The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent, a licensed physician, committed violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes, sufficient to justify the imposition of disciplinarysanctions against her license. The resolution of this issue rests upon a determination of whether Respondent intubated the esophagus of a patient, as opposed to the patient's trachea, in the course of rendering anesthesia care; and whether Respondent then failed to provide a record justifying such a course of medical treatment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Saroja L. Ranpura, a licensed physician at all times pertinent to these proceedings, holding medical license number ME 0039872. Respondent was licensed in the State of Florida on April 27, 1982. She currently practices medicine in Ohio. Petitioner is the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, the state agency charged with the regulation of physicians in the State of Florida. On August 29, 1985, Frank Snydle, M.D., performed a laparoscopy on patient C.P. at Heart of Florida Hospital in Haines City, Florida. This medical procedure was performed on an outpatient basis. As a result, C.P. came into the hospital on the day the surgery was to be performed. She met Respondent, who later provided anesthesia care to her in the course of the laparoscopy. Respondent examined C.P. at that time, prior to the surgery, and noted that C.P. had a small mouth. Later, C.P. was brought into the operating room on a stretcher and moved herself over onto the operating table. Present in the operating room at that time were Jean Allen, L.P.N., Norma Masters, R.N., and Respondent. Respondent proceeded to do an unusual procedure known as a "blind nasal intubation." The procedure requires the placement of an tube in the patient's throat through the nose, as opposed to the mouth, in order to maintain an open airway during later anesthesia administration in the process of surgery. C.P. was sedated, but awake, during this process and was intubated with a minor degree of difficulty. Prior to placement of the endotracheal tube, Respondent had the patient breath pure oxygen through a mask covering the mouth and nose. The preoxygenation process, according to Respondent, provided extra oxygen "as a reservoir and as astorage" to C.P.'s body tissues. By letting a patient breath 100 percent oxygen for three to four minutes, the resultant saturation permits a margin of four to six minutes for such an intubation to be safely completed without risk of the patient becoming hypoxic. Jean Allen, with almost 25 years of nursing experience in a surgical assistance career where she assists in 400 to 600 operations per year, observed Respondent during the entire intubation process, inclusive of the preoxygenation phase. Accepted medical practice after such an intubation requires that the person placing the tube then listen for breath sounds over each lung and over the area of the stomach. Respondent maintains that she did listen for those breath sounds with the aid of a stethoscope. The anesthesia record completed by Respondent has a notation "BEBS" for bilateral and equal breath sounds which Respondent testified that she heard with the stethoscope prior to administering additional sodium pentothal to the patient and inflating the cuff of the endotracheal tube. This testimony of Respondent is not credited in view of the testimony of Ms. Allen that she observed Respondent during this entire time and that Respondent did not listen for the breath sounds with a stethoscope prior to administering the additional sodium pentothal to the patient. Allen's testimony is also afforded the greater credibility due to her opportunity as a neutral witness to observe the events which transpired and her testimony that although she didn't observe Respondent closely after the additional sodium pentothal was administered, she maintained that she would have recalled Respondent's use of the stethoscope prior to that point. Notably, it is at that point prior to the administration of the additional sodium pentothal and inflation of the cuff of the endotracheal tube where Respondent maintains she listened for the breath sounds. Respondent, after completion of the placement of the endotracheal tube, administered additional sodium pentothal to the patient without listening for breath sounds; connected the tube to the anesthesia machine; and remarked that "it must be in place, the bag is moving" in reference to the bag on the anesthesia machine which generally inflates as the lungs of the patient deflate. While inflation or deflation of a breath bag on an anesthesia machine is one part of the procedure for checking placement of an endotracheal tube, the expert testimony of John Kruse, M.D., and David Alan Cross, M.D., establishes that this procedure alone is not a reliable method of determining proper tube placement. Frank Snydle, M.D., who had entered the operating room by this time in the sequence of events, did a manual vaginal examination of the patient, left the room, scrubbed his hands and returned. He then donned surgical gloves and gown, moved to the left side of the patient and prepared to proceed with the operation. Ms. Allen took her position at the foot of the table, between the patient's legs with an unobstructed view of Respondent. Dr. Snydle proceeded to make a small incision in the patient's abdomen through which he inserted a hollow, "Verres" needle. Carbon dioxide was then introduced to C.P.'s abdominalcavity to push the abdominal wall away from the internal organs. Next, a device known as a "trocar" and a "trocar sleeve" was inserted through the incision into the abdomen. The trocar was then withdrawn and a laparoscope was inserted into the sleeve. Built somewhat like a telescope with a built-in light source, the laparoscope permits the surgeon to look inside the abdomen and visually observe the patient's internal organs. During this procedure, Nurse Allen commented that she heard a sound like a fog horn or frogs croaking when she touched the patient's abdomen. Allen's remark is corroborated by Norma Masters and Dr. Snydle. The proof establishes, as corroborated by expert testimony of Dr. Kruse, that such sounds were associated with air, captured in C.P.'s stomach as the result of esophageal intubation, escaping from the stomach when pressure was applied. When Dr. Snydle made his first incision in the patient's abdomen, Allen observed that the blood was dark and Dr. Snydle agreed. Respondent inquired whether it could be venous blood. Snydle indicated he didn't think this was the case. Notably, the dark blood was observed, according to Respondent's medical records at 10:27 a.m. Further, Petitioner's experts, Dr. Kruse and Dr. Cross, based on their review of C.P.'s medical records, determined that the patient was initially intubated at approximately 10:15 a.m. Thus, approximately 12 minutes transpired from the beginning of the intubation process and conclusion of preoxygenation of the patient until the observation of dark bloodat the time of incision. After her inquiry regarding whether the blood could be venous, Respondent further responded that she was giving the patient 50 percent oxygen. She testified that she then increased the oxygen level to 100 percent. While the anesthesia record indicates administration of 100 percent oxygen, there is no time notation when this occurred. Blood again welled up from the incision and Nurse Allen commented that the blood appeared black. The less oxygenated blood becomes, the darker it appears. By this time, Dr. Snydle had inserted the laparoscope in C.P.'s abdomen. He observed that the internal organs were a "blueish color" ; an observation consistent with a decreasing level of oxygen in the patient's blood and an indication that the patient was hypoxic. When the patient's internal organs were discerned to be blue, Respondent asked Dr. Snydle to wait a moment and requested the assistance of Norma Masters, the circulating nurse. Masters came to the head of the operating table and was handed another endotracheal tube by Respondent. Respondent then began the process of intubating the patient with that tube through the mouth. The original nasal tube was left in place during the insertion of the second tube; an unheard of possibility, according to expert testimony, unless one tube was in the patient's esophagus and the other in the trachea. Nurse Allen's testimony establishes that the second tube, inserted via the patient's mouth, became foggy after insertion. The observation by Allen is consistent with experttestimony and establishes the fog was created by warm moist air from the patient's lungs flowing through the second tube. Respondent's testimony that she placed the second tube at the conclusion of the surgical procedure is not credited in view of the very clear, contradictory testimony of Masters and Allen that the endotracheal tube was replaced contemporaneously with the notation that the blood was dark and the patient's organs "blueish". After removal of the nasal tube and connection of the second tube to the anesthesia machine, Respondent manually squeezed the anesthesia bag to ventilate the patient. Dr. Snydle observed that the organs were turning pink again, and continued the procedure without further incident. After finishing the procedure, Snydle went out of the operating room, sat at a desk across the hall and began to write his orders. Following the procedure, the patient was wheeled to the recovery room, a short distance away. Nurses Allen and Masters did not see C.P. open her eyes during this process. Respondent's assertion that the patient opened her eyes and was responsive to commands is corroborated only by Dr. Snydle. However, while he noted in his operative report and his deposition that C.P. was awake following the operation, Snydle's observation is not credited in view of other proof establishing that his back was to the patient as she was wheeled past and that he assumed an awake state in the patient because Respondent was speaking to C.P. In view of the foregoing, Respondent's testimony that the patient was awake or responsive to commands following the surgery is not credited. After the patient was removed approximately 15 feet away to the recovery room, Respondent maintains that she informed Margaret Bloom, R.N., who was on duty there, that the patient's endotracheal tube was not to be removed, although she omitted telling Bloom about the dark blood incident. Bloom, who is also a certified registered nurse anesthetist, maintains that Respondent told her nothing about C.P.'s condition; instead, she went rapidly to the rest room in the lounge area. Bloom, left in the recovery room with the patient, then proceeded to hook up appropriate monitors and oxygen to the patient's endotracheal tube and began the process of monitoring C.P.'s vital signs. Bloom places the time of C.P.'s arrival time in the recovery room at approximately 11:05 a.m. The patient was not responsive to Bloom's spoken commands when brought to the recovery room. The patient appeared well oxygenated to Bloom; a judgement she made based on her observation of the color of C.P.'s lips and fingernails, since C.P. is a black female. Bloom rated C.P.'s circulation at twenty to fifty percent of preanesthetic pressure and determined the patient to be totally unconscious. Respondent returned to the recovery room at this time, told Bloom that she had done an "awake intubation" on the patient and that the tube should remain in place until Bloom determined that the patient was ready for it to be removed. Respondent then left the recovery room. As the result of blood tinged mucus filling the patient's endotracheal tube, Bloom removed the tube after thepatient registered breathing difficulties and attempts by Bloom to suction the mucus failed. She replaced that tube with a device known as an oral pharyngeal airway which goes in the patient's mouth and curves down the throat, holding the tongue forward. The device does not reach to the lungs. Shortly thereafter the patient began making glutteral noises and Bloom placed a venturi mask on the patient. The mask controlled the percentage of oxygen going to the patient, estimated by Bloom to be sixty to one hundred percent oxygen. The patient's breathing improved. Bloom completed replacement of the endotracheal tube with the airway device and mask shortly before Respondent again returned to the recovery room. Respondent, upset at Bloom's action in removing the endotracheal tube, proceeded to replace the oral airway device with a nasal tube. At 11:20 a.m., Bloom noted in her records that the patient's state of consciousness was unchanged. Later the patient made moaning sounds and was responsive to pain stimulation at approximately 12:20 p.m. Respondent concedes that C.P. suffered an hypoxic event at some point which resulted in damaged brain function. It is Respondent's position that such event occurred in the recovery room as the result of laryngospasm, occasioned by Bloom's removal of the endotracheal tube. Allen and Masters working in the operating room a short distance away testified that the sounds they heard emanating from the area of the recovery room were not the type of noise they associated with laryngospasm. Bloom, trained to recognize laryngospasm, testified that C.P. did not have sucha spasm. The expert testimony of David Cross, M.D., based on a study of arterial blood gases of C.P. following the surgery, establishes that the patient suffered an hypoxic episode too severe and too protracted to have been the result of a possible laryngospasm in the recovery room and that, in his expert opinion, she did not have a recovery room laryngospasm. Respondent's defense that C.P.'s survival of such a lengthy esophageal intubation in the operating room is an impossibility, is not persuasive. The opinion of Respondent's expert, Dr. Gilbert Stone, that no esophageal intubation occurred in the operating room is predicated on his belief that the tube was not changed during the surgery. Dr. Stone conceded that replacement of the tube during surgery at the time the dark blood was noticed with resultant improvement in the patient's condition permits a conclusion that esophageal intubation was the cause of the hypoxia. Testimony of Petitioner's experts, Dr. Cross and Dr. Kruse, are consistent in their conclusions that C.P. was esophageally intubated by Respondent, although they differ in their reasons for C.P.'s survival of the event. The opinion of these experts, coupled with the eye witness testimony of Allen and Masters, further support a finding of Respondent's esophageal intubation of the patient in the operating room and that she failed to recognize such intubation in a timely manner as a reasonable and prudent physician should have. The expert opinion testimony of Dr. Cross establishes that C.P. was intubated in her esophagus and survivedas a result of oxygen, going into her stomach under pressure, being forced back up her esophagus into the pharynx and then drawn by negative pressure into the lungs. This resulted in a effect similar to, but not as efficient as, the technique known as apneic oxygenation. The technique, once used to provide marginally adequate oxygen levels to maintain a patient's neurological and cardiac status, has fell into disfavor since patients suffered from respiratory acidosis due to the buildup of carbon dioxide in the lungs. Cross also pointed out that the heart can function for a much longer period of time without adequate oxygen than is possible for the brain. Cross's testimony provides an explanation for C.P.'s neurological damage without similar cardiac impairment. Cross also noted that the preoxygenation process which C.P. initially underwent after entering the operating room added to the time she was able to undergo oxygen deprivation before the onset of tissue damage. Respondent notes the discovery of a tumor in C.P.'s throat some months later as a possible contributor to the patient's hypoxic event during surgery. Another of Respondent's experts, Dr. Deane Briggs, an otolaryngologist specializing in diseases of the ears, nose and throat, treated C.P. in October of 1985, following the August, 1985 surgery. He discovered the existence of a sub-glottic tumor in the patient's throat. However, the existence of the tumor at the time of the initial surgery is not established. Testimony of anesthesiologist experts, including Respondent's own expert, Dr. Stone, do not support a finding that the tumor, if itexisted, had any effect during the operation. Further, Dr. Briggs' opinion that Respondent probably intubated the patient's right stem bronchus, as opposed to the esophagus, and that neurological damage therefore occurred in the recovery room is not credited in view of the conflict of this testimony with that of other witnesses and expert opinions. A finding that C.P.'s neurological impairment following surgery may have been exacerbated by a possible laryngospasm in the recovery room is relevant only with regard to mitigation of the severity of penalty to be imposed for Respondent's misconduct. Respondent's esophageal intubation of the patient in the operating room, and the resultant hypoxic event are established by clear and convincing evidence. The fact that C.P. suffered brain damage is undisputed by the parties. The proof clearly and convincingly establishes that the severe and protracted hypoxic episode sustained by the patient resulted not from a possible mild recovery room laryngospasm, but from Respondent's esophageal intubation of that patient in the operating room. It is concluded with respect to treatment of C.P., Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment which is recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. Respondent failed to keep medical records which justified her course of treatment of the patient, C.P. This finding is based upon the testimony of Dr. Cross that Respondent'smedical records did not justify her course of treatment, as well as the testimony of Respondent's expert, Dr. Stone. While testifying that he did not believe Respondent had intubated the patient's esophagus, Stone also acknowledged that Respondent's records would be inadequate if such had indeed occurred.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered for Respondent's violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes, placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of three years upon terms and conditions to be determined by the Board of Medicine, including, but not limited to, a condition requiring Respondent's participation in appropriate continuing medical education courses; and imposing an administrative fine of $2,000. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED that such Final Order impose a penalty for Respondent's violation of Section 458.331(1)(m), Florida Statutes, of an administrative fine of $500 and a letter of reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-28. Accepted. 29. Unnecessary to result. 30.-31. Accepted. 32.-34. Adopted by reference. 35.-61. Adopted in substance. 62. Unnecessary to result. 63.-68. Adopted in substance. 69.-87. Adopted by reference. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-3. Rejected, not supported by the evidence. 4.-5. Rejected, not supported by the evidence, Further, proposed findings that records were adequate constitute legal conclusions. 6. Rejected, not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: David G. Pius, Esq. Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Sidney L. Matthew, Esq. Suite 100 135 South Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32302 Kenneth Easley, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Dorothy Faircloth Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation The Northwood Centre 1940 N. Monroe St. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Mark C. Alsaker, was a registered nurse having been issued license number 1174892 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Nursing (Board or DPR). He has been licensed since September 8, 1980. Respondent presently resides at 2972 Southwest 17th Street, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. On November 8, 1984 the Board entered an Order of Reinstatement which reinstated respondent's license and placed it on probation for three years, or to and including November 7, 1987. 1/ Among the terms and conditions contained therein was the prohibition against respondent consuming, injecting or otherwise self-medicating with any legend drug or controlled substance unless prescribed by a duly licensed practitioner. To enforce this condition of probation, the Board required that periodically respondent submit himself to a random urine test. On May 20, 1987 respondent visited DPR's Fort Lauderdale office to give a urine specimen. This was given in the presence of a DPR investigator. The specimen was capped in a container, sealed and placed in a bag. Respondent then initialed the bag and signed the chain of custody form. The bag was thereafter placed in a locked box for pickup by the testing laboratory, SmithKline BioScience Laboratories, Ltd. (SmithKline). SmithKline is an organization that tests urine samples for the presence or absence of various substances. The laboratory performed a qualitative drug profile and an Emit 10 profile on Alsaker's specimen. The former test determines the presence of certain substances in the urine but does not measure the quantity. The latter test is much the same as qualitative testing but is done by automation and is more precise. The testing results reflected a presumptive positive for cannabinoids (marijuana or opiates), a controlled substance. This was confirmed by a gas chromatography mass specimen (GGMS) test, a procedure employing an instrument to confirm the presence or absence of a substance. The GGMS test is considered to be the state of the art in terms of reliability. On September 22, 1987, and under the same conditions as were present on May 20, respondent gave another urine specimen in the presence of a DPR investigator. Using the same testing procedures, SmithKline confirmed the presence of cannabinoids (marijuana or opiates) in respondent's urine. Respondent was advised of both test results. However, he did not ask for a retest although he stated he was not aware of his right to do so. At hearing, respondent contended the tests were not 100 percent accurate and that some error or mix-up must have occurred when his samples were given to the laboratory. He also stated it would be foolish for him to use drugs just before giving a urine sample knowing that the results could violate the terms of probation. However, the contentions as to the unreliability of the testing procedures and the probability of a mix-up occurring were not supported by any independent proof and are contrary to the more persuasive evidence. Respondent is presently employed at a Broward County rehabilitation hospital where he uses his license as a registered nurse. There is no evidence of any complaint by his employer or that he has not adequately performed his job. Other than the two cited instances, there were no other positive test results during the three year probation period. There was no evidence that, by virtue of his using drugs on these two occasions, Alsaker was unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety. Finally, the record is silent as to whether his use of drugs equated to unprofessional conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1987), and that all other charges be dismissed. It is further recommended that respondent's license be placed on two years' probation, that he regularly attend Alcoholics Anonymous or Narcotics Anonymous meetings during that two year period, and that he submit to random urine tests under such terms and conditions as the Board deems necessary. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 1988.
The Issue Whether, in evaluating the responses to an Invitation to Bid and in making a preliminary decision to award the subject contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to these proceedings, Respondent has been the duly-constituted school board for Miami-Dade County, Florida. Respondent issued the subject ITB to obtain the services of an organization to screen applicants for employment and existing employees for drug use. Screening of employees subject to the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) was included in the subject ITB. The purpose of the subject ITB was stated as follows in paragraph 1 of the section styled “Special Conditions”: The purpose of this bid is to obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services, both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide. [1] Petitioner and Mercy timely filed responses to the ITB. Following the bid opening on May 23, 2006, Respondent determined that the bid award should go to Mercy, which was the low bidder. After Mercy, Petitioner was the next low bidder.2 Petitioner thereafter timely filed its notice of intent to file a bid protest, which was followed by a timely filed bid protest. Paragraph 4 of the Special Conditions Section of the ITB (paragraph 4) pertained to technical requirements and provided, in part, as follows: TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS: The following items, which shall constitute proof of technical competency, are requested to be submitted with the bid, or within three (3) days of request: * * * Copies of the certifications/licenses of all collection site staff and laboratory staff who will be handling specimens in the chain of custody as indicated in Attachment B. A copy of the quality assurance program of the testing laboratories, which must encompass all aspects of the testing process as indicated in Attachment B and Attachment E. List all collection sites, which must include the site address and copy of the certification of each site to be considered for this bid. Number of mobile sites available and proof of compliance and/or certification of mobile sites, if applicable. When it submitted its initial response to the ITB, Mercy did not specifically respond to the items listed in subparagraphs b., c., d., and e. of paragraph 4. On May 24, 2006, Respondent wrote to Mr. Rey, Mercy’s, laboratory director and the person responsible for Mercy’s response to the ITB, requesting copies of documents responsive to subparagraphs b., c., d., and e. of paragraph 4. Mercy thereafter timely supplied the requested information. CERTIFICATION Attachment B to the ITB contained the following pertaining to certification: A laboratory must be certified by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). DHHS has established comprehensive standards for laboratory policies, procedures, and personnel, which provide quality assurance and performance testing specific to urine testing. To be certified, a laboratory must be capable of testing for, at a minimum, the following classes of drugs: Alcohol, Marijuana, Cocaine, Opiates, Amphetamines, Barbiturates, Benodiazepines, Methaqualone, and Phencyclidines, as listed in Attachment E. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Mercy demonstrated it had the requisite certification. That dispute is resolved by finding that Mercy demonstrated that it had the requisite certification to perform all testing other than the OTETA testing.3 Mr. Rey testified, credibly, that Mercy intended to subcontract out the OTETA testing to a laboratory certified to perform such testing. Mercy did not identify the entity that would conduct the OTETA testing, however, there is nothing in the ITB to prohibit such subcontracting and there is nothing in the ITB that would require a bidder to have such a subcontract in place at the time it submitted its response to the ITB. Further, there is no requirement in the ITB that the bidder identify the entity that would serve as the subcontractor for the OTETA testing.4 There was also a dispute as to whether the certifications provided by Mercy would suffice as certification for the contemplated collection sites. The greater weight of the credible evidence resolved that dispute in the affirmative. Mr. Rey testified, credibly, that the collection sites could be operated by Mercy pursuant to its existing certifications. MEDICAL REVIEW OFFICER Attachment B contained the following in paragraph 17 under the heading of “Compliance”: 17. Reporting and Review of Results. (The service of a Medical Review Officer (MRO) is required to review ALL [sic] test results. The MRO may NOT [sic] be an employee of the laboratory. Mercy did not identify the person or organization that would serve as the MRO in the event it was awarded the contract. That omission did not make Mercy’s response to the ITB non- responsive because Paragraph 17 is merely a statement of industry practice. The ITB did not require bidders to identify the person or organization that would serve as the MRO for the winning bidder. THIRD PARTY ADMINISTRATOR A laboratory performing the type screening contemplated by the ITB must have a third party administrator (TPA) to administer the drug testing program. As with the MRO, a TPA must be independent of the laboratory to avoid conflicts of interest. Mercy’s response did not identify the person or organization that would serve as the TPA in the event it was awarded the contract. That omission did not make Mercy’s response to the ITB non-responsive because the ITB did not require bidders to identify the person or organization that would serve as the TPA for the winning bidder. IDENTIFICATION OF COLLECTION SITES Under the heading of Collection and Screening Site Parameters in Attachment B, Technical Requirements, the ITB provides, in part, as follows: Collection and screening sites shall be accessible Monday through Friday from 8:00 to 4:30 p.m., at a minimum, and shall meet the following parameters: The following locations [sic] parameters are examples of locations, which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure convenience for applicants and employees: Area 1. East of 27th Ave. from Flagler St. North to 215th St. Area 2. West of 27th Ave. from Flagler St. North to 215th St. Area 3. East of State Road 836, south to intersection of US 1, then south to 392nd St. Area 4. West of State Road 836, south to intersection of US 1, then south to 394th St. * * * 4. At least one site in the North end of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Mercy’s response to the foregoing was to provide specific addresses to two locations that were presently available as collection sites, to advise that it had a mobile collection site, and to provide three approximate locations where it would establish collection sites if awarded the bid. There was a dispute between the parties as to whether Mercy was responsive to the foregoing item pertaining to collection sites. The greater weight of the credible evidence resolved that dispute in the affirmative. The ITB did not require bidders to provide specific addresses for collection sites, nor did it require bidders to specify the hours of operation of each proposed collection site. The testimony of Ms. Fahmy and Ms. Jones established that Mercy adequately responded to this item of the ITB. BREATH ALCOHOL TESTING Mercy’s response to the ITB did not separately address breath alcohol testing or certification for such testing. Mercy’s response did include bid prices on specified breath alcohol testing procedures as required by the ITB. There was no requirement that Mercy provide a separate certification for breath alcohol testing. Petitioner is a TPA, not a laboratory, and is the existing provider for the drug screening services contemplated by the ITB. Petitioner intended to subcontract all laboratory work required by the ITB. Petitioner’s response to the ITB was responsive. Mercy’s response to the ITB was also responsive. Mercy committed to comply with all requirements of the ITB and it established by its responses that it had the wherewithal to meet that commitment. Mercy was the low, responsive, responsible bidder on the ITB.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Holiday Hunt Russell, Esquire The Law Offices of Holiday Hunt Russell, Chartered 1930 Harrison Street, Suite 309 Hollywood, Florida 33020 For Respondent: Stephen L. Shochet, Esquire Miami-Dade County School Board 1450 Northeast 2nd Avenue, Suite 400 Miami, Florida 33132
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s bid protest and awarding the ITB to Mercy. RESERVATION OF JURISDICTION Jurisdiction is reserved to rule on Petitioner’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs following Respondent’s entry of a Final Order in this matter. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 2006.
The Issue Whether the Board of Medicine should take disciplinary action against respondent for the reasons alleged in the administrative complaint?
Findings Of Fact Josefino P. Bargas holds license No. ME 0029440. He has been a licensed physician in Florida at all pertinent times, engaging in the general practice of medicine in central Florida. Internal Bleeding On October 25, 1984, Dr. Bargas admitted then 67-year old Mr. H.S. to Florida Hospital in Apopka. When the patient reached a medical floor at 3:40 that afternoon, Dr. Bargas assumed responsibility for H.S.'s care, taking over from staff in the emergency room, where H.S. had appeared that morning at 11:25. By 4:30 on the afternoon of October 25, 1984, H.S.'s pulse rate had fallen to 77. In the emergency room, Dr. Murphy had ordered "1,000 cc's of D5, half normal saline started with a 200 angio cath in the right wrist with a three-way stopcock ... [which one of petitioner's experts assumed] was in anticipation of giving him blood." T.102. Emergency room staff carried these orders out. The saline solution (with dextrose) was administered in response to apparent dehydration. An apparatus with a larger bore is ordinarily used for blood transfusions. When he arrived at the hospital, H.S. complained of melena and reported a history of ulcers. He had been taking Tagamet for epigastric pain. His pallor, his pulse rate of 104, his hemoglobin of 11.2 grams per liter and his hematocrit of 34% all pointed to decreased blood volume, reduced hemoglobin, and significant bleeding. Dr. Bargas ordered hemoglobin and hematocrit assessments once daily, and a single prothrombin time test, the results of which demonstrated that H.S.'s blood took longer than normal to clot, possibly a side effect of Tagamet. Nurses' notes reflected that stools H.S. passed after he was admitted contained blood. One was the subject of a laboratory test Dr. Bargas ordered to determine blood content; the result was 4+, the maximum indication. On October 26, 1984, Dr. Bargas wrote, on H.S.'s chart, "Bleeding still present?" Nothing about H.S.'s pulse, respiration, blood pressure nor anything in his demeanor indicated significant additional blood loss, although he complained of dizziness when he stood. The same day Dr. Bargas entered written orders, including "DC IV fluids," which signified, "Discontinue intravenous fluids." At two o'clock on the afternoon on the 26th, a nurse discontinued fluids and removed the apparatus through which they had entered H.S.'s vein. Dr. Bargas did not order another to replace it. Unless otherwise specified, a doctor's orders to discontinue intravenous fluids may be construed as a directive to discontinue intravenous access, which can be a conduit for infection. But Geraldine Petrone, for 13 years Director of Nursing at Williston Memorial Hospital, would not remove intravenous access without inquiry of the physician, if she saw "DC IV fluids" in a patient's chart. By 4:35 on the afternoon of October 26, 1984, the laboratory had reported to the floor that day's test results, including a hemoglobin of 7.2 grams per liter. But this had not been charted when Dr. Bargas made rounds at 85 that evening, and he did not inquire as to the laboratory results. The hospital laboratory is open 24 hours a day on an "on call" basis. Customarily, staff acts affirmatively to bring test results as significant as these to the attention of the treating physician. Before Dr. Bargas' arrival the following morning at 10:30, the nursing staff also learned the October 27 blood test results. Alarmed particularly at one of them, a hemoglobin of 5.5 grams per liter, and unable to reach Dr. Bargas, a conscientious nurse told the chief of staff about the situation. He ordered that four liters of blood be "typed and cross-matched," and that H.S. be given two units of blood. Only after Dr. Bargas arrived, however, did the transfusion begin. The drop in hemoglobin from 11.2 to 5.5 grams per liter reflected a loss of at least half the volume of H.S.'s blood, a "potential crisis situation." T. 87. Because hemoglobin measurements are "always behind in a patient that is bleeding," (T.87) hemoglobin and hematocrit testing only at 24- hour intervals is not adequate. When a patient is bleeding internally, minimum acceptable practice requires monitoring at intervals of "[s]ix hours at the outside, probably four," id., unless significant bleeding is known to have stopped. It would also have been better practice to order blood-typing, cross- matching, and intravenous access as precautionary measures or, as regards access, at least to have held off on ordering discontinuance of the access already in place (notwithstanding its straitness.) If evidence exists that a patient is actively bleeding, cross-matching should be done right away. T. 176. Physicians order blood typed and cross-matched as a precaution, in case an emergency transfusion proves necessary, even though blood that is not used must be wasted. "[P]eople can go into shock at any time." Reddy Deposition, p.11. Typing and cross-matching take about a half hour. Sometimes veins collapse before access is established, making it impossible to accomplish a transfusion, although such venal collapse is extremely rare. Reddy Deposition. Diabetes with Infection On October 26, 1984, Dr. Bargas admitted Mr. A.S., 51 years old at the time and disabled, to Florida Hospital. In the history he took on admission, Dr. Bargas noted that A.S. was taking "NPH insulin 25 units," Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, twice daily. Although A.S. may have begun this regimen only a week or two before admission, he had taken insulin orally for a period of years, and was "an insulin-dependent diabetic." Londono Deposition, p.14; McClelland Deposition, p.13. "He obviously was a pretty sick type of individual. He was dehydrated. He was febrile. He was nauseous. He was vomiting. And he had what seemed to be a rotten foot." Id., p.11. Septicemia, a blood borne infection apparently attributable to A.S.'s infected, ulcerated right leg, was among A.S.'s medical problems Dr. Bargas recognized on his admission to hospital. "With high blood sugars, there can be problems with white blood cell response to infection." McClelland Deposition, p.9. Insulin makes glucose in the blood available for use by cells, normalizing blood levels. When he entered the hospital, A.S.'s blood sugar level was elevated. Blood sugar levels at "a controlled diabetes level" range between 60 or 70 and 120 or 200 milligrams per milliliter. Londono deposition, p.12. An elevated blood sugar level is not critical or life-threatening in itself, unless it exceeds 500 milligrams per milliliter. Id., pp.11, 12. N.P.H. insulin "lasts" 24 to 36 hours, but regular insulin has a half-life of less than 30 minutes. Blood glucose levels oscillate in response to regular insulin, in no less than two to three hours, and, in response to "long acting insulin anywhere between 8 and 24 hours." Londono Deposition, p.21. On A.S.'s admission, Dr. Bargas ordered urinalysis and a blood sugar test "stat." He prescribed regular insulin, depending on the urinalysis results. Dr. Bargas wrote: Rx urine for sugar & acetone and give regular insulin accordingly 4+ 20 units 3+ 15 2+ 10 1+ 0 Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p.123A. Because blood tests for glucose levels are much more precise than urine tests, which only approximate blood glucose levels, Dr. Bargas' prescription for "insulin ... on a sliding scale for urine," Londono Deposition, p.15, left something to be desired. Dr. Bargas ordered urine tests for sugar and acetone four times a day, and blood tests, which are more expensive, once daily. As with A.S., a patient may be unable to void on schedule. Urine collects in the bladder over time; accordingly, urine test results for glucose reflect an average, which may be misleading. The volume of blood moving through the kidney affects the concentration of glucose in the urine. Renal thresholds (the levels at which glucose leaves the blood to enter the urine) vary among individuals. The correlation between glucose levels in blood and urine is particularly problematic when a diabetic is acutely ill. Infection can cause elevated blood glucose levels, and affect kidney function. Test results known to Dr. Bargas indicated A.S. had impaired kidney function. At four o'clock on the afternoon of the 26th, the "clinitest" for sugar in A.S.'s urine yielded a result of "3+." A.S. received 15 units of regular insulin an hour and a half later. A contemporaneous blood test indicated 398 milligrams of glucose per milliliter of blood. At seven o'clock (or half past) on the evening of October 26, 1984, A.S. received a second dose of 15 units of regular insulin. T.48; Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, p.220. Between six and seven the following morning and again at ten, A.S. was unable to produce a urine specimen. A blood test on a sample taken at ten o'clock indicated 264 milligrams of sugar per milliliter of blood. Tests on urine samples taken later on the 27th, at half past noon, at five o'clock and at seven o'clock yielded "+1." In keeping with Dr. Bargas orders, no insulin was administered to A.S. that day. A blood sample taken at quarter past two on the morning of October 28, 1984, in conformity with Dr. Bargas' order to test "stat.," indicated 399 milligrams of sugar per milliliter of A.S.'s blood. The laboratory apprised Dr. Bargas of these results. At 4:30 on the morning of the 28th, a urine test yielded a "3+." Three hours later A.S. received 15 units of regular insulin, his first insulin in some 36 hours. At no time did test results reflect ketosis. Even for general practitioners in Apopka in 1984, the failure to order more frequent blood sugar tests, and insulin coverage as indicated by such tests, for an insulin-dependent diabetic suffering from septicemia and a foot infection fell below minimum levels of acceptable practice. Dr. Bargas' approach, although once very common, was "antiquated" even than. His use of regular insulin, rather than N.P.H. insulin was appropriate. But allowing 36 hours to elapse between doses of regular insulin, and failing to order insulin promptly on learning the results of the tests the morning of the 28th, fell below standards.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, in consonance with Rule 21M-20.001(t) Florida Administrative Code, RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medicine suspend Josefino P. Bargas license to practice medicine for sixty (60) days, and thereafter until he has completed at least three (3) days instruction on the management of diabetes, and paid a one thousand dollar ($1,000) fine; and that, once his license is reinstated, he be placed on probation for a year, on condition that a representative of the Board of Medicine review a sample of his charts monthly to determine that they demonstrate that he is practicing at least minimally acceptable medicine. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 8 through 14, 16 through 30, 37, 40, 45, 46, 50, 51, 53 through 57, 63, 65, 69, 73, and 74 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the test were done after admission. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, Dr. McBride ordered that two units be administered. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 47, 48, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 66, 71 and 72 relate to subordinate matters. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 34, 35, 36, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49 and 52 accurately recite the substance of the witnesses' testimony they report. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 68 the test results were not charted when he was at the hospital that evening. With response to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 70, he testified that he did not even believe he might be bleeding. With response to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 75, Dr. Bargas' testimony did raise resal questions of this kind. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 15, 18, 19, 20 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 3, 6, 11, 16, 17 and 22 have been rejected, as unsupported by the weight of the evidence. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 2, H.S. was not stabilized and his wishes, which were not proven, are not determinative. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 9, clinical observations here included bloody stools and indicated more frequent testing. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 13, whatever Dr. Reddy would have done, minimum standards were not met. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 21, a preponderance of the evidence established, although not clearly and convincingly, that failure to order more frequent blood test fell below standards. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert L. Hessman Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler, P. A. 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 900 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Stephanie A. Daniel 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Peter Langley, III Post Office Box 486 Bronson, Florida 32621 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine, Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 =================================================================
The Issue The issue in the case is whether certain forms related to inspection and operation of breath test instruments, and which are incorporated by reference into various rules adopted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (Respondent), must be published in their entirety in the Florida Administrative Weekly during the rule adoption process.
Findings Of Fact Each of the Petitioners has been arrested and charged with driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of Section 316.193, Florida Statutes (2005). The DUI cases are currently pending. The Respondent is the state agency charged with adoption of rules related to operation of the alcohol testing program, including certification and operation of breath test instruments. Apparently during the arrest process, the Petitioners were administered breath tests using instruments identified as Intoxilyzer breath machines. The machines were allegedly maintained, and the tests administered, pursuant to requirements set forth on various forms incorporated by reference into rules adopted by the Respondent under the provisions of Subsection 316.1932(1)(a)2., Florida Statutes (2005). Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8 sets forth rules applicable to the "Implied Consent Program," including rules related to breath testing administered to persons suspected of DUI. Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.017 includes a list of forms referenced within Chapter 11D-8, which are "hereby incorporated by reference." Florida Administrative Code Rule 11D-8.017 states that all of the incorporated forms could "be obtained by contacting the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Alcohol Testing Program, P. O. Box 1489, Tallahassee, Florida 32302." Insofar as is relevant to this proceeding, the incorporated forms are as follows: FDLE/ATP Form 14 – Breath Test Result Affidavit – Revised March 2002. FDLE/ATP Form 16 – Agency Inspection Procedures – Revised March 2004. FDLE/ATP Form 24 – Agency Inspection Report – Revised March 2001 FDLE/ATP Form 34 – Instrument Evaluation Procedures – Revised March 2004. FDLE/ATP Form 35 – Department Inspection Procedures – Revised March 2004. FDLE/ATP Form 14 is titled "Breath Test Result Affidavit" and sets forth a series of 16 steps to be followed by a breath test operator in administering a breath test. FDLE/ATP Form 16 is titled "Agency Inspection Procedures" and sets forth a series of 12 steps to be followed in cleaning and testing a breath machine. FDLE/ATP Form 24 is titled "Agency Inspection Report" and is a form to be used by a permitted inspector to report machine inspection results to the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. FDLE/ATP Form 34 is titled "Instrument Evaluation Procedures" and sets forth the factors to be considered in evaluating breath testing equipment for approval for use in Florida. FDLE/ATP Form 35 is titled "Department Inspection Procedures" and sets forth a series of 11 steps to be followed in cleaning and testing a breath machine. The Respondent has not published the full text of the cited forms in the Florida Administrative Weekly at any time during the adoption, or subsequent amendment and re-adoption, of Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8. In the Petitioners' DUI cases, the State of Florida is seeking to present evidence of compliance with the rules and forms adopted by the Respondent related to maintenance of the machines and administration of the tests. The Petitioners assert that the rules and forms were improperly adopted and, therefore, are invalid. The Petitioners are substantially affected by the rules and forms at issue in this proceeding. There is no evidence that the Respondent was informed by the Department of State or the Administrative Procedures Committee during the rule adoption process that the process utilized in adopting the referenced rule was improper. There is no evidence that the rules have not been readopted as necessary to accommodate revisions to the forms.
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Since July 1993, and at all times material to this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a registered nurse holding Florida license number RN-2711762. On April 27, 1999, the Respondent was employed as a nurse by "Qwest, Inc." On April 27, 1999, the Respondent submitted to an employer-ordered drug screening at her workplace. The drug screen was conducted by use of a urine sample collected by Kenneth Stanley. Mr. Stanley owns and operates a business that specializes in collection of urine samples for purposes of drug screens. Mr. Stanley utilized the sample collection guidelines adopted by the "Florida Drug Free Workplace" program and the Florida Department of Transportation. Upon arriving at "Qwest, Inc." Mr. Stanley secured the rest room where the urine samples would be taken by placing blue dye in the toilet water and covering the faucet with a surgical glove secured with tape. Apparently, the purpose of the process is to prohibit the contamination of a urine sample by dilution. Mr. Stanley set up a table in the area outside the rest room to permit the processing of the samples and the completion of paperwork. Mr. Stanley called the Respondent into the area and verified her identification. He began to complete paperwork identifying the Respondent. Mr. Stanley removed a plastic cup from a sealed package that was opened for use in obtaining the sample from her. He provided the cup to her and asked her to enter the rest room, fill the cup to the proper level, set the cup on the sink counter, and then exit the rest room without washing her hands or flushing the toilet. Mr. Stanley retrieved the cup immediately after the Respondent notified him that she had completed the process and brought it back to his table. He placed the sample into a sealed tube and completed the paperwork identifying the sample as having been provided by the Respondent. The protocol utilized by Mr. Stanley requires the sample-provider to remain in the room until all paperwork is completed and the sample is properly sealed and packaged for shipment. The Respondent asserts that she left the room after providing the sample to Mr. Stanley and that Mr. Stanley failed to maintain appropriate security for her sample, permitting it to be contaminated by another employee. The evidence establishes that the Respondent remained in the area and was in the presence of the sample at all times during the collection, sealing and identification process. The Respondent was present when her sample was identified, processed, and packaged for shipment. There is no credible evidence that another employee of "Qwest, Inc." contaminated the Respondent's urine sample or that Mr. Stanley failed to maintain the proper identification of the Respondent's sample from the point of collection through the point of shipment. Mr. Stanley shipped the Respondent's sealed urine sample to Clinical Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Lenexa, Kansas. The sealed sample was received and processed by CRL, which similarly receives and processes approximately one million samples annually for purposes of drug screen testing. In performing urinalysis drug screen tests, CRL initially performs a preliminary test called an "enzyme immunoassay" on a portion of the sample. If the results of the preliminary test indicate the presence of a substance, CRL tests a second portion of the sample using a gas chromatography mass spectrometer to confirm the results of the first test and to quantify the specific amount of drug present in the urine sample. The enzyme immunoassay performed on the Respondent's urine sample indicated the presence of marijuana metabolites. Marijuana metabolites are a chemical substance contained in the Cannabis plant. Cannabis is a controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The gas chromatography mass spectrometer test performed on the Respondent's urine sample confirmed the presence of marijuana metabolites and indicated the specific amount of drug present in the urine sample as 28 nanograms of marijuana metabolites per milliliter of urine. Based on the results of the testing at CRL, the evidence establishes that the Respondent's urine sample taken on April 27, 1999 tested positive for marijuana. There is no evidence that the Respondent had a prescription or a valid medical reason for using marijuana.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order reprimanding the Respondent, imposing a fine of $250 and requiring the completion of an appropriate continuing education course related to substance abuse in health professions. The continuing education course shall be in addition to those continuing education requirements otherwise required for licensure. Further, the Final Order should further require that the Respondent participate in an evaluation by the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) within 60 days of the issuance of the Final Order, and comply with the treatment recommendations, if any, made by the IPN, or suffer suspension of licensure until compliance with this requirement is established. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Ruth R. Stiehl, Ph.D., R.N., Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 Elizabeth A. Hathaway, Esquire Reginald D. Dixon, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Annie Scotto Downs 8708 52nd Street North Tampa, Florida 33617
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has been charged with “DUI Manslaughter/Failed to Render Aid” and “Vehicular Homicide/Failed to Give Information or Render Aid” in Palm Beach County, Circuit Court Case No. 502010CF005829AXXXMB. The prosecution in the criminal case intends to offer the results of a blood alcohol test performed on blood collected from the Petitioner as evidence at the trial. The Petitioner has moved to exclude the blood alcohol test results from the trial based, in part, on the method used to collect his blood for forensic testing. The Respondent is the state agency responsible for implementing the “Implied Consent” blood alcohol testing program, including the adoption of rules. The Respondent has adopted such rules which are set forth in Florida Administrative Code Chapter 11D-8. The Petitioner has asserted that the Respondent’s “Implied Consent” rules are insufficient to ensure the scientific reliability of the blood alcohol test results to be offered against him in the criminal trial. On March 21, 2014, the circuit court judge presiding in the criminal trial entered an Order Granting State’s Motion to Invoke the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, which specifically directed the Petitioner to file a petition challenging rule 11D-8.012 with the Division of Administrative Hearings. On April 24, 2014, the Petitioner filed a Petition to Determine the Invalidity of an Existing Rule, challenging rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013 as invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority. The parties stipulated that the Petitioner is substantially affected by, and has standing to challenge the validity of, rules 11D-8.012 and 11D-8.013. Rule 11D-8.002 provides the following relevant definitions: (2) Accuracy - the nearness of a measurement to a known concentration. * * * (4) Agency - a law enforcement agency other than the Department, or an entity which conducts breath tests or submits blood samples for alcohol testing pursuant to these rules, or a civilian entity performing such duties on behalf of a law enforcement agency. * * * (7) Alcohol - ethyl alcohol, also known as ethanol. * * * Analyst - a person who has been issued a permit by the Department to conduct blood alcohol analyses. Approved Blood Alcohol Test - the analyses of two separate portions of the same blood sample using a Department- approved blood alcohol test method and a Department-approved procedure, with results within 0.010 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL), and reported as the blood alcohol level. * * * Blood - whole blood. Blood Alcohol Level - the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL). * * * (19) Department - the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. * * * (22) Methods - types of alcohol analyses approved by the Department to conduct chemical or physical tests of blood or breath. * * * (24) Permit - when issued by the Department, certifies that the holder has met all necessary qualifications, remains in full compliance with these rules and is authorized to perform all related duties. A permit is issued only to a qualified applicant and remains valid and in full effect until determined otherwise by the Department. Rule 11D-8.012 The Petitioner has asserted that rule 11D-8.012 is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not establish a venipuncture procedure regulating needle gauge and tourniquet usage by which blood is obtained for the purpose of performing a blood alcohol test. At the same time, the Petitioner asserts, and the Respondent agrees, that the Respondent lacks statutory authority to adopt such a rule. Rule 11D-8.012 provides as follows: Blood Samples - Labeling and Collection. Before collecting a sample of blood, the skin puncture area must be cleansed with an antiseptic that does not contain alcohol. Blood samples must be collected in a glass evacuation tube that contains a preservative such as sodium fluoride and an anticoagulant such as potassium oxalate or EDTA (ethylenediaminetetraacetic acid). Compliance with this section can be established by the stopper or label on the collection tube, documentation from the manufacturer or distributor, or other evidence. Immediately after collection, the tube must be inverted several times to mix the blood with the preservative and anticoagulant. Blood collection tubes must be labeled with the following information: name of person tested, date and time sample was collected, and initials of the person who collected the sample. Blood samples need not be refrigerated if submitted for analysis within seven (7) days of collection, or during transportation, examination or analysis. Blood samples must be otherwise refrigerated, except that refrigeration is not required subsequent to the initial analysis. Blood samples must be hand-delivered or mailed for initial analysis within thirty days of collection, and must be initially analyzed within sixty days of receipt by the facility conducting the analysis. Blood samples which are not hand-delivered must be sent by priority mail, overnight delivery service, or other equivalent delivery service. Notwithstanding any requirements in Chapter 11D-8, F.A.C., any blood analysis results obtained, if proved to be reliable, shall be acceptable as a valid blood alcohol level. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 322.63(3)(a), 327.352(1)(b)3., (d) FS. Law Implemented 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Commercially available kits, generally containing glass evacuation tubes, a non-alcohol skin wipe, and a 21-gauge needle assembly, may be used to collect samples for blood alcohol testing. The Respondent’s rules do not require usage of such kits, and the components of the kits are commonly available where blood collection is performed. The Legislature identified the persons authorized to collect samples for blood alcohol testing in section 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes, which states as follows: Only a physician, certified paramedic, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, other personnel authorized by a hospital to draw blood, or duly licensed clinical laboratory director, supervisor, technologist, or technician, acting at the request of a law enforcement officer, may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances therein. However, the failure of a law enforcement officer to request the withdrawal of blood shall not affect the admissibility of a test of blood withdrawn for medical purposes. The Petitioner asserts that the gauge of the needle used to puncture a vein for blood collection and improper application of a tourniquet during the collection process can result in “hemolysis” of blood and an inaccurate blood alcohol test result. As noted above, rule 11D-8.002(14) defines “blood” to mean “whole blood.” Whole blood is comprised of four components, including white cells, red cells, platelets, and plasma. Hemolysis is the release of the contents of red blood cells (hemoglobin) into blood plasma. Hemolysis can occur from a variety of causes, including, but not limited to, the manner of collection (regardless of the gauge of the needle used to puncture the vein), improper agitation of a sample in the collection tube, and storage of a sample. All blood alcohol testing performed by forensic laboratories in Florida is conducted through “gas chromatography headspace analysis.” Extensive testimony was presented at the hearing as to the process of gas chromatography headspace analysis. The reliability and accuracy of the gas chromatography headspace analysis process is not at issue in this proceeding. Gas chromatography headspace analysis involves the removal and testing of a subsample of the blood sample contained in a collection tube. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis alters the concentration of alcohol within a subsample taken from a sample of whole blood. The evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. Rule 11D-8.013 Rule 11D-8.013 governs the issuance of permits to analysts conducting blood alcohol tests, including a requirement that analysts define the method and procedures to be followed in conducting the tests. The Petitioner has asserted that the rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority because the rule does not explicitly require analysts performing a blood alcohol test to identify and/or exclude an “unreliable” blood sample from the testing process. Essentially, the Petitioner argues that samples exhibiting hemolysis or coagulation should not be analyzed for alcohol content. Rule 11D-8.013 provides as follows: Blood Alcohol Permit - Analyst. The application for a permit to determine the alcohol level of a blood sample shall be made on a form provided by the Department and shall include the following information: Name and address of applicant; A copy of state license if licensed, or college transcript; Name and address of employer and laboratory facility where applicant performs analyses; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, A complete description of proposed analytical procedure(s) to be used in determining blood alcohol level. Qualifications for blood analyst permit - To qualify, the applicant must meet all of the following requirements: Department approval of analytical procedure(s). All proposed analytical procedures will be reviewed and a determination of approval will be made by the Department; Satisfactory determination of blood alcohol level in five proficiency samples provided by the Department using the proposed analytical procedure. Satisfactory determination shall be made by reporting results for blood alcohol proficiency samples within the acceptable range for the samples. For blood alcohol testing, acceptable ranges shall mean the calculated proficiency sample mean + or - 3 standard deviations iterated twice. The mean and standard deviations will be calculated using the results reported by the analysts and reference laboratories; Identify at least one Agency for which blood analyses are to be performed pursuant to Chapters 316, 322, and 327, F.S.; and, Meet one of the following: Possess a clinical laboratory license in clinical chemistry as a technologist, supervisor or director, under Chapter 483, F.S.; or Be a licensed physician pursuant to Chapter 458, F.S.; or Complete a minimum of 60 semester credit hours or equivalent of college, at least 15 semester hours of which must be in college chemistry. The department shall approve gas chromatographic analytical procedures and enzymatic analytical procedures based on alcohol dehydrogenase which meet the following requirements: Includes the approved method used and a description of the method, and the equipment, reagents, standards, and controls used; Uses commercially-prepared standards and controls certified by the manufacturer, or laboratory-prepared standards and controls verified using gas chromatography against certified standards. For commercially-prepared standards and controls, the manufacturer, lot number and expiration date must be documented for each sample or group of samples being analyzed. For laboratory-prepared standards and controls, date, person preparing the solution, method of preparation and verification must be documented; A statement of the concentration range over which the procedure is calibrated. The calibration curve must be linear over the stated range; Uses a new or existing calibration curve. The new calibration curve must be generated using at least three (3) standards: one at 0.05 g/100mL or less, one between 0.05 and 0.20 g/100mL (inclusive) and one at 0.20 g/100mL or higher, and must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher. The existing calibration curve must be verified using a minimum of two (2) controls, one at 0.05 g/100mL or less and one at 0.20g/100mL or higher; Includes the analysis of an alcohol- free control, and the analysis of a whole blood or serum control. The whole blood or serum control may be used to satisfy the control requirement(s) in paragraph (d); A gas chromatographic analytical procedure must discriminate between methanol, ethanol, acetone and isopropanol and employ an internal standard technique; An enzymatic analytical procedure based on alcohol dehydrogenase must use the procedure recommended by the instrument manufacturer/test kit vendor for whole blood alcohol analysis, and the enzyme used must have sufficient selectivity to provide negligible cross-reactivity towards methanol, acetone and isopropanol. The permit shall be issued by the Department for a specific method and procedure. Any substantial change to the method, analytical procedure, or laboratory facility must receive prior approval by the Department before being used to determine the blood alcohol level of a sample submitted by an agency. The Department shall determine what constitutes a substantial change. An analyst shall only use a Department- approved procedure to determine the blood alcohol level of samples submitted by an agency. Approval of blood alcohol analysis methods and procedures shall be based on rule requirements in effect at the time they were submitted for approval. Specific Authority 316.1932(1)(a)2., (f)1., 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3) 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b)3. FS. Law Implemented 316.1932(1)(b), 316.1933(2)(b), 316.1934(3), 322.63(3)(b), 327.352(1)(b), (e), 327.353(2), 327.354(3) FS. Analysts submit the procedures referenced in the rule in the form of written “standard operating procedures” (SOP) filed with the Respondent. No SOP was admitted into the record of the hearing. As set forth above, the evidence fails to establish that hemolysis affects the results of a blood alcohol test performed on whole blood by gas chromatography headspace analysis. A subsample taken from a sample that exhibits hemolysis contains all of the components present at the time of collection and is whole blood. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that a sample exhibiting hemolysis should be excluded from testing. Notwithstanding the requirement in rule 11D-8.012 that glass evacuation tubes containing a preservative and an anticoagulant be used in the collection process, a collection tube containing a blood sample submitted for testing can, on occasion, include coagulated blood. Coagulation can occur for a variety of reasons, including the type of needle used in the collection process or the failure to mix the sample properly with the anticoagulant contained in the tube. Rule 11D-8.002(15) defines “blood alcohol level” as “the alcohol concentration by weight in a person’s blood based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood (g/100mL).” The entire sample in a collection tube containing a portion of coagulated blood contains all of the components that were present in the “whole blood” of the subject from whom the blood was collected. However, coagulation causes some of the blood components to solidify. Alcohol (ethanol) is water-soluble. Coagulation alters the ratio of liquid to solid in the sample and can increase the concentration of alcohol in the liquid portion of the sample. The evidence fails to establish that the mere presence of coagulation inevitably precludes the withdrawal of a subsample that properly reflects the components of the whole blood contained in the collection tube. Because gas chromatography headspace analysis uses a subsample of the liquid portion of the sample, the accuracy of the blood alcohol level reported by the subsample is related to the degree of coagulation present in the sample.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a licensed medical doctor holding license number 0013446 issued by the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. He specializes in internal medicine, geriatrics, endocrinology and nuclear medicine with an extensive educational and professional background in those fields. He is currently in private practice in Dade County, Florida. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged by Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (1981), with administering, regulating, and enforcing the licensure and medical practice standards as delineated by that chapter and related rules. Maurice Blanchar was examined at the Miami Heart Institute in 1976. At that time it was suggested by his attending physician that Mr. Blanchar have a "nuclear scan" because of a suspected abnormality described as "Gallin Syndrome." Mr. Blanchar was also examined at the Cooper Clinic in Dallas, Texas, in 1979, at which time it was also suggested that he have a nuclear scan (apparently related to cardiac complaints at that time of an unspecified nature). A coronary angiogram was performed at the Cooper Clinic, which was within normal limits. Sometime in 1979, Mr. Blanchar, with a prior history of undiagnosed cardiac complaints, read an advertisement in a local newspaper which offered nuclear scans to be performed by the Respondent, Dr. Sternberg. Mr. Blanchar kept this advertisement in his possession for approximately one year and ultimately called the Respondent's office for an appointment in July of 1980. Upon obtaining his appointment, Mr. Blanchar was advised to bring $95 as a initial fee, together with proof of medical insurance coverage. Upon arriving for his scheduled appointment at the Respondent's office, Mr. Blanchar executed a questionnaire designed to disclose his medical history. His specific presenting complaint was that he was suffering chest pains. He was a regular "jogger" and had no pain or discomfort attendant to this exercise, but suffered chest pains only while resting in bed at night. He met with the Respondent and informed the Respondent that he was responding to the advertisement regarding "nuclear scans" and informed the Respondent of his complaint, a somewhat unusual occurrence. Based upon Mr. Blanchar's complaints, together with information discerned from Mr. Blanchar's previous records from the Cooper Clinic and the Miami Heart Institute, Dr. Sternberg discussed the procedures he intended to perform with Mr. Blanchar. Dr. Sternberg informed him of the tests he would perform before and as he was performing them. Dr. Sternberg explained, and Mr. Blanchar admitted in his testimony, that the $95 fee was not for the entire nuclear scan series of tests performed, but was rather for a consultation and initial examination performed by the Respondent. The record does not clearly reflect whether specific fees for tests or procedures to be performed were discussed between the Respondent and Mr. Blanchar at this time, other than the Respondent informing Mr. Blanchar that his insurance company would pay for the cost of the nuclear scans involved. Prior to beginning the testing, the Respondent had no presupposition that Mr. Blanchar had cardiac arterial disease, based upon a previous normal coronary angiogram, and the symptoms of lack of pain while jogging, but pain while at rest in bed at night. Dr. Sternberg was aware that Mr. Blanchar was a jogger, which indicated to the Respondent that in terms of likelihood, his chances of having coronary artery disease were extremely small in terms of percentages. However, the fact that he developed chest pains while at rest in bed, led Dr. Sternberg to believe that this symptom could possibly be related to coronary artery disease. Because of the possibility of a hiatal hernia, arthritis, or possibly a congenital heart lesion, the Respondent performed three tests, the so-called "first pass," "MUGA at rest" and "MUGA at stress." All tests were designed to give complementary information, which information is not necessarily achievable by any one procedure in and of itself. The first procedure performed was the cardiac imaging blood pool test, commonly referred to as a "first pass study." It is the function of this test to assess the pattern of blood flow through the heart to determine right and left ventricular performance which is measured by cardiac wall motion and "ejection fraction." The first pass test is also utilized if there is a suspicion of vascular misformation, obstruction or shunting in a patient's heart. The first pass test was found to yield results within normal limits. The next procedure performed by the Respondent was the cardiac imaging, gated, static test, designed to show cardiac wall motion and ejection fraction, which last term is related to the volume of blood pumped by the heart upon ventricular contraction. This procedure is commonly termed the "MUGA at rest" study. The main concern of this test is a measurement of cardiac function as observed by wall motion of the heart and measured by the ejection fraction while the patient is at rest. This procedure is most commonly done as a baseline study for obtaining information concerning cardiac function while the patient is at rest for purposes of comparison with the cardiac imaging, gated, wall motion, ejection fraction test done with the patient at stress. This latter test is referred to as "MUGA at stress" and is performed in the case of patient Blanchar by using the so-called "Cold Presser Method," which involves stressing the heart to the required degree for the test by fastening an ice bag on the arm of the patient until he has reached the level of stress desirable for performing the MUGA at stress test. The MUGA at stress performed by the Cold Presser Method, although somewhat experimental, is an accepted means of inducing cardiac stress in the patient for purposes of obtaining meaningful MUGA at stress results. The MUGA at stress test, when used in conjunction with the MUGA at rest study, gives the physician a comparison of relevant data concerning cardiac function. Dr. Sternberg was the primary treating physician for Mr. Blanchar. He did not see him on a referral basis from any other physician with any attendant request to do a specific or narrow diagnostic service. Rather, Mr. Blanchar presented himself with a complaint of chest pains at night while at rest, therefore Dr. Sternberg had a broader range of potential problems to consider in determining which diagnostic test to perform on Mr. Blanchar. When Dr. Sternberg performed the first pass test, which was performed first of the three tests performed on patient Blanchar, the ejection fraction was normal, but on the lower side of a normal range for this patient. Dr. Sternberg and the Respondent's expert witness, Dr. Epstein, as well as Dr. Gottlieb testifying for the Petitioner, established that the first pass test is medically indicated to rule out problems such as "shunting," obstructions or regurgitation. Dr. Sternberg had no prior medical history of Mr. Blanchar which would automatically rule out any such problems and, in the exercise of sound medical judgment, felt that the first pass test should he performed. The decision to perform this test was medically appropriate given the patient's symptoms and the doctor's responsibility as the only primary care physician involved. Dr. Sternberg then performed the MUGA studies at rest and at stress and found that the wall motion of the heart looked normal in the left anterior oblique view. The ejection fraction was normal with the MUGA study "at rest" test, but was higher in the normal range than had been the case with the first pass study, which led him to believe that the previous first pass study had an anxiety factor in the patient as a contributing factor to its results. Thus, the MUGA at stress test was able to confirm the efficacy of the performance of and results of the first pass study and Dr. Sternberg was, as well, able to rule out any problems related to shunting, regurgitation, or obstruction in the patient. He was able to confirm that the first pass study, with the patient's anxiety as a factor, had resulted in a slightly altered ejection fraction result. In any event, after these two tests were performed, he also felt the need to look at the wall motion of the heart, under stress conditions in the other areas of the heart, because he had not yet found any area of abnormality. Ultimately, no substantial abnormality was found in the patient's heart, except a suggestion that stress altered his ejection fraction. He also found that the wall motion of Mr. Blanchar's heart in the region of the left circumflex branch, the posterior laterial wall, towards the apex, showed sluggish motion, in fact, almost a paradoxical type of motion during stress, as compared with the baseline study which indicated that there was evidence of probable coronary artery disease at that point. Dr. David Allen Epstein practices diagnostic radiology and nuclear medicine. He was accepted as an expert witness on behalf of the Respondent and largely corroborated the Respondent's testimony, finding the procedures performed by Dr. Sternberg for patient Blanchar to be medically legitimate and to constitute matters of clinical judgment. Dr. Epstein established that the Respondent had available to him other justifiable tests beyond those he performed for Mr. Blanchar and established that the first pass, MUGA at rest and MUGA at stress studies performed, were for medically justifiable reasons and, in a patient with the presenting symptoms of Mr. Blanchar, were each designed to elicit information not directly available from the other tests. The use of color for cardiac computer studies is a useful diagnostic procedure. Neither Dr. Stuart Gottlieb nor Dr. Stolzenberg (Petitioner's expert witnesses) found any fault with the management or care provided these patients, nor the choice of tests performed by Dr. Sternberg with the exception of the first pass test and the separately billed stress test. Both Drs. Gottlieb and Stolzenberg felt the first pass test was redundant. However, their testimony in this regard is rejected and Dr. Epstein's and the Respondent's is accepted, inasmuch as the Respondent was the primary care physician and the only physician concerned with these proceedings who saw the patients in a clinical setting, charged with evaluating the patient's own complaints and arriving at a diagnosis. Patient Blanchar was not presented to the Respondent by another referring physician upon a narrow area of specific inquiry, rather Dr. Sternberg had to perform the added first pass study in order to rule out possible shunting, obstruction, regurgitation and other problems and his testimony regarding the necessity for this is corroborated by that of his expert, Dr. Epstein. It was established that all three cardiac studies were efficacious with regard to patient Blanchar and the Respondent's testimony and Dr. Epstein's testimony is accepted to the exclusion of other testimony in this regard. The Respondent's bill presented to patient Blanchar (and presumably his insurance carrier) is set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit "A" and reflects the following charges: Comprehensive office visit, new patient $ 95.00 Stress testing 150.00 Provision of Radionuclide 20.00 Cardiac Imaging gated (wall Motion, ejection fraction) w/stress 500.00 Cardiac Imaging gated (wall Motion, ejection fraction) static 500.00 Cardiac Imaging blood pool (1st pass) and or vascular flow 500.00 Dr. Sternberg charged patient Blanchar an additional $150 for "stress testing" which is represented on his bill to be a separate and different test from the cardiac imaging, gated, wall motion study with stress or "MUGA at stress," for which the doctor charged Blanchar $500. Although the Respondent represented that this "stress testing" was a separate service performed, there is no evidence whatever in the record which would establish that such a stress test was performed separate and apart from the MUGA at stress, performed for the $500 charge. A separate stress test would have been redundant and unnecessary in any event. It is obvious therefore that the patient Blanchar was billed for a separate item called "stress testing" in the amount of $150 which was not actually performed and which was not necessary. Dehlia Teramo suffered an automobile accident on March 12, 1980. She was initially seen by Dr. Carlos B. Fernandez, who saw her on the day of the accident. He ultimately referred Ms. Teramo to the Respondent with a history of trauma sustained in the accident with subsequent pain throughout her head, ears, eyes, neck, nose, and left shoulder. On April 10, 1980, Ms. Teramo initially saw the Respondent complaining of frequent headaches, neck pain, eye pain, high blood pressure, back and shoulder pains and pain in her nose, having sustained trauma and unconsciousness after being thrown about in the interior of her car during the auto accident. She additionally suffered pain in the left upper and lower parts of her mouth and suffered a recurrence of her menstrual period. Dr. Fernandez sent her to the Respondent for evaluation and diagnosis with reference to all these physical complaints, including the possibility of a fracture in the head or left shoulder area, but not solely for determination of the presence of a fracture of the sphenoid bone of the head. The Respondent performed three diagnostic tests or studies on different dates to attempt to determine the basis of Ms. Teramo's injuries. The first study was conducted on April 10, a blood circulation study. This study, when confined to the cerebral area is known also as a brain flow study. The study was conducted by the Respondent in area of the head as well as the spine and shoulder. The test is performed by injecting the patient with a radionuclide and then following the "bolus" throughout the areas in the which the physician is interested in gathering data with an x-ray camera assisted by a computer. In effect, this test images the blood flow in the blood vessels involved in the head, spine and shoulder areas and is used to detect subdural or epidural hematomas, abnormal vascular changes in the brain and in the other areas tested. It is designed to show any breaks or "leaks" in the blood/brain barrier, that is, any passage of blood from the vascular system of the brain into surrounding brain tissue. In itself, it is not the primary test for determining a fracture, but it is useful and all expert witnesses agreed and established that it was within sound medical judgment and patient management to perform such a test to aid and ascertain the basis for the complaints Ms. Teramo had regarding her head, neck and shoulder areas. A sphenoid bone fracture would be difficult to diagnose with this one test alone, but that was not the sole basis for the referral of Ms. Teramo to the Respondent. The radionuclide which is injected travels throughout the patient's body and the physician can do a number of limited scans or a total body scan utilizing the one injection of radionuclide. In performing the blood circulation or blood flow study, the Respondent charged patient Teramo for each component of the study, in effect, each view taken was charged for as a separate procedure as was the injection of the radionuclide. The computer processing and color image analysis was also disclosed to patient Teramo to be a separate procedure and was billed for separately, as shown on Petitioner's Exhibit "K," the bill set forth below. The blood circulation study and the quantitative cerebral blood flow study were represented to the patient Teramo on the bill as being separate studies and a separate $200 charge was assessed against the patient for the quantitative cerebral flow study. These studies are performed during the same patient visit and utilizing the same injection of radionuclide. The cerebral blood flow study is dynamic, with imaging done as the radioactive "bolus" moves through the vascular area in question. The blood circulation study, also called blood pool study, is the static form phase of the procedure performed after the vascular system in the area in question has already been completely infused with radionuclide. The testimony of Dr. Stolzenberg, coupled with that of the Respondent himself, establishes that the quantitative cerebral blood flow study is indeed tested with the same injection of radionuclide at the same patient visit. It is a different test or procedure, however, although many practitioners do not use it and it is unusual to see it used. However, it was not demonstrated, because it is not a standard type of procedure, that a practitioner should not charge a separate fee for it, not that the brain flow study always necessarily includes a quantitative, cerebral blood flow study. Thus it was not shown that the quantitative, cerebral blood flow study with the separate charge of $200 on Ms. Teramo's bill was not a separately identifiable test performed on her. The Petitioner also was unable to establish that this particular test was not medically indicated for a patient with Ms. Teramo's presenting symptoms. On April 14, 1980, the Respondent performed another nuclear scan on patient Teramo, known as a bone scan. This is accomplished by again injecting the patient with a radionuclide substance which adheres to the bones and joints after passage of a period of time while the patient waits in the examining facility. This scan was utilized for the same areas as the previous scan or blood flow study, that is the head and left shoulder areas and cervical spine area. The bone scan is used to aid in the physician's determination of the presence of fractures. The Respondent separated his charges for this procedure into a separate charge for each view obtained, as well as a separate charge for the injection of the radionuclide, and a separate charge for computer processing and clinical color imaging analysis done by the Respondent himself. On April 18, 1980, the Respondent performed an echoencephalogram upon patient Teramo. This procedure is designed to determine the presence of subdural or epidural hematomas, fractures and tumors. It is commonly utilized in cases of patients who sustain traumatic injury. Having reviewed the results of all these procedures, the Respondent arrived at a diagnosis of patient Teramo as having a fracture of the sphenoid bone of the head. No apparent diagnosis was made with reference to the shoulder area. The Respondent presented a bill to patient Teramo, admitted as Petitioner's Exhibit "K," reflecting the following pertinent charges: 4/10/80 Initial consultation $ 95.00 Injection of Radio- nuclide for scans 20.00 Scans: (Blood circulation study) Head LL 75.00 Head PA 75.00 Head Vertex 75.00 Cervical Spine PA 75.00 Shoulder AP 75.00 L. Shoulder AP 75.00 R. Shoulder PA 75.00 L. Shoulder PA 75.00 Head AP 75.00 Head RL 75.00 Computer processing for high resolution and high sensitivity image produc- tion and clinical color image analysis 350.00 Quantitative Cerebral Blood Flow Study 200.00 4/14/80 Office visit 25.00 Injection of Radio- nuclide for scans 20.00 Scans: (Bone and Joint Study) Head AP 75.00 Head RL 75.00 Head LL 75.00 Shoulder AP 75.00 L. Shoulder AP 75.00 R. Shoulder PA 75.00 L. Shoulder PA 75.00 Head PA 75.00 Cervical Spine PA 75.00 Cervical Spine LL 75.00 Cervical Spine RL 75.00 Computer processing for high resolution and high sensitivity image produc- tion and clinical color image analysis. 350.00 4/18/80 Office visit 25.00 Echoencephalogram, A-Mode 150.00 The blood and bone scan studies done with regard to Ms. Teramo's complaints, as well as the echoencephalogram, are medically appropriate and a proper exercise of sound medical judgment by a clinical physician and primary treating physician in the position of Dr. Sternberg with regard to this patient. It must be remembered that Ms. Teramo was not merely presented for determining the presence of a sphenoid fracture, rather she was presented to Dr. Sternberg by Dr. Fernandez, for investigation of various types of suspected pathologies. Dr. Sternberg's testimony, as corroborated by that of Dr. Epstein, establishes that certain fractures not always detectable by specific types of radiographic techniques may be detected by the device of blood pool scans. The Respondent showed (corroborated to some extent by Drs. Gottlieb and Stolzenberg) that the tests performed on Ms. Teramo constituted matters of clinical judgment and that Dr. Sternberg had available to him other tests which he could have performed on Ms. Teramo or Mr. Blanchar and did not. Some physicians use color imaging in computer processing and that is a legitimate type of evaluation and diagnostic technique. Further, Dr. Stolzenberg recognizes that there are some physicians who do cerebral blood flow studies of the brain and charge fees there for and acknowledges that there is no prohibition against such a procedure and that some physicians use the aid of a computer during performance and evaluation of brain scans as a routine matter. Neither of the Petitioner's expert witnesses are primary care physicians and Dr. Stolzenberg admitted that he does not practice internal medicine; neither have examined either of Dr. Sternberg's patients concerned in this proceeding. Only Dr. Sternberg, of the three doctors involved, is a primary care physician. It has thus been shown that the first pass study, the MUGA at rest and the MUGA at stress studies, as well as the blood circulation study, quantitative cerebral blood flow study and bone scans performed on these two patients were medically legitimate and all were within an appropriate choice of tests and were selected and performed in a manner within acceptable medical standards. The fact that the Respondent charged a $75 fee for each of the various scans or views of the head, shoulders, and cervical spine of Ms. Teramo for purposes of the blood circulation study and the bone scans performed appears exorbitant, however there is no evidence that it was not a charge directly related to the Respondent's time and skill as a highly trained specialist, coupled with a component in each of those charges for the use of highly sophisticated, color, computer processing equipment and camera which he owned and operated himself in his own office. Since the specific rates charged by physicians for this and any other type of service, are not regulated, these charges cannot be delved into further for purposes of this proceeding once the diagnostic procedures to which they relate have been established, to be medically acceptable, which they have, with the exception of the $150 charged patient Blanchar for the unperformed stress test.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleading and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medical Examiners enter a Final Order finding the Respondent, Joshua L. Sternberg, M.D., guilty of a violation of Sections 458.331 (1)(1) and (o) Florida Statutes (1981), to the extent delineated above, and that he be fined the sum of $1,000 for each of the above two violations. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of November, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold M. Braxton, Esquire 45 S.W. 36th Court Miami, Florida 33135 Steven M. Slepin, Esquire 1114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety by reason of illness or use of alcohol, in violation of section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2020); and, if so, the appropriate penalty.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the credibility of witnesses and evidence presented at the final hearing and stipulated facts, the following Findings of Fact are found: 1 Respondent objected to Petitioner’s admission of Exhibit 7, which was a close-captioned television video recording of Respondent and others on July 2, 2020. Respondent argued that Petitioner only offered a portion of the recordings from that day, and, thus, Petitioner should offer the complete video. To address Respondent’s objection, Petitioner was instructed to contact Mr. Anderson to verify whether additional recordings were available for July 2, 2020. However, Mr. Anderson was not available. Given the location of the camera and the area of treatment, the video camera may have captured Respondent leaving the emergency room. After considering the record, however, additional recordings would not have changed the outcome of the undersigned’s findings in this matter. 2 Respondent indicated at hearing that he was offering the reference letter as his sole exhibit. He was permitted to file the exhibit with DOAH after the hearing. Instead, Respondent filed a copy of a certificate of completion for nursing continuing education courses. The reference letter was not filed and, thus, is not a part of the record. Stipulated Facts At all times material to this complaint, Respondent was licensed as a registered nurse within the State of Florida, having been issued license number RN 3349322. Respondent’s address of record is 805 Sunday Road, Chipley, Florida 32428. At all times material to this complaint, Respondent was employed by Doctors Memorial Hospital (DMH), located in Bonifay, Florida. Respondent submitted to a blood alcohol test, which returned positive at a level of 0.2637 g/dl. Facts Related to the Events on July 2, 2020 On July 2, 2020, several colleagues of Respondent observed Respondent’s behavior at work, which raised questions regarding whether Respondent was impaired. Janet Smith, a registered nurse, worked at DMH. She had worked with Respondent for approximately 10 years before July 2, 2020. Ms. Smith arrived to work at 8:00 a.m. She observed Respondent at the emergency room desk from a distance of 10 feet for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. She testified that Respondent’s speech was “different, it was drawn out, and he was talkative, more friendly than usual.” Ms. Smith had more than 30 years of experience working in the emergency room and was familiar with the behavior of persons under the influence of alcohol. Based on her experience, she believed that “[Respondent] appeared drunk.” Concerned about Respondent’s behavior, Ms. Smith shared her concerns with other staff members, including Ashley Hall, Debra Smitty, Rohan Anderson, and Dr. Contini. Dr. Contini and Ms. Smitty were not offered as witnesses at the final hearing. Although Ms. Smith had concerns about Respondent’s behavior on July 2, 2020, she otherwise believed he was a strong nurse. Rohan Anderson also observed Respondent on July 2, 2020, after Debra Smitty shared her concerns about Respondent’s behavior. Mr. Anderson works at DMH as the Chief Operating Officer and Director of Information Technology. Mr. Anderson had also worked with Respondent at another hospital and did not recall any prior impairment issues. Similar to Ms. Smith, Mr. Anderson observed Respondent from a distance of 10 to 15 feet near the emergency room desk. He also noticed that Respondent’s speech was different than usual. Mr. Anderson testified that Respondent was “slurring his words … the way he was controlling the pitch of his voice. And I knew something was going on based on that.” Mr. Anderson then shared his concerns about Respondent’s behavior with Dr. Ulhaq, the emergency room director. Mr. Anderson unequivocally testified that Respondent was known for being a good nurse and was used as an example for training purposes. Loyd Simmons, an advanced registered nurse practitioner, was working in the emergency room on July 2, 2020. At Dr. Ulhaq’s request, Mr. Simmons evaluated Respondent based on the reports of suspected alcohol use. Mr. Simmons noted that Respondent was not acting like his “normal” self and he appeared to be unsteady on his feet. Respondent experienced difficulty with upward gaze. However, he was alert, oriented, with clear speech. Mr. Simmons performed a physical examination of Respondent, where he did not find any bruises or signs of a recent fall. He also conducted a neurological examination with Dr. Ulhaq, which revealed a positive Babinski. A positive Babinski result may be an indicator of a problem in the central nervous system. It may, however, also be related to alcohol use. Mr. Simmons interpreted findings of Respondent’s EKG and CT scan as within normal limits. Mr. Simmons found Respondent’s EKG and CT scan results did not indicate a condition that would affect his blood alcohol level. The hematology results returned normal results. The blood alcohol level test returned a result of 263.7 mg/dc, meaning .263 g/dcl.3 The chemical analyzer machine used to perform the blood alcohol test was working properly, calibrated properly, and the machine properly reported correct blood alcohol test results for Respondent. Based on his findings, Mr. Simmons diagnosed Respondent with alcohol intoxication. There was no evidence deduced from the tests performed that Respondent suffered from liver complications or COVID-19 that would cause his significantly high alcohol level results. Mr. Simmons testified that he had no prior personal knowledge of Respondent being impaired at work. Ms. Hall worked with Respondent on July 2, 2020. She observed Respondent for approximately 30 minutes while working together. She testified that he was more “jolly” than usual on that day and his mannerisms were exaggerated. She then shared her belief with the Director of Nursing that Respondent appeared to be impaired. Ms. Hall was present during Respondent’s evaluation in the emergency room. She assisted with placing an IV catheter to withdraw a blood sample from Respondent. She followed the standard process by cleaning the insertion site with isopropyl alcohol, and allowing the area to dry before inserting the catheter. She withdrew the blood sample and then delivered the sample to the lab drop-off window for testing. She had no further contact with the blood sample. Although Ms. Hall primarily worked a different shift than Respondent, she had never witnessed Respondent exhibiting similar behavior as he exhibited on July 2, 2020. Overall, each witness who worked with Respondent on July 2, 2020, reported that he was not behaving like normal and his behavior was consistent with alcohol impairment. Evaluation on January 14, 2021 Respondent was placed on administrative leave and ultimately, terminated for “being at work while under the influence of alcohol.” He was 3 The legal limit in Florida for intoxication is considered a blood alcohol level of .08 or above. presented with the option to voluntarily report to Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) in lieu of a complaint filed with the Department, and he agreed to contact IPN. Respondent subsequently elected not to voluntarily participate in IPN because he could not “afford it.” The Department then issued an Order requiring Respondent to undergo an evaluation with Dr. Reeves. Dr. Reeves, a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida since 1994, has specialized in addiction medicine since 2010. Dr. Reeves is board certified in addiction medicine and a member of several professional organizations for addiction treatment providers. Dr. Reeves serves as the Medical Director for two treatment facilities, South Walton Medical Group and Sacred Heart Hospital of the Emerald Coast. Prior to practicing addiction medicine, he worked as a vascular surgeon. Dr. Reeves has written articles and delivered presentations on the topic of addiction medicine. Dr. Reeves has testified in other legal proceedings within the past 10 years and has never been disqualified as an expert. Dr. Reeves was accepted as an expert on addiction medicine in this matter. Dr. Reeves performed an independent medical examination (IME) of Respondent on January 14, 2021. Dr. Reeves routinely conducts IMEs of health care professionals to determine whether an individual has an issue with addiction or addictive substances, including alcohol. Dr. Reeves follows a process for conducting an IME. He reviews the available records, any medical history, and witness statements. Dr. Reeves then meets with the individual to conduct an in-person evaluation, which includes assessment tests and screening exams. Dr. Reeves testified that he understood that Respondent was referred to him for alleged alcohol intoxication while at work. Dr. Reeves was concerned as alcohol is a depressant and directly affects the judgement and decision-making functions in the brain. Dr. Reeves discussed the events that gave rise to the Department’s complaint and subsequent referral for evaluation. Respondent explained to Dr. Reeves that he began drinking more often while he was quarantined with COVID-19. Respondent told Dr. Reeves that he had increased his drinking from two to three beers a night to three to four beers per night, four to five times per week. Respondent stated that he drank several drinks the night before he returned to work to help him sleep. He did not believe that he drank a lot and was surprised that his test results reflected a significantly elevated alcohol level. He denied being intoxicated at work on July 2, 2020. Respondent completed a questionnaire after he arrived for his evaluation, which Dr. Reeves reviewed with him during the evaluation. Respondent suggested in his questionnaire that perhaps the alcohol level was because he had taken Nyquil4 while driving to work. Respondent later retracted that statement. Regarding assessments, the evaluation included an ethyl glucuronide (ETG) test, which was performed upon Respondent’s arrival to Dr. Reeves office. An ETG test is a urine test that measures the level of ethyl glucuronide in the body. An ETG test would generally yield positive results within two to five days after alcohol is ingested. Respondent’s test was negative. Dr. Reeves testified that the negative test results suggest Respondent had not drank alcohol within the prior three to five days. Dr. Reeves also asked Respondent to undergo a phosphatidylethanol (PEth) test, which tests a blood sample to measure intake of alcohol. The PEth test has a longer timeframe for measurement than the ETG test, as it measures alcohol in the system for up to 14 days after ingestion. To maintain the validity of the test, it must be completed within 48 hours of the request. 4 Dr. Reeves testified that a dose of Nyquil contains approximately the same amount of alcohol as a glass of wine. He estimated that a person would need to consume 10 to 15 doses of Nyquil to achieve a result of .2637 gm/dcl (Respondent’s test results). Respondent did not complete the test within that timeframe. Thus, there were no PEth test results for Dr. Reeves to consider. Dr. Reeves testified that the PEth test was not a necessary factor for diagnosing an alcohol-use disorder, as he had sufficient objective data from his evaluation to make a diagnosis. Expert Opinion Based upon his evaluation, Dr. Reeves diagnosed Respondent with moderate alcohol disorder. Dr. Reeves relied upon the criteria established in the Diagnostic Statistic Manual-5 (DSM-5), which sets out the standard of care for diagnosis of psychiatric disorders. The DSM-5 includes alcohol-use disorder as a psychiatric diagnosis. Dr. Reeves testified that if you meet two or more of 11 alcohol-use disorder criteria used in the DSM-5, the individual meets the criteria for that level of the disorder. Applying objective factors identified during his evaluation of Respondent, Dr. Reeves determined that Respondent met four of the 11 criteria for moderate alcohol-use disorder. Specifically, Dr. Reeves identified the following criteria in making his assessment: Alcohol is often taken in larger amounts or over a longer period than was intended; * * * 5. Recurrent alcohol use resulting in a failure to fulfill major role obligations at work, school, or home; * * * 8. Recurring alcohol use in situations in which it is physically hazardous; and * * * 10. Tolerance is defined by (a) a need for markedly increased amounts of alcohol to achieve intoxication or desired effect, or (b) a markedly diminished effect with continued use of the same amount of alcohol. Dr. Reeves testified that a nursing professional is considered a safety sensitive occupation, which requires good decision-making ability. Since alcohol significantly impairs judgement and decision-making ability, an individual who is impaired by alcohol is not safe to practice as a nurse. Dr. Reeves credibly opined that Respondent is not safe to practice as a nurse due to his diagnosis of moderate alcohol-use disorder. Dr. Reeves’ opinion is accepted. Dr. Reeves recommended a course of intensive outpatient treatment for a specified period of time. Even if Respondent indicated he stopped drinking, without treatment, Dr. Reeves maintains that Respondent is not safe to practice nursing. Based on his review of the records obtained from DMH, Dr. Reeves concluded that Respondent’s records reflected no symptoms to demonstrate that he suffered from a transient ischemic attack (TIA)5 as Respondent suggested. There was no evidence offered at hearing that Respondent harmed patients while he was impaired. Other than his behavior exhibiting impairment, the testimony overwhelmingly supported that he was considered a good nurse. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that Respondent was impaired while at work on July 2, 2020. 5 A TIA is a temporary period of symptoms similar to a stroke. Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence to demonstrate that Respondent is unable to practice nursing with reasonable skill and safety to patients due to his moderate alcohol-use disorder and alcohol use.
Conclusions For Petitioner: Ellen LeGendre Carlos, Esquire Dirlie Anna McDonald, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 For Respondent: Benjamin Dallas Stoe, pro se 805 Sunday Road Chipley, Florida 32428
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Nursing enter a final order finding: Respondent violated section 464.018(1)(j), Florida Statutes (2020); and suspending Respondent’s registered nursing license, until such time that Respondent enters into IPN and complies with any and all terms and conditions imposed by IPN. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Ellen LeGendre Carlos, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Dirlie Anna McDonald, Esquire Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Louise St. Laurent, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Benjamin Dallas Stoe 805 Sunday Road Chipley, Florida 32428 Joe Baker, Jr., Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Deborah McKeen, BS, CD-LPN Board of Nursing Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin D02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Respondent failed to maintain good moral character and thereby violated section 943.1395(7), Florida Statutes (2008),1/ and if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent has been a certified law enforcement officer, issued law enforcement certificate 233642. At all times material to the allegations in the Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as an officer by the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office (JSO). As such, he was subject to random drug screenings as a condition of his employment. On April 23, 2009, Respondent was selected for a random drug screen. He reported to Baptist Occupational Health Clinic (Baptist) in Jacksonville to provide a urine specimen for testing. Respondent gave the specimen by urinating in a previously unused specimen cup provided to him by Heather Walizer, a medical assistant employed by Baptist. Respondent delivered the cup containing his urine to Ms. Walizer, who divided the specimen into two vials. She then capped and sealed the vials, and had Respondent initial each vial and sign the chain of custody form. Ms. Walizer labeled Respondent's specimen with his social security number, and assigned to the specimen a unique specimen number, in this case number 6228701, which would not be used for any other specimen. The vials containing Respondent's urine specimen were sealed with a label that prevented the vials from being opened without breaking the seal. Ms. Walizer packaged the two vials with Respondent's urine specimens in a bag which was also sealed and labeled. Ms. Walizer put the bag with Respondent's urine samples in a refrigerator at Baptist for pick up by a courier to be delivered to Quest Diagnostics (Quest) laboratories in Tucker, Georgia. Upon arrival at Quest, the specimen was assigned a unique laboratory accession number, 842481F, for purposes of drug testing. There is no dispute that the urine sample supplied by Respondent was received by and analyzed by Quest, and that the report generated is for the sample provided by Respondent. Quest maintained the required chain of custody procedures in handling Respondent's specimen. The package received by Quest was unsealed by laboratory personnel qualified to receive it and the specimen was subjected to screening and confirmatory analysis for evidence of the presence of controlled substances in the urine. The initial test performed by Quest is an immunoassay test used to screen all samples. Any sample that is positive by that screening method is then tested by a confirmatory method, i.e., gas chromatography/mass spectrometry. Respondent's urine sample tested positive for the cocaine metabolite benzoylecgonine, and was reported at a concentration of 556 nanograms per milliliter. The confirmatory test results were consistent with those obtained for the screening test. The cutoff for a positive result in the immunoassay screening test is 300 nanograms per milliliter. The cutoff for the confirmatory test is 150 nanograms per milliliter. The test results were reviewed by Dr. Liberto Columbo, M.D., the Medical Review Officer for Baptist, who called Respondent and discussed the results of the testing with him. Dr. Columbo reported the results of both tests to Nurse Gerald Shaw of the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office as positive for cocaine. Nurse Shaw notified the JSO Internal Affairs Office of the drug test results, and Respondent was interviewed on April 30, 2009. Respondent vehemently denied, as he did at hearing, the illicit use of cocaine. Respondent was terminated from his position as a law enforcement officer by the JSO. Respondent testified that he did not take cocaine and would not do so. He had taken off work in the days immediately preceding the test to care for his grandchildren while his daughter was delivering her third child. His daughter testified credibly that she would never have left her children in Respondent's care if she believed he was under the influence of cocaine. Respondent suffers from cluster headaches and has done so for several years. He believes that some honey given to him by his daughter, which was purchased overseas, contained coca leaves, and his ingestion of this honey in the weeks before the drug test may have been the basis of finding the benzoylecgonine metabolite in his system. Advertisements for the honey located on the internet represent that it contains coca oil and powdered coca leaves. Respondent went so far as to have the substance analyzed for cocaine metabolites. He also subjected himself to further drug testing, including a fingernail analysis. While the results of the testing and the information related to the product Respondent believes was the source of the positive drug test was not admissible in this proceeding,2/ the undersigned has considered the efforts Respondent undertook to determine whether there could be a source for the positive result other than his illicit use of cocaine. Dr. Columbo acknowledged that there are several commercially-available food products, produced primarily in South America, that contain coca. He testified that those food products include tea and a honey that contains coca oil and powder. Even assuming that Respondent could demonstrate that the honey he ingested would produce a positive result for benzoylecgonine, however, there was no evidence as to what amount of honey he would have to ingest in order to cause a positive drug test, or whether he in fact he did ingest that amount. There was no evidence presented indicating that Respondent has ever been disciplined previously, either by his employer or by the Commission. Further, there is no evidence presented of any impaired behavior by Respondent, or any history of substance abuse. To the contrary, Respondent credibly testified that he has prescriptions for Scheduled II controlled substances to treat his cluster headaches that he has chosen not to fill.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of section 943.1395(7), as defined in Florida Administrative Law Rule 11B-27.0011(4)(d). It is further recommended that Respondent's certification as a law enforcement officer be suspended for a period of 60 days, followed by probation for a period of two years. As condition of probation, it is recommended that the Commission require random drug testing and substance abuse counseling, as contemplated by Florida Administrative Code Rule 11B-27.005(7)(c). DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 2011.
