Findings Of Fact Respondent, Richard C. Lightner, was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0408120. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker, with a home address of 1221 Duval Street, Key West, Florida 32040. Respondent, or a representative on his behalf, did not appear at the hearing to refute or otherwise contest the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: The Department enter a Final Order revoking Respondent's Real Estate brokers license. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of July, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of August, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Raymond O. Bodiford, Esquire 515 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040 Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= FLORIDA STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REAL ESTATE COMMISSION DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE Petitioner vs. Case No. 0154510 DOAH No. 87-3668 RICHARD C. LIGHTNER III Respondent /
The Issue Whether Petitioner's application for a real estate salesman's license should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Victor Kevin Koellner. By application, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. Petitioner was a unsuccessful candidate for the December 1988 real estate salesman's licensure examination. Petitioner received a score of 74. A score of 75 is required for licensure. Each correct answer has a grade value of one (1) point. Candidates are instructed to choose the most correct answer from among the multiple choice answers given. Petitioner challenges the answers selected by the Florida Real Estate Commission as correct as to questions numbered 15 and 52, on the test administered on December 5, 1988. Question 15 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1. The commission holds that the correct answer to question 15 is D. (Do any of the above). The Petitioner alleges that the better answer is A. (Request an Escrow disbursement order from the Florida Real Estate Commission). Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, supports the Respondent's conclusion. Seventy-three (73%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered the question correctly. Question 52 is confidential under the provisions of Section 119.07(3)(c), Florida Statutes, but appears in Respondent's Exhibit 1 (page 2). The commission holds that the correct answer is C. (Pay it at the closing). The Petitioner alleges that the correct answer is D. (Not pay it). The question asked what should the seller do concerning the sales commission at the closing. Based on the facts given in the Florida Real Estate Handbook, 1987 Edition, page 272, the seller would have no option but to pay the commission at closing. Sixty and 3/10 (60.3%) percent of the candidates taking the examination on December 5, 1988 answered question 52 correctly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Respondent's Proposed Findings: 1-8. Adopted in substance. Petitioner's Proposed Findings: Paragraphs 1,2,3,4,5 (in substance), 7, and 10 are accepted. Paragraphs 6,8 and 9 are rejected as not relevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Victor Kevin Koellner, pro se 1385 Taurus Court, Merritt Island, Florida 32953 E. Harper Field, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre, Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to notice, the Division of Administrative Hearings, by its duly designated Hearing Officer, G. Steven Pfeiffer, held a public hearing in this case on January 11, 1978, in Cocoa, Florida. The following appearances were entered: Charles E. Felix, Orlando, Florida, for the Plaintiff, Florida Real Estate Commission; and Kenneth A. Studstill, Titusville, Florida, for the Defendants, Thomas L. Pittman and Pittman Real Estate, Inc. The Florida Real Estate Commission issued an Administrative Complaint against the Defendants on August 23, 1977. On September 12, 1977, the Defendants filed an election of rights form which constituted a petition for hearing. In accordance with the provisions of Section 120.57(1)(b)(3), the Commission requested that a hearing officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings be assigned to conduct the hearing. The final hearing was scheduled by notices dated October 19, 1977 and November 2, 1977. At the final hearing the Commission called Gary W. Brandt, a registered real estate salesman, as its only witness. The Defendants called Virginia Laver, a former employee of Defendant Pittman Real Estate, Inc., and the Defendant Thomas L. Pittman. Hearing Officer's Exhibits 1-3, and Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 were offered into evidence and were received. There were conflicts in the testimony of certain of the witnesses. In resolving these conflicts due regard has been given to the credibility of the witnesses as evidenced in part by the demeanor of the witnesses at the hearing, and in part by the extent to which the witnesses' testimony has been corroborated by other evidence.
The Issue The issue in Count I is whether Section 475.42(1)(j) absolutely prohibits a broker or salesman from filing a lien or other encumberance against real property to collect a commission. The issue in Count II is whether the Respondents violated a lawful order of the Commission by failing to remove the motion of lis pendens contrary to Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes.
Conclusions Section 475.42(1)(j), Florida Statutes, provides as follows: "No real estate broker or salesman shall place, or cause to be placed, upon the public records of any county, any contract, assignment, deed, will, mortgage, lien, affidavit, or other writing which purports to affect the title of, or encumber, any real property, if the same is known to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property, maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce the payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person, or for any unlawful purpose." Clearly the Respondents placed or caused to be placed the notice of lis pendens in question. A notice of lis pendens is clearly an "other writing which purports to effect the title of, or encumber, any real property." The Florida Real Estate Commission argues that this provision is an absolute bar to the filing of any lien for the purpose of collecting a commission. The Respondents argue that this provision is not an absolute bar and there are circumstances when a broker may file a notice of lis pendens. They also assert that the notice of lis pendens falls within the exception because the Circuit Court refused to remove the notice of lis pendens upon motion of the property owner. Lastly, it is argued that the notice was filed by counsel for the Respondents in good faith on an action at law and that this mitigates their action even if there was a violation. The language of Section 475.42(1)(j) cannot be read to absolutely prohibit a broker from obtaining a lis pendens. When given this construction, it effectively denies brokers and salesmen access to the courts for redress of injury as provided in Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution. Section 475.42(1)(j) is a complex provision which is subject to two interpretations. One interpretation would prohibit a broker or salesman from filing an encumberance if the same were known to him to be false, void or not authorized by law; if not authorized to be upon the public records; if not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded; if the execution of recording thereof has not been duly authorized by the owner of the property; if maliciously (filed); if for the purpose of collecting a commission, if to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman or other person; or if for any other unlawful purpose. This first interpretation would consider each clause a separate limitation on filing an encumberance. The facts analyzed under this interpretation do not show any knowledge by Respondents that the lis pendens was false, void or not authorized to be filed or not on a form entitling it to be recorded. The facts do not show that Respondents filed the lis pendens maliciously, for the purpose of collecting a commission, or for the purpose of coercing payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. The nature of lis pendens would not require the owner's authorization of execution for recording. The facts show that the lis pendens was filed by Respondent's attorney in conjunction with a suit brought by the Respondents against Perrin. The record also shows that the circuit court determined that the lis pendens was recordable when it denied the motion to remove it. The notice of lis pendens was neither malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting the commission. The notice was for the purpose of perfecting the claim against the property for execution of the judgment if the Respondents prevailed in the suit. Executing on a judgment is different from collecting the commission or coercing payment. Under this interpretation the Respondents have not been shown to violate Section 475.42(1)(j). A second interpretation would read the clause, ". . . if the same is known to to him to be false, void, or not authorized to be placed of record, or not executed in the form entitling it to be recorded, or the execution of recording thereof has not been authorized by the owner of the property. . ." as the first of two criteria to be met to establish a violation. The second criteria would consist of proof that the encumberance was recorded maliciously or for the purpose of collecting a commission, or to coerce payment of money to the broker or salesman, or for any unlawful purpose. Again the facts do not show there was knowledge by the Respondents of the falsity, or impropriety of the notice of lis pendens, as stated above. Again the facts show that the lis pendens was filed in conjunction with a law suit pending between the Respondent and the property owner, and that the court before which the action was pending refused to remove it. The file of the notice by Respondent's counsel was a legitimate method of perfecting the Respondent's claim should they prevail and obtain judgment. The facts do not indicate that the filing of the notice was malicious, coercive or for the purpose of collecting a commission. Under either interpretation, Respondents did not violate the statute. COUNT II The Respondents are charged in Count II with violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, which provides that the registration of a registrant may be suspended for up to two years for violation of a lawful order of the Commission. Clearly, the facts reveal that the Respondents had a substantial interest involved in the litigation with Perrin. The order, of the Florida Real Estate Commission to remove the notice of lis pendens substantially affected their rights in this litigation. Therefore, any final order directing Kay to remove the notice of lis pendens should have issued after an opportunity for hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The evidence reveals that the Florida Real Estate Commission did not notice a hearing under Section 120.57, and therefore its order cannot be "lawful." The provisions of Section 475.25(1)(d) require that registrants not violate lawful orders. The Respondents have not violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, by not removing the notice of lis pendens as directed by the order of the Florida Real Estate Commission.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that no action be taken against the Respondent, Sam Kaye and Sam Kaye, Inc. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of September 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce I. Kamelhair, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 2699 Lee Road Winter Park, Florida 32789 William E. Boyes, Esquire Cone, Owen, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, P.A. Post Office Box 3466 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Gary R. Berkson, is a licensed real estate salesman, holding license No. 034697. From September 27, 1980, until May of 1983, the Respondent as a salesman working as an independent contractor for Act Now Real Estate, Inc., a corporate broker whose active qualifying brokers and officers were Robert F. Picheny and Thelma R. Sarkas. Robert F. Picheny was subpoenaed and requested to bring with him the records of Act Now Real Estate, Inc., showing the disbursement of commissions to the Respondent. These records did not contain any entries relating to rental transactions involving the persons named in the complaint as having paid commissions to the Respondent. The only lease offered and received in evidence was between Samuel Schnur, as lessor, and lessees named Davis and Johnston. Samuel Schnur, presented as one of the Petitioner's witnesses, did not pay a rental commission to the Respondent in connection with this lease. Another lease transaction where the Respondent was alleged to have received rental commissions was between Sami Elmasri, as landlord, and Donald Bauerle, as tenant. Sami Elmasri, presented as another of the Petitioner's witnesses, testified that he paid a $300 commission, but that this was not paid to the Respondent. This commission was paid to another salesman, Wendy Corman. The final witness for the Petitioner, except for the Respondent, was Wendy Corman. She showed Mr. Elmasri's property to persons wishing to rent through a lead given by the Respondent. She was paid a $300 commission by Mr. Elmasri. The Respondent did not receive any of this commission. The Petitioner's final witness was the Respondent, who testified that he never received a commission for rental property. The only money he received in connection with rental properties was a management fee he received on some properties owned by Richard Jacobson. This fee was in payment for management services consisting of arranging for repairs to the properties such as painting it, repairs to the plumbing and the garage door, and being available to tenants with problems in the absence of the owner. These management fees continued even after the Respondent left Act Now Real Estate, Inc., until Mr. Jacobson assumed the management duties himself.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent, Gary R. Berkson, be DISMISSED. This Recommended Order entered this 13th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June, 1984.
Findings Of Fact On January 23, 1984, the Secretary of the Department of professional Regulation (hereinafter "Department") signed an Administrative Complaint, count one of which alleges, in pertinent part: Respondents in their capacity as real estate brokers employed Doris H. Swanton as a real estate broker and office manager from approximately October 20, 1980 to April 18, 1982. On or about April 8, 1982 to the present, Doris H. Swanton has made numerous and repeated demands upon Respondents for the payment of a share of the compensation received by Respondent and earned by Doris H. Swanton while in the employ of the Respondents in the amount totalling approximately $7,815.52 involving a number of brokerage transactions. A copy of a list reflecting the transactions, dates and amounts owing is attached as Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Since April 8, 1982, Respondents have failed, refused and neglected to give a reasonable accounting or to pay Doris H. Swanton the $7,815.52 or any part thereof notwithstanding the demands for same made upon Respondents by Doris H. Swanton, the person entitled to said money. That by reason of the foregoing, Respondents are guilty of having failed to account and deliver a share of a real estate commission and other compensation to Doris H. Swanton in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. The Administrative Complaint signed on January 23, 1984, does not contain an allegation that there has been a judicial determination that Respondents are not entitled to retain the property claimed by Doris H. Swanton. On February 22, 1984, the Respondents served an Answer and Written Defenses in which the Respondents, inter alia, admit the first of the paragraphs quoted in finding number 1, above, and deny the other three paragraphs quoted above. The Respondents' Answer and Written Defenses also sets forth a detailed itemization of Respondents' reasons for contending that Doris H. Swanton is not entitled to the full amount of a single one of the twelve commissions she claims are due her from the Respondents. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES The thesis of the Motion to Dismiss filed by Respondents is that a broker cannot be disciplined for failure to account for and deliver non-escrowed property until there has been a judicial determination that the broker is not entitled to retain the property in dispute. The case of Golub v. Department of Professional Regulation, F.R.E.C., 9 FLW 460 (Fla. 5th DCA, Feb. 23, 1984), appears to be exactly on point. There a majority of the court concluded: Once there is a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain non-escrowed property then this statute [475.25(1)(d)] is authority to discipline the broker for a failure to account and deliver the property to any person, including a salesman, who is entitled to its prossession. Corollary to the quoted language from Golub is the conclusion that until there is a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain non- escrowed property, the statute does not authorize discipline of a broker for failure toe account and deliver the property. In other words, when the property in dispute is non-escrowed property, a judicial determination that a broker is not entitled to retain the property is an indispensable prerequisite to the establishment of a violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes, on the basis of a failure to account for or deliver such property. Accordingly, until a court determines that the Respondents in this case are not entitled to retain the property in dispute in this case, it cannot be established that Respondents have violated Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. And inasmuch as the Administrative Complaint fails to allege that there has been any such judicial determination, the Administrative Complaint is fatally deficient.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Analysis of the Issues, and Conclusions of Law, I recommend that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a Final Order in this case dismissing the Administrative Complaint without prejudice to the refiling of an Administrative Complaint against these Respondents if and when a court determines that the Respondents are not entitled to the property claimed by Doris H. Swanton. DONE and ORDERED this 3rd day of July, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert W. Lee, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 G. Michael Keenan, Esquire Post Office Box 1900 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Mr. Harold R. Huff, Director Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Florida Real Estate Commission take no action against the registration of Cindy Realty of Hernando, Inc., and William Colello as real estate brokers. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Fred Langford, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Stephen C. Booth, Esquire 1604 U.S. Highway 19, North New Port Richey, Florida 33552
