The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding is the amount of attorney’s fees to be paid by Respondent, Agency for Persons with Disabilities (“APD” or the “Agency”), to the Petitioners, G.B., Z.L., through his guardian K.L., J.H., and M.R.
Conclusions This matter is related to the promulgation of proposed rules 65G-4.0210 through 65G-4.027 (the “Proposed Rules”) by the Agency in May 2013 in its effort to follow the mandate issued by the Florida Legislature concerning the iBudget statute, section 393.0662, Florida Statute (2010). Petitioners challenged the Proposed Rules in DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP. The Proposed Rules were upheld by the Administrative Law Judge, but Petitioners appealed the Final Order to the First District Court of Appeal (the “Court”). The Court’s decision was rendered July 21, 2014. G.B. v. Ag. for Pers. with Disab., 143 So. 3d 454 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). The Fee Order was entered by the Court on the same date. The Fee Order had been entered upon the filing of a motion for appellate attorney’s fees filed with the Court by Appellants/Petitioners. The motion set forth three bases for an award of fees, to wit: Section 120.595(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: Challenges to Proposed Agency Rules Pursuant to Section 120.56(2).– If the appellate court or the administrative law judge declares a proposed rule or portion of a proposed rule invalid pursuant to s. 120.56(2), a judgment or order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. An agency’s actions are “substantially justified” if there was a reasonable basis in law and fact at the time the actions were taken by the agency. If the agency prevails in the proceedings, the appellate court or administrative law judge shall award reasonable costs and reasonable attorney’s fees against a party if the appellate court or administrative law judge determines that a party participated in the proceedings for an improper purpose as defined by paragraph (1)(e). No award of attorney’s fees as provided by this subsection shall exceed $50,000. Section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes, which provides: Appeals.– When there is an appeal, the court in its discretion may award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to the prevailing party if the court finds that the appeal was frivolous, meritless, or an abuse of the appellate process, or that the agency action which precipitated the appeal was a gross abuse of the agency’s discretion. Upon review of the agency action that precipitates an appeal, if the court finds that the agency improperly rejected or modified findings of fact in a recommended order, the court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees and reasonable costs to a prevailing appellant for the administrative proceeding and the appellate proceeding. Section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, which provides: All pleadings, motions, or other papers filed in the proceeding must be signed by the party, the party’s attorney, or the party’s qualified representative. The signature constitutes a certificate that the person has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, based upon reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the presiding officer shall impose upon the person who signed it, the represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expense incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. The Court did not specifically address which of Petitioners’ stated bases for award of attorney’s fees was being relied upon when granting Petitioners’ motion. Petitioners assert that it must therefore be presumed that the Court granted the request for fees on the basis of all three of Petitioners’ bases. There is no other support for that presumption, as the Fee Order is silent on the issue. It could equally be presumed that only one of the bases was relied upon by the Court. Thus, a determination of the appropriate basis for fees is critical in the determination of the amount of fees to be awarded, as will be set forth more particularly below. The Fee Order establishes only that attorney’s fees are awarded, with leave for the parties to determine the appropriate amount or, failing to do so, obtain direction from an Administrative Law Judge on the matter. There is no issue as to whether Petitioners are entitled to fees or costs, only the amount to be awarded. DOAH has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this proceeding under the August 6, 2014, Mandate of the First DCA, and under section 120.595(2). Although it is herein determined that section 120.595(2) is the appropriate provision to be considered for fees in this case, each of the other statutory sections argued in Petitioners’ motion for fees will be addressed nonetheless. Section 120.595(5) If section 120.595(5) is to be the basis for fees, it must be shown that Respondent is guilty of a “gross abuse” of its discretion. “Gross abuse” is not defined in statute. As stated by the Court in Allstate Floridian Insurance Co. v. Ronco Inventions, LLC, 890 So. 2d 300, 302 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004), “The troublesome nature of our review here is the admittedly high ‘gross abuse of discretion’ standard. . . . However, we have no definition of what a ‘gross’ abuse of discretion includes or how it differs from an abuse of discretion. We can only assume that it is more egregious than a typical abuse of discretion.” The Court cited Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), in which the Supreme Court iterated that if reasonable men could differ on an issue, there was no abuse of discretion to act one way or the other. Other courts, looking at the issue of “abuse of discretion” in administrative matters, have struggled with a definitive description or definition. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc., et al. v. Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, 401 U.S. 402; 91 S. Ct. 814; 23 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), the Court was trying to determine whether the Transportation Secretary had acted within his discretion. The Court decided it “must consider whether the decision was based on clear error or judgment. [citations omitted] Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id., at 416. And, as found by another Court, whether an act is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion is “far from being entirely discrete as a matter of the ordinary meaning of language. . . . Rather than denoting a fixed template to be imposed mechanically on every case within their ambit, these words summon forth what may best be described as an attitude of mind in the reviewing court one that is ‘searching and careful’ . . . yet, in the last analysis, diffident and deferential.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., et al. v. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, et al., 606 F.2d 1031, 1034, U.S. App. DC (1979). In Ft. Myers Real Estate Holdings, LLC, v. Department of Business and Professional Regulation, 53 So. 3d 1158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011), the Court awarded fees under section 120.595(5). In that case, the agency denied party status to the applicant for services. The Court said, “The position taken by the Division in the dismissal order, and maintained in this appeal, is so contrary to the fundamental principles of administrative law that, by separate order, we have granted Appellant’s motion for attorney’s fees under section 120.595(5), Florida Statutes.” The Court did not, however, define gross abuse of discretion any more specifically than that. Likewise, in Salam v. Board of Professional Engineers, 946 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), the Court found that an agency’s intentional delay on acting upon a petition for formal administrative hearing warranted fees under the statute. The Salam Court did not further define gross abuse of discretion; it merely found that such abuse existed under the circumstances of the case. Gross abuse of discretion must, by definition, be more difficult to ascertain than simple abuse of discretion. Gross abuse implies that the Agency first believed its intended action was improper, yet engaged in the action despite that knowledge. That is, that the Agency acted intentionally to do something it knew to be wrong. Proof of such intent would be extremely difficult.1/ One need only look at the plain language of the Court’s opinion in the rule challenge appeal at issue here to see that there was no gross abuse of discretion. The Court ultimately held that although the Agency’s rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language” concerning development of an algorithm to assist with the distribution of funds to needy Floridians, “[W]e recognize the difficulty in adhering to the Legislature’s command to create an algorithm solely capable of determining each client’s level of need. Further, we accept that [Respondent] is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” G.B. et al., supra, 143 So. 3d 454, 458. Nothing in that language suggests that the Agency knew its proposed rule was improper or that it was doing anything intentionally wrong. Rather, the language of the Court’s decision indicates that Respondent was certainly attempting to exercise its discretion properly in the adoption of the Proposed Rules. Despite the Agency’s attempts to justify the rules both at final hearing and on appeal, the Court found that the Proposed Rules did not comport with the specific authorizing statute. That failure did not, ipso facto, establish that there was a gross abuse of the Agency’s discretion. Besides, upon hearing all the testimony and reviewing the evidence, the undersigned initially upheld the Proposed Rule; that, in and of itself, is some indication that the Agency’s efforts were legitimate. Thus, in the present matter, there is no rational basis for finding that gross abuse of discretion was involved in the Court’s award of attorney’s fees. Section 120.569(2)(e) As for section 120.569(2)(e), there is no evidence to support Petitioners’ contention that the proposed rule addressed in the rule challenge proceeding (DOAH Case No. 13-1849RP) was interposed for any improper purpose. The appellate court said, “[W]e accept that APD is attempting to find a reasonable way to administer funds to the tens-of-thousands of people in need that it assists.” Id. Clearly, the Agency did not act for an improper purpose; its best efforts to follow the Legislative mandate for an iBudget simply fell short. The Proposed Rules contravened certain specific requirements of the governing statute. In order to find a way to meet its mandate, the Agency made a Herculean effort, yet failed. Although Petitioners argue that an “improper purpose” was implied by the Court in the Fee Order, there is no substantive support for that position. Not only was APD’s attempt to find a “reasonable way” to discharge its responsibility found wanting by the Court, experts in the field who testified at the underlying hearing disagreed as well. There was no dispute about the intended purpose of the Proposed Rules, only as to how that intent was to be effectuated. There was never any dispute as to the Proposed Rules’ intended purpose; they were meant to find a way to serve the tens-of-thousands of people in need. There is nothing in any of the Agency’s actions in this case that would be even arguably described as “interposed for any improper purposes, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay, or for frivolous purpose or needless increase in the cost of litigation.” This attorney’s fee section does not apply to the facts of this case. Section 120.595(2) Finally, in section 120.595(2), the Legislature has declared that if an appellate court or administrative law judge declares all or part of a proposed rule invalid, an order will be entered awarding reasonable attorney’s fees and costs (unless the agency demonstrated that its actions were substantially justified). The Court ultimately concluded that the proposed rules “directly conflict with and contravene the Legislature’s clear language.” That being the case, the Court seems to be finding that the Agency’s actions--promulgating the Proposed Rules--was not substantially justified, even if the Court did recognize the difficulty faced by APD in its efforts to comply with the statutes at issue. By process of elimination, section 120.595(2) is the basis for the Court’s award of attorney’s fees in the present case. That being so, the award is capped at $50,000. The Agency has conceded that Petitioners are entitled to at least $50,000 in fees, as well as costs in the amount of $41,609.65. There remains the issue of whether each of the four Petitioners is entitled to an award of the maximum fee. In their (singular) Petition for Administrative Determination of the Invalidity of Proposed Rules, the parties sought the following relief: That a Final Order be entered finding the Proposed Rules to be an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority; and That Petitioners be awarded their reasonable attorney’s fees; and Such other relief as the Administrative Law Judge deems appropriate. That is, the relief sought by each of the Petitioners was the same: invalidation of the proposed rules. It cannot be argued that each Petitioner in his or her own right was seeking individual redress or damages. Collectively, they wanted the proposed rules invalidated so that they could return to the status quo concerning their benefits from the State. In fact, only one of the four Petitioners presented testimony at the underlying administrative hearing as to the impact of the Proposed Rules. There was no issue as to each Petitioner’s standing in the underlying administrative hearing. As stated by the Agency in its Proposed Final Order in that case: “Petitioners are each recipients of Medicaid Services under the DD waiver program and have been or will be transitioned to the iBudget system. Stip., pp. 23-24. Thus, Petitioners have standing to challenge the substance of the Proposed Rules.” Petitioners contend that each of the 25,000-plus recipients of benefits from the Agency could have filed petitions challenging the Proposed Rule. That is true. But in the rule challenge proceeding there were four petitioners (ostensibly representing those other 25,000), each seeking the same relief, i.e., invalidation of the proposed rules. And only one of those, K.L., testified at final hearing in the underlying rule challenge proceeding. Thus, there is no justification for an award of fees to each of the Petitioners under section 120.595(2). In light of the findings and conclusions above, and based upon the Order as stated below, the issue of contingency multipliers is not relevant to the discussion of fees herein. As a general rule in Florida, fees and costs incurred in litigating entitlement to attorney’s fees are collectible although time spent litigating the amount of the award is not compensable. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Parma, 629 So. 2d 830, 833 (1993). § 92.931, Fla. Stat.; Stokus v. Phillips, 651 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Inasmuch as the Agency does not dispute entitlement to attorney’s fees, no fees for the fee case are warranted. The amount of fees sought in this administrative rule challenge by the Petitioners is, as set forth in their Proposed Final Order: $255,614.39 for the DOAH rule challenge proceeding; $154,662.35 for the appeal but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $309,324.70; $62,850.00 for the fee case but also applied a contingent multiplier for a total of $94,275.00; and $41,609.65 in taxable costs, for a total of approximately $660,000.00. While the amount of fees and costs allowed under the appropriate statute is well less than what Petitioners sought, it has been deemed legally sufficient by statute.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a small business party within the meaning of Subsection 57.111(3)(d), Florida Statutes (1987). Petitioner was required to relocate its business in 1986 as the result of a public taking of the property where the business was situated. Petitioner sought relocation benefits from Respondent's relocation assistance program. The program is operated by Respondent in accordance with authority contained in Sections 339.09(4) and 421.55(3), Florida Statutes. Various requests by Petitioner for payment of relocation benefits in accordance with the Uniform Relocation Act were denied by Respondent. In DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, Petitioner sought a formal administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes concerning Respondent's denial of the requested reimbursements. At the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, evidence was presented regarding Respondent's denial of benefit payments of $1,324 for advertisement expense in a telephone directory; $1,370 for installation of an exhaust fan at the new facility; $2,405 for fees for consultative services from an attorney; $1,200 for the alleged loss of employee time spent in conferences with Respondent personnel regarding relocation; $1,500 for expense of a second search for a suitable relocation site; and $1,035 for consultation fees associated with design of a product display area in the new facility. With the exception of Respondent's denial of the claim for $1,035 for consultant fees, Respondent's denials were found to be appropriate in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. Such a finding of appropriateness also equates to a finding of substantial justification for denial for purposes of this proceeding. A recommended order was issued in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, finding denials of all requested reimbursements to be appropriate with the exception of Respondent's denial of the request for $1,035 for consultation fees associated with design of a product display area. Payment of this latter amount was recommended as constituting an authorized reimbursement under legal provisions governing the relocation program. On December 26, 1988, Respondent entered a final order awarding Petitioner $1,035 for this consultation fee expense. Other claims for reimbursement by Petitioner in the amount of $10,414.17 were paid by Respondent, prior to the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T, in the course of proceedings in the Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida. That court adopted a settlement stipulation of the parties regarding those claims which expressly reserved attorney fees in regard to those issues for later determination by that court. Petitioner presented no evidence with regard to those claims at the final hearing in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. At the final hearing in the present proceeding, Respondent offered testimony that confusion concerning payment of those claims resulted from the death of the attorney handling the case for Respondent. Respondent initially denied the claims in the absence of the deceased attorney's records in the mistaken belief that the matter had been resolved earlier in the circuit court condemnation proceeding. Upon learning such was not the case, payment of the claim and effectuation of settlement of the issue was made in the circuit court case and occurred shortly after Petitioner's request for hearing in DOAH Case No. 88- 0778T. The circumstances surrounding the initial denial of payment of this benefit by Respondent substantially justify Respondent's denial and constitute a sufficient basis to deny Petitioner's recovery of fees or costs related to this payment recovery in this administrative proceeding. The proof submitted at the final hearing in this cause establishes that Petitioner's counsel expended between 55 and 70 hours of time in his representation of Petitioner's attempts to recover all denied benefits in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T. Counsel's average hourly rate was $125. However, the fee arrangement between client and counsel was a "modified or combined contingency fee" permitting any recoverable attorney fees to serve as the primary source of payment of counsel's fees. Petitioner was not bound by the agreement to pay counsel's fees beyond amounts determined to be appropriate by the hearing officer in the administrative case or the judge in the circuit court matter. To that extent, attorney fees in this cause that have been incurred by Petitioner may be considered "contingent." Documentation submitted by Petitioner includes an affidavit from its president which simply recites the status of Petitioner as a small business party, but sets forth no specifics of a fee arrangement with counsel. The affidavit of Petitioner's counsel establishes a minimum number of hours (55) and dates of work performed by counsel, and states that his hourly rate is $125. Calculating the number of hours by the hourly rate, one reaches a total fee amount of $6,875. Counsel's affidavit does not address which of the various benefits sought to be recovered was the subject of any particular expenditure of time. Although the relocation benefits sought to be recovered were separable subjects, allocation of time expended with regard to a particular benefit recovery effort is not established by the evidence. Testimony of William Robert Leonard was also offered by Petitioner to support the reasonableness of a legal fee amount of $10,000 for Petitioner's counsel. While Mr. Leonard opined that he normally would not support a $10,000 attorney fee as reasonable for a $1,000 recovery, the circumstances of this case were different because "[y]ou are arguing with the state." Petitioner attempted to establish through further testimony of Leonard that the enormity of the resources of the government of the State of Florida justify such a fee because cost considerations prevent private litigants from engaging in costly and protracted proceedings in matters of limited recovery. Leonard did not address allocation of the requested attorney fee among the various benefits for which recovery was sought, choosing instead to premise his opinion regarding reasonableness of a $10,000 attorney fee upon "the amount of time counsel was required to respond to a state agency." Leonard's testimony is not credited with regard to reasonableness of a $10,000 fee for recovery of the $1,035 relocation benefit due to his professed lack of knowledge of certain administrative law procedures; the failure of his testimony to address the nature or difficulty of tasks performed by counsel for Petitioner; and his concurrence with the assertion that his opinion of such a fee was based in part upon a "gut reaction." No evidence was submitted to support the reasonableness of the cost amount of $250 requested as a witness fee for Mr. Leonard's participation in the proceeding. Petitioner seeks recovery of $448.50 in costs associated with the transcript of final hearing had in DOAH Case No. 88-0778T and a $480 expert witness fee in conjunction with testimony of E. Scott Golden, an attorney, at that final hearing. The testimony of Mr. Golden in that proceeding related to his provision of relocation site advice to Petitioner and drafting of legal documents for Petitioner. Petitioner did not prevail with regard to recovery of relocation benefits related to the expense of Mr. Golden's services.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Insurance acted according to the requirements of law in reviewing submissions of vendors responding to the Department's request for proposals for provision of licensure and examination services.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Insurance is the state agency responsible for licensure and regulation of insurance agents in Florida pursuant to the Insurance Field Representative Licensing Procedures Law set forth at Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Persons seeking to become licensed by the Department are required to take and pass an examination. Insurance Testing Corporation (ITC) develops and administers insurance licensure examinations in other states. Assessment Systems Incorporated (ASI) develops and administers insurance licensure examinations in other states. Since 1990, the Department has contracted with the University of South Florida (USF) for exam administration. The contract was to expire on September 30, 1994. It has been twice extended and is currently set to expire on September 30, 1996. The parties have standing to participate in this proceeding. On December 29, 1995, the Department of Insurance issued a Request for Proposal Number 95/96-07 (RFP) seeking the provision of testing development and administration services. The RFP was prepared through a collaborative effort within the Department. In issuing the RFP, the Department intended to broaden the level of services obtained from a contracted vendor and to take advantage of the expertise of companies already in the business of regulatory examination provision. The Department issued an RFP to permit vendors to generate their own programs for licensure and examination programs. The alternative, an Invitation to Bid, would have required vendors to bid on a program designed by the Department. The RFP provided that the contract between the Department and the successful vendor would consist of the RFP, addenda and amendments to the RFP, and the successful vendor's proposal. The RFP also provided that Department reserved the right to negotiate with the selected contractor, to waive minor irregularities and to reject all submissions. The RFP provided a schedule and deadlines as follows: submission of questions and requests for clarification by vendors, January 15, 1996; the preproposal conference with vendors, January 22, 1996; submission of proposals, February 12, 1996; oral presentations by vendors, February 19, 1996; and posting of the intended award, February 23, 1996. There was no protest to the RFP's specifications. Submissions were received from five vendors. The RFP evaluation panel scheduled separate oral presentations by the five vendors submitting proposals. The purpose of oral presentations was to permit the vendors to present their proposals and to respond to questions from the evaluation committee. The first thirty minutes of each one-hour presentation were reserved for the vendor presentation; the second thirty minutes were reserved for questions from the evaluation panel to vendor representatives. Vendors were not invited to and did not attend the oral presentations of other vendors. For reasons discussed herein, ITC's proposal was deemed non-responsive and was not evaluated. After completion of oral presentations, the evaluation panel independently reviewed and scored the proposals (other than ITC's) and submitted the scores to the Department's purchasing office. The purchasing office opened and scored the vendors cost proposals, then calculated the vendors' total scores. Of the proposals which were evaluated, ASI's received the highest total score of 134.5 points. The second highest score, 115 points, was received by USF. The Department posted a Notice of Intended Award to ASI on February 23, 1996. On February 23, 1996, ITC contacted the Department purchasing director and requested a copy of the ASI proposal. At that time, ITC was advised that a notice of protest would be due on February 28, 1996. ITC filed a Notice of Protest on February 28, 1996. ITC filed a formal protest on March 8. 1996. Although the State of Florida insurance licensure tests are currently administered by USF, the Department retains ownership of the questions ("test items") used in the examination. Upon the expiration of the contract with USF, all test items are to be returned to the Department. The test items used in Florida insurance exams are developed by employees of the Department with experience in the subject matter being tested. Test items have been revised and updated by USF according to psychometric principles. The Department desires to continue ownership of the "Florida bank" of test items. Section 2.1B of the RFP, "EXAMINATION DEVELOPMENT," states: The Department currently retains ownership of all test items in use for existing exams. The Department shall maintain exclusive owner- ship of the items developed, item bank(s), examinations, and all related materials deve- loped for use in fulfilling the requirements of this RFP. The Contractor will be respons- ible for continued development and maintenance of an item bank for use in preparing the examinations.... Section 2.2 of the RFP, "Related Requirements and Information," states: Use of any test items owned by the Department or developed to fulfill obligations resulting from a contract entered into as a result of this RFP for any purpose other than those covered by said contract is prohibited with- out advance written authorization by the De- partment. Any violation of this provision will result in immediate cancellation of the contract and/or legal actions against the contractor. Vendors were allowed to submit questions and requests for clarification by January 15, 1996. At the preproposal conference, an addendum to the RFP was issued which included the Department's responses to vendor requests for clarification. All potential vendors received the addendum. As did other vendors, ITC submitted question and requests for clarification. ITC question Number 8 states: The Department claims ownership of all existing test questions and requires owner- ship of all items, examinations, and related materials used in the Florida tests. This requirement precludes the use of previously developed, calibrated, and validated banks of items owned by the major providers of insur- ance license examinations. It thus requires the development and maintenance of a completely separate bank of test questions for Florida. This can be done only at considerable expense, which must be reflected in the test fees. Is it truly the Department position that all questions used in Florida insurance tests will be or become the property of the Depart- ment? Is this a negotiable item? The Department's response to ITC's question Number 8 states: The desire of the Department to retain owner- ship of its test items does not preclude the use of previously developed, calibrated and validated banks of items. Subject to the approval of the Department, the selected vendor may use test items it has already de- veloped as long as the subject/line of auth- ority listings for Florida are adhered to and are in accordance with Florida law and administrative rules. It is the Department's position that all items currently owned by the Department or developed for the Department in fulfillment of services requested through this RFP, re- main the property of the Department. This is not a negotiable item. ITC question Number 22 states: Will the Department grant the contractor the right to use test items owned by the Depart- ment in other states where it has testing contracts. If so, what guarantees will the Department offer that the Department will treat these questions as confidential material in the future, when they are used in other states. The Department's response to ITC's question Number 22 states: Yes, the Department will grant the vendor authority to use test items owned by the Department in other states where it has testing contracts. However, some agreement would have to be reached regarding the vendor's liability and responsibility should any test item become compromised as a result of such use. The question relating to the Department offering a guarantee that it will treat such questions as confidential when they are in use in other states is not understood. Obviously, the Department would not want to compromise its own test items. By February 12, 1996, the deadline for submission of proposals, five vendors had submitted responses to the RFP, including ITC, ASI and USF. On the question of test item creation, ITC's proposal states: Generally, we provide the entire bank of questions that are used in the tests of a state we serve. Florida is unusual in providing a bank of questions to start with. Our approach to questions for the Florida tests will follow three tracks. First, we will use the questions in the current Florida tests. Second, we will identify those ques- tions in our own bank that are appropriate for use in Florida. Third, we will write additional questions where shortages are identified in the banks, or to cover add- itional topics in the study manuals. ITC's proposal further states, "ITC staff will write and develop all of the new test questions. We will not rely upon Department staff or the Florida insurance industry...to write any of the new questions required for your tests." On the question of test item ownership, ITC's proposal states: Since you currently own a bank of test ques- tions, we understand that you will want to own a bank of test questions when a contract you may establish with us comes to an end. We currently own our bank of questions and would not want to relinquish ownership to that bank as a result of contracting with Florida. Therefore, our proposal is to divide the bank ownership according to four criteria: (1) Ownership of questions in the original Florida bank will remain with Florida; (2) ownership of questions in ITC's bank as of contracting will remain with ITC; (3) owner- ship of ITC-developed questions that are Florida specific and not applicable to other states will be assigned to Florida; (4) ownership of ITC-developed questions that are applicable to other states will remain with ITC. Florida questions that are materially revised by ITC will be considered ITC questions. During the ITC oral presentation, the evaluation panel sought clarification of ITC's position on test item ownership. ITC indicated that its position was as set forth in the proposal. The issue of test item ownership was the central question discussed at ITC's oral presentation. Essentially, the ITC proposal provides that at the close of any potential contract period, the Department will own the questions it currently owns and only those ITC-developed questions that are specific to Florida and to no other state. Further, under the proposal, ITC would be able to "materially revise" any question in the current Florida test item bank and claim ownership of the revised question. Neither ITC's proposal nor its oral presentation provided reliable information as to what would constitute a "material revision" of a test item. After the oral presentations were concluded, the evaluation panel and Department purchasing personnel determined that the ITC proposal did not comply with RFP's requirement related to test item ownership. The ITC proposal was disqualified and was not evaluated by the panel. The evidence fails to establish that the Department acted improperly in disqualifying the ITC proposal. The evidence establishes that the ITC proposal fails to meet the requirements of the RFP relating to ownership of test items, and was properly disqualified from further evaluation. As set forth in the RFP, the Department requires "exclusive ownership of the items developed, item bank(s), examinations, and all related materials developed for use" in providing examination and licensure services to the Department. RFP Addendum Number 1 clearly states "the Department's position that all items currently owned by the Department or developed for the Department in fulfillment of services requested through this RFP, remain the property of the Department" and further states that the item is not negotiable. The purpose of the Department's insistence on ownership of test items is to assure that, at the conclusion of the contract period, the Department will own the questions which have been prepared by the successful vendor for use in Florida exams. ITC's proposal fails to provide the Department with test item ownership as specifically required by the RFP and addendum. ITC asserts that on the question of test item ownership, its proposal is essentially the same as the proposal submitted by ASI. The evidence fails to support the assertion. ASI's proposal states: ASI acknowledges that the Department currently owns all examination items in use for existing exams. Furthermore, the Depart- ment will also retain ownership of all items developed for use in Florida examinations. Unlike the ITC proposal, the ASI proposal clearly states that the Department will own all items developed for use on the Florida exam. Items developed for the Florida exam will be owned by the Department, whether or not the items are applicable to other states. ITC asserts that the inclusion of cost information within the body of the RFP warrants disqualification of the ASI proposal. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Each vendor was evaluated on compliance with Florida Certified Minority Business Enterprise (CMBE) contracting goals. Evaluation points were awarded if a vendor established that CMBE firms would receive at least 10 percent of the contract award. Section 2.4 of the RFP, "Proposal Form and Content," provides instructions on how to structure a vendor proposal and states: ...ATTENTION IS CALLED TO SECTION 1.8. ANY REFERENCE TO COST IN PARAGRAPHS (A) THROUGH (G) BELOW MAY DISQUALIFY THAT PROPOSAL. Paragraphs (A) through (G) include items related to technical portions of vendor proposals. Section 1.8 addresses copies of proposals and states, "[c]ost proposals must be labelled as such and be submitted in a separate envelope." ASI's proposal included the following statement: ...ASI has signed a Letter of Agreement with Stallion Properties Management of Tallahassee to provide certain real estate and property management services specifically related to the Department's RFP and this Proposal. In total, it is estimated that ASI's Letter of Agreement with Stallion Properties Management will provide a total income of approximately $600,000.00 to Stallion over the term of ASI's three year contract with the Department. This project income to Stallion represents ten percent of the total projected income that ASI will earn should we be awarded the Department's contract. The requirement for submission of sealed cost proposals is intended to assure that the technical review of proposals is not influenced by cost factors. Other than to note compliance with the CMBE goal, the members of the evaluation panel did not extrapolate the ASI disclosure to determine the total ASI cost proposal. There is no evidence that the ASI disclosure affected the panel's evaluation of the proposal. Had the ASI technical proposal included its total cost proposal, evaluation panel members would have referred the issue to the Department's purchasing office. Apparently because the panel members did not note the inclusion of the CMBE total and did not extrapolate cost information based on the CMBE disclosure, the members did not refer the matter to purchasing. Because no other vendor included cost information within the technical portion of the proposals, there was no comparative cost information available for evaluation until the cost proposals were opened by Department purchasing personnel. Cost proposals were reviewed after the evaluation of technical factors was completed. ITC asserts that ASI's proposal modification after the proposals had been opened and during the oral presentation warrants rejection of ASI's proposal. The evidence fails to support the assertion. Section 2.1L of the RFP, "COLLECTION AND REMITTANCE OF FEES," states: The Department requires the collection of certain fees from applicants for services related to the licensure and examination process. It is intended that the Contractor collect these fees, as necessary and appropri- ate, and remit these fees daily (exclusive of weekends and State of Florida holidays) in a manner acceptable to the Department. It is intended that the Contractor retain its fee for services as provided for in the contract and remit the balance to the Department as appropriate. The Department is currently not prepared to accept electronic funds transfers in this area, however, it is interested in proposals which could accommodate such tran- sactions during the contract period. The Department contemplates technological enhance- ments in the Receipt's database within the contract period, however it is unable to specify the details of such at this time. Contractor must be able to accommodate such technological changes and enhancements. If any invoices are required to be submitted by the contractor to the Department, they must be submitted in a manner acceptable to the Department and in detail sufficient for a pre- audit and postaudit thereof. The Contractor shall have a system which maintains certain data, as specified by the Department, related to its activities in this area. The Department had indicated that a vendor could collect the total fee, deduct the vendor service charge, and remit the balance of the fee to the Department. Prior to the preproposal conference, ITC submitted a question (Number 21) seeking information on how fees were to be conveyed to the Department. In Addendum Number 1, the Department indicated that a response to the question would be provided in a second addendum to be issued after the preproposal conference. In the second addendum, the Department's response to ITC's question Number 21 states: The Department intends for the vendor to receive, on behalf of the Department, certain fees currently paid by licensure applicants and/or exam candidates. These fees may be paid by personal check, certified check or money order. Cash cannot be accepted. All checks or money orders must be made payable to the Florida Department of Insurance and must be deposited by the vendor into a state concentration account (with Barnett Bank) or a clearing fund in the name of the Department. The Department will assist in establishing these accounts. The Department will require a daily accounting of all monies collected and/or deposited. This information must be in the format prescribed by the Department. This information must be transmitted via an automated system compatible with the Department's existing information systems in this area. The vendor will be required to submit in- voices to the Department for services rendered on a monthly basis. Such invoices must be in sufficient detail for pre-audit and post-audit purposes and be in a format prescribed by the Department. The Department's response in addendum Number 2 specifically noted that the Department's position had changed. ASI's proposal states: Fees will be collected on the day of examina- tion and/or license issuance. This method will eliminate late payment processing. We will collect examination fees payable to ASI. This will minimize reconciliation tasks for the Department, and will allow accounting efforts to focus on those fees collected on behalf of the Department. Application re- venues will be shared with the vendor, based on prices stipulated in the price proposal and associated processing volumes. Appli- cation and fingerprinting fees will be collected via checks made payable to the Department. ASI will provide a reconcilia- tion of these fees, and daily deposits will be made to the Department's account. ASI will invoice the Department for its applica- tion screening services on a monthly basis. ASI's proposal further states: As part of the standard project planning process, [ASI will work side-by-side with the Department to identify specific requirements to be included in the implementation plan, including fee collection procedures], de- tailed invoice requirements, and the most appropriate method to transmit detailed tran- saction information to the Department.... [emphasis supplied] The proposed fee collection process suggested by ASI is inconsistent with applicable Florida law and does not follow the procedure set out by the Department in Addendum Number 2. Section 2.4 of the RFP, "Proposal Form and Content," subsection (C) "Work Plan" states: Describe in narrative form your plan for accom- plishing the work described....Modifications of requirements of this RFP are permitted, however, reasons for changes should be fully explained and justified. " At the oral presentation, and prior to evaluation of the proposals, the evaluation panel advised ASI that the fee collection proposal was not legally appropriate. ASI representatives indicated that they were attempting to provide an improved fee reconciliation process and were not aware that Florida law prohibited their fee collection plan. ASI utilizes the two-check fee payment system in some of the states where ASI administers licensing exams. At the oral presentation, ASI representatives assured that, as specifically stated in the proposal, ASI was committed to working with the Department "...to identify specific requirements to be included in the implementation plan, including fee collection procedures...." ASI representatives stated that the fee collection procedure desired by the Department would be accomplished within the costs set forth in the proposal. Although ASI's fee collection procedure does not follow the method suggested in the RFP, such does not warrant rejection of the ASI proposal. As stated in the RFP, ASI's modification of the RFP requirement was permitted where the reasons for changes were fully explained and justified. ITC implies that ASI can't provide the services offered in the ASI proposal within the fee and cost structure set forth in the response to the RFP. There is no credible evidence supporting the implication.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance enter a Final Order DISMISSING the case and awarding the contract to Assessment Systems, Incorporated. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1996 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 96-1330BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 6. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Rejected, comment on testimony is not finding of fact. Rejected, unnecessary. The ITC proposal is not responsive to the Department's requirement of test item ownership. 12-13. Rejected, contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected, immaterial. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. 22. Rejected, subordinate. 23-24. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, not supported by the weight of the evidence. Respondent The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 2. Rejected, subordinate. 3-5. Rejected, unnecessary. 7-8. Rejected, unnecessary. 14. Rejected, irrelevant. 20-23. Rejected, unnecessary. 34-37. Rejected, cumulative. 48-59. Rejected, cumulative. 61-62. Rejected, irrelevant. 63-69. Rejected, cumulative. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, cumulative. 83. Rejected, cumulative. 96. Rejected, unnecessary. Intervenor ASI Intervenor ASI's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: Rejected, unnecessary. Intervenor USF Intervenor USF's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 20-21. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, subordinate. Rejected, unnecessary. Rejected as to use of phrase "final offer;" the ASI RFP specifically committed to working with the Department on fee collection procedures. Rejected, unnecessary. 45. Rejected, subordinate. 50. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Dan Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Carl D. Motes, Esquire Maguire, Voorhis and Wells, P.A. 2804 Remington Green Circle, Suite 4 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2429 Frank Fernandez, Esquire Thomas Valentine, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 William B. Graham, Esquire Richard N. Sox, Jr., Esquire Bateman and Graham, P.A. 300 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Regina L. DeIulio, Esquire Office of the General Counsel University of South Florida 4202 East Fowler Avenue, ADM 250 Tampa, Florida 33620-6250
The Issue The facts as presented indicate that AAA published a newspaper advertisement stating in pertinent part regarding fees: "Fee: 1 Weeks Salary Upon Acceptance." The Department alleged this ad was a misrepresentation of the fees charged because it departed from the fee schedule filed with the Department by (1) failing to include the word "cash" relating to the one week's salary, and failing to include the alternative term payment option. Therefore, the issue is whether the ad as published departs from the fee schedule filed with the Department of State.
Findings Of Fact AAA Employment is organized as a partnership and licensed by the Department of State as a private employment agency. AAA caused to be published the newspaper advertisement received as Exhibit 2. This advertisement states with regard to fees: "Fee: 1 Weeks Salary Upon Acceptance." The complaint upon which the Department of State acted was received from a competitive agency. No evidence was presented concerning AAA's contracts with its customers. No evidence was presented concerning AAA's practices with regard to its customers. The fee schedule filed by AAA with the Department of State was introduced as Exhibit 1. This exhibit provides regarding the fee schedule as follows: FEE: 1 WEEKS SALARY--CASH PAYABLE: Upon acceptance or FEE: 2 WEEKS SALARY--TERMS PAYABLE: 1/4 upon acceptance, before starting of work. Remainder of fee to be paid in 3 weeks, in 3 equal weekly installments. Temporary work: 1/2 weeks salary, cash Daywork: 15 percent of gross salary Waiters & Waitresses: $40.00 cash All commission jobs: $200.00 cash All seasonal jobs are considered permanent work. A letter dated May 29, 1979, from the Department of State to AAA advised that the Department felt that advertisement of the agency's cash fee without advertisement of its two term fee was a violation of Rule 1C-2.08(10), Florida Administrative Code. Subsequently, AAA filed an amended fee schedule which was introduced as Exhibit 1 (see Paragraph 4 above). This amendment substantially altered the fee schedule and provided for both cash and term payments. The annual licensing fee paid by AAA is $100.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that no civil penalty be levied against the AAA Employment Agency. DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: W. J. Gladwin, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. John DeHaven AAA Employment Agency 500 East Central Avenue Winter Haven, Florida 33880
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be assessed sales and use tax for the audit period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, per the Notice of Proposed Assessment dated July 3, 2003.
Findings Of Fact Wales is a Florida S corporation. Its principal place of business is located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Wales' federal employee identification number is 59- 1703273. Wales' Florida sales and tax number is 16-03-095273- 26/1. By letter dated June 6, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records (Notice of Intent). The Notice of Intent identified the audit number as A0205310975. On July 10, 2002, the Department's auditor assigned to perform the audit conducted an initial interview with Wales. The auditor discussed, among other things, the audit and sample methods that would be employed during the audit. On August 13, 2002, the auditor began examining Wales' books and records at Wales' business location. Wales was cooperative during the audit. Wales provided all available books and records for the audit. The sole shareholders of Wales are Stewart Levy and Diane Levy. Wales leased its business location from Element Two Enterprises, Inc., ( Element Two) a related entity. Stewart Levy and Diane Levy are also the sole officers of Element Two, president and secretary, respectively. Element Two is the record owner of the improved real property located at 2916 Southeast 6th Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, (realty). The address for the realty is also the address for Wales' place of business. Element Two mortgaged the realty leased by Wales. Wales paid monthly monetary consideration to Element Two in lease payments, which directly correlated to the amount of the monthly mortgage payments. Ad valorem taxes and property insurance were included in the monthly mortgage payments. Wales paid the ad valorem taxes and property insurance on the leased property. The lease payments to Element Two by Wales included the amount of the ad valorem taxes, property insurance, and common areas of maintenance. Wales did not pay sales tax on any of the lease payments to Element Two. Element Two did not charge or remit sales tax to the Department on the lease payments by Wales. Element Two was not registered with the Department as a dealer. Only dealers that are registered can remit sales tax on lease payments. Consequently, Element Two could not remit sales tax on the lease payments by Wales. Wales did not utilize all of the property it leased. Wales sub-leased a portion of the leased property to an unrelated entity. A prior sales and use tax audit was conducted of the sub-lessee, which included the period May 1997 through December 1998. The Department examined the sublease audit to determine whether Wales owed additional sales tax. The Department's examination of that audit revealed that the sales and use tax on the rent paid by the sub-lessee for the period May 1997 through September 1998 was assessed and paid by the sub-lessee. For the period May 1997 through December 1998, Wales had neither charged or collected sales tax nor remitted sales tax to the Department on the sub-lessee's payments. No sales tax was charged or paid on the sublease payments for the period October 1998 through December 1998. From January 1999 through April 2002, Wales charged, collected, and remitted sales tax on the sublease payments. The Department credited Wales for sales tax already paid on the subleased portion for the period May 1997 through September 1998 and January 1999 through April 2002. On its general ledger, Wales posted the lease payments to Element Two as rent payments. Element Two posted the lease payments to its general ledger as rent income. On its federal income tax returns, Wales reported the lease payments to Element Two as rent expense. Element Two reported the lease payments on its federal income tax returns as rent income. On November 29, 2002, the Department issued to Wales a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes for audit number A0205310975. Wales requested and the Department agreed to hold an audit conference to discuss the audit findings. Wales claimed that rent payments made were not subject to sales tax because both Wales and Element Two signed the mortgage and promissory note on the realty leased by Wales. However, only Element Two was reflected as the borrower on the loan and only Element Two was the signatory on the mortgage even though both Wales and Element Two signed the promissory note. On January 10, 2003, Wales executed a Consent to Extend the Time to Issue an Assessment or to File a Claim for Refund (Consent). The Consent extended the statute of limitations for the period of time in which an assessment may be issued or a claim for refund may be filed to December 31, 2003. On July 3, 2003, the Department issued, by certified mail, the Notice and an Addendum to Proposed Assessment for audit number A0205310975. The Notice provided, among other things, for the assessment of sales and use tax in the amount of $17,481.73; penalty in the amount of $8,741.10; interest in the amount of $5,756.03, with additional daily interest being computed at the rate of $3.54 per day from July 3, 2003; and a total assessment in the amount $31,978.86. On September 1, 2003, the Notice became a Final Assessment for audit number A0205310975. Wales contested the Final Assessment and requested a hearing. Wales is not contesting that part of the audit which found that Wales failed to pay sales tax on certain fixed assets purchased for use in its business. At hearing, Wales contended that its federal income tax returns could be amended to reflect the payments to Element Two as mortgage payments instead of rent payments, which would, in turn, change the Department's audit to reflect the payments as mortgage not rent. To address this contention, the Department presented the testimony of an expert witness in the area of rental consideration and sales tax audits. The Department's expert testified that the consideration for rental or use of property is the payment between/to one who owns the real property and/from one who uses the property; and concluded that consideration, as rental, was provided to Wales by Element Two based on the Department's taxing statute, Section 212.031, Florida Statutes, and its rules and regulation, Florida Administrative Code Rule 12A-1.070. The expert opined that the mortgage payments were consideration for a lease or license to use the real property and that, therefore, the monthly lease payment, which equaled the monthly mortgage payment, paid by Wales to Element Two was consideration for the lease or license to use the realty. The expert's testimony is found to be credible. The evidence presented shows that the mathematical computations performed by the Department in its audit are correct. Further, the evidence shows that the mathematical computations as to tax, penalty, and interest assessed are correct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue's assessment of sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation be sustained and that the Department of Revenue enter a final order assessing sales tax, interest, and penalty against Wales Garage Corporation for the period May 1, 1997 through April 30, 2002, consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Schnitzer GSS Advisory Services, Inc. 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 502 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue The factual issue to be determined is the amount of attorney fees and costs due and owing to the Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner incurred the following costs related to the proceedings in Case No. 87-0605: Copying Charges for Office Copies of Pleadings and Papers $173.25 Court Reporter Fees for Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing held 9/9/90 510.30 Miscellaneous Postage 26.75 Copying Charges 9.80 Typing Charges 100.00 TOTAL COSTS: $820.10 The parties stipulated that a reasonable hourly rate for Mr. Traynham's services was $150.00 per hour. At the time of the final hearing in Case No. 90- 5301F, Mr. Traynham had expended 25 hours in Case No. 90-5301F. A reasonable fee for counsel for Petitioner's services in the aforementioned case is $3,750.00. The parties also stipulated that work in presentation of this case to the Commission must be considered separately. The parties did not agree to an hourly rate or number of hours for the services provided by Mr. Stafman. Based upon the records presented and the testimony of Mr. Stafman, the reasonable number of hours required to review the file and for testimony at the hearing is seven hours. The reasonable rate for Mr. Stafman's professional services based upon the value of his services in relationship to the value of the services provided by Mr. Traynham is $150.00 per hour. A reasonable total fee for Mr. Stafman's professional services was $1,050.00. Curley Doltie, Esq. was retained by the Petitioner to represent him in this proceeding on a contingency fee basis. A contingency fee basis means that Mr. Doltie would be compensated for representing the Petitioner only if the Petitioner prevailed in the litigation. The amount of the contingency fee was to be determined and awarded by the Commission. The rule regulating the Bar requires contingency fee contracts to be reduced to writing. The Petitioner was a casual client of Mr. Doltie, and their contingency fee contract was not reduced to writing and executed. Mr. Doltie is a 1979 graduate of the Law School at Florida State University and was admitted to the Bar in that year. Between May 1980 and May 1982, Mr. Doltie served as an armored officer in the United States Army. Mr. Doltie's legal experience includes working as a staff attorney for the Legal Aid Society of Orange County from October 1979 until May 1980; assistant public defender in Sanford, Florida, from May 1982 until April 1983; private practice from April 1983 until October 1984; associate general counsel with the Public Service Commission from October 1984 until January 1987; Legal Services of North Florida from January 1987 until opening a private practice in Tallahassee in September 1987. The Petitioner was one of Mr. Doltie's first clients after he opened his private practice in 1987. Mr. Doltie currently handles both contingency fee cases and cases for which he regularly bills his clients. Mr. Doltie's current billing rate is $150.00 per hour. Mr. Doltie's practice involves, primarily, administrative litigation. Mr. Doltie regularly keeps time records, which reflect the activities in which he is engaged on behalf of his client, and the time expended in pursuit of these activities. Mr. Doltie maintained time records for the activities which he performed in providing professional services to the Petitioner. In addition, Mr. Doltie expended 4.5 hours preparing for the attorney fee hearing, 1.0 hour for a prehearing conference, and 8.0 hours testifying or being available to testify at the final hearing on the matter of attorneys fees and costs. The total number of hours expended by Mr. Doltie in the fee case was 13.5 hours. Mr. Doltie's summary of professional services rendered by date, description, and time expended on the administrative proceedings before the Commission, the Division of Administrative Hearings, and the appeal of the original case to the District Court of Appeals and the Florida Supreme Court is presented in the Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Doltie withdrew his claim for the appeal. Mr. Doltie recorded his time carefully and conservatively and claimed only that time which contributed significantly to the work product. The Respondent would reduce the time allowed for the services rendered on the following dates because the explanation is insufficient or the amount of time is excessive or the activity was unnecessary: 1/5/88 C/Weaver 3/23/88 C/Weaver 5/11/88 C/Weaver; R/Case 6/7/88 C/Weaver 9/27/88 L/Carothers 4/17/90 R/Case; P/Motion for Evidentiary Hearing 4/17/90 L/Carothers 5/1/90 P/Motion To Strike Respondent's Motion To Tax Costs; R/Case; C/Weaver 5/4/90 P/Petitioner's Reply To Respondent's Response To Petitioner's Motion For Evidentiary Hearing 5/23/90 R/Case 5/24/90 R/Case; P/Notice Of Failure To Settle; Motion For Rehearing And Motion For Clarification; Memorandum of Law; Motion To Strike 6/13/90 P/Petitioner's Motion Requesting FCHR To Become A Deferral Agency For The Federal Government; R/Case; P/Motion For Seniority Pay Steps; P/Motion Requesting An Expedited Hearing On Damages 6/14/90 R/Case; P/Motion Requesting FCHR To Appeal DCA Order 6/22/90 RV/FCHR Order; C/Weaver Based upon review of the time records and consideration of the services performed, the following adjustments are made with regard to the times recorded by Mr. Doltie: 1/5/88 C/Weaver .5 2/23/88 C/Weaver .2 6/3/88 1/ R/Case; RV/DOAH Order 1.2 6/7/88 C/Weaver 1.0 The total number of hours accepted from Mr. Doltie for his services rendered before the Division of Administrative Hearings and the Commission is 121.9 hours through the initiation of the appeal to the District Court of Appeals. The total number of hours of professional services rendered provided by Mr. Doltie after this case was returned to the Commission is also itemized in the Petitioner's Exhibit 2, commencing with the services provided on 4/17/90. Of those items to which the Respondent takes exception, only the services provided on 6/13/90 and 6/14/90 were adjusted. In both instances, it was determined that the motions were unnecessary, without precedent, and the time expended thereon should be disallowed. The total number of hours of professional services rendered from 4/17/90 through 8/16/90 were 32.2 hours. The total number of hours expended by Mr. Doltie and allowed to be charged after review is 154.1 hours. Based upon a consideration of Mr. Doltie's background and experience, in comparison with the fees for professional services charged by other attorneys in the Tallahassee, a reasonable rate for his services at the time would have been $110.00 per hour. Having originally heard the case presented by Mr. Doltie and being familiar with the litigation, Mr. Doltie's professional services undoubtedly resulted in the Petitioner vindicating his civil rights and the Respondent being directed to employ the Petitioner. Although the Petitioner's initial claim was for broader relief, the Petitioner did not present evidence on many of these issues and thereby abandoned them at hearing. Based upon the results achieved, a contingency fee of one-half again the billed rate would have been reasonable; however, as stated above, the contingency fee agreement between the Petitioner and Mr. Doltie was not reduced to writing. Recovery on a contingency fee in the absence of a written contract would be precluded by the Rules Regulating the Bar. Therefore, the recovery in this matter is on a quantum meruit basis. The value of the job and benefits of employment to the Petitioner were equal to the actual dollar value of the allowable hours times $110.00 per hour for 154.1 hours and $150.00 per hour for 13.5 hours.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner be awarded the following attorney's fees and costs: Costs: $ 820.10 Mr. Stafman: 1,050.00 Mr. Doltie: 18,976.00 Mr. Traynham: 3,750.00 Further, Mr. Traynham should receive an added fee for his presentation before the Commission to be determined by the Commission in its Final Order. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was represented by in this case by Michael Linsky, Esquire, beginning in April 1988. Two complaints of discrimination had been brought against the Department of Corrections by Petitioner. Linsky is an experienced trial lawyer having been admitted to the Florida Bar in 1970. However, he had no experience with discrimination cases prior to these proceedings. The Florida Commission on Human Relations found the Department had committed an unlawful employment practice when it assigned Petitioner to perimeter post duty and transferred him to Polk Correctional Institution in retaliation for having filed a discrimination complaint. Linsky originally took Petitioner's case on a contingency fee basis, but later it was decided between Linsky and Petitioner that the fee would be whatever was awarded by the Commission. Petitioner was only to be responsible for costs. Linsky submitted into evidence as Exhibit 1 a list of dates and hours expended on this case. However, this exhibit was prepared by Linsky's secretary some months after the events depicted and appear grossly exaggerated in some instances. Linsky claims a total of 159.35 hours expended. Linsky testified that his billing rate from April 1988 to December 1988 was $175 per hour, and thereafter it was raised to $190 per hour. Petitioner's expert witnesses contend the average billing rate in the Tampa area for this type of case ranges from $125 to $175 per hour. Respondent's expert witnesses contend the fees awarded run from $100 to $150 per hour. I find the appropriate fee in this case to be $135 per hour. Although Linsky claims to have spent 159.35 hour on this case, including the attorney's fees portion, 1 find that only 100 hours are reasonable. Costs of $423.60 is not disputed.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Department of Corrections be directed to pay Sefsick's attorney $13,500 attorney's fees and $423.60 costs in these proceedings. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted, except: 3. This proposed finding is accepted as a recital of the testimony presented, but rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #8. 5. Rejected insofar as inconsistent with H.O. #7. 6 and 7. Accepted as legal argument, but rejected as a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Linsky, Esquire 600 North Florida Avenue Suite 1610 Tampa, FL 33602 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas General Counsel Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Richard L. Dugger Secretary Department of Corrections 1313 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 =================================================================
The Issue The issues for determination are: (1) whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by manipulating fiscal practices of the City of Hialeah Gardens in an effort to afford himself a tax benefit; (2) whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by removing from the Mayor's Office furniture that had been donated to the City of Hialeah Gardens; (3) whether the Respondent violated Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes, by having a contractual or employment relationship with a company doing business with the City of Hialeah Gardens; and (4) if so, what penalty is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact George Hameeton (Respondent) was elected Mayor of the City of Hialeah Gardens (City or Hialeah Gardens) in March 1993 and served through March 9, 1995. As Mayor of Hialeah Gardens, Respondent was subject to the requirements of Part III, Chapter 112, Florida Statutes, the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees (Code of Ethics). Gilda Oliveros, formerly known as Gilda Cabrera de Corzo, was Respondent's immediate predecessor as Mayor. Oliveros served as mayor of Hialeah Gardens from 1989 until 1993, when she was defeated by Respondent. In 1995, Oliveros ran against Respondent again and was elected Mayor on March 7, 1995. Oliveros was sworn into office on March 9, 1995. The City Charter of the City of Hialeah Gardens, Florida, provides for a strong mayor form of government. According to the City Charter, "The Mayor is the executive head of the city, with all the necessary powers and authority to enforce all laws, ordinances, and resolutions of the City Council." Consistent with his role as "executive head," the mayor supervises, hires and fires, and has total supervisory powers over all departments. In addition, the Mayor has a fiduciary duty to the City. Transactions Involving Mayor's Expense Reimbursement Respondent's salary in 1994 and 1995 was $20,000 per year. In Hialeah Gardens, salary increases for the mayor must be voted on in a referendum. On November 1, 1994, the Hialeah Gardens City Council (City Council) took up the matter of an expense allowance for Respondent. Respondent was in attendance, but neither August Torres, the City's accountant; Lourdes Diez, the City's bookkeeper; nor James Warmus, the City's auditor, were in attendance. During City Council's discussion, the Acting City Attorney stated that the expense allowance would be a discretionary, nonreporting expense account. With this type of expense account, the amount paid would be static, no matter what expenses were incurred. Moreover, with this type of account, no receipts or other proof of expenses would have to be submitted. On November 1, 1994, the City Council adopted Resolution No. 1453 which authorized Respondent to receive a monthly expense allowance of $1,000 and a monthly automobile allowance of $800.00 retroactive to the date of his taking office in March 1993. No supporting documentation was required to substantiate these expense allowances. Resolution No. 1453 also provided that the City Council members and Respondent had the option to either participate in the City's health plan or to receive a sum equivalent to the City's contribution to the health plan on their behalf. Resolution No. 1453 provided that the $1,000 expense reimbursement was a nonreporting reimbursement. However, the resolution did not indicate how the automobile allowance should be categorized. Resolution No. 1453 provided in relevant part the following: Section 1. The Mayor shall receive the sum of one thousand dollars a month as reimbursement for expenses such as late meals, dry cleaning, cellular telephone, and other related expenses resulting from his fulltime employment with the City in an administrative position. Said reimbursement shall be nonreporting. Section 2. The Mayor shall receive the sum of eight hundred dollars a month for an automobile allowance which includes reimbursement for insurance, maintenance, and gasoline. The expense allowances authorized by Resolution No. 1453 totaled $1,800 per month, an amount which exceeded the Respondent's salary by $1,600 per year. "Nonreporting" or "nonaccountable" expense reimbursements as described above are treated as wages by the Internal Revenue Service. As such, the employer is responsible for withholding social security and Medicare taxes, and also for making a matching contribution. Failure of an employer to do so can result in the employer's having to pay a penalty of up to 100 percent of the amount which should have been withheld. After Resolution No. 1453 was adopted, Respondent told Diez to calculate the amount he and City Council members should receive pursuant to the terms of the Resolution No. 1453. Diez was not aware the insurance contributions and expense reimbursements were subject to taxation; neither was she familiar with the distinction between accountable or reporting expense and nonaccountable or nonreporting expenses. Therefore, she calculated the gross amount to which Respondent and City Council members were entitled. She did not withhold taxes or social security or make the employer's contribution as to any of the payments including those made to the City Council members. Respondent was Diez' immediate supervisor and usually checked her work. Consistent with this practice, Respondent, too, calculated the amounts owed to him and the City Council members and double-checked Diez' figures. Once the calculations were completed, Respondent instructed Diez to cut his expense reimbursement check and the health plan contribution checks for him and eligible City council members. In response to Diez' inquiry about where the money should come from, Respondent told her that the payments should come out of the City's general fund. Diez then called Torres to request the appropriate account number for the "expense" reimbursement. Because Diez did not mention that the expense reimbursement or any part thereof was nonreporting, Torres gave Diez the account number that allowed the funds to be paid as an operating expense. At the time Diez contacted Torres to get the account number, Torres had not seen a copy of Resolution No. 1453 and was unaware of its contents. The nonaccountable expense reimbursement check should have been issued from the City's payroll account. The payroll account or fund is set up with CompuPay, an outside third-party administrator, which is the City's payroll servicing company. Checks cut from the City's payroll fund or account, unlike those cut from the City's general operating fund, have payroll taxes and the employee's contribution automatically calculated and withheld by CompuPay. On the other hand, payments coming from the City's general fund are not normally subject to withholding. While it is possible to manually do the calculations on payments made from the City's general fund, because Diez was not aware the money was subject to taxes, it never occurred to her to do so. The transaction involving Respondent's expense reimbursement was a non-routine transaction and one that Diez had not previously seen or processed. On December 23, 1994, Respondent was issued a check for $43,685.93, which represented the total retroactive payment for the car allowance, the expense allowance, and the health plan contribution. No social security or Medicare taxes were withheld from this check and no employer's contribution was made. Respondent deposited the $43,685.93 check into his bank account on December 23, 1994, the day it was issued. Respondent's personal bank account was at the same bank as the City's account and the $43,685.93 was posted to Respondent's account the day the check was deposited. Shortly after the $43,685.93 check was issued to Respondent, Torres became aware that the check was for a nonaccountable or nonreporting expense reimbursement and that no social security or Medicare taxes had been withheld. While it is unclear who initiated the call, within one week after Respondent's $43,685.93 check was deposited into his bank account, Respondent and Torres had a telephone conversation regarding the check. Torres explained to Respondent that the expense reimbursement check "was of a nonreporting nature" and, therefore, payroll taxes had to be withheld. Respondent then told Torres that the check had already been deposited into Respondent's bank account. During the aforementioned telephone conversation, Respondent expressed concern about the tax consequences of receiving such a large sum at the end of 1994. Because Respondent believed the lump sum payment of $43,685.93 would adversely affect his income tax obligation for 1994, he asked Torres if he could defer taking the check until 1995. In response to Respondent's inquiry concerning whether he could defer taking the check until 1995, Torres told Respondent that taxes must be paid for the year in which the money is received. Nevertheless, Torres advised Respondent that if he redeposited funds to correct an error and if the reissued check did not get to him until 1995, he arguably would not have "received" the money until 1995. Based on his familiarity with the City's payroll processing schedule, Torres knew that the subject expense reimbursement check would not be reissued until 1995. Respondent and Torres never discussed whether it was permissible to make a deferred compensation contribution from the expense reimbursement funds. On December 30, 1994, Respondent contacted the bank and had the December 23, 1994, deposit of the $43,685.93 reversed. As a result of this action, the funds were deducted from Respondent's account and redeposited in the City's account. Respondent notified Diez that the $43,685.93 had been returned to the City's account and asked that a new expense reimbursement check be issued, minus a $9,624.00 contribution to Respondent's deferred compensation plan. However, Respondent did not tell Diez to withhold any social security or Medicare taxes or to make any employer's contributions. Diez took the funds from the City's general fund as she had done for the check issued December 23, 1994. It did not occur to Diez to withhold taxes from Respondent's reissued expense reimbursement check and she did not. When Respondent directed Diez to cut and reissue the expense reimbursement check, he knew that social security and Medicare taxes were to be withheld from the check. Nevertheless, he deliberately did not tell Diez to withhold these taxes. During the aforementioned telephone conversation, Torres explained to Respondent that the only way the expense reimbursement could be attributable to Respondent as income to Respondent in 1995 instead of 1994 was if the December 23, 1994, deposit were reversed to correct a "mistake" and the check was then reissued in 1995. The "mistake" to which Torres referred was the error in not withholding payroll taxes from the $43,685.93 reimbursement check. As a result of Torres' explanation, Respondent clearly understood that social security and Medicare taxes should have been withheld from the check. Moreover, Respondent understood that reversal of the December 23, 1994, deposit could be done only to correct the mistake involving withholding of social security and Medicare taxes. A new check was issued to Respondent on January 10, 1995. The original $43.685.93 had been reduced by $9,624.00, the deferred compensation contribution, and the check issued to Respondent was for $34,061.93. No social security or Medicare taxes were withheld and no employer's contribution was made. When Mayor Oliveros was elected and took office in March 1995, she asked the City auditor to conduct a complete audit. Ultimately, the auditor instead conducted an "agreed-upon procedure" which addressed Mayor's Oliveros' concerns without the scope and expense of a complete audit. The procedure covered the period October 1, 1994, to March 9, 1995, and the auditor's findings were summarized in a report dated May 1995. The agreed-upon procedure identified the handling of Respondent's reimbursement check as problematic. Specifically, the auditor discovered that no social security, or Medicare, or other taxes had been withheld from either of Respondent's expense reimbursement checks. Furthermore, the auditor found that the employer's contribution was never made by the City with regard to Respondent's expense reimbursement. In an effort to protect the City from exposure to IRS penalties, Torres suggested that the City pay Respondent's share of the taxes, as well as its own employer's contribution. To calculate the amount of taxes due and for purposes of calculating Respondent's salary for his 1995 W-2, Torres engaged in a calculation known as "grossing up." "Grossing up" is used when an employee mistakenly or otherwise improperly receives as net an amount he should have received as gross. Respondent should have received $43,685.93 gross, had taxes withheld, and then taken home some lesser "net" amount. Instead he took home $43,685.93. To "gross up," one would have to calculate what gross income would have resulted in a net income of $43,685.93. Respondent's "grossed up" income was $47,304.74. The City paid the Respondent's share and employer's matching contribution. In fact, due to an error in calculating the amounts, it overpaid taxes that should have been deducted from Respondent's check. Based on Respondent's "grossed up" income, the correct amount of social security and Medicare taxes was $3,618.81. As of the date of the hearing, Respondent had not reimbursed the City for his share of the social security and Medicare taxes. Removal and Replacement of Furniture in Mayor's Office In April 1994, during Respondent's term as Mayor, a sofa and loveseat were donated to the City. Respondent accepted the donated sofa and loveseat to replace the old stain-covered furniture in the Mayor's office. Respondent directed City workers to move the old furniture from the Mayor's office to the City's storage warehouse. Between March 7, 1995, the day Mayor Oliveros was elected, and March 9, 1995, the day she took the oath of office, Respondent had City employees remove the donated sofa and loveseat from the Mayor's Office and take it to the City's storage warehouse. Respondent then had the City workers to retrieve the old furniture from the City's storage warehouse and put it in the Mayor's office. Respondent returned the old furniture to the Mayor's office in retaliation against Mayor Oliveros. Respondent admitted that his action was "childish" and was done because he wanted to "gig" Mayor Oliveros, that is to get back at her, for leaving the old stain-covered furniture in the Mayor's office when he defeated her in 1993. Respondent never took personal possession of the "donated" furniture. Since taking office, Mayor Oliveros has been unsuccessful in her efforts to locate the "donated" furniture. Mayor's Relationship With Company Doing Business work for City In August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida. As a result of this hurricane, Hialeah Gardens sustained some damage. However, the damage was not extensive and consisted primarily of fallen trees and debris from damage to some smaller structures. Oliveros was Mayor of Hialeah Gardens during Hurricane Andrew. During the period after Hurricane Andrew, at Mayor Oliveros' direction, City maintenance personnel removed debris that may have created a dangerous situation caused by the storm. Immediately after Hurricane Andrew, Mayor Oliveros had fallen debris removed from various sites in Hialeah Gardens. Among the sites where debris had fallen was Bernie Wilson Park. A gazebo in the park had been damaged by the hurricane and debris from that structure was picked up by a City maintenance crew. After the storm, a portion of the gazebo including its roof remained standing. However, the remaining portion of the gazebo was not structurally sound. Mayor Oliveros applied for funds from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) before leaving office. FEMA funds were requested to cover overtime payments for the trash removal and a significant amount of the funds were specifically earmarked for removal of debris. Mayor Oliveros' understanding of the expenditures of FEMA funds was that bids were not necessary in emergency cleanup situations. According to Mayor Oliveros, because of the emergency situation, the County authorized the City to use contractors who had been approved by the County. However, once the debris was cleaned up and the emergency situation no longer existed, any further services were to be purchased in accordance with the City's purchasing procedures. A few weeks after Respondent was elected, he received complaints that Bernie Wilson Park was in disrepair. In response to these complaints, Respondent went out to the park to inspect the damage. Based on his assessment, in March 1993, Respondent had a fence built around the park and had the gate padlocked. Respondent also had signs posted indicating that the park was closed. In September 1993, Respondent hired Perfect Building, Inc., to repair the gazebo in Bernie Wilson Park that had been damaged as a result of Hurricane Andrew. Respondent took this action more than one year after Hurricane Andrew struck South Florida and approximately six months after he first inspected and assessed the damage at Bernie Wilson Park. The City paid Perfect Builders $13,000 for this work. Respondent's justification for using Perfect Builders was that repair or reconstruction of the gazebo was necessary because the damaged gazebo constituted an emergency situation. According to Respondent the cost of the project could be covered by FEMA only if the project were completed by a certain date. In an effort to meet this deadline, Respondent used Perfect Builders only after other contractors he telephoned indicated they were too busy to work on the project. The gazebo at Bernie Wilson Park did not constitute an emergency situation that would preclude Respondent's adhering to the City's prescribed purchasing procedures. In December 1993, Respondent again hired Perfect Builders to renovate the dispatch office in the Police Department at a cost of $1,900. Because the cost of this project did not exceed $4,000.00, Respondent was not required to follow bid requirements specified in the City's purchasing procedures. At the times Respondent hired Perfect Builders to perform work for the City, he had a contractual relationship with the company to serve as its qualifier. As qualifier for Perfect Builders, Respondent contractor's license was used to pull permits for the firm. For serving as its qualifier, Respondent was paid a monthly fee of $350 by Perfect Builders. Respondent had a contractual relationship with Perfect Builders which violated Section 112.313(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED that a final order and public report be entered finding that Respondent, George Hameetman, violated Sections 112.313(6) and 112.313(7)(a), Florida Statutes; imposing a civil penalty of $3,000.00 and restitution of $3,618.81; and issuing a public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Virlindia Doss, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Charles Toledo, Esquire 8201 Peters Road, Suite 400 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33324 Sheri L. Gerety, Complaint Coordinator Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue Whether, under section 120.569(2)(e), Florida Statutes, Petitioner, Garber Housing Resorts, LLC ("Garber"), is entitled to its reasonable attorney's fees incurred because of responding to three specific pleadings filed by Respondent, Glenda Q. Mahaney ("Mahaney"), and if so, the amount of such reasonable attorney's fees.
Findings Of Fact On March 27, 2019, DEP issued an SRCO after reviewing a limited groundwater assessment dated May 9, 2018, which included a recommendation for risk management option level one. DEP's SRCO stated that the prior conditional SRCO was being replaced because the limited groundwater assessment "demonstrates that conditions on the property have changed and improved such that the [conditional SRCO] is no longer appropriate.” Mahaney's May 13, 2019, petition and Garber's May 23, 2019, motion to dismiss were referred to DOAH on June 25, 2019, and assigned Case No. 19-3429. Garber's petition was 77 pages, 654 paragraphs, and contained 56 pages of attachments. 2 The Office Depot email suggested that an email was sent on January 4, 2020, but without the documents attached. The email address to which the document was allegedly sent was "AskDOAH," which is not a proper method for filing pleadings. The November 6, 2019, Notice from DOAH opening this fees case explained that "Parties not represented may file electronically through eALJ, facsimile, or mail. CHOOSE ONE METHOD of filing for each document." On July 18, 2019, Mahaney's petition was dismissed with leave to amend as legally insufficient under Florida Administrative Code Rule 28-106.201(2). The petition also contained irrelevant allegations that were not cognizable in an environmental administrative proceeding. Mahaney was allowed ten days to file an amended petition that "shall comply with the requirements of rule 28-106.201(2) and shall not contain the irrelevant and immaterial allegations discussed in this Order." On August 1, 2019, DEP received from Mahaney a document titled "Petitioner's 7-25-2019 Amended 5-9-2019 Petition for Hearing Regarding SRCO Dated Dated [sic] 3-27-2019 for Lamont Garber and/or Garber Housing Resorts, Inc., and Motion for Summary Proceedings Regarding Issues Admitted by FDEP and/or Motion to Immediately Revoke SRCO or Motion to Abate Proceedings Until Such Time as Petitioner's Property is Tested" ("amended petition"). DEP forwarded Mahaney's amended petition to DOAH on August 5, 2019. The amended petition was 69 pages, 690 paragraphs, and contained 59 pages of attachments. Garber had already filed, on August 2, 2019, its motion to dismiss the amended petition. On August 13, 2019, Mahaney filed her response to Garber's motion to dismiss the amended petition. A Recommended Order of Dismissal was issued on August 19, 2019, finding that the amended petition remained legally insufficient. The amended petition still contained irrelevant allegations concerning issues outside the subject matter of the SRCO. Those issues included a property boundary dispute, trespass and nuisance claims, alleged violations of pollution laws, alleged non-compliance with local land use regulations, flooding issues, and stormwater runoff issues. DEP issued its Final Order on November 1, 2019. Attached to the Final Order provided to DOAH were Mahaney's exceptions and Garber's responses to exceptions that had been timely filed with DEP. The Final Order denied each of Mahaney's exceptions, adopted the Recommended Order of Dismissal, and approved the SRCO. Mahaney is opposed to Garber's plan to develop the property that is the subject of DEP's SRCO. It was clear from Mahaney's testimony and her history of challenging remediation actions taken by Garber and prior property owners, that her primary purpose for bringing the underlying proceeding was her concern for potential contamination of her well and property. In addition, she was concerned that the SRCO did not "certify the entire [Garber] property as clean." Because of Mahaney's stated belief that DEP has not done its job over the years with regard to Garber's property and her property, she had challenged the prior conditional SRCO, and then the replacement SRCO. In addition, Mahaney testified that additional remediation occurred on Garber's property in February 2019, approximately a month before DEP issued the SRCO. She obtained a letter that was from the remediation company to Mr. Lamont Garber describing the remediation activities. Through reasonable inquiry, she learned that the letter was not in DEP's possession at the time of issuing the SRCO. The circumstances surrounding Mahaney's filing of her petition, amended petition, and exceptions show that her pleadings were not filed for an improper purpose. Garber's expert on reasonable attorney's fees reviewed the invoices of legal fees and the filings in the underlying proceeding. He testified that the time spent and legal fees incurred by Garber responding to Mahaney's pleadings and litigating entitlement to fees, were reasonable.3 Mahaney did not present an expert to dispute his testimony. 3 Garber's Composite Exhibit No. 1 consisted of nine invoices for legal services and three prebilling reports dated through January 21, 2020, which was the date of the final hearing. One invoice and one prebilling report addressed a separate matter titled "Maitland Rezone." One invoice did not separate Mahaney's petition from a separate petition filed by Corinne Garrett. The time spent on the underlying proceeding and this fees case reflected in the other seven invoices and two prebilling reports, total $16,621.00.
