Findings Of Fact Respondent issued an invitation to bid on March 13, 1992. Bid number SB 92-244I involved the disassembly and removal of an existing walk-in freezer and the furnishing and installation of a new walk-in freezer at Coral Sunset Elementary School. The invitations to bid provided in paragraph Y of the Special Conditions: Failure to file a specification protest within the time prescribed in Florida Statutes 120.53 3.(b) shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. (sic) Bid specifications were included in the invitations to bid issued on March 13, 1992. Twenty-three bids were solicited. There were five responses. One of the responses was submitted by Choice Restaurant Equipment, Inc. ("Choice"). Choice is a vendor for equipment manufactured by Petitioner, Nor-Lake, Inc. ("Nor-Lake"). Nor-Lake is an out-of-state corporation with manufacturer's representatives in numerous states including Florida. 4, Petitioner, CHD Marketing Group ("CHD"), is the manufacturer's representative for Nor-Lake in Florida. CHD represents no other manufacturer of the product included in the bid response. Choice is a sales agent for CHD and other manufacturer's representatives in Florida. Choice sells the products of a variety of manufacturers but is the exclusive sales agent for CHD pursuant to a verbal agency agreement. Choice timely submitted a bid for bid number SB 92-244I on April 8, 1992, prior to the bid deadline of 2:00 p.m. on the same day. The successful bidder submitted its bid by Federal Express at 4:51 p.m on April 8, 1992. Respondent's Department of Purchasing and Stores (the "Department") had stated on March 13, 1992, when the invitations to bid were issued, that bid responses must be received by the Department no later than 2:00 p.m. on April 8, 1992, at the Department's address at 3980 RCA Boulevard/Suite 8044, Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, 33410-4276. Prior to April 8, 1992, the Department relocated to a new facility at 3326 Forest Hill Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida. The new address was posted at the old location and Department representatives were present at the old address to accept walk-in bids. Federal Express first attempted to deliver the successful bid at the Department's old address at 10:30 a.m. on April 8, 1992. Federal Express delivered the successful bid to the Department's new address at 4:51 p.m. At 2:00 p.m. on the same day, The Department announced that all bids were in and opened the bids that had been delivered. The successful bid and one other bid were delivered on April 8, 1992, after the public opening conducted at 2:00 p.m. on the same day. Bids were tabulated on April 9, 1992. Bid tabulations were posted on April 13, 1992, and the successful bid was announced. The successful bid was for $8,174.00. Three bids were lower than the successful bid. Choice's bid was for $7,742.56. The other two lower bids were for $8,020.00 and $6,620.00. All three lower bids were rejected as non- responsive. Choice's bid was rejected because it did not meet bid specifications for 22 gauge steel, thermostatically controlled door heaters, and reinforced steel door panels. CHD filed a Notice of Protest on April 14, 1992, and a Formal Written Protest on April 24, 1992. CHD's protest alleges that: Choice's bid was lower than that of the successful bidder; the successful bid was not timely made; the bids were not opened publicly in violation of bidding procedure requirements; and the bid specifications were arbitrary and capricious, favored one bidder, and that Choice's bid was responsive. Neither a notice of protest nor a formal written protest was submitted by Choice or Nor-Lake. Neither Choice nor Nor-Lake attended the informal protest conference conducted on April 30, 1992. On May 7, 1992, Respondent's Office of General Counsel issued its written notice of proposed agency action. The written notice recommended that the bid be awarded to the successful bidder and that CHD's protest be dismissed for lack of standing. CHD requested a formal hearing on May 14, 1992, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for assignment of a hearing officer on May 15, 1992. The bid submitted by Choice was prepared by CHD but signed by the president of Choice. Neither Nor-Lake nor CHD signed a bid or were otherwise bidders of record for bid number SB 92-244I. Neither Choice, CHD, nor Nor-Lake, filed a notice of protest concerning the bid specifications within 72 hours after Choice received the notice of the project plans and specifications on March 13, 1992. The sole basis upon which CHD claims it is substantially affected is the adverse economic impact caused to it by the proposed agency action. The proposed agency action will result in lost sales from this and future transactions. CHD will lose commissions from this and future transactions. The dealer relationship between CHD and Choice will be damaged because Choice will not want to sell a freezer that is not acceptable to Respondent. The marketing strategy developed between CHD and Nor-Lake will be damaged because it is conditioned upon the award of public contracts.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent Donald T. Dean held real estate broker's license No. 0020554, and was employed as a broker-salesman by Adkinson Agency, Inc., in Pensacola, Florida, at all pertinent times. Betty M. Davis was the firm's qualifying broker at all pertinent times. Listed with the agency in the summer of 1979 was an 87-acre parcel located near Perdido Bay in Escambia County. Respondent Dean acted as salesman for Adkinson Agency in the sale of this parcel to Penny Storts Milne and Robert Milne, Jr., her "husband at the time" (T. 134), who acquired the already subdivided property with the intention of offering four-acre tracts for resale. After the Milnes had contracted to purchase the property, but before the transaction closed, they listed the subdivided parcels with Adkinson Agency, respondent Dean being the listing broker, for sale, subject to their obtaining good title. At closing, the sellers of the 87-acre parcel conveyed not to the Milnes personally but to a corporation they controlled. Eventually, on September 21, 1979, a corporation organized specifically for the purpose, Miracle Strip Investments, Inc., took title. Early on there were discussions between respondent Dean and Mrs. Milne about his participation in a joint venture to develop the property, which came to be known as Laura Lake Estates, and a proposed joint venture agreement dated August 6, 1979, was drawn up and signed by respondent and Mrs. Milne. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. Mr. Milne declined to sign at that time, however. Even so, respondent continued to work on development of the property. All three signed a subsequent draft of a joint venture agreement on September 21, 1979. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Under the agreement, profits from the sale of the property, if any, were "to be divided equally, between" respondent and Miracle Strip Investment, Inc. The Milnes were to contribute capital and respondent was to secure various permits and oversee construction of drainage ditches, dirt roads and the like. FIRST RESALE PROSPECT In August of 1979, in response to an advertisement in the Pensacola News Journal, William L. Spence, who had just sold his house and was looking for another place to live, telephoned respondent Dean who took him out to Laura Lake Estates. There were no houses or trailers on the property, but respondent assured Mr. Spence that he would be able to move a trailer on to the lot within six weeks. A dirt road, intersected in heavy rains by a creek, ran in front of the four acres the Spences eventually chose. They deposited $300 earnest money against the agreed sales price of $8,000, on August 28, 1979. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. This price reflected fair market value at the time. No closing date was specified in the sales contract. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. On November 13, 1979, Mr. Spence applied for a permit to install a septic tank on the parcel No. 18. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. The application was granted on December 5, 1979, with conditions. Mr. Spence inquired about obtaining electricity for a trailer he planned to place on the lot; he spoke to Mark William Creswell of Gulf Power Company, who told him it would cost $1,200 to $1,400 to get power to the lot. Mr. Spence put in a culvert, used a backhoe and placed fill on the lot. A well was dug, with the understanding that Mr. Spence would bear the expense if good water was found. Even though good water was found (at 93 feet) and a usable well was in place, Mr. Spence balked at paying; whereupon the well digger removed the casing. Mr. Spence eventually abandoned his efforts to improve the property, and on February 20, 1980, obtained a refund of the earnest money. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. He never recovered other moneys he spent on the property. Respondent did not disclose his plans or hopes to enter into a joint venture with the Milnes at the time Mr. Spence signed the sales contract. When the earnest money was refunded, Mr. Dean signed a document as "Agent and Partner." At the time of the hearing, Laura Lake Estates was still uninhabited. BROKER AND SALESMAN Ms. Davis, respondent's broker, learned of respondent's participation in a joint venture when she found respondent's copies of the joint venture agreement and the predecessor draft in a book in his office on or about December, 31, 1979. More than three months earlier, Ms. Davis had agreed to defer half the agency's commission earned on the sale of Laura Lake Estates to the Milnes, even though she paid respondent his share, as selling agent, in full. Ms. Milne explained her agreement with Ms. Davis: Credit Thrift had agreed earlier to give us half of appraised price, as far as loaning us the money, and the day before we were to go to closing they changed that and said half of appraised price or half of contract price, whichever is less. Well, that put us forty- seven thousand dollars ($47,000.00) short - if I remember correctly, and I had a few days to come up with that much money, so one of the things I did with Betty is, I asked her -- They had an eight thousand something dollar ($8,000.00) commission coming due, and I asked her if we could pay - I don't remember if it was four thousand ($4,000.00) or half of it, at the closing, and then we would relist the property with Adkinson Agency with Don as the sales person, and any commissions from that would be paid to her direct- ly, and once the debts were paid off on the sale of that last parcel, she would get paid the other four thousand dollars ($4,000.00), and that way she would in fact get double commissions out of it because she would have the original sale plus the listing of the resale. And, that was to talk her into letting us go through with or postponing the commission, plus I would just as soon have had Don as my agent anyway. Q And Betty Davis agreed to this arrangement? A Yes. There was no time frame put on it however, and she subsequently got upset about the time frame. Q You mean the time frame of paying off this deferred commission? A Yes. There was no time frame placed on it. I just told her, when we got the other debts paid off, which means we close enough property to pay off everybody else, then she would get her commission, prior to me getting any money. Q Now, did you have any understanding as to how Don Dean would be paid, his commission? A I did not, that was between Don and Betty. Respondent never disclosed his interest in the venture to Ms. Davis, even after he signed the second joint venture agreement; and even though Ms. Davis had yet to be paid the full commission due. Respondent never made any money in his capacity as a joint venturer, although he was paid commissions. The findings of fact proposed in petitioner's proposed recommended order have been largely adopted in substance. To the extent they have been rejected, they have been deemed irrelevant or unsupported by the weight of the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED That Petitioner suspend respondent's license for thirty (30) days. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: W. Douglas Moody, Jr., Esquire 119 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Edmund W. Holt, Esquire Three West Garden Street 480 Blount Building Pensacola, Florida 32501 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William Furlow, Esquire P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, acted illegally, arbitrarily, fraudulently, or dishonestly in rejecting all bids for lease #460:0119 and not awarding subject lease to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Insurance established a requirement to lease 5371 square feet of office space in Daytona Beach, Florida, and a "Request for Space Need" was approved by the Department of Management Services on February 11, 1998. The Department of Insurance subsequently issued a Request for Proposal (RFP) for lease #460:0119 (Respondent's Exhibit 1). A non-mandatory pre-bid conference was held on June 1, 1998, in Daytona Beach and two prospective bidders, Petitioner and Nova Village Market partnership attended. The RFP provided that proposals which did not meet all mandatory requirements of the RFP would be rejected as non- responsive. The RFP provided for evaluation criteria are awards factors. The awards factors totaled 100 points with no minimum point total required. Ten of the points were allotted for moving costs defined as the costs of relocating communications, networks, furniture and other equipment. This factor gave the current landlord an automatic 10-point advantage since there would be no relocation costs. Moving costs provisions tend to discourage the presentation of bids because the bidders have to overcome an automatic 10-point advantage provided the current landlord. The RFP also provided that all proposals could be rejected, however, such "rejection shall not be arbitrary, but be based on strong justification." None of the conditions of the RFP were questioned or challenged by interested parties. Two responses were received by the Department of Insurance in response to the RFP and these were opened in Respondent's Tallahassee office on July 8, 1998, by Mr. Kip Wells of the Department. One was received from the current landlord, Nova Village Partnership, hereafter Nova, and the other from the Petitioner. The Nova proposal was deemed non-responsive. Neither Nova nor Petitioner contested the determination that Nova's proposal was non-responsive. Only one responsive proposal, the Petitioner's proposal, remained. On July 9, 1998, the Department representative, Mr. Kip Wells, called Petitioner to schedule an appointment for 9:00 a.m., on July 10, 1998, to visit and evaluate the proposed facility. No persons from the Department appeared at the scheduled appointment. At 10:45 a.m., on July 10, 1998, Kip Wells called Petitioner to say that since Petitioner's proposal was the only responsive proposal received, and that "all bids" were being rejected. Mr. Wells testified at hearing. His reason for rejecting the remaining bid was: When I saw that it was obvious the current landlord was not going to be very cooperative, I decided that one choice was not enough. If we were going to have to make a move, we needed more than one thing to choose from. So, I immediately - - since I had already set up with local people in Daytona to tell them that I was coming down to evaluate the bids, I sent them an E-mail and told them that I would not be meeting the following day to evaluate the bids. Mr. Wells decided to reissue the RFP without any moving costs criteria, and redistribute those 10 points among the other award factors. Petitioner filed a Notice of Intent to Protest and then a Formal Protest, both in a timely fashion. There is no state policy prohibiting the award of a lease to a sole bidder on a RFP. The "Leasing Policy" of the Department of Insurance states that "The Lease Administrator, with assistance from the Division employees, will establish bid or quote specifications. These specifications will include special needs for the Division(s) as well as the evaluation criteria upon which to evaluate the proposals." Neither the Department's Lease Policy (Petitioner Exhibit 3) nor the State's Real Property Leasing Manual (Petitioner's Exhibit 4) give the Lease Administrator the authority to reject or evaluate bid responses. Neither does he have a vote in the bid evaluation process. His responsibility is to coordinate the process. Randall Baker, Manager of Private Sector Leasing of the Bureau of Property Management of the Department of Management Services (hereinafter DMS), testified. The DMS prepares a manual as a guideline for user agencies to assist in the leasing of property. The DMS manual is not binding on agencies and DMS has no review oversight; however, their comments on agencies' leases are reviewed by the state auditing authorities and failure to follow the guidelines can result in audit criticism. Baker confirmed that the agency's written procedures as outlined in the RFP were consistent with the DMS guidelines. The DMS manual states as follows regarding the receipt of only one responsive proposal: When only one responsive proposal is received it may be considered and accepted providing the following conditions are documented: Adequate competition was solicited. The rate is within established rental rate guidelines. The proposal meets stated requirements. The proposal was processed as though other proposals were received. The Petitioner's bid was responsive to the RFP and the lease rate bid by the Petitioner was less than the average rate for state leases in the Daytona area and less than the amount budgeted by the Department for this lease. The lease rate by the Petitioner was reasonably priced and competitive. Although the agency failed to complete the process as envisioned, see paragraph 20 below, this was in no way the fault of Petitioner. The Department's leasing policy requires that the lowest and best response to an RFP be determined through cost analysis and evaluation by an evaluation committee. Mr. Wells did not forward Petitioner's bid to or discuss with the evaluation committee Petitioner's bid, but unilaterally rejected it. It was clear from Mr. Wells' testimony that this was his individual decision and was based upon his personal belief that it was the best thing to do.1 At hearing, the stated justification for rejecting "all bids" was that it gave the Department the opportunity to delete the requirement of moving costs from the awards factors; however, the evidence does not indicate that the moving cost provision result in non-competitive bids. The sole responsive bidder was within the local lease price range and within budget. Neither the Respondent nor DMS has established a policy prohibiting the acceptance of a sole responsive bid if there is competition solicited. The Department of Insurance has accepted a sole bid on at least one project in the past. There was no evidence that the RFP was not an open and fair competition. The evidence shows that it was properly advertised, that all conditions were known, and that all interested parties had an equal opportunity to participate. In sum, there was adequate competition in submitting the bids. Mr. Baker testified regarding the policy of DMS. The DMS policy is that if there is one responsive bidder, there has been competitive bidding. The RFP provides that the Respondent may reject all bids if it has strong justification. See paragraph 5 above. Mr. Baker also provided examples of "strong justification for rejecting proposals." His examples include facilities which are proposed outside the required geographic area, prices considerably in excess of state guidelines and agency budgets, specification changes due to modification of the agency's program requirements, and "intervening external forces." No evidence establishing a strong justification for rejecting the Petitioner's bid was presented. Without completing the process and evaluating the Petitioner's bid, the agency never considered whether the bid was in the state's best interest. However, this was not the fault of the Respondent, and the agency's failure to follow its procedures should not inure to its benefits. Further, Because there was no minimum score required on the evaluation criteria of the RFP, there is no need to evaluate Petitioner's proposal because it is the only responsive proposal. For all the reasons stated above, the rejection of Petitioner's bid was contrary to the terms of the RFP, contrary to state policy, and arbitrary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which finds that: Respondent's actions in rejecting Petitioner's responsive bid were arbitrary; The Respondent did not follow the requirements set forth in the Department of Insurance Leasing Policy, nor the Department of Management Services Real Property Leasing Manual, or the Request for Proposal itself; That no adverse interest to the State or the Department would have occurred had Petitioner's responsive bid been accepted; and therefore, Petitioner's claim shall be upheld as the lowest cost and best proposal for RFP #460:0119, and that the Department of Insurance shall award Petitioner Lease #460:0119. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1998.
Findings Of Fact During March 1988, the Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid by which it sought to lease 17,973 net usable square feet of office space to be located within a specified geographic area in Tampa, Florida, under a nine year lease with two additional three year option periods. This Invitation to Bid is referred to as Lease Number 590:1927. Three bids were received in response to the Invitation to Bid, and they were opened on May 13, 1988. Bids were received from the Petitioner, 8900 Centre, Ltd., and the Allen Morris Management Company. All bidders were determined to be responsive to the Invitation to Bid. Despite the fact that petitioner submitted the lowest bid, Respondent notified Petitioner by letter dated June 10, 1988, of its intent to award Lease Number 590:1927 to 8900 Centre, Ltd., as the lowest and best bidder. Petitioner has timely filed its protest seeking review of that decision. It is undisputed that Petitioner submitted the lowest bid. For the first year of the lease, Petitioner bid $7.85 per square foot, while 8900 Centre bid $7.95 per square foot. Thereafter, Petitioner proposed a yearly increase of 50 cents per square foot, reaching $11.85 per square foot in the ninth year of the lease, while 8900 Centre proposed annual increases of approximately 75 cents, reaching $14.00 per square foot in the ninth year. This equates to an actual dollar difference over the nine year term of approximately 185,000. However, using a present value methodology and a present value discount rate of 8.81 percent referred to on page 17 of the bid submittal form, the present value difference in these two bids is approximately $1,000 per month, which would result in a present value difference between Petitioner and 8900 Centre of approximately $108,000 over the nine year period. Neither the Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, nor the actual bids were offered into evidence. One page of the bid submittal form, designated as page 17 of 18, was offered and received in evidence. This portion of the bid submittal form states that the "successful bid will be that one determined to be the lowest and best." It also sets forth evaluation criteria, and assigns weights to each criteria. The evaluation criteria include associated fiscal costs (35 points), location (40 points) and facility factors (25 points) . A synopsis of bids was also offered and received in evidence showing the points awarded to each bidder by the Respondent's bid evaluation committed. Out of a possible 100 points, 8900 Centre received 95.17 points, while Petitioner received 82.25 points and the Allen Morris Management Company received 70.67 points. Petitioner asserts that the members of the evaluation committee were not qualified or knowledgeable in basic construction, design and engineering principles, and therefore could not competently evaluate the bids submitted. However, Petitioner did not offer competent substantial evidence to support this contention. Only the chairperson of the committee, Susan Jennings, was called to testify, and she appeared thoroughly knowledgeable in the bid process, the needs of the agency, the bid requirements and the representations made to the committee members by each bidder, including Petitioner, when the committee made its site visit to each location. Since the actual Invitation to Bid, bid specifications, and evidence about the other committee members were not introduced, it is not possible to know what the specific duties of the committee were, how they were to carry out their duties their qualifications and training, and whether they failed to competently carry out these duties, as alleged by Petitioner. Despite Petitioner's lower bid, Respondent awarded this lease to 8900 Centre, Ltd., based upon the evaluation committee's determination assigning 8900 Centre the highest number of evaluation points. Out of a possible 35 points for fiscal costs, Petitioner received 34 and 8900 Centre received 31.5. Thus, Petitioner's status as low bidder is reflected in the points awarded by the committee. Since neither the bid invitation or specifications were introduced, no finding can be made as to whether the difference between these two bidders comports with any instructions or directions provided by the agency to potential bidders, or whether this difference of 2.5 points on this criteria reasonably reflects and accounts for the dollar difference in these two bids. Petitioner received 34.75 points out of a possible 40 points on the general evaluation criteria "location," while 8900 Centre received the full 40 points. Within this criteria, there were three subcategories, and on the first two subcategories (central area and public transportation) there was an insignificant difference of less than one-half point between Petitioner and 8900 Centre. The major difference between these two bidders which accounts for their significant difference on the location criteria, was in the subcategory of environmental factors, in which Petitioner received 15.17 points and 8900 Centre received the full 20 points. Petitioner did not present competent substantial evidence to discredit or refute the committee's evaluation in the subcategory of environmental factors. To the contrary, the only testimony from a committee member was that of Susan Jennings, and according to her, Petitioner failed to explain the availability of individual air conditioning and heating controls, or the possibility of separate program entrances, which could be made available under its bid. Although Petitioner sought to explain at hearing that these desires of the agency could be accommodated in its bid, there is no evidence that such an explanation was provided in its bid or during the bid process when the evaluation committee visited the Petitioner's site. The committee was aware, however, that 8900 Centre would provide individual heating and air conditioning controls, as well as separate outside entrances for the three programs which would occupy the leased space. Additionally, the committee was concerned, according to Jennings, that parking areas at Petitioner's facility were more remote and removed from the building entrance than at 8900 Centre, and were somewhat obscured by trees and shrubbery, thereby presenting a potential safety concern for employees working after dark. Finally, every employee would either have a window or window access at 8900 Centre, while it was not explained that Petitioner's site would offer a similar feature. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the evaluation committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for environmental factors to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. The evidence reflects a reasonable basis for this difference. The other significant difference between these two bidders was in the subcategory for layout and utilization under the evaluation criteria "facility." Petitioner received 13.67 points while 8900 Centre received a full 20 points. Jennings explained that the separate outside entrances leading directly into the three programs that would occupy this space was preferred to a single reception area for all three programs. Petitioner offered the single reception area in its bid and site visit presentation, while 8900 Centre made it clear that each program would have its own entrance. Since these programs do not have a receptionist position, and none wanted to give up a secretarial position to serve as receptionist for all three programs, the committee did not consider the single reception area entrance to be desirable. Additionally, Petitioner's facility was a two-story building, while 8900 Centre is a single story facility. Jennings explained that the committee considered a ground level facility to be preferable to a two story building, particularly since the Medicaid program was to occupy the major portion of this space. The Medicaid program would have to be split up at Petitioner's facility, either in two separate buildings or on two levels of the same building, while at 8900 Centre, Medicaid could be accommodated in one, single story building, with the other two programs in a second, single story building. Finally, parking at 8900 Centre was directly next to, and outside the entrance of the building, while Petitioner offered to make assigned spaces available in a general parking area which serves its entire 100,000 square foot complex. The parking offered by Petitioner is more remote than that offered by 8900 Centre, and would be less secure at night due to a greater distance from the building entrances and the parking lot. Thus, Petitioner failed to establish that the committee erred in assigning a significantly greater number of points for layout and utilization to 8900 Centre than to Petitioner. There is a reasonable basis for this difference, according to the evidence in the record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's protest to Lease Number 590:1927. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of December 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case Number 88-3765 BID) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted, in part, in Finding of Fact 1, but Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 3-5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4, but Rejected in 7. 6-7. Rejected in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected in Finding of Fact 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record. Rejected in Findings of Fact 9 and 10, and otherwise as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 1, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3-4. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 5 and 6, but otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence in the record of this case. Adopted In Findings of Fact 5, 7-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary since the point difference in this subcategory is insignificant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of fact 10. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael V. Giordano, Esquire 7821 North Dale Mabry Suite 100 Tampa, Florida 33614 Jack Farley, Esquire W. T. Edwards Facility 4000 West Buffalo Fifth Floor, Room 520 Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Herbert Lane is guilty of violation of Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Herbert Lane is a registered real estate salesman. Herbert Lane was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered, Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Herbert Lane as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire and Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Herbert Lane 3890 Swenson Apts. No. 503 Las Vegas, Nevada 89109 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 77-208 PROGRESS DOCKET HERBERT LANE, NO. 2960 DADE COUNTY Respondent. /
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Transportation (DOT), arbitrarily refused to accept the low bid submitted by the Petitioner, Quinn Construction, Inc. (Quinn), and Bay Machine, Inc., for State Project No. 15200-3902.
Findings Of Fact On or about December 7, 1994, the Petitioner, Quinn Construction, Inc. (Quinn), submitted a $1,695,534.84 bid on behalf of Quinn and Bay Machine, Inc., in response to a November, 1994, Department of Transportation (DOT) solicitation for bids on State Project No. 15200-3902. State Project No. 15200-3902 was essentially the same project for which the DOT previously solicited bids on or about July 1, 1994. The earlier solicitation for bids was cancelled when all bids were rejected, and the bid solicitation process was reinitiated. All bidders were required to furnish a bid guaranty, and the parties stipulate that any bid not accompanied by a bid guaranty would be declared nonresponsive. Attached to the Quinn/Bay Machine bid was a Bid or Proposal Bond on DOT Form 375-020-09. There was only one bridge rehabilitation project for Pinellas County among the projects for which the DOT was opening bids on December 7, 1994, and the bid bond was attached to the bid proposal of Quinn and Bay Machine for State Project No. 15200-3902. Utilizing the DOT form, the Quinn bid bond described the proposal being bonded as being "for constructing or otherwise improving a road(s) and/or bridge(s) or building(s) in Pinellas County; particularly known as Bayway 7918 Bridge Rehab." The part of the form calling for identification of the "Project No." was left blank. The bid bond was executed by James M. Moore as attorney- in-fact for North American Specialty Insurance Company. In addition to calling for the "Project No." in DOT Bid or Proposal Bond Form 375-020-09, the DOT routinely furnishes all bidders a Bidder's Checklist which reminds bidders to use the form and to identify the project on the form by county, by the federal aid number(s), if applicable, and by the State Project Job Number. Although the Bidder's Checklist was not in the bid package received by Quinn in connection with the November, 1994, solicitation for bids, Quinn received a Bidder's Checklist for the July, 1994, solicitation for bids on the same project and for many other previous bid solicitations. In prior bid proposal submissions, including the bid proposal submitted for the same project in August, 1994, Quinn had its surety use the "Project No." to identify the project on the bid bond. The attorney-in-fact for the bond company testified that the number 7918 on the bond was a typographical error. He testified that he thought 798 was the number that was supposed to be on the bond to identify the project. The WPI No. for the project was 7116982. The applicable State Road number was 679. The applicable bridge number was 150049. Although DOT Bid or Proposal Bond on DOT Form 375-020-09 called for identification of the "Project No.," DOT would have accepted a bid bond that identified the project by any of these numbers or by the official name of the bridge, if any. The bridge in question has no official name. It was not even proven that the bridge is commonly known as the Bayway 7918 Bridge, or even as the Bayway Bridge. The bridge in question is part of the Pinellas Bayway, which is a system of roads, causeways and bridges connecting St. Petersburg and St. Petersburg Beach and several small keys in Boca Ciega Bay. There are two state roads on the Pinellas Bayway: State Road 682, which connects State Road 699 to the west on St. Petersburg Beach to Interstate 275 to the east in St. Petersburg; and State Road 679, which intersects State Road 682 and runs south through Tierra Verde into Fort DeSoto Park on Mullet Key. Both 682 and 679 have combination fixed-span and bascule (draw) bridges. The bridge in question is on 679. When the DOT opened the bid of Quinn and Bay Machine, the incorrect identification of the project on the bid bond was noticed, and the question was referred to the Technical Review Committee. During its meeting on December 21, 1994, the Technical Review Committee sought the advice of its legal counsel and was advised that the bond probably would not be enforceable due to the inaccurate identification of the project to which it pertained. Based in part on the advice of counsel, the Technical Review Committee voted unanimously to recommend to the DOT Contract Awards Committee that the bid proposal be rejected as being non-responsive because of the bid bond. On December 23, 1994, the Contract Awards Committee met and voted unanimously to reject the bid proposal as being non-responsive because of the bid bond. Instead, the Committee accepted the bid proposal of M & J Construction Company of Pinellas County, Inc. (M & J). It was not arbitrary for the DOT to conclude that the Quinn bid bond was, or might well have been, unenforceable due to the inaccurate identification of the project to which it pertained. The DOT did not even consider whether the Quinn bid bond also may have been invalid and unenforceable because it named just Quinn as the principal, instead of both Quinn and Bay Machine, the actual entity that was prequalified to bid on the project and the actual entity bidding on the project. It also was not arbitrary for the DOT to conclude that submitting an unenforceable bid bond is not a minor irregularity. If a successful bidder does not enter into a contract, the project would be delayed while it is being rebid. The delay itself would result in a monetary loss. In addition, rebidding the project would result in additional costs to the DOT. Submitting an unenforceable bid bond could give a bidder the competitive advantage of feeling able to escape from having to contract and perform in accordance with a low bid, if advantageous to the bidder, without being liable under the bid bond.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the Petitioner's bid protest and awarding State Project No. 15200-3902 to M & J Construction Company of Pinellas County, Inc. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-0564BID To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. (It appears that the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are found at pages 2-5 of its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. For purposes of these rulings, the unnumbered paragraphs on those pages are assigned consecutive numbers.) Rejected in part. (Joint Exhibit 2 refers to State Road 679, not the project, as having the "Local Name: Pinellas Bayway." Joint Exhibit 5 also only refers to State Road 679, not the project, by the name "Pinellas Bayway." Only the front covers of the technical specs refer to the "Pinellas Bayway Bridge." The other pages refer to the "Pinellas Bayway," and all of the pages also include the State Project Number.) Otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Second and last sentences, rejected as not proven. Rejected in part as argument and in part as not proven. Last sentence accepted, but ambiguous and not legally significant, subordinate and unnecessary, whether DOT could "tie" the bid bond to the bid. Penultimate sentence, rejected in part as not proven (that Exhibit 4 "identified the project as the Pinellas Bayway"); otherwise, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. The rest is accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. First sentence, rejected as not proven. (The evidence was clear that the DOT form requires a state project number and that the Bidder's Checklist provided to bidders by the DOT reminds bidders to use the form and identify the project by county, federal aid number(s), if applicable, and State Project Job Number.) Second sentence, subordinate and cumulative. Rejected as conclusion of law. Last sentence rejected as not proven that North American identified the project or that it used the local name of the bridge. The rest is rejected as not proven because the evidence was clear that the DOT form requires a state project number and that the Bidder's Checklist provided to bidders by the DOT reminds bidders to use the form and identify the project by county, federal aid number(s), if applicable, and State Project Job Number.) Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that DOT was arbitrary. The rest is subordinate, in part cumulative and in part argument. Subordinate, cumulative and argument. Rejected in part as conclusion of law, in part as argument and in part as not proven. Respondent's and Intervenor's Proposed Findings of Fact. All of the DOT's and the Intervenor's proposed findings of fact are accepted and are incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary or argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne Quinn, Esquire 1321 77th Street East Palmetto, Florida 34221 Thomas H. Duffy, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Joseph G. Thresher, Esquire One Mack Center 501 E. Kennedy Bouelvard, Suite 725 Tampa, Florida 33602 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, a Florida-licensed yacht salesman, should be disciplined for violation of Rule 61B- 60.006(2), Florida Administrative Code, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated May 10, 2000.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, DBPR, through its Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (the Division) was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing and discipline of yacht salespersons and brokers in this state and the regulation of the yacht-brokering profession. Respondent, Justo Lamar (Lamar), has been licensed as a yacht salesperson since November 1976. Prior to this action, Lamar has never been the subject of disciplinary action arising out of the practice of his profession. This action was precipitated by a yacht owner, Juan A. Galan (Galan), who unsuccessfully attempted to sell his yacht to a client of Lamar's. In July 1998, Galan listed his yacht, the Caliente, for sale through Ardell Yacht and Ship Brokers (Ardell). The listing resulted in negotiations for the purchase of the Caliente by one Larry Griggs (Griggs), a prospective customer represented by Lamar. At all times relevant to this case, Lamar was acting as a sales agent for Allied Marine and its broker, Dwight Tracy (Tracy). As set forth in more detail below, the negotiations between Galan and Griggs took place over a three-month period from October 1998 through December 1998 with no meeting of the minds. On July 12, 1999, some seven months after negotiations between Griggs and Galan terminated, Galan lodged a complaint with DBPR. Although the complaint was ostensibly directed against salesman Lamar and broker Tracy, each and every allegation in the complaint was directed to the broker's conduct, not Lamar's. Galan, who did not testify at final hearing, alleged in his complaint that "Broker presented a contract representing that deposit had been received/deposited (upon acceptance). In fact, broker never deposited check and we wasted our time and money on survey/sea trial as buyer was not (at that time or any time later) financially capable of buying boat @ $1.75 million." Galan provided some, but by no means all, of the documents which revealed the details of the prolonged and ultimately unsuccessful negotiations between Galan and Griggs. In the narrative portion of his complaint, Galan asserted that he lost money on sea trials and implied, without actually stating, that the Caliente had been taken off the market during the pendency of negotiations with Griggs. For reasons which remain unclear, the Division did not focus its investigation on Tracy, who was the obvious target of Galan's complaint. Instead, it targeted Lamar, who was an obvious add-on target of Galan's ire. The exhibits reveal a complex series of offers and counteroffers and jockeying for negotiating advantage, not just between Galan and Griggs as prospective Seller and Buyer of the Caliente, but also between Lamar and the two brokers, all three of whom stood to profit if the transaction were consummated. Negotiations for the Caliente began in late October 1998. On October 30, 1998, Lamar's client Griggs, through a corporation he controlled, issued a $150,000 check for "Deposit, 72' (sic) Caliente Sportfisherman." This check accompanied a Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement dated October 29, 1998, offering to purchase the Caliente for $1,500,000. That same day, Galan's representatives faxed Lamar to advise that Griggs' offer was insufficient. Lamar forthwith provided the check to his broker, Tracy. Negotiations between Galan and Griggs continued in November. Galan chose to by-pass his own Broker and negotiate directly with Lamar over lunch on November 18, 1998. Lamar wrote Galan's demands on the back of a restaurant placemat. The primary sticking point was Galan's insistence on a "bottom line" of $1,665,000 to him, after all commissions and other expenses, if any, were paid. Griggs nevertheless persevered in his effort to buy the Caliente for $1,500,000. On November 24, 2000, Griggs executed another Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement in which he offered an entity called Majua, Inc., of which Galan was President, the opportunity to sell the Caliente to Griggs for $1,500,000. Galan signed the November 24 agreement, but added an addendum which materially changed the terms. The addendum unilaterally purported to raise the sales prices to Galan's previously stated "bottom line" of $1,665,000. Thanksgiving passed, and negotiations wore on. On December 4, 1998, Griggs executed a third Brokerage Purchase and Sale Agreement, raising his offer to $1,755,000. The new offer expressly stipulated that Griggs' $150,000 earnest money check could be deposited when and if all parties executed this new proposed agreement. Like the October 29 and November 24 brokerage purchase and sale agreements, the December 4 document never ripened into a contract. The December 4 document was a clear and unembarrassed reminder from Griggs that an earnest money check had been written by Griggs, but was not on deposit, and was not going to be on deposit until such time as Galan had signed off on the contract as written by Griggs. Galan nevertheless permitted a sea trial of the Caliente in furtherance of negotiations, now in their fifth week. Also as part of the negotiating process, Galan permitted some, but not all, of the inspections requested by Griggs. Expenses for the sea trial and inspections were borne entirely by Griggs. By Christmas Eve, relations between the parties had deteriorated to the point where Lamar retrieved the check from the Allied Marine corporate files and returned it to Griggs. At no time did negotiations with Lamar's client Griggs preclude or interfere with efforts by Galan to negotiate with and sell the Caliente to any other prospective purchaser.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that DBPR enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2001.
The Issue Whether Eli Paris is guilty of violation at Section 475.25(1)(a) and (2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Eli Paris is a registered real estate salesman. Eli Paris was employed by International Land Services Chartered, Inc. He was paid by International Land Sales Chartered Inc.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Eli Paris, as a registered real estate salesman. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of April, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Manuel E. Oliver, Esquire Charles Felix, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Eli Paris (Represented himself) 7917 West Drive North Bay Village Miami, Florida 33141 ================================================================= AGENCY MEMORANDUM ================================================================= TO: Renata Hendrick, Registration Supervisor FROM: Manuel E. Oliver, Staff Attorney RE: JD 78-018 (PD2772) - FREC vs. Richard H. White JD 78-020 (PD2963) - FREC vs. Eli Paris CASE NO. 77-211 JD 78-021 (PD2783) - FREC vs. Marian Malt Please be advised that the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District, rendered its opinion in the above cases, on July 17, 1979, unholding the Board's Final Order revoking these licensees' licenses. The DCA's order became effective on September 26, 1979, after the above named exhausted their appellate remedies.
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Respondent's intended award of a lease for office space to Intervenor, Anthony Abraham Enterprise, is arbitrary and capricious and whether the proposal of the Petitioner, Adlee Developers, the current lessor, is responsive.
Findings Of Fact The parties agreed that on April 7, 1991, the Department issued an Invitation to Bid entitled, "Invitation To Bid For Existing Facilities State Of Florida Lease Number 590:2286, Dade County" This procurement was for the provision of 30,086 net rentable square feet to be used for office space in Dade County. A 3% variance was permitted. The facility was to house the District's Aging and Adult Services office which has been a tenant in Petitioner's building for several years and remained there during the pendancy of this protest process. According to the published advertisement, a pre-proposal conference was to be held on April 22, 1991, with all bids due by the bid opening to be held at 10:00 AM on May 30, 1991. The pre-bid conference was conducted by Philip A. Davis, then the District's facilities service manager and included not only a written agenda but also a review of the evaluation process by which each responsive bid would be examined. Petitioner asserts that the potential bidders were told, at that conference, that annual rental increases for the ten year lease period could not exceed five per cent (5%) and claims that Abraham's bid exceeded those guidelines. Thorough examination of the documentary evidence presented and the transcript of the proceedings, including a search for the reference thereto in Petitioner's counsel's Proposed Findings of Fact, fails to reveal any support for that assertion as to an increase limitation. The ITB for this procurement, in the section related to the evaluation of bids, indicated that pursuant to the provisions of Sections 5-3 and 5-11 of HRSM 70-1, dealing with the procurement of leased space, the responsive bids would be reviewed by an evaluation committee which would visit each proposed facility and apply the evaluation criteria to it in order to determine the lowest and best bidder. The evaluation criteria award factors listed in the ITB defined a successful bid as that one determined to be the lowest and best. That listing of evaluation criteria outlined among its categories associated fiscal costs, location, and facility. As to the first, the committee was to look at rental rates for both the basic term of the lease and the optional renewal period. The rates were to be evaluated using present value methodology applying the present value discount rate of 8.08% and rates proposed were to be within projected budgeting restraints of the Department. The total weight for the rental rate category was to be no more than 40 points with 35 points being the maximum for the basic term and 5 points for the option. Evaluation of the location was to be based on the effect of environmental factors including the physical characteristics of the building and the area surrounding it on the efficient and economical conduct of the operations planned therefor. This included the proximity of the facility to a preferred area such as a co-location, a courthouse, or main traffic areas. This item carried a maximum weight of 10 points. Also included in location were the frequency and availability of public transportation, (5 points); the proximity of the facility to the clients to be served, (5 points); the aesthetics of not only the building but the surrounding neighborhood, (10 points); and security issues, (10 points). The third major factor for evaluation was the facility itself and here the committee was to examine the susceptibility of the offered space to efficient layout and good utilization, (15 points), and the susceptibility of the building, parking area and property as a whole to possible future expansion, (5 points). In that regard, the Bid Submittal Form attached to the ITB called for the successful bidder whose property did not have appropriate zoning at the time of award to promptly seek zoning appropriate to the use classification of the property so that it might be used for the purposes contemplated by the department within 30 days. In the event that could not be done, the award could be rescinded by the department without liability. The committee could award up to 100 points. The basic philosophy of this procurement was found in paragraph 1 of the Bid Award section of the ITB which provided: The department agrees to enter into a lease agreement based on submission and acceptance of the bid in the best interest of the department and the state. After the bid opening, three of the four bids received, excluding Petitioner's which was initially determined to be non-responsive, were evaluated by the Department's bid evaluation committee according to the above point system which allowed no discretion or deviation from the formula in comparing rental rates between bidders. Once Petitioner's bid was thereafter determined to be responsive, it, too was evaluated by the committee. At this second evaluation session, relating to Adlee's bid only, the committee scored the bid and added its scores to the original score sheets upon which the other three bidders' scores had been placed. Abraham had the lowest rental rates for the basic term of the lease and received the maximum award of 35 points for that category while Adlee received points. Abraham received an additional 2.29 points for the optional period rates while Adlee got 0. In the other categories, "location" and "facility", which comprised 60% of the points, Adlee's facility was routinely rated superior to Abraham's except for the area related to susceptibility for future expansion in which Abraham was rated higher by a small amount. Overall, however, Adlee was awarded 620.41 points and Abraham 571.03 points and as a result, Adlee was rated by the committee to be the lowest and best bidder. RCL, another bidder, was rated second, with Abraham third and DCIC fourth. Thereafter, the committee chairman, Mr. VanWerne, forwarded the new (and complete) evaluation results to the District Administrator on June 14, 1991 by an addendum dated June 27, 1991 which recommended award of the bid to Petitioner, Adlee Developers. No award was made at the time. Several factors not pertinent to the issues here caused that delay. Among the major of these was pending legislation which would have transferred the operation needing this space to another agency. This transfer was never consummated, however. On or before March 20, 1992, the new District Administrator, Mr. Towey, who had been appointed to his office in December, 1991, and who was made aware that this procurement had not been finalized, requested all available material on it so that he could study it and make his decision based on his own review of the submission. As a part of his determination process, he visited and inspected both the Adlee and the Abraham sites. One of the factors he considered was what appeared to be the significant monetary discrepancy between the two pertinent bids. Initial calculations indicated that Abraham's bid was approximately $835,000.00 lower than Adlee's over the ten year basic term of the lease. This amount was subsequently determined to be somewhat lower but the discrepancy is still significant. Nonetheless, because of that difference, Mr. Towey called a meeting with the members of the evaluation committee which had evaluated the bidders and had recommended Adlee. His stated reason for calling that meeting was to allow him to hear their reasons for rating the submissions as they had done and to take that information into consideration when he made his final decision. None of the committee members who testified at the hearing at Petitioner's behest indicated any feelings of pressure or intimidation by Mr. Towey. During his meeting with the committee members, Mr. Towey went over several of the evaluation criteria award factors to determine the committee's rationale. Of major importance was the issue of cost, of the availability of the facility to transportation to and from the building, employee security and the ability to control access to the facility, and the availability of on-site parking without cost to both employees and clients. It appears the Adlee facility is a multistory building with some parking available on site and would be easier to control. In addition, it is closer to public transportation access points. There is, however, some indication that on-site parking for clients would not be free and the closest free parking is some distance away. According to Adlee's representative, this matter would not be a problem, however, as adequate, free on site parking, which apparently was not initially identified as a problem, could be provided in any new lease. The Abraham facility is a one story building surrounded by on-site parking. In that regard, however, at hearing, Petitioner raised the claim that the Abraham site did not, in actuality, provide adequate parking because the zoning requirements of the City of South Miami, the municipality in which the facility is located, did not permit the required number of parking spaces to accommodate the prospective need. Petitioner sought and received permission to depose the Building and Zoning Director for the city, Sonia Lama, who ultimately indicated that the Abraham site was grandfathered in under the old zoning rule and, thereby, had adequate parking available. In any case, had this not been true, under the terms of the ITB, any zoning deficiencies could have been corrected after award, or the award rescinded without penalty to the Department. After the meeting with the committee, Mr. Towey indicated he would probably go against the committee's recommendation. One of his reasons for doing so, as he indicated to them, was the appearance certain amenities in the facility would give. In the period between the time the committee met and Mr. Towey was ready to decide, there were several newspaper articles published in the Miami area which were negative in their approach to Department leasing policies and this publicity had an effect on him. In his response to a reporter's question, in fact, Mr. Towey indicated he would not permit the lease of any property which contained such amenities while he was District Director. There is some evidence that the wet bar referred to here was a sink and counter used by agency employees to make coffee. However, before making his decision, Mr. Towey also met with Herbert Adler of Adlee. Mr. Towey advised him he was concerned about the fact that the Adlee property provided a wet bar, a private bathroom and some other amenities in that suite of offices occupied by the Department. Mr. Towey was adamant in his public and private pronouncements on the subject that there would be no such amenities in HRS offices in his District while he was in charge. At the meeting in issue, Mr. Adler made it very clear he was willing to remove all the offending amenities to bring the space into conformity with Mr. Towey's standards. Mr. Towey obviously took Adler at his word as he did not consider this matter to be an issue when he evaluated the bids. Based on his independent evaluation of the proposals, and considering all the pertinent factors, Mr. Towey decided not to concur with the committee's recommendation and instead recommended to the Department's Office of General Services that the bid be awarded to Abraham. Because his recommendation differed from that of the evaluation committee, under the provisions of Section 5-13, HRS Manual 70-1, he was required to forward additional justification for his position. In his forwarding memorandum dated March 20, 1992 to Mr. King Davis of the Department's Office of General Services, Mr. Towey listed as his reasons for disagreement with the committee's recommendation, (1) the lower term cost of Abraham's bid, (2) his opinion that the one story floor plan of Abraham was more convenient and accessible to clients, and (3) the provision for ample free parking at the Abraham site as opposed to the limited parking at the Adlee building. Petitioner claims that Mr. Towey's justification for disagreement was improper because, (a) the rental difference he cited was not based on the ITB formula and did not consider the difference in square footage offered; (b) the rental rate comparison compared a proposed lease with an existing lease, not with a proposal; and (c) the reference to on-site parking referred to the situation under the existing lease with Adlee and not to what could occur under a new lease. The major factor in Mr. Towey's decision was the price differential between the two offerings. While the difference may not have been as great as presented initially by the department staff, even taken in its most conservative light of about half that amount, and considering the appropriate figures, the difference was still considerable and significant. In the continuing period of budgetary austerity under which state operations have been and must continue to be conducted, the financial consideration loomed large in his thinking. As for the parking situation, no change for the better was provided for in Adlee's proposal and even if it were, it was but one of several factors. When Mr. Towey's March 20, 1992 memorandum in justification of his disagreement was evaluated at the Office of General services, it was determined that his decision was rational and objectively justified. Thereafter, by letter dated April 2, 1992, the Office of General Services authorized District 11 to award the lease to Abraham and this decision was transmitted to all responsive bidders by letter dated April 7, 1992. It was this action which prompted Petitioner's protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the protest by Adlee Developers, Inc., of the award of procurement No. 590:2286 to Anthony Abraham Enterprises. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of July, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of July, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2798 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted that the pre-bid conference was held but reject the finding that a 5% limit was mentioned. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 11. Accepted and incorporated herein. 12. - 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted except for the next to last sentence which is rejected. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted but not probative of any material issue. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 30. Rejected. - 33. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT AND INTERVENOR: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. - 5. Accepted. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 16. Accepted and incorporated herein. 17. - 19. Accepted and incorporated herein. 20. & 21. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 25. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Melinda S. Gentile, Esquire Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell 200 East Broward Blvd. P.O. Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Paul J. Martin, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol - Suite 1501 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Peter W. Homer, Esquire Greer, Homer & Bonner, P.A. 3400 International Place 100 S.E. 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 John Slye General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power Agency Clerk DHRS 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact Until December of 1974, respondent William W. Lambert did business as a general contractor under the corporate name of Lambert Enterprises, Inc. As qualifying agent for the corporation, he built homes, poured concrete, laid sod, and did other general contracting. During 1974, respondent was in the process of acquiring a sod farm, as well as being engaged in the general contracting business. Lambert Enterprises, Inc. dealt largely with other contractors. When The Commonwealth Corporation went bankrupt, other contractors, notably the Collins brothers, also ended up in bankruptcy, and unable to make good on outstanding obligations to Lambert Enterprises, Inc. Respondent caused a voluntary petition in bankruptcy to be filed on behalf of Lambert Enterprises, Inc., on November 22, 1974. At that time he held all the stock in Lambert Enterprises, Inc., and served both as president and as a member of the board of directors of the corporation. Respondent Lambert has never been interested in any other corporation that has been declared bankrupt, and has never gone into bankruptcy personally. Mr. William E. Wingate, an investigator for the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, checks bankruptcy records twice monthly. By looking through bankruptcy records, he has learned of ten to twelve bankruptcies, in the Northern District of Florida, involving contractors in the last two years. He may have missed some, but every time he finds out about a contractor's bankruptcy, he reports it to the Board's Jacksonville office. On July 31, 1975, he first learned of respondent's corporation's bankruptcy. He obtained certified copies of pertinent papers which he then forwarded to other Board staff in Jacksonville. After Lambert Enterprises, Inc. failed, respondent obtained a general contractor's license as an individual, which is currently in force. Since December of 1975, respondent has been employed by Century Construction, first in Tallahassee, then in Jacksonville, where he is now a project manager for the company. Permits for work performed by Century Corporation are not pulled on respondent's license. Respondent's financial condition is now stable, and he is financially sound.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent be reprimanded. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of April, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida COPIES FURNISHED: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire Blackstone Building, Suite 1010 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Daniel J. Wiser, Esquire Post Office Box 10137 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202
