The Issue (1) Whether facts and circumstances demonstrate the existence, on August 20, 2019, of an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students of Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc.-5422 d/b/a "Championship Academy" ("Championship") justifying the immediate termination of its charter by the Broward County School Board ("School Board") pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c); and (2) whether the School Board formulated one or more agency statements that constitute unadopted rules, in violation of section 120.54(1)(a), and applied one or more of those unadopted rules as the basis for its agency action immediately terminating Championship's charter.1 1 Championship's rule challenge petition, as filed, also challenged an adopted School Board rule under section 120.56(3). This challenge was abandoned at the beginning of the final hearing.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Championship is a Florida not-for-profit corporation that holds the charter for numerous charter schools throughout Florida, including in Broward County, Florida. Championship was the holder of the charter for Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc., the charter school for which the charter was immediately terminated by the School Board on August 20, 2019.4 Pursuant to Article IX, section 4 of the Florida Constitution, the School Board is the political subdivision that operates, controls, and supervises all district public schools in Broward County, Florida.5 3 CS for CS Senate Bill 7030 (2019) substantially amended section 1006.12, Florida Statutes, regarding safe-school officers. This legislation was published as chapter 2019-22, Laws of Florida (2019) and has been codified in numerous Florida Statutes, including section 1006.12. 4 For purposes of this Final Order, including the stipulated facts, all references to "Championship" are to the Championship Academy of Distinction at Davie, Inc., the charter school for which the charter was terminated on August 20, 2019. 5 The School Board is an educational unit, as that term is defined in section 120.52(6), and, therefore is an "agency" for purposes of chapter 120. Pursuant to section 1002.33(8), Florida Statutes, the charter termination proceeding is conducted pursuant to sections 120.569 and In Florida, charter schools are nonsectarian public schools that operate pursuant to a charter contract with a public sponsor. § 1002.33(1), Fla. Stat. In this case, the School Board is the sponsor for Championship. Stipulated Facts At a regularly scheduled meeting, the School Board approved a renewal Charter School Agreement (the "charter"), dated April 5, 2016, with Championship. The charter became effective on July 1, 2016, for a term of five years. At a regularly scheduled meeting on August 20, 2019, the School Board voted to immediately terminate Championship's6 charter pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). As the basis for its action, the School Board concluded that the particular facts and circumstances indicated that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students existed on that date, due to Championship's failure to comply with and implement the requirements of section 1006.12, by failing to arrange for the assignment of one or more safe-school officers for the protection and safety of students, school personnel, and property, without interruption, during all school hours of every school day, and for repeatedly allowing a licensed security guard other than a safe-school officer to possess a firearm on Championship's campus in violation of section 790.115(2)(a), Florida Statutes. The School Board's notice of termination of the charter was delivered to Championship on August 22, 2019. The first day of the 2019-2020 school year for the students at Championship was Wednesday, August 14, 2019. Students attended classes at Championship on Wednesday, August 14, through and including Friday, 120.57(1). Additionally, pursuant to section 1001.41(2), Florida Statutes, the School Board is required to adopt its policies pursuant to the rulemaking procedure in section 120.54. 6 In the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, the parties interchangeably refer to "Championship" and the "Charter School." For consistency, the stipulated facts in this Final Order are modified to refer to "Championship." August 16, 2019, and on Monday, August 19, through Thursday, August 22, 2019. Pursuant to section 1022.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes, the School Board assumed operation of Championship after it immediately terminated Championship's charter. On August 14, 2019, Championship had an armed security guard, rather than a safe-school officer pursuant to one of the four options authorized and required by section 1006.12, present on its campus. On August 15, 2019, Championship had an armed security guard, rather than a safe-school officer pursuant to one of the four options authorized and required by section 1006.12, present on its campus. On August 14, 2019, Detra Adams observed a person sitting behind the front desk at the Charter School. Championship's principal, Todd Dupell, told her that that person was an armed guard. On August 15, 2019, starting at approximately 2:37 p.m., a police officer from the Davie Police Department was present on Championship's campus. A police officer from the Davie Police Department was present on Championship's campus during all school hours on Friday, August 16, 2019; during all school hours on Monday, August 19, 2019; and during all school hours on Tuesday, August 20, 2019. On August 19, 2019, Broward County Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie, Leslie Brown, and School Board Deputy General Counsel Robert Vignola received a copy of an email dated August 16, 2019, from Davie Police Department Captain Christopher Chastain to Todd Dupell, stating, in part: We will meet with the Town Administrator Monday morning to finalize everything. In the interim[,] there will be an officer at your location on school days. We hope to have an approved agreement ready for signing by Monday afternoon which will provide you with what is being requested by the county. Runcie stated the following during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: "I know, I think it was late on Thursday afternoon, and certainly on Friday when we checked, there was a full-time officer there from the City of Davie." Brian Katz, the School Board's Chief Safety, Security, and Emergency Preparedness Officer, stated the following regarding whether the Charter School was in compliance with section 1006.12, during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: "as of today [August 20, 2019], they are." School Board member Nora Rupert stated the following regarding a written communication she received from the Mayor of Davie, Judy Paul, during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: The Mayor of Davie, Judy Paul, says there presently are Davie officers in the three Davie charter schools, and the executed agreement will be forwarded, specifically, Championship, excuse me, when completed today. We take care of our own, ["]we["] meaning their city. They've always been a very good, good partner with us. I asked if I could say this publicly, and she said yes. This is for the public record. I also forwarded it to the attorney, as well as the Superintendent the minute I received it, and just so my colleagues could have that information, I had to say it here. Vignola stated the following during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: If there's an officer there [at Championship] now and . . . if there is a representation from appropriate officials in the City [Town of Davie] that they see themselves as having a binding obligation to provide safe-school officer coverage with continuity, that goes to your threshold question of whether immediate termination is appropriate. The following exchange occurred between School Board member Laurie Rich Levinson and Vignola during the School Board meeting on August 20, 2019: Levinson: "So, Mr. Vignola, I know it's a difficult question, but legally, where are we? As of today, we are going to have an agreement with the Town of Davie that this school is covered, so as of today, we're not able to terminate a contract." Vignola: "If we get that representation from the city, I think that I would counsel voting against immediate termination." School Board member Donna Korn stated the following during the meeting of the School Board on August 20, 2019: "Do I believe that our decision will be overturned? Unfortunately, to the extent we have a very mixed message, I do." Vignola stated the following at the meeting of the School Board on August 20, 2019: Right now, today, they have, as I've been—it's been reported to me, they have a safe[-]school officer on campus today that would be compliant. As for what they have down the road, the law is not very clear as to an obligation. There's nothing in here that says have a contract in place. At an emergency meeting held on August 27, 2019, the School Board voted against immediately terminating its charter school agreement with The National Ben Gamla Charter School Foundation, Inc. ("Ben Gamla Charter School"), pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c), concluding that the particular facts and circumstances did not indicate that an immediate and serious threat to the health, safety, or welfare of that charter school's students existed on August 27, 2019. The School Board was aware, at its August 27, 2019, meeting that the security guard at the Ben Gamla Charter School campus was not a certified guardian pursuant to section 1006.12. School Board member Dr. Rosalind Osgood stated the following during the August 27, 2019, meeting of the School Board regarding the Ben Gamla Charter School: It was a problem because there were not enough law enforcement officers in the whole state even available to meet the demands of the legislature, so we had to be very creative in the way that we made decisions to keep our kids in the traditional public schools safe[,] with requiring that they have military or law enforcement background and training, which again, we keep hearing limited the pool, but it's the . . . safest way that we can address it. Runcie stated the following during the meeting of the School Board on August 27, 2019, regarding the Ben Gamla Charter School: "[s]o I think they're [Ben Gamla Charter School] working to try to get to a point where they have a sustainable plan, but if they currently have a plan, no matter how short-term it is, and they're able to have a safe[-]school officer on campus, they're technically in compliance." Chief of the Plantation Police Department, W. Howard Harrison, stated during the meeting of the School Board on August 27, 2019, that the Plantation Police Department did not provide any officers for the campus of Ben Gamla Charter School on August 14 through 16, and August 26, 2019. A Plantation Police Department Officer was provided to Ben Gamla Charter School for half a day on August 19, 2019, and an officer from the Broward County Sheriff's Office provided coverage for August 27, 2019. The School Board did not designate, assign, or provide any safe-school officers at Championship for the 2019-2020 school year. Championship timely filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearings with the School Board, requesting an administrative hearing on the School Board's immediate termination of its charter. The School Board referred Championship's request for hearing to DOAH on September 11, 2019. Findings of Fact Based on Evidence at Final Hearing Safe-School Officer Statute In response to the tragic school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School that occurred on February 14, 2018, the Florida Legislature enacted the Marjorie Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, a portion of which is codified at section 1006.12, the statute titled "Safe-school officers at each public school." Certain provisions of section 1006.12 have given rise to the matters in dispute in these consolidated proceedings. School Board Communications and Actions Regarding Charter School Compliance with Section 1006.12 On or about March 8, 2019, the Florida Department of Education ("DOE") contacted the School Board, requesting information regarding the status of compliance, by all public schools in the Broward County Public Schools District ("District"), including charter schools, with the statutory requirement in section 1006.12 for a safe-school officer to be present at each school. The request set a March 22, 2019, deadline for each school in the District, including charter schools, to provide that information to DOE. The School Board contacted all charter schools in the District, requesting that they provide the information requested by DOE by March 22, 2019. Championship did not provide the requested information by that date. The amendments to section 1006.12 enacted as part of SB 7030 became law on May 8, 2019. On May 15, 2019, Katz conducted an informational meeting with charter school personnel to inform them of the requirements of newly- amended section 1006.12, and to provide instructions to upload compliance documentation into the Charter.Tools application. Dupell attended the meeting. On June 28, 2019, Commissioner of Education Richard Corcoran sent a letter (the "Corcoran Letter") to the representatives of charter schools regarding compliance with newly-amended section 1006.12. The letter provided information regarding the options for meeting the requirement to have at least one safe-school officer present on campus while school is in session. The Corcoran Letter particularly addressed the expanded school guardian option codified at section 1006.12(3), and the new school security guard option codified at section 1006.12(4). The letter stated, in pertinent part: [E]very public elementary, middle, and high school in Florida, including all Florida charter schools, must have a Safe-School Officer (SSO) physically present on each campus while school is in session. . . . All charter schools without current [safe-school officer] coverage have until August 1 to come into compliance for the 2019-2020 school year For those charter schools that choose to treat our requests for information as optional, our only option going forward will be to use the full extent of the law to ensure compliance. On July 9, 2019, Katz and Leslie Brown, the School Board's Chief Portfolio Officer, issued a memorandum directed to the charter schools in the District. The memorandum stated: "[t]he statute requires each charter school to implement one of the safe-school officer options." The memorandum listed the options and explained that the first three options, with some legislative revisions, had been available to charter schools in the 2018-2019 school year. The memorandum further stated: [t]he School Board has taken no action to deny any charter school access to any of the safe-school officer options summarized above and more fully detailed in [s]ection 1006.12, Florida Statutes." Citing the Corcoran Letter, the memorandum stated, in boldface type: If one of the Safe[-]School Officer options is not confirmed by your location by August 1st,[2019,]such facts and circumstances will be considered by your charter school sponsor to present an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of your charter school's students. Please be advised that, under those circumstances, the school district will request the School Board of Broward County, Florida, to "use the full extent of the law[,]" as urged by Commissioner Corcoran and immediately terminate your charter agreement pursuant to [s]ection 1002.33(8)(c), Florida Statutes. July 9, 2019, memorandum, Exhibit JE-4 (emphasis added). From this memorandum, it is apparent that the School Board interpreted the phrase "use the full extent of the law," as referenced in the Corcoran Letter, to mean immediately terminating a noncompliant charter school's charter. In so stating, the School Board was not merely following guidance set forth in the Corcoran Letter—which did not mention immediate termination of a charter as a sanction for noncompliance with section 1006.12—but, instead, was articulating its own sanction, which it would impose for noncompliance with section 1006.12.7 The memorandum further stated: "[p]lease upload into Charter.Tools, under the benchmark entitled Senate Bill 7030, the attached form and pertinent documentation that confirms that your implemented Safe[-]School Officer option is in compliance with [s]ection 1006.12, Florida Statutes, for the 2019-2020 school year. This documentation is due by August 1, 2019." On July 31, 2019, the School Board sent a follow-up email to the principals of the charter schools in the District, reminding them of the August 1, 2019, deadline. 7 To this point, in response to an email from Broward County Public Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie dated August 15, 2019, Corcoran counseled against immediate charter termination to sanction noncompliant charter schools, recommending instead that the District take immediate steps to provide safe-school officer coverage at a noncompliant charter school, followed by steps to ensure that the school maintained coverage and implemented a long term solution. The School Board conducted another meeting with charter school principals on August 1, 2019, at which Katz highlighted the four safe-school officer options available under section 1006.12, and reminded the charter school principals of the School Board's position that charter schools were solely responsible for establishing and assigning one or more safe-school officers for their campuses. Championship did not meet the August 1, 2019, deadline to upload the safe-school officer documentation into Charter.Tools. Katz testified at the final hearing that the School Board did not establish or assign any safe-school officers at any charter schools in the District, including Championship, in the 2019-2020 school year. Actions Taken by Championship Regarding Safe-School Officer Requirement in 2019-2020 School Year On Friday, August 2, 2019, Linda Williamson, office manager for Championship, emailed Lieutenant Patricia Ravine of the Davie Police Department regarding obtaining a school guardian while Championship's security guard was in training to become certified as a School Guardian. Ravine told her that the Broward County Sheriff's Office ("BSO") was in the process of developing the guardian program, and that the Davie Police Department had a contract with the School Board for all 13 of its school resource officers to be assigned to the 12 traditional public schools in Davie. Ravine suggested that Championship contact a security agency, and she also suggested, as an alternative to a temporary guardian, that Championship secure the services of a Davie Police Department private duty detail officer. On or about Friday, August 9, 2019, Championship submitted a Private Duty Detail Application ("Application") to the Davie Police Department, requesting private duty detail officer coverage for Championship from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. for each school day, beginning on August 14, 2019, and ending on September 28, 2019. Private duty detail coverage consists of voluntary coverage by off-duty police officers whose presence is not guaranteed by the police department. To that point, the Application states, in pertinent part: "[e]very reasonable effort will be made to fill the detail request, but there is no guarantee that it will be filled. Members of the Davie Police Department, who are authorized to work Private Duty Detail, do so voluntarily during their off duty hours." The first day of the 2019-2020 school year for District schools, including Championship, was August 14, 2019. On August 14, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not send a private duty detail police officer to provide safe-school officer services to Championship, and Championship did not have any other persons qualified under any of the safe-school officer options in section 1006.12 present on its campus that day. On August 14, 2019, Championship did have present on its campus an armed security guard, Steven Carbone, who Championship had hired to provide school safety services on its campus. Although Carbone had not yet completed the school guardian training program, he met the other safe-school officer requirements set forth in section 1006.23, including having completed a psychological evaluation which indicated that he was suitable for the position, and holding Class D and Class G licenses under chapter 493, Florida Statutes. Additionally, Carbone was trained regarding domestic and foreign terrorism, explosives, improvised explosive devise recognition, and identification of hazardous materials. Detra Adams, Curriculum Supervisor of Secondary Literacy for the District, visited Championship's campus on August 14, 2019. She did not view a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12 on Championship's campus that day. However, she did observe a person at the front desk wearing a security uniform and bearing a firearm. That person ultimately was identified as Carbone. Adams met with Dupell, who told her that Championship had procured the service of an armed security guard (Carbone) who was present on campus that day. Dupell acknowledged that Championship had not submitted the required documentation to the District to have an armed security guard on campus. He told Adams that Carbone was registered for a school guardian training program8 and that once he completed the training, Championship would submit the certification documents to the District. Dupell also told Adams that Championship had arranged for a Davie private duty detail police officer to be present at the school on some, but not all, school days. On August 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not send a private duty detail police officer to provide safe-school officer services to Championship, but did send an on-duty police officer who arrived shortly before the end of the school day. Donte´ Fulton-Collins, Director of the Charter Schools Management Support Department for the District, visited Championship's campus on August 15, 2019, and did not observe a safe-school officer meeting the requirements of section 1006.12 on campus that day. However, she did observe an armed security guard on that date. That person ultimately was identified as Carbone. Katz, along with Damien Kelly of the DOE Safe Schools Office, visited Championship's campus on August 15, 2019, to discuss with Dupell the need for Championship to secure the services of a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12. At that meeting, Dupell provided documentation to Katz showing that Championship had filed the Application with the Davie Police Department, 8 On July 31, 2019, Championship entered into an agreement with the BSO to provide Carbone training to serve as a safe-school officer pursuant to the Aaron Feis School Guardian option under section 1006.12(3). The training course was only offered every three months, so when Carbone was hired to fill the safe-school officer position at Championship, the soonest he could obtain training by BSO was early September 2019, after the 2019-2020 school year had begun. requesting to have private duty detail officer coverage until Carbone could complete the training to satisfy the requirements for certification as a school guardian under section 1006.12(3). Dupell also provided Katz a list of dates for which Davie Police Department had signed up to provide private duty detail coverage at Championship between August 14 and September 28, 2019. Katz observed that for many of the shifts on school days during that period, no officers had signed up to provide coverage at Championship. In sum, for the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, Championship was not in compliance with section 1006.12 because it did not have present on its campus an individual who met the statutory requirements to serve as a safe-school officer. Championship does not dispute that it was not in compliance with section 1006.12 on those days. For the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, Championship did have an armed security guard, Carbone, who had been hired by Championship specifically to provide school safety services to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its students. As discussed above, although Carbone had not yet been trained as a school guardian, he met the other requirements to be a school guardian. Pursuant to an electronic mail exchange between Championship and Ravine on the afternoon of August 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department guaranteed police officer coverage for Championship's campus, for the full school day, on all the days requested in the Application for which no private duty detail officer had volunteered. Thus, by the afternoon of August 15, 2019, Championship had secured guaranteed police officer coverage from the Davie Police Department—albeit not pursuant to a fully-executed contract. Pursuant to this informal arrangement, a police officer from the Davie Police Department was present and provided safe-school officer services on Championship's campus for the entire school day on August 16 and 19 through 22, 2019. On Wednesday, August 22, 2019, Championship and the Town of Davie, Florida, executed a Safe School Officer Agreement ("SSO Agreement") for a term commencing on August 14, 2019, and ending no more than 90 days later. Article 2 of the SSO Agreement states, in pertinent part, T[own] shall assign a certified police officer to serve as a [Safe School Officer ("SSO")] at the charter school for a period not to exceed the school year [(sic)] to allow C[harter] to otherwise become compliant with the [c]hapter 2019-22, Laws of Florida (2019) . . . . The certified police officer assigned to the school will be working in an overtime capacity. There is no guarantee that the same officer will work at the school on a daily basis. The parties agree that this does not include any after[-]hours activities, sports programs, aftercare, etc. Assignment of SSOs. The Town may change the law enforcement officer assigned to participate as a[n] SSO at any time during the Agreement. Unless precluded by emergency circumstances, the T[own] shall at all times maintain an SSO on duty during those regular school hours. "Regular school hours" shall be defined as the respective [p]articipating school's posted bell schedule. Wherever possible, the T[own] shall assign a replacement SSO during the time that the assigned SSO is absent when students are required to be in attendance during regular school hours. Pursuant to the SSO Agreement, the Town of Davie guaranteed police officer coverage for Championship for every school day during regular school hours, commencing on August 14, 2019, and ending no more than 90 days later. This coverage was to be provided by private duty detail officers when available, and if no private duty detail officers were available, safe-school officer coverage would be provided by an on-duty police officer. Because the SSO Agreement was not fully executed until August 22, 2019, and because no private duty detail officers had volunteered to provide safe-school officer coverage at Championship on August 14 and 15, 2019, the Davie Police Department did not provide coverage on those dates. However, as found above, pursuant to the informal arrangement for private duty detail coverage that Championship had made with the Davie Police Department on August 15, 2019, a Davie police officer was physically present and provided safe-school officer services on Championship's campus on August 16 and 19 through 22, 2019. Thereafter, the Davie Police Department provided safe-school officer services to Championship under the SSO Agreement for the rest of the 2019- 2020 school year, until all District schools were closed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Other School Safety Measures Taken by Championship Cynthia Dotson, Chief Executive Officer of the management company who provides services to small charter schools, including Championship, testified regarding the measures that Championship has implemented on its campus to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its students and staff. The Championship campus is located in a fenced facility within a small business park in a cul-de-sac. The school has one point of ingress and egress for the public, and additional means of ingress and egress for the provision of fire, life, and safety support services. Championship screens persons entering the campus through a software application used to determine whether that person has a criminal record. It also utilizes a video camera system to provide surveillance of the interior and exterior of the campus, an audio communication system consisting of an intercom system and walkie-talkies, and a software application through which faculty members can report suspicious activity to the appropriate authorities. Additionally, Championship has hired a retired SWAT team to train all of its employees to respond to active assailant situations on campus in order to mitigate any threat and prevent injury and loss of life. To this end, Championship conducts monthly code red drills in both the summer months and the school year. Before the 2017-2018 school year, Championship hired a school security guard, Yoan Herrera, to provide school safety services to its campus. Herrera became certified by the BSO on November 15, 2018, to serve as an Aaron Feis Guardian on Championship's campus.9 He provided those services to Championship until approximately mid-March 2019. After Herrera left his position, Championship retained the temporary services of the King Security Agency ("King") to provide school security services while it searched for a replacement school security employee. After an exhaustive search that yielded very few qualified applicants, Championship hired Carbone to fill the school security guard vacancy. Carbone had been an employee of King and had provided school security services to Championship during the last few months of the 2018-2019 school year. As noted above, Carbone's psychological evaluation indicated that he was suited for the position. Additionally, he had training regarding domestic and foreign terrorism, explosives, improvised explosive device recognition, and identification of hazardous materials, and he also held Class D and Class G licenses. After Championship hired Carbone, he was immediately enrolled in the Aaron Feis School Guardian certification program offered by the BSO. However, due to the high demand for such training and limited program 9 Notably, even though Herrera was present on Championship's campus while carrying a firearm for the entire 2017-2018 school year and a portion of the 2018-2019 school year, and for part of that time, provided school security services in a capacity other than as a safe- school officer pursuant to section 1006.12, no evidence was presented at the final hearing showing that the School Board considered Herrera's presence on Championship's campus as constituting a violation of section 790.115(2), warranting immediate termination of Championship's charter. offerings, Carbone was unable to begin the training before early September 2019. Thus, assuming he successfully completed the program, he would not have been certified as a school guardian pursuant to section 1006.12(3) until October 2019. Ultimately, Carbone did not successfully complete the training program. Additionally, on August 19, 2019, Championship hired Andre Chambers to serve as a safe-school officer at its campus. At the time Chambers was hired, he already was certified as an Aaron Feis School Guardian pursuant to section 1006.12(3). He began providing safe-school officer services on Championship's campus in September 2019, and did so until all District schools, including Championship, were closed in March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. School Board's Immediate Termination of Championship's Charter As a result of Championship's failure to have a safe-school officer meeting the requirements of section 1006.12 on its campus on August 14 and 15, 2019, School Board personnel prepared an agenda item recommending immediate termination of the Charter for consideration at the School Board's next regular meeting, scheduled for August 20, 2019. At the final hearing, Brown and Katz testified that the School Board determined that Championship's failure to have, on campus, a safe-school officer who met the requirements of section 1006.12, constituted an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students, which commenced on August 14, 2019, and continued through August 20, 2019, when the School Board immediately terminated Championship's charter. Brown acknowledged that the School Board was aware that as of August 16, 2019, Championship had a police officer from the Davie Police Department physically present on its campus. She testified that this did not change the School Board's position that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare to Championship's students existed. As she put it: [t]he services were piecemeal, there was nothing that we could depend on, nothing had been established and nothing had been assigned. . . . There was no evidence that [having a Davie police officer on campus] was going to be the case as each—each minute or hour or day that was going to continue. Katz and Brown also testified that the School Board interpreted section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place a fully-executed contract for a safe-school officer in order to meet the statute's requirement that a safe-school officer be "established and assigned" to the school. To this point, Katz testified that having a Davie Police Department police officer present on campus would not, by itself, meet the safe-school officer requirement, because an executed contract "establishing" the presence of the officer also is required by the statute. He stated: "I believe both things are necessary, the agreement and presence. A fully[-]executed contract and presence [J]ust to be clear, a contract that states that there will be coverage, not a contract that says there may be coverage."10 Katz and Brown also testified that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as placing the responsibility solely on the charter school to secure a safe-school officer for its campus. To this point, Katz testified that the School Board has "always believed that they [charter schools] were responsible for . . . assigning or establishing a safe school officer for every one of their schools." 10 In the stipulated facts set forth above, Katz stated, in response to a question from a School Board member at the August 20, 2019, meeting, that if Championship had a law enforcement officer present on its campus on that day, it was in compliance with section 1006.12. At the final hearing, Katz testified at the final hearing that this statement assumed the existence of a fully-executed contract on that date. As discussed above, the evidence establishes that the SSO Agreement was not fully executed until August 22, 2019. Brown testified that the School Board views Florida law as prohibiting the District from assigning a safe-school officer to a charter school. To that point, she testified that if a charter school wished to secure the services of a school resource officer under section 1006.12(1) to meet the safe-school officer requirement, the charter school would have to directly contract with the law enforcement agency to do so.11 Further to this point, Katz testified that the School Board did not have the authority to assign a law enforcement officer whose services are contracted by the District to provide safe-school officer coverage on a charter school's campus.12 Both Brown and Katz testified that the School Board met the requirement in section 1006.12 to "collaborate with charter school governing boards to facilitate charter school access to all safe-school officer options available" by providing information, presentations, and training to charter schools regarding the statute's safe-school officer requirements and available options for meeting those requirements. Katz acknowledged at the final hearing that Championship having an armed security guard who was not a safe-school officer present on its campus to provide school security services did not pose an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship. Fulton-Collins testified that she assisted in preparing the School Board agenda item recommending the immediate termination of Championship's charter because, as she put it: 11 Section 1006.12(1), establishing the school resource officer option, states: "A school district may establish school resource officer programs through a cooperative agreement with law enforcement agencies." § 1006.12(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). Notably absent from this provision is language authorizing charter schools to do so. 12 Section 1002.33(12)(a) states: "A charter school shall select its own employees. A charter school may contract with its sponsor for the services of personnel employed by the sponsor." § 1002.33(12)(a)(emphasis added). This provision appears to authorize a school board to contract with a charter school to establish or assign a safe-school officer at the charter school, pursuant to a partnership between the school board and a law enforcement agency or security agency as provided in the first sentence of section 1006.12. all charter schools must be in compliance with any requirements that the Legislature has deemed to be necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the students. The Legislature specifically found in section 1006.12 . . . that the establishment or assignment of a safe school officer on a charter school campus is necessary for the protection of school personnel, property, students, and visitors. And by failing to do so, failing to establish and assign a safe school officer on the campus, Championship created an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, and welfare of its students. Fulton-Collins testimony, T. Vol. I, p. 192. Fulton-Collins acknowledged that section 1006.12 does not expressly state that charter schools are responsible for establishing and assigning their own safe-school officers.13 However, she maintained that charter schools are solely responsible for establishing and assigning safe-school officers for their own campus, and that the School Board's duty is "not impeding [them] on any opportunity that they have to secure a safe-school officer." Broward County Public Schools Superintendent Robert Runcie confirmed that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as placing the sole responsibility on charter schools to secure their own safe-school officers. To this point, Runcie testified: " [j]ust as we [the District] go and secure [safe- school officers], by any means necessary, to have them on our campuses, [charter schools] are also required to go and use whatever means they can to secure them." Runcie also confirmed the School Board's position, articulated by Katz and Brown, that for charter schools to be in compliance with section 1006.12, a person meeting the requirements of one of the safe-school officer options 13 Notably, during the 2019 Legislative Session, the Legislature expressly rejected an amendment to SB 7030 that would have amended the first sentence of section 1006.12 to also require "charter schools, as applicable" to establish and assign one or more safe-school officers at its school facility. must be physically present on the school campus for the entire school day, and a fully-executed contract must exist, guaranteeing the presence of the safe-school officer on the campus each school day, for the full term of the contract.14 Runcie testified that the School Board interprets the terms "establish and assign" to require that both of these conditions be met for the charter school to be in compliance with section 1006.12. He acknowledged that section 1006.12 does not expressly state that a fully-executed contract is required for compliance with the statute.15 To this point, he testified: [t]he statute, itself, may not specify a contract. It says what you are required to do. And the reason why it doesn't specify a contract is that there are several means to do it. There are some school districts, like Miami, I believe Palm Beach may be similar, but there's a handful of them where they actually have their own police force. So they're not going to have a contract in order to meet that[.] So the legislation is not going to be that specific because there's varying ability in how school districts and charter schools go about securing safe- school officers. So it wouldn't have that . . . degree of specificity. Runcie testimony T., Vol. II, pp. 44-45. Further to this point, Runcie testified: It [(the statute)] doesn't specifically require that, but the—so, again, the statute speaks to multiple 14 Runcie testified that in the School Board's view, section 1006.12 does not require an executed long term contract, such as a school-year-long contract, securing safe-school officer services; rather, the School Board interprets the statute as requiring a fully-executed contract that guarantees continuous presence of a safe-school officer on campus for the duration of the contract's term, whatever that term is. 15 See paragraph 243, below. To the extent a statute does not specify the precise means by which it is to be implemented, rulemaking may be necessary in order for an agency to implement the statute. See § 120.52(16), Fla. Stat. (defining "rule" as a statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the procedure or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any requirement or solicits information not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule). avenues, multiple ways of securing a safe-school officer. A couple of those don't require a contract. Again, if you have your own police force or you're using an armed guardian. So, for example, we actually have some schools that we have put in our detectives from our school investigative unit when we needed to. So we have 15, 20 police officers, if you will. So some districts, their whole entire system, they have their own police department. Or you can hire an individual, put him through the guardian program, have them become certified. Outside of doing those two things you would actually have to have a contract or some types of established agreement, an arrangement to be able to fulfill that. Runcie testimony, T. Vol. II, pp. 58-59. The School Board terminated Championship's charter on August 20, 2019, because Championship did not have a safe-school officer present on its campus for the first two days of the 2019-2020 school year, and because as of August 20, 2019, Championship did not have a fully-executed contract with the Town of Davie guaranteeing the presence of a police officer to serve as a safe-school officer on Championship's campus; thus, the School Board considered these circumstances to constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship, warranting immediate termination of the charter pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). Safety-Related Circumstances on Championship's Campus in the 2019- 2020 School Year Three parents of students who attended Championship in the 2019-2020 school year testified regarding the safety-related circumstances on Championship's campus at the beginning of the school year leading up to the School Board's termination of Championship's charter on August 20, 2019. Specifically, Anne-Valerie Daniel-Laveus, the mother of three students enrolled at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year and a teacher at Championship during that school year, testified that she observed a school security guard present at the school every day. In her experience as a teacher at Championship and as a mother whose children were enrolled there, she perceived conditions at Championship as being safe. To that point, no other parents or students relayed to her any concerns they had regarding safety at Championship at any time during the 2019-2020 school year, including on August 14 through 20, 2019. She was not aware of any incidents, threats, or weapons-related incidents having taken place at Championship at any time during the 2019-2020 school year. Sandra Acosta, the mother of a student enrolled at Championship, testified that she took her child to school daily during the 2019-2020 school year, that she always saw a security guard present on campus when she did so. She always felt that her child was safe at Championship, and that she was not aware of any incidents in which the safety of the students at Championship was threatened. Melissa Bustamante, the mother of two students enrolled at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year and a member of Championship's governing board since 2011, also testified regarding conditions at Championship during the 2019-2020 school year, including on the school days between August 14 and 20, 2019. Specifically, when she took her children to school, she always observed a security guard at the front of the school, which is the only publicly-accessible entrance to the school facility. She was not aware of any bomb threats, weapons threats, or trespassing by unauthorized persons on Championship's campus during the 2019-2020 school year, nor was she aware of any parents of Championship students having expressed concerns regarding safety-related matters at the school during the 2019-2020 school year. As a member of Championship's governing board, she verified that the school had secured the presence of a Davie police officer on campus before, and for some time after, the charter was terminated, and also had secured a school guardian (Chambers) to serve as a safe-school officer for the remainder of the 2019-2020 school year. No evidence was presented showing that there were any actual or imminent threats or dangers to the health, safety, or welfare of the students at Championship on any school days between August 14 and 20, 2019. Additionally, no evidence was presented showing that the presence of Carbone, who had been hired by Championship specifically to provide school safety and security services and who provided those services, presented a threat or danger to the students at Championship on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019. To the contrary, the witnesses who observed Carbone testified that he was at the front entrance to the school performing his school protection duties. None of them testified that they perceived him as a threat or saw him threatening or endangering the students, and all of them testified that his presence was one reason they perceived Championship's school campus as being safe. Additionally, as noted above, Katz conceded at the final hearing that Championship's having an armed security guard on campus to provide school security services on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019, did not present an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students. Championship's Standing The School Board took action on August 20, 2019, to immediately terminate Championship's charter, pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). Although the School Board subsequently operated Championship for the 2019-2020 school year while these proceedings were pending, if the School Board were to prevail in Case No. 19-4818, Championship's charter would be permanently terminated and the charter school could no longer operate. Thus, the School Board's immediate termination of Championship's charter has caused Championship to suffer an immediate, direct injury that is within the scope of these proceedings, which are brought under sections 1002.33 and 1006.12. Additionally, as discussed below, the School Board applied unadopted rules to Championship in these proceedings to terminate its charter. Findings of Ultimate Fact Immediate Termination of Charter under Section 1002.33(8)(c) Championship's Noncompliance with Section 1006.12 did not Cause Immediate and Serious Danger to Its Students Pursuant to the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the School Board did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students was in existence on August 20, 2019, when it immediately terminated Championship's charter. The School Board contends that Championship's failure to have present on its campus a person who met the statutory qualifications for serving as a safe-school officer on August 14 and 15, 2019, coupled with its failure to have a fully-executed contract securing the services of a safe-school officer for Championship by August 20, 2019, constituted an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students warranting immediate termination of its charter, pursuant to section 1002.33(8)(c). However, the School Board presented no evidence of any particular facts and circumstances showing that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students was in existence on August 20, 2019—whether due to Championship's failure to have a person on campus who met the statutory qualifications for serving as a safe-school officer plus a fully-executed contract securing the services of a safe-school officer for Championship, or for any other reason. To that point, there was no evidence presented showing that there were any threats or actions constituting a threat—such as bomb threats, trespassing by unauthorized persons, armed persons presenting a danger or threat, or any other circumstances on Championship's campus that existed on August 20, 2019—or on any other school day in the 2019-2020 school year, for that matter. To the contrary, Championship presented the testimony of three witnesses stating that to their knowledge, there had been no threat or danger whatsoever to Championship's students at any time during the 2019-2020 school year, including on the school days before and including August 20, 2019. Each of these witnesses was in a position to have personally known whether, or be informed if, there had been any actual, immediate threat or danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students. The very most that may be inferred from the evidence is that not having a person who was qualified as a safe-school officer on campus may have presented a potential threat to Championship's students on August 14 and 15, 2019. However, even such a potential threat—to the extent it may have existed—was substantially diminished by the presence of a trained, armed security guard who had been hired specifically to provide protection to the students, faculty, and staff on campus, and who had satisfied most of the requirements, including the psychological evaluation, to become certified as a school guardian. Further, starting on August 16, 2019, a Davie police officer was present and provided safe-school services on Championship's campus every day for the rest of the school year, including on August 20, 2019, when the School Board immediately terminated Championship's charter. There is no dispute that these law enforcement police officers met the qualifications expressly stated in section 1006.12 to serve as safe-school officers. Therefore, as of August 16, 2019, the only remaining ground for the School's Board's conclusion that an immediate and serious danger existed on Championship's campus warranting immediate termination of its charter was that a contract securing the guaranteed presence of a safe-school officer on Championship's campus had not yet been fully executed. However, no evidence was presented showing that Championship's failure to have a fully-executed contract for a safe-school officer constituted any danger—much less an immediate and serious danger—to its students. Accordingly, there was no factual or circumstantial basis for finding that an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students existed on August 20, 2019, when its charter was terminated. Based on the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence failed to establish the existence of an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students on August 20, 2019, as a result of Championship not having a safe-school officer on August 14 and 15, 2019. Additionally, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the evidence failed to establish the existence of an immediate and serious danger to Championship's students on August 20, 2019 (or on August 14 through 16, and 19, 2019), as the result of Championship not yet having secured a fully- executed contract guaranteeing the presence of a safe-school officer on Championship's campus. Presence of Armed Security Guard Did Not Constitute an Immediate and Serious Danger As previously discussed, no evidence was presented showing that Carbone presented any threat or danger to the students at Championship on August 14 through 16, 19, or 20, 2019. The witnesses who observed him on those days testified that he performed his school protection duties, and he did not threaten or endanger Championship's students. Additionally, the evidence establishes that the school security and protection services that Carbone provided on Championship's campus on these days were school-sanctioned activities. To that point, Championship hired Carbone for the specific purpose of providing school security services to its students. As such, Carbone was given express permission by Championship's governing board to be on campus specifically to provide school security services to enable and support school-related activities. Based on the foregoing, it is found, as a matter of ultimate fact, that the presence of the armed security guard on Championship's campus on August 14 through 16, 19, and 20, 2019, did not constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship's students warranting the immediate termination of its charter under section 1002.33(8)(c). Unadopted Rules Applied to Championship to Terminate Charter Section 120.57(1)(e)1. states, in pertinent part: "[a]n agency or administrative law judge may not base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule." This provision prohibits an ALJ or an agency from basing agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule. Because this statute is directed at, and specifically circumscribes, the authority of the ALJ, or the agency, as applicable, neither the ALJ nor the agency is authorized to base agency action on an unadopted rule, regardless of whether a party has alleged that a particular agency statement constitutes an unadopted rule. The evidence establishes that in immediately terminating Championship's charter, the School Board determined Championship's substantial interests based on two unadopted rules. Unadopted Rule Interpreting Section 1002.33(8)(c) The evidence shows that the School Board has determined that the failure of a charter school (in this case, Championship) to have, on campus, a safe-school officer who meets the requirements of section 1006.12, to constitute an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students, warranting immediate termination of the school's charter. In so determining, the School Board has interpreted section 1002.33(8)(c)—specifically, the first sentence of that statute16—to define a charter school's failure to comply with section 1006.12 as per se constituting an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the school's students. This interpretation ascribes a meaning to the first sentence of section 1002.33(8)(c) that is not readily apparent from the literal reading of the statute. Indeed, the first sentence of that section specifically speaks to the "particular facts and circumstances" showing that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students exists. Thus, the statute's plain language requires that the particular facts and circumstances of each particular case be considered to determine whether those particular facts and circumstances constitute an immediate and serious danger that exists at the time the charter is immediately terminated. Nowhere does the statute's plain language speak to, or authorize, a school board to formulate a categorical determination that a defined set of facts and circumstances—here, noncompliance with section 1006.12—per se constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the charter school's students. It is indisputable that the School Board's interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) requires compliance and has the direct and consistent effect of law. This interpretation requires a charter school to comply with section 1006.12—including all of the interpretive gloss the School Board has placed on that statute by imposing the requirement that a fully-executed safe-school officer contract be in place to be in compliance—or face having its charter immediately terminated on the basis of such noncompliance. 16 The first sentence of section 1002.33(8)(c) states: "[a] charter may be terminated immediately if the sponsor sets forth in writing the particular facts and circumstances indicating that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students exists." § 1002.33(8)(c), Fla. Stat. The evidence also establishes that the School Board uniformly applies this interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) to all charter schools in the District. Therefore, the School Board's interpretation of section 1002.33(8)(c) to determine that a charter school's noncompliance with section 1006.12 per se constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of the charter school's students is a rule. This interpretation has not been adopted as rule pursuant to section 120.54, and, thus, constitutes an unadopted rule, as defined in section 120.52(20). The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship to determine that an immediate and serious danger to the health, safety, or welfare of Championship student's was in existence on August 20, 2019, such that its charter must be terminated. Unadopted Rule Interpreting Section 1006.12 The evidence also establishes that the School Board interprets section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place, at the time the school is in session, a fully-executed contract with an appropriate safe-school officer entity, guaranteeing that a safe-school officer will be present on the school's campus for the entire school day for the specified term of the contract.17 Nowhere in the plain language of section 1006.12 is there an express requirement for a charter school to have a fully-executed contract for safe- school officer services in order to be in compliance with the statute. Thus, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 imposes a requirement that is not apparent from the literal reading of the statute. 17 Runcie, Katz, and Brown each testified that a fully-executed contract is necessary for a charter school to meet the statutory requirement that a safe-school officer be "established and assigned" to the school. This interpretation of section 1006.12 requires compliance and has the direct and consistent effect of law. Specifically, it requires a charter school to either have a fully-executed contract for safe-school officers in place by the time school is in session, or face having its charter immediately terminated on the basis of such alleged noncompliance. The evidence also shows that the School Board uniformly applies this interpretation of section 1006.12 to all charter schools in the District. Therefore, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 as requiring a charter school to have in place, at the time the school is in session, a fully-executed contract with an appropriate entity that guarantees that a safe-school officer will be present on the school's campus for the entire school day for the specified term of the contract, is a rule. This interpretation has not been adopted as rule pursuant to section 120.54, and, thus, constitutes an unadopted rule, as defined in section 120.52(20). The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship to determine that Championship was not in compliance with section 1006.12 on August 20, 2019, such that an immediate and serious danger to its students was in existence on that date, warranting immediate termination of its charter. Alleged Unadopted Rules Challenged under Section 120.56(4) Championship alleges that in immediately terminating its charter, the School Board has formulated and applied two agency statements which constitute unadopted rules. As articulated in the Rule Challenge Petition, these statements are: "[T]he School Board's unadopted policy that it is not legally required to provide safe-school officers to charter public schools within its borders"; and "[T]he School Board's policy of failing to collaborate with charter schools to facilitate access to safe-school officers pursuant to section 1006.12. . . by directing charter schools to either comply with the statute or risk having their charters terminated." Each of these alleged unadopted rules is separately addressed. Alleged Unadopted Rule that School Board is not Legally Required to Provide Safe-School Officers to Charter Schools in the District The School Board takes the position that it is not required by section 1006.12 to establish or assign safe-school officers to charter schools in the District, and that the responsibility for securing a safe-school officer for a charter school rests solely with the charter school itself. To this point, the School Board contends that the only circumstance under which it ever would be required to assign a safe-school officer to a charter school is if it denied the charter school access to a safe-school officer—which the School Board claims means actively preventing a charter school from securing a safe-school officer, and then declares it has not done so.18 As more fully discussed below, the School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 ascribes a meaning to the statute that is not readily apparent from a reading of the statute's plain language. Further, the School Board's interpretation requires compliance and has the force and effect of law because it directs charter schools to secure their own safe-school officers and imposes the penalty of charter termination for failure to do so. . The School Board's interpretation of section 1006.12 is applied to every charter school in the District, and, thus, is a statement of general applicability. Therefore, the School Board's statement that it is not required to establish and assign safe-school officers to charter schools except when it has affirmatively prevented a charter school from securing a safe-school officer, is an unadopted rule. 18 The July 9, 2019, memorandum from Brown and Katz to charter school principals states, in pertinent part: "The School Board of Broward County has taken no action to deny any charter school access to any of the safe-school officer options summarized above and more fully detailed in [s]ection 1006.12." The School Board applied this unadopted rule to Championship such that it did not assign a safe-school officer to its campus for the 2019-2020 school year. This led to the School Board determining Championship noncompliant with section 1006.12 and immediately terminating its charter on that basis. Alleged Unadopted Rule that School Board has a Policy of Failing to Collaborate to Facilitate Charter School Access to Safe-School Officers Championship also alleges that "the School Board has a policy of failing to collaborate with charter schools to facilitate access to safe-school officers pursuant to section 1006.12. . . by directing charter schools to either comply with the statute or risk having their charters terminated." By casting the alleged agency statement in these terms, Championship effectively asserts that by not establishing and assigning safe- school officers to charter schools, the School Board has a policy of "failing to collaborate" with charter schools in direct contravention of the second sentence in section 1006.12. The evidence does not show that the School Board has a policy of "failing to collaborate" with charter schools—which would be tantamount to the School Board having a policy of purposefully violating the statute. Rather, as more fully discussed below, the evidence shows that the School Board interprets the phrase "collaborate to facilitate" to mean that it is only required to communicate with charter schools and inform them regarding the safe-school officer requirements of section 1006.12, and to require them to provide documentation showing compliance.19 Championship disputes the correctness of this interpretation, and contends that instead, this phrase means that the School Board must 19 Championship has not challenged the School Board's interpretation of the phrase "collaborate to facilitate" as an unadopted rule in this proceeding. establish and assign a safe-school officer to each charter school if the charter school so chooses.20 Based on the evidence, and for the reasons more fully discussed below, it is determined that the School Board's alleged policy of "failing to collaborate" to facilitate charter school access to safe-school officers is not an unadopted rule. The School Board did not present evidence showing that to the extent the alleged agency statements constituted rules, rulemaking was not feasible or practicable, as provided in section 120.54(1)(a)1. and 2.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether a district school board is entitled to suspend for 30 workdays, without pay, a paraprofessional for just cause based upon the allegation that he kicked an autistic student and struck the student with an umbrella.
Findings Of Fact Background The Miami-Dade County School Board ("School Board"), Petitioner in this case, is the constitutional entity authorized to operate, control, and supervise the Miami-Dade County Public School System. As of the final hearing, Respondent Robert Blanc ("Blanc") had worked in the Miami-Dade County Public School System for more than 20 years. During the 2006-07 school year, and at all times relevant to this case, Blanc was employed as a therapeutic paraprofessional at South Miami Senior High School, where he provided educational services to students with disabilities. The alleged incident giving rise to this case occurred on Friday, October 12, 2007. The School Board alleges that on that date, at approximately 2:30 p.m., Blanc kicked an autistic student named C. R. in the leg, and then used his umbrella to strike C. R. on the arm. This allegation is based on the accusations of two purported eyewitness (hereafter, collectively, the "Accusers")——Julie Ann Rodriguez and Nemy Aimable——both of whom were (and as of the final hearing continued to be) education paraprofessionals working at South Miami Senior High School. Blanc consistently has maintained his innocence, denying that he kicked or struck C. R. as charged. Moreover, he claims——and testified at hearing——that C. R. kicked him, and that he (Blanc) then used verbal commands to redirect C. R. and get the student to sit down, thereby protecting himself and others. This case boils down to a credibility contest between the Accusers and Blanc. If the Accusers' account is truthful and accurate, then Blanc is guilty of at least one of the charges against him and should be disciplined. On the other hand, if Blanc's account is believed, then he is not guilty of misconduct. Given that the credibility determination drives the outcome, the undersigned will first, as a predicate to evaluating the evidence, set forth the competing accounts of the incident in question, and then make determinations, to the extent possible, as to what might have happened. It is important to note, however, that unless otherwise specifically stated, the findings in the next two sections merely report what the respective witnesses said occurred; these do not necessarily correspond to the undersigned's findings about what likely took place on October 12, 2007. The Accusers' Story While the respective accounts of Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable concerning the incident in question differ as to some nontrivial details, they agree on the big picture. Their story begins at about 2:30 on a Friday afternoon. The Accusers were on "bus duty," as were other staff members, as was Blanc. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were sitting next to one another on a wall or ledge overlooking a field of grass that lay between them and the road where a line a buses stood waiting for children to clamber aboard. This was a busy time of day, and many people were moving about the bus loading area. Sitting on the long wall with the Accusers were a number of other school employees——at least 25 teachers and aides in all, maybe more, Ms. Rodriguez recalled (and the undersigned finds). Blanc, however, was not sitting on the wall; he was standing on the grass, among the students. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were engaged in conversation, when suddenly each noticed Blanc——who was located about 10 feet in front of them——kick C. R. on the leg and strike the student with an umbrella across the upper body. Ms. Rodriguez recalls that C. R. was sitting down on a ledge, near other faculty members, when Blanc attacked. Mr. Aimable, in contrast, remembers C. R. standing in the grass when Blanc struck. According to Ms. Rodriguez, Blanc yelled at C. R., threatening to "beat up" the student if C. R. ever hit Blanc again. Mr. Aimable does not recall Blanc making such a threat, although he vaguely remembers Blanc uttering something about not letting C. R. get away with hitting him. By their own admissions, which are accepted as credible and found as fact, neither of the Accusers saw anything that transpired between Blanc and C. R. before the alleged battery. The altercation upset Ms. Rodriguez, and she began to cry. She and Mr. Aimable continued talking——but not about the battery they had just witnessed. It is undisputed that neither of them made any attempt to protect C. R. or other students from Blanc; nor did they examine C. R. for injuries or offer any assistance.1 No one else did either. Apparently none of the other staff members on the scene saw Blanc attack C. R., and the Accusers (it is found, again based on undisputed evidence) did not mention to anyone sitting near them on the wall the remarkable event they had seen. About ten minutes later, the Accusers rose from the wall and walked to the office, where they would "sign out" for the day. Blanc's Testimony Blanc, who was on bus duty the afternoon of Friday, October 12, 2007, was standing in the middle of the grassy area near the buses, chatting with another teacher, when he felt a sharp pain in his lower right leg. C. R. had just kicked him hard, without warning, and was now pressing very close, invading his personal space. C. R. is a special education student who has been diagnosed with autism. He is reportedly nonverbal. (C. R. did not appear at the final hearing.) It is an undisputed fact that C. R. has a history of violent and assaultive behavior: he has injured teachers and once broke a bus driver's nose; in addition, he hurt a student by striking her in the stomach. Also material are the undisputed facts that C. R. is an adult- sized male who, at the time of the incident, was 17 years old, stood approximately six feet tall, and weighed about 200 pounds. Blanc, who is blind in one eye, was taken by surprise when C. R. attacked him. Though his hands were full——Blanc was holding a collapsible umbrella in one hand and a coffee mug in the other——he raised his arms to protect his face, yelled at C. R. to sit down, and began backing C. R. toward the ledge, where he could be seated. This approach worked. C. R. sat down, and the situation was defused. At this point, Isidro Alfonso, who is C. R.'s one-on-one paraprofessional, took charge of C. R. Blanc immediately reported to his supervisor, Yvette Williams, that C. R. had kicked him. Ms. Williams was (and as of the final hearing continued to be) a special education teacher at South Miami Senior High School. She, too, was on bus duty that day but had arrived on the scene after the incident took place. Blanc told Ms. Williams that he was going home to put ice on his ankle, which hurt. Ms. Williams saw no need to report the incident because C. R. was known to lash out at teachers and others. Blanc, for his part, declined to make a formal report out of concern for Mr. Alfonso, who, he felt certain, would be disciplined for inattentiveness if the matter were brought to the attention of the administration. Resolutions of Evidential Conflict The competing accounts of what occurred are sufficiently in conflict that both cannot simultaneously be considered fully accurate. The fact-finder's dilemma is that neither account——the Accusers' on the one hand, Blanc's on the other——is inherently incredible, impossible, or patently a fabrication; neither, in short, can be readily or easily dismissed as false. Of course, it is not the School Board's burden to prove to a certainty that its allegations are true, but only that its allegations are most likely true. As the fact-finder, the undersigned therefore must consider how likely it is that the incident took place as described by the respective witnesses. In evaluating the credibility of the witnesses who testified against Blanc, the undersigned has considered the relationship that existed between Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable, as well as their post-incident conduct. As mentioned above, after the incident, the Accusers walked to the office together, arriving at about 2:45 p.m. At some point, they agreed to report what they had observed, namely that Blanc had physically attacked a disabled student. Yet, once the two were in the office, they decided that it was "too busy" there——and so, rather than waiting to be seen, they left after at most ten minutes, without telling anyone in authority that Blanc had (at least as they understood the situation) committed a battery on a minor. This impatience seems a bit strange, given the circumstances. The undersigned supposes that a reasonable school employee, having witnessed an incident as serious as the one the Accusers claim to have seen, would have been insistent about speaking to someone in the administration about it. That the Accusers lacked such persistence does not completely discredit them, but it does raise doubts about their veracity. Leaving the office, Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable walked to the parking lot, got into Ms. Rodriguez's car, and drove off the premises together, around three o'clock. This was not unusual for them: they carpooled to work. Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable were not, in other words, merely co-workers; they were co-workers who spent off-duty time together. The Accusers made two stops on the way home that day, to pick up Ms. Rodriguez's children from their respective schools. Ms. Rodriguez then dropped off Mr. Aimable at his place. By that time, it was about 3:35 p.m. At home, Mr. Aimable continued to stew about the incident, he says, and after about an hour, around 4:30, he called Ms. Rodriguez to ask that she pick him up and return with him to the school to report the matter. According to Mr. Aimable, Ms. Rodriguez assented; she arrived at his residence around 4:50 p.m. From there, they proceeded to the school, where they eventually found an assistant principal, Ms. Tudor. It was now around 5:30 Friday evening, some three hours after the alleged event. Each of the Accusers prepared for Ms. Tudor a written statement about the incident. According to Mr. Aimable, this process took until about 6:45 p.m., at which time the Accusers went home. Later Friday night, at a homecoming dance, Ms. Tudor notified the school's principal, Gilberto Bonce, about the complaint made earlier against Blanc; she also let him know that the Accusers' statements were on his desk. Mr. Bonce took no action that night, however, nor did he do anything in reference to alleged incident over the weekend or during the following Monday, October 15. Curiously, in view of the possibility (if the Accusers were believed) that one of his staff might have committed a crime against a student, Mr. Bonce did not report the matter to the school police until Tuesday, October 16, 2007. All in all, the circumstances——especially the following——give the undersigned reasons to discount the Accusers' testimonies. The failure of Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable to take any immediate action at the scene of the incident not only is inconsistent with their claim to have seen Blanc beat C. R., but also it ensured that there would be no better evidence than their eyewitness accounts of a sudden and unexpected, fast-moving event whose duration can be measured in seconds. Had the Accusers gone to the aid of C. R., as a reasonable, responsible adult in their position should have done, they could have examined him for injuries. If Blanc had given C. R. a hard kick in the leg and struck him with an umbrella, the blows likely would have left at least a red mark somewhere on the student's body. Mr. Aimable, for example, could have studied such a mark or welt, not for a moment, but long enough to form a firm, lasting impression, one less subject to misinterpretation or distortion than the mental image left behind after catching a fleeting glimpse of activity that occurred unexpectedly in his field of vision, while focused on something else. Testimony about such an injury would have been compelling. But there was none. The Accusers' decision not to report the incident immediately because it was too "busy" in the office is inconsistent with the gravity of the alleged misconduct. But more than that, because Ms. Rodriguez and Mr. Aimable left the premises together before telling anyone about what they claim they saw, the two had ample opportunity to talk privately for a couple of hours——plenty of time to "get their story straight." One does not need to believe that the Accusers consciously intended to harm Blanc to realize that their discussing the incident (which they must have done——after all, they returned to the school on a Friday evening to make a report about it) likely helped them reach a consensus about what had happened, potentially corrupting their memories in the process. The Accusers' respective accounts are not, at bottom, independent accounts, and may, in fact, be dependent on one another.2 Indeed, in this case, one eyewitness might have been more persuasive than these two. Finally, it is significant that, while the incident took place in full view of more than two dozen responsible adults, not one of them intervened——and no one (besides the Accusers) even saw the altercation. To be sure, these facts cut both ways: nobody saw C. R. kick Blanc or intervened to help him either. Nevertheless, as between the competing scenarios, it seems more likely that C. R. was the attacker, rather than the other way around, for at least two reasons. First, C. R. had a history of assaultive behavior whereas Blanc did not. Second, if Blanc were inclined to hit C. R., he likely would have refrained from doing so in broad daylight before an audience of his peers. C. R., on the other hand, being severely autistic and physically aggressive in nature, would not likely have been deterred by the presence of witnesses. Taken as a whole, the evidence is insufficient to establish that, more likely than not, Blanc struck C. R. as alleged. Based on the evidence, the undersigned believes that, as between the two scenarios presented, the incident more likely occurred as Blanc described it; in other words, relative to Accusers' account, Blanc's is more likely true. Accordingly, the undersigned accepts and adopts, as findings of historical fact, the statements made in paragraphs 12 through 15 above. The upshot is that the School Board failed to carry its burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Blanc committed a disciplinable offense. Determinations of Ultimate Fact The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of the offense of violating the School Board's policy against violence and threatening behavior in the workplace. The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of the offense of unseemly conduct. The greater weight of the evidence fails to establish that Blanc is guilty of violating the School Board's Code of Ethics.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board enter a final order exonerating Blanc of all charges brought against him in this proceeding and awarding him the back pay, plus benefits if any, which accrued while he served the previously imposed suspension of 30 workdays. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2009.
Findings Of Fact During the 1985-86 school year, Respondent Francisco Gutierrez was a student in the eighth grade at Rockway Junior High School. Respondent was suspended a total of 38 days during the 1985-86 school year as a result of his defiant and disruptive behavior. Between November 1985 and April 1986 fourteen Student Case Management Referral Forms were written regarding Respondent's behavior by six different teachers. These complaints concerned Respondent's refusal to abide by school rules and involved such conduct as repeatedly refusing to serve detentions, refusal to work in class, preventing other students from working, refusing to sit or stand where instructed to by various teachers, refusal to refrain from talking with other students after being directed to stop talking, playing tackle football, refusal to "dress out" in his physical education class, "blasting" the foghorn during his physical education class, and throwing paper in the classroom. These various incidents resulted in Respondent's numerous indoor and outdoor suspensions. By the end of the third grading period during the 1985-86 school year, Respondent's grades were F3F in Art, D3F in Industrial Education, C2C in Physical Education, F3F in Mathematics, F3F in Language Arts, and F3C in Social Studies. Respondent's only passing grade of "C" in Physical Education was given to him by a teacher who had just taken over teaching that class two weeks earlier. Several conferences with Respondent's parents were held by school personnel during the school year. At those conferences it was learned that Respondent intended to fail in school so that when he was eventually promoted to Coral Park Senior High School, he would be older and physically more mature than others in his class and he would, therefore, be able to excel in sports. Respondent's plan is condoned by his father, and, accordingly, conferences with the parents in an effort to help Respondent were exercises in futility. In April 1986 a conference was held at Rockway Junior High School which culminated in the recommendation that Respondent be transferred into the educational alternative program at J. R. E. Lee which offers smaller classes, behavioral modification, and full-time psychologists. Respondent's own therapist agrees that Respondent is disruptive and disinterested in school and that Respondent could benefit from a more structured educational program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered assigning Respondent Francisco Gutierrez to the educational alternative program at J. R. E. Lee until such time as his performance reveals that he can be returned to the regular school program. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 9th day of September, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of September, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard Britton, Superintendent School Board of Dade County 1410 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Phyllis O. Douglas Assistant Board Attorney Dade County Public Schools 1410 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Frank R. Harder, Esquire Twin Oaks Building, Suite 100 2780 Galloway Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. & Mrs. Eugenio Gutierrez 9570 S.W. 28 Street Miami, Florida 33165
The Issue The ultimate issue in the instant case is whether Respondent should be reassigned from the Dade County School Board's Students at Risk Program at Riviera Middle School to its disciplinary program at J.R.E. Lee Opportunity School.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Respondent is 14 years old. He was born in Cuba. Since his arrival in the United States he has lived in Dade County and attended public school. From the middle of December of 1992, until the reassignment that is the subject of the instant controversy, Respondent was a seventh grade student at Riviera Middle School (hereinafter referred to as "Riviera"), a public school operated by the School Board. Prior to enrolling as a student at Riviera, Respondent attended another School Board-operated middle school. His academic performance at this other school was woeful. During the 1991-92 school year, he received a failing grade in every one of his seventh grade classes, except one, his chorus class, in which he received a D. He thus had to repeat the seventh grade the following school year. Respondent's academic performance failed to improve during the first part of the 1992-93 school year. Riviera has a special program for students who are deemed to be at risk of dropping out of school. The program is called the Students at Risk Program or "SARP." The 85 to 100 students in "SARP" are given more individualized instruction and attention in a smaller class setting than are students at the school who are not in the program. Upon enrolling at Riviera, Respondent was assigned to "SARP." Despite the efforts of the administration at Riviera and his "SARP" teachers, Respondent's poor academic performance continued. Respondent was absent from school a considerable amount of time. When he did attend class, he often came unprepared, did little or no work and slept during the lesson. When he was awake, he frequently disrupted the class by doing such things as tapping on his desk or talking to his classmates. On one occasion, Respondent caused a commotion in class by drawing on his shirt. On another occasion, during a math lesson, he used white out to write on the floor near his desk. Still another time, when students in his math class were being tutored, Respondent pounded on the classroom door and continued to do so despite being told to stop by the teacher tutoring the students. In his physical education class, Respondent bullied smaller students. There was at least one instance where such bullying led to a fistfight during class between Respondent and another student, who was bloodied during the altercation. Respondent's disruptive classroom behavior interfered with his teachers' ability to provide instruction to Respondent and to the other students in the class. Valuable classroom time was wasted in attempting to deal with Respondent's misconduct. Respondent's disruptive conduct was the subject of various written referrals his teachers sent to the school administration. The discipline that Respondent received in response to these referrals included in-school suspension. Respondent, however, refused to meet the requirements of the in-school suspension program and therefore was sent home on outdoor suspension. This occurred on two separate occasions. Respondent's teachers counseled Respondent numerous times. They also met with his mother, who indicated that she would do whatever she could to help modify Respondent's behavior in school. The measures taken, however, were to no avail. Respondent's disruptive classroom conduct persisted. The resources available at Riviera to help modify Respondent's behavior having been exhausted, a decision was made to reassign Respondent to the School Board's disciplinary program at J.R.E. Lee Opportunity School (hereinafter referred to as "Lee"). Lee is better equipped than Riviera to deal with problem students such as Respondent. It has on staff more teachers and counselors per student than does even Riviera's "SARP." Furthermore, unlike Riviera, it has a full-time psychologist on staff. Respondent attended Lee for only approximately 12 or 13 days. His mother refused to allow him to return to the school because she was concerned about his safety. She had information that led her to believe that, in the short time that he had been at the school, he had been assaulted on three separate occasions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Dade County School Board enter a final order approving and upholding Miguel Aguero Lopez's reassignment to the disciplinary program at J.R.E. Lee Opportunity School. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1993.
The Issue Whether just cause exists for Petitioner to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment as a teacher.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Petitioner is a duly-constituted school board charged with operating, controlling, and supervising all free public schools within the Broward County, Florida, pursuant to Florida Constitution Article IX, section 4(b), and section 1012.23, Florida Statutes. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was employed with Petitioner as an exceptional student education ("ESE") teacher at Silver Ridge Elementary School in Broward County, Florida. The Events Giving Rise to this Proceeding Respondent has extensive educational training and experience in working with disabled and special needs students for many years. Respondent worked in the school system in Long Island, New York, as a paraprofessional for an estimated 13 to 14 years. Her duties included working with exceptional students at a cerebral palsy center, where she assisted teachers in changing students' diapers, feeding them, and assisting them in using various types of adaptive equipment. She also taught and tested special needs students having physical disabilities but possessing greater cognitive awareness. At the encouragement of teachers with whom she worked, Respondent pursued and received her bachelor's degree in elementary education in 1999, while continuing to work as a paraprofessional in the school system. Thereafter, she pursued her master's degree while working as a substitute teacher during the school year and as a teacher for summer school during the summer months. Respondent received her master's degree in special education in 2003. Respondent began working as an ESE teacher at Silver Ridge Elementary School in 2003, shortly after she moved to Florida. The allegations giving rise to this proceeding span the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years. During both school years, Respondent's ESE students were disabled and most of them were nonverbal. Petitioner alleges that during both school years, Respondent engaged in physically and verbally aggressive and abusive actions toward students in her classroom in violation of Department of Education rules and Petitioner's policies. The 2011-2012 School Year Background Starting in August of the 2011-2012 school year, paraprofessionals Rostande Cherelus and Cara Yontz were assigned to assist in Respondent's classroom. Cherelus and Yontz both testified that they had a good working relationship with Respondent. However, this testimony is belied by the credible, persuasive evidence establishing that Respondent did not enjoy a smooth working relationship with either of them. The persuasive evidence establishes that the difficulties in Respondent's relationship with both paraprofessionals stemmed from their frequent tardiness, leaving the classroom during instructional time without Respondent's permission, and frequent use of their cell phones in the classroom during instructional time. Respondent let them know on many occasions that this behavior was not acceptable. The persuasive evidence further establishes that neither paraprofessional was particularly cooperative in assisting Respondent in the classroom. For example, when Respondent attempted to engage the participatory-level students in the various learning activities class, the paraprofessionals ——particularly Cherelus——would often respond with what Respondent characterized as "huffing and puffing," rolling of the eyes, crossed arms, and comments questioning the utility of engaging in activities to educate the students because "that kid can't do anything anyway." Respondent credibly testified that when admonished, Cherelus would make statements such as "thank God, God didn't give me a kid like that." Respondent consistently reported the ongoing problems with Cherelus and Yontz to then-Principal Marion Gundling and then-Assistant Principal Saemone Hollingsworth. However, it appears that this effort was in vain. By November 7, 2011, the situation in Respondent's classroom had deteriorated to the point that Respondent requested a meeting with Gundling and Hollingsworth to address the continuing problems with the paraprofessionals. After the November 7, 2011, the situation in Respondent's classroom did not improve. Respondent testified, credibly, that both paraprofessionals continued to be difficult to work with, that there was constant friction in the classroom, and that both paraprofessionals were aware of her lack of satisfaction with their behavior and job performance. They also knew that she communicated her dissatisfaction to the school administration. On December 1, 2011——notably, before Cherelus and Yontz alleged student abuse by Respondent1/——Respondent contacted Gundling and Hollingsworth by electronic mail ("email"), stating "[m]y classroom is an absolute disaster since our meeting." The email described in great detail2/ events, actions by the paraprofessionals, the dysfunctional atmosphere in Respondent's classroom arising from the paraprofessionals' behavior and poor job performance, and Respondent's continued dissatisfaction with them. On December 15, 2011, Yontz filed a written statement with the school administration alleging that Respondent had taken abusive actions toward students D.N. and J.M. Yontz's statement alleged that in October of that year, Respondent had become angry with D.N., screamed at her, and grabbed her hair from behind. The statement also alleged that in October of that year,3/ Respondent punished student J.M. by confining her to the classroom bathroom from 8:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. The statement further alleged that on December 15, 2011, Respondent had become angry with and screamed at student J.M., pushed her face, and attempted to secure J.M's glasses, which were too large for her face, with a rubber band. According to Yontz's statement, Respondent pulled J.M.'s hair, causing her to make noises indicating that she was in pain. Cherelus filed a written statement with the school administration on December 16, 2011, stating that when she had returned from break the previous day, J.M. was upset. According to Cherelus' statement, when she asked J.M. what was wrong, J.M. said "Ms. T. pull" and made a pulling motion while pointing to her glasses. On December 16, 2011, Respondent was removed from her classroom pending an investigation of the allegations against her made by Yontz and Cherelus. Ultimately, the investigation yielded insufficient evidence to support Yontz's and Cherelus' allegations and Petitioner took no disciplinary action against Respondent at that time. She was returned to her classroom in April 2012. Notwithstanding that the investigation absolved Respondent, Petitioner now seeks to take disciplinary action based on these accusations. Allegations in Amended Administrative Complaint In Petitioner's Amended Administrative Complaint filed in this proceeding on April 1, 2014, Petitioner alleges that during the 2011-2012 school year, Respondent engaged in physically and verbally aggressive and abusive acts toward students D.N., J.M., A.S., and C.A., who were assigned to her class. Each of these allegations is addressed below.4/ Student D.N. Petitioner alleges, in paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that in October 2011, Respondent screamed at student D.N. for being unable to complete her work and pulled her hair. At the final hearing, Cherelus and Yontz both testified that one day in the classroom, Respondent grabbed D.N. by her ponytail. However, their testimony is inconsistent regarding key details and circumstances. Cherelus testified that Respondent grabbed D.N. and pulled her up from her chair because she had asked D.N. to get up and go get her classwork, and D.N. did not do so. Cherelus testified that Respondent said something to the effect of "[l]et's go, you don't want to do your work" and pulled D.N. up from her chair by her ponytail, causing D.N. to fall on the floor. Cherelus testified that D.N. screamed and Respondent let her go. Cherelus further testified that Respondent did not scream at D.N. Yontz, on the other hand, testified that Respondent screamed at D.N. because she was not focusing on the classwork in front of her on her desk. Yontz testified that at one point, Respondent grabbed D.N. by the back of the neck and forcefully held her head to keep her facing downward. Yontz testified that Respondent then grabbed and tugged D.N.'s ponytail and pulled her head backward to force her to look at her work. The inconsistencies between the Cherelus' and Yontz's testimony are significant. Cherelus described a situation in which Respondent jerked D.N.'s ponytail to make her get up from her desk, and that as a result, D.N. fell to the floor. However, Yontz described a situation in which D.N. remained seated and Respondent jerked her head backward by her ponytail to make her focus on the work on her desk.5/ Additionally, Yontz testified that Respondent screamed at D.N., while Cherelus specifically stated that she did not scream. Yontz testified that Respondent grabbed the back of D.N.'s neck, while Cherelus did not testify to that effect. Testimony regarding key details and circumstances surrounding the incident is vital to determining credibility in a case such as this, where the witnesses for both parties have differing accounts of the events at issue. Here, due to the inconsistencies in their testimony regarding significant details and circumstances regarding the alleged incident, the undersigned finds neither Cherelus' nor Yontz's testimony persuasive or credible. By contrast, Respondent provided a clear, detailed account of the incident that significantly differed from that provided by Cherelus and Yontz. On the day in question, Respondent was working with D.N., who has a movement-related disability, to direct her to focus on her work. Because of D.N.'s disability, she was easily distracted and often looked around at activity occurring on either side of her. Thus, when Respondent engaged in one-on-one instruction with D.N., she would stand behind D.N. and use a series of voice and gestural commands, verbal and gestural prompts, and physical prompts as necessary, to get D.N. to focus on her work. Pursuant to D.N.'s individual education plan ("IEP"), she had worn a weighted vest to assist her in focusing on her work, but shortly before the incident, her IEP had been amended to no longer include use of the vest, so Respondent had instead begun using physical compression on D.N.'s shoulders, with her thumbs touching the back of her neck, to assist D.N. in focusing. Respondent credibly testified that the compression was slight, not forceful. On the day in question, Respondent used the compression technique but D.N. continued to look around, so Respondent put her hands on the sides of D.N.'s face to focus her to gaze downward at her work. When Respondent removed the compression from D.N.'s shoulders, she popped backward. Respondent credibly testified that she did not pull D.N.'s hair or jerk her head backward by her ponytail. Respondent's account of the incident is credible and persuasive.6/ Further, the timing of Respondent's email communication with Gundling and Hollingsworth is significant to determining the comparative credibility of Respondent, Cherelus, and Yontz. Respondent's December 1, 2011, email to Gundling and Hollingsworth described in significant detail the events and actions that had taken place in Respondent's classroom following her November 7, 2011, meeting with them. Of particular note is Respondent's detailed description of Cherelus' actions on December 1, 2011, toward student D.N.——specifically, that Cherelus pulled D.N's hair and screamed at her. Respondent's email account of that incident, sent on the same day it was alleged to have occurred and describing it in substantial detail, is far more persuasive than both Cherelus' or Yontz's subsequent statements and hearing testimony regarding the incident. The credible, persuasive evidence leads to the inference that as a result of the paraprofessionals' poor relationship with Respondent, they accused her——after she had reported their poor performance——of the very conduct toward student D.N. that Respondent previously reported that Cherelus had committed. This is a far more reasonable inference than the version of events that Petitioner espouses——which would require the undersigned to infer that Respondent somehow knew that she was going to be accused, at a later date, of pulling D.N.'s hair and screaming at her, so she covered herself by preparing and sending the December 1, 2011, email accusing Cherelus of engaging in that same conduct. For these reasons, the undersigned finds the testimony of Cherelus and Yontz regarding the alleged incident involving D.N. incredible and unpersuasive. Conversely, the undersigned finds Respondent's testimony regarding D.N. credible and persuasive. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove the allegations in paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint regarding student D.N. Student J.M. In paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that in October 2011, Respondent confined student J.M. to the classroom restroom from 8:30 a.m. to 1:45 p.m. as punishment for urinating in her pants. Petitioner's direct evidence to support this allegation primarily consisted of Yontz's testimony.7/ According to Yontz, J.M. came to school one morning after having wet her pants the previous day, and Respondent immediately placed her in the classroom restroom, with the door closed, to punish her.8/ Yontz testified that Respondent left J.M. in the restroom by herself with the door closed beginning at 8:30 a.m. until 1:45 p.m., only being allowed to leave the restroom for lunch in the cafeteria. Yontz also testified that because J.M. was confined to Respondent's classroom restroom all day, the other students in Respondent's class had to use the restroom in other classrooms. Cherelus did not testify regarding this alleged incident.9/ Respondent's clear, credible explanation of this incident differed sharply from that provided by Yontz. Because J.M. frequently would urinate in her pants, her mother would send multiple sets of clothing to school so that Respondent could change J.M.'s clothes when this happened. J.M. had urinated on herself the previous day and had gone through her last set of clothing that day, so Respondent sent a note home to J.M.'s mother asking her to send a fresh set of clothing to school the following day. However, when J.M. arrived at school the next day, she had urinated in her pants and her mother had not sent extra clothing. Respondent changed J.M. into a borrowed set of D.N.'s clothing. J.M. again urinated in her pants and at that point, there was no extra clothing in the classroom for J.M. to wear. Respondent sent Cherelus to the school clinic to see if there was extra clothing that J.M. could wear and she also contacted J.M.'s mother to bring clothing to school for J.M. During the time it took for Cherelus to go to the clinic and return with clothing for J.M. to change into, Respondent put J.M. in the restroom. Respondent could not recall the exact amount of time that J.M. was confined to the restroom, but estimated that it was a short amount of time. She credibly testified that J.M. did not spend the entire day confined to the restroom, and that J.M. was not placed in the restroom as punishment, but, rather, to await a change of clothing. J.M.'s mother, Shakima Brown, verified Respondent's account of the incident. Brown testified that Respondent called her on the day in question to request that she bring a change of clothes to the school. Brown lived only ten minutes away, and she directed Respondent to place J.M. in the restroom until she could bring the extra clothing to the school. Brown testified, credibly, that J.M. had never communicated to her that Respondent confined her to the restroom as punishment, and that had that happened, J.M. would have let her know. The credible, persuasive evidence supports Respondent's account of this incident. The undersigned finds Yontz's account of this incident incredible and unpersuasive. Petitioner also alleges, in paragraph 6. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that on December 15, 2011, Respondent verbally abused J.M., slapped her face, and popped her with a rubber band that she had tied to J.M.'s glasses in an effort to keep them on her face. Yontz is the only witness whose testimony Petitioner presented who claimed to have actually seen the incident. Yontz testified that on the day in question, J.M. was attempting to write her name but was unable to do so without making mistakes. According to Yontz, this annoyed Respondent, who screamed at J.M. Yontz testified that J.M.'s glasses kept falling off, so Respondent tied a rubber band on the ends of them to keep them from falling off. However, the rubber band was too tight so kept popping J.M.'s ear, causing her to make noises as if she were in pain. According to Yontz, Respondent pushed J.M.'s face and screamed at her "oh, you're so annoying, you freaking idiot." Yontz testified that Respondent did not slap J.M.'s face.10/ Cherelus' also testified regarding this incident. She testified that on that day, she took J.M. to another classroom, and that as she was doing so, J.M. cried. Cherelus testified that when she asked J.M. what was wrong, J.M. said "Ms. T slapped me" and gestured in a manner that Cherelus interpreted as showing that Respondent had slapped J.M.11/ On cross examination, Cherelus acknowledged that she did not see Respondent slap J.M., pull her hair, or otherwise hurt her. Cherelus further acknowledged that J.M. is largely nonverbal and incapable of articulating sentences, and that she only said "Ms. T." while making a pulling motion. In any event, Cherelus did not have personal, independent knowledge of this alleged incident, and her testimony was based on J.M.'s limited statement and gesture. Maureen McLaughlin, the child abuse designee for Silver Ridge Elementary School, also testified regarding this alleged incident. McLaughlin testified that Yontz brought J.M. to her office,12/ and that at Yontz's prompting, J.M., using a teddy bear, indicated that Respondent had pushed her head using an open hand. McLaughlin testified: [a]nd basically, it's hard to enact, but J. took her hand, sort of open like this, and what I remember is that her head turned, like, she turned her head. So it was hard to tell, like, is it a slap, is it a push, but it was an open hand and her head ended up being turned because of it. McLaughlin reported the incident to the abuse hotline.13/ Respondent provided a credible, persuasive explanation of the incident. She testified that J.M. previously had a pair of glasses that did not fit her and had used a teal elastic band to hold them on her face. At some point, J.M. lost both the elastic band and her glasses, so Respondent contacted J.M.'s mother regarding getting another pair of glasses for J.M.; however, J.M.'s mother told her that they could not afford to purchase another pair of glasses. Respondent gave J.M.'s mother a pair of glasses frames that had belonged to her daughter, and J.M.'s mother had the frames fitted with J.M.'s prescription. However, those glasses also did not fit J.M.'s face and fell off when she looked down. On the day in question, Respondent tried, unsuccessfully, to tie the glasses on J.M.'s face using a large rubber band. The rubber band popped, causing J.M. to make a sound. Respondent apologized, tried one more time to tie the glasses on J.M.'s face using the rubber band, then gave up. Respondent testified that while she was attempting to tie the glasses on J.M.'s face, J.M. was moving around, so Respondent had J.M. put her head down on the desk. J.M. was hearing-impaired and had put her head down on the side on which her functioning ear was located, so Respondent used her open hand to turn J.M.'s head to the other side. Respondent credibly testified that she did not slap J.M., scream at her, or pull her hair. J.M.'s mother, Shakima Brown, testified that she had been informed of the incident concerning J.M.'s glasses and that on her own, over a period of days, had asked J.M. several times if anyone had hit her. Brown testified, credibly, that J.M. said "no" every time she was asked.14/ The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not scream at J.M., did not slap her face, and did not intentionally hurt her by popping her ear with a rubber band. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove the allegations in paragraph 6. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Student A.S. In paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that Respondent handled A.S. in a physically rough manner, causing him to sustain a scratch on his neck. Cherelus testified that she did not recall any incident involving a student named "A.," and she could not recall his last name. Yontz testified that one day, she took the children out for recess, and as they were leaving, A. was in the room with Respondent. A. subsequently came outside and was crying, and Yontz observed scratch marks on A.'s neck. Yontz testified that she had asked what had happened, and Respondent told her that A. had scratched his neck on the corner of the counter as he put trash in the trash can. Neither Yontz nor Cherelus saw Respondent scratch A., and Petitioner presented no other evidence showing that Respondent scratched A. The sum of Petitioner's evidence regarding this allegation is that A. was scratched while in the classroom with Respondent. There is absolutely no competent substantial evidence in the record showing that Respondent scratched A. Additionally, neither Yontz nor Cherelus, or any other witness, specifically identified "A." as the student "A.S." named in paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Thus, Petitioner failed to present any competent substantial evidence linking the testimony about "A." to any allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove the allegations set forth in paragraph 5. of the Amended Administrative Complaint involving student A.S. Student C.A. Petitioner alleges, in paragraph 7. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that C.A. went home with scratches on his neck and face over a three-day period, and that when Respondent was questioned, she claimed that C.A. "had an encounter with a tree." Presumably, paragraph 7. is intended to charge Respondent with scratching C.A. and then lying about it. However, this paragraph does not expressly allege that Respondent scratched C.A. or otherwise injured C.A., so fails to allege that Respondent engaged in conduct that, if proven, would violate Petitioner's policies or Department of Education rules. Further, to the extent paragraph 7. could be read to sufficiently allege that Respondent scratched or otherwise injured C.A., there was no testimony presented at the final hearing by anyone having personal knowledge of the alleged incident. Thus, Petitioner failed to present any competent substantial evidence supporting this allegation.15/ Thus, Petitioner failed to prove the allegation involving student C.A. set forth in paragraph 7. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. The 2012-2013 School Year Background Petitioner alleges in the Amended Administrative Complaint that during the 2012-2013 school year, Respondent again engaged in physically and verbally abusive acts toward students assigned to her class. Paraprofessionals Shirley Brown and Monica Jobes were assigned to assist in Respondent's classroom in the 2012-2013 school year. That year, approximately nine ESE students were assigned to Respondent's classroom. The credible, persuasive evidence made abundantly clear that neither Brown nor Jobes enjoyed a smooth working relationship with Respondent. This was, in large measure, due to the fact that Respondent had high expectations regarding their performance in assisting her in the classroom, and she consistently reminded Brown and Jobes of those expectations.16/ In particular, Respondent made clear that her——and, by extension, the paraprofessionals'——job entailed taking reasonable and necessary measures to work with students to help them achieve to their capabilities. Respondent testified, persuasively, that neither Brown nor Jobes were dedicated to this approach and instead viewed their jobs more as caretakers or "babysitters" of the students for the school day. Respondent frequently made clear to Brown and Jobes that as the teacher, she was in charge of the class and the instructional approach and all other activities and aspects of classroom management. It was apparent from the credible, persuasive evidence that Brown and Jobes resented Respondent's repeated, overt assertion of authority over them. The persuasive evidence establishes that Brown was as much as a half-hour late to Respondent's class nearly every day, and that Respondent also regularly had to admonish her about frequent use of her cell phone for personal matters during instructional time. Brown also frequently disregarded Respondent's instructions on a range of student-related matters, and when Respondent confronted her, Brown verbally lashed out.17/ The persuasive evidence also establishes that Jobes often sent and received personal text messages during instructional time, causing her to be distracted and interfering with her work. The persuasive evidence established that Brown's and Jobes' behaviors were disruptive to the classroom environment and, in some instances, posed a danger to the students, and that Respondent let them know that their behavior was unacceptable. Shortly before the holiday vacation in December 2012, a holiday celebration was held in Respondent's classroom. While Respondent tended to the other students in the class and their parents, she specifically asked Brown and Jobes to stay with and tend to student C.R., since he did not have a parent present at the celebration. At some point, both paraprofessionals left C.R. alone. While unattended, C.R. ingested something to which he was allergic, went into anaphylactic shock, and ultimately had to be transported to the hospital. In early January 2013, shortly after school commenced following the holiday vacation, Respondent's students went to the music teacher's classroom. Brown was going to place C.R. on the floor, notwithstanding that Respondent had specifically directed her not to do so because he might again ingest something that could make him ill. At that point, Respondent told Brown not to place C.R. on the floor, to which Brown responded "don't worry, I got this" or something to that effect. Respondent tersely admonished Brown and reminded her that it was her (Respondent's) call because she was the teacher.18/ It was apparent from Brown's testimony that she greatly resented Respondent's assertion of authority over her. To address Brown's ongoing behavior and performance issues, Respondent requested a meeting on January 9, 2015, with Principal Hollingsworth, Assistant Principal Long, and ESE Supervisor Vickie Bloome. At the meeting, Hollingsworth informed Brown that Respondent had complained to her about her (Brown's) repeated cell phone use during classroom instructional time and directed her to refrain from using her cell phone during that time. Notwithstanding this meeting, nothing changed in Respondent's classroom. Respondent continued to experience friction in working with the paraprofessionals, who knew that Respondent had complained to the school administration about their performance. On January 16, 2013, an incident involving C.R., discussed in detail below, occurred. During this incident, C.R. became very aggressive, fought, bit and scratched himself, and grabbed for Respondent's insulin pump, which she wore on her arm. As discussed in greater detail below, Respondent and C.R. fell on the floor. Respondent prepared a written report detailing the incident. Persons who witnessed the incident, including Brown and Jobes, signed the report, and Respondent filed it with the school administration that day. On January 23, 2013, Respondent called a meeting with Jobes and Brown to address their ongoing performance issues, update them on student issues, and cover common core implementation procedures. In the email Respondent sent to Jobes and Brown regarding the meeting, she reminded them: "STILL seeing phones being checked and answered during class time. Even if a phone rings during class, it should NOT be answered until your personal time." At the meeting, Respondent once again reminded Brown and Jobes that they were not to use their cell phones during classroom instructional time. On the afternoon of January 23, 2013, following Respondent's meeting with her and Jobes, Brown reported to Assistant Principal Long an incident in which T.P. allegedly said "Ms. T. hurt me." At some point, Jobes also reported to Long that T.P. told her the same thing.19/ Jobes also sent an email to Hollingsworth that afternoon describing a situation in which T.P told her "Ms. T. hurt me." Thereafter, Long spoke with Respondent to get her version of what had happened. At some point on the evening of January 23, 2013, Respondent sent an email to Long stating that she had not been alone with T.P. that day. It was apparent from Respondent's email that she felt that could not trust Brown. She requested that Brown be removed from her classroom. Brown was removed from Respondent's classroom on the morning of January 24, 2013. At some point thereafter, Brown prepared, signed, and filed a report, dated January 23, 2013, alleging that Respondent had engaged in numerous aggressive and abusive acts toward students over a period of months. It is obvious in reading the report——which references Brown's removal from Respondent's classroom———that it was not prepared until sometime after Brown was removed from Respondent's classroom on January 24, 2015. Jobes also signed the report. She testified that Brown had prepared it and that she had contributed "notes." Brown also prepared and filed another written statement alleging that Respondent had engaged in specific instances of abusive and aggressive behavior toward students in her class. This report also was dated January 23, 2013, but again referenced her removal from Respondent's classroom, so obviously was prepared sometime after January 24, 2013. On the evening of January 24, 2013, Jobes sent an email to Hollingsworth requesting to be removed from Respondent's classroom. The email stated: "I came home today so stressed and exhausted from Ms. T all day at me." Jobes, who was pregnant, was concerned that the stress she was experiencing in working with Respondent in her classroom would adversely affect her health. On January 25, 2013, Jobes was removed from Respondent's classroom. On or about January 29, 2013, Respondent was removed from her classroom and reassigned to another position in the school system pending the outcome of an investigation conducted by the Broward County Sheriff's Office Child Protective Investigations ("CPI") Section. In a statement dated February 3, 2013, Jobes alleged that Respondent had taken aggressive and abusive actions toward certain students in her class over a period of months. She also stated that she felt bullied because Respondent, at times, spoke to her disrespectfully, and that Respondent would "constantly remind everyone in the room that she is the boss and if they wanted to be the boss then they need to go get a 4-year degree." Notably, prior to their January 23, 2013, meeting with Respondent, neither Jobes nor Brown had ever reported that Respondent had engaged in aggressive or abusive behavior toward her students.20/ Allegations in Amended Administrative Complaint In the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that Respondent engaged in physically and verbally aggressive and abusive behavior toward specific students in her class. Each of these allegations is addressed below. Student M.M. In paragraph 9. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that Respondent grabbed student M.M. by the back of her neck, held her head down in the garbage can to make her retrieve an open bag of chips, and forced her to eat them because she had asked for them. At the hearing, Brown and Jobes both testified that on one occasion during classroom snack time, Respondent had given M.M. a bag of chips at her request. M.M. ate a few chips, then tossed the bag in the trash can. Brown and Jobes testified that Respondent held M.M. by the back of the neck and forced her to remove the chips from the trash can. On direct examination, Jobes testified that Respondent forced M.M. to eat the chips, but on cross-examination, testified that, M.M. did not eat the chips. Brown testified that M.M. ate some of the chips but did not finish. Respondent confirmed that she did make M.M. retrieve the chips from the garbage can, but explained the context and the circumstances for making M.M. do so. She credibly denied that she had forced M.M. to eat the chips. Specifically, M.M. had been purchasing school lunches, but Jobes and Brown informed Respondent that M.M. was not eating her lunch. Respondent contacted M.M.'s mother, and collectively, Respondent and M.M.'s mother arrived at a plan in which M.M. would pick out her lunch and snack items at home. The items would be packed in her lunch box, and she would bring her lunch and snacks to school every day. M.M.'s mother also sent a large bag of snacks for M.M. that was kept in the classroom closet and M.M. would get the snack of her choice at snack time. M.M.'s mother specifically requested that Respondent send home anything that M.M. did not eat so that she (M.M.'s mother) would know what M.M. was and was not eating. On the day at issue, M.M. requested a bag of chips. Respondent gave them to her and M.M. returned to her seat, where she ate one or two chips, then threw the bag of chips away in the trash can. Respondent saw this and told M.M. to retrieve the chips from the trash can. Respondent did this so that she could send them home with M.M., consistent with the plan she had devised with M.M.'s mother. Consistent with Respondent's method of prompting M.M.'s behavior, she asked M.M. three times to remove the chips from the trash can. She then added a gestural prompt, done multiple times, that consisted of pointing to the trash can to inform M.M. exactly what she wanted her to do and where she was to go. When M.M. did not respond, Respondent took M.M. by the hand, led her to the trash can, and again gestured and asked her to remove the chips. Again, M.M. did not respond, so Respondent employed a physical prompt that consisted of placing her hand on M.M.'s shoulder and hand and applying enough pressure to show M.M. that she needed to bend down to retrieve the chips. At that point, with Respondent's help, M.M. retrieved the chips from the trash can. Respondent told M.M. to put them in her lunch box so that she could take them home, consistent with M.M.'s mother's request. Respondent credibly testified that she did not tell M.M. she had to eat the chips or force her to eat them. The evidence does not establish that M.M. cried or was distressed as a result of Respondent's actions, and there was no evidence presented to show that M.M. was injured or sickened as a result of this incident. The credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not punish M.M. for throwing the chips away, that she did not forcefully grab M.M. by the back of the neck or hold her head down into the trash can, and that she did not force M.M. to eat the chips. The evidence instead shows that Respondent's actions in dealing with M.M. on this occasion were appropriate and were consistent with her discussions with M.M.'s mother. Petitioner did not prove the allegations in paragraph 9. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Student T.P. In paragraph 10. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that in December 2012, Respondent force-fed student T.P., causing him to regurgitate. The undisputed evidence establishes that T.P. often refused to eat. On the day in question, T.P. purchased lunch from the cafeteria but he refused to eat the lunch, so was brought back to the classroom, where Respondent attempted to get T.P. to eat his lunch. Brown testified that Respondent forced a piece of chicken and chicken skin into T.P.'s mouth, that he was crying hysterically, and that he gagged. Brown further testified that Respondent made a video recording of T.P. eating. Jobes, who also was present when the incident occurred, did not testify that Respondent force-fed T.P.——only that Respondent was verbally urging T.P. to eat plantains. She did not testify that T.P. gagged or regurgitated. She also testified that Respondent made a video recording of the incident. Respondent testified that T.P. was a very picky eater who did not eat well, and that he regurgitated on the way to lunch every day. She testified, credibly, that she had discussed this issue with T.P.'s parents, and they had directed her to encourage him to eat.21/ Because the sight of other students eating or the smells of food would cause T.P. to vomit, he typically ate at a small table in the cafeteria positioned so he could see the outdoors. On the day in question, the students ate lunch in the classroom. T.P. was having particular difficulty eating that day because he was situated with the entire class as they ate, making him uncomfortable. In an effort to persuade T.P. to eat, Respondent went over to him, picked up a piece of food and coaxed him to eat. T.P. regurgitated all over his food. At that point, Respondent stopped trying to persuade T.P. to eat and sent a note home to his parents describing what had happened. Respondent's version of events is credible. By contrast, the testimony of Jobes and Brown regarding this incident was inconsistent, incredible, and unpersuasive. Thus, Petitioner did not prove the allegations in paragraph 10. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. In paragraph 14. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that on January 23, 2013, Respondent grabbed T.P. by the back of the neck and pushed him toward the door, causing him to stumble and fall to the ground and to verbalize that "Ms. T. hurt me." Jobes testified that on that day, she was in the cafeteria when Brown and T.P. entered, with T.P crying. Jobes testified that Brown told her at lunch that she (Brown) had heard some kind of altercation while she was in the classroom restroom. Jobes did not see Respondent grab, push, or take any other action toward T.P. Jobes testified that later that day, T.P. told her "Ms. T. hurt me," and held his hands in a "U" shape. Jobes interpreted that as indicating that Respondent had choked T.P. Brown testified that she actually saw Respondent grab T.P. by the back of the neck and push him toward the door, causing him to fall, and that he got up, crying, and went with Brown and the rest of the class to lunch. She testified that later in the afternoon, T.P. told her and Jobes that "Ms. T. hurt me." Specifically, she testified: I didn't understand him clearly, you know. So Ms. Jobes was on the other side. He turned, he said 'Ms. Jobes, Ms. Jobes, Ms. T. hurt me, she grabbed me like this." And I, like, what? He said 'I'm going to tell them, I'm going to tell them, Ms. Brown, that Ms. T. hurt me, you see, Ms. T. hurt me.' The undersigned finds Brown's testimony incredible and unpersuasive. First, Brown's statement that she actually saw Respondent grab and push T.P. is inconsistent with her statement made to Jobes while at lunch that same day, that she had been in the restroom at the time and had heard an altercation. Further, the evidence showed that while T.P. is somewhat verbal, he is not capable of the extended, coherent discourse that Brown claims he verbalized in telling her and Jobes that Respondent had hurt him. The undersigned also assigns no weight to Jobes' testimony regarding whether the alleged incident actually occurred. Jobes did not witness the alleged incident, so has no personal independent knowledge regarding whether it occurred. Thus, Petitioner did not prove the allegations in paragraph 14. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Student M.P. In paragraph 11. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that in an effort to make M.P. stop crying, Respondent jerked her chair backward to scare her to make her stop crying, and that when M.P. did not stop crying, Respondent laid the chair down on the floor so that M.P.'s feet were in the air, leaving her in that position for approximately 20 minutes. Brown and Jobes both testified that M.P. often cried and rocked back and forth in her chair. They testified that in order to make M.P. stop crying, Respondent would try to scare her by jerking the chair backward. Then, if M.P. did not stop crying, Respondent would lay her chair down on the floor so that M.P.'s feet were in the air, and she would leave M.P. in that position until she cried herself to sleep. Both Brown and Jobes testified that they had seen Respondent do this on numerous occasions. Respondent acknowledged that she had, on more than one occasion, laid M.P. down on the floor in the Rifton chair,22/ but, again, provided credible context for taking this action. Specifically, as a result of her exceptionality, M.P. would constantly verbalize and often would rock in her chair. When she became agitated, she would rock her chair so violently that she tipped the chair backward. Initially, Respondent had moved M.P.'s chair against a bookshelf, but M.P. banged her head on the bookshelf. In an effort to prevent M.P. from hurting herself, Respondent then removed M.P. from her chair and placed her on the floor; however, M.P. banged her head on the floor. At that point, Respondent placed M.P. in the Rifton chair. M.P. continued to rock violently, so Respondent ordered a Rifton chair with footrest; however, that measure did not solve the problem with M.P.'s rocking. Respondent then considered placing M.P.'s chair up against the teacher's desk, which would help stabilize the chair but had nothing against which Respondent could bang her head. On one occasion, as Respondent tipped the chair back at a 45-degree angle to place it against her desk, she noticed that M.P. calmed down and closed her eyes. Thereafter, Respondent would sometimes tip M.P.'s chair against her or her desk if she was not otherwise occupied with activities. However, when she was occupied with other activities, she would sometimes completely recline the Rifton chair, with M.P. strapped in it, on the floor. She did this because it calmed M.P., who otherwise would constantly vocalize, cry, and rock back and forth. To determine whether this was an appropriate technique, Respondent asked colleagues who also taught ESE students about their view of this technique and whether there were better techniques of which they were aware. Respondent testified, credibly, that the consensus among other ESE teachers was that if the technique worked to soothe the child and did not endanger her, it was appropriate to use. Respondent also had consulted regularly with occupational specialist Mariana Aparicio-Rodriquez regarding techniques to prevent M.P. from rocking her chair so that she would not tip her chair over and injure herself, but they had not collectively arrived at a solution to the problem. Respondent testified that she and Aparicio-Rodriquez had not specifically discussed reclining the Rifton chair on the floor with M.P. strapped in it. One day, while Respondent was alone in the classroom, Aparicio-Rodriquez entered the classroom and saw M.P. completely reclined on the floor in the Rifton chair. Initially, Aparicio- Rodriquez was alarmed that M.P. had tipped the chair over. Aparicio-Rodriquez testified that Respondent told her that she had placed M.P. on the ground to give her a sense of what it felt like to fall back. Respondent then picked up the chair and placed M.P. in an upright position. Aparicio-Rodriquez confirmed that during the entire time that she was in Respondent's classroom, M.P. was calm, unhurt, and not in distress, and that she did not cry. Aparicio-Rodriquez testified that she did not believe this was an appropriate or useful technique for teaching M.P. not to rock in her chair, and she had intended to report the incident to her supervisor, but because one of Respondent's paraprofessionals informed her that the matter was going to be reported, Aparicio-Rodriquez did not report it. Aparicio- Rodriquez testified that she did not consider the incident to constitute child abuse, so did not report it to the Department of Children and Families. On cross-examination, Aparicio-Rodriquez stated that it was her opinion, from an occupational therapist's perspective, that using the Rifton chair in such a manner was not appropriate; however, she conceded that placing M.P. on the floor in a reclined position in the Rifton chair was not unsafe, and that M.P. was neither hurt nor in imminent or potential danger. She acknowledged that she and Respondent had a difference of opinion regarding the propriety of the use of the Rifton chair in this manner.23/ Aparicio-Rodriquez did not identify any statute, rule, policy, or other applicable standard that was violated by Respondent's use of the Rifton chair in this manner. The persuasive evidence supports the inference that Respondent's placement of M.P. in the Rifton chair in a reclined position on the floor was not intended as a disciplinary measure to frighten or punish M.P. for crying or rocking in her chair, and was appropriate under the circumstances. Respondent credibly testified that she had tried numerous measures to prevent M.P. from harming herself while rocking back and forth, and that when she inadvertently discovered this technique, she discussed it with other ESE professionals, who had suggested that she continue using it since the child was not distressed or injured and the technique worked to soothe her and prevent her from rocking back and forth and potentially injuring herself. Aparicio-Rodriquez disagreed with Respondent regarding the appropriateness of the technique, but she was neither qualified nor presented as an expert witness in appropriate teaching techniques for ESE students or in any other subject, and she did not identify any applicable professional or other standards that were violated by Respondent's use of the Rifton chair in this manner. The persuasive evidence establishes that Aparicio- Rodriquez and Respondent had a difference of opinion regarding the appropriateness of this technique; however, unlike Aparicio- Rodriquez, Respondent had actual successful experience in using this technique without harming M.P. Thus, Respondent's view regarding the appropriateness of using this technique under the circumstances is afforded greater weight than Aparicio- Rodriquez's view. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent distressed, injured or otherwise harmed M.P., placed M.P. in danger, or violated any applicable statute, rule, policy, teaching technique, or standard by placing M.P. in the Rifton chair in a reclining position. Thus, Petitioner did not prove the allegations set forth in paragraph 11. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner also alleges that on one occasion, Respondent disciplined M.P. for crying by placing a plastic bag of ice directly on M.P.'s bare chest, and when that technique was unsuccessful, Respondent placed the bag of ice on M.P.'s back, causing her to cry more loudly. Petitioner presented the testimony of Jobes to substantiate this allegation. Jobes testified that "a couple of times," she saw Respondent place bags of ice under M.P.'s clothing on her bare skin in an effort to get M.P. to stop crying, but that M.P. would not stop crying. Petitioner did not present the testimony of any other witnesses to corroborate Jobes' testimony. Respondent flatly denied ever having placed ice on M.P. for any reason, and stated that under any circumstances, she did not know how that would have helped make M.P. stop crying. Respondent also denied having kept ice in the refrigerator in her classroom. Respondent's testimony was credible, and Jobes' testimony was not credible, regarding these allegations. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove the allegations in paragraph 12. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Student C.R. In paragraph 13. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, Petitioner alleges that on one occasion, Respondent removed C.R. from his wheelchair, screamed in his ear, held both hands behind his back, laid him face-down on the floor, and laid on top of him for several minutes as he gasped for air. The undisputed evidence shows that on the morning of January 16, 2013, student C.R. (also referred to as "C.J." in the final hearing testimony) arrived at school in an extremely emotionally-distressed state. Although C.R. is a small child who weighs approximately 30 pounds and is confined to a wheelchair, he becomes physically aggressive when distressed and is capable of inflicting injury on others by biting, scratching, and hitting. Upon arriving at school that day, C.R. physically struggled with school personnel, including Jobes, Brown, and Cherelus. Brown took C.R., still upset, in his wheelchair to Respondent's classroom, where he was placed in his classroom chair. C.R. attempted to grab, bite, and scratch Respondent, Jobes, and Brown, bit his own hands, and rubbed and scratched his own face, arms, and legs. Respondent left him in his chair and he eventually calmed down. At that point, Respondent removed C.R. from his chair and carried him to another classroom, where the rest of the class was engaged in instructional exercises. Thereafter, when Respondent carried C.R. back to her classroom, C.R. again became very upset and bit and scratched her. At that point, Respondent notified the school administration and C.R.'s mother of the incident involving C.R. that morning. Assistant Principal Long visited Respondent's classroom to determine what had happened. As of 11 a.m. that day, C.R. was still seated in his classroom chair aggressively biting his own hands and rubbing and scratching his face, arms, and legs.24/ Respondent prepared and submitted an incident report detailing these events, and Brown, Jobes, and Cherelus, and another school staff member, Julie Weiss, signed and dated the report that same day. Jobes testified she read the January 16, 2013, incident report before signing and dating it that same day. She stated that although she had signed the document without being under duress, she had questioned Respondent regarding its accuracy before signing it. Brown testified that she signed the January 16, 2013, incident report that day, but did not read it before she signed it. It is undisputed that at some point in the day on January 16, 2013, Respondent and C.R. ended up on the floor of Respondent's classroom, with Respondent laying on top of C.R. However, there is conflicting evidence regarding the time of day, sequence of events, and circumstances that led to this incident. Jobes and Brown both testified that the events that led to Respondent and C.R. being on the floor with Respondent laying on top of C.R. occurred in the morning after C.R. came to school in an emotionally distressed state, and that Respondent had placed C.R. on the floor and laid on top of him to punish him for his aggressive behavior. However, their testimony is contradicted by the version of events detailed in the January 16, 2013, incident report——which they both had signed and dated that same day, thus tacitly acknowledging its accuracy. As discussed in greater detail below, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the incident during which Respondent and C.R. ended up on the floor actually occurred later that same day, and that afterward, C.R. was taken from the classroom to the school clinic and did not return to the classroom for the rest of the day. Had Brown and Jobes been correct regarding the time of day when the incident occurred, C.R. would have been removed from the classroom during the morning. However, according to the January 16, 2013, incident report, C.R. was still in the classroom as of approximately 11 a.m. that day. Indeed, according to the incident report, Assistant Principal Long visited the classroom to investigate the events that were detailed in the report. Had C.R. been removed from the classroom in the morning after the incident, Long would have discovered that when she visited the classroom.25/ Further, Respondent would have known that so would not have stated in the written incident report that C.R. was still in the classroom as of 11 a.m. that day. It is undisputed that Jobes did not actually witness Respondent place C.R. on the floor. Jobes testified that when she looked over from another part of the classroom where she had been tending to other students, she saw C.R. face down on the floor with Respondent on top of him. Notwithstanding that by her own admission, Jobes did not witness the entire incident between Respondent and C.R., she nonetheless testified that Respondent held C.R. down on the floor for three to five minutes.26/ Brown claims to have witnessed the entire incident between Respondent and C.R. She testified that C.R. was acting aggressively, so to punish him, Respondent picked him up, flipped him around, placed him face-down on the floor, and laid on top of him for approximately 20 seconds as he gasped for breath. As noted above, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that the allegation regarding Respondent laying on top of C.R. arose from an incident that occurred later in the day on January 16, 2013, after lunch and after the incident that had happened earlier that day. The credible evidence establishes that when C.R. returned to Respondent's classroom after having had lunch in the cafeteria under Jobes' and Brown's supervision, his face was red and he was scratching himself and squirming in his chair. Respondent became very concerned, from the previous experience that school year, that C.R. was again having an allergic reaction to something he had eaten. Respondent removed C.R. from his wheelchair in order to place him in his Rifton chair so that she could administer his epi-pen to counter any allergic reaction he might have been having. Respondent is diabetic and wears an insulin pump strapped to her left arm. Respondent testified, credibly, that as she was removing C.R. from the wheelchair, he grabbed at her insulin pump. In an effort to prevent C.R. from pulling her insulin pump off of her arm, Respondent jerked her hand and arm backward, causing her to lose her balance. She fell to the floor with C.R. and landed on top of him. Respondent estimated that she and C.R. were in that position for perhaps five seconds,27/ at which point she scrambled off of C.R. and placed him in his Rifton chair. C.R. was then taken to the clinic to address his allergic symptoms and did not return to the classroom that day. Respondent testified, credibly, that Brown did not witness the entire event because for part of it, she was in the restroom with M.P., consistent with their established routine after the students returned from lunch. The undersigned finds Jobes' and Brown's version of the incident unpersuasive and incredible.28/ Their testimony was imprecise, inconsistent, and directly contradicted by other credible evidence regarding the incident. By contrast, Respondent's testimony regarding the incident was specific, precise, and detailed. The undersigned finds her account of the incident credible and persuasive. Thus, Petitioner failed to prove the allegations in paragraph 13. of the Amended Administrative Complaint. Allegations Regarding Unspecified Students Petitioner alleges, in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that Respondent "was observed grabbing students by the arm and forcefully pulling them to the ground." The Amended Administrative Complaint does not identify the students whom Respondent is alleged to have treated in such a manner. Jobes testified that "one or two times" she had seen Respondent grab a student by the arm and pull that student to the ground in an effort to get the student to sit down. She could not recall which students she allegedly saw Respondent treat in that manner and she did not provide any detail regarding these alleged incidents. Her testimony was not corroborated by any other competent evidence in the record and was too vague and lacking in detail to be deemed credible or persuasive. Brown testified that on one occasion, Respondent pushed M.P. to make her walk faster, causing her to fall to the ground. Although Brown identified the specific student, she provided no temporal context or detail regarding the incident. Her testimony was confused and imprecise, so was neither credible nor persuasive. Petitioner failed to prove the allegation in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent grabbed students by the arm and forcefully pulled them to the ground. Petitioner also generally alleges, in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that on occasion, Respondent would grab students by the neck to force them to look at their work. However, neither Brown nor Jobes identified any specific students to whom Respondent's alleged conduct was directed or provided any detail or context in which these alleged incidents occurred, and their testimony was too vague and imprecise to be deemed credible or persuasive. Petitioner did not present any other competent substantial evidence to substantiate this allegation. Respondent testified that at times, it was necessary for her to physically focus students' attention on their work. At those times, she would place her hands on the student's head and turn the student's face down toward the desk so that the student could attend to his or her work. She testified that she did not grab students by the back of the neck or engage in any forceful techniques as she focused their attention on their work. Her testimony was credible and persuasive. Thus, Petitioner failed to prove the allegation in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent grabbed students by the neck and forced them to look at their work. Petitioner also alleges, in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint, that "[i]n one incident, Respondent crumbled [sic] a student's paper into a ball before throwing it at the student." The student whom Respondent is alleged to have treated in this manner was not identified in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Paragraph 8. specifically states that the incidents alleged therein occurred "shortly after the commencement of the school year in August 2012." However, the only evidence Petitioner presented in support of this allegation was the testimony of Cara Yontz, a paraprofessional assigned to Respondent's classroom in the 2011-2012 school year——a completely different school year than Respondent's actions alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Thus, Petitioner failed to present any evidence to substantiate this allegation in paragraph 8. Even assuming that the reference in the Amended Administrative Complaint to the 2012-2013 school year was a drafting error and that Petitioner actually intended to allege that Respondent engaged in such conduct during the 2011-2012 school year, Petitioner still did not prove this allegation by credible, persuasive evidence. Yontz testified that on one occasion, a student named "D." was having difficulty with his work and that twice, when he turned his work in to Respondent, she yelled at him, crumpled up his paper, and threw it back at him, causing him to cry. Petitioner did not present any other competent substantial evidence to support this allegation. Respondent denied having thrown D.'s paper at him and testified, credibly, that she never had thrown anything at any student. The undersigned finds Respondent's testimony on this point credible and persuasive. Thus, Petitioner failed to prove the allegation in paragraph 8. of the Amended Administrative Complaint that Respondent crumpled a student's work and threw it at him. Petitioner also alleges in paragraph 8. that Respondent verbally abused unspecified students, making statements such as "they're so stupid," and that she was "happy that God never gave her kids like them." Petitioner did not present credible, persuasive evidence proving this allegation, and Respondent credibly testified that she had not, and would not, ever address a student in such a manner. Failure to Provide Statement On March 4, 2013, the Broward District Schools Police Department issued a Notice to Appear for Statement ("NTA") to Respondent, informing Respondent that an investigation regarding a reported incident had been initiated. The NTA informed Respondent that on March 11, 2013, she was required to appear at a designated location and provide a statement as part of the investigation. The NTA further informed her that a representative of her choice could be present during the statement and that her failure to appear on the scheduled date and to provide a statement would constitute gross insubordination and lead to disciplinary action up to and including termination. Respondent is a member of the Broward Teacher's Union ("BTU") and was represented by Diane Watts, a field staff representative with BTU, in the investigation. Watts had contact with Kathleen Andersen, a detective with the Broward District Schools Police Department regarding scheduling the appointment and other matters with respect to Respondent's statement. At some point before Respondent was to appear and provide her statement, Andersen called Watts to give her a "heads-up" that the investigation was "going criminal"——meaning that a criminal investigation was being commenced and that criminal charges may be filed against Respondent. Watts testified, credibly, that when a matter "goes criminal," the BTU retains a lawyer to represent the member being investigated. At that point, BTU had not yet retained an attorney to represent Respondent in any investigation that may "go criminal." Under those circumstances, it is customary for the employee not to appear and provide a statement. Watts testified, credibly, that she informed Andersen that under the circumstances, Respondent would not appear as scheduled on March 11, 2013, to provide the statement. Watts understood Andersen to have agreed that, given the circumstances, Respondent was not required to appear and, in fact, she credibly testified that she believed Andersen had called her to give her a "heads-up" specifically so that she and Respondent would not make a wasted trip to appear at the location of the scheduled statement, only to find out there that the investigation had "gone criminal"——at which point, Watts would have advised Respondent not to make a statement pending BTU's retention of a lawyer to represent her. Based on her belief that she had an understanding with Andersen, Watts advised Respondent that she was not required to appear and provide a statement on March 11, 2013. Therefore——specifically at Watts' direction and advice——Respondent did not appear and provide a statement on March 11, 2013. At the final hearing, Andersen disputed that she had agreed with Watts that Respondent did not need to appear and provide a statement as directed in the Notice to Appear. Andersen testified that pursuant to Petitioner's Policy 4.9, Respondent was required to appear and provide a statement, and that she had not done so.29/ IV. Findings of Ultimate Fact Petitioner seeks to suspend Respondent without pay and to terminate her employment as a teacher on the basis of just cause, pursuant to section 1012.33, Florida Statutes. The statute defines just cause to include immorality, misconduct in office, incompetency, gross insubordination; and being convicted of or found guilty of, or entering a plea of guilty of, regardless of adjudication of guilt, any crime involving moral turpitude. Here, Petitioner charges that just cause exists, on each of these bases, to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment. As more fully addressed below, Petitioner bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to establish each element of each offense with which Respondent is charged. Further, whether Respondent committed the charged offenses is a question of ultimate fact to be determined by the trier of fact in the context of each alleged violation.30/ For the reasons discussed in detail above, Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence, any of the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint, and therefore failed to prove any of the administrative charges stated in the Amended Administrative Complaint. Petitioner asserts in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order that "Petitioner had a number of witnesses to testify to these various events. Respondent had none." This mischaracterizes the evidence presented in this case. Although Petitioner presented the testimony of four persons having personal knowledge of some of the incidents, for several of the allegations, Petitioner presented the testimony of only one witness who had personal knowledge of the alleged incidents, and, as discussed above, often that testimony was not credible. Even when Petitioner presented the testimony of more than one witness regarding a particular allegation, as discussed above, often that testimony was inconsistent on significant details, calling into serious question the credibility and reliability of the testimony. Also, Respondent herself testified. Her testimony was clear, precise, credible, and persuasive, and she provided consistent, logical accounts of the incidents that gave rise to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint.31/ In addition to her own testimony, Respondent presented the testimony of the mother of student J.M., who credibly supported Respondent's version of the incident giving rise to one of the allegations involving her daughter. Here, the undersigned did not find the testimony of Cherelus, Yontz, Brown, or Jobes credible or persuasive on most of the matters about which they testified. As discussed in detail above, in many instances their testimony was vague, unclear, or inconsistent with other testimony or evidence. Moreover, it was abundantly clear that each of these paraprofessionals found Respondent difficult to work with because she was demanding, did not tolerate lax performance, and consistently reminded them that as teacher, she was in charge of the management of her classroom. It was apparent that each of them resented her frequent assertion of authority over them. Each of them had ample motive to be untruthful or to exaggerate regarding certain events——such as those involving J.M. being placed in the restroom, C.R. and Respondent falling on the floor, and T.P. being fed by Respondent. In other instances——such as reclining M.P. in the Rifton chair or directing M.M. to retrieve her snack from the trash can——it is plausible to infer that the paraprofessionals misunderstood Respondent's actions and judged to be inappropriate, when, in fact, they were appropriate under the circumstances. Another factor militating against the paraprofessionals' credibility is that each of them was a mandatory child abuse reporter under Florida law, each of them knew that, and each understood her legal duty. Nonetheless, most of the incidents alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint were not reported until sometime after the incident is alleged to have occurred. In particular, Brown and Jobes first reported that Respondent had engaged in abusive behavior only after she had taken measures to address their classroom performance issues, including her requesting a meeting with the principal and holding her own meeting aimed at, again, addressing their unacceptable behavior and performance. Petitioner focuses on a statement in Respondent's January 23, 2013, email thanking Brown and Jobes for their efforts as indicating that up to that point, Respondent and the paraprofessionals enjoyed a smooth working relationship and that Respondent did not have any problems with their performance, and, in fact, was pleased with their performance. However, this position is contradicted by the strong evidence showing otherwise. Respondent's emails to the school administration dated December 1, 2012, and January 9, 10, and 23, 2013, particularly speak to the ongoing difficulty she was having with both paraprofessionals, even before they submitted statements alleging that she had abused students. Further, the testimony by Brown, Jobes, and Respondent shows that the relationship between Respondent and the paraprofessionals was not a smooth one. In sum, the evidence establishes that the paraprofessionals were not reliable witnesses, and their testimony was neither credible nor persuasive. Conversely, Respondent's testimony was credible and persuasive. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove, by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence, that Respondent engaged in conduct during the 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 school years that violated Department of Education rules and school board policies, and, thus, constituted just cause to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment. Petitioner also has charged Respondent with gross insubordination for failure to appear and provide a statement to the Broward District Schools Police Department on March 11, 2013. As discussed above, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not appear and provide a statement to the Broward Schools Police Department specificially because she had been directed and advised by her BTU representative not to do so. Further, even if Watts did not, in fact, have an understanding with Andersen that Respondent would not provide a statement, it is undisputed that Watts told Respondent that such an understanding existed so that she did not need to appear and provide a statement. Thus, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not intentionally refuse to appear and provide a statement, but, instead, simply and reasonably followed the advice and direction of her BTU representative, who had specifically told her not to appear and provide a statement. Under these circumstances, it cannot be inferred that Respondent intentionally refused to obey a direct order, reasonable in nature. Accordingly, the credible, persuasive evidence establishes that Respondent did not commit gross insubordination. Based on the foregoing, it is determined that Petitioner failed to meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the competent substantial evidence, that Respondent engaged in conduct, alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint, that violates Department of Education rules and school board policies. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove that just cause exists to suspend Respondent without pay and terminate her employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, Broward County School Board, enter a final order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint against Respondent; reinstating Respondent's employment as a teacher; and awarding Respondent back pay for the period of her suspension, less the amount of back pay that would be owed for the period commencing on November 6, 2013, and ending on January 23, 2014.42/ DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of October, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of October, 2015.
The Issue The issue is whether Juan Jiminez should be assigned to J.R.E. Lee Opportunity School-South?
Findings Of Fact Juan is an 8th grade student at the Citrus Grove Middle School in Dade County, Florida. According to the school records, Juan has been involved in a number of instances of misconduct. On January 12, 1988, he received a referral to the school office for generally disruptive conduct, defiance of school authority, and excessive tardiness. On January 14, 1988, he received another referral for general disruptive conduct, and received in-school suspension. On March 9, 1988, he was involved in a fight, was suspended from the school grounds, and a letter concerning the matter was written to his parents. After he returned to school, on March 21, 1988, he again received a referral for disruptive behavior, followed by another suspension on April 18, 1988, for generally disruptive conduct and defiance of school authority, for which he received an in-school suspension. On May 2, 1988, he received a referral for cutting classes, which resulted in a conference with his parents. He received another referral on May 6, 1988, for general disruptive conduct and excessive tardiness, for which he received an in-school suspension. As the result of his poor performance during the 1987-88 school year, at the beginning of the 1988-9 school year in September of 1988, Juan was selected for participation in a drop-out prevention program, known in the Dade County schools as the Student At Risk Program (SARP). As a result of, the referral, a multi-disciplinary child study team considered his record. It was recommended to Juan's mother that Juan be placed in an opportunity school, but she resisted the suggestion, and the school's administrators agreed to continue the placement at Citrus Grove Middle School while Juan participated in the SARP program. In that program, Juan would be in small classes (usually 18-20) students in order to provide him additional attention. The school and the parents have been working, to some extent, at cross purposes. The parents regard Juan as a good child because he was not a gang member. The school was not concerned because they thought Juan was a member of a gang, but because of his disinterest in his subjects, and his cutting classes, being tardy, or acting out in class which inhibited not only his learning, but that of other students in the class. Even in the SARP program, Juan's situation did not improve a great deal. On November 15, 1988, he received another disciplinary referral for general disruptive conduct, for which he received a reprimand. On November 23, 1988 he received another referral for fighting, and he was suspended from the school grounds. On January 25, 1989, he received a referral to the administration from his reading teacher in the drop-out prevention program, Ms. Jane Liberman. Juan and two friends had come in late, been disruptive in class, and disturbed other students. He was reprimanded and given detention. Juan's excessive absences resulted in a home visit by W. Chester on March 8, 1989. The school administrators hoped for behavioral improvement following the visit, but Juan's behavior did not improve. Juan received at least three more disciplinary referrals that year for disruptive conduct, defiance of school authority, and for cutting class. Juan's disruptive behavior continued in the 1989-90 school year. On September 21, 1989, he received a disciplinary referral from Ms. Sonia Alcazar, his math teacher, for arriving late, being disruptive in class, using foul language, and making fun of the teacher. September 21, 1989, was only his fourth day in math class. He had come to school on September 5, 1989, but then had cut class until September 19, 1989. He attended on the 19th, 20th, and 21st, when the disciplinary referral occurred. Juan needs the increased structure and discipline that is available for students disinterested in education and which is offered at an opportunity school. That program should assist him academically. His current pattern of conduct is a substantial disruption which inhibits other students in his classes at Citrus Grove Middle School from taking advantage of instruction.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the assignment of Juan Jiminez to the J.R.E. Lee Opportunity School-South be upheld. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of March, 1990. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank R. Harder, Esquire 2780 Galloway Road, Suite 100 Twin Oaks Building Miami, Florida 33165 Gladys Jiminez 1512 Northwest 25th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Dr. Joseph A. Fernandez Superintendent of Schools Dade County Public Schools School Board Administration Building 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Sydney H. McKenzie, General Counsel Department of Education The Capitol, PL-08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Manatee County School Board (Petitioner) has just cause to terminate the employment of Charles Willis (Respondent).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Respondent was a drama teacher employed by the Petitioner to work at BRHS pursuant to a professional services contract. During 2010, the Respondent had an account on Facebook, a social networking internet website. Facebook allows an individual user to create and maintain a personal "page" including text and photographs, which can be viewed by other users. Users can also provide links to content posted elsewhere on the internet, and viewers can access the linked information. Facebook allows users to establish privacy settings that restrict access to various types of content. Such privacy options include the identification of other Facebook users as "friends." Privacy settings can be established that prevent users from posting comments to content posted by a user, or from viewing comments posted by other users. Social networking websites are used by some teachers to communicate classroom assignments or other educational information to students. Social networking websites are widely used by students and, at least based on the testimony presented at the hearing, by parents and other adults as well. Prior to the allegations underlying this dispute, the Respondent's privacy settings permitted his Facebook "friends" to view all content posted by the Respondent. The Respondent had in excess of 100 BRHS students identified as friends on his Facebook account. At all times material to this case, the Petitioner had no policy, written or otherwise, that restricted an employee from having an account on a social networking website, or regulated the use of any social networking website by an employee. At various times during 2010, the Respondent posted remarks on his Facebook page that included certain acronyms. Such acronyms, and their commonly understood meaning, included the following: WTF (What the Fuck) OMFG (Oh My Fucking God) F'n (Fucking) LMAO (Laughing My Ass Off) ROTFLMFAO (Rolling On The Floor Laughing My Fucking Ass Off) At the hearing, the Respondent asserted that he intended the "F" in the above acronyms to be understood as "fricking." There was no credible evidence that any student or parent who read the Respondent's Facebook remarks understood the "F" to mean anything other than "fucking." On his Facebook page dated July 31, 2010, the Respondent posted a remark that stated "[I]t's not who you know, it's who you blow," in an apparently derogatory reference to the judging of a student competition. On his Facebook page dated March 30, 2010, the Respondent posted a photograph of a bumper sticker that read "[F]uck the man, become the man" that was taken by a student on a trip to New York. The Respondent explained his posting of the photo by claiming that the people on the trip had agreed that all photos taken on the trip would be posted without censorship and that he had posted several hundred trip photos onto Facebook. On his Facebook page dated August 7, 2010, the Respondent posted a photograph (titled "Accidental Porn") that he obtained from another Facebook user's page. The photograph displayed a television weatherman standing in front of a map showing an elongated weather system. Based on the location of the weatherman and the weather system, the image was perceived by some viewers as depicting the broadcaster holding his penis in a sexually-suggestive position. Comments on the Respondent's Facebook page made it apparent that his viewers were aware of the perception. On his Facebook page dated August 20, 2010, the Respondent posted a link to content titled "[I]t's a great day to whoop somebody's ass." On his Facebook page dated June 26, 2010, the Respondent, apparently intoxicated, posted remarks indicating that he'd consumed excessive alcohol one evening and then posted remarks on the next day indicating that he had a headache related to the consumption. Although the Respondent asserted that some of the posts referenced herein occurred during summer months when he was not "on contract" as a teacher, his students, past and future, were able to freely access the Respondent's Facebook pages during the summer. The Respondent also had an account on Formspring, another social networking internet website. Formspring presents user content in a "questions and answer" format. In an undated post to the Respondent's Formspring page, a student commented "[T]hanks for letting me skip your class today." The Respondent wrote in response, "[Y]ou're welcome, but now you owe me....LOL....just do an amazing job at the encore show." The Respondent acknowledged that he allowed the student to miss his class in order to attend a rehearsal. While the Respondent may have failed to comply with school attendance policy by permitting the student to miss class, the Petitioner's assertion that the posting created the impression of an inappropriate arrangement between a teacher and a student was not supported by credible evidence. In another undated post to the Respondent's Formspring page, an unidentified Formspring user asked "what happened with the whole UP dvd thing," apparently in reference to an incident wherein the Respondent played a movie in class. The Respondent replied, "I got areprimand [sic] for showing an unauthorized video and not following the counties [sic] video policy." The Petitioner's assertion that the Respondent's response was an inappropriate discussion of an employer/employee disciplinary matter with a student was not supported by credible evidence. The reprimand was public record. The identity of the person posting the question was unknown. Upon the initiation of this disciplinary action, the Respondent altered his privacy settings on the social networking sites to limit access of personal content to adults. There was no evidence that social networking internet websites cannot be used for appropriate educational purposes. On more than a few occasions, the Respondent was known in the classroom to use "spoonerisms" in speech, wherein letters in various words were deliberately switched to alter a verbalization of a phrase. While in class and in the presence of students, the Respondent used phrases such as "nucking futs" or "doggammit." The school received a complaint about the practice. On one occasion in the classroom, the Respondent referred to his former wife as a "bitch." On at least one occasion, the Respondent used a hand gesture in the presence of students to signify the word "bullshit." On April 30, 2010, the BRHS principal directed the Respondent to refrain from making such statements and gestures. There was no credible evidence that the Respondent continued to engage in such verbal or physical communication after the April 30, 2010, directive. At the start of the 2009-2010 school year, the Respondent approached the BRHS principal to inquire about organizing a theatre trip to New York for some of his drama students. The principal declined to authorize the travel as a school-sponsored event. The Respondent thereafter organized the trip on a private basis. Eight students expressed interest in going on the trip, and the trip ultimately occurred with a number of parents traveling as chaperones. At times, the Respondent discussed the proposed trip in his classes. The announcement of an organizational meeting occurred during class. The meeting was conducted on the school grounds at a time and place where play rehearsals were occurring, which had been previously arranged by the Respondent. There was no evidence that the Respondent mislead any participant to incorrectly presume that the trip was sponsored by the school. The participants in the trip were aware that the travel was not a school-sponsored event. There was no credible evidence that any participant or parent believed that the trip was a school-sanctioned event. The Respondent failed to comply with the school procedure for private use of the facility, which requires application and approval by school administration. Although execution of a facility lease may be required for larger groups, there was no evidence that such a lease would have been required for this meeting. There was no evidence that there was any adverse consequence to the Respondent's failure to seek permission to hold the organizational meeting in the previously-approved play rehearsal space. The time and location of the organizational meeting was not unreasonable, given the nature of the trip and the expected participants. Teachers who need to leave BRHS grounds during the workday are directed to obtain permission from a school administrator and then document the early departure in a log book maintained in the school office. The school administrators are the principal and the assistant principals, who are identified as such during formal meetings at the beginning of the school year. On September 2, 2010, the Respondent needed to go home on his lunch break and switch cars with his wife. The Respondent testified that he could not locate an administrator and that he thereafter went to the office of Bob McCabe, the BHRS "administrative parent liaison" and advised Mr. McCabe that the Respondent was leaving campus early. Mr. McCabe is not a school administrator and has no authority to approve a request to leave school grounds. Mr. McCabe works with parents and on student disciplinary matters. Mr. McCabe told the Respondent that he would tell the administrators, and the Respondent left the school. Mr. McCabe testified that shortly after the Respondent left, an assistant principal inquired as to whether the Respondent had left the grounds. Mr. McCabe also testified that the assistant principal had told him that she was present in her office at the time the Respondent claimed to be unable to find her, but the hearsay testimony was not otherwise corroborated. The evidence establishes that, had the Respondent requested to leave campus, the request would have most likely been granted, as such authorization, absent use of leave, was routinely granted by school administrators. There was no credible evidence that other teachers who have left school grounds without prior administrative approval have been subjected to discipline for the infraction. The Petitioner presented the expert testimony of Terry Osborn, dean of the University of South Florida College of Education, Sarasota-Manatee campus, who opined that some of the Respondent's social networking interactions could have had negative effects on the learning environment, could cause anxiety for some students, and potentially result in a loss of credibility by the educator. Mr. Osborne essentially based his opinion on very limited literature. There was no credible evidence that any of the adverse impacts identified by the witness has occurred.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Manatee County School Board enter a final order, dismissing the Administrative Complaint filed against Charles E. Willis. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott A. Martin, Esquire Manatee County School Board 215 Manatee Avenue West, Second Floor Bradenton, Florida 34205 Melissa C. Mihok, Esquire Kelly & McKee, P.A. 1718 East Seventh Avenue, Suite 301 Post Office Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Lois Tepper, Acting General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Tim McGonegal, Superintendent Manatee County School Board 215 Manatee Avenue, West Bradenton, Florida 34206-9069
The Issue The issue presented is whether Respondent is guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against her, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent has held a teaching certificate issued by the State of Florida, valid through June 30, 2002. At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed by the School Board of Miami-Dade County, Florida, as a language arts (English) teacher, assigned to Lake Stevens Middle School and subsequently assigned to her own home as an alternate work site. On May 4, 1995, Lucille Collins, an assistant principal at Lake Stevens, conducted a conference with a student, that student’s parent, and Respondent. During the conference, Respondent became enraged and began shouting at Collins. Collins terminated the conference and attempted to return to her office. Respondent followed her, continuing to shout as the two proceeded toward Collins’ office. The student and the parent witnessed Respondent's behavior. On February 8, 1996, Assistant Principal Collins convened a conference with Respondent and Dorothy Johnson, the principal’s secretary, to address conflicts between Respondent and Johnson. Toward the end of the meeting, Respondent became agitated. She began shouting at Collins and trying to provoke another argument with Johnson. On May 2, 1996, Respondent entered the teachers’ workroom and started yelling at Collins. Collins directed Respondent to stop and to come meet with her privately, but Respondent refused twice to meet with Collins. Respondent remained “out of control” and continued yelling as she moved through the office and out into the hall near the cafeteria. On May 15, 1996, Collins conducted a TADS observation of Respondent. A TADS observation is an extended and formal observation of a teacher in a classroom to determine if the teacher possesses the minimum competencies required of a classroom teacher. The trained observer is required to assess six categories that must be deemed satisfactory in order for the teacher to receive an acceptable evaluation. The teacher undergoing the TADS observation is required to submit to the observer lesson plans, student folders, and the grade book. On that day Respondent was unable to produce a lesson plan or grade book. Respondent was given five days to produce the required materials. As of May 20 Respondent had not complied. However, she did eventually comply, and the TADS observation showing Respondent was deficient was then voided. On October 2, 1996, Dr. James Monroe, Executive Director of the Office of Professional Standards for the Miami- Dade School Board, directed Respondent to attend a conference- for-the-record on October 7. The purpose of the conference was to address an act of battery by Respondent and her fitness for future employment. Respondent attended the meeting. At the meeting, she was referred to Dr. Michael Hendrickson for a psychological evaluation. Respondent went to Hendrickson who opined that Respondent was able to return to her teaching duties, with the following recommendations: (1) that Respondent seek help through the School Board’s Employee Assistance Program; (2) that Respondent undergo a neurological examination to rule out any neurological problems; and (3) that Respondent undergo psychotherapy once a week for a year. Based upon that evaluation, Respondent was permitted to return to her classroom. Shortly thereafter, an event known as “Back to School Night” was held at Lake Stevens. During that evening, teachers at Lake Stevens are required to be present in their classrooms to meet with parents. Respondent did not attend and did not advise the administrators at the school that she would not attend. Several parents complained to the principal and to Assistant Principal Collins that Respondent was not in attendance and that they were concerned because they had not received progress reports from Respondent and did not know if their children were passing or failing in Respondent’s class. Due to the parents’ concerns, the principal instructed Collins to conduct another TADS observation of Respondent. On October 22, 1996, Collins conducted another TADS observation of Respondent. She observed that Respondent's grade book had no recorded grades for periods five and six. She noted that the student folders contained no graded assignments. Respondent could not produce any graded tests, quizzes, weekly exams, unit tests, or progress checks. Respondent had not completed organizing the students' class work, homework, or folders in any observable fashion. In addition, Respondent's lesson plans were incomplete. On October 30, 1996, Collins reviewed with Respondent her written evaluation of Respondent's performance during the TADS observation. The written report noted Respondent's deficiencies and directed Respondent to comply with a prescription plan. Respondent was given specific deadlines, as follows: submit five sample graded tests and five writing portfolios to Collins by October 31; submit a complete and up- to-date grade book to Collins by November 1; complete all student folders and portfolios and have them available for review by November 1; read relevant portions of the TADS Prescription Manual by November 12, and submit activities for review and discussion with her department chairperson by November 12. Respondent acknowledged receipt of these directives by signing the TADS report on October 30. Respondent failed to comply with those directives and has never complied with them. Collins reported to Principal Willie B. Turner Respondent's failure to comply with her directives. On December 11, 1996, Principal Turner sent Respondent a memorandum directing her to report for a conference-for-the- record to be held in his office on December 16. The purpose of the conference was to discuss Respondent's non-compliance with the TADS prescription plan. On December 12 Respondent approached Principal Turner while he was on bus duty in front of Lake Stevens Middle School. Turner invited Respondent to speak to him after he was finished. Respondent came to his office and began "venting" at Turner, screaming at him and using "choice words." Turner told Respondent to leave his office, but she refused. Other staff members who were attracted by Respondent's screaming attempted to remove Respondent from Turner's office. With the help of the school's resource office, they were eventually able to do so. Immediately after the December 12 incident in Turner's office, Respondent was removed from Lake Stevens Middle School and assigned to work at her home. The conference originally scheduled to be held at Lake Stevens was re-scheduled to be held at the Office of Professional Standards on December 16. At the meeting, which Respondent attended, she was directed by Dr. James Monroe to contact the Employee Assistance Program immediately, undergo the required neurological evaluation, and attend the required psychotherapy once a week for a year. On or about January 9, 1997, Respondent contacted the Employee Assistance Program but declined to participate. On January 31, 1997, Dr. Monroe sent Respondent a memorandum in which he noted that she had not complied with his three prior directives. Respondent was given five additional days to comply and was informed that her continued failure to comply would be considered gross insubordination. Respondent attended a follow-up visit with Dr. Hendrickson on March 6, 1997. Following this visit, Hendrickson advised Dr. Monroe in writing that Respondent should undergo a psychiatric evaluation to assess her behavior and aggressive outbursts. Upon receiving Hendrickson's report, Dr. Monroe scheduled a meeting with Respondent for March 25. Respondent acknowledged receipt of that notice on March 19. Respondent attended the March 25 meeting. By that time, she had complied with the requirement that she undergo a neurological examination. At the meeting, she presented to Dr. Monroe a letter from a Dr. Cheryl Nowell indicating that Respondent had commenced psychotherapy on January 21, 1997. At that time, however, Respondent had still not undergone a psychiatric evaluation. On April 8, 1997, Dr. Monroe sent Respondent a memorandum summarizing the March 25 meeting. He again directed Respondent to undergo a psychiatric evaluation, gave Respondent five days to comply, and advised Respondent that her failure to comply would be considered gross insubordination. Dr. Monroe transmitted the information furnished by Respondent at the March 25 meeting to Dr. Hendrickson for review. After reviewing the information, Dr. Hendrickson wrote to Dr. Monroe that he believed that Respondent still needed to undergo a psychiatric evaluation. Dr. Monroe subsequently advised Respondent of that continuing requirement. Respondent did not undergo a psychiatric evaluation. On April 29, 1997, Dr. Monroe notified Respondent that she was to report for a conference at the Office of Professional Standards on May 1. Respondent signed the notice on April 29. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Respondent's continued refusal to comply with prior directives. On April 30, 1997, Respondent contacted Dr. Joyce Annunziata, the Assistant Superintendent of the Office of Professional Standards. Respondent, through her union representative, advised Annunziata that Respondent would not attend the meeting unless she was escorted by an uniformed Metro-Dade County deputy or City of Miami police officer. Respondent stated her reason to be that she was in fear of her life due to what she perceived to be threats from Dr. James Monroe. Dr. Annunziata investigated Respondent's assertion and found it to be without merit. Her union representatives at every prior meeting with Dr. Monroe had accompanied Respondent, and Dr. Monroe had not physically threatened Respondent. Respondent failed to appear for the May 1 meeting. At her request, the meeting was re-scheduled for May 2. Respondent continued to insist a deputy sheriff or police officer accompany her. On May 2, Dr. Annunziata notified Respondent's union representative in writing that Respondent's demand for an uniformed law enforcement officer would not be met, that Respondent must decide if she would attend the meeting or not, and that Respondent's failure to attend the meeting would be considered gross insubordination. Respondent failed to attend the meeting. On that day Principal Turner recommended that the Miami-Dade County School Board terminate Respondent from further employment. Dr. Monroe decided to give Respondent one more chance. He re-scheduled the meeting for May 13, 1997, sent Respondent a written notice, and read the notice to Respondent over the telephone. Respondent was advised that her failure to attend the re-scheduled meeting would result in termination of her employment. Despite having notice, Respondent did not attend the May 13 meeting as she had failed to attend the May 1 and 2 meetings. On June 13, 1997, Respondent received an overall unacceptable TADS evaluation for the 1996-97 school year. She achieved an unacceptable rating in the categories of preparation and planning, assessment techniques, and professional responsibilities. Respondent's continuing failure to attend the conferences scheduled by Dr. Monroe constitutes gross insubordination. Further, Respondent's failure to comply with the reasonable TADS prescriptive plan given her to overcome her classroom deficiencies constitutes gross insubordination. Respondent's failure, in conjunction with her TADS observation, to have records of students' grades, graded assignments, graded exams, lesson plans, and student writing portfolios constitutes incompetence. Respondent received an unacceptable evaluation based upon her classroom performance on October 26, 1996. She achieved two subsequent unacceptable evaluations for professional responsibility for her continuing failure to comply with directives given to her, not for conduct in her classroom. Finally, she achieved an unacceptable annual evaluation. In light of Respondent's long-standing history of aggressive behavior, the Miami-Dade County School Board's requirement that she submit to a psychiatric examination was reasonable. Respondent's failure to comply with that directive was unreasonable and further constitutes gross insubordination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and permanently revoking her teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 J. Wiley Horton, Esquire Pennington Law firm Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Room 224E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Helen B. Williams Post Office Box 551894 Carol City, Florida 33055-0894
The Issue Whether or not the Respondent student, Rommel Luis Montes, should be assigned to the J. R. E. Lee Center, an opportunity school.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rommel Luis Montes, age fifteen, was a student at Riviera Junior High School (Riviera) in Dade County, Florida, during the school years 1984-85, 1985-86, and 1986-87. During the 1984-85 school year Respondent's academic performance was very poor. He received five failing grades, passing only the subject of physical education with the grade of C. Also his ratings for effort during the four marking periods of that year were poor. The result of Respondent's lack of effort and poor academic performance was his not being promoted to the next grade. During the 1985-86 school year Respondent's academic performance was also poor. During that year he received poor ratings for effort, a D as a final grade in five subjects and the grade of F in two subjects. Respondent did not improve his academic performance during the 1986-87 school year. During the first grading period of that year, Respondent received grades of F in three subjects, grades of D in two subjects and one incomplete grade which subsequently was changed to an F. As before, Respondent's rating for effort was poor. Mrs. Carol Ann Golden, a math teacher, had Respondent as a student during the first marking period of the 1986-87 school year. While enrolled in that class, Respondent refused to do any work. Most of the time he would come to class without materials, he would rarely do homework and less than 10 percent of the time did he perform any class work. He had unexcused latenesses and out of forty-five school days he was absent twenty. In efforts to discourage tardiness, Mrs. Golden would issue detentions to Respondent (requiring him to stay in school after hours), but he would either serve them late or not at all, in defiance of school personnel authority. Those times when Respondent was issued indoor suspensions (CSI) as a disciplinary measure, he would refuse to do any work. Mrs. Deanna A. Villalobos, a history teacher at Riviera, also had Respondent as a student during the 1986-87 school year. Here again Respondent's behavior was the same: he would come to class without materials 70 percent of the time, hardly did any homework, performed approximately 5 percent of the work assigned in class, had approximately twenty absences (including one instance when he failed to return to class after lunch), was frequently tardy, would spend his time day dreaming and looking out the window, and as a result failed all the history tests administered. Respondent was also issued detentions by Mrs. Villalobos which he failed to serve. It is the practice at Riviera for teachers and school administrators to submit written reports relative to troublesome student behavior. Such reports are prepared on forms called Student Case Management Referral Forms (SCMRF) and are generally reserved for serious behavior problems. Mrs. Golden and Mrs. Villalobos each issued two SCMRFs on Respondent regarding, inter alia, his total lack of interest in school and failing grade average. In addition Respondent received five other SCMRFs from a different teacher. In addition to Respondent's lack of interest in school, these reports also complained of his skipping class, excessive talking in class, leaving class without permission, and simply refusing to do any work in class. As a counselor at Riviera, Mrs. Waizenhofer worked on a weekly basis with Respondent. From her testimony it was apparent that Respondent, although not a bad kid, was disinterested in school and was not responding to the various techniques used by teachers, counselors and administrators to make students more interested and improve their academic performance. During one counseling session Respondent, while in tears, promised Mrs. Waizenhofer to improve his school effort just a little. Twenty minutes later, Respondent was caught cutting class. One attempt at interesting Respondent in school, was to place him in the work experience program at Riviera. This consisted of securing employment for Respondent at Burger King on a part-time basis. Respondent was not able to hold the job for more than two weeks and he failed the program. Mrs. Thomas, assistant principal, and Mrs. Waizenhofer had numerous conferences with Respondent's mother. The parent, however, was not able to cause a change in Respondent's attitude toward school. It was recommended to both Respondent and his parent that assistance be sought at different community agencies, which could provide specialized counseling services at little or no cost. Despite the efforts made by the school administrators, no change was noted in Respondent. At Riviera, like other schools with regular school programs, the average number of students in a class is about thirty. Such schools are not geared to address peculiar student needs or provide individual students with continuous special attention. By contrast, at an opportunity school, such as the J. R. E. Lee Center, the ratio of teachers to students is about nine-to- one, students are the subject of individualized educational plans, and there are more counselors on staff, including a psychologist. The expert opinions of both Mrs. Thomas and Mrs. Waizenhofer was that the more structured environment at an opportunity school would be better for Respondent, as opposed to permitting him to remain in a regular school program where he was making no progress.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a final order affirming the assignment of Respondent Rommel Luis Montes to the J. R. E. Lee Center. DONE AND ORDERED this 17th day of March, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0294 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1-12, have been adopted in paragraphs 1-12, respectively. COPIES FURNISHED: Jaime Claudio Bovell, Esquire 370 Minorca Avenue Coral Gables, Florida 33134 Mrs. Estrella Montes 10030 Southwest 43rd Street Miami, Florida 33165 Dr. Leonard Britton, Superintendent Dade County Public Schools The School Board of Dade County, Florida 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Madelyn P. Schere, Esquire Assistant School Board Attorney Board Administration Building, Suite 301 1450 Northeast Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33132
