondent's registration to dispense controlled substances has included Schedule II drugs for 1981 and 1982. (Testimony of Jones, Dodd, Paige, Rowley, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-3, Respondents Exhibits 2, 7). Respondent's driver's license was suspended for driving infractions in October, 1976 and reinstated in June, 1978. After Respondent returned a car he had borrowed from a patient, Pierce Brereton found a Florida driver's license in the glove compartment in the name off Albert Bela Klein, but bearing a photograph of Respondent. Kein had died on June 24, 1972, but records of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles show that three speeding Violations were charged against his license in 1977-78. (Testimony of Brereton, Petitioner's Exhibits 9-11) Pursuant to an Order issued by the Secretary, Department of Professional Regulation, on June 11, 1981, under subsection 458.331(1)(s), Florida Statutes, Respondent submitted to a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. George L Warren of Clearwater, Florida during the period July 31--August; 17, 1931. In addition, psychological testing of Respondent was performed by Dr. Richard N. Fran on August 7, 1981 As a result of the examination and testing, Dr. Warren concluded that Respondent suffered from a mild degree of impairment, most likely due to alcohol abuse which had caused some degree of brain damage, and a compulsive personality disorder. However, he did not feel that Respondent was suffering from a sufficient mental or emotional impairment which would adversely impact on his ability to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients. When he testified at the hearing, Dr. Warren disclosed that Respondent had contacted him the night before and disclosed that he had "borrowed" a driver's license during the pendency of criminal charges against him. Respondent had not disclosed this information to Warren during the previous psychiatric examination Dr. Warren testified on direct examination that the possession and use of the false driver's license by Respondent constituted antisocial behavior and than as a result of Respondent's disclosure, he would modify his opinion to find that Respondent was not able to practice medicine with skill and safety to patients. However, upon cross-examination, he stated that that fact alone would not change his opinion, but that he would have to reevaluate the case based on the factual correctness of matters contained in various hypothetical questions posed to him which were based upon the other charges in the Administrative Complaints. (Testimony of Warren, Petitioner's Exhibit 22, Respondent's Exhibit 1). Respondent has been treated by a psychiatrist during the past year and, in his opinion, Respondent is a highly intelligent, well qualified psychiatrist who is competent to practice his profession. Additionally, several psychiatrists who have known Respondent in the past are of the same opinion. (Testimony of Afield, Gardner, Silverman, Thomas, Respondent's Exhibit 9).
Recommendation That Petitioner Board of Medical Examiners revoke the license of Respondent Louis J. Tsavaris to practice medicine pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Deborah J. Miller, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Grover C. Freeman, Esquire 4600 West Cypress, Suite 410 Tampa, Florida 33607 William S. Lancaster, Esquire 1715 Tampa Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Frank Ragano, Esquire 620 East Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael Schwartz, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Harbour Shores Hospital is a 60-bed short-term psychiatric facility, with 36 adult beds and 24 adolescent beds. The facility opened in October 1985, and had an occupancy of 62 percent at the time of the final hearing in March 1986. T. 14, 20. The hospital is an integral part of Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc., located in Ft. Pierce, Florida, and Lawnwood is owned by Hospital Corporation of America. T. 13-14. Hospital Corporation of America now operates 5,000 psychiatric beds in the United States. T. 18. Lawnwood Medical Center, Inc. (Lawnwood), submitted an application for certificate of need number 3363 on June 14, 1984, for the conversion of 12 short-term psychiatric beds to 12 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds. T. 15. No construction is needed to convert these 12 beds. T. 16. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) initially denied the application. T. 106. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long-term hospital inpatient hospital substance abuse beds, which is rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five year period specified in rule 10- 5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-6. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. HRS Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance 3. All references in this order to Harbour Shores Hospital shall include the Petitioner, Lawnwood, unless specifically stated otherwise. The parties stipulated that the only issue in this case is need and any ancillary issue which is based upon need. T. 4-5. HRS has a rule governing short and long term hospital inpatient hospital-substance abuse beds, which is Rule 10-5.11(27), Florida Administrative Code. Subparagraph (f)1 of the rule contains what HRS calls bed "allocations" and calculates need for a health service district as a whole. Harbour Shores Hospital is located in St. Lucie County in Health District IX. District IX is composed of St. Lucie, Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, and Palm Beach Counties. HRS Ex. 2, p.7. The District IX Local Health Council has identified two subdistricts for purposes of allocating short-term psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Subdistrict 1 is St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee Counties, and subdistrict 2 is Palm Beach County. HRS Exhibit 2, p.7; T. 110. HRS proposes to determine need as of January 1989 using the date of the application as the starting point for the five-year period specified in Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 107-8. The basis of this decision is a new policy by HRS to implement the Gulf Court decision. There is a need for only 1 additional short-term substance abuse bed in District IX by January 1989 based upon Rule 10-5.11(27)(f)1, Florida Administrative Code. T. 109. Exhibit 1. HRS proposes also to refer to such need for short term substance abuse beds as indicated by local health council plans, relying upon rule 10- 5.11(27)(h)3, Florida Administrative Code. T. 110. The local health plan for District IX allocates needed beds based upon the subdistricts described above. HRS Exhibit 2, p. 6. Further, the local health plan has adopted the method of HRS found in rule 10-5.11(27), supra, for calculating need, and calculates such need using the HRS rule factor of .06 substance abuse beds per 1,000 population in each of the two subdistricts. HRS Exhibit 2, pp. 5 and 8, paragraph II. Using current estimates of the populations of each subdistrict in January 1909, HRS projects that subdistrict 1 will have a surplus of 15 substance abuse beds in 1989, and all net need (16 beds) will be in subdistrict 2, which is Palm Beach County. T. 111; HRS Exhibit 1. HRS has not adopted these subdistricts by rule. T. 128-29. There was no evidence to substantiate the reasonableness of the subdistricts adopted in the local health plan. T. 131. The following is a summary of the existing and approved short-term substance abuse beds in District IX, showing county of location, and occupancy rates for 1985: Humana Hospital 16 Licensed Indian River 8509 Sebastian Lake Hospital 16 Licensed Palm Beach 3558 Palm Beaches Fair Oaks 17 Licensed Palm Beach 3807 Savannas 20 Approved St. Lucie Hospital Beds Status County Patient Days Occupancy 145.7% 60.7% 60.7% The number of patient days at Fair Oaks, however, is for four months, August, October, November, and December 1985. Thus, the actual number of patient days, 1269, has been multiplied by 3 to obtain an estimate for an entire year. T. 23- 24, 61-62. The occupancy rate is the number of patient days divided by the product of the number of days in the year (365) and the number of licensed beds. Using the statistics in paragraph 10, the average occupancy rate for the three existing facilities in District IX was 88.8 percent. If one assumes, as did Petitioner's expert, that the utilization rates for short-term substance abuse beds will at least remain the same as in 1935, with the addition of the 20 new beds at Savannas Hospital, District IX may have an occupancy rate of 63.8 percent and subdistrict 1 may have an occupancy rate of 64.8 percent . The 20 new beds at the Savannas Hospital are those granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc., and are projected to open in November 1986. T. 83. As discussed above, Harbour Shores Hospital had been in operation about five months by the time of the March 1986 hearing, and its 60 short term psychiatric beds were averaging 62 percent occupancy, which is about 15 percent above the occupancy projected in its certificate of need application. T. 38. Harbour Shores serves patients from the four counties of subdistrict 1, St. Lucie, Martin, Indian River, and Okeechobee, and serves a significant number of patients from Palm Beach County as well; three to four percent of its patients also come from Brevard and Broward Counties. T. 19. About 80 percent of the patients at Harbour Shores in the first five months of its operation had a substance abuse problem secondary to the primary diagnosis of mental illness. T. 30, 50, 63. This is consistent with experience throughout Florida. T. 63. Most of these "dually diagnosed" patients have been through a detoxification program before entering Harbour Shores Hospital. T. 30. In its beginning months of operation, Harbour Shores has had patients referred from the courts, law enforcement agencies, community and social agencies, physicians, and from HRS. T. 21-22, 59. Harbour Shores can expect to obtain substance abuse referrals from these agencies. Staff at Harbour Shores works with the DWI Board, Students Against Drunk Driving, and school administrative personnel. T. 39-40. In October and November 1985, Harbour Shores received 38 requests from physicians, the courts, law enforcement agencies, and social agencies, for admission of patients for substance abuse treatment. T. 22, 49. There is no evidence that Harbour Shores had any such requests in December 1985 or January 1986. In February 1986, it had 14 such requests, and in March to the date of the hearing, it had 5 requests. T. 48. There is no evidence as to whether these requests were for short or long-term substance abuse services, or whether these were requests from different patients or multiple requests from the same patient. There is also no evidence that the persons requesting substance abuse treatment were not adequately treated at existing facilities. Thus, the data from these few months is not an adequate basis for determining future need for short term substance abuse beds. Ms. Peggy Cioffi is the coordinator for the Martin County Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. Deposition, Ms. Peggy Cioffi, p. 2. Ms. Cioffi testified as to the need for substance abuse services in her area. She did not testify as an expert witness. Her program is primarily designed to assist the County Court in referrals of misdemeanants and others within the Court's jurisdiction who need substance abuse services. Id. Ms. Cioffi has difficulty placing persons needing inpatient or residential treatment. Id. at p. 3. She related an example of a county prisoner who asked to be detained in jail three months for lack of an alcohol program. Id. at p. 4. Ms. Cioffi did not state whether this person needed residential or inpatient hospital care. She also had recently reviewed a 14 page county court docket and determined that 67 percent of those charged represented alcohol or drug related offenses. Id. Ms. Cioffi did not clearly show how she was able to infer this fact. Further, Ms. Cioffi was unable to tell from this statistic how many of these defendants needed short term inpatient hospital substance abuse treatment. Id. at p. 6. She stated that a very high percentage of these could benefit from some kind of services, but did not separate the kinds of services, Id. at p.7. Ms. Cioffi stated that she often had to wait to find a place for a person in the following facilities: Dunklin, CARP, and Alcohope. Id. at p. 5. Ms. Cioffi stated that these were "residential" facilities, but she did not state whether these facilities were the equivalent of short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse facilities. These facilities are located in District IX, Id. at p. 7, but are not short-term in patient hospital substance abuse beds licensed as such. See paragraph 10 above. See also T. 96-99. In summary, although Ms. Cioffi identified a generalized need for residential or hospital substance abuse treatment, she did not draw any distinction between the two services. If there was a similarity, she did not provide evidence of the similarity. Lacking evidence in the record that need for residential treatment programs can be used to show need for inpatient hospital beds, Ms. Cioffi's testimony is insufficient to show need for the services sought by the Petitioner. The Honorable Marc Cianca is a County Judge in St. Lucie County. Deposition, Judge Marc Cianca, p. 2. Judge Cianca was of the opinion that his area attracted semi-young people with substance abuse problems in greater numbers than the retirement population. Id. at 17-18. He frequently was frustrated in his efforts to find substance abuse services for defendants in his Court. Id. at 3-5. Judge Cianca felt that most of the people he saw needed long-term therapy, beginning with inpatient services, followed by long-term follow-up programs. Id. at 12-14. Like the testimony of Ms. Cioffi (which concerned the same group of persons before the County Court), Judge Cianca did not clearly distinguish need for short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse services from need for all other forms of substance abuse treatment, and the record on this point is silent as well. For this reason, Judge Cianca's opinion that 100 short-term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds are needed must be rejected. The testimony of Ms. Cioffi and Judge Cianca is insufficient as a predicate for determining need for the inpatient hospital beds sought by the Petitioner for another reason, and that is the lack of evidence that the persons identified as needing substance abuse services will have the ability to pay for such services at Petitioner's facility, or that third party payment will be available for them. The people in need in Ms. Cioffi's testimony normally do not have funds to pay for treatment. Cioffi, p. 8. Similarly, a substantial number of the people in need seen by Judge Cianca do not have insurance coverage and would not be able to use Harbour Shores unless they qualified for Medicaid and unless Harbour Shores took all of those qualified for Medicaid. Id. at 7, 15-16. A substantial number of the persons needing substance abuse treatment do not have jobs or insurance and must rely upon "welfare" for services. Id. at 15, 17. These persons cannot afford certain programs, and must rely upon state aid through programs such as those provided by Indian River Community Mental Health Center, and for these programs there is always a waiting list. Id. at There is no evidence that any of these persons are eligible for Medicaid. Ms. Sharon Heinlen, Director of Planning and Development for Harbour Shores Hospital, who testified for the Petitioner as an expert in health planning and hospital administration, had not studied the Medicaid population in the area to determine need. T. 76. Although Harbour Shores had about 15 percent of its psychiatric patient days devoted to Medicaid patients, T. 33, the validity of this percentage for substance abuse patients, or for the reasonably near future, was not established by other evidence. Petitioner's formal application for this certificate of need projects 5 percent of its gross revenues from Medicaid and another 5 percent devoted to bad debt, indigents, and Baker Act cases. Petitioner's Exhibit 1, p. 5. But the application does not state whether this percentage will be evenly distributed among psychiatric and substance abuse patients. In any event, the percentages of indigent care and Medicaid care are too small to satisfy the need identified by Judge Cianca and Ms. Cioffi. Stated another way, the need identified by those two witnesses is not relevant to Petitioner's application except with respect to a small percentage. Harbour Shores plans to have after care for substance abuse patients. T. 40. The Savannas Hospital is the name of the hospital to be completed in November 1986 to provide, among other services, 20 short term inpatient hospital substance abuse beds under the certificate of need granted to Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82-83. The primary service area of the Savannas Hospital will be the same four counties as now served by Harbour Shores Hospital, as well as Palm Beach County. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital intends to be licensed. T. 84. The Savannas Hospital is located in Port St. Lucie, in St. Lucie County. T. 95-96. The service proposed is a comprehensive substance abuse service. T. 87. Five of the twenty substance abuse beds will be devoted to detoxification. T. 92. The Savannas Hospital will be operated by the Mediplex Group in partnership with Indian River Community Mental Health Center, Inc. T. 82. The land will be owned by Mediplex. T. 95. The Savannas Hospital will be a private, for profit, hospital, while the Mental Health Center will be a not-for- profit facility. T. 86. The Savannas Hospital publicly states that it will take five percent indigent patients, which does not include Medicare. T. 87. There is no commitment to provide more indigent care. T. 89. All other patients acre expected to be fully paying. T. 93. The actual figure for free or nonpaying patients has not yet been calculated. T. 94. The Savannas Hospital will not serve Medicaid substance abuse patients because it is a freestanding facility. T. 36, 86. Humana Hospital Sebastian is the closest facility to Harbour Shores currently in operation providing inpatient short-term hospital substance abuse services, and Humana Sebastian can accept Medicaid patients. T. 59. Ms. Elizabeth Dudek testified for HRS as an expert in health planning and certificate of need review in Florida. Ms. Dudek has reviewed all of the applications made in District IX for substance abuse beds since November 1983, and as a supervisor, has reviewed all of the applications in the state for substance abuse beds. T. 104. She has been in contact with the District Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Program Office and has attended public hearings, as well as administrative hearings, concerning substance abuse beds in District IX. T. 104-05. She also listened to all of the evidence presented at the final hearing. It was Ms. Dudek's opinion that there was no need for the substance abuse beds sought by the Petitioner. T. 127-28. Ms. Sharon Heinlen was also qualified as an expert in health planning, as well as hospital administration. T. 13. Ms. Heinlen has only recently moved to Florida, T. 11, 66, and stated that she did not know Florida well enough to know what might be the best thing to advocate in Florida with respect to whether all hospitals should provide all services. T. 65-66. She had conducted studies of District IX, however. T. 66. The average occupancy rates for District IX testified to by Ms. Heinlen were mathematically incorrect, and the correct lower rates do not support her opinion that additional short term substance abuse beds are needed. See FF 11. The fact that about 80 percent of the psychiatric patients now are at Harbour Shores Hospital also have a substance abuse problem does not necessarily support Ms. Heinlen's opinion as to need. See FF 12. This statistic is consistent with experience in all of Florida, and therefore should be accommodated by the HRS numeric need methodology. Moreover, it must be inferred that hospitalization of these patients as psychiatric patients was proper, rather than as substance abuse patients, and that even if additional substance abuse beds were available, these patients still would need to be in a psychiatric bed for treatment of the primary diagnosis. As discussed in FF 14, the data concerning recent requests for substance abuse services at Harbour Shores Hospital is not sufficient to conclude that a need exists for additional beds. As discussed in FF 17, Ms. Heinlen did not have an adequate basis for any opinion as to the need for short-term substance abuse beds for Medicaid patients in District IX. Finally, Ms. Heinlen testified that there was a waiting list for patients to be admitted to licensed short-term substance abuse beds at Fair Oaks and Lake Hospital, but the testimony was hearsay. T. 28. Since this evidence conflicts with the relatively low occupancy rates at these same facilities, and has not otherwise been corroborated by non-hearsay evidence, it must be rejected as a basis for a finding of fact. Further, due to the conflict with the low occupancy rates, it is rejected as a basis for Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion. In summary, Ms. Heinlen's expert opinion that there is a need for short-term, inpatient hospital substance abuse beds in District IX must be rejected. It is the position of HRS that even if the rule showed a need, the occupancy factor would be a factor in showing no need. T. 134. Conversely, if the rule showed no need, the occupancy factor would be one factor among others which night show need. Id.
The Issue Did Respondent, Tonya Shrader, R.N. (Ms. Shrader), violate section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2015),1/ by being unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients by reason of illness or use of alcohol, drugs, narcotics, or chemicals or any other type of material, or as a result of any mental or physical condition? If Ms. Shrader violated section 464.018(1)(j), what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 464, Florida Statutes, charge the Department of Health, Board of Nursing, with the licensing and regulation of nurses. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Ms. Shrader was a licensed registered nurse in the State of Florida. She holds license RN 9180605. Ms. Shrader has a complicated history of psychiatric and medical problems that affect her ability to practice nursing with the level of skill and safety to patients required in the State of Florida. Ms. Shrader has suffered from depression since childhood. Ms. Shrader treated her depression with a variety of medications, including: Lithium, Depakote, Pamelor, Elavil, Topamax, Lamictal, and Prozac. In the past five years, Ms. Shrader has not received treatment for her depression. Ms. Shrader also suffers from anxiety. Ms. Shrader is not receiving treatment for her anxiety. In addition to depression and anxiety, Ms. Shrader suffers from chronic severe migraines. The cause has not been determined despite extensive neurological evaluations. Ms. Shrader has been prescribed Tramadol, Fiorcet, and Clonazepam to treat her migraines. At all times material to the Department's complaint, Ms. Shrader was prescribed Fiorcet for her migraine symptoms. Between March 24, 2012, and July 22, 2013, Ms. Shrader complained of multiple neurological symptoms, including double vision, balance and gait instability, and tingling and numbness in her hands. Ms. Shrader elected to undergo extensive neurological testing to rule out demyelinating disease, multiple sclerosis, and palsy. The tests provided no indication that Ms. Shrader's symptoms resulted from a neurological disorder. At all times material to this proceeding, Ms. Shrader worked as a registered nurse in the Neurological and Psychiatric Unit at Gulf Coast Medical Center (Gulf Coast). On December 20, 2013, Ms. Shrader took an excessive dose of four Fiorcet pills. She told her family that she "plans to keep overdosing until she dies," and that she "predicts that [she] will be dead by the end of the year." Ms. Shrader's family contacted the Emergency Medical Services. Ms. Shrader was transported to Lehigh Regional Medical Center, where she was treated for an overdose. Ms. Shrader was involuntarily admitted to SalusCare, Inc. (SalusCare), for inpatient psychiatric observation and treatment. On December 20, 2013, the Crisis Stabilization Unit (CSU) at SalusCare conducted an in-patient psychiatric evaluation of Ms. Shrader. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader denied past psychiatric treatments or psychiatric medication. Ms. Shrader also denied that her Fiorcet overdose was an attempted suicide. Her statements during her SalusCare evaluation contradict her medical charting and statements she has made, which indicate that she has an extensive history of psychiatric illnesses. SalusCare discharged Ms. Shrader on December 23, 2013. The director of nursing at Gulf Coast contacted the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) about Ms. Shrader. IPN is an impaired practitioner consultant to the Department's Board of Nursing. IPN works with nurses and monitors them for safety to practice issues. IPN contacted Ms. Shrader on January 2, 2014, to discuss her entering the program. Ms. Shrader denied that she was impaired or abused any substances. She admitted that she was depressed. But she said that she stopped her depression treatment approximately five years earlier. IPN asked Ms. Shrader to undergo an evaluation to determine her fitness to practice nursing. Ms. Shrader scheduled an evaluation with Theodore Treese, M.D., an expert in the psychiatric treatment, monitoring, and care of health care practitioners. He conducted the evaluation on January 28, 2014. Dr. Treese diagnosed Ms. Shrader with severe major depressive disorder; alcohol abuse; opioid abuse; sedative, anxiolytic abuse; relational problems, not otherwise specified; and rule-out polysubstance abuse. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader attempted to hide her in-patient psychiatric treatment at SalusCare. Based on Ms. Shrader's diagnoses, Dr. Treese determined that Ms. Shrader was not capable of practicing as a registered nurse with reasonable skill and safety to patients. Dr. Treese recommended that Ms. Shrader seek treatment at a substance abuse treatment center at a level of at least partial hospitalization. Ms. Shrader did not agree with Dr. Treese's recommendation. IPN gave Ms. Shrader the opportunity to seek a second opinion from another IPN-approved evaluator. IPN informed Ms. Shrader that she needed to either obtain a second opinion or enter the recommended treatment before April 14, 2014; otherwise, IPN would close her intake case file. Ms. Shrader refused to obtain a second opinion or enter into the recommended treatment. IPN closed Ms. Shrader's file on April 14, 2014. On December 2, 2014, Mark Sylvester, M.D., a physician specializing in psychiatry and addiction medicine, evaluated Ms. Shrader pursuant to Department Order. Dr. Sylvester reviewed Ms. Shrader's medical records, the IPN intake case file, and the Department's investigative report. Dr. Sylvester also asked Ms. Shrader to undergo a urine and hair drug screen. Ms. Shrader did not participate in the screens. Dr. Sylvester diagnosed Ms. Shrader with recurrent major depressive disorder, opioid abuse, alcohol abuse, benzodiazepine abuse, nicotine dependence, factitious disorder versus malingering, rule-out hypochondriasis, and rule-out conversion disorder. During the evaluation, Ms. Shrader attempted to conceal her psychiatric history, substance abuse, and symptoms of depression. Ms. Shrader's unwillingness to be forthcoming during her evaluation demonstrated denial of her symptoms and presented a significant barrier to her treatment and recovery. Dr. Sylvester concluded that Ms. Shrader's poor judgment and decision-making detrimentally affected her ability to practice nursing. Specifically, Ms. Shrader's judgment in attempting to practice nursing while impaired, her lack of insight into her illnesses, her inability to follow treatment recommendations, and her disagreement with medical professionals showed poor judgment. Poor judgment can affect decision-making while practicing nursing, especially in a crisis situation. Dr. Sylvester concluded that Ms. Shrader was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety by reason of her depression, use of alcohol, opioids, and benzodiazepines, lack of insight into her symptoms, and poor judgment. In order for Ms. Shrader to be able to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients, she must: undergo treatment at a residential treatment center; enter into an IPN monitoring agreement; and submit to a hair analysis drug screening test. These steps are essential to Ms. Shrader's recovery and to regaining the ability to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients. There is no evidence that Ms. Shrader has taken any of these steps. Ms. Shrader is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Nursing, enter a final order: finding that Respondent, Tonya L. Shrader, R.N., violated section 464.018(1)(j); requiring her to undergo an IPN evaluation; imposing a suspension of her license until such time as she undergoes an IPN evaluation; requiring compliance with IPN recommendations, if any; requiring the payment of an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00; and awarding costs for the investigation and prosecution of this case, as provided in section 456.072(4) to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2015.
