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THE BISCAYNE INSTITUTE vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-001837 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 19, 2003 Number: 03-001837 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 2008

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws to payment for professional services to an injured worker for the billings identified by the three notices of disallowance at issue in this consolidated proceeding.

Findings Of Fact The claimant, a male, was born July 21, 1961. On February 17, 1995, the claimant sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) and other injuries during the course of his employment with the City of Hollywood, Florida. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the claimant has been receiving benefits pursuant to the Florida workers’ compensation laws. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the carrier has been the workers’ compensation carrier for the employer. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the claimant has lived in a home purchased for him by the carrier. The claimant has a life estate in the home and the carrier has the remainder interest. The claimant lives in the home with his mother and has 24-hour attendant services paid for by the carrier. The carrier has purchased a van for the claimant, which his attendant uses to transport the claimant to therapy and other appointments. The claimant has a history of mental illness dating to his teenage years, when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a result of his injury and his illness, the claimant acts out periodically and becomes physically resistive to those trying to care for him. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a provider of rehabilitation services to various patients, including those with TBI. Dr. Marie DiCowden, a psychologist, is the founder and director of Petitioner. Dr. DiCowden described Petitioner as being a health care community that provides an integrated administration for a long continuum of care post acute rehabilitation through community reintegration using health promotion, prevention, and integrated primary care. Petitioner is accredited by two national accrediting organizations referred to by the acronyms CARF (Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities) and CORF (Commission on Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities). Petitioner is also certified by the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (formerly housed in the Department of Labor and now housed in the Department of Education), the Florida Division of Workers’ Compensation, and by the Florida Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program.4 As a result of his accident, the claimant was in a coma for several weeks. He was hospitalized (first in an acute care facility and subsequently in two different rehabilitation hospitals) until December 28, 1995, when he was placed in Whitehall Nursing Home. Whitehall was not an appropriate placement for the claimant because of his behavior and his need for rehabilitation services. On March 27, 1996, Yvonne Beckman, a rehabilitation nurse consultant employed by the carrier, referred the claimant to Petitioner for an evaluation. Shortly before that referral, the claimant had been evaluated by two neuropsychologists (Dr. Jorge A. Herra and Dr. Lee. H. Bukstel), who had opined that the claimant would benefit from rehabilitation services. Ms. Beckman asked Dr. DiCowden to recommend a neurologist who practiced in South Florida. In response, Dr. DiCowden gave Ms. Beckman the names of three neurologists, one of whom was Dr. Paul Wand. Ms. Beckman authorized Dr. Wand to provide services to the claimant. Dr. Wand prescribed continued rehabilitation services for the claimant at Petitioner’s facility. The services at issue in this proceeding were provided by Petitioner pursuant to prescriptions from Dr. Wand.5 Prior to accepting the claimant, Dr. DiCowden informed a representative of the carrier that Petitioner would accept the claimant as a patient in its brain injury program and estimated the annual costs to be $200,000.00. The claimant began receiving rehabilitation services from Petitioner five days a week beginning August 1, 1996. The claimant received from Petitioner’s staff physical therapy, occupational therapy, cognitive retraining, speech training, language training, psychological services, art therapy, music therapy, and yoga therapy. The claimant continued to receive those rehabilitation services from Petitioner (five days a week) from August 1996 to the date of the hearing (and presumably to date). The authorization for the provision of rehabilitation services to the claimant was periodically reviewed by the carrier. In November 1998, the carrier had the claimant examined by Dr. Richard Bailyn (a neurologist) and by Dr. Kevin Lapinski (a neuropsychologist). Those doctors opined that the claimant was not benefiting from cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, speech therapy, or language therapy at Petitioner’s facility. They further opined that the claimant required an activity program to satisfy his recreational and stimulation needs, but that such a program did not require Petitioner’s facility since the claimant’s aide could be trained to provide those services. Dr. Bailyn was of the opinion that as of November 1998 the various therapies provided by Petitioner’s facility to the claimant were not reasonable and were not medically necessary. Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, requires a carrier to review bills by providers of medical services as follows: (6) UTILIZATION REVIEW.--Carriers shall review all bills, invoices, and other claims for payment submitted by health care providers in order to identify overutilization and billing errors, including compliance with practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, and may hire peer review consultants or conduct independent medical evaluations. Such consultants, including peer review organizations, are immune from liability in the execution of their functions under this subsection to the extent provided in s. 766.101. If a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services or a billing error has occurred, or there is a violation of the practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, it must disallow or adjust payment for such services or error without order of a judge of compensation claims or the agency, if the carrier, in making its determination, has complied with this section and rules adopted by the agency. As required by Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, the carrier conducted a utilization review of the services provided by Petitioner to the claimant beginning in late 1999. The carrier retained Dr. Thomas G. Hoffman to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On April 10, 2000, Dr. Hoffman submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant has severe, residual deficits as a result of his accident. He requires 24-hour attendant care. There is no reasonable expectation for further improvement. The therapy he was receiving at that time (and still receives) was not reasonable or medically necessary. The therapy was excessive in frequency and duration. Dr. Hoffman’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained Dr. Victor B. Robert to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On June 19, 2000, Dr. Robert submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The treatment rendered by Petitioner was excessive in frequency and duration. The claimant reached an improvement plateau in early 1997 and therapy was thereafter needed only for maintenance reasons. Dr. Robert’s testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained International Assessment Systems, Inc. (IAS), a professional association of various medical practitioners, to conduct an independent neurological, neuropsychological, and psychological examination of the claimant. On September 22, 2000, IAS submitted a report (Intervenors’ Exhibit 8) based on the examinations of claimant and the review of his medical records by Dr. Kenneth C. Fischer, Dr. Alan J. Raphael, and Dr. Charles J. Golden. The report included several observations and conclusions, including those that follow. The testimony of Drs. Fischer, Raphael, and Golden was consistent with the written report they prepared for IAS. Pages 12-13 of the IAS report contain the following: [The claimant] was oriented to person, but not to place or time. He did not know the current day, date, month, or year. His sensorium was significantly impaired. His mood was volatile, ranging from normal to agitated. His affect was similarly labile, at times he was placid, laughing, and able to converse at a basic level, however he was also quite violent. Attention and concentration were significantly impaired. His receptive, expressive and fluency language capabilities were similarly impaired, although, as noted, he was capable of basic/functional [sic] communication. There were no direct indications of hallucinatory or delusional phenomena, however, based on his behavior, it is likely that some hallucinatory or delusional phenomena were present. His reality testing and insight were significantly impaired. During his repeated fits of anger, he often uttered suicidal and homicidal threats, however there was no evidence of actual intent or plan. He showed no ability to monitor his own safety. Page 15 of the IAS report contains the following: From a neuropsychological and psychological perspective, there were gross impairments noted in his cognitive abilities and emotional functioning. . . . He has been afforded considerable time to maximize his cognitive recovery at this point. It is clear that he has plateaued with regard to cognitive improvement. He will not benefit from continued rehabilitation efforts, although he will require continued stimulation to avoid further cognitive decline. His mood and labile affect may also be benefited by continued stimulation in terms of recreational activities to provide appropriate quality of life.6 Page 17 of the IAS report contains the following under the heading “Neurologic Impression”: . . . I [Dr. Fischer] would recommend that he be placed in a supervised residential setting which will give better protection for him and his caregivers than his present home setting. As the patient is four and a half years status post-injury, specific rehabilitative and therapeutic endeavors will have no benefit and are unwarranted. This would relate to hyperbaric oxygen and cognitive rehabilitation was well as any form of physical, occupational, or speech therapies. Page 19 of the IAS report contains the following: [The claimant] was certainly aided by initial removal from the nursing home and receiving cognitive and physical therapies at Biscayne. However, he has long since reached a plateau in his improvement and no further improvement can be expected at this time. Maximum medical improvement should have been reached within 18 to 24 months post-injury. Any treatment after that time would be palliative or maintenance-oriented (sic). Therefore, the treatment prescribed by Dr. Wand became unreasonable and medically unnecessary several years ago. Page 20 of the IAS report reflects the opinion that while the treatments at Petitioner’s facility were excessive in all respects, the claimant does require maintenance rehabilitation services. It is opined that cognitive retraining is no longer appropriate, but that cognitive tasks and games are appropriate in a recreational setting. By letter dated October 27, 2000, the carrier, through its counsel, advised Petitioner that based on its Utilization Review investigation, it had concluded that as to the identified dates of service “. . . there has been overutilization and/or misutilization since the treatment has been excessive and not medically necessary.” This Letter of Disallowance was the first of a series of letters sent by counsel for the carrier to Petitioner, and frames the issues for all of the disallowances at issue in this proceeding. Thereafter, Petitioner timely disputed the carrier’s basis for disallowing its services to the claimant and petitioned the Respondent to resolve the dispute. The total amount disallowed and at issue in this consolidated proceeding is $615,587.00. Respondent employed four Expert Medical Advisors (EMAs) to perform peer review and assist it in resolving the dispute involving the rehabilitation services provided the claimant by Petitioner. Respondent employed Dr. Fernando G. Miranda, Dr. Jorge Villalba, Dr. Gerard P. Garcia, and Dr. David McCraney to serve as EMAs.7 Each of these doctors prepared a report following his review and each sat for deposition. Dr. Miranda’s report, dated September 17, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 17). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The referral for intensive multi-disciplinary treatment at Petitioner’s facility is no longer medically necessary. The services provided by Petitioner are excessive in frequency and duration and he will not further improve with speech therapy, cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, or individual psychotherapy. Maintenance physical therapy is recommended. Dr. Miranda testified in his deposition that the recommended physical therapy could be performed by the claimant’s attendant. Dr. Miranda’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Villalba’s report dated October 15, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 19). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant reached maximum medical improvement between February 1996 and October 1997. Dr. Villalba described the services provided by Petitioner to claimant “clearly not medically necessary” after October 1997. He also opined that the claimant will require maintenance physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech and language therapy on a continuing basis. Dr. Villalba’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Garcia’s undated report was prepared during the second week of October, 2001, and is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 16). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant should be on a maintenance program and Petitioner’s treatment was excessive. The claimant is unlikely to make further neuropsychological improvement, but he should be treated by a psychiatrist for his schizophrenia. Dr. Garcia’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. McCraney’s report dated November 18, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 18). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. While the care provided Petitioner appears to be excellent, the claimant is far beyond the point where Petitioner’s therapies would be reasonable or medically necessary. Dr. McCraney’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. DiCowden testified at length about the various services her facility provides the claimant and the records her staff generates as a result of those services. Dr. DiCowden testified that her staff is well-trained in assessing the functional status of rehabilitation patients using nationally recognized assessment methodologies. FIN-FAM, acronyms for “Functional Independence Measures” and “Functional Assessment Measures” is one assessment measure used by Petitioner’s staff. The FIN-FAM measure purports to quantify a patient’s progress or lack thereof and can be used by staff as a tool in developing treatment strategies. Dr. DiCowden presented a chart of the FIN-FAM scores for the claimant for the periods at issue in this proceeding. The chart, prepared for this litigation, reflects steady functional improvement of the claimant. Dr. DiCowden further testified that Petitioner’s staff uses a scale of cognitive functioning developed by a rehabilitation facility known as Rancho Los Amigos Hospital, which measures a patient’s response to stimuli on a scale of Ranch Level I (no response) to Ranch Level VII (appropriate response). She asserts that the measurement of the claimant’s status using the Rancho methodology reflect that the claimant has improved over the years. In support of its position that the claimant steadily progressed while undergoing therapy at its facility, Petitioner presented the testimony of Drs. Antonio Puente, Vernando Batas, and Richard Kishner who observed the claimant at Petitioner’s facility on June 23, 2003, September 13, 2003, and February 24, 2004, respectively. Each of these witnesses had the subjective impression that the claimant was benefiting from therapy at Petitioner’s facility. Petitioner asserts that the FIN-FAM scores, the Rancho Levels, and the testimony of its experts establish that the claimant is benefiting from therapy. That assertion is rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the credible evidence. The FIN-FAM scoring and the Rancho scale depend on the subjective impressions of the various therapists who treat the claimant at Petitioner’s facility and the record reflects that the scoring was done on an irregular basis.8 Dr. DiCowden adamantly disagreed with the contention that the rehabilitation services provided by her facility is not reasonable or medically necessary. All evidence presented by Petitioner, including Dr. DiCowden’s testimony, has been carefully considered by the undersigned in resolving the conflicts in the evidence. At best, Petitioner established that the claimant made some unquantified amount of progress in the highly structured therapeutic setting at Petitioner’s facility. Intervenors’ experts clearly established that any progress made by the claimant in therapy did not transcend that therapeutic setting to the real world. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the rehabilitation services it provided the claimant were appropriate and medically necessary. To the contrary, the greater weight of the credible evidence established that at all times relevant to this proceeding the rehabilitation services provided by Petitioner to the claimant have been excessive and that those excessive services have been neither reasonable nor medically necessary.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order that sustains the disallowances at issue in this consolidated proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57440.13440.44766.101
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REHABILITATION AND HEALTHCARE CENTER OF TAMPA vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 09-005518 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 08, 2009 Number: 09-005518 Latest Update: Aug. 20, 2014

Conclusions THE PARTIES resolved all disputed issues and executed a Settlement Agreement. The parties are directed to comply with the terms of the attached settlement agreement. Based on the foregoing, this file is CLOSED. DONE and ORDERED on this the ----3_ day of J--+Ni 1_c..y....,....,_-..._.{_· , 2014, m Tallahassee, Florida. /\ /' f ' .' C \ ).;'-(/ '((l /r- ELIZABETH DUDEK, SECRETARY (Agency for Health Care Admforstration A PARTY WHO IS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO A JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. (OPPOSING COUNSEL) Peter A Lewis, Esquire 302 North Shannon Lakes Drive Suitel0l Tallahassee, Florida 32309 (Via U.S. Mail) Bureau of Health Quality Assurance 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 9 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Shena Grantham, Chief Medicaid FFS Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Building 3, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Karen Chang, Bureau Chief Medicaid Program Analysis 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 21 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Bureau of Finance and Accounting 2727 Mahan Drive Building 2, Mail Station 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Zainab Day, Medicaid Audit Services Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 21 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Kristin M. Bigham Office of the Attorney General The Capitol PL - 01 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 (Via US Mail) State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (Via U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been furnished to the above named addressees by U.S. Mail on this the of -;,;;-D, 2014. Richard Shoop, Esquire Agency Clerk State of Florida Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

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THE BISCAYNE INSTITUTE vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 03-003890 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Oct. 21, 2003 Number: 03-003890 Latest Update: Apr. 25, 2008

The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled under Florida’s workers’ compensation laws to payment for professional services to an injured worker for the billings identified by the three notices of disallowance at issue in this consolidated proceeding.

Findings Of Fact The claimant, a male, was born July 21, 1961. On February 17, 1995, the claimant sustained a severe traumatic brain injury (TBI) and other injuries during the course of his employment with the City of Hollywood, Florida. At all times relevant to these proceedings, the claimant has been receiving benefits pursuant to the Florida workers’ compensation laws. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the carrier has been the workers’ compensation carrier for the employer. At all times relevant to this proceeding, the claimant has lived in a home purchased for him by the carrier. The claimant has a life estate in the home and the carrier has the remainder interest. The claimant lives in the home with his mother and has 24-hour attendant services paid for by the carrier. The carrier has purchased a van for the claimant, which his attendant uses to transport the claimant to therapy and other appointments. The claimant has a history of mental illness dating to his teenage years, when he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. As a result of his injury and his illness, the claimant acts out periodically and becomes physically resistive to those trying to care for him. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner has been a provider of rehabilitation services to various patients, including those with TBI. Dr. Marie DiCowden, a psychologist, is the founder and director of Petitioner. Dr. DiCowden described Petitioner as being a health care community that provides an integrated administration for a long continuum of care post acute rehabilitation through community reintegration using health promotion, prevention, and integrated primary care. Petitioner is accredited by two national accrediting organizations referred to by the acronyms CARF (Commission on Accreditation of Rehabilitation Facilities) and CORF (Commission on Outpatient Rehabilitation Facilities). Petitioner is also certified by the Florida Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (formerly housed in the Department of Labor and now housed in the Department of Education), the Florida Division of Workers’ Compensation, and by the Florida Brain and Spinal Cord Injury Program.4 As a result of his accident, the claimant was in a coma for several weeks. He was hospitalized (first in an acute care facility and subsequently in two different rehabilitation hospitals) until December 28, 1995, when he was placed in Whitehall Nursing Home. Whitehall was not an appropriate placement for the claimant because of his behavior and his need for rehabilitation services. On March 27, 1996, Yvonne Beckman, a rehabilitation nurse consultant employed by the carrier, referred the claimant to Petitioner for an evaluation. Shortly before that referral, the claimant had been evaluated by two neuropsychologists (Dr. Jorge A. Herra and Dr. Lee. H. Bukstel), who had opined that the claimant would benefit from rehabilitation services. Ms. Beckman asked Dr. DiCowden to recommend a neurologist who practiced in South Florida. In response, Dr. DiCowden gave Ms. Beckman the names of three neurologists, one of whom was Dr. Paul Wand. Ms. Beckman authorized Dr. Wand to provide services to the claimant. Dr. Wand prescribed continued rehabilitation services for the claimant at Petitioner’s facility. The services at issue in this proceeding were provided by Petitioner pursuant to prescriptions from Dr. Wand.5 Prior to accepting the claimant, Dr. DiCowden informed a representative of the carrier that Petitioner would accept the claimant as a patient in its brain injury program and estimated the annual costs to be $200,000.00. The claimant began receiving rehabilitation services from Petitioner five days a week beginning August 1, 1996. The claimant received from Petitioner’s staff physical therapy, occupational therapy, cognitive retraining, speech training, language training, psychological services, art therapy, music therapy, and yoga therapy. The claimant continued to receive those rehabilitation services from Petitioner (five days a week) from August 1996 to the date of the hearing (and presumably to date). The authorization for the provision of rehabilitation services to the claimant was periodically reviewed by the carrier. In November 1998, the carrier had the claimant examined by Dr. Richard Bailyn (a neurologist) and by Dr. Kevin Lapinski (a neuropsychologist). Those doctors opined that the claimant was not benefiting from cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, speech therapy, or language therapy at Petitioner’s facility. They further opined that the claimant required an activity program to satisfy his recreational and stimulation needs, but that such a program did not require Petitioner’s facility since the claimant’s aide could be trained to provide those services. Dr. Bailyn was of the opinion that as of November 1998 the various therapies provided by Petitioner’s facility to the claimant were not reasonable and were not medically necessary. Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, requires a carrier to review bills by providers of medical services as follows: (6) UTILIZATION REVIEW.--Carriers shall review all bills, invoices, and other claims for payment submitted by health care providers in order to identify overutilization and billing errors, including compliance with practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, and may hire peer review consultants or conduct independent medical evaluations. Such consultants, including peer review organizations, are immune from liability in the execution of their functions under this subsection to the extent provided in s. 766.101. If a carrier finds that overutilization of medical services or a billing error has occurred, or there is a violation of the practice parameters and protocols of treatment established in accordance with this chapter, it must disallow or adjust payment for such services or error without order of a judge of compensation claims or the agency, if the carrier, in making its determination, has complied with this section and rules adopted by the agency. As required by Section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes, the carrier conducted a utilization review of the services provided by Petitioner to the claimant beginning in late 1999. The carrier retained Dr. Thomas G. Hoffman to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On April 10, 2000, Dr. Hoffman submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant has severe, residual deficits as a result of his accident. He requires 24-hour attendant care. There is no reasonable expectation for further improvement. The therapy he was receiving at that time (and still receives) was not reasonable or medically necessary. The therapy was excessive in frequency and duration. Dr. Hoffman’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained Dr. Victor B. Robert to review the claimant’s medical records and to express opinions pertaining to the services provided to him by Petitioner. On June 19, 2000, Dr. Robert submitted a report that included several conclusions, including those that follow. The treatment rendered by Petitioner was excessive in frequency and duration. The claimant reached an improvement plateau in early 1997 and therapy was thereafter needed only for maintenance reasons. Dr. Robert’s testimony was consistent with his written report. The carrier retained International Assessment Systems, Inc. (IAS), a professional association of various medical practitioners, to conduct an independent neurological, neuropsychological, and psychological examination of the claimant. On September 22, 2000, IAS submitted a report (Intervenors’ Exhibit 8) based on the examinations of claimant and the review of his medical records by Dr. Kenneth C. Fischer, Dr. Alan J. Raphael, and Dr. Charles J. Golden. The report included several observations and conclusions, including those that follow. The testimony of Drs. Fischer, Raphael, and Golden was consistent with the written report they prepared for IAS. Pages 12-13 of the IAS report contain the following: [The claimant] was oriented to person, but not to place or time. He did not know the current day, date, month, or year. His sensorium was significantly impaired. His mood was volatile, ranging from normal to agitated. His affect was similarly labile, at times he was placid, laughing, and able to converse at a basic level, however he was also quite violent. Attention and concentration were significantly impaired. His receptive, expressive and fluency language capabilities were similarly impaired, although, as noted, he was capable of basic/functional [sic] communication. There were no direct indications of hallucinatory or delusional phenomena, however, based on his behavior, it is likely that some hallucinatory or delusional phenomena were present. His reality testing and insight were significantly impaired. During his repeated fits of anger, he often uttered suicidal and homicidal threats, however there was no evidence of actual intent or plan. He showed no ability to monitor his own safety. Page 15 of the IAS report contains the following: From a neuropsychological and psychological perspective, there were gross impairments noted in his cognitive abilities and emotional functioning. . . . He has been afforded considerable time to maximize his cognitive recovery at this point. It is clear that he has plateaued with regard to cognitive improvement. He will not benefit from continued rehabilitation efforts, although he will require continued stimulation to avoid further cognitive decline. His mood and labile affect may also be benefited by continued stimulation in terms of recreational activities to provide appropriate quality of life.6 Page 17 of the IAS report contains the following under the heading “Neurologic Impression”: . . . I [Dr. Fischer] would recommend that he be placed in a supervised residential setting which will give better protection for him and his caregivers than his present home setting. As the patient is four and a half years status post-injury, specific rehabilitative and therapeutic endeavors will have no benefit and are unwarranted. This would relate to hyperbaric oxygen and cognitive rehabilitation was well as any form of physical, occupational, or speech therapies. Page 19 of the IAS report contains the following: [The claimant] was certainly aided by initial removal from the nursing home and receiving cognitive and physical therapies at Biscayne. However, he has long since reached a plateau in his improvement and no further improvement can be expected at this time. Maximum medical improvement should have been reached within 18 to 24 months post-injury. Any treatment after that time would be palliative or maintenance-oriented (sic). Therefore, the treatment prescribed by Dr. Wand became unreasonable and medically unnecessary several years ago. Page 20 of the IAS report reflects the opinion that while the treatments at Petitioner’s facility were excessive in all respects, the claimant does require maintenance rehabilitation services. It is opined that cognitive retraining is no longer appropriate, but that cognitive tasks and games are appropriate in a recreational setting. By letter dated October 27, 2000, the carrier, through its counsel, advised Petitioner that based on its Utilization Review investigation, it had concluded that as to the identified dates of service “. . . there has been overutilization and/or misutilization since the treatment has been excessive and not medically necessary.” This Letter of Disallowance was the first of a series of letters sent by counsel for the carrier to Petitioner, and frames the issues for all of the disallowances at issue in this proceeding. Thereafter, Petitioner timely disputed the carrier’s basis for disallowing its services to the claimant and petitioned the Respondent to resolve the dispute. The total amount disallowed and at issue in this consolidated proceeding is $615,587.00. Respondent employed four Expert Medical Advisors (EMAs) to perform peer review and assist it in resolving the dispute involving the rehabilitation services provided the claimant by Petitioner. Respondent employed Dr. Fernando G. Miranda, Dr. Jorge Villalba, Dr. Gerard P. Garcia, and Dr. David McCraney to serve as EMAs.7 Each of these doctors prepared a report following his review and each sat for deposition. Dr. Miranda’s report, dated September 17, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 17). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The referral for intensive multi-disciplinary treatment at Petitioner’s facility is no longer medically necessary. The services provided by Petitioner are excessive in frequency and duration and he will not further improve with speech therapy, cognitive retraining, occupational therapy, or individual psychotherapy. Maintenance physical therapy is recommended. Dr. Miranda testified in his deposition that the recommended physical therapy could be performed by the claimant’s attendant. Dr. Miranda’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Villalba’s report dated October 15, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 19). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant reached maximum medical improvement between February 1996 and October 1997. Dr. Villalba described the services provided by Petitioner to claimant “clearly not medically necessary” after October 1997. He also opined that the claimant will require maintenance physical therapy, occupational therapy, and speech and language therapy on a continuing basis. Dr. Villalba’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. Garcia’s undated report was prepared during the second week of October, 2001, and is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 16). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. The claimant should be on a maintenance program and Petitioner’s treatment was excessive. The claimant is unlikely to make further neuropsychological improvement, but he should be treated by a psychiatrist for his schizophrenia. Dr. Garcia’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. McCraney’s report dated November 18, 2001, is attached to his deposition (Intervenors’ Exhibit 18). The report included several conclusions, including those that follow. While the care provided Petitioner appears to be excellent, the claimant is far beyond the point where Petitioner’s therapies would be reasonable or medically necessary. Dr. McCraney’s deposition testimony was consistent with his written report. Dr. DiCowden testified at length about the various services her facility provides the claimant and the records her staff generates as a result of those services. Dr. DiCowden testified that her staff is well-trained in assessing the functional status of rehabilitation patients using nationally recognized assessment methodologies. FIN-FAM, acronyms for “Functional Independence Measures” and “Functional Assessment Measures” is one assessment measure used by Petitioner’s staff. The FIN-FAM measure purports to quantify a patient’s progress or lack thereof and can be used by staff as a tool in developing treatment strategies. Dr. DiCowden presented a chart of the FIN-FAM scores for the claimant for the periods at issue in this proceeding. The chart, prepared for this litigation, reflects steady functional improvement of the claimant. Dr. DiCowden further testified that Petitioner’s staff uses a scale of cognitive functioning developed by a rehabilitation facility known as Rancho Los Amigos Hospital, which measures a patient’s response to stimuli on a scale of Ranch Level I (no response) to Ranch Level VII (appropriate response). She asserts that the measurement of the claimant’s status using the Rancho methodology reflect that the claimant has improved over the years. In support of its position that the claimant steadily progressed while undergoing therapy at its facility, Petitioner presented the testimony of Drs. Antonio Puente, Vernando Batas, and Richard Kishner who observed the claimant at Petitioner’s facility on June 23, 2003, September 13, 2003, and February 24, 2004, respectively. Each of these witnesses had the subjective impression that the claimant was benefiting from therapy at Petitioner’s facility. Petitioner asserts that the FIN-FAM scores, the Rancho Levels, and the testimony of its experts establish that the claimant is benefiting from therapy. That assertion is rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the credible evidence. The FIN-FAM scoring and the Rancho scale depend on the subjective impressions of the various therapists who treat the claimant at Petitioner’s facility and the record reflects that the scoring was done on an irregular basis.8 Dr. DiCowden adamantly disagreed with the contention that the rehabilitation services provided by her facility is not reasonable or medically necessary. All evidence presented by Petitioner, including Dr. DiCowden’s testimony, has been carefully considered by the undersigned in resolving the conflicts in the evidence. At best, Petitioner established that the claimant made some unquantified amount of progress in the highly structured therapeutic setting at Petitioner’s facility. Intervenors’ experts clearly established that any progress made by the claimant in therapy did not transcend that therapeutic setting to the real world. Petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the rehabilitation services it provided the claimant were appropriate and medically necessary. To the contrary, the greater weight of the credible evidence established that at all times relevant to this proceeding the rehabilitation services provided by Petitioner to the claimant have been excessive and that those excessive services have been neither reasonable nor medically necessary.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration issue a final order that sustains the disallowances at issue in this consolidated proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2004.

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.57440.13440.44766.101
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CORDETT D. MCCALL vs DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, 96-001305 (1996)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Mar. 07, 1996 Number: 96-001305 Latest Update: Jul. 24, 1996

Findings Of Fact Petitioner has had a relationship with his wife since they were 16 years old. At the time the hearing was conducted, husband and wife were 24 years old. They had been married for approximately three years and had a child who was four years old. Beginning February 1995, Petitioner became suspicious that his wife was having an affair with another man. Around that time, the couple argued several times a week. This would cause Petitioner to leave their home. In addition, Petitioner and Mrs. McCall would not speak to each other for a couple of days following these arguments. On March 16, 1995, the man with whom Petitioner's wife was having the relationship called the couple's home. On that occasion, Mrs. McCall would not say who was speaking to her on the telephone and appeared secretive. It led to a further argument between Petitioner and Mrs. McCall. Petitioner then grabbed his keys and started to leave. Mrs. McCall struggled with him to get the keys out of his hand. During the struggle, Mrs. McCall was scratched on her chest. The noise that the couple made was sufficiently noticeable that the neighbors called the police to investigate. When the police arrived at Petitioner's home on March 16, 1995, Petitioner was sitting on the couch. The police noticed the visible marks on Mrs. McCall's chest. Consequently, Petitioner was charged with battery under Section 784.03, Florida Statutes. On March 18, 1995, Petitioner pled no contest to the offense of battery for the incident that took place on March 16, 1995 involving his wife. He was given two days unsupervised probation and required to pay $75.00 in court costs. The court adjudicated Petitioner guilty of the offense. After the March 16, 1995 incident the McCalls continued to argue. On April 11, 1995, when Petitioner left home to go to work that morning, he told Mrs. McCall that he was going to leave work in the afternoon and travel to Deland, Florida, to see his father. Instead, Petitioner went home that afternoon to get some papers before making the trip to see his father. When he arrived at his home a person named Renee, Mrs. McCall's friend, was watching the McCalls' child in one room, while Mrs. McCall was in bed with her male acquaintance in the McCalls' bedroom. When Petitioner discovered his wife with another man, he began to scream and yell and picked up his son to leave the home. Mrs. McCall tried to intervene and stop Petitioner from leaving the home with her son. During the course of this incident, Petitioner grabbed his wife by the arms and pushed her aside, causing her to fall against the wall. The areas upon which she was grabbed by Petitioner were bruised. Mrs. McCall is prone to bruising because she is a hemophiliac. Their child was not harmed during this physical exchange between the couple. After the exchange, Petitioner left the home and went to Deland, leaving the child with his mother. Before discovering his wife in bed with the other man, Petitioner did not know, as a matter of fact, that his wife was having a relationship with that person. When Petitioner discovered his wife in bed with the other man, he did not threaten her, notwithstanding the yelling and screaming. Renee had called the police when Petitioner arrived at the home, but the police did not arrive for one-half hour to one hour after Petitioner had left the home. Mrs. McCall was concerned about how her husband would react beyond the point where he had discovered her with another man. Therefore, she determined to make a complaint about her husband's physical activity in which he bruised her arms. Based upon that complaint, the police determined to arrest Petitioner. Following the trip to Deland Petitioner came back that night and spent the night with a friend in Jacksonville, Florida. The next morning Petitioner called Mrs. McCall and inquired concerning the circumstances of their exchange. Mrs. McCall told him that she had called the police after he left because she was afraid of what he might do to her and that made her "press charges". Petitioner responded by telling his wife where he was located and telling her to have the police come to that location and pick him up, which they did. When the police arrested Petitioner for the events on April 11, 1995, they again charged him with a violation of Section 784.03, Florida Statutes, and made mention that the battery for which he was accused was associated with domestic violence. Following the arrest, Mrs. McCall spoke with the state attorney's office to have them drop the charges for the battery that occurred on April 11, 1995. The state attorney's office was unwilling to drop the charges in view of the prior charge dating from March 16, 1995. Petitioner pled no contest to the battery offense related to the April 11, 1995 incident. He was given a 30-day sentence, credited with serving two days of the sentence, and the remaining 28 days of that sentence were suspended, conditioned upon the successful service of probation. The probation was served for nine months. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty for the offense and was required to participate in a program for individuals who had committed offenses involving domestic violence. The program emphasized controlling one's aggression. Petitioner completed the program related to management of his aggression. In the program to deal with domestic violence, Petitioner and other participants were required to discuss the experiences they had concerning domestic violence. The McCalls lived apart from April, 1995 until January, 1996. During that time, Petitioner kept their child for the most part because his living arrangements were more suitable than those under which Mrs. McCall existed. While they were estranged, initially, the couple did not do things together and would separately spend time with their child. At the end of their estrangement the couple began to do things as a family unit. Subsequent to being reunited, the McCalls had been seeing a marriage counselor for about a month at the time the hearing was conducted. The McCalls had been to four sessions with the counselor and intended to continue seeing a marriage counselor in the future. The McCalls described their relationship as improving since they have been reunited. Prior to the events in March and April, 1995, in which Petitioner battered Mrs. McCall in the manner described, Petitioner had never struck his wife. As explained at the hearing, Mrs. McCall is not concerned that her husband will batter her in the future. Petitioner holds a bachelor's degree in psychology. He has one year of study in sociology in a bachelor's-level program. In the past, he worked two and one-half years for ARA Living Centers, providing direct care to adults. He left that position and took employment with an organization known as New Directions. This was a mental-health position, working with children on an out- patient basis. Petitioner held this job for approximately two years. Beyond that point, Petitioner took a position as a child-guidance case worker in a mental-health capacity. It was that position that prompted the screening that was conducted in January, 1996, leading to the decision to disqualify him from that employment. The procedures followed in the disqualification are as detailed in the preliminary statement above. Petitioner contested the decision to deny him an exemption from disqualification. His request to be heard before the Respondent and to seek a formal hearing to contest the preliminary decision by Respondent denying the exemption from disqualification were both timely filed. Before being terminated from his position as a child-guidance counselor based upon the disqualification, Petitioner had worked voluntarily at a group home for children. In the past, when working with children and adults, Petitioner has never been disciplined or reprimanded concerning his conduct in providing that care. Mr. George Robinson is an HRS Protective Services worker. He began work with Respondent on June 12, 1995. Prior to that employment, Mr. Robinson worked in the Mental Health Center in Jacksonville, Florida, as a discharge planner. Mr. Robinson knew Petitioner when they attended college. He considers Petitioner his friend and speaks highly of Petitioner's character. In addition, Mr. Robinson is familiar with Petitioner's work history and recommended that Petitioner receive a position at the Mental Health Center of Jacksonville, Florida, where Petitioner was employed from November 15, 1993 through November 30, 1995. Jane Escobar, M.S.W., Manager, Children's Department for the Mental Health Center of Jacksonville, Inc. refers to Petitioner's work history with that organization. Among the duties Petitioner performed with the organization was as an individual assigned to the Therapeutic Group Home within the Mental Health Center, in which position Petitioner worked with emotionally-disturbed children. This work entailed association with counseling groups, individual social skills training, chart documentation, and recreational activities. It also involved interaction with families and other treating professionals. Following receipt of his bachelor's degree, Petitioner was promoted to a position of mental-health counselor within the Mental Health Center, a position which required him to carry a case load of approximately 15-18 clinical cases, involving individual counseling with children, family work, and often involving seeing the children in their homes, as well as at their schools, and in his office. Petitioner left the position with Mental Health Center of Jacksonville in good standing to pursue a career-enhancing position. Ms. Escobar considers Petitioner to be a well-liked and a highly-respected clinician. Ms. Escobar indicates that the Mental Health Center would willingly return Petitioner to employment if a position were available at the Center. Mr. Val Thomas has written to commend Petitioner for his work as a counselor for Mr. Thomas' son. Mr. Thomas attributes Petitioner's good works for helping the Thomas family to correct problems which their son was having. Ms. Nancy Edmonds, a clinical social worker, speaks favorably of Petitioner, whom she has known in a professional and personal capacity for two years. She is impressed by Petitioner's moral character and finds Petitioner to be an understanding and caring person. She has found him capable of dealing with the most difficult circumstances in their work, without losing his composure. She finds that he works well with children and adolescents. Mr. Brian J. Maxson is the First Step Coordinator at Hubbard House, the facility in which Petitioner participated in group sessions concerning his conduct toward his wife, as a condition of his probation. Mr. Maxson confirms that Petitioner completed that program. At present, Petitioner works with AT&T in soliciting customers to use its services. He had held that position for two months when the hearing commenced.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered granting Petitioner an exemption from disqualification to work with children in positions of special trust. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 1996.

Florida Laws (7) 120.57394.455402.305435.04435.07741.28784.03
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CONNIE LEONESSA vs HODGES UNIVERSITY, 20-003059 (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 08, 2020 Number: 20-003059 Latest Update: Dec. 25, 2024

The Issue Did Respondent, Hodges University (Hodges), commit an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner, Connie Leonessa, on account of her religion, as defined and prohibited by section 760.10(5), Florida Statutes (2018)?1

Findings Of Fact Parties Hodges is a university located in Ft. Myers, Florida. It offers a master's degree in counseling through the Clinical Mental Health Counseling (CMHC) program housed within Hodges' Nichols School of Professional Studies. Ms. Leonessa was a student in Hodges' CMHC master's program. Ms. Leonessa is an experienced registered nurse who has primarily served pediatric patients over the years. She also volunteered regularly to work with children in inner cities of the Northeast. Those experiences, her compassion for children, and her personal trauma of molestation drove Ms. Leonessa to want to serve children better. In her words, "and I just felt that God wanted me to go back to school to get a master's so I can help these victims." Ms. Leonessa was enrolled in Hodges from 2015 until the fall of 2018. Her goal was to prepare herself to provide counseling services to child victims of trauma. There is no persuasive, competent evidence proving that providing counseling services to child victims of trauma is a profession, occupation, or trade that requires a master's degree in counseling. In fact, paid positions in the counseling field are available without a master's degree. A master's degree, followed by two years of full-time, post- graduation, paid supervised work experience is required to obtain a mental health counselor license. So is passage of the NCMHCE Exam administered by the National Board for Certified Counselors. The persuasive, competent evidence of record does not prove that Ms. Leonessa intended to take the post-graduation steps required to obtain a mental health counselor license or to seek a mental health counselor license. Hodges' Master's Program Earning a master's degree in social work from Hodges requires successful completion of academic coursework, a 200-hour practicum, and three 267-hour internships. The providers of the practicum and internships are not part of or controlled by Hodges. The student is responsible for identifying and making arrangements with the practicum and internship providers. Hodges assists when it can. Hodges' program, like counseling itself, requires students to develop awareness of their preferences, prejudices, ethics, and philosophies and separate them from the support and guidance provided clients. Upon entering the program, students agree to abide by the requirements of a Clinical Mental Health Counseling Professional Attitude and Behavior Agreement (Agreement). Ms. Leonessa signed the agreement on September 2, 2015. The Agreement states the student's obligation to align her "personal ethics with the professional ethics as defined by the American Counseling Association (ACA) 2014 Code of Ethics [Code].” The Code was attached to the Agreement. The Agreement emphasizes the priority of avoiding harm to clients or future clients and taking care to not impose the counselor's personal beliefs, values, and behaviors on clients. The Agreement recognizes the ethical dilemmas the profession presents and articulates a student's obligation to consult others about the dilemmas and develop "an ever increasing ability to apply a professional ethic to difficult situations involving ethical dilemmas and associated law … ." As part of the Agreement, Ms. Leonessa agreed to have "an open and willing attitude toward feedback and suggestions given by faculty, peers and site supervisors to help the student reduce the possibility of harm." This tenet supports the value of requiring a counselor to put "a high priority on avoiding harm to clients or future clients." The Agreement obliges the student to understand and abide by the Code. The CMHC Student Handbook (Handbook) contains and emphasizes requirements similar to the Agreement's requirements. It encourages students to pursue personal therapy and growth, for their intrinsic benefits and to provide insight into what clients experience. The Handbook emphasizes that counselors are held to higher ethical standards and higher levels of personal growth and mental health than the average person. It states that evaluation of a student's progress in those areas is part of judging a student's suitability for the counseling profession. Hodges' program includes regular evaluation of a student's progress in "interpersonal interactions with students, faculty, site supervisors, and others involved with his/her academic progress." The program requires progress in those areas and provides for a Student Development Plan for remediation if the student does not improve his or her interpersonal interactions and skills. The Handbook directs students to review the Code. The Handbook requires students to work professionally and respectfully with fellow students, faculty, site supervisors, and site employees. The Handbook also requires students to accept others without rejection based upon, among other things, age, culture, gender identity, sexual orientation, religion, or marital status. A student commits to be "respectful of differing opinions and professional practice … ." A student also commits to work "to continually improve her/his professional relationship skills and clarify professional boundaries." The Handbook, signed by Ms. Leonessa, concludes with this affirmation: I understand that the Hodges University Clinical Mental Health Counseling Program requires students to perform adequately in areas of academic assessment that include the ability to form and continue positive relationships with others; the ability to acquire and correctly use counseling knowledge and skills, and the ability to successfully complete all practicums and internships in the judgment of the faculty and site supervisors. These expectations are in addition to the didactic coursework expectations and assessment procedures. I understand that I will be expected to continually improve my ability to demonstrate counseling competencies as I progress in the program. I further understand that the American Counseling Association 2014 Code of Ethics forms the basis of professional standards to which I must adhere. In sum, the nature of the counseling field that Ms. Leonessa sought to enter and the program at Hodges required students to develop an open and tolerant and patient way of communicating with people with whom they may disagree, even disagree vehemently. Conflict in Hodges' Academic Program Ms. Leonessa performed well in her academic work. But her interactions with three fellow students and a professor were marked with conflicts. She attributed the conflict to discrimination against her on account of her religion. The evidence does not support the attribution. Ms. Leonessa's sensitivity to the age differential between herself and other students and her aggressive personality caused conflict with fellow students. Ms. Leonessa acknowledged her aggressiveness, saying, "You know, I know I have a tone and I've been honest about that. I have a tone." (Tr. V. I, p. 206). Ms. Leonessa also had a pattern of attributing any disagreement or conflict to opposition to her Christian beliefs. Dr. Thomas Hoffman taught many of Ms. Leonessa's classes. Like Ms. Leonessa, Dr. Hoffman is a Christian. In email communications each referred to scripture. For instance, Dr. Hoffman, in counseling Ms. Leonessa about alleviating her repeated personal conflicts, advised her to be "wise as a serpent, but gentle as a dove." Ms. Leonessa, in defense of her combative approach said, "Jesus Christ spoke truth and was hated for it." Neither Dr. Hoffman nor any other Hodges representative ever prohibited Ms. Leonessa from referring to her Christian beliefs in communications with them. In addition, Dr. Hoffman never asked Ms. Leonessa not to share her religious views, such as her anti-abortion beliefs, in class. As the years passed, Ms. Leonessa's communications to Dr. Hoffman grew increasingly querulous and combative. Her tone was frustrated and loud. She challenged Dr. Hoffman's competence, honesty, and integrity in a disrespectful manner. Ms. Leonessa clashed, in class and outside class, with three fellow students. She felt the students did not treat her with the respect that was her due because of her age. Ms. Leonessa had a dispute with one student about abortion. She had conflicts with another about the use of the "F" word in class. Ms. Leonessa had a conflict with a third student who said that Ms. Leonessa was trying to impose her values in class. During these conflicts, Ms. Leonessa raised her voice and spoke hostilely. Sometimes she pointed her finger. In an encounter outside of the school, one of the students told Ms. Leonessa that Ms. Leonessa's beliefs were "f…ed up" and that Ms. Leonessa should attend a Christian school. Once Ms. Leonessa jerked on another student's purse strap to make a point. Those three students did not have conflicts with other students or faculty. Also, as will be addressed below, Ms. Leonessa had significant problems in her internships, problems the other students did not have. The three students were not similarly situated to Ms. Leonessa. Due to these conflicts and ways of interacting with Dr. Hoffman, Hodges faculty met with Ms. Leonessa in February 2016 in an informal coaching session. The purpose was to address Ms. Leonessa's inability to control her emotions and express herself in an appropriate manner. These are all issues whose importance to counseling the Agreement, the Handbook, and the Code all emphasize. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs were not the reason for convening the coaching session or the communications during it. The faculty also conducted informal coaching sessions with the other three students. Despite the coaching sessions, Ms. Leonessa's conflicts with the students and Dr. Hoffman continued. Hodges' Handbook provides for establishing a formal Student Development Plan (SDP) to assist students who are not performing in a manner that is consistent with the Code. An SDP's purpose is to formalize concerns not resolved by the informal coaching and provide a plan for addressing them. It is a remedial measure. Hodges established SDPs infrequently. Since 2011 it has implemented seven. The faculty created an SDP for Ms. Leonessa and placed her on it in October 2016. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs played no part in the decision to create the plan or setting the plan's requirements. The behaviors which the SDP addressed included the changes in Ms. Leonessa's tone and raised volume when she disagreed with others, her practice of interrupting others with whom she disagreed, and her belaboring of class topics well after the instructor was trying to move the class to a resolution and on to the next subject. The plan provided supports and measurable goals for Ms. Leonessa. They were: (1) pairing her with a third-year student as a mentor, (2) completing a case study assignment, (3) completing role-playing exercises, and (4) documenting her changes of tone and volume in class. Ms. Leonessa disagreed with the SDP but agreed to follow it and signed it some two months after the faculty presented it to her. The role-playing exercises assigned to Ms. Leonessa involved same-sex attraction and abortion. The faculty selected these two topics because they recur frequently in counseling. Ms. Leonessa's religious beliefs were not the reason for selecting the topics. Ms. Leonessa successfully completed the SDP. The three students with whom Ms. Leonessa clashed were not placed on SDPs. Their issues did not match Ms. Leonessa's in frequency or intensity. Practicum Ms. Leonessa sought to establish a practicum placement at Cape Christian, also known as Samaritan Health and Wellness Center (Cape Christian). There was some uncertainty whether the supervision available at Cape Christian met Hodges' requirements. Ms. Leonessa's contact at Cape Christian, Ms. Trout, was not satisfactorily responsive to Ms. Leonessa's efforts to sort the issue out. This resulted in combative telephone calls and emails from Ms. Leonessa to Ms. Trout. An excerpt from one email illustrates Ms. Leonessa's pattern of hostility and injection of religion into disputes. In a December 5, 2016, email to Ms. Trout from Ms. Leonessa describing her displeasure with the responsiveness of Cape Christian and a conversation with one of Ms. Trout's co-workers, Ms. Leonessa wrote: You stated I chewed her out but you were not on the phone. I did not disparage her character in any way, I said as believers we are to keep our word and that now I would have to find another place at the last minute. That is all I said. The Bible says be angry and sin not. According to what I have heard, you do not believe people should be angry and I would bet there are times in your life when you have had an unprofessional tone. Also I have had to wait weeks before hearing back from you, it amazed me how quickly you called about this situation-seconds! Ms. Trout replied: If you were my student and you'd have behaved in the manner as this [sic], you would be put in a professional development status, complete with remediation, to determine your appropriateness to move forward in the field of counseling. The fact that you sent this email in its current form further highlights the display of lack of professionalism and emotional maturity now exhibited in two separate phone calls as well. I would encourage that you seek some assistance in processing your emotions, and the manner in which you communicate those. I wish you the best. Ms. Leonessa replied to Ms. Trout, "Please do not contact me further." Ms. Trout forwarded the email exchange to Sue Hook and Dr. Mary Nuosce of Hodges. Dr. Nuosce answered, "Amy, I apologize for her total lack of professionalism. We are working on this. Thank you for your patience." This incident triggered an update to the SDP. The update was because of Ms. Leonessa's conduct and unrelated to her religious beliefs. Ultimately, Ms. Leonessa obtained and successfully completed a practicum with FRS/Omega Center. Tina Friedman was her supervisor. Ms. Friedman twice noted in the July 7, 2017, evaluation form that Ms. Leonessa required ongoing attention in the area of values management. The values criterion relates to many of the requirements and principles of the Agreement, the Code, and the Handbook. The evaluation form describes it thus: "Value Management: How did the student cope with values? Were attempts made to impose the student's values during the interview?" Ms. Friedman's Session Evaluation Form noted, "Connie does repeatedly offer her own values during client/student interaction." Ms. Friedman wrote a note to Ms. Leonessa on the form stating that Ms. Leonessa's development was at an expected level save for in values management. The note went on to specify: "Please work more diligently in this area as that may [prove] to be a problem in the future." The August 17, 2017, final evaluation emphasized the problem stating, HER BURNING DESIRE TO INITIATE CHANGE, MAY PROVE TO BE HER MOST DIFFICULT PERSONAL CHALLENGE AS A CLINICIAN. IT IS HOPED THAT IN TIME AND WITH FURTHER EXPOSURE TO THE TENETS OF EFFECTIVE COUNSELING, CONNI CAN LEARN TO ACCEPT AND MEET THE CLIENT WHERE THEY ARE AT IN THE PROCESS. CONNI HAS STRONG, DEEP ROOTED BELIEFS AND VALUES, WHICH MAY BE DIFFERENT THAN THOSE OF THE CLIENTS AS WELL AS HER PEERS, THAT SHE ENCOUNTERS. I HAVE SHARED THIS OBSERVATION WITH CONNI AND HAVE ENCOURAGED HER TO CONSIDER THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING OPEN AND ACCEPTING TO THE DIVERSITY OF THE POPULATION SHE WILL SERVE. Internships Ms. Leonessa obtained an intern position with True Core Behavioral Solutions (True Core). True Core provided services to the Ft. Myers Youth Academy, a juvenile detention center. True Core terminated Ms. Leonessa's internship after two days. The problems leading to her termination were those of value imposition and boundary crossing presaged by her practicum. Ms. Leonessa participated in two counseling sessions for the juveniles. Her improper conduct included sharing personal information about her abandonment by her husband and her celibacy since then. In the counseling profession this boundary crossing behavior is often damaging to the therapeutic process. Ms. Leonessa also criticized a young man who supported his girlfriend obtaining an abortion, telling him abortion was murder and talked about holding premature babies in her hands. She criticized some of the youth for engaging in premarital sex telling them it violated God's law. She told one young man his troubles stemmed from abandonment by his father. This conduct demonstrated emotionalism and an inability to respect client perspectives that the SDP was intended to ameliorate. For this reason, Hodges updated the SDP. Ms. Leonessa acknowledges that it would be professionally wrong for a counselor to advocate her personal religious beliefs and values to clients. She denies that she did so. But the preponderance of the competent, substantial evidence proves that she did. True Core reported Ms. Leonessa's termination and the causes for it to Hodges. After Ms. Leonessa's termination from True Core, Dr. Mary Nuosce, Dean of the Nichols Schools of Professional Studies and a faculty member, tried to assist her in finding another internship placement. Dr. Nuosce was the supervisor for Ms. Leonessa's internships. She approached Janean Byrne from Serenity Counseling about accepting Ms. Leonessa as an intern. Dr. Nuosce thought Serenity might suit Ms. Leonessa more because it was a faith-based counseling provider. She gave Ms. Leonessa Ms. Byrne's contact information and asked her to follow up on establishing an internship. Ms. Leonessa did not seek the internship. She refused to contact Ms. Byrne for non-specified reasons. She told Dr. Nuosce, "I just emailed her [Ms. Byrne] and turned down the position. What occurred today has taught me that I need to find a place where my values are shared and respected so I will continue to look for a sight [sic]." When Dr. Nuosce asked how she could be so judgmental about someone she had never met, Ms. Leonessa responded, "I never said anything against her [Ms. Byrne], however, I am looking for a place that shares my biblical values especially after what occurred today that is all. I do have the right to choose where I want to intern at!" Hodges' faculty continued efforts to help Ms. Leonessa locate an intern position. Ms. Leonessa obtained an internship at HEADS. Within a few weeks, HEADS dismissed her. Ms. Leonessa worked with therapist Julie Jakobi attending sessions with clients. Jerry Sprague, HEADS's clinical supervisor for Ft. Myers, selected Ms. Jakobi to work with Ms. Leonessa because he was aware of Ms. Leonessa's ardent Christian beliefs and Ms. Jakobi held similarly strong Christian beliefs. The first client Ms. Jakobi and Ms. Leonessa saw was a 13-year old female with a long history of running away and conflict with her mother. They saw her at school in a room in the office. The student was very concerned about telling her mother that she was gay. After the student left the room, Ms. Leonessa turned and loudly and aggressively confronted Ms. Jakobi telling her she was wrong in her counseling of the student. Ms. Leonessa insisted Ms. Jakobi should have told the student that she would catch sexually transmitted diseases, she would become depressed, and she would commit suicide. The room's door was open, and a secretary sat right outside the door. The lack of privacy and danger to client confidentiality concerned Ms. Jakobi. They also visited a client, a man concerned about becoming an opioid addict and the effect on him of growing up in a rough neighborhood. He and his wife were separated and had completed the documents necessary to finalize their divorce. Ms. Jakobi had informed Ms. Leonessa of the pending divorce before they arrived at the home. Ms. Jakobi and Ms. Leonessa met with the client at his wife's home. Ms. Leonessa began talking to the man about how he could work through his problems and learn to love his wife better. This "froze" the client and sabotaged efforts to provide the addiction counseling he sought. On the drive back to the office, Ms. Leonessa was very rude and hostile to Ms. Jakobi. Ms. Leonessa was physically tense. Her tone was sharp. Ms. Leonessa brought up homosexuality again and renewed advocacy of "conversion therapy." At the time, this was not permitted. As soon as she left Ms. Leonessa at her car, Ms. Jakobi called Mr. Sprague to report the day's incidents. He concluded that quick action was required and asked Ms. Leonessa to apologize to Ms. Jakobi. It is worth noting that Mr. Sprague's email signature quotes from the Bible, Psalm 82:3. Ms. Leonessa’s apology read as follows: "I realize not everyone see's [sic] things eye to eye. However when differences occur truth needs to be spoken in a way that is gentle. I realize my 'tone' is not always gentle and I am working on this." This is no apology and was not received as one. Mr. Sprague spoke further to Ms. Jakobi and another counselor who worked with Ms. Leonessa about their experiences with her. He concluded that he was "not convinced that she will not cause harm." He decided that terminating Ms. Leonessa promptly was best. Mr. Sprague's September 27, 2018, email to Dr. Nuosce explaining his decision is persuasive and was reasonably accepted by the Hodges faculty. He began by reporting that Ms. Leonessa was very difficult to communicate with. He reported that Ms. Leonessa "failed at a very basic level to demonstrate the ability to maintain appropriate boundaries and to demonstrated basic empathy skills." His email went on to state: I would be surprised if you didn't already know this as her strong personality, strong beliefs and aggressive tendencies are hard for her to manage. She had told me she has had conflicts with professors so I imagine this is why. He concluded that Ms. Leonessa was "stuck on a superficial (immature) level of reasoning and so she is failing to both read others well and to maintain appropriate social boundaries … ." Mr. Sprague strongly suggested Ms. Leonessa consider a different career than counseling. This report, supported by the evidence in this case, caused Dr. Nuosce to conclude that Ms. Leonessa was not complying with her revised SDP. Also Ms. Leonessa had failed to complete two internship programs and one practicum. Failure to complete the practicum revealed significant problems which persisted. Three internships are required to obtain a counseling degree from Hodges. Ms. Leonessa completed none. For these reasons, Hodges administratively withdrew Ms. Leonessa. Ms. Leonessa appealed within the Hodges system. Her appeal papers did not acknowledge what she had done wrong or how she proposed to improve. Instead they discussed her background and accused Hodges of repeatedly violating its policies and procedures. Hodges' Provost reviewed the many documents generated during Ms. Leonessa's tumultuous enrollment. He noted the similarity of reports of unacceptable behavior from different and unrelated sources, within and without the University. He denied the appeal. Summary The record of Ms. Leonessa's three years in Hodges' counseling program, including her time in practicum and internships, is a record of consistent, disputatious conduct. When the subject of religion, specifically Christianity arose, it was because Ms. Leonessa initiated criticisms of others' behavior as unchristian, because Ms. Leonessa sought to advocate her Christian views to counseling clients, and because she explicitly judged clients' actions, decisions, and options by her standards. The evidence does not prove that Hodges took any actions against Ms. Leonessa, including imposition of the SDP and termination from the program because of her religion. Hodges' terminated her because she violated the fundamental counseling requirement to accept clients as they are and not seek to impose her values on them. The record does not prove that any of the practicum and internship providers took any actions against Ms. Leonessa on account of her religious beliefs. Furthermore, the practicum and internship providers were independent of Hodges. They were not subject to its control or direction or acting in its stead.

Recommendation It is Recommended that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief of Connie Leonessa. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Thomas K. Rinaldi, Esquire Bond, Schoeneck & King, PLLC Suite 105 4001 Tamiami Trail North Naples, Florida 34103 Cheyanne Costilla, Gen. Co. Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Connie Leonessa American Liberties Institute Post Office Box 547503 Orlando, Florida 32854 Matthew Brown McReynolds, Esquire Pacific Justice Institute Post Office Box 276600 Sacramento, California 95827 Michelle Wilson, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Florida Laws (5) 120.569120.68760.01760.10760.11 DOAH Case (1) 20-3059
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I. M. P. A. C. T. INSTITUTE, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 95-006043 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Dec. 14, 1995 Number: 95-006043 Latest Update: Nov. 04, 1996

The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner's Medicaid provider number should be cancelled.

Findings Of Fact I.M.P.A.C.T. Institute, Inc. (Petitioner) provides primarily counseling services to residents of Broward County and the surrounding areas. The majority of the residents who receive Petitioner's services are low income, have language barriers and have little education. Petitioner provides a valuable and important service to the community that it serves. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was licensed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in accordance with Chapter 397, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was issued its regular license on December 29, 1994. At all times material hereto, Petitioner was enrolled as a community mental health provider in the Florida Medicaid program pursuant to Subsection 409.906(8), Florida Statutes. Petitioner has been enrolled in the Medicaid program for approximately three years. At all times material hereto, Petitioner has been issued a Medicaid provider number which has been continuously renewed. Petitioner is currently receiving Medicaid reimbursement for community mental health services pursuant to Subsection 409.906(8), Florida Statutes. On June 10, 1994, Petitioner executed a Medicaid Provider Agreement (Agreement). The Agreement provides in pertinent part: The provider and the Department [Depart- ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services] agree to abide by the Florida Administrative Code, Florida Statutes, policies, procedures, manuals of the Florida Medicaid Program and Federal laws and regulations. The agreement may be terminated upon thirty days written notice by either party. The Department may terminate this agreement in accordance with Chapter 120, F.S. Respondent has a handbook which describes, among other things, the community mental health services program and provider participation requirements. Effective December 1995, the handbook provides in pertinent part: Community mental health services are governed . . . through the authority of Chapter 409.906(8), Florida Statutes. * * * To be eligible to be enrolled in Medicaid, a provider must have a current contract pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 394, Florida Statutes, for the provision of community mental health services; and, if applicable, a regular (i.e., not provisional or interim) license as an alcohol prevention and treatment or drug abuse treatment and prevention program from the district Depart- ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health (ADM) program office. Petitioner does not have a contract with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health (ADM) program office. Petitioner has been attempting to obtain a contract with the Health and Rehabilitative Services ADM program office but has been unable to do so because the Health and Rehabilitative Services ADM office has had no money to fund such a contract. Respondent is cancelling Petitioner's Medicaid provider number because Petitioner does not have a contract with the Health and Rehabilitative Services ADM program office.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order terminating I.M.P.A.C.T. Institute, Inc.'s Medicaid provider contract and cancelling its Medicaid provider number. DONE AND ENTERED on this 8th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Rejected as being argument, or a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 5, 8, and 9. Rejected as being subordinate, irrelevant, or unnecessary. Respondent Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. NOTE: Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being subordinate, irrelevant, unnecessary, cumulative, not supported by the evidence, argument, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jason H. Clark, Esquire Post Office Box 17486 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416 Roger R. Maas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Ft. Knox No. 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Jerome W. Hoffman, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403

Florida Laws (4) 120.57409.902409.906409.907
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AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION vs NEW HORIZON`S ADULT LIVING, INC., 98-004688 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Port Charlotte, Florida Oct. 22, 1998 Number: 98-004688 Latest Update: May 21, 1999

The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of various deficiencies found during surveys of its adult living facility and, if so, the amount of the administrative fines.

Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a license issued by Petitioner, Respondent owns and operates New Horizon, an assisted living facility in Punta Gorda. The license is a standard license. Violeta Sebastian is the owner and president of Respondent and the administrator of the facility. On July 8, 1998, Petitioner conducted a survey of New Horizon. Petitioner's investigator found several residents sitting in the day room when he arrived at the facility between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Resident Number 3, who is very elderly, remained seated in an over-stuffed chair all morning. When staff helped her to the dining room at around 11:30 a.m., the investigator asked to see her buttocks area and found a Stage 2 pressure sore on the coccyx area. Resident Number 3, who was wearing adult briefs, had also urinated on herself at some earlier point in time. Resident Number 3 required the assistance of two staffpersons to get her to stand; she was unable to assist in this process. She also required the assistance of both staffpersons to walk, and she required complete assistance to change her briefs. The records concerning Resident Number 3 revealed nothing about the existence or treatment of a pressure sore or that staff had notified the resident's physician. An aide knew of the pressure sore for three days, but had not informed the administrator nor commenced treatment. The records also revealed that she was admitted to New Horizon on August 28, 1997, and her health assessment was conducted on September 29, 1997, which was 32 days after admission. A Stage 1 pressure sore is a reddened area. A Stage 2 pressure sore is a reddened area with a blister. A Stage 3 pressure sore occurs when the affected area is open to the muscle. A Stage 4 pressure sore is when the affected area is open to the muscle, bone, and tendon. Stage 2 pressure sores are susceptible to infection and may cause a loss of fluids, including protein, around the wound site. The pressure sore on this female resident was about two centimeters wide. As a result of these findings concerning Resident Number 3, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tags A 006, A 401, A 407, A 409, and A 700. Another investigator asked for the most current Radon test. The last Radon test, which the facility passed, was November 16, 1992, which meant that the facility had not been tested in almost five years and eight months. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 202. The investigator checked the training records for two of four staffpersons and determined that two employees had not received the two hours' required training in resident behavior and handling abuse, neglect, and exploitation. The administrator thought that they had received the required training, but was unable to produce documentation of training. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 504. The investigator checked the training records for four staffpersons and determined that they had not received the required training in assisting residents in the activities of daily living. The administrator said that this was an oversight and would be corrected. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 505. The investigator could not determine who was in charge of medications. However, the administrator and one part-time employee were in charge of medications. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 602. The investigator found a bottle of milk of magnesia in an unlocked refrigerator and a bag of medications in an unlocked kitchen drawer. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 607. The investigator testified as to restraints of a resident found by another investigator in a 1996 survey and found by her in a 1998 complaint investigation. However, her testimony concerning the incident of which she had personal knowledge was vague and provides an insufficient basis on which to fine Respondent. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 709. The investigator examined a ledger maintained by Respondent for one resident who was receiving certain federal benefits in the form of a monthly $35 check. Respondent's records do not document that it supplies the resident quarterly with a copy of this accounting, and staff and the administrator admitted to not supplying quarterly statements to the resident. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 102. Petitioner did not produce admissible evidence to show that any violations were repeat violations.

Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order imposing an administrative fine against New Horizon's Adult Living, Inc., in the amount of $3000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruben J. King-Shaw, Jr., Director Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Karel Baarslag, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration State Regional Service Center 2295 Victoria Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Violeta D. Sebastian Qualified Representative New Horizon's Adult Living Facility 1391 Capricorn Boulevard Punta Gorda, Florida 33983

Florida Laws (2) 120.57404.056 Florida Administrative Code (8) 58A -5.018158A -5.018258A-5.018158A-5.018258A-5.018458A-5.019158A-5.02358A-5.024
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