Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Larry Zeigler, started working for the Quincy Telephone Company as a lineman in the cable maintenance section in 1976 or 1977. His duties include the installing of telephone cable, both buried and aerial. He worked on the job with Claude Butler, Cleveland Zeigler, and Melton W. (Toby) Bruce. These four men, with several others, made up the entire cable and construction section. Among the men in that section, Butler had the most seniority and as a result did most of the paperwork. The job assignments were banded out to the crews by the supervisor of the section and it was company practice that the senior individual was the one in charge and normally responsible for accomplishing the paperwork. Telephone installation at this Company is primarily divided into two major sections. Cable and construction (C&C) is responsible for the outside installation of cable and telephone lines up to a building. Installation and repair (I&R) is a separate department which deals with inside wiring and the actual connection of the telephone instruments. C&C is and was at the time in question supervised by Bruce Gaston. I&R was not. In early May, 1983, Petitioner was transferred for a period of time to I&R to help out though he was still assigned to C&C. Right after lunch on May 27, 1983, he was directed to go to see Bruce Gaston, his supervisor, who advised him that the company was being forced to lay off a number of employees and that he, petitioner, had been selected as one of those. Petitioner contends that neither Gaston nor any other company official ever gave him a reason for discharge other than the force reduction, but this is not so. He claims, however, Gaston did advise at that time that he was aware of petitioner's previous discrimination complaint and that petitioner should not file one this time. Petitioner was confused over these developments. When he was sent over to I&R to help out, he was told that he was the only one in C&C with the skills needed at I&R. If that were the case, he reasoned, why should he be laid off without warning. In addition, at one point during 1982, Petitioner had asked Gaston for a transfer to I&R but was refused at that time because, according to petitioner, Gaston said he was needed in C&C. Petitioner was one of three individuals from the C&C section who were laid off. The others were Horace Jenkins, who is black, and Toby Bruce, who is white. Several individuals from I&R were also laid off and in the interim since the layoff, at least one new employee has been hired. Petitioner is convinced that he could do the job either in C&C or in I&R which was filled by outside recruitment since he was laid off. When a new parent company took over the operation of the Quincy Telephone Company in early 1983, there was a meeting held for all company employees at which a senior management official advised the employees that no layoffs were anticipated. Petitioner denies having any serious trouble with his employment while working for the company. To be sure, there were some rough spots, however. He had some trouble working with Melvin Locke, a more senior employee. According to Petitioner, Locke was lazy and did not want to work, pushing his work off on the Petitioner. They had words and Petitioner brought the matter up with Mr. Gaston. The following day, Mr. Forshay talked with Petitioner about it and advised him to do whatever Locke directed. Though Petitioner did not consider this to be particularly fair, nonetheless, he did as he was told. According to Gaston, however, Petitioner was assigned to work with Locke for on-the-job training in maintenance. It appeared he was selective as to what orders he would follow, refusing to learn how to do maintenance in those areas that did not interest him. On another occasion, according to Petitioner, when he drove a company vehicle into the work lot, Forshay told him he was driving too fast. In doing so, he says, Forshay cursed him in front of outsiders. On still another occasion, he disagreed with the way Forshay handled one of his absences. In summary of Petitioner's position, he feels that he was discriminated against when discharged because: he was there longer than others who were not discharged; less experienced people were retained instead of him; he had several disputes with Mr. Forshay; and, he filed a prior discrimination complaint which he won and had to be rehired. In May, 1983, Gaston was advised by Mrs. Corbin, the general manager of the company, that there was going to be a reduction in force. He was instructed how to identify those to be retained and those to be discharged. The emphasis was to be placed on selecting the best people for retention - not the worst people for discharge. In other words, supervisors were to examine their people closely with a positive attitude to identify those with the best records and the best potential rather than looking for reasons to discharge those with lesser records or potential. He was advised that of the 9 technicians working for him he would be allowed to retain only 6. Using the criteria given him he selected the 6 he would be able to keep which resulted in Petitioner, Mr. H. Jenkins, and Toby Bruce being identified as those not to be retained. Gaston then discussed his selections with Mr. Forshay who in turn forwarded them to Mrs. Corbin with his concurrence. Mrs. Corbin made the ultimate selection and decision. In going over the personnel records of the people in his section, Gaston made a memo on each one which he subsequently placed in each employee's file. There were several significant factors on the memo about Mr. Zeigler which contributed to his being one of the lowest three rated individuals in the section. These were: He frequently missed work for reasons other than illness. Review of Petitioner's time records kept by Mr. Gaston showed that in 1980. Petitioner was late 6 times and absent 11 times. All absences referred to here are unexcused absences wherein the employee did not call in advance to let anyone know he would not be in. This required a readjustment of the work schedule made up in advance on the expectation of the employee's presence. In 1981, he was late 5 times and absent 4 days. Gaston considered this to be an abuse of time off and Petitioner's absentee and tardy rates were much higher than those of the other employees in the section. Other disciplinary problems: On October 5, 1981, Petitioner requested that his time sheet be falsified (that time taken off as personal time be reported as sick leave). Petitioner did not deny this which, according to the company personnel handbook is grounds for dismissal. Though Gaston recommended this, dismissal action was not taken because it appeared to be an isolated incident. Petitioner broke his arm and took time off to see the doctor with the understanding he would call to report when he would be back to work. He failed to call and could not be reached by phone because his service had been disconnected for nonpayment of the bill even though, as a company employee, he got local service free and a discount on toll service. At this point in time, the company required employees to have a phone so that they could be reached in an emergency. Petitioner knew this. Again, here, Gaston recommended disciplinary action and again none was taken even though this was the second time this had happened. Employee conflict with Mr. Locke referenced above. Petitioner's training scores in courses which, though not required, would be beneficial to him in the performance of his duties, were below standard. He was given the opportunity to take the same material on two separate occasions: once at a company school in Winter Park where his scores were unsatisfactory, and again, from a black instructor in Quincy where, again, his score was unsatisfactory. No other student failed to achieve a satisfactory score. Error rate. The reports for January through May, 1983 and after the force reduction, kept by Gaston on the basis of checks made at random with full knowledge of the employees, reveal that the three employees who were laid off from this section were weak with Petitioner having a very high error rate. After the lay off the remaining people doing the same amount of work as before, made fewer errors than while these three were still employed. Paperwork. From time to time, Petitioner was in charge of details which required the completion of paperwork. His paperwork was unsatisfactory. He would let other people on the job do the paperwork. In making the decision as to who was to be retained and who was to be released, seniority was not the key element. Performance and capability were more important and seniority was important only if it carried with it the experience and competence needed. On the basis of the above factors, Gaston felt, and it is clear that his judgment was accurate, that Petitioner's record, not considering his seniority, reflected limited potential and competence. Mr. Gaston did not want to lay off any employees, black or white, because he felt there was ample work to do to keep the entire work force occupied. The work has not let up since the lay off but has increased. Notwithstanding Petitioner's comments that he was not given a reason for his lay off, Mr. Gaston fully explained to each terminated employee why he was being laid off. Mr. Bruce indicates that Gaston told him that if he had his choice, Bruce would still be working. This is true. A similar comment was made to each of the three men being discharged and it had no racial connotation at all. Gaston did want to keep each employee if he could. Race has never been an issue in the department and he always felt race relations were good. Mr. Gaston discharged Petitioner because he was the weakest employee in the section. He was the employee with the least potential for being able to accomplish all the tasks anticipated after the cutback. There are some minor inconsistencies in the official records as reflected by the employee performance appraisal forms rendered on the Petitioner and the personal work records kept by Gaston in his department. They are such things as tardiness and absences and some of the factors relied upon by Gaston in his analysis of the employee which he testified to at the hearing do not specifically appear on the appraisal forms. Gaston justified not putting them there by contending that he felt that at the time the deficiencies were noted, the appropriate corrective action was taken and the matter would not have been raised again had it not been for the cutback. Use of these factors was appropriate in weighing Petitioner's future use to the company in a comparison against other employees. Mr. Gaston's evaluation of Petitioner appears to have been accurate as other employees with whom he worked, such as Evant Jenkins, indicating that when Petitioner was assigned to him for training for several weeks, Petitioner did well in those areas in which he had an interest, but completely failed to learn anything that did not interest him. Mr. Butler also worked with Petitioner frequently and felt that though Petitioner could do the work, there were times he was difficult to work with and insisted on doing things his own way. Petitioner's uncle, Cleveland Zeigler, knows Petitioner's work and rates him as an acceptable worker. He states, however, that the people hired since the lay off in 1983 are high quality people and the work standards and performance have improved since that time. Toby Bruce feels that both Petitioner and Jenkins were highly qualified, perhaps even more so than he. He also feels that the layoffs were not appropriately done in some case with the wrong people being let go. He feels that he was not treated fairly because he had a house mortgage on which to pay, two cars on which to pay, and a family to support and with that, he was let go without notice with only two weeks severance pay. His obvious bias makes his credibility questionable. Mrs. Corbin made her ultimate decision on who would be retained and who would not on the basis of the entire personnel record of each employee which she reviewed over the several weeks prior to the cutback. She contends she had no choice in implementing the layoffs - that though she fought against them, she was directed by higher headquarters to put them into effect. She is convinced that Petitioner is a good construction man but his performance reports showed that he needs training in maintenance and it is her confirmed opinion that he could not compete with those identified for retention. It was on this basis and not on race that the decision was made to let him go. Race has not been an issue with the company and in fact there is a very active and strong equal opportunity program in effect. Of the 11 people cut from the total work force, 6 were white and 5 were black. Even after the cutback, blacks still accounted for 32 percent of the staff of 65.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitioner, Larry Zeigler's Petition for Relief be denied. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida, this 29th day of March, 1985. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of March, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Srygley, Esquire 1030 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Blutcher B. Lines, Esquire P.O. Box 5500 Quincy, Florida 32351 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a telephone salesperson license should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (Department), is the state licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility of administering and enforcing Chapter 501, Part IV, Florida Statutes, the Florida Telemarketing Act. On or about November 29, 1999, Petitioner, Gary A. Pappas (Petitioner), applied for licensure as a telephone salesperson. By letter dated February 10, 2000, the Department issued a letter denying Petitioner's application for licensure. According to the letter, the basis for denial of the license was Petitioner's felony conviction and his failure to disclose information relative to the felony conviction on his licensure application. As a part of the Department's application review process, a background investigation is conducted on each applicant. In this case, the Department had such an investigation done on Petitioner. The results of the background investigation of Petitioner revealed that he had been charged and convicted of a felony offense. According to the background investigation report, on October 17, 1988, in Pinellas County, Florida, Petitioner was convicted of a felony offense, constructive possession of an illegal substance. The report further indicated that adjudication was withheld. The Department's application form for licensure as a telephone salesperson contained Question 3 which requested information concerning the applicant's criminal history. In pertinent part, the question is as follows: 3. Please complete this section if you: a. Have previously been arrested for, convicted of or are under indictment or information for a felony and, if so, the nature of the felony. Conviction includes a finding of guilt where adjudication has been withheld. * * * If you have not been subject to any charge set forth above and are not subject to any current or restrictive order, then mark your initials in the [preceding] box. Your true name at the time of the action: Court or administrative agency rendering the decision, judgement [sic] or order: Date of conviction, judgement [sic] or order: / / Docket# Name of governmental agency which brought the action: Nature of conviction, judgement [sic], order or action: In response to Question 3, Petitioner initialed the box next to the statement, "If you have not been subject to any charge set forth above and are not subject to any current or restrictive order, then mark your initials in the box. The term "charge set forth above" referred to the offenses described in subsections a, b, c, d, and/or e of Question 3. In this case, only subsection a of Question 3 is relevant. By initialing the box mentioned in paragraph 7 above, Petitioner was indicating that he had never been convicted of a felony. On November 29, 1999, Petitioner signed his completed application for licensure as a telephone salesperson. On the application, immediately above the applicant signature line, the following statement was printed in bold letters: I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN QUESTIONS 1-3, AND IN THE EXHIBITS ATTACHED HERETO, IS TRUE AND CORRECT. At the formal hearing, Petitioner admitted that in 1988, he had been convicted of a felony and adjudication had been withheld. He also testified that the conviction was for the sale and possession of marijuana. Although Petitioner had been convicted of a felony, he failed to disclose the conviction on his application for licensure as a telephone salesperson. Petitioner testified that he was misinformed and had misread and misinterpreted Question 3. Petitioner also testified that because the incident occurred more than ten years ago and adjudication was withheld, he thought the conviction did not have to be disclosed on the application. Petitioner's stated justification for failing to disclose his 1988 felony conviction lacks credibility given the clear wording of Question 3 on the application for licensure. Notwithstanding Petitioner's statements to the contrary, his testimony established that he was capable of reading and interpreting the questions on the application, including Question 3. Petitioner has had no felony convictions since the aforementioned conviction in 1988.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order denying Petitioner's request for licensure as a telephone salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of September, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of September, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Suite 508 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 William N. Graham, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 515 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Gary A. Pappas 2555 Oak Trail North, Number 114 Clearwater, Florida 33764
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner for registration as an electronic repair dealer should be denied.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Jack Resnick d/b/a Smart Service petitioned for an administrative hearing upon receipt from the Respondent of a Notice of Intent to Deny License or Registration. The hearing was scheduled for November 27, 1978 at 2:00 p.m. in Tallahassee, Florida. Prior to the hearing the parties requested that the Hearing Officer write a Recommended Order upon submission of "Stipulation of Facts and Questions of Law" filed jointly by the parties, copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The instruments filed in this case reflect that in February, 1978 Petitioner Jack Resnick applied to the Respondent, Division of General Regulation, for an electronic repair dealer registration under the provisions of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. In April, 1978 the Respondent notified Petitioner of its intent to deny said application for registration for the reason that applicant Jack Resnick intended to employ one Arthur Resnick as a repair work person In the business. Previously, in 1976 Arthur Resnick had been denied a registration certificate as an electronic service dealer by the Respondent, having been determined to be unfit and ineligible to be registered as an electronic repair service dealer. The Recommended Order entered in that cause, which was adopted as Respondent's final order, made the following; findings of fact: Arthur Resnick caused to be advertised in local (Florida)newspaper advertisements which would the public believe Arthur Resnick Television Repair Service was registered with the Bureau of Electronic Repair when, in fact, it was not. Arthur Resnick had been asked to disclose on his application for registration whether he had been convicted of a felony, misdemeanor, or any infraction other than traffic viola- tions to which Arthur Resnick answered "no" when, in fact, Arthur Resnick had been convicted of three counts of theft by deception involving the repair of television sets by the Court of Common Pleas in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania. The Hearing Officer concluded that: The acts and conduct of the Petitioner in operating without a registration; advertising in a leading and deceptive manner; making false statements as an inducement to the public to authorize repair, and his failure to answer truthfully to certain questions on his sworn application for registration is good and sufficient cause for the director of the Department of Business Regulation, Division of General Regulations to deny the Petitioner a registration certificate as an electronic service dealer. The order of the Respondent adopted the Recommended Order noting that it had received no exceptions to the Recommended Order from either party and thereupon denied the application for registration as an electronic service dealer filed by Arthur Resnick. The application of Petitioner Jack Resnick indicates that he is to be the sole proprietor of the business Smart Service. It indicates that Arthur Resnick, who has the same address as the Petitioner, is to do repair work with a possible employee named Jerry Cohen. Respondent gave no other reason for the denial of Petitioner's application except for the indicated employment of Arthur Resnick.
Recommendation Retract the Notice of Intent to Deny License or Registration which was based on the fact that Arthur Resnick was the prospective employee of the Petitioner. Grant Petitioner's application for registration as an electronic repair dealer providing he presently meets the requirements of the Respondent. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of December, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David M. Hudson, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Depariment of Business Regulation The Johns Building 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Alexander M. Siegel, Esquire 1303 North State Road 7 Margate, Florida 33062 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION JACK RESNICK and SMART SERVICE, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 78-1687 DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION, DIVISION OF GENERAL REGULATION, Respondent. /
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
The Issue The issue in this matter is whether Respondent, Management & Training Corporation1 (“Respondent”) subjected Petitioner, Songa Y. Clark (“Petitioner” or “Ms. Clark”), to employment discrimination. 1 Management & Training Corporation is the correct name of Petitioner’s former employer. Thus, the case style has been amended accordingly.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to notice, on June 1, 2021, this matter was scheduled for hearing on July 19 and 20, 2021. The hearing was initially scheduled for an in-person proceeding. On July 15, 2021, the undersigned issued an Amended Notice of Hearing, with the hearing to be conducted on the same dates by Zoom teleconference. The Notice of Hearing and Amended Notice of Hearing by Zoom Conference were not only placed on the online docket, but were mailed to Petitioner at her address of record (900 Timberlane Road, Bainbridge, Georgia 39817). Furthermore, the Zoom teleconference information was emailed to the email address for Petitioner provided in her Complaint and Petition. The final hearing began on July 19, 2021, at 9:30 a.m., as scheduled, Petitioner was not present when the hearing convened. Counsel for Respondent was present and prepared to present Respondent’s case. The hearing reconvened at 10:15 a.m., but Petitioner was still not present. During preliminary matters, the undersigned considered Respondent’s two Motions to Dismiss,2 which the undersigned denied. The hearing was again recessed at approximately 10:20 a.m. and reconvened at approximately 10:25 a.m. Petitioner had not appeared at the hearing, or contacted DOAH or Respondent. The hearing was then adjourned without Petitioner making an appearance herself or through representation. The Complaint alleged that Petitioner was the subject of employment discrimination based upon religion. FCHR issued a Notice of Determination of finding: “No Reasonable Cause.” Thus, Petitioner was entitled to an administrative hearing before DOAH regarding whether Respondent subjected Petitioner to unlawful employment action. Petitioner presented no evidence in support of her claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the petition with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of July, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Lindsay Dennis Swiger, Esquire Jackson Lewis PC 501 Riverside Avenue, Suite 902 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Christina Pignatelli 500 North Marketplace Drive Centerville, Utah 84014 Songa Y. Clark 900 Timberlane Road Bainbridge, Georgia 39817 Katherine B. Brezinski, Esquire Jackson Lewis P.C. 501 Riverside Avenue, Suite 902 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petition for Relief, charging the Respondent with sex discrimination, should be granted.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bay Area Medical Exchange Serving Hillsborough County, Inc., operates a telephone answering service business for area medical physicians. It employs 15 or more in the business. 1/ The Petitioner, Stotherd Darby, a male, began telephoning the Respondent, in October, 1989, in response to advertisements in the Tampa Tribune for full-time help wanted. Ads generally appeared in the newspaper weekly, and each time the Petitioner would telephone in response. Each time the Respondent would tell the Petitioner that the positions had been filled. In fact, the Respondent told the Petitioner that the positions had been filled because the Respondent did not want to hire a male for the job. 2/ The Respondent conceded that, aside from his gender, the Petitioner was qualified for the job. Based on out-of-court statements, the Respondent claims not to want to hire a male for the job because its clientele of medical doctors allegedly do not want their obstetrical-gynecological patients to have to talk to a male voice when calling the answering service. Allegedly, during the night shift, for which the Petitioner was applying, only two employees worked the switchboard. If one was male, the chances would be good that some ob-gyn patients calling the answering service at night would be connected to a male operator. Allegedly, if the other operator on duty were occupied, it would cause a delay if the patient insisted on talking to a female. The Respondent did not want to hire any male answering service operators because the Respondent would not let a male work the night shift and because letting males work even the day shift would reduce the Respondent's flexibility in covering the night shift in the event of the termination or absence of the regular night shift personnel. The Respondent did not appear at the final hearing, and the evidence did not prove that the Respondent's refusal to hire males as switchboard operators is reasonably necessary for the performance of the job of telephone answering service switchboard operator for the Respondent. In addition, it is clear that males could be hired for the day shift with no repercussions other than inconveniencing the Respondent by impinging on its flexibility in covering for the regular night shift when necessary. Also, there is little reason for a patient to tell an answering service switchboard operator very much more than the patient's name and phone number, and maybe a very general description of the medical condition about which the patient is calling. The Respondent did not prove that imparting this minimal information to a male answering service operator would embarass an ob-gyn patient. After December 15, 1989, the Petitioner sought and obtained other employment on a part-time basis. Meanwhile, the Petitioner took courses necessary to become licensed as a security guard. He obtained full-time employment as a security guard on or about July 1, 1990. Subtracting the time the Petitioner spent in classes required for licensure as a security guard, and subtracting what the Petitioner earned in his part-time employment, and not including the cost of tuition and fees for obtaining his security guard license, the Petitioner's would have earned approximately $2,200 more than he did between December 15, 1989, and July 1, 1990, had he been hired by the Respondent for the position advertised on or about December 15, 1989.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order granting the Petition for Relief filed in this case, prohibiting the Respondent from the practice of refusing to hire male telephone answering service switchboard operators, and requiring the Respondent to pay the Petitioner $2,200. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner is MCI Telecommunications Corporation, whose business address is Suite 400, 400 Perimeter Center Terrace NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30346. The Respondent is State of Florida, Department of General Service, whose address is 614 Larson Building, 200 East Gaines Street, Tallahassee, Florida. The Intervenors are Microtel, Inc., whose address is 7100 West Camino Real, Suite 311, Boca Raton, Florida 33433, and United States Transmission Systems, whose business address is 320 Park Avenue, New York, New York 10022. MCI, Microtel, AT&T, Southland, and USTS are all interexchange carriers authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to provide, among other things, interstate WATS. MCI, AT&T, Southland, and Microtel are all interexchange carriers certified by the Florida Public Service Commission to provide, among other things, intermachine trunks and intrastate WATS. The interexchange carriers who participated in the November 5, 1987, negotiations were not advised prior to 9:00 a.m. on that day that the negotiations would consist of three rounds of price quotations with the prices quoted and each round being posted immediately on the board for review by the other carriers. The posting by the Division of Purchasing between 3:00 p.m. on November 2, 1987, and 3:00 p.m. on November 5, 1987, of a draft memorandum from William Monroe to Glenn Mayne was not a bid tabulation. The State of Florida provides a communications system to state agencies, local governments, and public school districts through the SUNCOM Network. The SUNCOM Network consists of switches, access lines, and transmission facilities such as Intermachine Trunks, Interstate WATS, and Intrastate WATS. On the SUNCOM Network, long distance calls from one SUNCOM user to another SUNCOM user are completed on IMTs. Intrastate WATS facilities are used to place in-state long distance calls from a SUNCOM user to a party not a member of the SUNCOM Network. Interstate WATS facilities are used to complete out-of-state long distance calls. The Division of Communications desired to migrate the data users of the SUNCON Network from an analog environment to a digital environment. In order to do that, there had to be changes to the SUNCOM switching facilities and changes to the transmission facilities. In 1984, a Request for Proposal (RFP) was issued for the switches. As a result of the RFP, the network went from 5 to 11 switches on December 1, 1986. The Division of Communications decided to utilize digital transmission facilities for both IMTs and Interstate WATS facilities on the newly configured network. In 1985, the Division of Communications negotiated a contract with MCI for the provision of the Interstate WATS. MCI made no protest to being awarded the contract by negotiation. AT&T was selected to provide the IMTs. The selection of AT&T and MCI was an interim measure to give the Division of Communications time to evaluate the transmission facilities for changes after the new network had stabilized. At the time of the final hearing, AT&T was the current provider for the IMTs and Intrastate WATS and MCI was the current provider for the Interstate WATS. On March 1, 1987, the Division of Communications and the Division of Purchasing sent a letter to seventeen suppliers of transmission facilities. The letter advised the suppliers that the Division of Communications was beginning an evaluation process to determine the viability of replacing some or all of the SUNCOM Network completion facilities with different suppliers. The suppliers were advised that a potential supplier did not have to service all routes or provide all facilities in order to be considered. Suppliers were requested to provide information concerning their transmission facilities. It was contemplated that the transmission facilities would be tested for approximately 90 days, during which time there would be consideration of reliability, maintainability, cost, and billing. The evaluation process also contemplated consideration of corporate viability and status, network typology, and references from existing customers similar in size to the State of Florida. The suppliers were cautioned that their participation in the evaluation process did not guarantee a contract and that it was possible that the evaluation process might not result in any contract. The suppliers were also advised that any contract would be negotiated. The March 18, 1987, letter is a request for information and was so considered by the Division of Communications and the Division of Purchasing. By April 9, 1987, the Department of General Services had received ten responses to the March 18, 1987, letter. A five member evaluation team was formed to review the April 9 responses from the suppliers, conduct the oral presentations, conduct the 90-day test and make recommendations. The evaluation committee was comprised of five employees of the Division of Communications. Division of Purchasing personnel did not actively participate on the evaluation committee because they wanted to remain impartial in the event the Division of Purchasing would later have to decide what method of procurement to use. Each potential supplier was scheduled for an oral presentation in late April or early May of 1987. Additional information about the proposals was obtained at those presentations. The suppliers were asked during oral presentation if their prices were open for negotiation. Ed Martinez of MCI said that MCI was open for negotiation. Of the carriers that survived the technical evaluation process, MCI had submitted the lowest price for all of the solicited telecommunications facilities and services. An in-service test of the ten suppliers was conducted from July 10 to September 30, 1987. One supplier, Lightnet, disconnected its transmission facility prior to the end of the test period. Robert Davis, chairman of the evaluation committee, used a numerical rating scheme to assist in evaluating the suppliers. The numerical point system was used as a way to make the evaluation process more objective. Additionally, when the evaluation was begun, the evaluation committee did not know whether contracts would be awarded through a formal acquisition process or through negotiation. The committee thought that an orderly ranking of the participants based on a rating scheme would be beneficial to Mr. Mayne in determining the method of acquisition. Mr. Mayne was unaware that a numerical point system was being used to evaluate the responses until he read the report prepared by the evaluation committee. On October 16, 1987, the evaluation committee issued the "Report on Alternate Suppliers for SUNCOM Network Transmission Facilities." The report outlined the evaluation process, presented the findings of the committee in the areas of pricing, billing, reliability-maintainability, corporate viability and general compliance by the suppliers, and made recommendations based on their findings. The evaluation committee concluded that, based on the prices submitted by the suppliers, it was possible for the state to reduce the cost of the operation of the network by over $368,000 per month. In considering the corporate viability of a supplier, the evaluation committee did not intend to conduct an indepth financial analysis. The evaluation committee wanted to determine whether the suppliers would have the ability to survive in a competitive environment for the contract period of three years. Both DGS' staff and MCI's financial analysis expert agreed that ITT, MCI, Microtel, AT&T and Southland were in a position to maintain their corporate viability for the contract period. The evaluation committee recognized that there was an opportunity to further reduce the cost of the network transmission facilities. The committee recommended that the IMTs, Interstate WATS and Intrastate WATS not be provided by one supplier. It was also recommended that Sprint, Digital Signal, and Lightnet be eliminated from further consideration. The report did not recommend specific suppliers. The committee recognized that if the point evaluation were used that the ranking would change as the result of further negotiations. They felt that if a decision was made not to use the point evaluation, then low cost would determine the suppliers. The report was presented to Glenn Mayne for his consideration. Based on his review of the report, Mr. Mayne determined that the State was currently paying far too much money for the transmission facilities; the State desired to have more than one supplier for the transmission facilities; and there was a group of potential alternate suppliers who could supply the State with transmission facilities which would be acceptable for the SUNCOM Network. As soon as Mr. Mayne became aware of the enormous potential savings to the State (and probably because of that awareness) things began to happen very quickly. A copy of the evaluation report was given to Bill Monroe. Mr. Mayne and Mr. Monroe discussed the report and Mr. Mayne expressed some concerns relating to the Division of Communications' need to migrate data signals to the network. Monroe asked that those concerns be put in writing. Mr. Mayne complied by memorandum dated October 28, 1987, in which he expressed his concerns relating to the discontinuance of Telpak and the Division of Communications' plans to migrate data to the voice network. The desire to address these concerns in the negotiations was due primarily to an AT&T proposal submitted in the late summer or early fall of 1987, which addressed these concerns. The Department had made no effort to obtain proposals similar to AT&T's from the other suppliers prior to requesting authority to negotiate from the Division of Purchasing. The Division of Purchasing deemed the October 28 memorandum to be the Division of Communications' formal request for the authority to negotiate. Mr. Monroe authorized the Division of Communications to negotiate contracts for the transmission facilities and services for the SUNCOM Network. The authorization to negotiate was granted because the providing of transmission facilities and services was a regulated portion of the telephone industry; the participants were limited to those which met Florida Public Service Commission guidelines for facility based operations; an indepth evaluation of the suppliers had been performed; and the delay incident to using any other procurement method would result in a substantial monetary loss to the State. The most significant factor in the decision to negotiate was the monetary loss which would result from delay. The authorization memorandum recommended that the negotiation be handled as a joint venture between the Division of Communications and the Division of Purchasing, and that the Division of Purchasing participate in development of the criteria for final selection of a supplier. Mr. Mayne discussed the method of negotiations to be used with Mr. Monroe and his staff. Based on his past experience with one-on-one negotiations, Mr. Mayne felt it would be fairer to put up everyone's prices on the board so that all suppliers could see each others prices. Mr. Mayne suggested that there be two verbal rounds of pricing and a final round in writing. Mr. Monroe concurred with Mr. Mayne's suggestion. It was felt this method of negotiations would result in better pricing for the State; could be done quickly and easily; and would reduce the chance of one supplier being favored over another. The intended decision of the Division of Purchasing to authorize the negotiation was posted in the Division of Purchasing beginning November 2, 1987, at 3:00 p.m. The posting was in the form of a post-dated, unsigned memorandum from the Division of Purchasing Director to the Division of Communications Director. Stamped at the bottom of the draft memorandum was the language required by Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, indicating that the failure to file a timely protest would constitute a waiver of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, proceedings. In large letters at the top of this posting was the word DRAFT. Each of the ten suppliers was notified that the Division of Purchasing had authorized negotiations and that this decision would be posted beginning November 2 through November 5, 1987. On November 2, 1987, Cherrie McClellan, a purchasing specialist for the Division of Purchasing, called MCI's Ed Martinez to advise him that the authorization for the Division of Communications to negotiate for the procurement of the SUNCOM Network alternate suppliers would be posted from 3:00 p.m. November 2, 1987 to 3:00 p.m. November 5, 1987. Ms. McClellan was unable to reach Mr. Martinez and left the message on his recording machine. On November 3, 1987, Mr. Martinez called Ms. McClellan to confirm the message. She told him that the posting was for the authority for the Division of Communications to negotiate and she assumed that the Division of Communications would be contacting him. In giving the telephone notification to MCI, the Division of Purchasing did not specifically advise MCI that its failure to file a timely protest of the Division of Purchasing's decision would waive MCI's rights to proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. On November 3, Mr. Martinez also called John Fain, a purchasing specialist supervisor with the Division of Purchasing. Mr. Fain advised Mr. Martinez that the Division of Purchasing had received a request for authority to negotiate from the Division of Communications, final negotiation could not begin until after the conclusion of the posting at 3:00 p.m. on November 5, 1987, and he did not know if there would be another posting. On November 2, 1987, Mohammed Amirzadeh Asl, an electrical engineer with the Division of Communications, called Ed Martinez between 2:00 and 3:00 p.m.; invited him to the negotiations on November 5; told him to bring his best prices for IMT routes and personnel who could make a decision; advised him he would have access during the negotiations to a phone but he had to use his credit card for any calls; and told him that DGS would be faxing him additional information concerning the negotiations. Mr. Amirzadeh also advised the other suppliers on November 2 of the negotiations and told them the same thing he had told Mr. Martinez. Mr. Martinez called Mr. Amirzadeh on November 3 and 4 with questions concerning the negotiations. On November 4, DGS faxed a memorandum to the suppliers concerning the criteria for the negotiations and the prices which had been quoted thus far to the Division of Communications. The memorandum advised the suppliers that preliminary discussions would start at 9:00 a.m. on November 5 at the Division of Communications and official negotiations would not start until 3:00 p.m. When Mr. Martinez, the MCI representative, came to the negotiations, he expected the Department to negotiate first with MCI to attempt to reach a mutually satisfactory agreement for the solicited telecommunications facilities and services, and he expected the Department to negotiate with other suppliers only if the negotiations with MCI were unsuccessful. These expectations were based on MCI's status as one of the incumbent suppliers, on the fact that the Department appeared to very satisfied with MCI's performance, and on the fact that MCI had submitted the lowest price proposals for all of the solicited telecommunications facilities and services in its April 9, 1987, submittal. These expectations were unwarranted. The negotiations began at 9:00 a.m. on November 5,1987. Glenn Mayne started out the negotiations by discussing the criteria which had been faxed to the suppliers on November 4. The suppliers were also given copies of the evaluation committee report. The suppliers were advised that there would be three rounds of negotiations The first two rounds would be preliminary. The last round of negotiation was to take place prior to 5:00 p.m. There were some assumptions that the suppliers were given to use in presenting their prices. The suppliers' prices were to be for one T-1 on each route, and the costs were to include access charges. Additionally, if there was any difference between the quoted and actual access charges the difference would be the responsibility of the supplier. The format used by the Division of Communications for the negotiations on November 5, 1987, was not normally used by the Department. The first round of pricing was at 11:00 a.m. Each supplier gave its price orally and as the price was given it was written on a board in the room. An objection was raised by one of the suppliers that the method used could give the last supplier an advantage because he would have seen all of the other suppliers' prices prior to giving his price. The second round was scheduled for 2:00 p.m. The method of receiving prices was changed to accommodate the objections at the first round. In the second round each participant wrote his prices on a piece of paper, all the papers were picked up, the papers opened, and the prices were written on the board. Between the second and third rounds, each supplier was given an opportunity to meet with Mr. Mayne and his staff. Mr. Martinez met with Mr. Mayne and his staff at 3:00 p.m. During the meeting, Mr. Mayne advised Mr. Martinez that DGS would like two separate fibers for each T-1 route for IMTs. The price for IMTs given by Microtel was approximately $9.50 per mile month. The corresponding price for MCI was around $15 or $16 per mile month. Mr. Mayne advised Mr. Martinez that, in order for MCI to be considered for a portion of the IMTs, MCI's price needed to be around $10 per mile month. Mr. Mayne did not reference access charges when he discussed the $10 per mile month. One of the assumptions of the pricing for the negotiations was that all prices would include access charges. During the meeting, Mr. Mayne told Mr. Martinez that MCI's price for IMTs was almost twice as much as the other suppliers. Additionally during the 3:00 p.m. meeting between Mr. Mayne and Mr. Martinez, Mr. Mayne explained to Mr. Martinez that the suppliers would reconvene at 4:00 p.m. and report their final responses and the last round of pricing would be before 5:00 p.m. Notwithstanding the clear explanation of when the suppliers would have their last opportunity to give their final prices, Mr. Martinez was apparently confused because he thought (albeit erroneously) that he would have another opportunity to offer a price after the third round. Because he thought that as an incumbent supplier MCI would have another opportunity to offer a price after all of the other suppliers had given their final prices, Mr. Martinez made a judgment call not to offer MCI's best price during the third round of the negotiations. The best price that Mr. Martinez was authorized to offer on the interstate WATS was slightly higher than the best price actually offered by another supplier. Mr. Martinez appears to be the only one who was confused about the finality of the third round of negotiations. It would not have been fair to the other suppliers to have afforded MCI an opportunity to submit further prices after the third round. No one from the Department of General Services advised Mr. Martinez that he would be given an opportunity to present further pricing after the other suppliers had given their best and final prices. The suppliers reconvened at 4:00 p.m. A supplier inquired whether the prices could be given before 5:00 p.m. Mr. Mayne asked the other suppliers whether they were ready and no one objected to giving the prices before 5:00 p.m. Mr. Mayne emphasized the third round was the last round. The suppliers gave their final prices at 4:19 p.m. The suppliers were asked to sign the sheets which contained their prices for the last round. Microtel submitted the lowest price for IMTs at $8.89 per mile. MCI's price for the IMTs was $12.52 per mile. ITT submitted the lowest price for Interstate WATS facilities at $.1249 per minute. MCI submitted $.1285 per minute for the Interstate WATS facilities. MCI submitted the lowest price for Intrastate WATS facilities at $.1133 per minute. Microtel submitted $.1139 per minute for the Intrastate WATS facilities. At the conclusion of the final round of pricing, AT&T indicated that they had additional pricing which was contained in a proposal submitted to Mr. Mayne in late summer or early fall of 1987. Mr. Mayne thought that AT&T had submitted its final prices during the last round and he advised AT&T that he would not consider the prices that were not contained on the sheets submitted by AT&T during the last round. John Fain, representative for the Division of Purchasing at the negotiations, also stated that prices not placed on the board could not be accepted. Mr. Mayne advised the suppliers at the end of the negotiations that the Division of Communications would try to reach a decision by the close of business on November 6. At the end of negotiations on November 5, 1987, the Division of Communications returned to AT&T its proposal which had formed part of the basis for the Division of Communications' request for authority to negotiate after AT&T claimed pricing information contained in that proposal was proprietary. At the beginning of the negotiation session on November 5, Mr. Mayne was satisfied that each of the participants could provide the solicited transmission facilities and services. Since the AT&T proposal would not be considered, Mr. Mayne determined that the contract should be awarded based on lowest cost for each of the transmission facilities. Prior to acting on this determination, Mr. Mayne discussed the matter with the Division of Purchasing. The Division of Purchasing concurred in the decision to award on the basis of lowest cost. The contract awards were based on low price and not the total points assigned to the providers based upon the numeric rating system used by the evaluation committee in the evaluation report. Mr. Amirzadeh telephoned Mr. Martinez on November 6, 1987, to inform MCI that the Department intended to award the Intrastate WATS facilities to MCI. Mr. Martinez advised Mr. Amirzadeh that the prices submitted by MCI were package prices. MCI later contacted the Department and advised the Department that the MCI price for Intrastate WATS was a package price. MCI withdrew its offering for Intrastate WATS. On being advised that MCI was withdrawing its offer for the Intrastate WATS facilities, the Department decided to award the Intrastate WATS facilities to the next lowest provider, which was Microtel. On November 10, 1987, the Department issued Communications Service Authorizations (CSAs) to Microtel for the Intrastate WATS facilities and IMTs, and to ITT for the Interstate WATS facilities. These CSAs are the only contracts to be executed by the State of Florida for the solicited telecommunications services and facilities. The CSAs were signed by the Division of Communications. By contracting with Microtel for IMTs, Mr. Mayne estimated there would be a cost savings of $216,000 per month. The cost savings associated with contracting with Microtel for the Intrastate WATS is approximately $98,000 a month. It is estimated the State will save approximately $105,000 per month by contracting with ITT for Interstate WATS. MCI filed a notice of intent to protest the contract awards on November 12, 1987. MCI filed its formal written protest on November 23, 1987. In acquiring these transmission facilities the Department is leasing spaces on the supplier's fiber optic cable. The spaces within the cable are analogous to time envelopes, which may carry information or no information, being shot down the fiber optic cable. The Department leases the spaces in multiples of T-1s. A T-1 represents 1.544 million spaces per second. When the Department leases a T-1, the Department has a dedicated physical connection and the information that will be contained in the spaces or time envelopes will always appear in the same space and in the same time. The Department leases the fiber facilities on a 24-hour-a-day basis, because it is more economical than leasing for shorter periods of time. While the space is being leased to the State, no other customer of the transmission facilities supplier can use that space. The functions of the facilities can also be described as follows. The interstate WATS service, the intrastate WATS service, and the IMT service for which the Department contracted, involve the receipt by the carrier of an originating call from a SUNCOM switch and the transmission of that call over the carrier's owned or leased facilities, including access facilities leased by the carrier from the local exchange company, to its destination either outside or inside the State of Florida or to another SUNCOM switch. In addition to the lease of spaces, the Department will be acquiring maintenance and billing services and, in the case of the WATS facilities, it will also be procuring management reports concerning the location of calls. For the facilities used to provide interstate WATS service, intrastate WATS service, and IMT service, the State of Florida will not have physical access to, the ability to monitor traffic over, maintenance or repair responsibility for, or rights to use particular components of those facilities. This applies to both the carriers' facilities and the access facilities leased by the carrier from local exchange companies to connect the SUNCOM switches and the carriers' facilities. For the facilities used to provide interstate WATS service, intrastate WATS service, and IMT service, the long distance carrier will have the responsibility for maintenance and repair of those facilities, the right to replace or upgrade those facilities in a fashion transparent to the State, and the right to determine the physical path through those facilities over which information from the State of Florida would be transmitted. This applies to both the carrier's facilities and the access facilities leased by the carrier from the local exchange companies to connect the SUNCOM switches to the facilities. The Department interprets Rule Chapter 13C-2, Florida Administrative Code, to apply to the acquisition of nonregulated communications equipment. The forms referred to in Rule 13C-2.008 are forms which State agencies use in requesting approval from the Division of Communications for the purchase or lease of nonregulated communications services or equipment. Rule Chapter 13C-1, Florida Administrative Code, has been interpreted by the Department to deal with a regulated environment. The procurement at issue in this proceeding is in a regulated environment. The criteria and procedures described in Chapter 13C-2, Florida Administrative Code, were not used in this procurement of the solicited telecommunications facilities and services. The negotiation process itself was negotiated in a fair and equitable manner. Each supplier was advised at the beginning of the negotiation session that there would be three rounds of pricing. There has been no claim by MCI that any of the suppliers had knowledge prior to 9:00 a.m. on November 5, 1987, of the actual negotiation process that would be used. When an objection was made by one of the suppliers to the method of accepting pricing in round one, the method of accepting prices was changed so that no supplier would have an advantage over another. It was made clear that the third round was the last round in which the suppliers could submit their best and final offers. The Department did not consider offers which were not submitted during the third round. The Department attempted to provide competition in the negotiation process by having the suppliers compete against each other in the pricing rounds. No supplier was treated more favorably than another. MCI was never told that it would be awarded the contracts. MCI made no protest or objection to the negotiation process prior to or on November 5, 1987.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that a final order be entered denying the relief requested by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of February, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-5338BID The following are my specific ruling on all of the findings of fact proposed by all of the parties. Findings proposed by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9: All generally accepted, but some details have been omitted as either subordinate or unnecessary. Paragraph 10: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 11 and 12: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 13, 14, and 15: Accepted. Paragraph 16: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 17, 18 and 19: Accepted. Paragraph 20: Rejected as irrelevant in light of other evidence. Paragraphs 21, 22, 23 and 24: Accepted. Paragraph 25: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 26 and 27: Accepted. Paragraph 28: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected a subordinate and unnecessary Paragraphs 31 and 32: Accepted: Paragraph 33: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraphs 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39: Accepted. Paragraphs 40 and 41: Rejected because the analogies fail. Paragraph 42: Accepted. Paragraph 43: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Findings proposed by the Respondent: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 9 and 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18: Accepted. Paragraph 19: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32,33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43 and 44: Accepted. Paragraph 45: First sentence accepted. The remainder is rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 46: First four sentences accepted. Last sentence is a conclusion of law. Paragraphs 47 and 48: Accepted. Findings proposed by the Intervenors: Paragraph 1: Rejected as statement of position rather than proposed finding. Paragraph 2 and 3: Accepted. Paragraphs 4, 5 and 6: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10: Some of the details proposed in these paragraphs have been included, but most are rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary, details. Paragraphs 12 add 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 14: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 16 and 17: Rejected as irrelevant or as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24: Some of the details proposed in these paragraphs have been included, but most have been rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Paragraphs 25, 26 and 27: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 28: Accepted. Paragraph 29, 30, 31 and 32: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 33, 34, 35, 36, 37 and 38: Accepted. Paragraphs 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 50 and 51: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 52 and 53: Accepted. Paragraph 54: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraph 55: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 56: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. Paragraphs 57, 58 and 59: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 60 and 61: Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary details. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan Kirkland, Esquire Sandra D. Allen, Esquire Office of General Counsel Department of General Services Room 452, Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955 Carolyn S. Raepple, Esquire Richard D. Melson, Esquire Hopping, Boyd, Green & Sams Post Office Box 6526 Tallahassee, Florida 32314 Patrick K. Wiggins, Esquire Wings Solcum Benton, Esquire Ranson & Wiggins 325 West Park Avenue Post Office Drawer 1657 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald W. Thomas Executive Director Department of General Services 133 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0955
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner Maia Fisher (Petitioner) on the basis of her gender and retaliated against Petitioner because of her pregnancy in violation of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an aggrieved person within the meaning of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37, Section 16. Petitioner is a female and filed a complaint with the Board alleging that Respondent engaged in gender discrimination and retaliation after Petitioner disclosed her pregnancy. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Section 16. Respondent operates a printing business. Respondent is a corporation wholly-owned by Mr. John Disbrow and Ms. Angela Disbrow. Mr. and Ms. Disbrow are the principal operators and decision-makers. Respondent was Petitioner's employer. Petitioner was an employee during the relevant period. Petitioner began her employment with Respondent sometime in March 2008. Respondent terminated Petitioner’s employment on July 28, 2008. Petitioner discovered in June 2008 that she was pregnant. Petitioner informed Mr. and Ms. Disbrow. Mr. Disbrow instructed Mr. Alfred Buranda to terminate Petitioner’s employment sometime in July 2008. Mr. Buranda was the head of human resources for Respondent at that time, but has since moved on to other employment. Mr. Buranda refused to terminate Petitioner’s employment. Mr. Buranda conducted a teleconference with Petitioner in his office on July 28, 2009. Mr. Buranda telephoned Mr. and Ms. Disbrow on his office speaker phone with Petitioner present in his office. Mr. and Ms. Disbrow explained to Petitioner by speaker phone that the pregnancy was the reason for the termination of employment. Respondent owes Petitioner unpaid compensation in the total amount of $2,820.00. Respondent owes Petitioner back wages for unpaid overtime equal to $720.00. Respondent owes Petitioner unpaid commissions equal to $2,100.00. Back wages in the amount of $720.00 is the product of multiplying an hourly overtime rate of $12.00 by the total of uncompensated overtime equal to 60 hours. Unpaid commissions of $2,100.00 are composed of two parts. Petitioner made five sales under $500.00 for which Respondent owes a commission of $100.00 for each sale and a total of $500.00 for all five sales. Petitioner made eight sales over $500.00 for which Respondent owes a commission of $200.00 for each sale and a total of $1,600.00 for all eight sales. Petitioner has been living in a shelter for battered women. Contact and service on Petitioner has been problematic. The Board may require an investigator or other means to provide Petitioner with actual notice of the final order in this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the final order issued in this proceeding should find that Respondent is guilty of discrimination and retaliation on the basis of gender in violation of Hillsborough County Human Rights Ordinance 00-37 and require Respondent and its principals to pay Petitioner $2,820.00 in unpaid compensation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Maia Fischer 2302 48th Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34207 Camille Blake, EEO Manager Hillsborough County Post Office Box 1110 Tampa, Florida 33601-1101 John Disbrow ADCO Printing 8412 Sabal Industrial Boulevard Tampa, Florida 33619
