The Issue Whether Respondent is guilty of violating Sections 509.221(1) and (7) and 509.032, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 61C-1.004(5), (6), and (13), 61C- 3.001(2), as set out in the Administrative Complaint dated March 24, 2003.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants (DHR) is the State Agency charged with regulating the operation of hotel establishments pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapter 509, Florida Statutes. At all times material hereto, Respondent has been licensed by DHR or otherwise subject to DHR's jurisdiction, pursuant to issued License No. 26-00783. Respondent's last known business address is Clark Apartment and Rooms, 9762 Bayview Avenue, Jacksonville, Florida 32208. On February 3, 2003, and again on March 10, 2003, a DHR sanitation and safety specialist, John Phelan, inspected Respondent's premises. On February 3, 2003, the initial inspection, Mr. Phelan was accompanied by his superior, David Futlon. At the February 3, 2003, initial inspection, the following deficiencies were observed by both inspectors and noted for Respondent by Mr. Phelan: No proof was observed that the smoke detectors were interconnected as required by law and as stated by management. The door of a gas oven was held in place by a garden spade. Live roaches were on the floor and climbing the walls around the oven. The inspectors observed a stained mattress and a missing mattress pad on the bed in room They also observed that the second floor bathroom was out- of-order, and that shower curtains and shower stalls were dirty with soap scum. On March 10, 2003, Mr. Phelan returned to Respondent's premises by himself and noted that the foregoing problems/violations remained. According to both inspectors, the most serious violation was that there was no documentation that the smoke detectors were interconnected. This is a critical violation because it could present a potential fire hazard. The next violation that was found to be critical was that there was "a garden spade holding the oven door closed." This was seen as a violation because of the potential for fire. Next down the urgent and critical scale was the presence of live roaches around the oven. The absence of a mattress pad on room 17's mattress and the stain on the mattress were of somewhat less concern. However, these bedding problems are violations because they pose a sanitary issue. The next-ranked violation was that the second floor bathroom was out-of-order. The bathroom also presented a lesser sanitary issue, which was that the shower curtain and shower stall were dirty with soap scum. Based on the foregoing uncorrected deficiencies, Mr. Phelan caused an administrative complaint to be issued against Respondent on March 24, 2003, alleging Respondent's violation of Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, and/or the administrative rules promulgated thereunder. Although it was demonstrated at hearing that Mr. Clark, Respondent's principal, had been attempting, between the two inspections, to fix the originally-cited deficiencies, and although some progress at renovation had been made, most problems had not been fully addressed as of the date of the follow-up inspection on March 10, 2003. The credible evidence and testimony as a whole show that Mr. Phelan had recognized that a gas heater which had been cited at the initial inspection had been disconnected by the date of the second inspection and that it was no longer in use at the time of the second inspection. Therefore, the gas heater had been crossed off the notification to Respondent by Mr. Phelan and had not been cited as a violation in the administrative complaint. The stove also had been disconnected prior to the re-inspection. The gas heater and gas stove were disconnected at the same time, so propping the stove door open or closed with a spade had no significance with regard to fire hazard. Like the heater, the stove should have been removed from the premises as a safety precaution, but because Mr. Phelan did not know that the stove had been disconnected when he made his re-inspection, it was cited and included in the administrative complaint. The reason the disconnected stove was still present on the premises was because Respondent was fumigating for roaches by setting off "roach bombs" inside it. The fumigation of the roaches in an area where all other exit holes for them were intentionally sealed had resulted in some dead roaches, but many live roaches had fled into the kitchen in the vicinity of the stove. The live roaches were observed by all the witnesses who saw the kitchen on or about the re-inspection date. The testimony of several witnesses was credible that the upstairs bathroom's sink and tub had been repaired prior to the re-inspection. Mr. Musselwhite recalled credibly that he had screwed the faucet handles back on the tub between the two inspections. However, the testimony of Mr. Musselwhite that he was using the tub and sink upstairs at the time of the re- inspection is not credible. The greater weight of the credible evidence is that the tub and sink upstairs might have been repaired, but they were not actually in working order at the time of the March 10, 2003, re-inspection, because the water had not yet been turned back on. The evidence is clear that plaster board had been installed in the shower by the date of the re-inspection and that this was done to deal with the prior notice concerning discoloration. A dispute among the witnesses as to whether the discoloration on the old shower walls was soap scum, discoloration by scum removers, or mildew cannot be resolved. However, it was proven that, despite several changes of shower curtains between the two inspections, the shower curtains present on the re-inspection date remained covered with soap scum and/or mildew. Respondent admitted that the lack of a mattress pad on the mattress in room 17 on the date of re-inspection was an oversight. It was proven that a mattress from a first floor room had been moved upstairs to room 17. In the opinion of Respondent's witnesses, this constituted, a "new" mattress which was not stained. In this situation, Mr. Phelan's observation of the mattress stain is more credible. On his first inspection, Mr. Phelan told Mr. Clark that in the absence of other documentation, Mr. Clark needed to have the State Fire Marshall inspect Respondent's smoke detectors, in order to provide documentation that they were interconnected. By "interconnectedness" the parties meant that if one smoke detector sounded, then all of the smoke detectors throughout the hotel should also sound. Mr. McGee and Mr. Clark testified that between the two inspections the issue of the smoke detectors had been "looked into" with employees of Home Depot and at the local fire department. Mr. Clark stated that he had contacted the Jacksonville Fire Department, which would not give him any documentation, but its employees agreed to come and inspect his smoke detectors. Mr. Clark testified convincingly that he had purchased and installed smoke detectors from the Home Depot which did not provide written documentation of interconnectedness but which could be tested for interconnectedness by pushing their buttons. He maintained that if the inspector had punched the button on any single smoke detector on the re-inspection date, the interconnectedness of all the smoke detectors would have been demonstrated by their all "going off" at once. The inspectors did not punch the smoke detectors' buttons during the two inspections because they could not reach the buttons, as they had no ladders. Respondent was written-up by DHR on both occasions because written documentation of interconnectedness was not provided and because interconnectedness was not otherwise demonstrated. In other words, Respondent provided neither papers showing interconnectedness nor a physical demonstration of interconnectedness during the second inspection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, shall enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 509.221(1) and (7), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 61C-1.004(5) and (6), and 61C-3.001(2), and not guilty of violating Florida Administrative Code Rule 61C- 1.004(13); Ordering Respondent to pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $2,500.00, due and payable to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, 1940 North Monroe Street, Tallahassee, Florida 32399, within 30 days of the final order; Requiring Respondent to attend a Hospitality Education Program class within 60 days of the date of the final order and provide proof thereof to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Hotels and Restaurants; and Requiring that Respondent pass a re-inspection of its premises within the same 60 days set out in (3), above. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent failed to properly maintain the premises at Park Avenue Sub, in violation of Section 509.032, Florida Statutes (2000), as alleged in the Administrative Complaints.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and testimony of the witnesses presented and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of facts are made: 1. Respondent, Sang Kuen Cho, held license number 69-0347-R for the operation of a public food service establishment operating under the name Park Ave Sub, and located at 1203 South Park Avenue, Sanford, Florida 32771. As to DOAH Case No. 01-0961: 2. On August 18, 19, and 22, 2001, Carolyn Moore, Inspector with Petitioner's Division of Hotels and Restaurants, conducted an inspection of Respondent's premises. 3. It was observed that there was no 40 BC Fire Extinguisher available on the premises. The Fire Suppression System was tagged 11-99, and the last inspection report was dated 11-99. The barrel used for grease collection was not ona surface that was non-absorbent. There was no evidence that the restaurant manager was certified by Petitioner as a certified food manager. There was no probe thermometer available. The meat slicer had old, dried food debris on it. There was bare wood exposed on the preparation table, and the covering was worn out. There was old, dried food splattered on the wall behind the slicer. The flooring around the cooking equipment was missing tiles or other non-porous covering. There was a large amount of newspapers and empty boxes under the preparation table. 4. There were no chemical test strips available to test the concentration of the sanitizing solutions. The filters in the hood over the stove had an accumulation of dust and a black substance on them. There was no covered receptacle in the restroom. The restroom had no paper towels or other hand-drying device provided. The front door was propped open on August 18, 2000. The last inspection report was not available. As to DOAH Case No. 01-1110: 5. On January 24, 2001, and again on February 1, 2001, an inspection was conducted on Respondent's premises. 6. It was observed that there was no 40 BC fire extinguisher on the premises for the grease fryer. The tag on the Fire Suppression System indicated it was last inspected 11- 99. 7. Deli meats in containers in the refrigerator had not been date marked to indicate the date the food should be consumed by. The ceiling tiles over the hood system were not properly installed, leaving a gap. Old food debris and a black substance were on the hood filters. The wall by the back door had old, dried food debris splattered on it. As to DOAH Case No. 01-1111: 8. On July 26, 1999, and again on August 20, 1999, an inspection was conducted on Respondent's premises. 9. The right compartment of the three-compartment sink was not plumbed for hot and cold water. The front exit door was open in a fixed position. The fire extinguisher was stored on the floor by the rear exit door. The floor in the kitchen area had torn and missing tiles and was not sealed. An extension cord was being used for operating the microwave, and a carbon dioxide tank was not secured. 10. There was still no 40 BC fire extinguisher available when the premises were re-inspected on April 18 and 27, 2001.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 For Respondents: No appearance.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be enter by the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, as follows: 1. As to DOAH Case No. 01-0961, an administrative fine of $5,400 be imposed and Respondent's license be suspended until payments of fines have begun and the restaurant is brought into compliance with the Food Code, the Fire Safety Code, and other provisions of Chapter 61C, Florida Administrative Code. 2. As to DOAH Case No. 01-1110, an administrative fine in the amount of $3,400 be imposed and Respondent's license be suspended until the restaurant is brought into compliance and payments on the fine are begun. 3. As to DOAH Case No. 01-1111, an administrative fine of $1,000 be imposed and Respondent's license be suspended until payment, in full, is made. 4. Respondent be required to make monthly payments until the administrative fines are paid in full under such terms anda conditions as the Department deems just and reasonable. DONE AND ENTERED this Gl, day of June, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this A day of June, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Park Avenue Sub 1203 South Park Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Sang Kuen Cho d/b/a Park Ave Sub 1203 South Park Avenue Sanford, Florida 32771 Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Susan R. McKinley, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurants Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner was legally justified in issuing a conditional license rating to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating nursing homes in Florida. Respondent Berkshire is a licensed nursing home located in North Miami, Florida. On April 2, 2002, AHCA conducted a survey of Berkshire and identified the violations which give rise to this proceeding. Specifically, at the time of the survey, several magnetic door locks--the record does not reveal precisely how many, although the parties agree that the number was no less than three and no more than seven out of a total of fifteen fire exit doors--did not immediately unlock upon activation of the fire alarm system. The purpose of the door locks is to prevent cognitively impaired residents from wandering away from the facility. When the magnetic lock system is working properly, the doors unlock immediately upon activation of the fire alarm. In response to the AHCA survey finding, Berkshire immediately summoned an alarm system repair person. On April 2, this individual was located somewhere in Florida's Panhandle. He left north Florida and proceeded immediately to Berkshire. The repairman determined that two wires and a circuit were reversed, most likely due to an error by Berkshire's on- site maintenance director. By the next day, April 3, the problem had been corrected and all door locks were deactivating simultaneously with the activation of the fire alarm system. Based upon the April 2 survey, AHCA issued a conditional license to Berkshire effective April 5, 2002, and imposed an administrative fine of $12,500. AHCA also placed the facility on a six-month survey cycle and assessed a survey fee of $6,000. These penalties, particularly the conditional license status, have a substantial adverse impact upon the reputation and the business interests of a nursing home. AHCA's decision to impose a conditional license status was predicated upon the opinion of its inspectors that the mechanical failure identified in the survey was, in fact, likely to cause serious injury, harm, impairment or death to a resident receiving care in the facility, and must therefore be deemed a Class I deficiency which warrants, as a matter of law, the penalties imposed. At the time of the survey, Berkshire had no history of fires, had passed its most recent annual inspection by the local fire marshal, and had a sprinkler system and fire extinguishers throughout the facility. The survey itself revealed no fire hazards. AHCA cites no statute, rule, or case which supports its view that the mechanical problem identified constitutes a Class I deficiency. Instead, it offers opinion testimony that as a result of this problem, residents were in danger on the date of the survey. That opinion testimony is based solely upon speculation. For example, AHCA's life safety inspector who participated in the survey said, ". . . we always look at, inspect the facilities under a worst case scenario type situation. In the event of a fire, we could have a situation we would have residents where the fire alarm system would activate and we would have residents attempting to exit the building. They would find that those doors, affected doors, would not be openable. They would not be able to exit the building. " In fact, the evidence established that the ability of residents to vacate the building in a safe and timely manner in the event of a fire, or fire drill, was not significantly impacted on April 2 by the mechanical problem identified. The automatic unlock feature which was not operating on less than half of Berkshire's fire exit doors is just one part of Berkshire's fire safety plan. State and federal law and Berkshire's own operating procedures provide that staff be given detailed training regarding what to do in the event of a fire; fire safety plans must be approved by the local fire marshal, and most include back up plans for system failures which can reasonably be anticipated. With reference to each of the door locks identified in the April 2 survey, the evidence established that each of these doors could be opened manually, and that there was an adequate number of able bodied staff members who could open each of the doors as may be necessary had a real fire or a fire drill occurred on April 2. Berkshire's fire safety procedures provide that when the fire alarm activates, an announcement is made over the public address system to inform all present of the fire's location. Depending upon the fire's location, staff members will respond in various appropriate ways. Within each department, various individuals are assigned to perform various functions, including, most importantly, assuring that each resident is safely escorted from the building and protected while outside. State law requires monthly tests of the fire alarm system, but Berkshire exceeds this standard with weekly tests. Fire drills are conducted for staff members who work on all three shifts, and staff are trained in evacuating residents in a manner appropriate to their individual circumstance. No matter where one is located in the building, there are multiple means of egress, and each exit door has multiple means by which it can be opened in a timely manner in the event of fire or other emergency. Monthly unannounced fire drills are conducted at Berkshire on all three shifts in an effort to ensure that staff can safely and quickly evacuate residents should the need arise. There is no evidence that staff could not have done so had a fire or fire drill occurred on April 2. Thus, AHCA's finding that the mechanical problem which existed on April 2 and which was remedied by April 3 posed a likelihood of serious injury, impairment, or death to residents in Berkshire's care is not supported by any competent evidence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that AHCA issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaints in these cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Nelson Rodney, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 8355 Northwest 53rd Street Miami, Florida 33166 R. Davis Thomas, Jr. Qualified Representative Broad & Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1300 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated October 4, 2005, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence and the testimony of witnesses presented, and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: At all relevant times, the Division is the state agency responsible for licensing, regulating, and inspecting public lodging establishments. With particular relevance to this case, it is the Division's responsibility to establish and enforce rules pertaining to sanitation and public health and safety in accordance with relevant provisions of the Florida Statutes; to ensure compliance with its rules; and to impose discipline in appropriate circumstances. At all relevant times, Green Terrace was licensed by the Division as a public lodging establishment under license number 1605642. At all relevant times, Green Terrace was located at 260 Southwest 8th Street, Pompano Beach, Florida 33060, and was owned by Peter Sporea (Mr. Sporea). At all relevant times, Larry Torres (Mr. Torres), a certified food manager and specialized fire safety inspector, was employed by the Division as a sanitation and safety inspector. Mr. Torres' duties include conducting inspections of Division licensees, including Green Terrace. On or about August 5, 2005, Mr. Torres conducted a routine inspection of Green Terrace. Based upon his inspection he documented various sanitation and safety violations and issued a written warning to Green Terrace which directed that the violations be remedied within 30 days. On September 29, 2005, Mr. Torres returned to Green Terrace to conduct a re-inspection. His re- inspection revealed that the violations documented at the time of the inspection had not been remedied. Two violations observed by Mr. Torres were "critical" in that they are more likely than other violations to pose an immediate threat to public health or safety; the remaining violations were deemed by Mr. Torres to be “non-critical.” Non-critical violations are violations which pose risk to the public health or safety, but are not considered to present an immediate threat. The violations which Mr. Torres observed and documented at the inspection, and again at the re-inspection were: Violation 01-09, based upon Mr. Torres' observation that a portable fire extinguisher located near apartment four was not charged. Failure to provide and maintain fire extinguishers in an operational condition is a critical violation. Violation 12-02, based upon Mr. Torres' observation of a loose railing on the second floor balcony by apartment seven; all building structural components, attachments and fixtures shall be kept in good repair. This violation is a critical violation due to the risk of serious injury if a person were to fall from a second floor balcony. Violation 13-01, based upon Mr. Torres' observation of a door in disrepair and a broken window in or near apartment 10. This is a violation because building structural components must be kept in good repair. Violation 25-01, based upon Mr. Torres' observation that excessive trash was observed in various places on the property grounds. For example, discarded equipment such as stoves was observed in hallways on the second floor. Violation 26-01, based upon Mr. Torres' observation that garbage was lying loose on the ground in the fenced area where garbage cans are available for community use. This is a violation because proper disposition of garbage is necessary to prevent nuisance conditions. Violation 26-14, based upon Mr. Torres' observation that trash receptacles lacked covers. This is a violation because uncovered trash receptacles could attract pests and constitute a public nuisance. Violation 26-18, based upon Mr. Torres' observation of a soiled waste receptacle that was attracting pests. This is a violation because dirty receptacles may attract pests, as they did here, and constitute a public nuisance. Mr. Torres and Mr. Sporea were the only witnesses at hearing. The trier of fact closely observed each, and evaluated such factors as their demeanor under oath; their candor with the fact-finder and with the opposing party under cross-examination; their opportunity to speak from personal knowledge concerning relevant facts; and their respective backgrounds, training and experience. Mr. Torres was forthright, direct and entirely credible. Mr. Sporea dissembled, and provided no persuasive testimony with respect to any of the material allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Upon a finding that a public lodging establishment licensee has operated in violation of relevant provisions of the Florida Statutes or rules promulgated thereuder, the licensee is subject to fines not to exceed $1,000.00 per offense; mandatory attendance at an educational program sponsored by the Hospitality Education Program; and the suspension, revocation or refusal of a license. In this case the Division has proposed that Respondent pay an administrative penalty in the amount of $2,700.00, and attend, at personal expense, a Hospitality Education Program approved by the Division. The proposed penalty is well within the Division's authority and is reasonable and generous under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding the violations described and imposing an administrative fine on Green Terrace in the amount of $2700 due and payable on terms prescribed by the Division; and requiring the owner and/or manager of Green Terrace to attend, at the licensee's personal expense, an educational program sponsored the Hospitality Education Program or other educational program approved by the Division, within 60 days of the date of the final order, and to provide proof thereof to the Division. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of July 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of July, 2006.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent has violated various provisions governing public lodging establishments and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a public lodging establishment known as First Street Apartments at 220 South First Street in Immokalee. The license to operate this establishment, which is number 21-00721-H, expired December 1, 1997. However, Petitioner has allowed Respondent to continue to operate under this license until the resolution of pending proceedings against the license. First Street Apartments comprise 84 residential units in buildings not greater than three stories. At the time of the inspection, about 60 units were occupied. The buildings were constructed in 1963, and Respondent acquired the property in 1984. The controlling owner of Respondent was formerly a professional football player, and he formed Respondent to acquire First Street Apartments while still playing football. He has since retired, and he assumed direct responsibility for managing the property in 1994. First Street Apartments generate a net cash flow of $25,000 to $35,000 annually. Respondent has no formal policy setting the frequency of inspections of apartment units. However, the weekend prior to the hearing, Respondent's owner and his family moved into one of the apartments. Petitioner’s inspector conducted inspections of First Street Apartments on July 30 and August 19, 1997. The July inspection resulted in the issuance of a warning for 38 violations. The inspector allowed Respondent 30 days to correct these violations. The findings below describe the conditions at First Street Apartments on August 19, when Petitioner’s inspector and a local fire inspector returned to the site for the reinspection. As to the first alleged violation, apartments 30, 32, 40, and 79 lacked smoke detectors. As to the second alleged violation, apartment 31 had a smoke detector, but it was inoperative. As to the third alleged violation, an undetermined number of apartments had hasps affixed to the outside doors, so as to permit them to be latched. Most if not all of these hasps were affixed to the screen door. Most but not all of these hasps were unlocked. There is no evidence that any hasps were locked with occupants inside. The evidence suggests that tenants used the hasps to secure the contents of their premises while they were gone. However, the evidence does not establish that all of these hasps were attached to the doors and doorframe so securely as to present more than a momentary impediment to someone from the inside or outside trying to force the hasp open without unlocking it. The doorframes appear to have secured so many hasps that the wood is pitted and incapable of securing the hasp against much force. The clear appearance of numerous screwholes in the doors and doorframes supports Respondent’s contention that its representatives have frequently removed the hasps, only to find them reaffixed a short time later. As to the fourth alleged violation, one of the apartments had uninsulated wiring, unprotected by conduit, running from the ceiling to a water heater. This uninsulated wiring ran within eight feet of the floor. The proximity of this exposed wiring to the water in the water heater rendered this violation especially hazardous. However, Petitioner failed to prove its allegation of a broken electrical socket with a hot plate plugged into it. As to the fifth alleged violation, occupants of apartments 31, 32, and 33 used extension cords for other than intermittent purposes, such as cleaning, maintenance, or other temporary activities. These more ongoing, permanent uses included cooking and playing radios and televisions. As to the sixth alleged violation, there was no public lighting in the alley between the north building and a fenced area to the next property. However, Respondent or Lee County has since added more exterior lighting, and the record does not permit a finding as to the effect of the former condition. As to the seventh alleged violation, Respondent conceded that Respondent did not provide heat at the time of the inspections. As to the eighth alleged violation, the original design of the guardrail along the balcony contains openings greater than four inches. To remedy this hazardous situation, Respondent or a prior owner placed chain-link fence behind the guardrail, so as to reduce the openings to the size of the openings in the chain- link fence. The chain-link fence may have been missing on the west side of the building, but this fact does not emerge clearly from the record. There is some evidence that the chain-link fence elsewhere had loosened from the guardrail, but the evidence fails to establish the extent to which any separation had occurred and the extent to which such separation presented a hazard to persons falling between the openings in the guardrails and then between the guardrails and the chain-link fence. Respondent has since repaired the guardrails, in any event. As to the ninth alleged violation, apartments 30 and 32 had broken windows, torn screens, and a broken faucet in the kitchen sink repaired with duct tape; apartments 30 and 31 had leaky ceilings with structural damage and falling plaster; walls were pulling away from the ceiling; the south building had exposed interior beams; exterior areas had structural damage with worn concrete revealing the metal foundation; the exterior wall of the southeast end of the building had a 15-foot crack; and the concrete pillar supporting the second-floor landing on the northeast side of the building was worn and cracked. As to the tenth alleged violation, apartment 32 had a rotten shower wall and leaky toilet, and apartment 31 had an inoperative shower. As to the eleventh alleged violation, there were roaches and flies around the premises, but there is no evidence of "noxious small animals or parasitic insects, such as lice, fleas, worms, rats, or mice." As the administrative law judge advised at the hearing, he took official notice of this dictionary definition of "vermin" taken from a Funk and Wagnall's Dictionary present in the courthouse at which the hearing took place. As to the twelfth alleged violation, there was a car seat under a stairwell and about a dozen five-gallon plastic pails. However, the tenants stored these items, on a temporary basis, for their work. They remove car seats to increase the passenger-carrying capacity of their motor vehicles, and they use the pails while picking fruits and vegetables. As to the thirteenth alleged violation, there was no concrete pad under one of the two dumpsters. As to the fourteenth alleged violation, a dumpster lid remained open for the entire 1.5-hour inspection. As to the fifteenth alleged violation, a broken sewer line had leaked a pool of gray water, and a sewer cap was missing from the sewer line as it left a residential unit. In sum, Petitioner proved the following violations, with critical violations marked with an asterisk: 1*, 2*, 4* (unprotected wiring, but no broken socket), 5*, 7*, 9, 10 (except for water leaking from under the sinks) 13, 14, and 15*. By Ordinance No. 92-72, the Collier County Commission adopted National Fire Protection Association Life Safety Code 101, Life Safety Code, effective October 21, 1992. NFPA 5-2.2.4.6(c) provides: "Open guards shall have intermediate rails or an ornamental pattern such that a sphere 4 in. (10.1 cm) in diameter cannot pass through any opening." NFPA 19-3.4.4.1 provides: Approved single station or multiple station smoke detectors continuously powered from the building electrical system shall be installed in accordance with 7-6.2.9 in every living unit within the apartment building regardless of the number of stories or number of apartments. When activated, the detector shall initiate an alarm that is audible in the sleeping rooms of that unit. This individual unit detector shall be in addition to any sprinkler system or other detection system that may be installed in the building. Section 5-402.14, 1995 Food Code, as adopted by the Food and Drug Administration, Public Health Service, United States Department of Health and Human Services (Food Code), provides: "Sewage shall be conveyed to the point of disposal through an approved sanitary sewage system or other system, including use of sewage transport vehicles, waste retention tanks, pumps, pipes, hoses, and connections that are constructed, maintained, and operated according to law." Section 5-501.11, Food Code, provides: "If located within the food establishment, a storage area for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall meet the requirements specified under Parts 6-1 and 6-2." Section 5-501.12, Food Code, provides: "An outdoor storage surface for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall be constructed of nonabsorbent material such as concrete or asphalt and shall be smooth, durable and sloped to drain." Section 5-501.113(B), Food Code, provides: "Cardboard or other packaging material that does not contain food residues and that is awaiting regularly scheduled delivery to a recycling or disposal site may be stored outside without being in a covered receptacle if it is stored so that it does not create a rodent harborage problem." Section 5-501.114(B), Food Code, provides: "Equipment and receptacles for refuse, recyclables, and returnables shall be kept covered . . . [w]ith tight-fitting lids or doors if kept outside the food establishment."
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Hotels and Restaurants enter a final order imposing an administrative fine against Respondent in the amount of $2750 and requiring Respondent's controlling owner to undergo additional education. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel R. Biggins Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 D. Nathan Hoskins Peck & Peck First Union Building, Suite 103 5801 Pelican Bay Boulevard Naples, Florida 34108 Dorothy W. Joyce, Director Division of Hotels and Restaurant Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assigned conditional license status to Respondent, Westminster Woods on Julington Creek, based upon its determination that Respondent had violated Florida Administrative Code, Rule 59A-4.130, and 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies cited at the most recent annual licensure survey of January 27-29, 2003. Whether Petitioner Agency for Health Care Administration properly assessed a $30,000.00 fine against Respondent for violating 42 CFR Section 483.70 via Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.1288, as well as Florida Administrative Code Rule 59A-4.130, due to the presence of two wide-spread Class I deficiencies at the most recent annual survey on January 27-29, 2003. Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration is entitled to $6,000.00 in costs related to the investigation and prosecution of this case(s), pursuant to Section 400.121(10), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 59A-4, Florida Administrative Code (2002), AHCA is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure of skilled nursing facilities and for enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing skilled nursing facilities, of which Respondent Westminster Woods at Julington Creek is one. On January 27-29, 2003, AHCA conducted an annual licensure and re-certification survey of Respondent's facility. As a result of that survey, the facility was cited for two Class I deficiencies related to failure of the facility's fire alarm system. Each of these deficiencies was cited upon the same underlying facts. AHCA represented that one was cited as a Federal "tag" and the other was cited as a State "tag." In the Administrative Complaints, AHCA alleged, in a single Count, two separate Class I deficiencies. Respondent is a 60-bed skilled nursing facility located in Jacksonville, Florida. Respondent houses more of the "older- old" or "elderly-elderly" residents than the average skilled nursing facility. Respondent is a second floor facility with two stairwells that provide direct outside egress from the facility and that can be used as fire exits. During the January 27-29, 2003, survey, the facility housed 58 residents. Respondent's 58 residents on those dates were fairly dependent in terms of their physical capabilities. More than one-half of them were over the age of 85, and a couple of the residents were over 100 years old. Only one of the residents on January 27-29, 2003, was independently ambulatory. The remainder of the residents were incapable of independent ambulation. One of the residents was bed-ridden. Thirty-eight residents required extensive assistance in transferring or ambulating. The remainder of the resident population required assistive devices such as canes or walkers to transfer or ambulate. Due to their age, physical condition, and inability to engage in self preservation, these residents were extremely vulnerable in the event of a fire. The survey team arrived at the facility at 6:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. At around 8:00 a.m., the facility's maintenance supervisor, John Doran, conducted his usual rounds of the facility. Mr. Doran personally checks the fire alarm panel twice daily, and did so that morning. The panel has three lights: A green light which means that the panel is working; a yellow light which means a mechanical failure has occurred; and a red light which signifies an alarm. Mr. Doran noted that no light was on. The fire doors, which close automatically if the alarm is activated, were still open. Except for the absence of any alarm panel light, everything seemed to be normal. Therefore, on the morning of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran believed that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel, not the fire alarm system. In addition to Mr. Doran's twice-daily checks, Respondent's alarm system is monitored by an outside monitoring company which is supposed to call the facility if any problem is detected with its fire alarm system. The monitoring company did not call, which also suggested that the system itself was not malfunctioning, but merely that a light was out on the alarm panel. Nonetheless, Mr. Doran called his secretary, who contacted "W. W. Gay," the contract repair company for the system, and asked that a technician come to the facility. Thinking there was no immediate danger, but only that there was a problem with the alarm panel lights, and believing that everything that could be done up to that point had been done, Mr. Doran did not mention the alarm panel/system to surveyor Patricia McIntire, R.N., when she interviewed him about hot water temperatures around 10:00 a.m. on January 27, 2003. W. W. Gay's technician arrived at the facility about 10:30 a.m. and began trouble shooting the fire alarm system. The first technician could not find the problem, so he called for a second technician. During the course of January 27, 2003, three technicians arrived at Respondent's facility and worked on the panel, in full view of staff and surveyors who were in and around the nurses' station. During the entire period that the fire alarm panel was not working, which ultimately amounted to at least three days, a large number of staff and other responsible people were around the resident areas. The January 27, 2003, morning shift had a minimum of 17 staff members directly assigned, with others coming and going from the unit. In all, there were around 25 people circulating in the nursing home during the day shift. After the surveyors had left, the evening shift had nine staff members assigned to the unit, with additional staff overlapping from the day shift. The night shift had six assigned staff members, plus "Ron," Respondent's security man, who was assigned to a fire watch, beginning late on the afternoon of January 27, 2003. (See Finding of Fact 32.) On Tuesday, January 28, 2003, there were 20 staff people directly assigned to the unit on the day shift. Counting the AHCA surveyors and ancillary staff, there were approximately 27 people on the floor. The evening shift had nine specifically assigned staff members, with others overlapping. The night shift had at least six staff members. On Wednesday, January 29, 2003, the numbers were similar. During the course of January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran did not tell Respondent's administrators, Don Wilson or Mike Sweeney, about the problem with the fire alarm panel because he thought the fire alarm panel problem was being resolved by the W. W. Gay technicians and because both administrators were very busy with the AHCA survey. Around 4:00 p.m., January 27, 2003, Mr. Doran found out that the problem with the fire panel was more serious than he had earlier thought. The AHCA surveyors had already left the facility. Mr. Doran went to Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson. He told them at that time that W. W. Gay's third technician had told him that it would be the next morning before the fire alarm/system panel could be repaired. Mr. Sweeney and Mr. Wilson advised Mr. Doran that the situation was unacceptable. They instructed Mr. Doran to call W. W. Gay and tell that company to return and fix the panel immediately. Mr. Doran made the phone call, but as it ultimately turned out, the fire panel could not be fixed that night because a part had to be ordered. The facility had in-place a three-tiered system of evacuation in case of fire. First, residents in the room where the fire is located and those in the two adjoining rooms would be moved to safety. Second, if the fire continued to spread, all residents on the side of the fire doors where the fire was located would be moved to the other side of the doors and the fire doors closed. Third, and only if the fire were still not contained, would the residents be moved out of the building through the stairwells. The control panel of the fire alarm system is the "brains" of the facility's fire safety system. It has a direct connection to the local fire department and provides the fire department with direct, immediate notification if there is a fire in the facility. It provides immediate notification to the residents and staff of the facility through the sounding of bells, chimes, strobes, etc., of the existence of an emergency. It operates the smoke detectors. It automatically shuts down the air conditioning unit to prevent the spread of carbon monoxide, smoke, and fumes throughout the facility, and it automatically locks and unlocks the fire doors. It is the transfer of smoke and toxic gases generated during a fire which is the most common cause of casualty. The continued operation of the air conditioning system during a fire could make the lateral transfer of residents to another compartment on the same floor (tiers one and two of the facility's fire safety plan) ineffective because the continued operation of the air conditioning system could still transfer gases and smoke throughout the facility. However, in this case, although the facility's air conditioning system does move air, smoke being carried throughout the building was unlikely, since the intakes were located in common areas where smoke would be detected by staff. Fire drills are held by Respondent at least monthly. Staff is trained to respond to fires by Scott Fogg, a facility employee who has 23 years' United States Navy experience in training to fight fires, watching for fires, and fighting fires. Mr. Fogg has personally fought over 30 fires. He orients each new employee for at least one and one-half to two hours. He also does annual training of staff. Part of the training provided by Mr. Fogg consists of going step by step through the facility's fire plan. The plan includes contacting the fire department. Once the charge nurse knows of a fire, it is her responsibility to call "911." The facility's plan requires that the charge nurse notify the fire department, regardless of whether or not the alarm system is functioning.1/ The facility's fire plan is kept at several locations, including in the possession of the charge nurse and at the nurses' station. Every individual who goes through orientation also receives a copy. There is a sprinkling system for the entire facility. The sprinkling system is not dependent on the alarm system functioning. Each resident's room has at least two sprinklers, and some rooms have three sprinklers. The bathrooms inside the residents' rooms have an additional sprinkler. The dining room, halls, common area, and stairwells have sprinklers. There are fire extinguishers located at each corner of the building and fire hoses on the walls. Mr. Fogg evaluates the monthly fire drills. If he notes a problem, he writes it up and does follow-up training. The building is made of concrete, and nonflammable paint is used. Smoking is not permitted in the facility building. Staff are required to smoke in a designated smoking area behind another building. Residents are not allowed to keep combustible materials in their rooms. The kitchen and laundry are located in another building. Evacuation routes are posted throughout the building. Upon learning at approximately 4:00 p.m. January 27, 2003, that the fire alarm/system could not be fixed that night, Messrs. Wilson and Sweeney instructed Mr. Doran to institute a one-hour fire watch. A fire watch involves dedicating an individual to go around the building at stated intervals (in this case, hourly) looking for potential fire, smoke, or fire risk. Mr. Sweeney is the facility's Executive Director. He is also a licensed nursing home administrator. Based on his 25 years of experience in health care and his knowledge of the properties of the facility's physical plant, he thought a one- hour fire watch was reasonable and appropriate. Mr. Wilson, the facility's Health Services Administrator, concurred. Respondent's security man, Ron, was instructed to perform the hourly fire watch. Mr. Doran walked Ron around the area and told him to use his eyes, ears, touch, and sense of smell to look for any signs of fire. Ron carried a cell phone so that he could quickly communicate with Messrs. Doran, Wilson, Sweeney, or the fire department, if necessary. There is no evidence that Ron failed in his instructed duties for an hourly fire watch. Most of the survey team returned about 7:00 a. m., on January 28, 2003. At approximately 8:30 a.m., another team member, Nicholas Linardi, AHCA's Life Safety Inspector, arrived at the facility for the first time. Mr. Doran met with Mr. Linardi in the administrative conference room at around 9:00 a.m. There is no dispute that the first order of business was Mr. Linardi's review of all of the facility's service and safety logs. Mr. Fogg was also present at that time. After this point, there are significant differences among the witnesses' respective testimonies as to the chronology of events and the time span involved. However, having weighed the credibility of the respective witnesses, it is found that no later than their arrival on the second floor skilled nursing unit at approximately 9:30 a.m., January 28, 2003, Mr. Doran told Mr. Linardi that there was a problem with the fire alarm panel/system. How clear Mr. Doran was in this first explanation of the extent of the problem or how much or how little of Mr. Doran's explanation Mr. Linardi appreciated at that time is not clear from the record, but Mr. Linardi inquired concerning what the facility was doing about solving the problem, and Mr. Doran told him. Mr. Linardi requested that Mr. Doran call W. W. Gay again. Mr. Linardi did not require that the facility shut off the air-conditioning, pending repair of the fire alarm system. He did not offer any immediate suggestions as to additional actions the facility staff should take to protect its residents. He did not state that the facility should increase the frequency of the fire watch. There also is no clear evidence that he told anyone at that time that the facility must notify the local fire department that the panel/system was inoperative. Mr. Linardi's testimony was clear that when he is on a facility's premises, he is one of the appropriate persons or entities to whom AHCA expects the facility will report a fire alarm/system malfunction, but he was also adamant that rigid enforcement of "tags and fire standards," means that the facility is required to report any malfunction to the local fire authority, in this case, to the St. Johns County Fire Department. It is Mr. Linardi's practice to issue a survey citation, regardless of the reason a fire alarm is out of commission. The rest of AHCA's survey team first became aware of the extent of the problem with the fire alarm system at approximately 2:45 p.m., on January 28, 2003, when Mr. Linardi conducted a fire drill in the facility for purposes of AHCA’s survey. During the fire drill, it became evident to the AHCA survey team that the alarm did not sound and the fire doors did not automatically close. During the fire drill, staff members had to yell out information to alert other staff members that there was a fire drill and to identify the location of the "pretend" fire. If the fire alarm system is working, it automatically closes the correct doors. If it is not working, staff members do not know which doors to close until told where the fire or pretend fire is, but during the fire drill, it took facility staff only four and one-half minutes to realize that the correct fire doors had not closed and to go to the north corridor to manually shut them. In general terms, Mr. Linardi felt that an incipient fire can start and be transferred throughout a facility within four minutes. He did not specifically discuss Respondent's facility. No one testified to what the response time should have been if an alarm had sounded. Beyond what could at most have been a half-minute response delay due to the absence of a functioning alarm, AHCA apparently found no fault with the staff's response to, and conduct of, the fire drill. Mr. Linardi was, in fact, complimentary of the results. After the fire drill on January 28, 2003, Mr. Linardi personally called W. W. Gay and verified that the part necessary to fix the panel/system was on order. Still later in the afternoon, Mr. Linardi notified the St. Johns Fire Marshal that Respondent's fire alarm system was not in service. The St. Johns Fire Marshal directed that the facility institute a 15-minute fire watch. Respondent immediately instituted the 15-minute fire watch on January 28, 2003. Mr. Linardi testified that he was concerned that the Fire Marshal's assigned fire watch frequency of 15 minutes was too liberal and that a fire watch perhaps should have been instituted at even shorter intervals, but since the regulations presume that the local authority shall set the protocol for fire watches, he said nothing. There was some surveyor commentary to the effect that laundry carts "stored" in Respondent's hallway near one of the exits to the stairs violated survey criteria and aggravated danger to residents, but Mr. Linardi conceded that laundry carts could legitimately be rolled through hallways as linen goods were transported in them from the linen closet to each resident's room. It was his opinion such carts should have been parked in residents' rooms for any extended period of time. No accurate measurements of acceptable time or unacceptable time that these carts remained in the hallways was advanced by any witness, so this survey criticism is not indicative of a citable flaw. A chair was found on the landing at the top of one of the two exit stairwells. The landing and stairwell are large. The chair was not blocking the door leading onto the second floor landing from the skilled nursing unit. The chair's location would not have prevented an ambulatory person or a person on a cane, assisted by another, from descending via the stairs. The only obstruction the chair might have represented would have been if a patient had to be carried on a stretcher or litter and the stretcher or litter had to be turned by two people on the landing. Mr. Linardi commented that actual egress was not at issue, but because survey criteria specifically prohibit furniture or any other object from being there, the chair's presence on the landing was still a citable offense. Renovations were ongoing in the facility during this period, and construction workers had temporarily stored some of the construction materials that they were using in the bottom recess of an exit stairwell. These supplies were stored without permission or knowledge of facility staff. The bottom of the stairwell is a large open area, 22 feet long by 10 feet wide. Most of the construction materials were stored beneath the stairs and were not blocking either a step down from the stairs or access to the outside exit door. However, one piece of flat molding protruded in front of the exit door, and had the potential of impeding egress. Although there was testimony that this molding could have been easily stepped over, the photographs make clear that this item could have impeded the speed of an evacuation of the above-described frail, elderly and non-ambulatory population if an evacuation had been necessary. There is no persuasive evidence that a hinge on any exit door prevented its being opened or that any exit door was otherwise unreachable or otherwise out of commission. During the 15-minute fire watch on the third day of the survey, January 29, 2003, Ron (See Findings of Fact 13, 32, and 42) found a tray on top of the juice machine in the beverage area of the facility’s dining room and removed it. This area is within three feet of a sprinkler head and within six feet of a fire extinguisher. The juice machine has thermal overload protection to prevent electricity going to the motor if the motor gets hot. In short, if the motor gets hot, the machine cuts off. When the surveyors arrived on that date, a number of residents and staff members were in the dining room. The surveyors noted an odor similar to that of a burning motor in the vicinity of the juice machine. At that time, the tray had already been found and removed as part of the 15-minute fire watch. When a motor overheats, the smell lingers for a long time. There is no evidence that the incident did more than produce an unpleasant odor. AHCA gave Respondent a written mandated correction date of February 6, 2003, but before the survey team finally exited on January 29, 2003, the facility had changed the fire watch to every 15 minutes and had advised that the fire alarm system would be operational on January 30, 2003. Therefore, AHCA removed the "immediate jeopardy" classification on January 29, 2003, prior to the end of the survey, when it determined that fire watches were being conducted every 15 minutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order Finding Respondent guilty of a single, isolated Class III deficiency, fining Respondent $1,000.00 therefore, and removing Respondent's conditional licensure status; and Remanding to the Division of Administrative Hearings the issue of the amount of any costs related to the investigation and prosecution of these cases, pursuant to Section 400.121(10), in the event the parties cannot stipulate to those costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of November, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November 2003.
The Issue The Administrative Complaint alleges that Respondent violated certain provisions of Chapter 509, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 61-C, Florida Administrative Code, regarding the absence of required equipment, equipment not operative, and failure to post required signs for public information. Specifically, Respondent, after notice of specific violations and lapse of the allotted time to correct those violations, Respondent failed to do so.
Findings Of Fact On or about February 29, 2000, an employee of the Agency, Kenneth Phillips, supervised inspector trainee, Rick Decker, who performed the initial inspection of Respondent's establishment. A copy of the Public Lodging Inspection Report, citing specific violations noted in or about the establishment was prepared, and each violation was fully explained to Virgie Fowler. A copy of the inspection report was given to Mr. Fowler. Kenneth Phillips advised Mr. Fowler that a call-back re-inspection for correction of cited violations would be made on or about March 13, 2000. On or about March 13, 2000, inspectors Kenneth Phillips and Rick Decker undertook a call-back re-inspection. Previously cited violations not corrected were observed by both inspectors, and entries were made in their re-inspection report, which constituted the Administrative Complaint herein filed. The Agency is charged with the regulation of public lodging establishments and public food service establishments, pursuant to authority granted by Chapter 509, Section 509.032, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Gardenville Motel, is holder of State of Florida License No. 39-01017-H, with a last-known business address of 11549 US Highway 41, Gibsonton, Florida 33534-5210. Respondent is owned and operated by Virgie Fowler.1 Gardenville Motel has a total of 16 non-sequentially numbered rooms available to rent. The Division of Hotels and Restaurants has employed for four years Kenneth Phillips as a Sanitation and Safety Specialist. His primary duties are the inspection of hotels, restaurants, apartment complexes, and mobile vehicles, for the purpose of ascertaining licensees' compliance with safety and sanitation requirements provided by Chapter 509, Florida Statutes. Mr. Phillips has a four-year college degree in criminal justice and a two-year degree in environmental technology. He is a certified special fire inspector and receives ongoing training in food safety and inspection criteria. On or about February 29, 2000, Mr. Phillips and Rick Decker conducted an inspection of the Gardenville Motel (hereinafter "Motel"), following a consumer's complaint of not being satisfied with the conditions of his motel room and management's delay in refunding his money. Rick Decker recorded the results of their initial inspection in a "Food Service Inspection Report," under the supervision and direction of Kenneth Phillips. The Report noted 25 safety and sanitation violations. The Report contained the notification: "Warning: Violations in the operations of your establishment must be corrected by: Date: 2/13/00. Time: 8:00". The date for re-inspection was a scrivener's error. The corrected date is "3/13/00."2 On the day of the inspection, a copy of the report was provided to the owner/manager, Virgie Fowler, who acknowledged receipt, by his signature at the bottom of the report. Kenneth Phillips and Rick Decker discussed with Mr. Fowler, each cited violation contained in the report including the 15-day period before re-inspection for compliance (i.e. correct date of 3/13/00). On March 13, 2000, Mr. Phillips and Mr. Decker, conducted their re-inspection of the Motel to determine whether violations cited on February 29, 2000, were corrected. The two inspectors found eight uncorrected violations. A "Callback/Re- inspection Report" noting the uncorrected violations was completed. A copy of the Callback/Re-inspection Report was signed by and provided to Richard Mercurio, who signed the report as "Manager."3 Critical violations, noted on the initial report by an asterisk to the left of the cited violations, are considered dangerous. Critical violations present a risk to the personal health and safety of guests entering or staying at the motel. Respondent had three critical violations that were not corrected at the time of re-inspection. Violations cited were: no smoke detectors in Rooms 7 and 9; the smoke detectors in Room 5 were inoperative; no fire extinguishers in Rooms 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, and 26; lack of hot water in Rooms 7 and 9; electrical wire exposure in Room 9; and current license not displayed nor available upon request. There was excessive trash in the rear of the premises. Every hotel, motel, and other public rental establishment is required by rule to post room rental rate cards in each room. The report cited Respondent for not posting a room rental rate charge card in each room offered for rent. At the time of the re-inspection Respondent had not corrected three critical violations and one non-critical violation. Respondent did not appear at the final hearing to present mitigating circumstances.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Hotels and Restaurants, enter a final order imposing a fine in the amount of $1,000 per critical violation per day beginning on March 13, 2000, forward until each of the three critical violations has been corrected. It is recommended that the Board impose a separate and additional fine in the amount of $500 per non-critical violation per day from beginning on March 13, 2000, forward until the one non-critical violation has been corrected. It is recommended that the Board suspend License No. 39- 0107-H until full compliance with all sanctions herein imposed is made. Finally, it is recommended that the Board impose upon Virgie Fowler, owner of the motel, the requirement to attend, at personal expense, an appropriate Education program to be designated by the Hospitality Educational program director prior to renewal or reinstatement of license No. 39-01017-H. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2001.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents have violated various statutes and rules governing persons licensed to install and service fire extinguishers and fire suppression systems and, if so, what penalties Petitioner should impose.
Findings Of Fact General Respondents hold Class A and C licenses as fire extinguisher dealers, Class D licenses as pre-engineered systems dealers, Class 01 licenses as fire extinguisher permittees, and Class 04 licenses as pre-engineered systems permittees. Respondent Todd Jacobs (Jacobs) is the qualifier for Respondent National Fire and Safety Corporation (NFS). NFS has been in the fire-safety business for about 15 years. Jacobs received his first permit about ten years ago. Neither Respondent has been disciplined prior to the suspension of all of their licenses and permits effective May 15, 1997, for the incidents described below. The suspension has remained continuously in effect through the present. Pre-engineered systems are custom installations of fire-suppression systems. These pressurized systems, which are activated by heat-sensitive fusible links and small cylinders known as cartridges, feature large metal cylinders that supply the powder through pipes to specific hazard areas. Pre-engineered systems must be installed in accordance with pretested limitations and configurations. Petitioner has cited various violations of the standards of the National Fire Protection Association. As noted in the conclusions of law, violation of these standards, which are incorporated into the rules, provide the basis for discipline. The relevant standards of the National Fire Protection Association are divided into two sections: one governs persons dealing with fire extinguishers and the other governs persons dealing with pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10 is titled, “Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 1-3 defines a “portable fire extinguisher” as a “portable device carried on wheels and operated by hand containing an extinguishing agent that can be expelled under pressure for the purpose of suppressing or extinguishing a fire.” National Fire Protection Association 10 applies to fire extinguishers, not pre-engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 4 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-1.4 provides that “[m]aintenance, servicing, and recharging” of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available the appropriate servicing manual(s), the proper types of tools, recharge materials, lubricants, and manufacturer’s recommended replacement parts or parts specifically listed for use in the fire extinguisher.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.1.2 requires that persons recharging a fire extinguisher shall follow the “recommendations of the manufacturer.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.1 requires that persons recharging fire extinguishers use “[o]nly those agents specified on the nameplate or agents proven to have equal chemical composition, physical characteristics, and fire extinguishing capabilities ” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 4-5.3.2 prohibits persons recharging fire extinguishers from mixing “[m]ultipurpose dry chemicals” with “alkaline-based dry chemicals.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Chapter 5 governs the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers. Table 5-2 provides that the longest hydrostatic test interval for fire extinguishers is 12 years. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-1.2 provides that the hydrostatic testing of fire extinguishers shall be performed by trained persons “having available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and appropriate servicing manual(s).” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers first conduct an internal examination of the cylinder. National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.1.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing fire extinguishers do so in accordance with the “procedures specified in the pamphlet Methods for Hydrostatic Testing of Compressed Gas Cylinders (CGA C-1), published by the Compressed Gas Association.” National Fire Protection Association 10, Standard 5-5.2 provides that the testing procedures for low-pressure cylinders, shells, and hose assemblies are detailed in Appendix A. Appendix A contains detailed material, but, according to a prefatory statement, “[t]his Appendix is not part of the requirements of this National Fire Protection Association document but is included for informational purposes only.” National Fire Protection Association 17 is titled, “Standard for Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “pre- engineered systems,” in part, as [t]hose having predetermined flow rates, nozzle pressures, and quantities of dry chemical [with] specific pipe size, maximum and minimum pipe lengths, flexible hose specifications, number of fittings and number and types of nozzles prescribed by a testing laboratory.” National Fire Protection Association 17 applies to pre- engineered systems, not fire extinguishers. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 1-4 defines “inspection” as a “’quick’ check to give reasonable assurance that the extinguishing system is fully charged and operable.” The definition adds that this is done by “seeing that the system is in place, that it has not been activated or tampered with, and that there is no obvious physical damage or condition to prevent operation.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-8.3.1 requires that the dry chemical container and expellant gas assemblies of a pre-engineered system shall be located “so as not to be subjected to severe weather conditions or to mechanical, chemical, or other damage.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 3-9.1 provides that, for pre-engineered systems, the “pipings and fittings shall be installed in accordance with good commercial practices.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Chapter 9 governs the inspection, maintenance, and recharging of pre- engineered systems. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-1.1 provides that, when dry chemical pressure containers are not attached to piping or hand hose lines, the discharge outlet shall have a protective diffusing safety cap to protect persons from recoil and high-flow discharge in case of accidental activation. The caps shall also be used on empty National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9- 1.4 provides that “[a]ll dry chemical extinguishing systems shall be inspected in accordance with the owner’s manual and maintained and recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual and service bulletins.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2 provides that “[f]ixed temperature-sensing elements of the fusible metal allow type shall be replaced at least annually from the date of installation. They shall be destroyed when removed.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-3.2.1 provides that the “year of manufacture and date of installation of the fixed temperature-sensing element shall be marked on the system inspection tag[,]” and the “tag shall be signed or initialed by the installer.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-4.2 provides that “[s]ystems shall be recharged in accordance with the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5 requires that trained persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems have “available suitable testing equipment, facilities, and an appropriate service manual(s).” This standard requires hydrostatic testing at 12-year intervals for the dry chemical container, auxiliary pressure containers (unless less than two inches in outside diameter and two feet in length or unless they bear the DOT stamp, “3E”), and hose assemblies. National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.1 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems subject the tested components of hydrostatic test pressure equal to the marked factory test pressure or the test pressure specified in the manufacturer’s listed installation and maintenance manual. This test prohibits any leakage, rupture, or movement of hose couplings and requires test procedures in accordance with the manufacturer’s detailed written hydrostatic test instructions.” National Fire Protection Association 17, Standard 9-5.2 requires that persons hydrostatically testing pre- engineered systems remove and discard the dry chemical agent from the containers prior to the test. Page Field (Counts I and II) In March 1997, Rick Clontz, a Lee County employee, asked Roland Taylor, an NFS employee, to service components of the fire-safety system at the Lee County Hazardous Materials Facility at Page Field in Fort Myers. This fire-safety system protects an area at which Lee County stores corrosive, flammable, and poisonous materials. Initially, Mr. Taylor removed three ten-pound ABC fire extinguishers. These are small portable cylinders, whose “ABC” designation refers to their ability to suppress a broad range of fires. According to the National Fire Protection Association standards, Class A fires involve “ordinary combustible materials, such as wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics.” Class B fires involve “flammable liquids, oils greases, tars, oil-based paints, lacquers, and flammable gases.” Class C fires involve “energized electrical equipment . . . .” On April 1, 1997, Mr. Taylor returned the three 10- pound ABC fire extinguishers. Later inspection revealed that Mr. Taylor had properly removed and discarded the ABC powder from each cylinder, but he had refilled only one of the three cylinders entirely with ABC powder. He erroneously filled the other two cylinders with mixtures of 75 percent and 50 percent BC powder. The improper filling of two of the fire extinguishers at the Page Field Hazardous Materials Facility threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Meeting Mr. Taylor at the Page Field facility when Mr. Taylor returned the three small cylinders, Mr. Clontz asked him to remove the 50-pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder and hydrostatically test it. Mr. Taylor noted that the cylinder was not yet due for this test, but quoted a price to which Mr. Clontz agreed, and Mr. Taylor disconnected the cylinder from the pre-engineered system and transported it from the site. Hydrostatic testing is a hydraulic interior pressurization test that measures ductility, which is the ability of cylinder walls to expand and contract. The purpose of hydrostatic testing is to determine the suitability of a cylinder for continued service. Hydrostatic testing requires the tester to release the pressure and empty the contents of a cylinder. Using specialized equipment, the tester then fills the cylinder with water, pressurizing it to twice the service pressure or, for the systems cylinders involved in this case, 1000 pounds per square inch. Cylinder failure from the loss of structural integrity can result in a dangerous rupture, possibly causing an improperly bracketed cylinder to launch like an unguided missile. A cylinder that passes its hydrostatic test does not have to be retested for 12 years. Three days later, Mr. Taylor returned the Ansul cylinder with a tag stamped to show the date on which NFS had hydrostatically tested the cylinder. Mr. Taylor reconnected it to the pre-engineered system, changing the three fusible links. However, Mr. Taylor did not tighten the actuation piping wrench-tight, as required by the manufacturer’s specification. Instead, Mr. Taylor left the actuation piping sufficiently loose that it might cause a failure of the pre- engineered system to activate. As Respondents conceded, the loose actuation piping threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Finished with his work, Mr. Taylor gave Mr. Clontz a receipt, but no diagram or report, as Mr. Clontz usually received after such service. Consistent with the work requested by Lee County, the receipt stated that NFS had hydrostatically tested and recharged the three ten-pound and one 50-pound cylinders. However, NFS had not hydrostatically tested the 50- pound Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. NFS had not even changed the powder in the cylinder. Jacobs was personally aware of these facts and personally authorized the deceitful stamping of the tag to show a hydrostatic testing. The fraudulent misrepresentation concerning the hydrostatic testing of the Ansul SPA 50 cylinder threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Additionally, NFS had replaced the three fusible links with three other fusible links. Petitioner failed to prove that there are material differences between the two types of links so as to justify discipline. There are two differences between the links. First, NFS used Globe links rather than Ansul links. However, Ansul links are manufactured by Globe. The Ansul expert testified that Ansul subjects the links to an additional inspection. However, the record does not reveal whether Globe does not also subject its brand-name links to another inspection that it does not perform for the links that it manufactures for Ansul. The Ansul expert did not testify as to the defect rate resulting from the Ansul inspection or any difference between the performance of the “two” links. On this record, then, there is no demonstrated difference in the two brand-named fusible links. The second difference is that NFS installed an ML link rather than the newer K link currently in use. Ansul approved the ML link in the Ansul SPA 50 pre-engineered system until five years ago. At that time, Ansul authorized use of the older ML link until dealer inventories were depleted. Even assuming that the K link represents a safety advance, compared to the ML link, Ansul’s gradual introduction of the new link precludes a finding that the difference was material, unless one were to assume that Ansul disregarded public safety when authorizing the gradual introduction of the new link. Respondents conceded that they did not have a copy of the Ansul SPA 50 manual when they serviced the Ansul SPA 50 system. They have since obtained the manual. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to have the manual threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Respondents conceded that they did not produce the inspection form for the system. They had provided such a form previously. Petitioner failed to show that the failure to produce an inspection form threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. At the hearing, Petitioner agreed not to pursue the claim against Respondents regarding the LT10R cartridge. Petitioner effectively conceded that Respondents were not required to hydrostatically test the cartridge because it is exempt from such testing. Petitioner evidently elected not to pursue the recharging issue for other reasons. Mobile Service Units (Counts III-V The service truck operated by Mark Thackeray did not have a conductivity tester, certified scales, or proper manuals. The conductivity tester ensures that the braiding is intact on carbon dioxide hoses. The certified scales ensures that the cylinder is filled with the proper amount of dry chemical. The manuals ensure that the person servicing a pre- engineered system understands all of its components and how it works. Additionally, one cylinder in the truck had a drill bit instead of a safety pin installed in the head of the bottle. Petitioner also proved that the fire extinguisher and pre-engineered system tags bore the Naples and Fort Myers addresses for NFS. As noted below, the Fort Myers location was inactive, used only for storage and drop-offs and not for shop work or retail sales activity. For several years, Petitioner’s representatives knew that the tags bore both addresses and knew that the Fort Myers location was inactive, but never objected to Respondents’ practice. The only violation involving Mr. Thackeray’s truck that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. The service truck operated by Ward Read lacked an operational inspection light, six-inch vise, and proper manuals. Additionally, Mr. Read’s truck had tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses for NFS. However, none of these violations involving Mr. Read’s truck threatened the public health, safety, or welfare. Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read’s truck lacked leak testing equipment. The truck had a bottle of Leak Tech with which to detect leaks in fire extinguishers. The truck also had a cable-crimping tool. The truck lacked a Kidde tool, but Petitioner failed to prove that Mr. Read installed Kidde systems off this truck or that the crimping tool present on the truck could not service adequately Kidde installations. The service truck operated by Donald Zelmanski lacked an inspection light, a six-inch vise, certified scales, leak-testing equipment, and proper manuals. Mr. Zelmanski’s truck contained tags with the Fort Myers and Naples addresses. The only violation that threatened the public health, safety, or welfare was the failure to have certified scales. Naples and Fort Myers Facilities (Counts VI-VII) The NFS Naples facility lacked operational hydrostatic test equipment on April 9, 1997. Respondents claim that they were having the equipment upgraded and calibrated at the time of the inspection. Ordinarily, this defense might be creditable, but not in this case. While the hydrostatic test equipment was out of service, NFS accepted the Page Field cylinder for hydrostatic testing and returned it to service, fraudulently representing that the cylinder had been hydrotested. This is precisely the practice against which the requirement of operational testing equipment is designed to protect. The Naples facility also lacked certified gauges for low-pressure testing. Respondents claim that the equipment upgrade described in the preceding paragraph would allow them to test high- and low-pressure cylinders on the same machine. However, due to Respondents’ fraudulent handling of the Page Field cylinder during the equipment downtime, this defense is unavailing. The Naples facility lacked an adapter to allow Respondents to recharge an Ansul SPA 50 cylinder. Jacobs drove the Page Field cylinder to St. Petersburg to have the cylinder recharged by a competitor that had such an adapter. However, the requirement that a facility have an adapter reduces the risk that a licensee will ignore its professional responsibilities and simply return a cylinder to service without first discharging it and performing a visual internal inspection. Respondents’ failure to discharge their other professional responsibilities underscores the materiality of the requirement that they keep an adapter for the Ansul SPA 50 that they elected to accept for service. Respondents kept tags at the Naples facility with tags containing addresses of the Naples and Fort Myers facilities. At the time of the inspection, Respondents also lacked documentation for two of eight scales, including a scale in 1/4-pound increments. Jacobs’ claim that they sent the two uncertified scales for servicing immediately after the inspection does not obviate the fact that, at the time of the inspection, they were available for use and in disrepair. Respondents failed to include serial numbers of serviced fire extinguishers on the relevant invoices. Respondents also failed to include the necessary permit number on inspection forms. Respondent falsely represented that they had hydrotested the Page Field Ansul SPA 50 cylinder at the Naples facility when they had not done so. Respondents stored cylinder bottles without safety caps in place. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents did not post DOT certification near the hydrostatic testing equipment or that they stocked nitrogen cylinders without an acceptable blow-out disk in place. The blow-out disks were not Ansul brand, but Petitioner failed to prove that the disks were not UL listed or the substantial equivalent of Ansul disks. Respondents concede that the Fort Myers location lacked the items alleged by Petitioner. However, the Fort Myers location is inactive and serves merely as a drop-off or storage facility. All shop work and retail sales activities occur at the Naples location. At the time of the April 1997 inspection, Respondents surrendered the license for the inactive Fort Myers location. Other Jobs (Counts VIII-XI) Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the SunTrust Bank in Naples. The cylinder is in the bank vault, which it is designed to protect. Petitioner charged that Respondents improperly located the cylinder in the hazard area, but Petitioner did not discuss the fact that the cylinder at Page Field was in the hazard area. Obviously, the corrosive effect of the hazardous materials at Page Field represents a greater risk to the cylinder than the corrosive effect of money and other valuables in the vault at the SunTrust. Additionally, some language in the Ansul manual cautions not to locate the cylinder in the hazard area, but only if the hazard is corrosive. Respondents replaced the fusible links at SunTrust annually. However, they failed to record the year of manufacture of the fusible links on the system tag when last servicing the system in October 1996. There is no evidence as to whether Respondents had suitable Ansul manuals and adapters when it serviced the system at that time. Respondents installed a pre-engineered system at the VFW Post in Naples. In doing so, their employee, who also misfilled the three fire extinguishers at Page Field, left the end-pipe-to-nozzle loose, so as to risk a loss of pressure in case of fire. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare. Although Respondents fired this employee shortly after discovering his poor performance, this action does not eliminate the safety violations for which he, and they, are responsible. Petitioner also proved that Respondents located the 260 nozzle over the griddle in the wrong location. This condition threatened the public health, safety, and welfare because the system might not extinguish a fire on the griddle. Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents located the 230 nozzle in the wrong location. The Ansul manual allows this nozzle to be located anywhere along or within the perimeter of the fryer, if aimed to the center of the fryer. The 230 nozzle was so located and aimed. Respondents installed two pre-engineered systems at Mozzarella’s Café in Naples. In the course of this job, Respondents committed several violations governing documentation. Respondents improperly combined two pre- engineered systems on one inspection report, failed to include in the inspection report references to the manufacturer’s drawings and page numbers, failed to list in the inspection report a second gas valve on the front hood of one system, and failed to include in the inspection report Respondents’ permit number. However, Petitioner failed to prove that Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the type of fusible links in each hood. Respondents serviced a pre-engineered system at Kwan’s Express in Fort Myers in December 1996. Respondents failed to list in the inspection report the degree and types of fusible links installed and a reference to the drawing and page number in the manufacturer’s manual. However, Respondents listed in the inspection report the model number of the system. Red Lobster (Count XII) Several months after Petitioner had suspended Respondents’ licenses and permits, counsel for both parties negotiated a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, Petitioner would immediately lift the suspension. Jacobs and his general manager, Judson Schroyer, learned that Respondents’ counsel had received an unsigned, final draft settlement agreement on Monday, August 18, 1997. The settlement conditions were acceptable to Respondents, and Jacobs knew that Respondents’ counsel had signed the agreement and faxed it back to Petitioner’s counsel for execution by Petitioner’s representative. On August 18, the general manager of the Red Lobster in Naples called NFS and spoke with Jacobs. The general manager described a job involving the installation of a new oven, which would necessitate the relocation of other kitchen equipment a few feet. Thinking that the settlement agreement would be fully executed by then, Jacobs agreed to visit the general manager at the site the following morning. The next morning, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer met the general manager at the Red Lobster. Giving the general manager NFS business cards with their names, Jacobs and Mr. Schroyer briefly examined the pre-engineered system in the kitchen, as the three men walked through the kitchen, and assured the general manager that there would be no problem doing the work in the short timeframe that the customer required. The purpose of the visit was much more for marketing than it was for preparation for the relatively simple job that the general manager envisioned. Shortly after leaving the Red Lobster, Mr. Schroyer realized that Respondents might not have their licenses and permits reinstated in time to do the job. He conveyed this concern to his supervisor, Jacobs, who spoke with Respondents’ counsel on the evening of August 19 and learned that they could not do the job. Jacobs instructed Mr. Schroyer to call another company in Fort Myers, FireMaster, to which Respondents had referred work during their suspension. Mr. Schroyer called a representative of FireMaster, and he agreed to perform the work. FireMaster assigned the job to Ward Read, who, as is authorized by Petitioner, held a dual permit, which means that he was permitted to work for two licensed dealers. One was NFS, and the other was FireMaster. Mr. Read reported to the Red Lobster in the predawn hours of August 21, as requested by the general manager of Red Lobster. Because his FireMaster truck had insufficient supplies, Mr. Read used an NFS truck, the equipment tags, inspection report, and invoice all bore the name of FireMaster.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the State Fire Marshal enter a final order suspending the licenses and permits of both Respondents for two years, commencing from the effective date of the earlier emergency order of suspension. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Attorney Mechele R. McBride Attorney Richard Grumberg Department of Insurance and Treasurer 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Mark H. Muller Quarles & Brady, P.A. 4501 North Tamiami Trail Naples, Florida 34103 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
