The Issue The issue is whether Respondent undertook to act as a contractor without a license as charged in the Administrative Complaints, and if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Section 20.165, the Division of Professions is a subordinate unit of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation (the Department). The Department provides administrative support, including prosecutorial support to the Construction Industry Licensing Board (the Board), which is also located within the Department. Mr. Grandmont is not currently licensed as a State Registered or State Certified Contractor in this state, nor has he ever been licensed by the Board. Mr. Grandmont's last known address is 355 China Berry Circle, Davenport, Florida. He was provided notice of the hearing at that address, and at 7733 Park Road, Charlotte, North Carolina 28210, which is the address he used when demanding a hearing on disputed facts in two of these cases. In DOAH Case No. 06-3279, he provided no address in his demand for a hearing. All attempts by U. S. Mail to notify Mr. Grandmont of the hearing, were returned. Mr. Grandmont is deemed to have known of the time, date, and place of the hearing, and is deemed to have waived his appearance at the hearing. On November 11, 2005, subsequent to Hurricane Wilma, Robert L. Coe, of Lake Worth, Florida, was contacted by Mr. Grandmont, who offered to repair his damaged mobile home. He provided a written estimate of $10,500. The estimate contained a list of 11 items requiring repair, and stated that he would accomplish the repair of them. He demanded a $4,200 down payment, which Mr. Coe provided in a draft drawn on Fidelity Cash Reserves, and dated November 11, 2005. Mr. Coe never saw Mr. Grandmont again. The repairs set forth in the written estimate were not accomplished. The draft, however, was negotiated by Mr. Grandmont. On November 12, 2005, subsequent to Hurricane Wilma, Joseph Webster, of Lake Worth, Florida, was contacted by Mr. Grandmont, who offered to repair his damaged residence. Mr. Grandmont discussed charging $13,500 in return for repairing Mr. Webster's residence. After negotiations, Mr. Grandmont agreed to do it for $11,500. No written estimate or contract was prepared. Mr. Grandmont demanded $5,750 payment in advance. Mr. Webster rounded off the down payment to $6,000 and presented Mr. Grandmont an official check of the Taunton Federal Credit Union, of Taunton, Massachusetts, for that amount. The check was negotiated by Mr. Grandmont, but the promised repairs were not accomplished. On November 4, 2005, subsequent to Hurricane Wilma, Ella Arseneau, of Lake Worth, Florida, was contacted by Mr. Grandmont, who offered to replace her roof. He provided an estimate of $5,500 in return for repairing Ms. Arseneau's residence. He demanded that she pay $3,500 in advance, which Ms. Arseneau provided by presenting Mr. Grandmont a check for $3,500, drawn on an account in Wachovia Bank. The check was negotiated by Mr. Grandmont, but the roof was not repaired as promised. Mr. Coe is 78 years of age, Mr. Webster is 85, and Ms. Arseneau is 77.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation impose a fine upon Clifford Grandmont in the amount of $30,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th of November, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Clifford Grandmont 7733 Park Road Charlotte, North Carolina 28210 Nancy S. Terrel, Hearing Officer Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Simone Marstiller, Secretary Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Paul K. Scapecchi, is a registered general contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number RG 0015926, and a registered roofing contractor, holding license number RC 0031048. The Respondent is the qualifier for Paul's Construction Company, which is the Respondent's firm. Edwin Schmid is a resident of West Germany who vacations in North Florida, and who testified by deposition which was received in evidence as Exhibit 1. He owns six parcels of real estate, or lots adjacent to each other, including Lot 19, Bon Bay Estates, in Santa Rosa County, Florida, which he purchased in approximately February, 1980. Edwin Schmid intended to have a home constructed on Lot 19 to be used as rental property. Subsequently, Edwin Schmid was introduced to the Respondent and the Respondent's father, Walter Scapecchi, by Lee and Carolyn Swigger. The Swiggers had become friendly with Edwin Schmid because Carolyn Swigger speaks German. Thereafter, Edwin Schmid contracted with the Respondent and Walter Scapecchi to have his home built on Lot 19 in Bon Bay Estates. This contract was in written form and dated March 21, 1981. Although Walter Scapecchi signed this contract "doing business as Paul's Construction Company," as contractor, the Respondent admitted that the contract was with himself, and that his father was merely an employee of the firm. The initial contract with Edwin Schmid in which the price was set at $36,000 was participated in by both the Respondent and his father. Edwin Schmid dealt with the Respondent directly on several occasions, but the business card he had been given showed Walter Scapecchi's name written in by hand over the Respondent's name. The deposit check written by Edwin Schmid was made payable to Walter Scapecchi in the amount of $8,000. Walter Scapecchi is not licensed to engage in the business of general contracting, but was so engaged, aided and assisted by his son, the Respondent. The deposit check for $8,000 was to be used to cover the digging of the foundation, the necessary fill, the pouring of the concrete foundation, a culvert for the driveway, and electrical service, which was to have been completed by April 10, 1981, pursuant to the contract. A second payment of $10,000 was to have been made on April 10, 1981. On April 10, 1981, however, no work had yet been done, and none was done until March of 1982, nearly one year later. The work done in March 1982 consisted only of placing foundation markers. The Respondent admitted that the work of placing foundation markers did not cost anything near the $8,000 paid, and that he did not request the second payment of $10,000 because the work done did not exhaust the initial payment. Nevertheless, no part of the $8,000 initial payment was refunded to Edwin Schmid. Throughout the period of time after the contract was executed in March of 1981, Edwin Schmid wanted the Respondent to complete the construction pursuant to the contract. At one point after the first year had elapsed without any substantial work being done, Edwin Schmid attempted to effect a new contract with the Respondent that required the initial work for which he had already paid $8,000 to be completed. The Respondent agreed to this, but did not perform any more work at the construction site. The Respondent admits that he has not performed as required by the contract. He contends this was due to personal financial problems. Other excuses for the Respondent's nonperformance included his underestimation of the amount of fill required, heavy rains which caused delays, and State of Florida requirements. Nevertheless, work was not begun for nearly one year after the contract, contrary to the agreement, and only a minimal amount of work was done as of the date of the hearing. The Respondent moved out of the State of Florida in February of 1982, without notifying Edwin Schmid.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, Paul K. Scapecchi be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(e), (f), (h), (j) and (k), Florida Statutes, and that licenses numbered RG 0015926 and RC 0031048 held by Paul K. Scapecchi be REVOKED. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 27th day of September, 1983. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas A. Shropshire, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul K. Scapecchi 133F 25th Court, N.W. Birmingham, Alabama 35215 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Linnan, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32202
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and exhibits in evidence, and the observed candor and demeanor of the witnesses, the following are found as facts: At all times relevant to the proceedings, the Respondent, David R. Decker, held a current general contractor's license issued by the State of Florida. David R. Decker & Associates, Inc., by its president, the Respondent herein, and Robert and Shirley Dyer, entered into a contract for the construction of a residence at 1240 Majestic Oak Drive, Apopka, Florida. This contract contained a draw schedule setting forth six "draws". The Respondent received draws 1 through 4 for a total of 75 percent of the loan proceeds held by the lender, Heritage Federal Savings and Loan Association. The Respondent had not been paid draw 5 entitled "trim out" and draw 6 entitled "completion, including landscaping". At the time when construction was discontinued by the Respondent, the performance was between 75 percent and 90 percent complete. At the time of discontinuance of performance by the Respondent, Hardware Products and Specialties, Inc., had outstanding invoices, bearing dates of May 6, 1981, May 7,1981 and May 22, 1981, for locksets, doors, escutcheons, locks, garage door, and garage door opener, totalling $849.47. These items are properly considered "trim items". When the Respondent discontinued construction, Fanning Lumber and Hardware Company, Inc., had outstanding invoices for purchases made during April through May of 1981, for a total amount of $2,152.61, for items which are also properly considered in the trade as "trim items". Upon receipt of the invoices from Panning Lumber and Hardware Company, Inc., the Respondent notified Panning that he could not make payment because he had not received the "trim draw" from the Complainants. At the time of discontinuance of performance by the Respondent, Schilke Enterprises, Inc., had an outstanding invoice in the amount of $1,766.62 for aluminum windows, patio sliding glass doors and screens, as well as installation charges. The Respondent made partial payment of $502.70 for windows and screens, and by letter informed Schilke Enterprises, Inc., that he has not been paid the "trim draw" to pay for the remaining items, the bulk of which were patio doors. The co-complainant, Shirley Dyer, informed Schilke Enterprises Inc., that in no way would Schilke be paid for the windows and patio doors sold by them. Disagreements and disputes as to construction arose, eventually culminating in a meeting between the Complainants and the Respondent on May 28, 1981. Mr. Dyer testified that the Respondent Decker stated "I quit". The Respondent testified that on a number of occassions disagreements had erupted, not only between himself and the Dyers but between the Dyers themselves, and that he had to remove himself from these discussions to permit Mr. and Mrs. Dyer to resolve their conflicts. Mr. Decker further testified that he again took this approach on May 28, 1981, when another disagreement arose. Mr. Decker denied having stated "I quit", but did state "We can't go on like this". It is unclear from the testimony whether or not Mr. Decker, in fact, abandoned the construction project on May 28, 1981, or whether he was forced to remove himself from the meeting with Mr. and Mrs. Dyer because of the disagreement. Subsequently, the Respondent did notify the complainants' that he sought to complete performance under the terms and conditions of the contract. In response, the complainants informed the Respondent that they were proceeding with the completion of the contract without him. The Respondent once again expressed his desire to continue, and requested a meeting to resolve their differences. Mr. Dyer responded through his attorney on June 29, 1981, refusing to permit the Respondent to continue with the contract. On or about June 23, 1981, the complainants, through their attorney, notified all subcontractors and suppliers that "Mr. and Mrs. Dyer have terminated their contract" with David R. Decker and Associates, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint, as amended, against David R. Decker, be dismissed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 4th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: John O. Williams, Esquire 547 North Monroe Street Suite 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Michael E. Gray, Esquire Post Office Drawer Z Sanford, Florida 32771
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has been a certified general contractor in the state of Florida, having been issued license number CG C027718. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been the qualifying agent for Classic Design Builders. William R. DeFreitas describes himself as a broker of building materials for third world countries. His wife is also employed in that same business. They had their office building constructed for them. When they subsequently determined to add an addition to their residence, they solicited bids from that contractor and from two other persons. Aaron Ware, who held himself out to be an architect and the president of a company known as L. A. Designs, Inc., was one of the persons from whom the DeFreitases solicited a bid. He submitted a bid dated April 26, 1990, and a draw schedule on May 3, 1990. The extent of the work to be performed was finalized on June 6, 1990, when Mr. DeFreitas initialed the changes to the initial bid. The construction project contemplated under that contract was the addition of a family room, a laundry room, a shower off the master bath, and a small bath at the front of the house. The June 6, 1990, contract also called for replacement of the garage door and "painting of some interior doors." The total contract price was $50,000. While Ware was negotiating with the DeFreitases, he was also discussing with Respondent entering into a joint venture agreement between Classic Design Builders and L.A. Designs for the DeFreitas construction project. Their verbal agreement was memorialized in a written agreement dated June 18, 1990. Thereafter, Respondent did not advise Petitioner that he had entered into a joint venture agreement and, similarly, did not qualify the joint venture as a separate business entity for licensure purposes. Pursuant to instructions from Ware, Mr. DeFreitas directed a letter to the City of Boca Raton advising the building department that he had entered into a contract to construct an addition to his residence with "L.A. Designs/ Classic Designs." On July 2, 1990, Respondent on behalf of Classic Design Builders obtained a building permit from the City of Boca Raton for the DeFreitas addition. On July 6, Ware began work on the addition. Ware worked on the project from July of 1990 through the end of that year. During the course of that construction, the DeFreitases made many changes in the scope of the work contemplated by the original contract, which increased the contract price to above $56,000. Additional work was performed, which was not covered by the contract and which the DeFreitases agreed to pay for directly to the supplier or subcontractor. On February 4, 1991, the DeFreitases directed a letter to Ware advising him that the construction was close to completion and that it was time for them to "settle our account" as to the extras for which the DeFreitases had not paid. In that letter, the DeFreitases also offered to produce the invoices for materials and labor that they had agreed to pay to finish the job. In July of 1991 the DeFreitases complained to the City of Boca Raton. Respondent, as the holder of the building permit, was contacted and advised that the DeFreitases were alleging that their contractor had failed to complete the project. Respondent immediately went to the DeFreitases' business, met with Mr. DeFreitas, inspected the home, and prepared a punch list of items to be completed, many of which were not covered by the construction contract but were done by Respondent in an attempt to achieve customer satisfaction. Respondent completed the project, obtained the final inspections, and presented the DeFreitases with a warranty and release of lien. The DeFreitases refused to accept the warranty or release of lien. As a result of the DeFreitases' complaints, Respondent and Ware were charged with violating local ordinances. In those prosecutions, as well as in this case, the DeFreitases have attempted to obtain $11,000 from Respondent as "restitution" for moneys they have had to spend or will have to spend to complete the work envisioned by their contract with L.A. Designs, Inc. Most of the items listed as components of the claim for restitution are not even part of the construction contract. Of those few items covered by the contract, the money claimed is not. For example, the contract allocated $500 to be expended on the bathroom cabinets. The DeFreitases spent $1,670 on the cabinets and, surprisingly, are claiming that Respondent should pay them the difference because they spent more than their contractual allowance. Finally, they have claimed the cost of replacing inferior building materials provided by them, such as wood French doors. The DeFreitases paid to Ware approximately $4,000 less than they had promised to pay him as a result of the work completed by L.A. Designs. Rather than suffering a loss, the DeFreitases have actually received a windfall. At no time material hereto was either Ware or L.A. Designs licensed in the state of Florida as a contractor, architect, professional engineer, or landscape architect. Respondent knew that Ware and L.A. Designs were not licensed. At the time that Classic Design Builders and L.A. Designs entered into their written joint venture agreement and at all other times material hereto, Respondent was not an officer, director, stockholder, or employee of L.A. Designs, and Ware was not an officer, director, stockholder, or employee of Classic Design Builders. When Ware approached Respondent about entering into a joint venture for the DeFreitas project, Respondent had already suffered a minor heart attack and two mini-strokes. The joint venture agreement itself recites Respondent's need to limit his activities due to health reasons. In July of 1990 Respondent additionally tore an Achilles tendon in his left leg and was in a cast until Christmas of 1990. Due to his immobility during that time period, Respondent delegated all of his construction jobs to others, understanding that he was ultimately responsible for those projects since he was the contractor of record on them. In the same way, he delegated to Ware the day-to-day responsibility for the DeFreitas project. Other than "pulling the permit" for the DeFreitas project, Respondent's only other involvement in the job until the time that he was contacted as a result of the DeFreitases' complaints to the City of Boca Raton in July of 1991, was right after the job was commenced regarding some problem concerning the lot line. He was able to resolve that problem with the City of Boca Raton by telephone. The DeFreitases did not know that Respondent was the contractor for their construction project and ultimately responsible for that work. Although Ware had advised them that a "buddy" would somehow be involved in the construction, and although Mr. DeFreitas referred to both L.A. Design and Classic Design Builders in his letter to the City of Boca Raton authorizing a building permit to be issued, the evidence is clear that had the DeFreitases known of Respondent's responsibility, they would have been insisting that he perform services months earlier. In 1987 Respondent was charged with abandoning a construction project and/or failing to timely complete it. Respondent entered into a settlement stipulation admitting that fact and agreeing to pay a fine to the Construction Industry Licensing Board in the amount of $1,000. A Final Order Approving Settlement Stipulation was entered on June 8, 1988. Respondent received no money from the DeFreitases or from Ware for the work Respondent performed on the DeFreitas addition. Respondent's out-of-pocket expenses for labor and materials on the DeFreitas residence between July of 1991 and June of 1992 total $1,747.50.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered: Finding Respondent guilty of Counts I, II and VII of the Administrative Complaint filed against him; Finding Respondent not guilty of Counts III, IV, and V of the Administrative Complaint filed against him; Requiring Respondent to pay an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000; and Placing Respondent's license number CG C027718 on probation for a period of two years. DONE and ENTERED this 16th day of November, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 2-10, 16-20, and 22 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 11-15, 21, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 1 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 23 has been rejected as being subordinate. COPIES FURNISHED: John David Ashburn, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 3932 RCA Boulevard, Suite 3210 Palm Beach Gardens, Florida 33410 Diane Perera, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite N-607 Miami, Florida 33128 Peter Mineo, Jr., Esquire 8220 State Road 84 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33324 Copies furnished, continued Richard Hickok, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467 Jack McRay, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue This case arises on an amended administrative complaint filed by the Petitioner which seeks to have Respondent's contractor licenses disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, incident to the construction of a residence near Melrose, Florida. The case originally was scheduled to be heard on July 10, 1987, but after the hearing was convened, Respondent's counsel sought a continuance based on Respondent's health problems which were supported by a doctor's statement. The motion was granted and the hearing was continued until August 25, 1987. At the hearing, Petitioner presented the testimony of Evans Starke, Marion Uhl, and Robert H. Adams. Petitioner submitted eight exhibits in evidence, including the depositions of Respondent and Matthew M. Gordon. Respondent testified in his own behalf and submitted three exhibits in evidence. However, Respondent's exhibit three, which was a house plan, was retained by Respondent and a copy thereof was to be filed within 10 days after the hearing. Additionally, Respondent was provided a period of 10 days after the hearing to submit a deposition of James A. Taylor However, the deposition was not filed within the required period nor was Respondent's exhibit three. Respondent's post-hearing motion to extend the time for filing the deposition was denied. The parties were provided a period of ten days from the filing of the hearing transcript in which to file proposed recommended orders. Neither party made a timely submission. However, Respondent's post-hearing motion to extend the time period was granted. The proposed Findings of Facts submitted by both parties were considered and substantially incorporated herein.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Joseph Rentz is licensed as a registered building contractor, roofing contractor, and mechanical contractor, and was so licensed at all times pertinent to this proceeding. In addition, he is the qualifying contractor for Alachua Association Builders. (Petitioner's exhibits 2-3) In March 1985, Evans Starke of Miami, Florida entered into an oral agreement with Respondent for the construction of a residence near Melrose, Florida. Respondent agreed to build the house on a cost-plus basis and estimated that the cost would be approximately $27.00 per square foot or less. Respondent told Starke that he would be satisfied with 10 percent of the cost of construction for his fee. The arrangement was that Starke would Periodically provide money to his aunt, Lenora Peterson, and that Respondent could make draws from that source as required to progress with construction. Starke also asked Respondent to open a checking account from which he would pay the bills for materials and labor. (Testimony of Starke) The original construction plans provided to the Respondent by Starke were for a house of approximately 4,000 square feet, but since Starke wished to expand the size of the house considerably, he informed Respondent of the various modifications which resulted in Respondent obtaining revised plans from a draftsman for a house of approximately 10,000 square feet. (Testimony of Starke, Respondent) Respondent obtained a building permit in his name and commenced construction. As work progressed, Respondent would inform Lenora Peterson of the need for progress payments for materials and labor on a weekly basis. She would then provide the necessary money in cash to Respondent and obtain a signed receipt from him. During the period March through September, 1985, Respondent signed receipts amounting to $121,360. Respondent had several checking accounts in the name of "J. & L. Properties", into which some of the draws were deposited and checks drawn thereupon to pay materialmen, subcontractors, and workmen. In other instances, Respondent paid cash to workmen, but obtained no receipts therefor. Starke visited the project site usually on a biweekly basis during the initial months of construction. On several occasions, he met Respondent midway between Gainesville and Miami to deliver cash for construction costs. Some of this money given to Respondent was not evidenced by a receipt of Respondent. Starke testified that on one occasion, he gave Respondent $3,000 to pay for the installation of a well, but Respondent had only given the well-digger $1,000, and Starke later found that he still owed the balance, plus a 25 percent rise in cost. Starke also claimed that he spent $1,000 to put a drain under the driveway to the basement because Respondent had forgotten to do so. He further stated that he had given Respondent $5,000 to purchase shingles for the house, but Respondent bought only enough to cover the garage. Consequently, Starke was obliged to expend further sums to obtain the remaining shingles. (Testimony of Starke, Respondent, exhibits to deposition of Rentz (Petitioner's Exhibit 2), (Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6) During Starke's periodic visits to the job site, he requested that Respondent show him the bills and receipts for the purchase of construction material and labor payments, but Respondent evaded such request by saying that his wife was handling the business matters, and that she was ill and unable to show him the records. Eventually, Starke became more concerned because of the discrepancies in the expenditures of funds, and therefore made a special trip in October 1985 to meet with Respondent and go over the project accounts. At that meeting, Respondent's wife provided Starke with a number of canceled checks on the J. & L. Properties account, which failed to identify any specific payments for the Starke project, but which consisted mostly of apparent payments of Respondent's personal bills. (Testimony of Starke, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 2,6) Subsequent to the October meeting, Respondent asked Starke for the sum of $1,500 for his own services, which was paid. This was the last payment made by Starke to Respondent and the last contact that he had with him. Respondent performed no further work and left the project about the third week of November 1985. Although Starke attempted to get in touch with him during the intervening period, he was unsuccessful in doing so. (Testimony of Starke, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 2) On January 31, 1986, Starke obtained a new building permit to complete his residence, and hired Marion C. Uhl, a certified residential contractor, at an hourly rate to supervise the remaining work. Uhl found at that time that the house consisted of a shell with some interior partitions erected and doors in place, but without any electrical or plumbing work, except for a garage bathroom. It took him approximately ninety days to correct previous construction errors before it was ready for subcontractor work. Specifically, he found that the partition walls were out of plumb and that some of the doors were not framed properly. It was necessary for him to tear them out and redo the work. He found no backing (dead wood) for the ceilings and walls which should have been in place before the roof was sheathed. He had to take out all the windows which were out of plumb and reinstall them. It was necessary to frame out the gables of the house in order that water wouldn't accumulate in vacant areas. Water had accumulated in the garage basement due to a failure to install proper drain fields under the house. Additionally, it was discovered that there was no concrete in the tie beams which supported the floor above and could cause it to sag eventually. In Uhl's opinion, which is accepted, these problems would not have occurred if the job had been properly supervised. (Testimony of Starke, Uhl) Robert H. Adams, an expert in the residential contracting field, who owns a building inspection firm, inspected the Starke premises on May 18, 1987 at the request of Petitioner. Based upon his examination of the house, he found the following deficiencies, which had existed at the time Respondent left the project: In some areas, the brick veneer exterior walls were not properly supported on the footing in that the brick veneer protruded beyond the outside edge of the footing. Also the footing was at grade rather than being below grade. Failure to utilize solid concrete walls or pouring of concrete into concrete blocks which formed walls supporting a steel I-beam. This deviation from the plans could result in failure of the foundation walls. Improper splicing of girders under the house. Girders were butt-spliced rather than spliced with either a shep or a diagonal cut. The joints were not over a supporting pier. Settling from the floor above could cause the house floor to sag. The exterior brick roll-out window sills were level instead of being at a slight angle to permit water to flow away from the bottom of windows, thus causing the potential of water intrusion into the house. Front entry brick steps were not centered with the door opening by approximately 18 inches. An exterior garden hose bib Produced hot water instead of cold at left front of the garage. This was caused by "mis- plumbing" the cold and hot water lines. Block wall of the garage was out of plumb approximately 7/8 of an inch over a 4 foot vertical distance. One of the garage roll doors had only 9 foot, 3 inch clearance instead of 10 feet as called for by the plans. Uneven coursing of brick veneer at the ceiling of the right rear porch. Waferboard was used on roof decking rather than plywood as called for by the plans. Waferboard is not as strong as plywood. Water intrusion into the garage- basement. In Adams' opinion, which is accepted, the deficiencies noted by his inspection reflected very poor workmanship and gross negligence, in that the fundamentals of construction as practiced in the construction trade were not observed by Respondent in major areas. They were gross deviations from good building practices and a competent contractor properly supervising the job would have been aware of the deviations from good contracting practice. In addition, it is incumbent upon a contractor to keep accurate and complete financial records for a particular project. (Testimony of Adams, Petitioner's Exhibit 7) In January 1986, Starke employed Universal Engineering Testing Company, a structural engineering firm, to ascertain the cause of groundwater leaking into the garage-basement of his house and to provide remedial recommendations. Professional engineers of the firm inspected the premises and observed that groundwater was leaking at the wall-floor joint around most of the garage. They found that although a drainage system had been installed during construction, soil and groundwater conditions at the site limited the effectiveness of the existing system, due to hydrostatic pressure build up under the garage floor. It was determined that, unless the pressure was dissipated with under-slab drainage, the slab would heave, crack, and leak at the wall-slab joint They found that the situation could only be remedied by installing an under drain grid after removal of the existing slab. In their professional opinion, which is accepted, the failure of the existing slab had been caused by excessive water pressure build up and improper construction techniques. (Testimony of Gordon, Petitioner's Exhibit 1) At the hearing, Respondent admitted that he had never constructed a house of the scope and size of the Starke residence, but that he had attempted to build what Starke desired in accordance with the plans and numerous changes required by Starke during the course of construction. Such changes, in his view, caused the difficulty in centering the brick work at the front of the house since this work was called for after the front door had already been installed. He claimed that he had waterproofed the garage-basement and put in French drains, but that water couldn't go out, and it was necessary to install a tank under the driveway to pump the water from the basement. Respondent also conceded that he did not maintain continuing records during the course of construction as to the financial aspects of the project, but intended to recapitulate all costs and payments when construction was completed. He acknowledged that receipts from the project were commingled with other funds in his bank accounts and he was unable to show the disposition of proceeds from the project. As to leaving the job, Respondent said that he left because he was threatened by Starke and also because of ill health caused by the stressful situation which came from continuing complaints by Starke concerning the workmanship, and also by the numerous changes to the construction plans. Although Respondent claimed that he notified Starke by letter of January 14, 1986, that he intended to remove his permit no later than January 27, 1986, because it appeared that Starke had decided to take charge of completing the construction, Starke denied receiving such a letter and there is no credible evidence that it was delivered. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, Respondent's Exhibit 1) On two prior occasions in 1985 and 1986, Respondent was disciplined by the Construction Industry Licensing Board pursuant to settlement stipulations of administrative complaints filed by Petitioner against Respondent. In those stipulations, Respondent admitted violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the complaints, and administrative fines of $250 and $400 were imposed. (Petitioner's Exhibits 4-5)
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, the following findings of fact are made: The Petitioner, School Board of Brevard County, Florida, is empowered to designated the personnel positions to be filled, prescribe qualifications for those positions, and provide for the appointment, compensation, promotion, suspension, and dismissal of employees for the school district. The Respondent, Arthur Douglas Barna, has been employed by the Petitioner since the early 1970s. The Respondent has a degree in mechanical engineering, is a registered professional engineer, and has twenty years of experience in the construction field. Respondent's first position with the Petitioner was as construction manager. In 1976, Respondent's title was amended to staff engineer and construction manager. In 1981, Respondent was made Director of Facilities a position he held until February, 1991, when he was returned to the staff engineer position and John Allen was retained to be Director of Facilities. On April 23, 1991, Respondent was recommended for appointment to the position of staff engineer for the 1991-92 contract term by the school superintendent. The qualifications for appointment as staff engineer/project manager are: Graduation from a college or university with a degree in engineering. Registered as an engineer in the State of Florida. Experience (five years minimum) in educational design and facility planning administration. Experience in administration of educational construction contracts. Knowledge of Uniform Building Code and Florida School Laws and Regulations. On April 23, 1991, by a 3-2 vote, the Petitioner rejected the superintendent's recommendation to employ Respondent. Prior to April 23, 1991, Respondent had received satisfactory personnel evaluations. Prior to April 23, 1991, Respondent had not been reprimanded or disciplined for any act or omission regarding the performance of his duties. In the two years prior to April 23, 1991, Respondent had participated in numerous construction and remodeling projects for the Petitioner. Such projects exceeded $46,000,000.00 in cost to the public. One of projects Respondent was involved with during his tenure with the Board was Stone Middle School (Stone). That project originated with a bid proceeding to choose a contractor to perform the construction work. One of Respondent's duties was to represent the Board at bid openings. In the case of the Stone project, within a short time after the bid opening, the apparent low bidder on the job, Speegle Construction (Speegle), advised Respondent that an error had been made on the bid form. That error was claimed to be in the amount of $40,000.00. Speegle's bid was $90,000.00 lower than the next low bidder. Speegle had tendered a bid bond in the amount of $50,000.00. After reviewing the matter with the bidder, Respondent took the matter to his supervisor who then took the issue to the school superintendent and board staff. Among the staff who considered the issue was the school board attorney. Regardless of any dispute regarding the computation of the $40,000.00 error (such are deemed irrelevant to the essential issue), the Board was presented its options: to take the bid bond and award the contract to the next lowest bidder; to give Speegle the additional $40,000.00 and award it the contract; or, presumably, rebid the project. Since awarding Speegle the contract, with the $40,000.00 addition, still saved the public $50,000.00, over the next lowest bidder, Respondent recommended that option. His recommendation was supported by his superiors. After public discussion of the matter, the Board unanimously voted to select Speegle as recommended by staff. No evidence supports the assumption that the Board's decision, based in part on Respondent's recommendation, was found to be illegal, unethical or challenged by the other bidders on the project. The Stone project had additional problems since the architectural firm hired to complete the drawings did not meet the guidelines established by the Department of Education. On at least two occasions the plans had to be returned to comply with state standards. Consequently, the project was late commencing. Such lateness was not due to the fault or error of the Respondent. To the extent he was involved, Respondent properly supervised the Stone construction project and did not approve inferior work. All specifications of the contract were met and verified by Respondent and then assistant superintendent for facilities, Leon Cowling. Issues regarding performance of the Stone project arose between Respondent and Cliff Gordon, president of the architectural firm involved with the job. Such issues related to the lockers and an athletic field which Mr. Gordon claimed did not meet specifications. Such allegations are not supported by the record in this case. When the Stone project was not completed on time, Respondent assessed liquidated damages against Speegle in accordance with the contract terms. Respondent was not responsible for the lateness, and Speegle, in fact, made good on the damages. Respondent and Mr. Gordon did not agree on aspects of the Stone project. Mr. Gordon became disgruntled when Respondent would not approve payment to Mr. Gordon's firm for work allegedly done. Mr. Gordon attended Board meetings regardless of his claim that Respondent had advised him to stay away. Respondent was not responsible for the removal or encapsulation of asbestos found in several schools. Respondent's position placed him in a position over construction, not maintenance. Moreover, another school administrator was assigned to be responsible for overseeing issues related to asbestos at all times material to this case. Respondent did not supervise a project wherein the treatment of asbestos was at issue. Anderson Elementary School (Anderson) has a noise problem in that sound travels from one area to another. The ceiling tile used in the Anderson project was the same product used in the other schools and was the contractor's choice. At the time of installment an issue arose as to whether the tile to be used met the specifications of the contract. Ultimately, the architect signed off on the use of the tile requested by the contractor. Unfortunately, the tile used does not buffer noise. Whether the tile originally requested would more effectively buffer the noise is unknown. Whether the design of the facility contributes to the noise problems is also unknown. That there is a noise problem at Anderson is not due to an act, omission, or the negligence of the Respondent. In connection with the air conditioning system installed at Southwest Junior High School (Southwest) a problem arose as to that system's design. Respondent did not design the system. In fact, a design firm was retained to complete the work and the system was installed based upon that work. The Board does not have the personnel or the staff expertise to verify whether outside consultants perform their jobs correctly. Presumably, the Board utilizes such consultants because it does not have the internal resources to do the work requested. In the case of Southwest, the firm hired designed the system improperly. As a result, the Board made a claim, and collected, against the firm's errors and omissions insurance. Thus, the Board received damages for the design defect. Cambridge Elementary School (Cambridge) is located adjacent to a housing subdivision developed by Centex Homes. Due to drainage problems associated with the development, the homeowners' association and the developer requested that the Board execute a drainage easement on the Cambridge property so that the properties might be enhanced. The homeowners' proposal made to the Board gave the expense of preparing and maintaining the easement to the association. Respondent was approached regarding the drainage easement and considered the matter to benefit the school site. Respondent and Mr. Cowling recommended granting the easement. Such easement was to be preceeded by an agreement setting forth the homeowners' obligations to the Board. For reasons not addressed by this record, an agreement was not prepared and returned to the Board as had been directed. In fact, the Board chairman and superintendent executed the drainage easement without evidence of an agreement. Nothing in this record suggests Respondent had anything to do with the execution of the easement or the failure to obtain a written agreement regarding it. Moreover, these events occurred in May and November, 1988, some three years prior to the nonappointment of Respondent. The construction of the educational services facilities at Viera posed many novel and complicated construction issues for the Board and its staff. For one thing, the Board had not utilized a "design/build" format in construction before. Based upon the record in this case, it is unlikely that the format will be used again. The design/build format requires the construction of some phases of a project while the design is still occurring. As a result, unlike situations where a contractor has a determined set of plans to follow, the builder in the design/build format is in a constant state of flux and change. As may be expected, the owner is tied to the same constant amendment to plans. In the case of Viera, Respondent served as the owner's representative on the project. By contract, all notices and changes went through Respondent who was then responsible for coordinating with the Board staff. At all times material to the Viera project, Respondent kept his supervisor aware of the progress of the project and of the changes to plans or specifications. It was not Respondent's responsibility to report directly to the Board regarding the Viera project (or any other for that matter). Respondent routinely made reports to his supervisor who then coordinated matters with finance and the superintendent. Respondent was available to the Board for any matters that might require his input. Early on in the Viera project Respondent advised his supervisor and the Board that they had little control over how the building was constructed. As long as the project stayed within the general design concept, the specifications were fairly open. Respondent's first priority was to try to keep the Viera project on budget as to the changes that occurred. To that end, items such as the carpet allotment were reduced to capture more funding for other requested items. In each such case Respondent made his superior aware of the changes. Ultimately, the changes requested by Respondent, the superintendent, or John Forbes were placed before the Board as change order #1 and approved. While some of the changes had already occurred, there is no evidence that the Board took action to prohibit Respondent and the administration from making the day-to-day decisions on the project. In fact, the contractor make changes on the Viera project without authorization from any Board administrator. Presumably, necessity caused the Board to accept such work. There is no evidence that the changes authorized by Respondent on the Viera project were arbitrary or in violation of the contract. Respondent did not fail to abide by the contract terms. Respondent did not act improperly regarding the Viera project and is not responsible for the quality of the workmanship of the job. As energy costs became a concern to the Board, the Respondent participated in a conservation effort whereby energy firms were solicited for proposals as to how the Board might save on energy expenses. Initially five contractors showed interest in the project but only three filed proposals with the facilities department. To evaluate the proposals, which was deemed a "win/win" deal by the Board, an outside consultant was hired to review each of the submittals. The proposals, along with input from the consultant, was then heard and considered by a committee of eleven school board employees. The Respondent was not a voting member of the group. After receipt of the proposal and the foregoing review, the committee and Respondent recommended to the Board that Facility Masters Incorporated (FMI) be selected for the contract. The Board also reviewed the proposals and recommendations and approved the recommendation to hire FMI. The contract between FMI and the Board was reviewed by the school board attorney. The scope and terms of the project were outlined to the Board and the administrative staff. The concept of the proposal was to replace, at no initial cost to the Board, the outdated and inefficient equipment with new, efficient units so that the energy savings would actually pay for the equipment. None of the persons who reviewed the FMI project was aware that the proposal might require a performance bond. Respondent and others aware of the project were familiar with bonds and the necessity to have same on certain types of projects. In this instance, the superintendent, the assistant superintendent for facilities, the school board attorney, and Respondent did not request a bond for this job. No Board member questioned whether a bond should be requested for the project. All of the foregoing operated under the assumption that the replacement of equipment and the construction incidental to that did not require a bond. The principals employed at FMI had a satisfactory work history on similar projects. Their qualifications were investigated by Mr. Cowling, the assistant superintendent. No prior poor work performance was discovered. Under the terms of the FMI contract, the Board was to receive and approve a list of subcontractors before FMI was to "commence the installation of the System." There was no requirement that FMI submit a list for subcontractors of subcontractors. After commencement of the installation of the system, the Board and several of its individual members were sued for amounts allegedly owed Miller Electric, a subcontractor of a subcontractor on the FMI project. That suit brought to light the issue of the performance bond, or lack thereof, and the discovery that an individual, identified in the record as Armondo Diaz, had somehow obtained the balance of $167,000 from the Shawmut Bank. Such monies represented the final draws due on the FMI project. Respondent, however, did not authorize the final draw from the bank nor is there any evidence that he supported Mr. Diaz in that matter. Subsequently, the Board sued the bank over the release of the funds and settled the suit with Miller. Whether the $167,000 (quickly released) would have settled Miller Electric's claim is unknown. Certainly, it would have greatly reduced it. At the time of Respondent's departure from employment, the FMI system was operating in seven of the twelve schools in an acceptable manner. The other five schools were operational but not to the efficiency level anticipated. The Respondent acted reasonably in the selection and award of the contract to FMI, the administration of the project, and is not responsible for the improper release of the final draw. Three Board members testified that they have lost confidence in Respondent's ability to perform the duties of staff engineer/project manager. None of the three had registered complaints regarding his work performance with Respondent or his supervisor, Mr. Cowling, prior to the Board meeting April 23, 1991. None of the three Board members was able to articulate the factual basis for her lost confidence when asked to do so in December, 1991. The Respondent meets all of the qualifications for employment as staff engineer/project manager as that job title is described by the Board. The Respondent acted appropriately and within the scope and description of his job duties on each of the following projects: Stone Middle School; asbestos; Anderson Elementary School; Southwest Junior High School; Cambridge Elementary School; Viera; and FMI.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered appointing Respondent to the position of staff engineer/project manager with all back pay and benefits withheld him from the date of his termination. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO CASE NO. 91-5645 RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER, THE SCHOOL BOARD: It should be noted that Petitioner did not number the paragraphs in its proposed findings of fact. The numbers indicated below were assigned as follows: paragraphs 1 through 20 related to Respondent's general job description and responsibilities; paragraphs 21 through 31 are under the heading related to Viera; paragraphs 32 through 53 are under FMI; paragraphs 54 through 66 are under the Stone Middle School heading; paragraphs 67 and 68 are under Southwest Jr. High School; paragraphs 69 through 73 are under the asbestos heading; and 74 through 79 are under Cambridge Elementary School heading. No proposed findings of fact were submitted for the allegations related to Anderson Elementary School. Paragraphs 1 through 16 are accepted but do not necessarily reflect accurate quotes of the cited material as there are minor, insignificant irregularities. Paragraph 17 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. While it is accepted that three board members testified they had lost confidence in Mr. Barna, it is not concluded that they had objective reasons for that opinion prior to the vote on the Superintendent's recommendation. Paragraph 18 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 19, it is accepted that the job description had been held by Mr. Barna prior to the Board decision and would have been afterwards had they accepted the Superintendent's recommendation. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 25 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 26, it is accepted that some, but not all, of the changes addressed by change order 1 were completed prior to the submission of the item to the Board. Paragraph 27 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, and contrary to the facts established at hearing. Mr. Barna did not authorize changes without making his superiors aware of the items to be considered. The contract speaks for itself as to his authority. Paragraph 28 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence; see also comment re: paragraph 27 above. With regard to paragraph 29, it is accepted that change order 1 represented an increased cost to the project; otherwise rejected as not supported by the record cited. Paragraph 30 is accepted but is irrelevant since evidence established that Mr. Barna did not approve some of the changes to the project and that they were done without any authorization. Paragraph 31 is accepted but is irrelevant; Mr. Barna did not stand as the guarantor on the work performed by others. Paragraph 32 is accepted. Paragraph 33 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 34 and 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as not supported by the record cited; weight of the evidence supports the fact that Miller Electric was a subcontractor for a subcontractor and that the contract did not require the disclosure of subs of subs. Paragraph 37 is rejected as contrary to weight of the evidence; see comment paragraph 36 above. Paragraph 38 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 39 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraph 40 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 41 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 42 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 43 is rejected as not supported by the evidence; to the extent that the paragraph suggests Mr. Barna was generally familiar with bond requirements and that he compiled "boiler plate" forms it can be accepted, otherwise must be rejected since no evidence that Mr. Barna prepared or drafted documents. The bond form on its face shows it is an AIA document A310 form. Paragraph 44 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 45 is rejected as a conclusion of law. The facts of this case establish that no one associated with the School Board side of the project realized it was, or should have been, a bond job until the lawsuit was filed. Had anyone suspected a bond should be required, it would have been requested. Mr. Barna was not at fault for not requesting a bond anymore than Mr. Walker was, or Mr. Cowling, or Mr. Collingsworth, or the individual Board members who know when bonds are required. Paragraph 46 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 47 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence as it suggests Mr. Barna knew a bond was required (as it was a construction job); clearly, neither he nor anyone else realized a bond would, or should, be required. Paragraph 48 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 50 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 51 is accepted. Paragraph 52 is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 53 is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 54 through 57 are accepted. Paragraph 58 is rejected as a conclusion of law not supported by the record and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as a conclusion of law not supported by the record and contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 60 is accepted but is irrelevant. Paragraphs 61 through 66 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, irrelevant, or assuming facts or conclusions of law not evidence. Paragraph 67 is accepted. Paragraphs 68 through 73 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence, conclusions based upon facts not in evidence, or irrelevant. Paragraph 74 is accepted. With regard to paragraph 75, it is accepted that Mr. Barna represented that drainage would be improved by the proposed easement drainage; as to the suggestion that Mr. Barna assured "no water" would be drained unto the property, such proposed fact is rejected. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. The Board's decision to accept the concept was not solely based upon Mr. Barna's recommendation. Paragraph 78 is accepted. Paragraph 79 is rejected as irrelevant, beyond the scope of this proceeding, and to the extent it suggests Mr. Barna to be at fault, is contrary to the weight of the evidence. Mr. Barna was not responsible for drainage problems at the school. RULINGS ON THE PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT SUBMITTED BY THE RESPONDENT, BARNA: 1. Paragraphs 1, 2, 7 through 18, 20, 22, 23, 25 through 38, 41, 43, 46 through 56, 58 through 61, 66 through 71, 77 through 79, 93 through 97, 101, 102 through 105, 109 through 111, 113, 114, 116, 120, 123, 124, 127, 129, 130, 132, 135 through 146, 148, 149, 151 through 157, 159, 160, 162 through 165, 167 through 169, 171, 172, 174, 176, 177, 179, 181, 182, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191 are accepted. Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 are accepted but are irrelevant. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant; reiteration of charges, not fact; or argument. With regard to paragraph 21, it is accepted that projects described in statement of cause were extent of Board consideration (if that); otherwise, not supported by record cited. 5. Paragraph 24 is rejected as irrelevant and argument. 6. Paragraph 39 is rejected as repetitive or argument. 7. Paragraph 40 is rejected as argument. 8. Paragraph 42 is rejected as conclusion of law. 9. Paragraph 44 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. 10. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument or comment. 11. Paragraph 57 is rejected as restatement of document not fact and argument. Paragraph 62 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. Paragraph 63 is rejected as restatement of document not fact and argument. Paragraph 64 is rejected as comment, not fact. Paragraph 65 is rejected as hearsay not supported by direct evidence. Paragraphs 72 and 73 are rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraph 82 is rejected as restatement of document not fact and irrelevant. Paragraph 83 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 84 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraphs 85 and 86 are rejected as argument. Paragraph 87 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 88 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 89 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraph 90 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraphs 91 and 92 rejected as argument and recitation of testimony. Paragraph 98 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 99 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraph 100 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 106 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraphs 107 and 108 are rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 112 is accepted to the extent that the terms outlined were Mr. Barna's understanding but such terms were not reduced to writing in accordance with the Board's directive. Why the easement was signed prior to an agreement being drafted and approved by the Board is unknown. No evidence suggests Mr. Barna was responsible for the oversight. With regard to paragraph 115, see comment regarding paragraph 112 above. Paragraph 117 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 118 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraph 119 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 122 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 128 is rejected as not supported by evidence cited. Paragraph 131 is rejected as hearsay. Paragraph 133 is rejected as hearsay. Paragraph 134 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 147 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraph 150 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. With regard to paragraph 155, the phrase "which ultimately recommended" should be added before "FMI" to clarify the statement instead of "recommending." Paragraph 158 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. Paragraph 161 is rejected as restatement of document not fact. With regard to paragraph 166, it should be added that at all material times to the review of the project before the letting of the job, the FMI project was considered as described. Paragraph 170 is accepted with the substitution of the word "acceptably" for "perfectly." It is the view of the trier of fact that no system can be perfect. Paragraph 173 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. From this record it would appear that Mr. Walker gave no definitive statements regarding the FMI project. Paragraph 175 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. It is accepted that Mr. Barna and Mr. Walker, together with other persons in authority, discussed the FMI project. Paragraph 178 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 180 is rejected to the extent it concludes funds were obtained by fraud; clearly that is the Board's position as no one authorized the final draw. Paragraph 183 is accepted but is irrelevant to this case. Paragraph 184 and 185 are rejected as argument not fact. Paragraph 187 is rejected as irrelevant and argument. Paragraphs 192 through 196 are rejected as argument, conclusion of law, or not supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Stanley Wolfman David J. Wolfman STANLEY WOLFMAN, P.A. 200 W. Merritt Island Causeway Post Office Box 540513 Merritt Island, Florida 32954-0513 Louis V. Cianfrogna James H. Earp CIANFROGNA, TELFER, REDA & FAHERTY, P.A. Suite 102 1990 West New Haven Avenue Melbourne, Florida 32904 Abe Collingsworth Superintendent of Schools Brevard County School District 2700 St. Johns Street Melbourne, Florida 32940
The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., 489.129(1)(g)2., 489.129(1)(j), 489.129(1)(m), and 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes (2005),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Calleja had a valid and active license as a commercial certified pool/spa contractor. His license number is CP 1456568. At all times material to this proceeding, Mr. Calleja was the owner of or did business as Nautica Pools & Spa (Nautica). The Board is charged with regulating the practice of contracting in the State of Florida pursuant to Chapters 455 and 489, Florida Statutes. On April 2, 2005, Mr. Calleja, as the representative for Nautica, entered into a contract with Jack Coleman to renovate Mr. Coleman’s existing pool. From April 2005 to July 27, 2005, Nautica installed rebar in the pool and set a new skimmer. Nautica subcontracted with Prestige Gunite of Melbourne, Inc. (Prestige), to put the gunite in the pool. Gunite is concrete that is sprayed out of a hose to form the walls of the pool. Personnel from Prestige arrived on the project site on the afternoon of July 27, 2005, to apply the gunite, but did not do so because the application would have taken longer to do than one afternoon. The following day, July 28, 2005, Mr. Calleja and a crew from Prestige returned to the project. A representative from Prestige told Mr. Calleja that the steel rebar had not been laid properly. Mr. Calleja told Prestige to apply the gunite and do what was necessary to cover the steel. Mr. Calleja left the project site, and Prestige began applying the gunite. During the application of the gunite, it became evident that the first spraying of gunite was not going to cover the steel. Attempts were made to reach Mr. Calleja, but Mr. Calleja was not available to solve the problem. Prestige began applying additional coats of gunite in an attempt to cover the steel. After the gunite was applied, two problems were identified. The first problem was in the fountain area. The gunite had not been applied properly, and there were hollow areas. The second problem was in the wet deck area. The steel rebar was too close to the surface of the floor, and the steel was visible. In order to remedy the problems, the concrete in the areas would have to be jack hammered to remove the concrete, and new gunite would have to be applied. By letter dated August 28, 2005, Nautica requested Mr. Coleman to pay Prestige $954.57. Nautica advised Mr. Coleman that when that amount had been paid, Nautica would pay the balance owed to Prestige and forward a release to Mr. Coleman. Mr. Calleja claimed that Mr. Coleman owed the $954.57 because Mr. Coleman had damaged Mr. Calleja’s saw. In the letter, Nautica acknowledged that there was additional work which had not been completed. The letter was signed by Mr. Calleja’s wife. Mr. Calleja had verbally told Mr. Coleman that he wanted Mr. Coleman to pay him $2,000.00, and he would take care of paying Prestige. The general specifications in the contract required that the contractor was responsible for “[s]tandard structural engineering plans and permits required by code.” Prior to commencing work on the pool renovation, Mr. Calleja did not secure the required building permits for the project. Mr. Coleman called Clifford Stokes, who is the building official with the town of Indialantic, and asked whether a permit had been issued. Mr. Stokes went to the project site. At that time, the gunite had been shot, and there was exposed steel rebar. Since no permit had been pulled, no inspection had been done after the steel was put in place. On September 15, 2005, Mr. Calleja applied for a building permit. Because the steel had been placed, and the gunite shot, it was impossible to do a visual inspection to determine whether the steel had been placed properly. In order to get a permit after the construction had been commenced, certain affidavits had to be submitted to the building official of Indiatlantic. Mr. Calleja had to submit an affidavit stating that the steel had been placed properly. An affidavit stating that the work had been performed properly had to be submitted from an engineer, who had made a site visit to the project and had determined that the work performed had been according to code. Additionally, Mr. Coleman was required to submit an affidavit that stated that he understood that no inspection had been done of the work by the building official. Mr. Calleja also had to pay a fine to Indiatlantic for commencing work without a building permit. On October 19, 2005, Mr. Calleja and Robert Lee from Lee Engineering came to the project site for the purpose of preparing the affidavits necessary to secure a building permit. Mr. Calleja did not return to the project site after October 19, 2005. Mr. Coleman sent a letter to Mr. Calleja dated October 13, 2005, noting that no work had been done on the project since July 28, 2005, and requesting that Mr. Calleja remedy a number of deficiencies with the work performed on the project and complete the job in accordance with the contract. The letter was returned to Mr. Coleman by the postal service because the time for forwarding mail from the address listed in the letter had expired. When Mr. Calleja came to the project site on October 19, 2005, Mr. Coleman requested a current address from Mr. Calleja, but Mr. Calleja refused to give him one. Mr. Coleman wrote another letter to Mr. Calleja dated October 25, 2005, again stating that no work had been done since July 28, 2005, and requesting that Mr. Calleja correct the deficiencies in the work and complete the contract. Mr. Coleman filed an action in small claims court attempting to recover the money for the lien filed by Prestige. However, Nautica had filed for bankruptcy, and Mr. Coleman did not proceed with the small claim action. A building permit for the project was issued in January 2006. The issuance of the building permit did not relieve Mr. Calleja from the responsibility of assuring that the work in the shallow end of the pool area where the rebar was sticking up was redone properly. After the building permit was issued, neither Mr. Calleja nor Mr. Coleman called for inspections by the Indiatlantic building official. The permit expired in June 2006. After the issuance of the building permit, Nautica performed no further work on the project. The total contract price was $9,340.00. Mr. Coleman and Mr. Calleja entered into an addendum to the contract on July 27, 2005, which increased the contract price to $13,000.00. The contract called for a down payment of $934.00, which was ten percent of the contract amount. After completion of excavation and the form and steel work, a payment of $3,736.00 was due, representing 40 percent of the total work. After completion of the pool shell, a payment of $2,802.00 was due, representing 30 percent of the total work. Prior to plastering, which represented 20 percent of the total work, a payment of $1,868.00 was to be paid. The contract addendum of $3,660.00 called for 50 percent of the addendum amount to be paid at the completion of the pool shell, and the remaining 50 percent of the addendum amount was to be paid at the completion of the pool. By check dated April 22, 2005, signed by Mr. Coleman’s wife, Mr. Coleman paid Mr. Calleja $1,000.00 as down payment on the project. In June 2005, Mr. Coleman gave Mr. Calleja a check for $573.42 for a pool and spa light. Mr. Coleman was to receive a credit of $380.00 toward the contract for the light. Additionally, Mr. Coleman overpaid Mr. Calleja by $166.90. By check dated July 27, 2005, and signed by Mr. Coleman’s wife, Mr. Coleman paid Mr. Calleja $7,396.00. This payment was to include half of the addendum amount, but Mrs. Coleman inadvertently included the full amount of the addendum. By check dated August 1, 2005, and signed by Mrs. Coleman, Mr. Coleman paid Mr. Calleja $739.10. Thus, by August 1, 2005, Mr. Coleman had paid Mr. Calleja, $9,682.00 on the contract. In December 2005, Mr. Coleman asked a representative of Paradise Pools, Patrick McDonough, to come to the project site and give an estimate to complete the pool. The estimate of $7,800.00 from Paradise Pools was for a cosmetic plaster of the existing pool, and the work was not warranted against leakage. Mr. McDonough would not warrant the work, because he saw a lot of potential liability problems with the work performed by Mr. Calleja. Mr. McDonough did not recommend that a cosmetic plaster be performed because of the potential problems. On October 26, 2005, Prestige filed a Claim of Lien against the property of Mr. Coleman for $4,227.40 plus interest, costs, and attorney’s fees. The lien was for the work which Prestige had performed on the project on July 28, 2005, and for which Mr. Calleja had failed to pay. Mr. Coleman called Mr. Calleja and told him that a lien had been filed. Mr. Calleja assured him that he would pay the lien, but he failed to do so. Mr. Coleman satisfied the lien by check dated April 11, 2006, for the amount of $5,139.58. David Bogenrief, P.E., viewed the project in June 2008 and provided Mr. Coleman with a quote to develop structural plans to repair Mr. Coleman’s pool. There was no testimony on the amount of the quote, and the Department did not request that the written proposal be admitted in evidence. Mr. Bogenrief did not know what it would cost to repair the pool. The Department has incurred $470.49 for costs in the prosecution of this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Mr. Calleja did not violate Subsection 489.119(2), Florida Statutes, and that Mr. Calleja violated Subsections 489.129(1)(g)1., 489.129(1)(g)2., 489.129(1)(j), 489.129(1)(m), and 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes; for the violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(g)1., Florida Statutes, imposing a fine of $2,000.00, suspending Mr. Calleja's license for six months, and requiring Mr. Calleja to pay Mr. Coleman $5,139.58 as restitution for the payment of the lien filed by Prestige; for the violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(g)2., Florida Statutes, imposing a fine of $2,000.00, suspending Mr. Calleja's license for six months, and requiring Mr. Calleja to pay Mr. Coleman $9,682.00, which represents the amount that Mr. Coleman paid to Mr. Calleja; for the violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine and four years of probation; for the violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine and four years of probation, which shall run concurrently with the other probation imposed; and, for the violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(o), Florida Statutes, imposing a $1,000.00 fine and two years of probation to run concurrently with the other probation imposed; and requiring payment of $470.49 as costs for the prosecution of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2008.
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of alleged violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, set forth in an Administrative Complaint signed March 3, 1987. Specifically, the Respondent is charged with having violated Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, "by abandonment of a construction job Respondent was engaged on" and with having violated Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, "by failure to subcontract work in violation of 489.113(3)." At the hearing the parties agreed to an amendment to paragraph 8 of the Administrative Complaint to reflect that there were two contracts, one for $15,500.00 and one for $1,491.00, for a total contractual price of $16,991.00. The Respondent also stipulated to most of the allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Thereafter, the Petitioner presented the testimony of two witnesses and offered six exhibits, all of which were received in evidence. The Respondent then testified on his own behalf and offered two exhibits, both of which were received in evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing the parties were given 30 days from the date of the filing of the transcript within which to file their proposed Recommended Orders. The transcript was filed on October 2, 1987, and the Petitioner thereafter filed a timely proposed Recommended Order containing proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. As of the date of this Recommended Order, the Respondent has not filed a proposed Recommended Order nor any other document containing proposed findings of fact. Specific rulings on all proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner are contained in the Appendix which is attached to and incorporated into this Recommended Order.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulation of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the sworn testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: Stipulated Facts Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of contracting, pursuant to Section 20.30 and Chapter 455, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was licensed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board as a certified general contractor. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent had been issued by said Board, and held, license number CG C031803. Respondent's address of record is in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent did, through the contracting business Respondent was then associated with and responsible for in his capacity as a licensed contractor, contract with Irene McIntosh to perform certain contracting work. The contracting work generally consisted of remodeling a church. The contracts for the remodeling work were entered into on or about March 6, 1986. One contract was for $15,500.00 and one was for $1,491.00. The jobs were located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent's contracting business thereafter began the jobs described above. In the course of said jobs, Respondent did, himself or through his unlicensed employees, perform plumbing work. At no time relevant hereto was Respondent licensed to engage in plumbing work. The Rest of the Findings Respondent began work on the two contracts sometime during the latter part of 1985. Respondent continued to perform work on the two contracts until sometime during March of 1986. Respondent finished most of the work under the two contracts, but he did not finish all of the work he had agreed to perform. Respondent has not performed any work on either of the contracts since March of 1986. Apparently some form of dispute, the exact nature of which is not revealed in the record of this case, arose between the parties to the contract. The last time the Respondent attempted to do any work under the contracts, he was unable to do so because the locks on the premises had been changed. At about that same time, a representative of the church told the Respondent that the Respondent would not be paid any more money for work on the contracts. After being locked out of the premises, the Respondent did not attempt to contact Irene McIntosh to arrange to finish the work or to notify her that he was terminating the work. There is no evidence that Irene McIntosh attempted to contact the Respondent after he was locked out of the premises. The Respondent has not been paid the contracted amount of $1,491.00 under the second contract. If the Respondent were to be paid the $1,491.00 that is owed to him, he would be willing to finish all of the work under the two contracts. A general contractor cannot lawfully perform plumbing work in the City of Jacksonville without a plumbing license.
Recommendation Based upon all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a final order in this case to the following effect: Dismissing the charge that the Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, by abandoning a construction project; Finding the Respondent guilty of the charge that he violated Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes; and Imposing a penalty of a fine in the amount of two hundred fifty dollars ($250.00) and a suspension of the Respondent's license for a period of ninety (90) days. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 4th day of December, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2220 The following are my specific rulings on each of the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Findings proposed by the Petitioner: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted with exception of contract amount. There were two contracts for a total price of $16,991.00. Paragraph 3: Accepted in essence, with exception of exact month. Exact month is not established by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: The proposed list of work remaining to be finished is rejected because it is not all supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and also because it constitutes unnecessary subordinate details. It is sufficient to find that the Respondent did not finish all of the work under the contracts. Paragraph 6: The essence of this proposal is accepted with a different emphasis and with additional findings in the interest of clarity. Paragraph 7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: Accepted. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Findings proposed by the Respondent: (none) COPIES FURNISHED: E. Raymond Shope, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mr. Eugene Williams, Jr. 10337 Jolynn Court West Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Honorable Tom Gallagher Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 William O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Mr. Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201
