The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner was convicted of specified criminal offenses, requiring the forfeiture of all his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of accumulated contributions.
Findings Of Fact From 1999 until 2017, Bautista was an employee of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (“MDPS”). On August 24, 2017, Bautista resigned from his position as principal of the Miami Jackson Adult Education Center, an office he had held since 2011. Bautista departed shortly after being arrested on charges of organized fraud, official misconduct, and grand theft. In the criminal Information leading to Bautista’s arrest, the State Attorney of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit alleged, in summary, that Bautista had used his position as principal to misappropriate between $20,000.00 and $50,000.00 of MDPS’s funds for personal expenses, and had destroyed official payroll records to cover his tracks. On or about July 10, 2019, Bautista pleaded nolo contendere in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit Court to one count of official misconduct, a felony of the third degree pursuant to section 838.022, Florida Statutes, and to one count of grand theft under section 812.014, Florida Statutes, also a third- degree felony. The court withheld adjudication of guilt and placed Bautista on community control, to be followed by probation. In addition, Bautista was ordered to pay restitution to MDPS in the amount of $41,798.22. SBA is an agency of the state of Florida whose jurisdiction includes the administration of the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan (the “Plan”). By letter dated August 14, 2019, SBA notified Bautista that his rights and benefits under the Plan are forfeit as a result of his pleas of no contest to the aforementioned criminal charges, which had arisen from acts allegedly committed by Bautista as an MDPS employee. SBA offered Bautista an opportunity to request a formal administrative proceeding to contest the determination, and Bautista timely requested a hearing. As grounds for opposing the forfeiture, Bautista claims that his former employer, MDPS, failed to provide him due process of law during the run-up to his forced resignation. He complains, as well, that “procedural irregularities” in the criminal prosecution likewise deprived him of due process. Next, Bautista notes that he never admitted guilt and insists that he is, in fact, innocent of the charges to which he pleaded no contest. Finally, Bautista argues that he was not “convicted” for purposes of forfeiture of retirement benefits, because the court withheld adjudication of guilt on the criminal charges against him. To be sure, if Bautista was not afforded due process or was otherwise victimized by prosecutorial abuse or inadequate legal representation, as he alleges, then Bautista might have suffered an injury for which the law affords redress. But this proceeding is not the vehicle, and DOAH is not the forum, for hearing such disputes. It does not minimize the seriousness of Bautista’s allegations to recognize that, even if true, none of them changes the undisputed facts that he pleaded nolo contendere to the crimes of official misconduct and grand theft, each of which is a “specified offense” under section 112.3173(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Conviction of a specified offense results in the forfeiture of retirement benefits pursuant to the plain language of section 112.3173(3).1 Thus, the MDPS investigation and any “irregularities” in the criminal prosecution are irrelevant to the issues at hand, and the undersigned declines to make findings of fact concerning Bautista’s allegations in this regard.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the State Board of Administration enter a final order determining that Joey Bautista forfeited all his rights and benefits under the Plan, except for the return of any accumulated contributions, when he pleaded nolo contendere to “specified offenses” committed prior to his retirement from public service. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Soeurette Michel, Esquire The Michel Law Firm, LLC Post Office Box 245131 Pembroke Pines, Florida 33024 (eServed) Rex D. Ware, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. 3500 Financial Plaza, Suite 330 Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Jonathon W. Taylor, Esquire Moffa, Sutton & Donnini, P.A. Trade Center South, Suite 930 100 West Cypress Creek Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33309 (eServed) Ash Williams, Executive Director and Chief Investment Officer State Board of Administration 1801 Hermitage Boulevard, Suite 100 Post Office Box 13300 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-3300
The Issue Whether the Respondent is a Public Employer within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether the Petitioner is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether there is a sufficient showing of interest as required for the filing of a representation election petition under Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. Whether the employee organization is a properly registered organization with the Public Employees Relations Commission. What is the appropriate unit of public employees in the cause before the Public Employees Relations Commission. HEARING OFFICER'S REPORT The five issues were discussed at the hearing with the following results: It was agreed that the City of Rockledge is a public employer. It was agreed that the Petitioner is an employee organization within the meaning of Florida Statutes, Chapter 447. It was agreed that there is a sufficient showing of interest as required for the filing of a presentation election petition under Florida Statutes, Chapter 147. It was agreed that the employee Organization is a properly registered organization with the public Employees Relations Commission. The appropriate unit of public employees in the cause was in dispute. The Petitioner stated that the Association wanted to represent the dispatchers, patrolmen, sergeants, lieutenants and the detectives. The Public Employer requested that only patrolmen and detectives should make up the unit.
Findings Of Fact The Petition, styled Brevard County P.B.A, Petitioner, and City of Rockledge, Public Employer, seeks a certificate of representation as the exclusive bargaining agent for Officers of the City of Rockledge, Florida, including patrolmen, sergeants, dispatchers lieutenants and detectives. Excluded are captains and the chief of police. The city Counsel of the city of Rockledge, Florida, in the minutes dated April 2, 1975, agreed to follow guidelines under "Section 300" (8H300) of the Florida Administrative Code. See "Exhibit (1)". An envelope furnished by PERC containing authorization cards for the Brevard County P.B.A., alphabetized list of employees provided by the employers, notice of appearance forms for the attorneys, request to appear forms by the public, registration file (original) for the Brevard County P.B.A, original petition file including Petition, affidavit of registration, affidavit for 30 per cent showing interest, was circulated and without objection entered into evidence. See "Exhibit (2)". There are eighteen (18) men in the proposed bargaining unit: nine (9) patrolmen, two (2) detectives, three (3) dispatchers, three (3) lieutenants and one sergeant. A copy of the official job description of the City of Rockledge Police Department effective prior to the instigation of these proceedings was requested to be examined by both parties and submitted to the Hearing Officer and was submitted and marked as Supplement to the Record" and is made a part of this file. The major functions of personnel as delineated in the job descriptions submitted are as follows: Lieutenant: This is supervisory work in coordinating police activities on an assigned shift or specialized division of the department. The employee is responsible for the overall supervision of the subordinate personnel (patrolmen, dispatchers, etc.) engaged in police activities on an assigned shift or a specialized division. Part of the duties are to assign, direct and supervise the work of subordinate personnel engaged in routine police activities or criminal investigations. This employee reviews and makes recommendations for disciplinary action of subordinate personnel of the department. Sergeants: This is supervisory and specialized police work in the field and in police headquarters. An employee in this classification may also assume the total responsibilities as assigned to a regular shift commander. An employee in this classification may also be assigned the duty of coordinating the communication operators (dispatchers). When working as a shift commander the duties are the sane as listed for a lieutenant's duties. Patrolmen: This is general duty police work in enforcing laws and ordinances of the federal, state and local governments. Specific assignments are received from superior officers and carried out in accordance with the established rules and procedures. Personnel must be able to act without direct supervision in emergencies. Primary duties are to enforce the laws and ordinances and investigate and see whether these laws and ordinances are being violated. Detectives: The major functions of the detective is specialized police work but also includes enforcing the laws and ordinances of the federal, state and local governments. Major duties include the conducting of surveillance assignments to help detect crime and general investigative work. Communication operator or dispatcher: This is specialized work receiving, screening and dispatching messages of police communication systems. His duty largely is the operation of the radio transmitter for the purpose of dispatching patrol and detective units and receiving messages. In accordance with Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, no recommendations are submitted. August 8, 1975. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Williams, Vice President Brevard County P.B.A. 978 Beacon Road Rockledge, Florida 32955 Vernon Weekly, Past President Brevard County P.B.A. 700 Sandgate Street Merritt Island, Florida 32952 Dale Dixon, President Brevard County P.B.A. 2460 North Coutenay parkway Suite 216 Merritt Island, Florida 32952 John A. Hipp, City Manager City of Rockledge Post office Box 488 Rockledge, Florida 32955 Jim Gilliard 993 Pinson Boulevard Rockledge, Florida Ronald F. Ray Post office Box 206 Rockledge, Florida Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 105 2005 Apalachee parkway Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Betty E. New, is entitled to membership in the senior management services class (SMSC) of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from July 1, 2004, through her retirement in 2015.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, on February 1, 2002, was employed by the Pinellas County Board of Commissioners (Pinellas County) as court counsel. In her position as court counsel, Petitioner, through an inter-local agreement, was under the supervision and control of the chief judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, but her salary and benefits were paid by Pinellas County. Specifically as to benefits, Pinellas County was solely responsible for paying employer contributions to Petitioner’s state retirement account. When initially hired as court counsel, the position was designated in the Regular Class of the FRS. In March of 2003, Pinellas County requested that Petitioner’s position be added to the SMSC of the FRS, and the request was granted by Respondent, retroactive to her hire date of February 1, 2002. On June 30, 2004, Petitioner ceased being employed by Pinellas County and she received a payout of all unused leave, pursuant to the termination payout rules of Pinellas County. Additionally, on June 30, 2004, Pinellas County ceased being responsible for making employer contributions to Petitioner’s state retirement account. On June 30, 2004, Judge David A. Demers, then chief judge of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, requested that Petitioner be paid a $10,000.00 bonus due to the fact that Petitioner would “no longer be a member of the senior management class for retirement purposes.” The bonus was approved and Petitioner accepted the same. Effective July 1, 2004, funding for all court system employees was transferred to the State. Consequently, Petitioner, on July 1, 2004, was reported to the Division of Retirement as an employee of the Office of State Courts, in the Regular Class of the FRS. Petitioner was aware that her position would no longer be included in the SMSC at least as early as September 2004, and chose not to request an opportunity to challenge the determination until several years later. Petitioner asserts that she was continuously an employee of the Office of State Courts from February 1, 2002, and that she was never an employee of Pinellas County. Stephen Bardin credibly testified that if Petitioner had been an employee of the Office of State Courts, rather than of Pinellas County, her position would never have been eligible for inclusion in the SMSC in 2002.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for SMSC credit from July 1, 2004, through the date of her retirement in 2015. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of April, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of April, 2016.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System are subject to forfeiture.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert T. Lacey (Lacey), was employed as the Director of the Criminal Justice Institute, Broward Community College, Broward County, Florida, from at least January 1, 1985, until his resignation in March 1986. At all times pertinent to this case, Broward Community College (BCC) was an employer which participated in the Florida Retirement System, and petitioner, while employed by BCC, was a member of the Florida Retirement System. On February 4, 1987, a Grand Jury impaneled in Broward County, Florida, returned a fourteen (14) count true bill of indictment against Lacey. The matter was ultimately assigned Case No. 87-2056CFA, Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida. Pertinent to this case are Counts I-XII of the indictment, one count for each of the calendar months of 1985 (January through December 1985). Each count charges that Lacey did, while employed by BCC that year, commit the following acts each month: . . . unlawfully and knowingly obtain or endeavor to obtain the property of Broward Community College, to wit: United States Currency, services and/or material, of a value of one hundred dollars ($100.00) or more, with the intent to permanently or temporarily deprive Broward Community College of a right to the property or a benefit thereof, or to appropriate the property to his own use or the use of any person not entitled thereto, contrary to F.S. 812.014(1)(a)., and (1)(b)., and F.S. 812.014(2)(b). The gravamen of such charges was the assertion that while employed as director of the Criminal Justice Institute, an entity within Broward Community College, Lacy used materials, time and personnel to benefit him personally in his consulting business. On February 25, 1988, following a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of grand theft, as alleged in Counts I-XII of the indictment, and not guilty as to Counts XIII and XIV of the indictment. Although found guilty by a verdict of the jury, the court withheld adjudication as to each count, placed Lacey on probation for a period of three years, ordered Lacey to pay $3,000 in restitution to BCC, and ordered Lacey to perform 200 hours of community service. Lacey's post trial motions for arrest of judgment, new trial, and renewed motion for judgment of acquittal were denied by the court. Following the true bill of indictment that issued February 4, 1987, Lacey was also charged by direct information filed April 21, 1987, in the Circuit Court, Broward County, Florida, Case No.87-6744CFA, with two counts of official misconduct (Counts I and III), one count of petit theft (Count II), and one count of grand theft (Count IV). Pertinent to this case, Count I of the information charged that on or about September 5, 1985, Lacey did, while a public servant, to wit: . . . an employee of Broward Community College . . . did then and there unlawfully and knowingly falsify, or cause another to falsify, an official record or official document, to-wit: a Broward Community College form entitled "STAFF AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT COURSE APPROVAL FORM," with the corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself . . . or another, to-wit: for the benefit of JACINDA LYNN FANNIN, contrary to F.S. 839.25(1)(b). Counts III and IV of the information charged Lacey with official misconduct and grand theft, respectively; however, that portion of the information which would have set forth the factual basis for Counts III and IV is not of record, and no conclusion can be drawn as to whether or not the basis for those charges related to Lacey's employment with BCC. In response to the information in Case No. 87-6744 CFA, and following the resolution of Case No. 87-2056CFA, Lacey entered a plea of nolo contendere to all counts. The Court, by order of November 28, 1988, withheld adjudication of guilt, and placed Lacey on probation for three years with regard to Counts I, III and IV and six months as to Court II. All probationary terms were to run concurrent and coterminous with those imposed in Case No.87-2056CFA. 2/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered forfeituring the rights and benefits of petitioner, Robert T. Lacey, under the Florida Retirement System, except for the return of his accumulated contributions. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 25th day of March 1994. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March 1994.
Findings Of Fact On October 23, 1978, Petitioner was hired as secretary to W. J. Crist, president of Hygroponics, Inc. On February 26, 1979, W. J. Crist evaluated Petitioner's overall job performance as "good." With respect to cooperation, the Petitioner was rated in the category of "cooperates very well," the highest rating possible for that category of performance. With respect to job knowledge, she was rated as showing "unusual capacity," also the highest rating possible for that category of performance. On March 5, 1979, Petitioner received an increase in salary from $4.18 per hour to $4.51 per hour, based in part upon her increased responsibilities and in part upon demonstrated merit. Following is Hygroponics, Inc.'s office staff organization chart dated May 2, 1979: HYGROPONICS, INC. OFFICE STAFF ORGANIZATION CHART | President | /| W. J. Crist |\ / | | \ / | \ \ \ | Purch. Agent | | Controller | \ | Technical Service | | Dick Destival | | James Jobe |" \ | Dick Jeffery | | | | | "" \ | | " / | | " "\ | " / | | " \" | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | " \ " | " / | | "\ "| | Marsha | | Liz | | Nell | | Arlene | | Carolyn | | Betsy | | | | | | | | | | | | | /|\ Direct lines of authority. Answerable to this person at all times " Indirect lines of authority. Answerable for secondary duties and when direct lines are not available. The above organizational chart does not include the company's chief executive officer. On occasion, members of the company's secretarial staff went directly to the chief executive officer with employment-related problems. In September, 1979, after James Jobe, the controller referenced in the above chart, left the company's employ, W. J. Crist, the company president, advised Petitioner that she was to become office manager. After that time, Petitioner assumed many of the duties of office manager. Petitioner inquired when she would receive a raise commensurate with her increased responsibilities, and was advised that this would be accomplished after the company hired a new controller. Emmett Singleton was hired to fill the position of controller on October 29, 1979. On December 11, 1979, Petitioner formally became acting office manager. On that date Petitioner was evaluated by Emmett Singleton, who rated Petitioner highest in the areas of decision-making and ability to organize, and lowest in the areas of acceptability and responsibility. Specifically, Singleton made the following comments concerning Petitioner's job performance: "Has difficulty in establishing satisfactory relationships with people"; "Average leader, conventional in manner and enthusiasm, conveys ideas but does not motivate group"; "Has problem with admitting an error or fault"; "Reluctant to accept job responsibilities. Supervision and follow-up often required"; "Considers job an eight to five task with scheduled breaks reguardless [sic] of status of workload"; "Employee is preoccupied with the position rather than a concern for getting the job done"; and, "Employee resents being monitored or controlled. Sometimes uncooperative and slow to respond to direction." In addition, members of the company management group, other than Emmett Singleton, commented on this evaluation that Petitioner "alienates co-workers," "Has experienced confusion in the scheduling of grower school," and expressed concern with Petitioner's "attitude." The controller noted on the evaluation form that he planned ". . .to work closely with [Petitioner] for the next 60 days and make an assessment during this time as to whether on [sic] not suited for office manager." Finally, Mr. Singleton noted on Petitioner's performance review form that Petitioner ". . .is classified as Acting Office Manager and is on probation with reguard[sic] to classification. No change in rate of pay is being made at this time. Employee will be reevaluated in 60 days on or about 2/10/80." In order to improve her skills in the area of acceptability and responsibility, Petitioner requested that Mr. Singleton issue a memorandum clarifying the lines of her authority especially since her subordinates had not been advised that she had been given supervisory responsibility over them. Her request was denied at that time because Singleton wanted to first determine whether she could handle the position. On January 12, 1980, Singleton reevaluated Petitioner's job performance. According to Singleton's rating, Petitioner had improved in the areas of acceptability and responsibility, which had been her weak points in the evaluation performed one month earlier. On this same day, Petitioner was reclassified from acting office manager to office manager, and received an increase in pay to $821.60 per month, retroactive to November 1, 1979. Petitioner also assumed the duties of payroll clerk and accounts payable in addition to the duties of office manager. Shortly after receiving this promotion, Petitioner advised employees of Hygroponics, Inc., that she was pregnant. W. J. Crist and Emmett Singleton acknowledged her pregnancy, and the latter inquired concerning her intentions regarding her employment. Petitioner responded that she intended to continue working for the company, and to return to work after the birth of her child. Hygroponics, Inc., had no maternity leave policy. No other female employee had ever given notice of pregnancy and stated her intention to return to work following childbirth. However, at least two other employees had become pregnant during the term of their employment with Hygroponics, Inc. One of these employees, in fact, suffered two miscarriages during her term of employment, and continued working with the company. Another female worker became pregnant, gave birth to a child, and returned to work without ever advising the company or the company ever being aware that she had been pregnant until after she had returned to work. On January 30, 1980, Petitioner submitted a memorandum to Eugene Crist, the company's chief executive officer. The memorandum suggested changes regarding the responsibilities of certain of the office personnel under her supervision. Petitioner had previously discussed these suggested changes with Emmett Singleton, her immediate supervisor, who advised her that he thought her suggestions were a good idea. At the time the memorandum was submitted to the company's chief executive officer, W. J. Crist, the president of the company, was out of the state. On January 30, 1980, Eugene Crist showed the memorandum to Emmett Singleton. The memorandum was then returned to Petitioner by the company's chief executive officer with a notation that the matters contained in the memorandum should be handled through Singleton. Two days later, on February 1, 1980, Singleton asked Petitioner for the memorandum. When Petitioner could not locate the memorandum, and offered to discuss the details of it with Singleton, Singleton advised her that there was no basis for conversation if she could not produce the memorandum. As noted above, Singleton had seen and read the memorandum two days previously when it was shown to him by Eugene Crist. Upon W. J. Crist's return to Florida, Singleton advised him that Petitioner had submitted a memorandum directly to the company's chief executive officer, and that when Singleton asked Petitioner to see the memorandum, she advised him that she had misplaced it. On February 8, 1980, W. J. Crist circulated a memorandum to the Hygroponics, Inc., executive staff concerning Petitioner's ". . .insubordination, poor attitude [and] defiance of executive orders. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: It is my understanding that Carolyn recently drafted a memorandum on her proposed changes in office duties for many people, changes in accounting procedures, etc. I have been informed that she: "by-passed you, her immediate superior and by-passed me, her next-in-line superior." and delivered this memo directly to Gene, our CEO. Then when Gene informed her to "discuss the memo directly with you," she advised you "she did not even have the memo anymore." I find these actions, on Carolyn's part very distressing and feel we must take disciplinary actions with her. So - what are the problems. Her "uncooperative" and "attitude" problems outlined in your personnel evaluation of her on December 11, 1979 (which she acknowledged) when you put her "on probation," the first time, still persist. She demonstrated anything but teamwork in by-passing her two immediate superiors and going directly to our CEO. This is very bad for an employee to do but even worse for her since she is suppose [sic] to be a leader of our people in her slot as Office Manager. Her disregarding Gene's directive to discuss the memo with you was corrected only by your insistance[sic] that the two of you discuss it. Her statement to you that "she no longer had the memo" is also distressing. Has she destroyed it? This additional negative certainly weakens her argument that "she went directly to Gene because he was going out.[sic] (Original emphasis.) The above-referenced memorandum solicited the views of the company's executive staff as to whether to terminate Petitioner, discipline her in some fashion, or give her an opportunity to resign. The decision was unanimous among all five members of the executive staff to terminate Petitioner. No member of the executive staff questioned Petitioner before concurring in the decision to discharge her. Such a memorandum of concurrence was not the company's standard practice in discharging employees, which generally was for the discharge decision to be made by the employee's supervisor alone. Hygroponics, Inc., was, at all times material to this proceeding, a rather small organization, numbering at the most approximately fifty employees. As a result, many of the internal functions of the company were informal in nature. For example, there were no strict lines of authority for secretarial staff to air grievances or make suggestions. There was, however, a generalized procedure for employees to approach their immediate supervisor with any employment-related problems. There is no direct substantive evidence in the record in this cause from which it can be concluded that Petitioner was terminated from her employment because she was either female or pregnant. Further, whatever circumstantial evidence there is in this record to support such a contention is overcome by Respondent's demonstration that Petitioner was at best an employee of average ability who management viewed at times to be a problem employee. It appears, therefore, that the reason for Petitioner's discharge was an accumulation of events, culminating in her memorandum of January 30, 1980, being submitted to the company chief executive officer, and not for any reason relating to her sex.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Commission on Human Relations, dismissing the Petition for Relief, and denying the relief requested therein, with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 1983, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. White, Jr., Esquire 229 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 John F. Daniel, Esquire Post Office Box 2522 Panama City, Florida 32401 Dana Baird, Esquire Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard E. Williams Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Suite 100, Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has forfeited his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact Based on the record in this proceeding, including the evidence presented at the formal hearing and the joint pre- hearing stipulation1 of the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Florida Retirement System (FRS) is a public retirement system as defined by Florida law. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Respondent or Division), is charged with managing, governing, and administering the FRS. Petitioner, Mr. Johnson Holsberry, Jr. (Petitioner or Mr. Holsberry), was formerly employed as a teacher at the West Area School of Choice by the Palm Beach County School Board (PBCSB). By reason of his employment with the PBCSB, Mr. Holsberry became a member of the FRS. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Code of Ethics of the Education Profession in Florida found in Rule 6B- 1.001, Florida Administrative Code. As a teacher, Mr. Holsberry was subject to the Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida found in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6B-1.006. On or about December 5, 2000, Mr. Holsberry resigned his teaching position with PBCSB. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was charged, by amended information, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, with one count of child abuse, a third degree felony, in violation of Section 827.03(1), Florida Statutes. The same amended information is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. The victim of the alleged crime, R.D., was a female student at the Area School of Choice. In Palm Beach County, Florida, between the dates of January 1, 1999, and December 31, 1999, Petitioner, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, was alleged to have had contact with R.D. and to have acted in such a manner as to cause mental injury to said child. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry entered an agreement with the State Attorney's Office wherein he agreed to plead guilty as charged in the amended information. The same plea agreement is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF- 001185. Mr. Holsberry's guilty plea was made freely and voluntarily. Mr. Holsberry pled guilty because he was in fact guilty. On or about October 24, 2001, Mr. Holsberry was adjudicated guilty. The same judgment is filed in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. On or about January 8, 2001, Mr. Holsberry applied to the Division for early service retirement from the FRS and began receiving retirement benefits. The Division suspended payment of Mr. Holsberry's monthly retirement benefits in June 2008. By certified letter dated June 13, 2008, Mr. Holsberry was notified of the Division's intended action to forfeit his FRS rights and benefits as a result of his guilty plea in the case styled and numbered State of Florida v. Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., Case No. Ol-CF-001185. At the hearing, Mr. Holsberry testified that R.D. was in his classroom a few times, but that he was not sure of the year, frequency, or why she was there. He testified that he does not remember taking a picture of R. D. sitting at his desk, but that might have taken place. Mr. Holsberry also testified that he does not recall permitting R. D. to access her email from his classroom, or inviting her to join him on trips, to come to his home, or otherwise to meet him any place outside of the school. Mr. Holsberry testified that he does not recall giving R. D. his home telephone number. He recalls having an email screen name of Sameagle1, but does not recall whether he emailed R. D. from that email address or whether he had another screen name, Gutster. He testified that he does not recall referring to himself as H-Man (although he said some students called him "Mr. H.") or referring to R.D. as "Dukey Dufus." In general, Mr. Holsberry's testimony that he does not recall his actions that ultimately ended his career as a teacher is not credible. Mr. Holsberry noted that R.D. was not officially assigned to any of his classes, so that he was not responsible for her education, nor was he involved with her in any after school program that would have made him responsible for her welfare. Mr. Holsberry testified that he probably would not have met R.D. but for his position as a teacher at her school. He also recalled having being interviewed by an investigator named Green. Angelette Green, an employee of the Palm Beach County School District for 15 years, was the investigator assigned to Mr. Holsberry's case. Detective Green testified that Mr. Holsberry admitted that he helped R. D. set up an email account, communicated with her by email, including having sent by internet a picture of her taken in his classroom. She also testified that she remembers emails inviting R. D. to go somewhere. She said Mr. Holsberry called R. D. "Dukey Dufus" after he sent her an email and she questioned who it was from. On July 30, 2002, an Administrative Complaint was filed by the Commissioner of Education seeking disciplinary sanctions against Mr. Holsberry's license based on allegations of professional misconduct. Mr. Holsberry did not contest the disciplinary matter, having already agreed to surrender permanently his teaching certificate as a part of his plea agreement. The Education Practices Commission entered a final order permanently revoking his teaching certificate. On October 24, 2001, a plea conference was held on the following charge: Amended Information For: CHILD ABUSE In the Name and by the Authority of the State of Florida: BARRY E. KRISCHER, State Attorney for the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, by and through his undersigned Assistant State Attorney, charges that JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY JR. on or between January 01, 1999 and December 31, 1999, in the County of Palm Beach and State of Florida, did knowingly or willfully, intentionally inflict physical or mental injury upon R.D., a child, {or} did an intentional act or actively encourage another to do an act that results or could reasonably be expected to result in physical or mental injury to R.D., a child, contrary to Florida Statute 827.03(1). (3 DEG FEL) At the plea conference, the following exchange occurred: [By Mr. Jaegers, Assistant State Attorney:] The defendant will be adjudicated guilty of the offense; he will be placed on five years probation. There will be no early termination contemplated. The defendant will be required to pay Court costs in the amount of $261.00, $50.00 to the Drug Trust Fund, $50.00 cost of prosecution. The defendant must undergo a psychological evaluation and successfully complete any recommended treatment. * * * The defendant is to surrender all and not seek at any time in the future any teaching certificates in any jurisdiction in the world. There will be no contact with children under 18 unless they're in the presence of an adult who is aware of these charges. And those are the terms of the negotiated settlement. The facts in this case, Judge, are that the defendant, Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr., did in Palm Beach County, Florida, on, between the dates of January 1, 1999 and December 31st, 1999, while teaching in a position of parental responsibility, in that capacity had contact with a juvenile female by the name of, or by the initials of SRD, I think it's on the plea sheet. MR. WILINSKEY [Counsel for Mr. Holsberry] That's right. MR. JAEGERS: -- RD, and did act in a manner such as to cause mental injury to said child. The -- those are the facts that occurred in Palm Beach County. THE COURT: Sir, raise your right hand, please. JOHNSON LEO HOLSBERRY, JR. BEING FIRST DULY SWORN BY THE COURT, TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: THE COURT: Your name? THE DEFENDANT: Johnson Leo Holsberry, Jr. THE COURT: How old are you? THE DEFENDANT: 62 * * * THE COURT: Do you understand what the things are you have to do? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Do you agree with the facts the State Attorney gave me as the basis for your plea of guilty? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner was convicted of a specified offense pursuant to Section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing the forfeiture of his FRS rights and benefits. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2009.
The Issue Whether Brian Cattaneo can return to suitable gainful employment without further training and education.
Findings Of Fact Brian Cattaneo, a 39-year-old male, was employed by Petitioner, Roadhouse Grill, from March 1995 in various management positions in Jacksonville and Orlando, Florida. He sustained a worker's compensation injury on or about March 25, 1998, while working as a kitchen manager for Petitioner. Cattaneo sustained a low back injury resulting from the consistent lifting and carrying of objects. His duties as a kitchen manager included loading ice baths into sinks located 12 inches from the floor, loading 50 pound bags of flour, and carrying and organizing cases of frozen foods and canned goods. Cattaneo was diagnosed with a herniated disk and placed on light duty. He was given restrictions on lifting, twisting, and bending. Upon returning to work the employer returned Cattaneo to the same duties he had when he was injured. The work he did fell outside of his restrictions as he was required to bend, twist, and lift, and he was provided with no accommodations for his restrictions. During this period, Intervenor was re-injured and was later diagnosed with a ruptured disk. Intervenor underwent a diskectomy. After time off for surgery, Intervenor returned to work with a six-hour working restriction and restrictions for bending, lifting, twisting, and climbing. After working for a while, Cattaneo was experiencing too much pain and was placed on off-duty status. After reaching maximum medical improvement, Cattaneo was given restrictions of no walking, sitting, or standing for more than two hours at a time, and no consistent bending, sitting, twisting, or climbing. Cattaneo was unable to reach his pre-injury earnings due to his inability to fully perform the duties of a manager. He was told by Petitioner that his restrictions would have to be lifted in order to return to full management wages. During his employment with Petitioner, and while on off-duty status, Cattaneo temporarily worked at Financial Mortgage Planning from October 1998 to February 1999. Section 440.491, Florida Statutes, creates the re- employment services program and authorizes all recommended programs and expenditures to injured employees. The ultimate goal of that statute in regard to an injured worker is to return the worker to suitable gainful employment. Suitable gainful employment is meant to get an employee as close as possible to the wages he or she was earning at the time of injury and with the permanent physical restrictions resulting from the industrial accident. This includes any benefits, such as medical benefits and commissions, the employee was earning at the time of injury. Suitable gainful employment is defined to mean "employment or self-employment that is reasonably attainable in light of the employee's age, education, work history, transferable skills, previous occupation, and injury, and which offers an opportunity to restore the individual as soon as practicable and as nearly as possible to his or her average weekly earnings at the time of injury." Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes. The Division of Workers' Compensation (Division) goes through a process to determine whether an individual merits re- employment services. The process begins with orientation, in which the employee is given a DWC-23, which is the application for re-employment services. The employee is requested to sign the DWC-23 and to have the employer sign a section of the form that says it has no job available either modified or accommodated for the employee at this time. Shortly after orientation the Division requests medical records from the carrier to determine the employer's restrictions. Once all the paperwork is received, one of the Division nurses reviews the medical records from the claimant's physician, the maximum medical improvement date, and permanent restrictions, work history, and education. The Division also does a transferable skills analysis where the claimant's educational background, hobbies, and interest are evaluated to determine the best way to return the injured employee to work. In the effort to return the employee to suitable gainful employment, the Division considers three options. First, the Division determines whether there are any direct placement options for the employee with another employer. If this is not feasible, the next option is on-the-job training. If that is not a viable choice, the file goes to an independent evaluator to determine what, if any, retraining options are available to the employee. Once an injured worker is approved for retraining and education, the insurance carrier is obligated to pay temporary total rehabilitation benefits for at least 26 weeks, with an option to provide an additional 26 weeks for a maximum of 52 weeks of benefits while the injured employee is in retraining. Rehabilitation temporary total disability benefits are calculated by taking 66 2/3 percent of the claimant's average weekly wages 13 weeks prior to the claimant's date of accident. A transferable skills analysis determined what jobs Cattaneo would be able to perform with his current medical restrictions, educational history, and previous work history. Short of retraining, there were no jobs within Cattaneo's restrictions which would return him to his pre-injury wages of $959.00 per week. As a result of Intervenor's high pre-injury earnings and restrictions, it was recommended that Intervenor pursue a career in human resources through the bachelor in human resource management program at the University of Central Florida. Since Cattaneo had already completed his core requirements through his previous education, it would only take him two years to complete the degree. Cattaneo's background in personnel and dealing with people, coupled with the fact that he had already completed his core classes from his previous education indicated that the bachelor of human resource management degree would be an appropriate choice for Cattaneo. A labor market survey for positions utilizing a bachelor's degree in human resources indicated that five or more current positions which utilized the bachelor's degree in human resources management were available within the last six months. Due to a change in the statute in 1996, one of the options for retraining is to place an employee in a baccalaureate program. Cattaneo was approved for retraining in the bachelor's degree program in human resources at the University of Central Florida. The Division argues that Cattaneo fell within the ambit of Section 228.041(22)(a)3., Florida Statutes, due to the degree program's use of current skills in the hospitality industry, abilities, and interests, along with returning him to his pre- injury earnings. The reliance of Section 228.041(22)(a)3., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1996), by Respondent does not contradict its prior admission to Petitioner dated March 31, 2000. Respondent answered the following request for admission: Admit that the University of Central Florida Human Resources Management Program is not a career education program as defined under Section 228.041(a), Florida Statutes (1999). The response: "There's no definition of career education program in Section 228.041(a). However, we admit that the University of Central Florida Human Resources Program is not a career education program as defined under Section 228.041(22)(a)." Petitioner Roadhouse Grill fails to note that Respondent did not admit that the University of Central Florida human resource management program is not a career education program under Section 228.041(22)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1996 Supp.), which was one of the retraining options listed in Chapter 38F-55 of the 1996 Florida Administrative Code and which was in effect at the time of Cattaneo's approval for retraining in the program. The rule and statute section clearly controlled at the time of Cattaneo's approval and the Division was well within its authority to designate such bachelor degree programs for potential retraining of employees. Based on Intervenor's transferable skills analysis, previous work history, previous educational background, and the results of testing done by the independent evaluator, the best way to return Cattaneo to suitable gainful employment is through retraining. Petitioner never informed the Division indicating whether it had suitable employment within Intervenor's restrictions. Returning Cattaneo to work with Roadhouse Grill is not a viable option. Intervenor's employment with Roadhouse Grill would not return him to suitable gainful employment given that he was earning less than half of his pre-injury average weekly earnings of $959.85. Cattaneo was limited to a salary of $400 per week by Roadhouse Grill due to the restrictions limiting his ability to return to full management status and the resulting full management salary. Cattaneo's restrictions prevent him from returning to the occupation of a restaurant manager. Managers in the hospitality industry are more active and hands-on. While categorized as a light-duty position in the Director of Occupational Titles, the manager position encompasses duties beyond a light-duty demand. Given his restrictions of never bending, twisting, and lifting over twenty pounds, Cattaneo could not return to suitable gainful employment in a manager's position. Several factors led to the determination to place Cattaneo in the human resource management program at the University of Central Florida. Intervenor's interest in the area, his experience in the hospitality industry, his experience as a manager and supervising others, and dealing with personnel made placing Cattaneo in the program a reasonable alternative. Further, testing done by Esther Levensohn, as well as the demand for experienced individuals in the hospitality and tourism industry, indicated that the program was a viable alternative for Cattaneo. Petitioner Roadhouse Grill claims that Cattaneo had a job available to him with Petitioner because he was working with Petitioner after his work-related accident. The mere fact that Cattaneo had a job with Roadhouse Grill or any other employer is not enough. It must be established that the job was at or near Intervenor's pre-injury average weekly earnings and within his restrictions. Cattaneo did have the capability to obtain a job at any point. However, the Division's goal, as mandated by statute, is to assist Intervenor in obtaining employment at or near his pre- injury average weekly earnings of $959.00. Petitioner's assertion that Levensohn's recommendation to place Cattaneo in the human resource management program was based purely on subjective considerations is without merit. Levensohn performed various tests to determine Intervenor's aptitudes and transferable skills. Levensohn also went on to state that while interest is considered, the primary bases for placing an employee are transferable skills and results of vocational testing. She further testified that in her opinion as a vocational evaluator, interest in one's work is important to the individual in order to be a good employee. Trey Webb, Regional Director for Roadhouse Grill, failed to show that Roadhouse Grill made a serious effort to accommodate Cattaneo's restrictions. While Webb testified that an assistant manager or general manager position did not require heavy lifting, documentation from Roadhouse Grill's personnel file describes the duties of an assistant manager, which mandate that he "must be able to exert well paced mobility for periods of up to four hours in length and have the ability to lift 10 pounds frequently and up to 50 pounds occasionally. Must have the stamina to work at a minimum of 50 to 60 hours a week." Webb himself acknowledged that managers, in the course of their duties would bend, twist, stoop, squat--all of which are outside Cattaneo's restrictions. In addition, the light-duty position eventually created for Cattaneo did not allow him to earn his pre-injury wages. Cattaneo testified that he was told he could not earn his pre-injury wages unless his restrictions were lifted, enabling him to perform full managerial duties. Finally, the lack of accommodation of Cattaneo's restrictions is illustrated by the fact that he was re-injured after he was initially placed on light-duty while employed with Roadhouse Grill. Dan Dittleberger's testimony also failed to establish that Petitioner Roadhouse Grill accommodated Cattaneo's restrictions. He acknowledged that as a general manager, he himself did heavy lifting and was injured. While lifting a 50- pound bag of potatoes, the same weight requirements given in the assistant manager job description, Dittleberger's condition and restrictions were identical to those of Cattaneo, especially given the fact that Dittleberger did not undergo surgery while Cattaneo had surgery to his back. Petitioner also presented testimony from Lynn Esko, who was accepted as an expert in the field of vocational evaluation. Esko testified that she never interviewed or even met Cattaneo. She also testified that she did not perform any test on Cattaneo or produce a report of any of her findings concerning Cattaneo, but merely conducted a file review of Cattaneo's case based on material submitted to her from Petitioner's counsel. Esko's testimony failed to establish that Cattaneo could return to suitable gainful employment without retraining. Finally, Petitioner failed to show that retraining Cattaneo through the bachelor's degree program in human resource management will not return him to suitable gainful employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the relief requested by Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of July, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Wayne Johnson, Esquire DeCiccio, Johnson, Herzfeld and Rubin 652 West Morse Boulevard Winter Park, Florida 32789 Elana J. Jones, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Irvin A. Meyers, Esquire Meyers, Mooney, Stanley and Hollingsworth 17 South Lake Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801-2797 Mary B. Hooks, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 303 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Sherri Wilkes-Cape, General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Hartman Building, Suite 307 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue Has Respondent committed an "unlawful employment practice" against Petitioner, pursuant to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, based upon a Petition for Relief dated October 13, 1997, referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Florida Commission on Human Relations?
Findings Of Fact Respondent stipulated to jurisdiction, and the evidence demonstrates that by number of employees, Respondent is an "employer" as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a freight company which ships and receives living nursery stock by truck through a depot/warehouse. Petitioner was employed there from 1993 until June 16, 1995. In the course of formal hearing, Petitioner waived his Charge of Discrimination on the basis of his national origin (United States citizen). (TR-116). There is no evidence the Respondent employs anyone other than United States citizens. The remainder of Petitioner's allegations were that Respondent failed to accommodate one or more handicaps and subjected Petitioner to disparate treatment from similarly situated black employees. Petitioner also related a series of remarks and one personnel action that he considered to be harassing and abusive due to his handicaps. The "handicaps" that Petitioner testified to were high blood pressure, an undefined heart condition requiring medication, "bad knees," and problems with his back. At formal hearing, no medical physician or health care professional corroborated the foregoing conditions. However, it is undisputed that on or about January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented a physician's excuse to Respondent's Warehouse Supervisor, Jeff Bradner. That physician's excuse stated that Petitioner could return to work on that date, working 10 hours per day, 5 days per week, doing medium lifting, that is, "lifting 30 pounds and frequently lifting and/or carrying objects weighing 25 pounds." The excuse further stated that Petitioner was to avoid squatting, kneeling, and climbing. Mr. Bradner informed Eddie Payne, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, that the foregoing January 9, 1995, medical restrictions were to be observed for Petitioner. Attached to both Petitioner's initial Charge of Discrimination and his later Petition for Review was another physician's letter dated January 29, 1993. It stated, in pertinent part: [Petitioner], patient of record, suffers from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease. These conditions are aggravated by the stress caused by problems he has with his teenage son. Also attached was a March 3, 1994, doctor's letter stating that Petitioner had a spine and knee injury. It contains the same restrictions as the January 9, 1995, letter. Because the 1993 and 1994 letters are part of the record herein, (attached to the Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief), I have taken official recognition thereof and find that they supplement or explain Petitioner's oral testimony at formal hearing to the effect that Petitioner was suffering from high blood pressure, anxiety, and arterial coronary disease in 1993, and from a knee injury in 1994. However, these letters were not introduced in evidence at formal hearing, and Petitioner did not testify that he ever presented any such written medical confirmations of these conditions to any of Respondent Employer's supervisory personnel. Mr. Payne and Mr. Bradner denied that any oral or written requests for accommodation had been received from Petitioner other than the January 9, 1995, doctor's excuse listing specific restrictions. Contrary to Petitioner's testimony, Mr. Payne denied knowing of Petitioner's heart condition. There also is no corroboration of Petitioner's testimony that he orally requested any accommodation specifically because of his high blood pressure or heart condition at any material time. Furthermore, and most importantly, the 1993 letter places no restrictions on Petitioner in the workplace, and the 1994 letter imposes the same restrictions as the 1995 letter, which is in evidence. The only medical condition any of his co-workers ever heard Petitioner complain about was his "bad knees." Upon the record as a whole, it is inferred that Eddie Payne also knew Petitioner complained of "bad knees." At all times material, both before January 9, 1995, and afterwards, Petitioner worked for Respondent as a "checker." Checkers have the most physically non-taxing job in Respondent's operation. They make sure that "wheelers" or "loaders" place unloaded freight on pallets in the correct location in the warehouse and that "loaders" load the correct freight from the warehouse or warehouse dock into the correct truck. In this capacity, the bulk of Petitioner's work was carrying a clipboard, making notations thereon, and orally directing others where to put boxes. Petitioner testified that due to his blood pressure and back condition, he "needed" to sit down for 15 minutes' rest every 20 minutes after January 9, 1995. The evidence as a whole does not indicate that Petitioner clearly enunciated this "need" to any supervisor. Moreover, the credible evidence supports the inference that no one could work effectively as a checker while taking 15 minute breaks as frequently as every 20 minutes, because each truck needed to be loaded or unloaded as a component, so as to avoid shipping errors. Therefore, substituting other checkers every 20 minutes would have adversely affected Respondent's business and would constitute an unreasonable accommodation for Petitioner and undue hardship for the Employer. Either substituting another checker or waiting on Petitioner to rest every 20 minutes would have been unduly costly, burdensome, or substantially disruptive and would have altered the nature of Respondent's business. Prior to January 9, 1995, Petitioner worked at least a 40-50 hour week and was paid by the number of hours he worked. Due to the nature of Respondent's business and the hours when freight was received, Petitioner's usual hours before January 9, 1995, were from approximately 4:00-4:30 p.m. until 9:30 a.m. (17- 18 hours) three days a week, mostly Monday, Tuesday and Thursday. At all times material, both before and after January 9, 1995, only twenty-five percent as much freight came in on Wednesdays and Fridays as came in on the other three work days of each week. Therefore, all employees were not needed for a 17-18 hour day on those days, and employees had the option of working at whatever was available on those days to "make their hours" for pay purposes. At all times material, on Wednesdays and Fridays, all employees who wanted to work took turns digging weeds out of the cracks in the Respondent's paved parking lot with a claw on a broom handle or the edge of a shovel; picking the weeds up with a shovel; and throwing them away. Sometimes a blower was used. In accord with the January 9, 1995, physician's written restrictions, Eddie Payne accommodated Petitioner by assigning him to work from 10:00 p.m. until 8:00 a.m., so that Petitioner would only be working 10 hours per day. This assignment had Petitioner working the hours during which the employer needed the most men because those were the hours when the workload was the heaviest. Petitioner complained because Mr. Payne would not let him work his 10 hours from 4:30 p.m. to 2:30 a.m., a less busy time, but he complained only because those hours were more convenient for him. Petitioner related that after January 9, 1995, he was made to lift more than 30 pounds of parking lot weeds at a time, with the shovel, after getting on his hands and knees to dig the weeds out, and always in the hot sun, which aggravated his undisclosed heart condition. He also related that he never got to use the blower like other employees. His testimony on this issue is not credible in light of the contrary testimony of all the other witnesses. Even if credible, Petitioner was not forced to do this work. He was permitted to do this "make work" during slow days so that he would earn at least 40 hours per week. Witnesses confirmed that another "make work" project on a single occasion was digging muck out of a ditch. Petitioner testified that he was required to dig more than 30 pounds of muck in each shovelful that he lifted out of the ditch. His description was neither corroborated or refuted, but again, Petitioner was the one who controlled the content of each shovel, and he could have declined to work at that "make work" project. According to Petitioner's time cards, from which information Petitioner received his pay, Petitioner usually worked only 10 hours or less per day after January 9, 1995. Occasionally, he worked more than 10 hours, but less than 11 hours per day. Petitioner and Eddie Payne were fishing buddies outside of work, and on at least one occasion, Eddie Payne treated his subordinates, including Petitioner, to a night-clubbing expedition. Petitioner asserted that on the job, Eddie Payne had used derogatory and profane language to him, on account of his handicaps. Once, when Petitioner wanted to punch-out early, Mr. Payne supposedly said, "Go home if you need to, you crippled old pussy." Once, Mr. Payne allegedly called Petitioner "a crippled old Mother F-----." Mr. Payne denied ever using such language either socially or on the job. Mr. Bradner testified that he had instructed his subordinates against profanity on the job, and related that Mr. Payne had a reputation for not using profanity. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's testimony that any such language had ever been addressed to Petitioner. Petitioner called Matthew Hickox, a co-employee, as a witness. Mr. Hickox related that Petitioner would often "act goofy," by doing a "Quasimodo imitation," twisting his arm, making a face, and dragging one leg behind him. When Petitioner did this, other employees would "make cracks." Petitioner claimed that dragging his leg behind him was evidence of his handicap. Mr. Hickox's opinion was that "disabled don't give you the right to act like a nut and then people not make some comment." Petitioner testified that he had only become entirely disabled since leaving Respondent's employ June 16, 1995. Although Petitioner moved slowly and evidenced pain on rising and sitting, he was able to move around and approach the witness stand at formal hearing. The undersigned observed no twisted arm, facial contortions, or dragging leg. It is inferred from observing the candor and demeanor of all the witnesses, including Petitioner, and from the whole of the evidence, but particularly from Mr. Hickox's testimony, that on such occasions as Petitioner performed his imitation on the job, Mr. Payne or Mr. Bradner may have vehemently ordered Petitioner back to work and warned him to cut out the horseplay. Petitioner claimed to have received only a fifteen-cent per hour raise when other employees received more. According to Petitioner, the other employees, including Mr. Gonzalez, were raised by twenty-five cents per quarter hour for a $1.00 per hour raise. What anyone was being paid before this raise is not in evidence. Since no evidence indicates whether this raise occurred before or after January 9, 1995, when Respondent's management clearly knew of any of Petitioner's restrictions, there was no nexus between the lack of raise and handicap discrimination.2 Petitioner also developed no nexus between this raise and racial discrimination. According to Eddie Payne, Petitioner was a sub-average worker. According to Eddie Payne and Jeff Bradner, they frequently had to instruct Petitioner to resume work. Mr. Bradner related an incident when Petitioner was leaning on a shovel in the parking lot, so Mr. Bradner sarcastically commented, "You're not getting much work done leaning on that shovel," but this motivational comment was not directed at a handicap. No employee testified that any supervisor's instructions to Petitioner, which they observed or overheard, were offensive or otherwise inappropriate. On one occasion, Petitioner was told by Mr. Bradner to stop kicking a "basketball of tape" around; throw it away; and get back to work. No employee other than Petitioner found this instruction offensive. On another occasion, Petitioner was given a written reprimand when a truckload of freight was sent to the wrong location. Petitioner attributed the error to a black "loader" named James Oliver and perceived the reprimand as discriminatory because Mr. Oliver was not reprimanded. Petitioner's superiors reprimanded Petitioner as a formal personnel action instead of Mr. Oliver because they considered Petitioner responsible for the error and resultant costs since Petitioner was in the superior position of checker. Petitioner suffered no loss of pay, hours, or seniority as a result of the reprimand. Petitioner's assertions that he was required to climb tall ladders to change light bulbs in the warehouse, to squat to lift boxes, and to kneel to pull weeds were denied by management witnesses and uncorroborated by Petitioner's witnesses. On one occasion, Petitioner had just come on duty and was having a coke and a cigarette, when Mr. Bradner told him to get to work helping a black loader named "Willie T." unload a truck. On this single occasion, Petitioner may have been asked to lift boxes in excess of 30 pounds, but the boxes also may have weighed as little as 20 pounds. This incident may have occurred before Mr. Bradner knew of Petitioner's medical restrictions on January 9, 1995, but it was probably afterwards. If so, this single incident was contrary to Petitioner's doctor's instructions, but Petitioner admittedly never complained to Mr. Bradner about this one-time incident in terms of "lack of accommodation" for his physical limitations. On the same occasion, Willie T., who already had been loading the truck for three hours, took a coke and cigarette break a half an hour after Petitioner began to help him unload the truck. Willie T. asked Petitioner to join him on his break, which Petitioner did. Mr. Bradner spotted them and instructed Petitioner to return to loading the truck because he felt Petitioner was not entitled to a break after only a half an hour of work, but did feel that Willie T. was entitled to a break after three full hours of work. This was a bona fide business consideration of Respondent. Petitioner failed to establish a nexus of racially discriminatory intent on the basis of this incident. On June 16, 1995, Petitioner was sweeping the warehouse floor, leaving trails of residue behind. Petitioner intended to go back and sweep up the residue, but before he could do so, Mr. Bradner told him that he was leaving trails and that he should do a better job. Petitioner considered this instruction to be demeaning and discriminatory, but he did not reply to Mr. Bradner. Mr. Bradner noted that Petitioner began to do a better job of sweeping, and Mr. Bradner left the area. Petitioner perceived that his co-workers were laughing at the incident and became upset. Petitioner finished sweeping one section of the warehouse and asked Eddie Payne if he could clock-out. He assumed that Eddie Payne knew he was upset because of Mr. Bradner's comment but did not tell him so. Eddie Payne authorized Petitioner to clock-out. Petitioner clocked-out and never returned to work for Respondent
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Human Relations Commission enter a Final Order denying and dismissing the Petition for Relief on all issues. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October, 1998.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner, Erin R. McGuire, is entitled to purchase retirement service credit for the 1980-1981 school year based upon the determination of whether she was on a properly authorized leave of absence for that school year or, conversely, had actually resigned for that year before returning as a full- time employee of the Bay County School System the following year.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a regular class member of the FRS, with some 28 years of service credit. Her entire FRS career has been with the Bay County School District. On October 8, 1980, the Petitioner resigned her employment with the Bay County School System to re-locate her residence to Alabama. She wanted to be closer to her family in Alabama and at the time did not intend to return to Bay County. She changed her mind, however, and on September 9, 1981, was re-hired by the Bay County School System. She has continued her employment with Bay County schools from that time until the present. The Petitioner maintains that she spoke to her school principal after tendering her resignation in 1980, and he persuaded her to rescind her resignation and instead take a leave of absence. No school board record of such a decision or denomination of her absence from employment as a leave of absence, was produced at hearing. The Petitioner did admit that when she left her employment with Bay County in 1980, she had no intention of ever returning at that point. She did, however, return for the following school year and has been employed by Bay County Schools ever since. When a member, such as the Petitioner, seeks to purchase a leave of absence from the FRS, they, and their employer, must verify the leave of absence on the FRS form FR That form is provided by the Division and must be executed by both the employer and the employee. The leave of absence must have been approved by the employer, the school board, either prior to or during the time period of the leave of absence, according to the rule cited herein. When Ms. McGuire submitted her form FR 28 to the school board, the board completed the form indicating that she had resigned on October 8, 1980 (not a leave of absence), and was re-hired as a "new hire" on September 9, 1981. It is also the case that the school board approved amending her record to show the time period in question as a leave of absence. That amendment of her record was approved by the school board on January 14, 2004, however, long after the time period of the purported leave of absence itself.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, denying the Petitioner's request to purchase leave of absence credit for the period October 1980 through September 1981. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Sarabeth Snuggs, Director Division of Retirement Department of Management Services Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Alberto Dominguez, General Counsel Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Thomas E. Wright, Esquire Department of Management Services Division of Retirement 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Erin McGuire 1507 Rhode Island Avenue Lynn Haven, Florida 32444
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, C. DEAN LEWIS, was first employed on March 4, 1966 by the Lafayette County School Board and remained employed by that agency until September 1, 1975. From the time of his employment with that agency, Mr. Lewis was enrolled in the agency retirement system. On September 1, 1975, Petitioner was employed as County Attorney by Suwannee County, Florida. From the time of enrollment in 1966 until such time as the retirement system became non- contributory, sums were withheld from his salary for payment into the retirement fund. When Petitioner became County Attorney for Suwannee County in September 1975, he continued his enrollment in the Florida Retirement System. The evidence presented in the form of enrollment cards fails to show the exact date of enrollment or for what position of employment he was enrolled. However, it is quite clear that Petitioner was enrolled in the Florida Retirement System or its predecessor system continuously since the inception of his employment by a governmental agency. On July 1, 1979, the Division of Retirement issued new rules regarding membership in the Florida Retirement System contained in Section 22B-1.04(5)(6), Florida Administrative Code. On September 15, 1979, the Division of Retirement promulgated its Memorandum No. 79-20, to all Florida Retirement System reporting agencies outlining the new guidelines for enrollment. This memorandum specifically referred to attorneys and encouraged the agency to examine the employment status of attorneys to determine whether that individual was an employee of the agency or merely a contractor. Thereafter on February 26, 1981, the Division of Retirement sent out another memorandum, Number 81-38, again to all retirement system reporting units, which placed specific emphasis on those situations involving employees versus consultants/contractors. This situation clearly pertains to the situation of the Petitioner here. When these memoranda were received by Suwannee County, at least one was inserted in Petitioner's personnel file. At no time, however, was any consideration given to the Petitioner's situation nor was any mention made by the County to the Petitioner regarding these memoranda. In addition, at no time did any representative of the Florida Retirement System or the Division of Retirement have any contact with Petitioner either in person or through correspondence to advise him that his status was under reconsideration and that he had an obligation to clarify his standing to the satisfaction of the Division. In early 1984 the Division of Retirement forwarded an employment relationship questionnaire to the Suwannee County Board of County Commissioners requesting that it complete the questionnaire as it pertained to Petitioner, the County Attorney. This questionnaire was completed by Jerry A. Scarborough, Clerk of the Circuit Court, who was responsible for maintaining the personnel records of Petitioner and most other county employees. On the basis of Mr. Scarborough's answers to various questions, the Division of Retirement on May 14, 1984, advised Petitioner of its intention to disenroll him from the Florida Retirement System. The Division listed some seven areas wherein Mr. Scarborough's answers indicated that Petitioner was a "consultant or other professional person" as defined in Rule 22B-6.01(12), rather than a true employee of the county. As such, Mr. Tom F. Wooten, Chief, Bureau of Enrollment and Contributions, Division of Retirement, concluded that Petitioner was, therefore, not eligible to participate as a member of the Florida Retirement System. Mr. Wooten further indicated the Division's intent to remove him from membership as of July 1, 1979. Thereafter, as was stated previously, on July 6, 1984, Mr. A. J. McMullian, III, State Retirement Director, by letter, advised Petitioner that he had considered his response to the original letter of intent but nonetheless, continued to conclude that he was not eligible to participate as a member of the Florida Retirement System. The July 6, 1984 letter by Mr. McMullian indicated the finality of the Division's decision. It is not now the Division's intention to disenroll Petitioner from the Florida Retirement System effective in 1979. Based on a recent decision of the Florida District Court of Appeals, the Division recognizes that it can reasonably disenroll him no earlier than the date he was first advised of the Division's concern regarding his status. That date is May 14, 1984, the date of the Division's initial letter of intent. The decision by the Division of Retirement to remove Petitioner and other professional contractors from the retirement system is based on its contention that the Petitioner and these other individuals are not bona fide employees of the agency under whose auspices they are enrolled in the system. It is not the position of the Division that only full-time employees can be enrolled. To the contrary, the agency is quite willing to accept that part-time employees are eligible for enrollment providing they meet the other criteria. With regard to the Petitioner and other professionals, primarily attorneys and physicians, it is the Division's contention that they are not true employees of the county but are independent-contractors or consultants who are not eligible for membership in the system. The factors leading to the conclusion drawn by the Division include such things as: Petitioner was not trained or schooled by the county in the professional work he performs; That he is not given instructions as to how the work is to be done; That he is not required to maintain regular office hours established by the county; That the county does not provide him with materials, tools, or equipment to perform his duties; That he is available to provide identical professional services to others in the county and in furtherance of that pursuit, maintains a business listing in the telephone book, and a trade journal to that effect as well as maintaining a private office for the practice of his profession; That he hires, pays, and supervises assistants who assist him in the performance of his law firm duties as well as those duties performed for the county; and That he is not eligible for annual or sick leave from the county. The Petitioner is hired by the county to advise the Board of County Commissioners, constitutional officers, and citizens of the county having business with the county referred to him by the Board. His private law firm also does additional work for the county in other areas for which it is compensated independently. Petitioner's yearly salary, which was recently increased from $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 per year is related solely to his performance of duties as county attorney. In that capacity he does not get involved in the county's litigation. His firm, as well as other firms in the area, is hired by the county separately for that function. Petitioner vehemently denies that any partner of his or any employee substituted or acted for him at meetings of the Board of County Commissioners in his capacity as county attorney. Whenever such partners or employees addressed the Board, they did so on work they were doing for the firm separately from that related to his position as county attorney. Petitioner contends that he spends an average of 10 hours per month on county business of which 80 percent is accomplished at the county courthouse. In addition to these 10 hours per month, citizens of the county, the press, and county officials contact him at home and at other places at all hours of the day and night regarding county business. He is not furnished an office in the county courthouse or any other county building. Though he contended that his seat in the county commission room is his office and the place where he accomplished most of his county related work, and though this contention was supported by the Clerk of Court, Mr. Scarborough, it is clear that in reality, Petitioner does not have an office furnished him by the county, and such work as he accomplished on the county's behalf is done primarily in the office of the official requesting it. It is also most likely that substantial correspondence and other clerical work is accomplished for the county by the petitioner in his private office and is accomplished by his own law firm employees. The county supplies him with some books and manuals including copies of various ordinances, codes, and attorney general opinions. The outside work which he does for the county, including, for example, such things as plat examinations, is billed to the county at a rate of $75.00 per hour. The amount he receives, however, never exceeds the amount received by the county for this service. In 1975, prior to his becoming county attorney, he discussed the potential for assuming this position with his predecessor and law partner, Mr. Airth. One of the major factors convincing him to accept the position of county attorney was the prospective retirement benefits he could expect after fulfilling a number of years in this job. Petitioner was hired by the County Commission on an oral contract basis and has never had a written contract with the county. At the first commissioner's meeting of each year, the Board considers Petitioner's continued relationship with the county and confirms it. It could, at any time, decline to extend the relationship, though it has not yet done so. This arrangement differs from that of a normal consultant in that the relationship with a relationship is terminated automatically when the specific job for which the individual is hired has been completed. Petitioner's relationship has been continuous since 1975 and at the present time there appears to be no indication that it will be terminated in the foreseeable future. His compensation is reported to the Internal Revenue Service on a form W-2. That which was submitted for the year 1983 reflects that social security taxes were withheld but no federal income tax. Petitioner explains this on the basis that he claims four dependents and that, therefore, no tax should have been withheld. This explanation is questionable at best. Petitioner takes exception to several of the answers by Mr. Scarborough on the questionnaire submitted to the Division of Retirement. For example, at question 4b, Petitioner contends that he does in fact attend regularly scheduled meetings of the Board of County Commissioners and other agencies and is, therefore, required to follow daily routines. He contends that he is given the specific work which has to be done and the time in which it is to be accomplished and is, therefore, instructed as to how the work is `to be done by his employer. He contends that this same relationship makes him no different than any other county agency or section director who have authority to accomplish their work with some latitude and discretion. Petitioner also contends that he was hired for one year, not an indefinite period, though he has continued to work since 1975 and anticipates no change in his relationship in the future. He contends that the requirement to attend meetings on definite dates at certain times, which takes up to 60 to 80 percent of his time on the job, constitutes the fixed hours and certain times mentioned in the questionnaire. Further, he indicates that with regard to the determination of the hours when the work should be performed, this decision is made not by the employee as indicated on the questionnaire, but by his employer, the county. Petitioner also contends that such help as he utilizes in performing county business is received from public employees, not from his own law firm employees, and that most of his work is done in the courthouse. While Petitioner does not earn annual leave, sick pay, bonuses, or other benefits, he has been enrolled in the retirement system, was eligible to purchase county insurance, and was carried as any other employee on the county's workers' compensation policy. He is authorized to miss one commission meeting per year for vacation and others during the year as excused for illness. Taken in its totality, it becomes obvious that Petitioner's relationship with Suwannee County, Florida is little different from that of any other attorney-client relationship of long standing. It is clear that Petitioner's relationship with the county, though it may have been intended since May, 1984 to fall within the guidelines set forth by Use Division of Retirement, did not do so from 1975 to the latter date. It is clear that the Petitioner's primary employment was that of a private practitioner. One of his clients, and perhaps his largest client in terms of population, is Suwannee County, but the relationship is that of attorney-client, not that of employer- employee. While Petitioner no doubt is the Suwannee County Attorney, he performs that function as a private practitioner and not as a member of the county work force even though his salary is paid from the general salary and wages account.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, C. DEAN LEWIS, be disenrolled from the Florida Retirement System effective May 14, 1984. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of February, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William A. Frieder, Esquire Division of Retirement 2639 North Monroe Street Suite 207 - Building C Tallahassee, Florida 32303 C. Dean Lewis, Esquire c/o Airth, Sellers, Lewis & Decker Post Office Drawer 8 Live Oak, Florida 32060 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
