The Issue Whether the Petitioner received a salary overpayment from the Respondent for leave usage to which she was not entitled, as set forth in amended correspondence dated October 2, 2009, and, if so, the amount of any overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ms. Anderson was employed by the Department as a full- time Career Service employee until her separation on August 11, 2009. She had one year and four months' service with the State of Florida. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Anderson was paid biweekly. Based on her years of service, Ms. Anderson accrued four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave each biweekly pay period. Ms. Anderson used the People First System to complete her timesheets, request approval of leave, and review her leave balances. At issue is the amount of annual and sick leave used by Ms. Anderson during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009 and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson entered her time in the computerized People First timesheet as follows: February 6, 2009 8 hours' worked February 9, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 10, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 11, 2009 3.25 hours' sick leave 4.75 hours' annual leave February 12, 2009 8 hours' personal holiday February 13, 2009 8 hours' annual leave February 16, 2009 7.25 hours' annual leave February 17, 2009 8 hours' worked February 18, 2009 8.75 hours' worked February 19, 2009 4 hours' sick leave 4 hours' annual leave The Pay Period Overview in the People First System for the pertinent time period reflected the following: Beginning balance 2/06/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Accrual 2/19/09: 4 hours' annual leave 4 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Used N/A : (24.00) hours' annual leave (23.25) hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Ending Balance 2/19/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday The Department's Policies and Procedures for Attendance and Leave provides in pertinent part: III. Standards and Procedures * * * Annual Leave Method of Earning Annual Leave * * * Bureau of Personnel 1. Annual leave earned during any period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period or, in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Annual Leave Employee 1. Use of annual leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited and shall only be used with the prior approval of the proper authority. * * * Sick Leave Method of Earning Sick Leave * * * Employee * * * 4. Sick leave earned during any pay period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period, or in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Sick Leave Employee 1. Use of sick leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited to the employee and shall only be used with the approval of the proper authority. The Department keeps an official record of an employee's leave balances and accruals for each pay period, and it conducts audits of an employee's leave upon separation. The Department performed an audit of Ms. Anderson's leave and created an Employee Leave Record setting out annual and sick leave earned and used by Ms. Anderson up to her date of separation in August 2009. The audit revealed that Ms. Anderson had 20 hours of annual leave and 19.25 of sick leave available as of January 6, 2009, and that she accrued 4 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave on February 19, 2009, which could be used beginning February 20, 2009. As shown on the People's First timesheet prepared by Ms. Anderson and set out above, Ms. Anderson used 24 hours of annual leave and 23.25 hours of sick leave during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009, and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson, therefore, used four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave to which she was not entitled during the pay period extending from February 6, 2009, to February 19, 2009, and she was paid for these hours in the salary warrant issued February 27, 2009. In calculating the amount of the salary overpayment to Ms. Anderson, the Department made allowance for the one hour's annual leave balance Ms. Anderson had when she separated from the Department. The Department, therefore, calculated the salary overpayment based on seven non-compensable hours, and the balance owed by Ms. Anderson to the Department for the salary overpayment is $66.65.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order requiring Lillian Anderson to remit to the Department of Juvenile Justice the amount of $66.65. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lillian Anderson 3617 Carambola Circle North Coconut, Florida 33066 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Willie Mae Miles is entitled to retirement credit for the period beginning March 1952 through August 1976 when she was employed at the Jackson Memorial Hospital in Miami, Florida (the "Hospital"). There is no dispute that Willie Mae Miles was employed at the Hospital during that time period. However, the Department of Administration (the "Department") contends that Ms. Miles received a refund of her employee retirement contributions of $5,475.39 in May 1977. Therefore, the Department contends that Respondent is not entitled to credit for that period of service. Ms. Miles claims that she did not apply for or receive a refund of retirement contributions. She also claims that she would only have accepted a lump sum refund if it included her contributions and the county and state contributions with interest. Since no such sum was received, she claims she is entitled to retirement credit for her employment at the hospital.
Findings Of Fact While Mrs. Miles has handled her case up to and including the hearing since she dispensed with the services of her attorney, her testimony and the nature of the exhibits indicate that she did not fully comprehend the meaning and intent of the documents that she signed requesting a refund of her retirement contributions and mistakenly believed that she still had funds in the Retirement Trust Fund from which a retirement benefit would be paid later upon her retirement. Her belief was erroneous. Under the State and County Officers and Employees' Retirement System (SCOERS), an employee and the employing agency each paid retirement contributions into the Retirement Trust Fund, and these contributions were credited to the employee's retirement account. Eventually, when the employee retired, the retirement benefit was paid from the total contributions paid into the Trust Fund, including investment earnings of the Fund. However, if the employee terminated employment before retirement, he could legally receive only a return of his personal contributions paid in and not the retirement contributions paid in by his employing agency. Mrs. Miles believed she was due and had a right to her own paid-in contributions, as well as the contributions paid in for her by her employing agency, and since she had received a refund of only a portion (her portion) of her retirement contributions, there were monies (retirement contributions made by her employer) still on deposit with the Division of Retirement that would provide for her retirement. Mrs. Miles did not understand that the return of her personal contributions would end any entitlement or vested right on her part to a future retirement benefit under the SCOERS. It is also evident from her testimony that no one with her employing agency advised her of this fact and that none of the information received from the Division of Retirement made this clear to her. The "Request for Refund" card stated the effect of a refund of personal contributions, but Mrs. Miles did not understand the instructions on the refund card. In April, 1989, the Division received an inquiry from Mrs. Miles advising that she was applying for her retirement benefits. This is further evidence that she believed she still had an active retirement account with the State of Florida. It is concluded that Mrs. Miles never had any actual intent to relinquish her right to apply for and receive a retirement benefit under the SCOERS.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner not be credited with any creditable service under the provisions of Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, for the period from March 1952 to May 1977. DONE and ORDERED this 30 day of March 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30 day of March 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 89-4834 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent in this case. Petitioner's submittal was a mixture of argument, conclusions and facts which have been carefully considered in the preparation of this Recommended Order. However, specific ruling on proposed findings of fact by the Petitioner is not possible given the format of her proposal. Rulings on Respondent's Findings of Fact Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 1. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3. The first sentence is adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5. The remainder of the proposal is rejected as unnecessary. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 7. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 8 and 10. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 11 and 12. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 14 and 16. COPIES FURNISHED: Willie Mae Miles 10220 S.W. 170th Terrace Miami, Florida 33157 Larry Scott, Esquire Division Attorney Office of General Counsel Department of Administration Room 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner’s husband’s selection of Option 1 for his pension plan benefits could be changed.
Findings Of Fact Mrs. Renaud, who is deaf, was married to Mr. Renaud for approximately 40 years. Mr. Renaud was employed by the State of Florida as a correctional officer at all times relevant hereto. He entered the State retirement program (in the pension plan) in November 1994. Mr. Renaud was in the “special risk” category of retirement class based on his position as a correctional officer. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud signed and submitted a “Florida Retirement System Pension Plan Application for Service Retirement” form to the Department, indicating his intent to retire. The application was signed and notarized; it designated Mrs. Renaud as the sole beneficiary of his retirement benefits. On the same day, Mr. Renaud signed an “Option Selection” form, wherein he designated which of four payment options he wanted to utilize for payment of his retirement income. He selected Option 1, which states: A monthly benefit payable for my lifetime. Upon my death the monthly benefit will stop and my beneficiary will receive only a refund of any contributions I have paid which are in excess of the amount I have received in benefits. This option does not provide a continuing benefit to my beneficiary. The form also contains the following statement: “I understand that I must terminate all employment with FRS employers to receive a retirement benefit under Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. I also understand that I cannot add service, change options or change my type of retirement . . . once my retirement becomes final. My retirement becomes final when any benefit payment is cashed, deposited or when my Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) participation begins.” The option selection form was signed by Mr. Renaud and notarized by a certified notary public. Inasmuch as Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, it was necessary that he and his designated beneficiary (Mrs. Renaud) also fill out form SA-1, the “Spousal Acknowledgement” form. On the acknowledgement form, Mr. Renaud indicated that he was married. Mrs. Renaud then signed the “spousal acknowledgement” portion of the form. The acknowledgement statement included this statement: “I, Vivian Renaud, being the spouse of the above named member [Mr. Renaud], acknowledge that the member has selected either Option 1 or 2.” Option 2 provides for continued benefits during the retiring person’s lifetime. However, benefits to the person’s spouse will continue for only a 10-year period. If the retiring person dies within the first 10 years of retirement, the spouse would only receive benefits for the balance of the 10-year period starting at the retirement date. The benefits under Option 2 are, therefore, limited in nature. The state retirement system requires a person selecting Option 1 or Option 2 to have their spouse acknowledge that selection choice because those benefits have finite ending dates, whereas retirement benefits under the other options continue as long as either the retiree or his/her beneficiary is living. By letter dated October 30, 2013, the Department acknowledged receipt of Mr. Renaud’s retirement application. The letter referenced the date the application was received (October 24, 2013) and the option Mr. Renaud had selected (Option 1). The letter was mailed to Mr. Renaud’s address of record, the same address he listed in his retirement application. The letter was sent to Mr. Renaud some 30 days before the first retirement benefit check was deposited in his account. Mrs. Renaud does not remember seeing the letter, but inasmuch as it was addressed to Mr. Renaud, her recollection of its receipt is not relevant. After Mr. Renaud’s death, his family found numerous un-opened letters in his car; the acknowledgement letter from the Department could well have been in that group. Mr. Renaud retired on November 1, 2013. His first payment of retirement benefits was transferred to his bank by way of electronic fund transfer, commonly referred to as direct deposit, on November 27, 2013. The gross amount of his monthly retirement benefit was $1,987.85; the net amount was $1,937.75 after $30.09 had been deducted for taxes. At that time, Mr. Renaud had not signed form W4P, the form which showed how many dependents the retiree was claiming for tax purposes. After later filling out that form (in which he indicated he would prefer to file as “single” for tax purposes), his monthly net benefit was reduced to about $1,735. Mr. Renaud received a direct deposit of retirement benefits on December 31, 2013; on January 31, 2014; and again on February 28, 2014. Mr. Renaud passed away on March 26, 2014, only five months after commencing his retirement. In accordance with the provisions of Option 1, Mr. Renaud’s retirement benefits ceased at that time. His beneficiary was entitled to payment for the entire month that he expired, but was not to be provided any further retirement benefits. Thus, a final payment was deposited in Mr. Renaud’s account on March 31, 2014. Mrs. Renaud was provided notice of the cessation of retirement benefits due to Mr. Renaud’s death. She timely filed a protest, seeking to have the payment of benefits reinstated. The Department denied her request, resulting in the instant matter. It is clear from the evidence that Mr. Renaud selected Option 1, Mrs. Renaud acknowledged that Mr. Renaud had selected either Option 1 or Option 2, and that retirement benefits were directly deposited to Mr. Renaud’s bank account for several months. Mr. and Mrs. Renaud’s signatures were duly notarized and have a presumption of legitimacy. Mrs. Renaud disagrees as to whether Mr. Renaud’s selection of Option 1 was legitimate, legal, or proper under the circumstances as she views them. First, Mrs. Renaud contends that Mr. Renaud was not mentally well at the time he signed the option selection form. The basis for her contention is that Mr. Renaud had experienced some seizure-related behavior during the year prior to signing the form. He had driven his car north on US Highway 301 one day in July 2012, “heading to work,” but ended up in Georgia without remembering why or how he got there. He later apparently lost his driver’s license because of the seizures (although the testimony on that issue was not clear).1/ Mr. Renaud worked for approximately 15 more months after his inexplicable drive to Georgia. Mrs. Renaud also argued that Mr. Renaud’s signatures on the three different forms he signed on October 24, 2013, were not similar to each other, indicating in her mind that he was having some sort of medical or psychological difficulty at that time. Inasmuch as there could have been any number of reasons the signatures were different (whether he was in a hurry, what base existed under the paperwork, etc.), there is insufficient evidence to determine why the signatures did not match. Mrs. Renaud’s testimony regarding the signatures is not persuasive. Ed Renaud said Mr. Renaud had been forced to retire due to his medical condition, i.e., that he had lost his driver’s license due to having seizures and the Department of Corrections would not let him work if he could not drive. However, Ed Renaud also said Mr. Renaud was able to continue working even when he was “forced” to retire. Again, the testimony on these facts was not clear. Mrs. Renaud said she should have been provided an interpreter on the day she signed the acknowledgement form. She did not state whether she requested an interpreter or whether the agency employee who provided her the form was aware of her disability.2/ Again, no one from Mr. Renaud’s employer, the Department of Corrections, testified at final hearing as to what happened on the day the forms were signed. Mrs. Renaud stated that she could read and write English, so she knew what she was signing.3/ She did claim to be confused as to whether her husband had selected Option 1 or Option 2, but candidly admitted that Mr. Renaud never told her one way or the other which option he had chosen. He only told her that he would “continue to provide for her in the future.” She believed the amount which was to be deposited in their account each month under Option 2 would be approximately $1900. The first check was in that approximate amount (due to the fact that Mr. Renaud had not established the amount of taxes to be deducted from his check at that time). The next five checks were in a lesser amount, approximately $1700. There is no evidence that Mrs. Renaud questioned the amount of the later checks. However, once the first check had been deposited in Mr. Renaud’s bank account, he would not have been allowed to change his option anyway. Lastly, Mrs. Renaud said her husband’s medical and mental condition was not conducive to making the option selection in October 2013. However, there was no competent evidence to support her claim. There was no direct testimony as to Mr. Renaud’s condition on the day he signed, nor as to whether he was or was not capable of understanding what he was signing. The only statement about his condition that day was that he wanted to park the car far enough away from the building that his co-workers could not see that Mrs. Renaud had driven the car. Ed Renaud also pointed out the issue of Mr. Renaud’s three signatures that day looking different from each other, but his lay opinion is not evidence upon which a finding of fact can be made as to Mr. Renaud’s mental condition. On October 24, 2013, Mr. Renaud had not been adjudged mentally incapacitated and no guardian had been appointed. Ed Renaud said that Mr. Renaud still believed he could perform his work assignments at that time and did not want to retire. But, other than his wife, no one provided any evidence that Mr. Renaud did not understand what he was signing. Mrs. Renaud, however, could not say which option he had selected because he never told her. Her subsequent presumption that Mr. Renaud did not intend to choose Option 1 is not persuasive. It should be noted that selection of Option 1 by Mr. Renaud set his average pre-tax monthly benefit at around $1,900.00; had he chosen Option 2, the benefit would have been around $1,700. Thus, there was incentive to “roll the dice” and select Option 1, hoping that he would survive long enough to provide for his wife. In this case, sadly, that gamble did not pay off. The facts of this case are sad in that Mr. Renaud had every intention of providing for his wife financially as long as she lived. However, he either made a mistake when he selected his payment option or he attempted to tempt fate and hope for the best. In either case, once he made his selection and began receiving benefits, the die was cast. Based upon the facts as presented, there is no basis for overturning the Department’s denial of Mrs. Renaud’s requested amendment of the payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services denying Petitioner's request for entitlement to her husband’s retirement benefits following his untimely death. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2015.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment from Respondent for leave usage to which he was not entitled, as set forth in correspondence dated April 26, 2013; and, if so, whether Respondent is entitled to a repayment for the salary overpayment made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bruce Deterding, was an employee of the Department of Health, having served as an executive director of a medical practice board, making him a Select Exempt Service (SES) employee. Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with the Department on December 19, 2012. The agreement required Petitioner to resign his position with the Department effective February 28, 2013, and included the following conditions: Petitioner's last day in the office would be December 18, 2012, one day preceding the signed settlement agreement; and Petitioner was required to utilize 384 hours of accrued annual leave beginning on December 19, 2012, and ending on February 27, 2013. Petitioner did not participate in the preparation of the settlement agreement, but agreed to its terms by his signature. The agreement was signed by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance Director Lucy C. Gee on behalf of the Department. From December 19, 2012, through February 28, 2013, Petitioner performed as obligated under the agreement. The Department paid Petitioner for the 384 hours of leave as required by the agreement. Petitioner relied on the Department's representations that he would be able to purchase his former military service time from the State Retirement System and retire with 30 years of state service on the resignation date set forth in the agreement. Petitioner demonstrated through a screen shot of his personnel records in the "PeopleFirst" system that he had an available balance of 428 hours of annual leave at the time he entered into the settlement agreement with the Department. The Department's employee verified through PeopleFirst that sufficient hours of leave were available prior to presenting the settlement agreement offering to pay 384 hours of leave to Petitioner. The Department notified Petitioner by a letter dated April 26, 2013, that he had received salary overpayments. Specifically, the letter stated that two payments in the amounts of $1,262.48 and $1,717.56, dated February 22, 2013, and March 8, 2013, respectively, had been erroneously made to him. Petitioner, as an SES employee, received 176 hours of annual leave on his leave accrual anniversary date of July 1 each year. In 2010, Petitioner received an annual leave accrual of 176 hours on June 18, 2010, and a second annual leave accrual on July 1, 2010. On April 26, 2013, Petitioner had a telephone conversation with Meshelle Bradford, one of the Department's payroll employees, concerning potential salary overpayments. During that conversation, Petitioner acknowledged he had received the two salary accruals totaling 352 hours on June 18 and July 1, 2010. Petitioner testified that he assumed he was the beneficiary of an "extraordinarily good hire date" which entitled him to receive leave on his former (from his previous state employment) and new leave accrual dates. The Department conducted a payroll and leave audit after the date of Petitioner's resignation and separation from the agency. The audit revealed that Petitioner had been overpaid for annual leave hours that he had accrued in 2010 by mistake. Petitioner had been paid for annual leave he used in February 2013, when he had exhausted all of his accrued leave. During the two-week pay period of February 1 through 14, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 58.5 hours of leave he did not have available, and for the two-week pay period of February 15 through 28, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 80 hours of leave he did not have available, resulting from the double accrual of leave in June and July 2010. The Department's position is that Petitioner should have been in leave without pay status for the 58.5 and 80 hours of leave for which he was paid in February 2013. The calculated overpayment for the unavailable leave is $2,980.04. The Department seeks reimbursement from Petitioner for that amount. Petitioner disputes that he owes any amount due to the fact he entered into a settlement agreement that delineated the payments to be made by the Department to him as a condition of his resignation. The Department's Agency Attendance and Leave Policy, in section VI.D.3, states: "It is the employee's responsibility to maintain an accurate accounting of their leave balances."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health requiring Petitioner to repay the overpayment of salary in the amount of $2,980.04. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Department of Health 2585 Merchants Row, Room 110J Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Bruce Milton Deterding 4841 Old Bainbridge Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Althea Gaines, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to either a refund of employee contributions to the Florida State and County Officers' and Employees' Retirement System ("SCOERS") made from August 26, 1966, through June 3, 1974, or service credit toward retirement for this period of time.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is the state agency responsible for the administration of the Florida Retirement System ("FRS"). § 121.025, Fla. Stat. (2004). Ms. Johnson has been employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital since February 1985, and she is an active member of the FRS. Ms. Johnson was also employed by Jackson Memorial Hospital from August 26, 1966, through June 3, 1974, and was a member of the SCOERS during that time. Under the SCOERS, both members and employers paid contributions into the system. Members of the SCOERS could request a refund of employee contributions into the system upon termination of employment.2 When Ms. Johnson terminated her employment at Jackson Memorial Hospital in June 1974, she completed a Division of Retirement Request for Refund card, in which she requested a refund of her contributions to the SCOERS. Ms. Johnson signed the Request for Refund Card, which directs that the refund be sent to the 17th Floor of the Dade County Courthouse, which was the address for the Miami-Dade County Finance Department. Ms. Johnson was an employee of Miami-Dade County when she worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital from 1966 until 1974. At the time Ms. Johnson terminated her employment in 1974, refund checks for employees of Miami-Dade County were sent to Miami-Dade County rather than to the employee, and all Request for Refund cards completed by Miami-Dade County employees had typed on the cards the Dade County Courthouse address of Miami- Dade County's Finance Department. Included on the Request for Refund card signed by Ms. Johnson was a statement that, by requesting a refund of contributions to the SCOERS, she waived the right to any retirement service credit for the time period covered by the refund. The normal business practice of the Division of Retirement is, and was at the times material to these proceedings, to notify the Comptroller's office to send the refund requested by a SCOERS member to the address indicated on the Request for Refund card. The normal business practice of the Division of Retirement is, and was at the times material to these proceedings, to affix to the Request for Refund card labels provided by the Comptroller's office confirming that refund checks were mailed to the member requesting the refund. The labels attached to Ms. Johnson's Request for Refund card indicate that two refund payments were sent by the Comptroller on Ms. Johnson's behalf to the address shown on the Request for Refund card: One, in the amount of $2,150.29, was sent on July 19, 1974, and one, in the amount of $242.18, was sent on January 31, 1975.3 Although Ms. Johnson claims that she did not receive any refund of her employee contributions to the SCOERS, she did not contact the Division of Retirement regarding the refund until August 2003, when she telephoned the Division of Retirement and stated that she had never received the 1974 refund. Because Ms. Johnson is an active member of the FRS, she is entitled to purchase the retirement service credit she accumulated between 1966 and 1974.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services enter a final order dismissing the request of Delores F. Johnson for a formal administrative hearing. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of September, 2004.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner should be permitted to transfer credit of certain hours of accrued sick leave from Petitioner's former place of employment, P.K. Yonge School, to Petitioner's current leave balance with Respondent, the Alachua County School Board (Board).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Tom E. Massey, began his employment with Respondent at the start of the 1983-84 school year. He had been previously employed at the University of Florida's P.K. Yonge Laboratory School since September 1, 1967. During the 1983-84 and 1984-85 school years, Petitioner was technically on a leave of absence from the University of Florida. At the conclusion of that two year period, Petitioner determined that he would make his employment relationship with Respondent permanent and formally terminate his employment with the University of Florida. At the time of separation from employment with the University of Florida, Petitioner had accrued a balance in that employment of 336 hours of unused sick leave prior to October 1, 1973, and 686.4 hours of sick leave after that date. Petitioner learned from Respondent's personnel department that existing policy did not provide for transfer of such leave to the Alachua County School Board employment. Transfers of existing leave balances were limited to other school boards in the state and educational personnel in residential care facilities of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Consequently, Petitioner elected, on September 6, 1985, to be paid by the University of Florida for unused sick leave under prevailing personnel rules at his existing salary rate for one-eighth of the hours accrued prior to October 1, 1973, and one-fourth of the hours accrued on or after October 1, 1973. As a result of his decision to sell his sick leave, Petitioner was paid approximately $2,419 by the University of Florida. At the present, Petitioner has no unused sick leave hours accrued at the University. As a result of the legislative enactment in 1990 of the "Sidney Martin Developmental Research School Act" (Section 2 of 90-49, Laws of Florida), codified at Section 228.053, Florida Statutes, university sponsored developmental schools were established as a category of public schools funded under the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP), as opposed to the previous practice of funding such "laboratory schools" through the budget of the State University System. On June 4, 1991, Respondent amended its policy to permit transfer of sick leave from other public schools in Florida funded through the FEFP. Pursuant to that policy, Respondent also permitted certain existing employees of the Alachua County School Board to transfer unpaid leave balances resulting from prior employment with the University of Florida. Leonard D. Jackson was employed at P.K. Yonge School from August 1, 1971, until November 23, 1973, when he left that employment with the University of Florida to commence employment with Respondent. Jackson had accrued 18 days and seven hours of sick leave (151 hours) during that period, but was ineligible for leave payment since the length of his employment with the University was less than 10 years. Following Respondent's June 4, 1991, policy change, Leonard D. Jackson transferred the 151 hours of accrued sick leave from the University of Florida to his then current employer, the Alachua County School Board. Upon his retirement, Jackson received payment for the leave at a rate of 110 percent of his final salary rate. Totsye J. Connor, employed at the University of Florida from September 1, 1968, until May 20, 1982, elected not to be paid for accrued sick leave when she left that employment for her subsequent employment with Respondent. Following Respondent's policy change in 1991, she then transferred 59 hours of accrued sick leave to her employment with Respondent and was paid for that leave upon her retirement. Petitioner intends to retire from employment at the conclusion of the present school term in June of 1996. Petitioner will receive compensation at that time for the leave balance accrued by him in Respondent's employment. Petitioner argues that he has been treated unfairly and should now be permitted to transfer and receive compensation for all or a portion of his previous unused sick leave balance accrued at the University of Florida's P.K. Yonge School.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's request for transfer and subsequent compensation for sick leave from the University of Florida's P.K. Yonge School. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1996. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings Petitioner's handwritten proposed findings were unnumbered and basically restated his argument that he has been treated unfairly by what he views as a discriminatory school board rule. The findings of fact, as set forth above, address, to the extent possible, facts proposed by Petitioner. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1.-8. Accepted. Rejected, unnecessary to result. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom E. Massey c/o Susan C. Massey 5160 Northeast Elliott Circle Corvallis, Oregon 97330 Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire School Board of Alachua County 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Michael Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the Department), was overpaid in the amount of $1,671.29 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a career-service employee of Respondent and was initially employed on September 18, 1992. In a letter dated March 13, 2001, Petitioner was informed that a salary overpayment occurred on the supplemental payroll of February 22, 2000. Two warrants were inadvertently issued on that day for $847.57 and $823.72 totaling $1,671.29. The overpayment resulted because the Department made a series of administrative errors. The reason for the overpayment was communicated to Petitioner. Petitioner's pay was remitted to her bank account electronically. She received a written explanation of her pay each time she was paid. However, Petitioner was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not realize she had been overpaid. Currently, Petitioner's rate of pay is $963.36 bi-weekly. Ms. Henderson prepared a certified letter dated February 28, 2001, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,671.29 in gross overpayments for the supplemental payroll dated February 22, 2000. The letter was not picked up by Petitioner and was, therefore, returned to the Department. Subsequently, Ms. Henderson prepared a letter dated March 13, 2001, notifying Petitioner of the overpayment. The letter indicated the overpayment would be deducted from her next two pay checks. Petitioner received the second letter. By letter dated March 15, 2001, Petitioner objected to the payroll deductions since the amount of the deductions would leave her with a little more than $100. The amount left to Petitioner would be below minimum wage. A meeting was arranged between Petitioner, Allean Lovett, Human Resources Manager, and Linda Ricke, Personnel Services Specialist, with the Department to discuss, inter alia, a schedule for repayment. The meeting took place on April 9, 2001, however, was not concluded and was to be continued, by mutual agreement, to April 13, 2001. Petitioner informed Mrs. Lovett on April 12, 2001, that she did not want to continue with their scheduled meeting and would prefer to have the matter determined through the administrative hearing process. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the gross overpayment. Petitioner testified that she would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. She could not afford any greater amount due to her living and medical expenses. The repayment schedule of $50 per pay period is reasonable.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Leslie Scott Jean-Bart, Esquire Farah and Farah, P.A. 1845 University Boulevard, North Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Craig A. Gibbs, Esquire Law Office of Craig Gibbs 1200 Riverplace Boulevard Suite 810 Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact On July 30, 1984, Richard Herring, the Petitioner, became a member of the Senior Management Service Personnel System within the State of Florida. He remained in that personnel system until March 2, 1987. His employer while a senior manager was the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, the Respondent in this cause. Petitioner determined to leave the position held with the Respondent based upon a concern that he might be dismissed from that position by the incoming secretary to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. In fact, the new secretary deemed it appropriate to make some personnel change in senior managers within his agency in the early part of 1987. On March 3, 1987, Petitioner undertook his new employment with the Florida House of Representatives. With this timing, Petitioner effectively transferred from one state agency to another. The new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, operated under a separate personnel system from that associated with senior managers. This meant that the treatment of annual leave credits by the Respondent agency and as addressed by the Florida House of Representatives was unique to those employers and that Petitioner, if he was entitled to the payment for any annual leave hours within his account upon his resignation from Senior Management with the Respondent, must be paid by the Respondent. Conversely, any annual leave hours which he transferred to an account with the Florida House of Representatives must be in accordance with that agency's personnel rules or policies. From the inception of his association with the Senior Management Service, Petitioner saw the annual leave hours he earned and the flexibility afforded him in their use as an important factor in his employment circumstance. When Respondent recruited the Petitioner he was led to believe that as many as 480 annual leave hours could be converted into payment upon the resignation from the Senior Management Service, without regard for whether that resignation led to a transfer to another state agency or the outright termination as a state employee. In confirmation of his understanding when recruited, a letter was addressed to the Petitioner on August 3, 1984, referring to the ability to cash- in accrued annual leave that did not exceed 480 hours. A copy of this correspondence may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 2. It is addressed to Petitioner from Vivian Pyle, the central personnel officer for the Respondent. The remarks made to him in the recruitment phase and as confirmed in the correspondence are a correct depiction of the rights which the Petitioner had at the beginning of his employment as a senior manager. These rights were established in Rule 22SM-1.112(3), Florida Administrative Code. That rule became effective on March 16, 1981. It called for the payment of unused annual leave upon separation, not to exceed the amount of 480 hours. Separation meant the resignation from the position of a senior manager to transfer to another state agency or to terminate from state government entirely. At the time that the Petitioner took his appointment as a senior manager, the rule pertaining to attendance and leave while still employed by the Respondent agency was Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code. It called for the accumulation of 176 hours per year of annual leave upon the appointment and upon each anniversary date beyond that initial appointment. It also described the retention and credit of leave brought with the new appointee at the time of appointment, subject to the approval by the employer or agency head. It allowed for the payment of the leave time which the new appointee brought into the system when the ultimate decision was made by that employee to terminate from Senior Management. Termination in this instance refers to leaving Senior Management, not leaving state government. In accordance with Rule 22SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code, Petitioner was allowed to bring into the system a balance of 205 annual leave credits and was assigned 176 additional annual leave credits on July 30, 1984, giving him a total of 381 annual leave hours at that point in time. On his anniversary date of July 30, 1985, he received an additional 176 hours which brought his total annual leave hours at that point to 470. In those instances wherein the annual leave hours had been granted to the Petitioner upon his appointment, existing hours brought with him had been credited and upon the first anniversary date of his employment as a senior manager, additional hours had been granted, those annual leave credit hours were available for use by the Petitioner from that date forward or as a cash holding that could be exercised upon his separation from Senior Management. On May 29, 1986, the personnel rules of the State of Florida, Department of Administration, as described in the preceding paragraphs, changed. A new Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, did not carry forward provisions which allowed for the payment upon separation of leave brought into Senior Management and leave earned while a senior manager. This finding pertains to those senior managers, like the Petitioner, who were already employed with the advent of the change in rules on May 29, 1986. The new rule chapter did continue to allow for the accumulation of 176 hours of annual leave upon the anniversary date of an appointment, pertaining to existing senior managers at the point at which the new rule became effective. The new rule chapter by its language described a circumstance pertaining to appointees who came into the position of senior manager upon the effective date of the new rule chapter or thereafter, discussing the payment for an annual leave balance above 240 hours which had been transferred to the Career Service. This speaks to a transfer from Senior Management to Career Service and the idea of transferring 240 hours to the Career Service Personnel System and paying for the balance of annual leave over 240 hours. It also called for the proration of this payment of annual leave upon appropriate accrual rates for Career Service. It spoke to the payment of annual leave upon termination of a senior manager who had come into the System on May 29, 1986, or thereafter, termination meaning someone who had left the state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following separation from the Senior Management Service. See Rule 22SM- 3.007(6)(c), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). By contrast, Chapter 22SM-3 effective May 29, 1986 does not describe in any fashion what happens to annual leave credits for those persons who had been senior managers prior to the effective date of the rules chapter when the senior manager decides to separate from Senior Management Service. The Petitioner had 371.5 annual leave hours upon his anniversary date of July 30, 1986, and was given an additional 176 hours of annual leave credit as contemplated by Rule 22SM-3.007(2), Florida Administrative Code (May 29, 1986). On February 1, 1987, amendments to Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, were enacted. Unlike the May 29, 1986, version of this chapter, the amended rule specifically addressed the circumstance of all Senior Management employees, those who were in that personnel system before February 1, 1987, and those who would be appointed from that date forward. This speaks to the issue of disposition of annual leave credits held by senior managers upon their separation from employment as a senior manager. At Section 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), senior managers who transfer to a state government position outside of the Senior Management Service were not entitled to be paid for annual leave credits, they could only transfer those hours subject to the rules governing the system into which the member may transfer. In addition, that provision indicated that the transfer of annual leave credits would be prorated dating back to the most recent anniversary date for service. A companion section, Rule 22SM-3.007(6), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), indicated that if the employee terminated from state government, that is the employee was not on any state payroll for at least 31 calendar days following the separation from Senior Management Service, then the annual leave credit held at the point of separation would be cashed. At Rule 22SM-3.007(3), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), the language was to the effect that upon the appointment and on each anniversary date after that time there was an increase in credit hours assigned to each Senior Management employee from 176 hours to 240 hours per annum. When the Petitioner determined to leave his position, he had prepared material pertaining to his termination, a copy of which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 9 admitted into evidence. In the form authorization for disposition of his annual leave was called for by K. Davis, the Deputy Assistant Secretary within the Respondent agency. This form indicates the election on the part of the Petitioner to gain payment for all unused annual leave, excepting 24 hours. A subsequent audit of his employment records revealed that the Petitioner had 432 hours of annual leave upon his separation from Senior Management, without regard for any proration of the July 30, 1986 - 176 annual leave hours installment. Payment for annual leave hours was not forthcoming and after making some attempts at ascertaining the reason why and gaining no satisfaction in these discussions, the Petitioner wrote to Vivian Pyle, the director of the central personnel services for the Respondent agency, on April 23, 1987 to inquire about this matter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 3. In the course of the correspondence the Petitioner indicates that his new employer, the Florida House of Representatives, had given him a computer print-out effective April 17, 1987, in which it was indicated that a substantial number of hours had been transferred to the Florida House of Representatives as opposed to having been paid to the Petitioner as he requested. By way of response, Ms. Pyle wrote to the Petitioner on April 28, 1987, and she referenced Rule 22SM- 3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), pertaining to the fact that the Respondent did not believe that the Petitioner was entitled to be paid for his annual leave and that the leave could be transferred subject to the rules within the receiving agency. In this instance, that refers to the Florida House of Representatives. Having been disappointed in the attempt to gain the payment for his annual leave credits, excepting the 24 hours which he wanted to have transferred, the Petitioner filed a petition for formal administrative hearing with the Respondent agency, received by the Respondent on May 15, 1987. That case was subsequently referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the conduct of the hearing which has led to the entry of this recommended order. The Petitioner also challenged rules within Chapter 22SM-3, Florida Administrative Code, in its May 29, 1986 language and its February 1, 1987 language. See DOAH Case No. 87-2172R supra. The outcome of that challenge was to the effect that the language within Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), which prohibits the payment for annual leave credits upon the transfer from Senior Management Service to another position in state government was stricken as an invalid enactment. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has appealed that decision. The State of Florida, Department of Administration has also enacted a Rule 22SM-3.0l3(1), Florida Administrative Code, which corresponds to the most recent amendments to Chapter 225M-3, Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987). Rule 22SM-3.013, Florida Administrative Code, indicates that Senior Management Service employees who were on board on January 31, 1987 will keep their anniversary dates and shall be credited additional amount of annual leave credits, as well as sick leave credits. The rate of that annual leave credit is 5.333 hours monthly or 2.46 hours biweekly for each pay period or portion thereof. When the July 30, 1986 annual leave credits are prorated for the partial service year completed by the Petitioner in the full months of August, 1986 through February, 1987 and the portions of July, 1986 and March, 1987, as envisioned by Rule 22SM-3.007(5), Florida Administrative Code (February 1, 1987), they total 141.85 annual leave credits. When the prorated formula described in Rule 22SM-3.013(1), Florida Administrative Code, is applied for the full month of February, 1987 and the two days within March, 1987 during which time the Petitioner was still employed an additional 5.505 annual leave credits are assigned. With these adjustments, that makes the annual leave credit balance for the Petitioner upon his transfer 403.355 annual leave hours. Within this figure, of the credits assigned on July 30, 1986, Petitioner's anniversary date, following the proration adjustment, there remained only 26.35 hours which had not been used as annual leave during the period July 30, 1986 through March 2, 1987.
The Issue Whether certain payments received by the Petitioner, James Gomia, from the Leon County Clerk of Court subsequent to July 1, 1989, constitute creditable "compensation" within the meaning of Rule 22B-6.001(16), Florida Administrative Code, for purposes of determining Mr. Gomia's retirement benefits.
Findings Of Fact Mr. Gomia's Employment. The Petitioner, James Gomia, has been employed by the Clerk of Court in and for Leon County, Florida, for the past eleven years. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Gomia has been employed as an Assistant Finance Director and Deputy Clerk. By virtue of his employment with the Clerk's office Mr. Gomia is eligible to participate in the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Mr. Gomia's Compensation. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Gomia received a monthly base salary from his employment with the Clerk's office. The Clerk's office operates for budget purposes on a fiscal year which begins October 1st and ends September 30th. In addition to his base salary, Mr. Gomia has been paid the following amounts (hereinafter referred to as "Additional Compensation"), during the following months: Month Amount September, 1989 $1,750.00 May, 1990 500.00 September, 1990 1,750.00 May, 1991 600.00 September, 1991 2,150.00 Mr. Gomia has been paid Additional Compensation twice a year since he was employed by the Clerk's office. The Clerk's Policy of Paying Additional Compensation. It has been the policy of Paul F. Hartsfield, Leon County Clerk of Court, to pay Additional Compensation to employees of the Clerk's office, with one exception not relevant to this proceeding, for at least the past twenty years. Additional Compensation has been paid to Clerk's office employees twice a year. One payment is made in May/June and the other payment is made in September/October/November. The amount of Additional Compensation paid to each employee is the same. For example, in May, 1991, all employees received $600.00 as Additional Compensation. The amount to be paid as Additional Compensation is included in the budget submitted by the Clerk's office each year for approval by the Board of County Commissioners. The amount requested is included as part of a lump-sum request for the amount of funds necessary to pay all salary, including employees' base salary. Although the amount of the payments to be made as Additional Compensation is broken out in the work papers to the budget each year, those figures are only seen by the financial personnel and not the Board of County Commissioners. Lack of Written Policy. The decision of whether Additional Compensation is paid is within the sound discretion of the Clerk to make. The Clerk of Court is under no legal obligation to make such payments even if included in an approved budget. The policy of paying Additional Compensation has not been reduced to writing. Nowhere has the Clerk stated in writing that the Clerk's office has a policy: That applies all employees will receive Additional Compensation equally; Additional Compensation will be paid no later than the eleventh year of employment; Additional Compensation will be paid for as long as an employee continues employment; and Additional Compensation will be paid at least annually. The only written indication that Additional Compensation will be paid to employees is the inclusion of the dollar amount necessary to make the payments in the work papers of the Clerk's office budget. Nowhere in the work papers to the budget or the budget itself are the conditions set out in finding of fact 13 included. Even if the work papers (or the budget) of the Clerk's office were sufficient to constitute a formal written policy, the policy evidenced in the work papers only applies to the fiscal year the work papers relate to. Therefore, if the work papers or budget constitute a written policy it is only a policy to pay Additional Compensation for the upcoming fiscal year and not on a recurring basis. Although a policy of paying Additional Compensation to Clerk's office employees exists, that policy has not formally been reduced to writing. Mr. Hartsfield, the Leon County Clerk of Court, admitted that there was no formal written policy during his deposition and in a letter dated November 12, 1991, attached as Respondent's exhibit 1 to Mr. Hartsfield's deposition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a Final Order declaring that the Additional Compensation paid to James Gomia between September, 1989, and September, 1991, was not paid as "average final compensation" for purposes of Rule 22B-6.001(6), Florida Administrative Code, and dismissing Mr. Gomia's Amended Petition with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 1992. APPENDIX Case Number 92-2504 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Gomia's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1, 4 and 6-11. Hereby accepted. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact 1-3. Findings of fact 4 and 6. Finding of fact 16. Conclusion of law. Findings of fact 4, 6 11 and 13. Finding of fact 4 and 6. Whether the payments come within the Department's rules is a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Harry H. Mitchell, Esquire 103 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Burton M. Michaels Assistant Division Attorney Division of Retirement Department of Administration Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1566 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Larry Strong Acting Secretary Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Susan Kirkland General counsel Knight Building, Suite 307 Koger Executive Center 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
