The Issue Whether respondents owe petitioner money on account of sales of potatoes?
Findings Of Fact In order to finance his 1991 crops, petitioner Daniel Methvin of Hastings, had to borrow money at the end of the year before. To do that, he was told, he needed to execute contracts for the sale of the potatoes he intended to grow. He had been glad to have future contracts for the 1990 season, when a glut of potatoes pushed the price below three dollars a hundredweight (cwt). Respondent J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. (or the company of which it is a subsidiary) had honored those contracts and paid considerably more than the market price for potatoes then. On November 24, 1990, Mr. Methvin executed a contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 10,000 cwt of "REPACK REDS", Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1 ("92% US #1 INCH AND 1/2 MIN. AT LEAST 95% SKIN, Id.) to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $6.50 per cwt. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. Consolidating smaller, earlier agreements, Mr. Methvin executed another contract entitled "Sales Confirmation" agreeing to sell 45,000 cwt of Atlantics ("85% U.S. #1") to J.P. Mach, Inc. during the period April 28 to May 31, 1991, at $5.75 per cwt, guaranteeing the potatoes would be suitable for chips. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. With these contracts (or, as to the chipping potatoes, their predecessors) as collateral, Mr. Methvin raised the funds necessary to plant. Both contracts between Mr. Methvin and J.P. Mach, Inc. had "act of god clauses" excusing Mr. Methvin's nondelivery of potatoes he failed to harvest on account of, among other things, tornadoes or hail. As it happened, tornadoes and hail prevented Mr. Methvin's reaping all he had sown. Petitioner only harvested 6,300 cwt of red potatoes and approximately 43,000 cwt of Atlantic potatoes. Another result of the bad weather was extremely high market prices, at some times exceeding $20 per cwt. On April 27, 1991, J.P. Mach visited Mr. Methvin's farm and the two men discussed incentives to keep Mr. Methvin from "jumping his contract," i.e., selling his potatoes to others at the market price. In the course of their conversation, Mr. Methvin said he needed to realize $450,000 from that year's potatoes; and Mr. Mach replied, "I will help you out", and "I will keep you in business." There was general talk of incentives and bonuses. Eventually, Mr. Mach said he would pay a premium over the contract price if Mr. Methvin fulfilled the original contracts to the fullest extent possible, by delivering all the potatoes he had; and Mr. Mach began remitting premium prices, as promised. On June 1, 1991, however, Mr. Methvin advised Mr. Mach of his intention to sell what remained of his harvest, some 1100 cwt of Atlantics, on the open market. When he carried through on this, Mr. Methvin realized approximately $200,000. Even at that, he lost $40,000 that season. Meanwhile Mr. Mach and his companies were sued for $550,000 for failure to deliver potatoes; and were not paid another $172,000 for potatoes they shipped to chip plants and others to whom they had promised still more potatoes. (Mr. Methvin was not the only grower who defaulted on contracts to ship potatoes to J.P. Mach, Inc.) As of June 1, 1991, Mr. Mach, his companies or his agents had paid Mr. Methvin "about $200,000," which was more than the contract price of the potatoes Mr. Methvin had loaded. Neither Mr. Mach nor his companies paid Mr. Methvin anything after June 1, 1991. At hearing, Mr. Methvin calculated the value of the loads as to which nothing had been remitted as of June 1, 1991, as "a few hundred more than $36,000," assuming the contract price plus the premium. But Mr. Mach and his companies or employees recalculated the price of the loads he had paid for by eliminating the premium, since Mr. Methvin had not, as promised on his side, delivered all his potatoes. J.P. Mach, Inc. was duly licensed during the 1990 season. After its license lapsed, a new license was issued to J.P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. on April 24, 1991. A $50,000 certificate of deposit was filed with First Performance Bank as a condition of licensure.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That petitioner's complaint be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Methvin Route 1, Box 92 Palatka, Florida 32131 Jeffrey P. Mach, President J. P. Mach Agri-Marketing, Inc. P.O. Box 7 Plover, Wisconsin 54467 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agricutlure 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issues in this case are: (1) whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.119(6)(b), Florida Statutes (2000); (2) whether Respondent violated Subsection 489.1425(1), Florida Statutes (2000); (3) whether Respondent violated Subsections 489.129(1)(f), (g), (i), (j), (m), and (q), Florida Statutes (2000); and (4) if so, what penalties should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Douglas V. Reynaert, was originally licensed as a certified general contractor in the State of Florida on June 10, 2000. For reasons not presented at this proceeding, the Board revoked Respondent's license as a general contractor on November 6, 2003. Consequently, Respondent is no longer able to engage in contracting in the State of Florida. Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., does not have a certificate of authority as a contractor qualified to do business in the State of Florida. The Dietzman Contract On or about March 27, 2000, three months prior to Petitioner's being issued a contractor's license, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., entered into a construction contract with Homer Dietzman ("Dietzman contract"). The construction contract provided that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., would construct a new house for Mr. Dietzman and his wife at 4515 - 6th Street West, Lehigh Acres, Florida, at a cost of $70,900. According to the contract, the construction of the house was to be completed by October 20, 2000. The Dietzman contract did not contain a contractor number either for Respondent or Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. As noted in paragraph 1, Respondent was not licensed as a contractor until June 2000, more than two months after the Dietzman contract was executed. Moreover, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., was never licensed or certified as a contractor qualified to do business in Florida. The Dietzman contract did not contain the written statement explaining the consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund required in Subsection 489.1425(1), Florida Statutes (2000). According to the Dietzman contract, the house was to be completed by the end of October 2000. However, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., did not begin construction on the house until September 2000; and by the end of October 2000, the company had only completed the slab. On or about February 15, 2001, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., stopped all construction work on the Dietzman house, even though the project was not complete. After the construction work on the house stopped, Mr. Dietzman called the foreman for Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., who was overseeing the project, and asked why the workman were not doing any work on the house. In response to Mr. Dietzman's inquiry, Mr. Dietzman was told by the foreman for Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., that "We're all done." The Dietzman construction contract included a Specification Sheet that provided that the contractor, Douglas Reynaert and Sons, Inc., would provide all permits and county impact fees, drawings, builder's risk insurance, hurricane engineering fees, survey, lot clearing and fill allowance, city water or well package, and city sewer or septic system. The Specification Sheet also detailed the exterior and interior features to be included in the Dietzman house. Many of the features included in the Specification Sheet, which was a part of the construction contract, were not provided by the contractor. Features that the contractor was to provide, but which, in fact, were not put in the Dietzman house were the following: dead bolt locks on exterior doors; stain- resistant carpeting; no-wax vinyl in the kitchen and bathrooms; two ceiling fans; lighting allowance; landscape package; 18-cubic-foot refrigerator with ice maker; self-cleaning range; built-in dishwasher and microwave; 40-gallon quick recovery water heater and laundry tub; washer and dryer; Monet faucets; custom cabinets; full-length vanity mirrors; garbage disposal; window blinds or verticals; water treatment; softener/reverse osmosis/aerator; well; some soffit; Bahai sod; two toilets; some cathedral ceilings; 10.0 seer-rated air conditioner; and prefabricated shower. On or about February 19, 2001, about two weeks after Doug Reyaernt and Sons, Inc., stopped working on the Dietzman house, Mr. Dietzman prepared a list of the contract items that were incomplete and mailed the list to Respondent. Mr. Dietzman also attempted to personally contact Respondent about the company's failing to complete the house, but the office of Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., was closed. Eventually, in late February or early March 2001, after learning that Respondent was in the office of Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., Mr. Dietzman went there and talked to Respondent about the incomplete construction project. In response, Respondent stated that he would complete the project if Mr. Dietzman paid him $25,000.00 above the contract price. Mr. Dietzman refused to pay any additional money to Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., to complete the project and decided to finish the home himself. Based on the contract amount, only $6,450.00 was due upon completion of the project. However, based on the money that Mr. Dietzman had paid to Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., as of late February 2001, he was under no obligation to pay any additional money until the project was complete. During the course of the project, Mr. Dietzman paid Douglas Reynaert and Sons, Inc., $64,450.00 of the total contract amount of $70,600.00. Mr. Dietzman expended a total of $14,571.00 to complete and/or include all the items listed in the construction contract that were not performed and/or provided by Douglas Reynaert and Sons, Inc. This amount does not include costs associated with mileage to pick up supplies, recording fees paid to the clerk of the court, nor an unexplained fee paid to the Department. Of the total costs expended by Mr. Dietzman to complete the house, $8,121.00 was in excess of the contract price. Mr. Dietzman completed the house, and after it was completed, he lived there for three years before selling it. During the period between March 2, 2001, and April 30, 2001, five subcontractors filed separate liens of claims on the Dietzman property, which alleged unpaid amounts of $1,785.00; $650.00; $137.00; $5,998.00; and $619.15. According to the liens of claim, the subcontractors had last furnished labor services or materials in January, February, and March 2001. Mr. Dietzman believes that the claims of lien filed against his property expired without satisfaction. Notwithstanding Mr. Dietzman's subjective belief, no evidence was presented upon which to determine whether the claims of lien, in the first instance, were valid; and, if so, whether they were satisfied or whether they expired. However, when Mr. Dietzman sold the house in December 2003, the title to the house was clear. On March 20, 2001, Mr. Dietzman filed a Uniform Complaint Form with the Department arising from the contract with Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. The Uniform Complaint Form stated that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., had abandoned the construction project and that Respondent had indicated that he would not finish the house unless the Dietzmans paid him another $25,000.00. The Department's costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the Dietzman contract, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, are $287.37. The Gammie Contract On or about May 20, 2000, Leila Gammie and her sister, Karen Gammie, entered into a construction agreement with Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. ("Gammie contract"). Pursuant to the Gammie contract, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., was to build a house for Karen and Leila Gammie at 1124 Southwest 15th Terrace, Cape Coral, Florida, for $92,420.00, and the buyers were required to pay the builder $3,000.00 when the agreement was signed. The Gammie contract was a one-page document and did not include the beginning and completion date for the project. Also, the contract did not include a general contractor's license number, certification number, or a written statement explaining the consumers' rights under the Construction Industries Recovery Fund. Leila Gammie paid a deposit of $6,000.00, by two checks of $3,000.00 each, to Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. The first payment was made on May 20, 2000, the day the Gammie contract was fully executed, and the second payment was made on June 3, 2000. The May 20 and June 3, 2000, checks were deposited in the account of Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., on May 26, 2000, and June 8, 2000, respectively. On July 15, 2000, the Gammie contract was amended by the parties to increase the price of building the house to $95,279.00 and to establish Reynaert and Sons, Inc.'s, responsibility for paying closing costs. Crossland Mortgage approved Leila and Karen Gammie for a construction loan to build the house. The construction loan agreement was executed in July 28, 2000, and required that construction be completed by February 1, 2001. Respondent signed the "Assent by Contractor" section of the construction loan agreement in which he certified that he was the general contractor for the borrowers and that in consideration of the lender making the mortgage loan, he agreed to be bound by the terms of the construction loan agreement. On July 28, 2000, Respondent executed a Crossland Mortgage Corporation's Contractor's Acknowledgment, in which he certified that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., had entered into a construction contract with Leila and Karen Gammie "on May 20, 1999 [sic]" for the construction project described in the construction loan agreement. In the Contractor's Acknowledgment, Respondent also confirmed that the contract price was $95,279.00 and that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., had already received $6,000.00, which had been applied toward the construction contract. Respondent's signature on the Contractor's Acknowledgement was notarized. On July 28, 2000, Leila and Karen Gammie executed an addendum to the construction loan in which they authorized the lender to make scheduled payments directly to Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. Leila Gammie, Karen Gammie, and Respondent, as representative for Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., are signatories on a loan document titled, "Construction Draw Guideline." That form was executed on July 28, 2000, and listed Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., as the contractor to whom payments would be made. Leila Gammie recorded a Notice of Commencement on August 3, 2000, in Lee County, Florida. After the Notice of Commencement was filed, Leila Gammie made regular visits to the lot on which her house was to be constructed. On each occasion, she observed that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., had not started the construction project. She then contacted Respondent to inquire about when construction of her house would begin. In response, Respondent told Leila Gammie that he would not go forward with the project unless she gave him $10,000.00 above the contract price. She refused to give Respondent any more money and Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., never started the job. By letter dated March 15, 2001, the Harris Trust Bank of Montreal, the apparent successor or assignee of the lender, Crossland Mortgage, advised Leila Gammie and Karen Gammie that the project had not progressed as scheduled and that for "this reason and other findings, Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., is no longer an approved builder of Harris Trust/Bank of Montreal." Leila Gammie engaged another contractor who built the house, which is her present residence. On March 20, 2001, Leila and Karen Gammie filed a Uniform Complaint Form with the Department arising from the contract with Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. In the Uniform Complaint Form, Leila and Karen Gammie stated that Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., kept changing the original start date of the construction project from August 2000 until February 2001 and that Respondent ultimately told Leila Gammie that he would not begin the project unless she paid him an additional $10,000.00. The Department's costs related to the investigation and prosecution of the Gammie contract, excluding costs associated with an attorney's time, are $287.37. Alleged Contracts with James Pledger and Angela Barnes The 2002 Administrative Complaint assigned DOAH Case No. 04-1547PL alleged certain violations related to an alleged construction contract between James Pledger and Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc. However, no evidence was presented regarding this alleged contract and the violations related thereto. The 2001 Administrative Complaint assigned DOAH Case No. 04-1546PL alleged certain violations related to an alleged construction contract between Doug Reynaert and Sons, Inc., and Angela Barnes. However, no evidence was presented regarding this alleged contract and the violations related thereto.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner, the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Construction Industry Licensing Board, enter a final order adopting the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and requiring Respondent, Douglas V. Reynaert, to pay restitution to Leila and Karen Gammie in the amount of $6,000.00 and to Homer Dietzman in the amount of $14,571.00. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of October, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of October, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles J. Pellegrini, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Douglas V. Reynaert 4815 Hidden Harbour Boulevard Fort Myers, Florida 33919 Tim Vaccaro, Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Leon Biegalski, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact There are no issues of material fact in dispute. Respondent, Department of Children and Families (Department), pursuant to section 394.9151, Florida Statutes (2018),2/ has contracted with a private entity, Wellpath, LLC (Wellpath), to use and operate a facility, Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC), to comply with the requirements of chapter 394, part V (entitled “Involuntary Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators”). Petitioner, who is a sexually violent predator, is a person subject to chapter 394, part V, and is confined in the FCCC. Petitioner alleges that the FCCC Resident Handbook is an unpromulgated rule which is imposed on FCCC residents, and that the same is an improper exercise of delegated legislative authority as a de facto agency rule that has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedures of section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Petitioner also claims that because “Baker Act residents” are housed at FCCC, then “all rules governing every aspect of the facility must be implemented” in accordance with section 394.457. Petitioner does not allege that he is housed at FCCC pursuant to the Baker Act.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioners, Mark K. Mast and Kirk E. Mast d/b/a Mast Farm, operate a sixty-acre potato farm on Cracker Swamp Road in or near East Palatka, Florida. The 1991 crop year was the first year in which the two brothers had operated their own farm. This activity was a part-time endeavor since the brothers worked full-time as logging contractors for Georgia Pacific Corporation. Respondent, G & G Sales Corporation, a Minnesota corporation licensed to do business in this state, is a dealer (broker) in agricultural products that purchases potatoes from growers throughout the country for resale to various potato chip companies. Its president and vice-president are Loren R. Girsbirger and George Wilkerson, respectively. As an agricultural dealer, respondent is required to obtain a license from and post a surety bond with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs (Department). In this case, the bond has been posted by respondent, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company. The amount of the bond is not of record. In order to start their farming operation, it was necessary for the Mast brothers to secure a loan from the North Florida Production Credit Association. That lending institution had a practice of requiring farmers to secure their loans with contracts for the sale of all or a portion of their crop. That is to say, the lender required a farmer to have a sales contract which equaled the amount of the loan. So that petitioners could meet this requirement, on January 29, 1991, the parties executed a contract wherein petitioners agreed to sell respondent 8,000 bags of Atlantic variety potatoes at an agreed upon price of $5.75 per bag, for a total price of $46,000. The lending institution then agreed to loan petitioners that amount of money. Although the brothers asked that respondent purchase more than 8,000 bags, respondent declined since it had only that contract amount (with chip companies) available. A copy of the contract has been received in evidence as joint exhibit The contract was drafted by respondent and it may be inferred from the evidence that it is a "standard" type of contract used by farmers and dealers in the potato business. The contract contained the following relevant conditions in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6: Buyer assumes that Seller will have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts, including open market sales. This contract does not restrict these open market sales, but Seller does protect Buyer's amount due. In the event of fire, unauthorized strikes, wars, transportation shortages, Acts of God, or events beyond the control of Seller or Buyer which prevent Seller or Buyer from performance in full or in part of the terms of this agreement, it is agreed that such failure to perform shall not be excused and shall not form the basis for any claim of damage or breach of contract. Seller agrees to seed sufficient acreage to cover the potatoes sold for delivery under this contract and other contracts to all purchasers with whom the Seller has contracted for the delivery of potatoes during the upcoming farm season. If, however, on account of shortages of crops not due to any act within the Seller's control or other causes beyond the control of the Seller, he is unable to deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in this contract, the Buyer will accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts without any claim for damages against the Seller. Seller will grant Buyer all necessary rights to insure and verify that he is receiving his fair and just pro-rate share. Such rights to include, but not limited to, inspection of all records, books, field reports, shipments, etc. Burden of proof rests with Sellers. Finally, paragraph 11 of the contract provided in part that "the terms of this contract cannot be re-negotiated without the written consent of the Buyer and the Seller." Thus, under the terms of the contract, petitioners were obliged to "have sufficient amount of potatoes to cover all contracts". However, if an Act of God prevented the seller from "deliver(ing) the full amount of potatoes called for in (the) contract", the seller was excused from full performance and could prorate its crop. Under those circumstances, respondent was required to "accept a prorated delivery with other buyers of the potatoes covered by similar contracts." In this case, there were no other buyers of potatoes covered by similar contracts. Finally, except for changes approved in writing by both parties, the terms of the contract could not be changed. Petitioners planted their crop on February 2 and 10, 1991. At that time, the brothers hoped to harvest 16,000 bags of potatoes, or around 267 bags per acre. Although the average yield per acre for Atlantic type potatoes in the area had been between 250 and 270 bags, most growers assume a more conservative yield of around 200 bags per acre to insure that all contractual requirements can be met. Here, however, except for a contract with respondent, petitioners had no other contracts with other dealers or individuals. When the contract was signed in January, the brothers expected to sell the remainder of their crop to other buyers on the open market. In this regard, they entered into an agreement (presumably verbal) with their father, who had co-signed the bank note, to split the net proceeds on all sales over and above that required under the G & G Sales Corporation contract. This latter agreement with the father was not a "similar contract" within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract and thus the G & G Sales Corporation contract is found to be the only relevant contract for crop year 1991. On April 23, 1991, a severe thunderstorm swept through a part of Putnam County. The storm was accompanied by high winds and hail and followed a path which ran through the potato farm belt in East Palatka. The Circle S farm, which lies about one-half mile from petitioner's farm, was "devastated" by the storm. Petitioners' farm received high winds, heavy rains and some hail. The extent of damage caused by the storm to petitioners' farm is in dispute, but it is agreed that the storm diminished the size of the crop. As it turned out, petitioners dug only 8,802 bags of potatoes, which still exceeded the amount required under their only contract. After the storm struck, Mark Mast immediately contacted Wilkerson by telephone and advised him that the farm had been hit with hail and asked that Wilkerson and Girsbirger survey the damage. On April 24, 1991, Wilkerson and Girsbirger visited the farm and found it "very wet" and muddy but the leaves on the plants still intact. This level of damage was generally corroborated by various other witnesses. Although the above conditions were present at that time, it was still impossible then for anyone to forecast exactly how the storm impacted the volume and quality of petitioners' crop. Most potato farmers purchase crop insurance prior to each farming season. A farmer has the option of purchasing either 50%, 65% or 75% coverage, although 65% coverage is the most common. This means that a farmer must lose at least 50%, 35% or 25% of his crop due to weather or insects in order to file a claim. The amount of insurance is based on a function of the percent of crop the farmer wishes to insure times the value per hundred weight of the crop. For first year farmers, such as petitioners, the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC) establishes a designated yield per acre which is based on FCIC's estimate, albeit conservative, of what the average yield should be. In the case of petitioners, who purchased 65% coverage, the FCIC (and insurer) set a designated yield of 184 bags per acre which meant petitioner would have a crop approximating 184 hundred weight per acre. Although petitioners had a crop insurance policy in 1991, they did not file a claim after the April 23 storm since they failed to meet the threshold requirements for coverage. Indeed, the local crop insurance agent visited the farm shortly after the storm and verified there was not enough damage to file a claim. However, he noted that there was excessive water for a few days and some of the leaves on the vines had holes caused by the hail. Between May 4 and 18, 1991, petitioners sold respondent nine loads of potatoes totaling 4,101 bags at a price of $5.75 per bag. During the period from April 30, 1991, through May 18, 1991, they sold ten other loads on the open market to two other buyers. The open market sales totaled 4,701.2 bags. Because potato prices had dramatically increased after the contract was executed, nine of these latter loads were sold at an open market price of $19 per bag while one was sold at a price of $18.50 per bag, for a total of $88,806. Petitioners contend respondent agreed that the above ten loads could be sold on the open market and thus it should not be heard now to complain that it was shorted on the contract. In this regard, the evidence shows that after the storm, which is the time period relevant to this contention, Wilkerson told Mark Mast that he had no problem with petitioners selling any extra potatoes on the open market as long as respondent received its 8,000 bags. Girsbirger also advised the Masts that it was okay to sell ten loads of potatoes on the open market if production was 200 bags per acre. However, he cautioned them to sell no more than four loads on the open market if the yield fell to 180 to 185 bags per acre since the remainder would be necessary to meet the terms of the contract. Thus, it is found that respondent did not agree to the sale of the ten loads on the open market if total production did not exceed 8,000 bags. Around May 3, 1991, Mark Mast approached Wilkerson and asked if respondent would renegotiate the contract price upward. Wilkerson declined to do so. On May 6, Mast sent Wilkerson a notice by registered mail advising him that due to the crop loss, which he estimated to be one-third of the crop, he intended to adjust the contract pursuant to paragraph 6 of the contract and supply only two-thirds of the 8,000 bags. This unilateral offer to modify the contract was never accepted by respondent, and in any event, petitioners failed to supply the amount offered in their May 6 letter. In all, respondent received only 51.3% of its contracted amount of 8,000 bags. Petitioners allocated respondent this amount on the theory they had originally planned to sell one-half of their total anticipated crop of 16,000 bags to respondent, that one-half of the anticipated crop was lost in the storm, and thus respondent should receive only one-half of the remaining crop, or around 4,000 bags. At hearing, petitioners defended this decision by treating the April 23 storm as an Act of God within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the contract. However, reliance on this provision was inappropriate since, despite the effects of the storm, petitioners could still deliver the full amount of potatoes called for in the contract. The testimony is in conflict as to whether petitioners offered respondent more than 4,101 bags during the harvest season. At various times, respondent was offered several "extra" loads at the market price of $19 per bag but declined since it still wanted the contract honored. According to petitioners, they were ready to load a truck on two occasions but respondent failed to send a truck. Respondent denies this assertion. In addition, petitioners claim that a truck arrived late one Sunday afternoon when their farm equipment was inoperable and thus they could not load any potatoes. Conversely, Wilkerson contended that Mark telephoned him on several occasions and told him not to send a truck because Mark was loading for "another contract". Accordingly, it is found that petitioners offered respondent only the 4,101 bags at the contract price but that additional loads were offered at the substantially higher open market price. After receiving the 4,101 bags, respondent presented petitioners a check dated June 17, 1991, in the amount of $4,777.92 as full payment for the 4,101 bags of potatoes. The check carried the notation "The undersigned, upon cashing check, accepts payment in full for attached invoices, with no recourse." It was never cashed by petitioners. Attached to the check was an invoice which calculated the $4,777.92 in the following manner. Respondent first calculated $23,598 by multiplying 4,101 bags times $5.75 per bag and then subtracted $82.08 for "Not Pat dues", an amount not explained but nonetheless unchallenged by petitioners. It then deducted $19,038 from that total for a net amount due of $4,777.92. The latter deduction of $19,038 represented a set-off for damages incurred by respondent in having to buy potatoes elsewhere by virtue of petitioners failing to supply the contracted amount of potatoes. It was calculated by assuming that petitioners would supply 2/3 (or 68%) of its commitment, or 5,440 bags. 1/ Since only 4,104 bags were delivered, this amounted to a shortage of 1,336 bags. Respondent represented, without contradiction, that it had to replace this shortage at the same price which petitioners received for non-contract sales on the open market. Respondent assumed that petitioners sold their potatoes at an open market price of $20, or $14.25 more than the contract price. Thus, it deducted 1,336 x $14.25, or $19,038 from the final payment. In actuality, petitioners sold the bulk of those potatoes at a price of $19 per bag. Thus, respondent's set-off should have been $17,702 rather than $19,038. This amount of set-off ($17,702) is deemed to be reasonable and should be subtracted from the amount owed by respondent to petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services requiring respondent to pay petitioners $5,813.92 within thirty days of date of final order. Otherwise, the surety should be required to pay that amount. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of May, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of May, 1992. 1/ For purposes of determining damages, respondent decided that petitioners were entitled to some relief under the contract due to the storm. Accordingly, respondent assumed that it would receive only two-thirds of the contract requirement. APPENDIX Petitioners: 1. Covered in the preliminary statement. 2. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-4. Accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 7-8. Accepted in finding of fact 4. 9. Accepted in finding of fact 3. 10. Accepted in finding of fact 5. Accepted in findings of fact 1 and 5. Accepted in finding of fact 6. 13-14. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 8. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. The remainder has been rejected as being contrary to the more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in findings of fact 11 and 12. Accepted in finding of fact 11. Accepted in finding of fact 9. 21-22. Accepted in finding of fact 14. Accepted in finding of fact 6. Rejected as being contrary to more persuasive evidence. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6 but this finding does not excuse performance under the contract. See finding of fact 12. Respondent: * Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. The remainder is covered in the preliminary statement. Accepted in finding of fact 1. Accepted in findings of fact 2 and 3. Accepted in finding of fact 4. Accepted in findings of fact 3 and 5. 6-8. Accepted in finding of fact 7. 9-10. Accepted in finding of fact 10. Accepted in finding of fact 7. Accepted in finding of fact 9. Accepted in finding of fact 14. * Respondent G & G Sales Corporation filed thirteen unnumbered paragraphs containing proposed findings of fact. The paragraphs have been numbered 1-13 by the undersigned for the purpose of making these rulings. COPIES FURNISHED: Joe C. Miller, II P. O. Box 803 Palatka, Florida 32178-0803 Ronald W. Brown, Esquire 66 Cuna Street, Suite B St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda D. Hyatt, Chief Bureau of License & Bond 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Charles T. Shad, Esquire 601 Blackstone Building East Bay & Market Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 (on behalf of St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co.) Richard A. Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture & Consumer Affairs The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Housing Finance Corporation’s (“Florida Housing”) review and scoring of the applications responding to RFA 2020-104 SAIL Funding for Farm Worker and Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“the RFA”) were clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing, the record as a whole, the stipulated facts, and matters subject to official recognition, the following Findings of Fact are made: Florida Housing is a public corporation created pursuant to section 420.504, Florida Statutes (2020).2 Its purpose is to promote public welfare by administering the financing of affordable housing in Florida. Florida Housing is authorized by section 420.507(48), to allocate federal low income housing tax credits, State Apartment Incentive Loans (“SAIL”), and other funding by means of competitive solicitations. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 67-60 provides that Florida Housing will allocate its competitive funding through the bid protest provisions of section 120.57(3), Florida Statutes. Funding is available through a competitive application process commenced by the issuance of a Request for Applications, which is equivalent to a “request for proposal” as described in rule 67-60.009(4). 1 Pueblo Bonito’s Exhibit 1 is the deposition of Nancy Muller of Florida Housing. 2 Unless stated otherwise, all statutory references shall be to the 2020 version of the Florida Statutes. Through the RFA, Florida Housing seeks to award up to an estimated total of $5,131,050 in SAIL Financing for the construction or rehabilitation of affordable housing developments for farm workers and commercial fishing workers. The RFA was issued on April 15, 2020, and a modified version was issued on April 24, 2020. The application deadline was May 19, 2020. La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito submitted applications proposing the rehabilitation of existing farm worker housing in Hillsborough and Lee Counties, respectively. Both applications were deemed eligible for funding. A review committee was appointed to review the applications and make recommendations to Florida Housing’s Board of Directors (“the Board”). The scoring of the applications was based on a 100-point scale. Applicants submitting a Principal Disclosure Form that had been stamped “pre-approved” received five points. The remaining points were awarded based on the subjective scoring of narrative sections within the applications, and the maximum points were available as follows: Current and Future Need for Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing in the Area (“Need”): 15 points Experience Operating and managing Farm Worker or Commercial Fishing Worker Housing (“Experience”): 20 points Outreach, Marketing, and Referral (“Outreach”): 30 points Resident Access to Onsite and Offsite Programs, Services, and Resources (“Access”): 30 points. With regard to Need, the 2019 Rental Market Study prepared for Florida Housing by the Shimberg Center for Housing Studies at the University of Florida determined that 14.2 percent of Florida’s farm workers are employed in Hillsborough County and 2.55 percent are employed in Lee County. Pueblo Bonito noted in its application that its development is only three miles from the Collier County line, and 5.63 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed in Collier County. La Estancia did not reference Manatee County in its application but noted in its request for a formal administrative hearing that its development is a similar distance from Manatee County, and 6.88 percent of the state’s farm workers are employed there. The Shimberg study also calculated need for farm worker housing type by county with 3,813 multifamily units needed in Hillsborough County, 741 multifamily units needed in Lee County, 1,546 multifamily units needed in Collier County, and 2,337 multifamily units needed in Manatee County. For some RFAs, Florida Housing imposes additional conditions on applications for developments located in Limited Development Areas (“LDAs”). The main purpose of an LDA is to protect Florida Housing’s funded developments in a particular area. An LDA is generally an area that Florida Housing has placed a boundary around that limits different types of new development. Florida Housing annually publishes an LDA Chart on its website listing areas or counties that may apply in the RFA cycle for the coming year. The mere existence of an LDA does not prohibit development within the LDA. This is especially true for rehabilitation projects like those proposed in the instant case. An RFA must specifically reference the LDA in order for the LDA to apply. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart was not published by Florida Housing until May 29, 2020, and thus the modified RFA issued on April 24, 2020, included no reference to the LDA Chart. Nor did the RFA include any specific provisions regarding LDAs. The first draft of the 2020 LDA Chart and each subsequent draft or amendment included Lee County for farm worker housing. Florida Housing indicated that the basis for Lee County’s LDA designation was a downward trend in occupancy rates. The occupancy rate for the housing stock in Lee County for the period of August 2019 through January 2020 was 91.67 percent as compared to 95.83 percent for the period of September 2019 through February 2020. Based on this trend, Lee County was proposed as an LDA for the 2020/2021 Florida Housing RFA funding cycle, which became effective July 10, 2020. The following table reflects how the review committee awarded points to the two applicants: Pueblo Bonito La Estancia Principal Disclosure Form (5) 5 5 “Need” (15) 12 12 “Experience” (20) 16 17 “Outreach” (30) 27 27 “Access” (30) 25 24 Total (100) 85 85 In the event of a tie, Florida Housing designed the RFA and the associated rules to incorporate a series of “tie-breakers.” The tiebreakers, in the order of applicability, were: By points received for the Need criterion, with more points preferred. Both applicants received 12 points for need. By SAIL Request Amount Per Unit, with lower SAIL funds per unit preferred. Both applicants requested $50,000 in SAIL funds per unit. By Total SAIL Request Amount as a percentage of Total Development Cost (“TDC”), with applicants whose SAIL request amount is 90 percent or less of TDC preferred. Both applicants’ Total SAIL Request Amount was 90 percent or less of their respective TDCs. By a Florida Job Creation Preference. Both applicants satisfied this preference. By lottery numbers randomly assigned to the applications when they were submitted to Florida Housing. Pueblo Bonito had lottery number 1, and La Estancia had lottery number 2. Nancy Muller was the Review Committee member assigned to review and score the “Need” narrative section of the Applications responding to the RFA. Ms. Muller is currently a Policy Specialist with Florida Housing. Prior to her current position, Ms. Muller was, for many years, the Director of Policy and Special Programs. In reviewing and scoring the applications submitted to Florida Housing in the instant case, Ms. Muller indicated that she first read the narrative question of the RFA and broke the question down into four separate component parts. The components included: (a) current and future need for farm workers over the next 10 to 15 years; (b) location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that typically use farm worker labor; (c) information concerning the types of crops, seasons, etc. and the demand for specific farm worker housing; and (d) whether waivers have been requested or granted for either the proposed Development or Developments in the area. Next, Ms. Muller reviewed each application against those component parts and ultimately awarded La Estancia and Pueblo Bonito 12 points each for their respective response to the need section. Marisa Button, Florida Housing’s corporate representative, testified that just because the documented need for farm worker housing is higher in Hillsborough County than it is in Lee County does not mean that La Estancia should have received a higher score in the narrative section than Pueblo Bonito because the RFA “sets forth a much more nuanced request for the description of the current and future needs in the area for the proposed development. So it’s not limited to just a flat-out look at the county under the Shimberg study. If [that] were the case, we wouldn’t need to have a narrative scoring component of the RFA.” Ms. Muller and Ms. Button persuasively testified that numeric need was just one of the components an applicant needed to address in responding to the needs question. In fact, Ms. Muller indicated she recognized the greater numeric need for farm worker housing in Hillsborough County, and the greater need factored into her consideration of that particular component. However, Ms. Muller pointed out that because both proposed projects were rehabilitation of existing units, neither was actually addressing nor reducing the numeric need for new units. Ms. Muller acknowledged that La Estancia’s response at this component of the need analysis was “stronger” because of the greater need. Nevertheless, Ms. Muller indicated that while La Estancia demonstrated a greater numeric need, Pueblo Bonito’s response was “stronger” in other areas of the overall need response. Specifically, Pueblo Bonito provided a stronger response as to the location and proximity of farms and other types of farm work that use farm worker labor. Ms. Muller considered and evaluated the strengths and weaknesses of each response and no one component was weighted greater than any other component. Based on the scoring and tie-breakers, the review committee recommended Pueblo Bonito for funding. However, the Board’s deliberations were not to be limited to the review committee’s recommendation or information provided by the review committee. With regard to the Board’s funding selection, the RFA stated that: [t]he Board may use the Applications, the Committee’s scoring, any other information or recommendation provided by the Committee or staff, and any other information the Board deems relevant in its selection of Applicants to whom to award funding. The Board met on July 17, 2020, to consider the review committee’s recommendation and preliminarily selected Pueblo Bonito for funding, subject to satisfactory completion of the credit underwriting process.3 Florida 3 The RFA also employed a “Funding Test” to be used in the selection of applications for funding. The “Funding Test” required that the amount of unawarded SAIL funding must be enough to fully fund that applicant’s SAIL request amount. After the selection of Pueblo Bonito for funding, there was only $1,131,050 in SAIL funding remaining, and that was not enough to fund La Estancia’s $4,200,000 SAIL request. Housing staff did not inform the Board that Lee County had been designated as an LDA for farm worker housing on the 2020 LDA Chart. Also, there is no evidence that any Board member knew of Lee County’s LDA status or of declining farm worker housing occupancy when they voted to select Pueblo Bonito for funding. La Estancia could not have presented the information regarding Lee County’s LDA status to the Board. The RFA contains a “noninterference” clause prohibiting an applicant or its representative from contacting Board members or Florida Housing’s staff “concerning their own or any other Applicant’s Application” during the period beginning with the application deadline and continuing until the Board “renders a final decision on the RFA.” If an applicant makes such contact in an attempt to influence the selection process, then that applicant’s application is disqualified. As a result, La Estancia was unable to correct the review committee’s omission of information regarding declining farm worker housing occupancy levels in Lee County. Ms. Button testified that it was Florida Housing’s practice not to apply new standards or requirements that changed after the application deadline when scoring applications. She stated that Florida Housing scores “based on the terms of the RFA and we wouldn’t retroactively apply something to those applications after they’ve been submitted.” She specifically testified that if a county is designated as an LDA after the application deadline, Florida Housing would not apply that designation to the application. She also testified that one of the reasons for not considering new requirements after the application deadline is that applicants would not be allowed to amend their applications to address these new requirements. Even if the July 10 LDA designation had applied to this RFA, there is no evidence that it would have changed Florida Housing’s scoring decision. The primary purpose for the LDA designation is to discourage new construction that could harm existing developments. In this case, both applicants are proposing to rehabilitate existing developments, and the evidence shows that Florida Housing would not prohibit the funding of a rehabilitation project even if it were in an LDA. Florida Housing has funded the rehabilitation of farm worker developments located in LDAs since 2013 or 2014. In RFA 2017-104, the only previous farm worker RFA in evidence, the LDA designation did not even apply to rehabilitation projects that were in Florida Housing’s portfolio. Ms. Muller testified that because the two applicants in this case both involved rehabilitation of developments in Florida Housing’s portfolio, the LDA designation would have been “moot,” unless the physical occupancy rates were dire, which they were not. She also testified that “preservation of existing developments is of much less, if any, importance related to LDA.” Ms. Button testified that she did not specifically inform the Board of the LDA designation “because it’s not relevant to the terms for which the applications were scored for this RFA, it was not a part of the RFA terms, and the applicants did not, you know, apply with that designation put in place. It’s for a future prospective funding cycle and it was not effective until after the application due date.” The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Florida Housing’s review and scoring of the applications responding to the RFA were not clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Housing Finance Corporation enter a Final Order dismissing La Estancia, Ltd.’s formal written protest and awarding funding to Partnership in Housing, Inc. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S G. W. CHISENHALL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Hugh R. Brown, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1329 (eServed) M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Bryant & Atkinson, P.A. Post Office Box 1110 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1110 (eServed) Michael P. Donaldson, Esquire Carlton Fields Suite 500 215 South Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 (eServed) Christopher Dale McGuire, Esquire Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed) Corporation Clerk Florida Housing Finance Corporation Suite 5000 227 North Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Janet J. Lewis, was subject to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, Royal American Management, Inc., on account of her race or her age in violation of section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, who was at all times relevant to this matter an employee of Respondent, is Caucasian. She was, at the time of her termination from employment, 54 years of age. Respondent is a property management company based in Panama City, Florida. Respondent owns and manages numerous rental properties in the southeastern United States. Respondent owned and managed the Spinnaker Reach apartment complex in Jacksonville, Florida, during the entire duration of Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Respondent, at all times material to this matter, employed more than 15 full-time employees. Spinnaker Reach is a “tax credit” property. In exchange for federal tax credits, Respondent is required to offer apartments at below-market rate rents for moderate to low- income tenants. Tenants qualifying for reduced rent apartments must meet certain income and eligibility requirements. Not all applicants for housing meet the requirements, and therefore not all applications ultimately result in apartment occupancy. Kerri Toth is Respondent’s president, and held that position during the entire period of Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Ms. Toth is Caucasian and over the age of 40. Denise Ost is Respondent’s senior vice-president of operations, and held that position during the entire period of Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Ms. Ost is Caucasian and over the age of 40. Judith Williams is Respondent’s regional vice- president, and held that position during the entire period of Petitioner’s employment with Respondent. Ms. Williams is Caucasian and over the age of 40. Teresa Dykes was Respondent’s regional manager for the region that included Spinnaker Reach from the date upon which Petitioner’s employment began until April 30, 2013. Petitioner was hired by Respondent on June 19, 2012, as the property manager at Spinnaker Reach, a position that she held for the full period of her employment. Petitioner had property management experience, though none was at tax-credit properties. Petitioner’s base salary was $42,000.00 per year, plus benefits and the rent-free use of an apartment at Spinnaker Reach. The decision to hire Petitioner came at the recommendation of Ms. Dykes, who was a close friend of Petitioner’s sister. The interview was done through Respondent’s Orlando office due to the relationship between Ms. Dykes and Petitioner. Ms. Dykes testified that she actually did the hiring. When Petitioner was hired as property manager at Spinnaker Reach, occupancy stood at 94 percent.1/ When Petitioner was hired, Spinnaker Reach was short- staffed. In addition to the property manager position which was filled by Petitioner, vacant positions included the leasing agent, assistant manager, and several maintenance positions. The evidence was not clear regarding the extent to which those vacancies overlapped. However, Respondent sent property managers from its other facilities in Jacksonville to Spinnaker Reach to assist Petitioner in the performance of her tasks until replacements could be hired. Though not full-time, the other property managers were on-site for at least two days per week for several hours each day. On August 20, 2012, Ms. Dykes provided Petitioner with her 90 Day Performance Review.2/ The Performance Review was intended to correspond to Petitioner’s probationary period. Ms. Dykes gave Petitioner high marks, with the only area needing improvement being Petitioner’s knowledge of the tax credit program. Respondent was having difficulty understanding the tax credit concept because she had not worked with tax credit housing when she was hired. Ms. Dykes indicated that “compliance is offering training” regarding the program. By December 2012, occupancy at Spinnaker Reach had fallen to 81 percent. On December 18, 2012, Ms. Dykes sent an email to Petitioner describing a number of perceived deficiencies in Petitioner’s job performance. On December 19, 2012, Petitioner responded to the email, denying some statements and explaining others. Ms. Dykes testified that as of the date of her email, Petitioner did not know all aspects of her job. By the week ending on February 3, 2013, occupancy at Spinnaker Reach had fallen to 79 percent, a rate duplicated for the weeks ending on March 3 and March 10, 2013. At some time prior to March 18, 2013, Ms. Williams asked “the property” to conduct a market survey of apartment complexes that were comparable to Spinnaker Reach. Ms. Williams could not recall whether the request was made directly to Petitioner, or was channeled through Ms. Dykes. Although Petitioner identified Kim Tompkins, the Spinnaker Reach leasing agent as having been delegated the responsibility to prepare the survey, Petitioner, as property manager, was ultimately responsible for accurately providing the requested information. The purpose of the survey was to get an up-to-date analysis of occupancy rates and information about the comparable properties. The market survey report submitted on March 18, 2013, bore an incorrect date of October 2012. Ms. Williams then audited the properties identified in the market survey report to determine the accuracy of the information. Her verification audit included calling the comparator properties to verify apartment features, and reviewing apartment features from the comparator’s websites. Ms. Williams discovered numerous errors in the market survey report, which indicated that comparable apartment complexes were not contacted to get the accurate information. Ms. Williams had never reviewed a market survey with the number of errors that were contained in the March 18, 2013, report. Ms. Williams did not forward her notes to Petitioner with a request that Petitioner input the correct information gathered by Ms. Williams. Rather, Ms. Williams advised Petitioner to call the properties, get the correct information, and submit an accurate report. The market survey was sent to Ms. Williams on several subsequent occasions with incorrect information. Finally, Ms. Williams contacted Ms. Dykes to advise her of the errors. On the third or fourth revision of the report, errors were corrected, and Petitioner provided a correct survey to Respondent. Effective April 30, 2013, Ms. Dykes was transferred to another position with Respondent. As of that date, Ms. Dykes was no longer responsible for Spinnaker Reach, and no longer supervised Petitioner. On May 1, 2013, Sheena Reeves, an existing employee of Respondent, replaced Ms. Dykes as regional manager. Ms. Reeves is African-American. Petitioner, having been hired on June 19, 2012, was due for her annual evaluation on June 19, 2013. On May 10, 2013, after Ms. Dykes had resigned her position as Respondent’s regional manager, she was asked by Ms. Williams to prepare Petitioner’s annual evaluation, since she was most familiar with Petitioner during her evaluation period. Ms. Dykes would not have done Petitioner’s annual evaluation had she not been asked to do so. Ms. Williams considered herself to be Petitioner’s supervisor, though not her direct supervisor. She wanted to be included in Petitioner’s evaluation since Ms. Reeves was new to Respondent and to Spinnaker Reach. Ms. Williams was heavily involved with Spinnaker Reach due to the performance of the property. She considers herself to be heavily involved in monitoring properties, which gave her sufficient knowledge of Petitioner’s performance to provide direct input into her evaluation. Thus, she believed it to be important for her to have direct input and direction on the evaluation. The annual evaluation consists of 15 items requiring numeric scores from 1 to 4, with space for written comments and recommendations for improvement. Ms. Dykes awarded numeric scores with an average rating of 2.87, a score based on how she perceived Petitioner’s work. Ms. Dykes identified tax credit compliance and Timberscan as areas requiring improvement. Timberscan is the software program used by Respondent for logging invoices into the system to be paid. The “Evaluation Date” was not provided, though Ms. Dykes signed the evaluation as the regional manager, and dated her signature as May 10, 2013. Ms. Dykes could not recall whether her evaluation was to be Petitioner’s final evaluation or a draft evaluation. Though asked by Respondent to do so, Ms. Dykes understood that she did not have authority to evaluate Petitioner, who was no longer under her supervision. She could not recall whether she ever discussed her evaluation with Ms. Williams or Ms. Ost. She did not discuss it with Ms. Reeves. After she had completed the evaluation, Ms. Dykes emailed a copy to Petitioner and Ms. Reeves. Petitioner testified that she received Ms. Dykes’ evaluation, printed it, took it home, and signed it. The date on which she signed Ms. Dykes’ evaluation was unclear. Petitioner did not send a copy of the signed evaluation to Respondent. Petitioner argued that section 8.15 of Respondent’s employee manual required that an employee’s annual evaluation should be performed “two to three weeks before the employee’s anniversary,” thus leading her to believe that the May 10, 2013, evaluation sent by Ms. Dykes was her “official” evaluation. Since Ms. Dykes’ evaluation was emailed to Petitioner almost six weeks prior to her anniversary date, the employee manual does not warrant such a belief. Ms. Reeves visited Spinnaker Reach on June 27, 2013. Upon her arrival, Petitioner’s first question to her was “[a]re you here to do my evaluation?” Petitioner reminded Ms. Reeves that June 19 was her anniversary date and, “according to the handbook, [the evaluation] would be done before or, you know, up to that time.” Ms. Reeves advised Petitioner that her evaluation had not yet been done. Under the circumstances, it is most plausible that the May 10, 2013, evaluation, having been prepared by a person who was no longer in Respondent’s employ, was to be a draft evaluation, subject to review and approval by Respondent. The evidence also supports a finding that, despite her efforts to make it appear to be “official,” Petitioner knew that the May 10, 2013, evaluation emailed to her by Ms. Dykes was not her final annual evaluation. Ms. Reeves returned to her office after the June 27, 2013, trip to Spinnaker Reach prepared to address the matter of Petitioner’s annual evaluation. In late June or July 1, 2013, Ms. Williams reviewed Ms. Dykes’ draft evaluation, line-by-line, and revised the scores based on her experience and knowledge of Petitioner and the performance of Spinnaker Reach. Although Ms. Reeves was in Ms. Williams’ office during the review, and offered input based on occupancy and financial reports, Timberscan inputs, and property maintenance reports, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Ms. Williams, who “was aware of any issues that were going on on that site,” was responsible for the revisions to Ms. Dykes’ draft evaluation. As a result of her review, Ms. Williams directed that changes be made in the evaluation scores, such that the numeric scores had an average rating of 2.06. After Ms. Williams’ review, a revised evaluation was prepared. Ms. Dykes’ comments were retained, with Ms. Reeves adding additional areas for improvement, including her handling of resident issues and complaints. Ms. Dykes’ dated signature was retained on the second page of the evaluation. Since Ms. Dykes was involved in the process, retaining her signature does not seem to be unwarranted. However, keeping her signature was confusing, and gave the implication that she agreed with the revised scores. Regardless of whether the revised evaluation was misleading as to Ms. Dykes’ participation in the development of the final scores, it provides no evidence of racial or age discrimination towards Petitioner. On or about July 2, 2013, Ms. Reeves called Petitioner to advise that her final annual evaluation was being emailed to her. Ms. Reeves remained on the telephone while Petitioner retrieved the evaluation, and the two of them went over it. Also on July 2, 2013, Petitioner was provided with a written counseling form. The counseling form was prepared by Ms. Reeves at the instruction of Ms. Williams and Ms. Ost and reviewed by Respondent’s human resources department before being presented to Petitioner. The counseling form identified a number of issues, including occupancy and housing application processing, responsiveness to resident concerns, and a lack of teamwork and professionalism with staff. That portion of the counseling form was prepared by Ms. Reeves in conjunction with Ms. Williams, and was based on information provided to Ms. Reeves by employees, review of company records, and telephone calls from Spinnaker Reach residents. At the time the counseling form was prepared, the most recent data available to Respondent, i.e., the occupancy report for the week ending June 30, 2013, indicated that occupancy stood at 84 percent. Among items identified in the specific plan for improvement was “I would like to see the occupancy increase to 93% occupancy by August 1, 2013.” The selection of a 93-percent occupancy rate as part of Petitioner’s performance plan was made by Ms. Williams with guidance from Ms. Ost. The counseling form concluded with “[i]f these goals listed above are not met, this will lead to immediate termination.” Petitioner was understandably upset by the counseling form, believing it to be “completely fabricated.” She believed it to be discriminatory because of “information [Ms. Reeves] could had [sic] gotten from speaking to my disgruntled maintenance man that I had just gotten onto for not doing his work, and she would have no knowledge of anything that’s in this email or in this write-up. Because as she said, she didn't know me, and she didn’t.” The fact that Respondent, and in particular Ms. Williams, would have believed the word of the “disgruntled” Caucasian maintenance man provides no foundation for a finding of discriminatory intent. On July 2, 2013, Ms. Ost sent an email to Joey Chapman, Respondent’s CEO and owner of Spinnaker Reach, providing an update on Spinnaker Reach residential applications. The email concluded that “[w]e are also running a blind ad for manager, I don’t feel Jan is the right fit so we are taking steps to make the change.” Ms. Ost testified credibly that her concerns expressed in the email were related solely to occupancy, delinquency, and the condition of the property, and had nothing to do with Petitioner’s race or age. It is evident that by July 2, 2013, Respondent was primed to move forward with terminating Petitioner. However, Ms. Ost testified that had Petitioner managed to increase occupancy to the 93 percent specified in the July 2, 2013, written counseling form, Respondent would not have followed through with replacing her. Ms. Ost’s testimony was credible, and is accepted. On July 30, 2013, Petitioner advised Respondent of her expectation that by the end of the day, Spinnaker Reach would be at 90-percent occupancy. For the week ending on August 4, 2013, occupancy at Spinnaker Reach stood at 89 percent. Petitioner argued at length that it was unreasonable, if not unprecedented for Respondent to require what she calculated to be the rental of 20 apartments, without attrition, in the month between July 2, 2013 and August 1, 2013. Furthermore, Petitioner argued that her occupancy numbers were “trending” towards 93 percent when she was terminated. Those facts, even if true, which Respondent disputed, are not sufficient to establish a discriminatory animus that led to Petitioner’s termination. Rather, the evidence is persuasive that Respondent’s decision to set a 93-percent occupancy goal, and the ultimate decision to terminate Petitioner, was grounded on a general dissatisfaction with Petitioner’s performance, and a specific dissatisfaction with issues related to occupancy and rent collection. On August 8, 2013, Ms. Reeves presented Petitioner with another written counseling form. The gravamen of the counseling form was Petitioner’s failure to enter invoices from vendors and suppliers which were in excess of $16,000 into Respondent’s Timberscan vendor/vendee accounting system by the end of July. As a result, the expenses for July were artificially lowered, “which means it’s going to hit the August financials.” Ms. Reeves testified credibly that the issue had been raised with Petitioner in the past, without the issuance of a counseling form, but had not previously been as bad. The decision to proceed with the written counseling form was jointly made by Ms. Reeves and Ms. Williams. Petitioner testified that any failure to timely submit invoices would have been the fault of her assistant, John Escobar. The position description for the assistant community manager included performing other related duties and responsibilities as assigned by the community manager. Petitioner was not told that she could not delegate invoice submissions to her assistant, so she did so. Despite her efforts to disclaim responsibility, Petitioner and Respondent understood that, as the property manager, she had the responsibility to ensure that invoices were properly inputted and accounted for. The evidence is persuasive that, despite her job description that she was to “submit invoices daily, as instructed, into the Timberscan manual,” Petitioner was not well-versed in how she was to operate Timberscan, thus her reliance on Mr. Escobar. Petitioner did not feel that the training provided to her was sufficient, but did not ask for additional training. Petitioner further argued that, in any event, the failure to timely enter invoices into Timberscan was of no consequence, since by the end of the year, the financial statements for the property would be correct. That expenses may have been accounted for by the end of the tax year does not diminish the impact of the failure to timely enter data on Respondent’s monthly reports. Respondent believed monthly accounting to be important for reasons other than annual tax compliance, a belief that was unrelated to Petitioner’s race or age. More to the point, whether the failure to make timely entries was of little or of great consequence, the evidence established that Petitioner had difficulty using Timberscan and, as a result, invoices were inputted too late to be accurately reflected in the monthly accounting system. Despite Petitioner’s testimony that she felt that Ms. Reeves was acting in a discriminatory manner towards her by virtue of her annual evaluation and the written counseling forms, Petitioner did not contact Respondent’s human resources department as required by the employee handbook. By August 14, 2013, occupancy at Spinnaker Reach had not reached 93 percent, with Respondent’s business records indicating that occupancy was closer to 89 percent. On August 14, 2013, Petitioner was terminated from employment with Respondent. Ms. Ost and Ms. Williams were solely responsible for the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment, with Ms. Toth giving final approval. By that time, there had been too many issues going on for too long of a time, and they were ready to make the change. Ms. Reeves, although she signed the termination form as regional manager, did not recommend Petitioner’s termination, or play any part in that decision other than messenger. Ms. Ost testified that the primary reasons behind the decision to terminate Petitioner were the decline in occupancy, the “out of control” delinquency, and problems with the condition of the property. She further testified that Petitioner’s race and age played no part in her decision. Ms. Ost’s testimony was credible, and is accepted. Ms. Williams also testified that the decline in occupancy and matters pertaining to delinquency of rent payments drove her decision. Ms. Williams testified that Petitioner was allowing tenants to remain on “promises to pay,” and allowed partial payments to be accepted, which precluded Respondent from filing for eviction. She further testified that Petitioner’s race and age played no part in her decision. Ms. Williams’ testimony was credible, and is accepted. Ms. Reeves was tasked with the duty of informing Petitioner of her termination. Petitioner testified that Ms. Reeves appeared at her office and advised that “I’m here to let you go.” She further testified that, upon being asked the reason, Ms. Reeves said “[y]ou just don’t fit in with the property,” giving no other reason. Ms. Reeves testified that she advised Petitioner that she was being terminated for the reasons set forth in the previous counseling forms, including occupancy and performance. It is Ms. Reeves’ practice when terminating employees to read to them the information on the termination form, to not go into detail, and to keep it as short as possible. While it is likely that Ms. Reeves indicated that Petitioner did not “fit in with the property,” the most credible evidence indicates that she also advised Petitioner of the more specific bases for the decision. Ms. Reeves asked for the petty cash and the keys, and at Petitioner’s request, provided her with the number for the human resources department. Ms. Reeves had no further conversation with Petitioner. Petitioner testified that she took Ms. Reeves’ facially-innocuous statement that Petitioner did not “fit in with the property” to mean that “I just wasn't a little, cute black girl is the way I took it,” and that “immediately it was like my property 75 percent, I always say, African American. As far as age, the residents probably average around 30, 35 years old.” Petitioner believed that Ms. Reeves’ statement meant that Petitioner did not “fit in” with the property because she was different than the tenants. She further testified that “the only thing she could have meant by that was the demographics of the property being 75 percent African American there-about, young, professionals.” To the contrary, there is nothing in the statement that is suggestive of any racial or age bias. Given the lack of involvement on the part of Ms. Reeves in the decision to terminate Petitioner, and in light of Ms. Reeves’ testimony as to her practice of delivering the news of termination to an employee, it is more plausible that, instead of reflecting some discriminatory animus, her statement was designed to end her unpleasant task in as perfunctory a manner possible. It is clear that Petitioner felt that she was treated poorly by Respondent, and by Ms. Reeves in particular. She was upset that Ms. Reeves “didn’t give me the time of day,” and did not treat Petitioner with respect. When Ms. Reeves came to the office, she “sat in my office, and did no interaction with anyone, even when something was going on on the property, she would just sit in that office . . . . She acted like she was better than me and it wasn’t her job.” Petitioner asserted that Ms. Reeves treated her differently than she did other people, based on Petitioner being “an old white woman.” However, Petitioner only observed Ms. Reeves interact with Spinnaker Reach’s two leasing agents, and “that was in a group session when we were asking her to -- for information about getting the leases approved.” When asked about how Ms. Reeves acted around residents of Spinnaker Reach, Petitioner testified that “I didn't see her interact with anybody else.” Petitioner had no point of reference to support her assertion, and offered no example of Ms. Reeves treating her any differently than she treated anyone else. Petitioner’s case can be boiled down to her testimony that “I have my rights, and I didn't like the way I was treated. I mean, that's just how she treated me.” In mid-July 2013, Ms. Williams was contacted by Debra Sutton, who called to inquire about employment opportunities with the company. Ms. Sutton is African-American and under the age of 40. Ms. Sutton had previously worked for Respondent as a property manager for the Good Bread Hills tax credit property in Tallahassee, Florida. She resigned in good standing to move to the U.S. Virgin Islands. At the time of her resignation, Ms. Sutton was deemed “eligible for rehire.” Ms. Sutton had decided to return to the continental United States and, having worked for Respondent in the past, decided a call was worthwhile. Ms. Williams recalled Ms. Sutton, and her recollection of her performance was favorable. Ms. Williams advised Ms. Sutton that there may be an opening, but did not tell her a location. Although Ms. Sutton had been the subject of rumors of improprieties with residents of Good Bread Hills, she had denied those rumors during her previous employment. A record of the discussions with Respondent and Ms. Sutton was retained, and indicated that the issue was resolved. No action was taken with regard to the unsubstantiated accusations, and Ms. Sutton completed her term of employment without incident. After Petitioner was terminated, Ms. Reeves was tasked with finding a replacement. The blind application published during the first week of July had produced a number of applications, and Ms. Reeves conducted interviews with six applicants for the job, one of which was with Ms. Sutton. After the interviews for the Spinnaker Reach property manager position were completed, and with approval from Respondent’s upper management, Ms. Reeves extended an offer to Ms. Sutton to fill the position, which Ms. Sutton accepted. Although Ms. Williams urged Ms. Reeves to hire Ms. Sutton, Ms. Sutton was already Ms. Reeves’ top candidate due to her experience with tax credit properties. There is no competent, substantial evidence that Ms. Sutton’s race or age played any role in Respondent’s hiring decision. Ms. Sutton’s starting salary was several thousand dollars less than that of Petitioner. During her employment as the Spinnaker Reach property manager, Ms. Sutton had an incident of her failure to timely enter invoices into Timberscan, resulting in late payment of waste collection bills. Respondent issued a written counseling form to Ms. Sutton, citing her for the problem. The written counseling form concluded by advising Ms. Sutton that further problems would result in “further counseling or immediate termination.” The problem did not recur. The issues of occupancy and delinquency that plagued Petitioner were largely resolved while Ms. Sutton was the Spinnaker Reach property manager. Respondent sold Spinnaker Reach on June 19, 2014. Respondent continued to provide property management services for Spinnaker Reach until November 4, 2014, when the property management agreement between Respondent and Spinnaker Reach’s new owners was terminated. Ultimate Findings of Fact Petitioner identified no instance of any racially- disparaging comments or behavior directed at herself, or at any other employee, by anyone affiliated with Respondent. Although Petitioner was replaced in her position by a person who was African-American, there was no evidence of any other similar employment decisions having been made at any of Respondent’s other properties from which a pattern of conduct could be discerned, or an inference of racial discrimination could be drawn. Petitioner identified no direct instance of any ill- treatment directed at her due to her age. Although Petitioner was replaced in her position by a person who was younger, there was no evidence of any other similar employment decisions having been made at any of Respondent’s other properties from which a pattern of conduct could be discerned, or an inference of age discrimination could be drawn. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing to support a finding that the decision to terminate Petitioner from employment was made due to Petitioner’s race or age. Rather, the decision was based on dissatisfaction with Petitioner’s job performance, and a specific inability to bring Spinnaker Reach to a level of occupancy deemed suitable and achievable by Respondent. There was no competent, substantial evidence adduced at the hearing of persons of different races or ages than Petitioner, but who were otherwise similarly-situated to Petitioner, who were treated differently from Petitioner, or were subject to dissimilar personnel policies and practices. Regardless of the perceived fairness of the sanction of termination, Respondent’s decision to fire Petitioner was not based on racial animus or age bias.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order determining that Respondent, Royal American Management, Inc., did not commit any unlawful employment practice as to Petitioner, Janet J. Lewis, and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in FCHR No. 2014-00937. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2016.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of sex discrimination in employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the relevant statute. Respondent is a wholesale food cooperative, which pools the wholesale purchasing power of numerous independent grocers. Respondent purchases goods from manufacturers and then sells them to the grocers, which are members of Respondent. The grocers offer the goods for sale at retail. Respondent also operates as a wholly owned subsidiary an insurance agency, which sells insurance to members and nonmembers. Although independent from the wholesale food operation, the insurance operation is housed in the same Tampa office building/warehouse complex as is the wholesale food operation. On June 19, 1991, Respondent hired Petitioner to work in the wholesale food operation. She was hired as an executive secretary or assistant to Gary Rinehart, who is the Vice President of the wholesale food operation. Petitioner had applied to work in the insurance operation, but was offered only the job in wholesale food. From the start, Petitioner told Mr. Rinehart that she wanted to move into insurance at the first opportunity. Mr. Rinehart had no objections as long as he was not left short- handed. Petitioner's primary responsibilities in wholesale food was to support the salespersons who travelled in the field assisting member-grocers with purchasing and displaying products. When the salespersons needed assistance while they were on the road, they would call Petitioner, who, from the Tampa office, would coordinate the efforts to solve a member's problems or get information or product to a member. Petitioner's ready availability was an important element of her job performance. Petitioner's immediate predecessor had quit after she had married another employee of Respondent. However, the evidence fails to establish that Respondent maintained a policy of requiring female employees who married another employee to leave upon their marriage. In any event, nothing surrounding the circumstances of the departure of Petitioner's predecessor suggests that her termination had anything to do with dating, which presumably preceded the marriage for some period of time. Mr. Rinehart discouraged dating among employees. When he first announced to his group that he had hired Petitioner, someone--presumably a travelling salesman--asked if she were married. Mr. Rinehart responded by telling his group that he did not like his employees to date each other. When Petitioner first began work, she did an excellent job, although she quickly developed a problem leaving work early and arriving late. She also failed to take a shorthand class that Mr. Rinehart had asked her to take, as Respondent's expense, since she joined Respondent. By the end of 1991, Petitioner evidently felt underchallenged by her assignment and had lost her enthusiasm for working in the wholesale food operation. Mr. Rinehart was receiving numerous complaints about Petitioner not being at her desk when needed, being on personal calls during working hours, and not relaying messages. She was also not doing her clerical tasks, like typing, accurately. Mr. Rinehart spoke with Petitioner about her work- related problems, but no improvement was seen until, in mid- December, 1991, Petitioner secured Mr. Rinehart's permission to seek a transfer into the insurance operation. Before the transfer was made, Petitioner had assisted in the preparation for an insurance seminar in Orlando sponsored by Respondent in late 1991 and had also begun attending the Monday morning meetings of the insurance sales staff. By mid-January, 1992, Petitioner had discussed with Harry Britton the possibility of her transfer into insurance. Mr. Britton is the general agent for Respondent's insurance agency and also serves as the Director of Human Relations. In February, 1992, Mr. Britton informed Petitioner that she could transfer into insurance if it was acceptable to Mr. Rinehart. Mr. Rinehart agreed, as long as Petitioner trained her replacement. She did and, at an undisclosed point in the month, transferred to the insurance operation. Petitioner's timing was unfortunate, assuming that she would have preferred her prior secretarial job to none at all. When Petitioner joined Respondent, it was still struggling to recover from the loss of the business of Kroger, which, when it withdrew from Florida, had accounted for over half of Respondent's gross sales. Respondent's performance had been poor for sometime, and it had already sold buildings, equipment, and leases in order to cut its expenses. Before taxes, on a consolidated basis, Respondent had the following earnings/(losses) for fiscal years ending 1987 through 1992, respectively: $482,000, $289,000, ($1,275,000), ($1,909,795), ($398,489), and ($1,503,543). The insurance operations accounted for the following earnings/(losses) for fiscal years ending 1988 through 1992, respectively: ($18,417), ($8207), $18,180, and $1810. In early 1992, Respondent confronted the facts that it had lost over $2.5 million over the past five years, was in the process of losing $1.5 million--the largest loss in Respondent's history--in 1992, and had already sold various assets. Additionally, it was entering the slow spring wholesaling season. Respondent's top management decided to make a reduction in force. The decision to make layoffs was made and communicated to Messrs. Rinehart and Britton around February 10-13, 1992. The decision had been discussed for about two months previously. The record does not disclose exactly when Petitioner transferred to insurance, but it appears to have been in early February, 1992. On February 22, 1992, Mr. Britton informed Petitioner that she would be laid off. Seven other employees were laid off at the same time, including others in the insurance operation. Layoffs were generally based on seniority with Respondent or in a particular department, and the layoff of Petitioner was consistent with this policy. Mr. Rinehart laid off four persons in his department. Although all of them hadmore experience than did Petitioner, her replacement as executive secretary, who had less experience with Respondent than did Petitioner, was not laid off. Unlike others laid off, Petitioner was given an indefinite period of time to look for work while remaining on Respondent's payroll and as much time off the job as she needed while she looked for work outside the office. Mr. Britton gave Petitioner special treatment because he wanted her to remain parttime. He offered her a parttime job in insurance at the meeting at which he informed her she was being laid off and again several times over the ensuing months. She refused each offer of parttime employment. After some difficulty, Mr. Britton eventually filled Petitioner's former position with a parttime person. On March 13, 1992, Petitioner announced that she did not want to remain employed by Respondent any longer, even under the special circumstances outlined above. She quit and Respondent paid her through March 20, 1992. Since the last quarter of 1991, Petitioner had been dating another employee of Respondent. This situation was known to Messrs. Rinehart and Britton. Although Mr. Rinehart was not reluctant to discourage employees from dating, there is no indication in the record that he took any action against Petitioner for dating an employee. The man whom Petitioner dated has also dated other employees of Respondent, evidently without adverse consequences to himself or the other employees, and remains employed with Respondent. More importantly, Mr. Britton, who laid off Petitioner, did not share Mr. Rinehart's concerns about dating among employees. Petitioner asked Mr. Britton at least twice if he had any problems with her dating an employee, and he replied that he did not. The record does not indicate that he took any action against Petitioner for dating an employee. Respondent had a legitimate, nonpretextual reason for laying off Petitioner--or, more precisely, converting Petitioner's position from fulltime to parttime. The reason was economics. Additionally, Petitioner had been a marginal employee in the wholesale food operation, so it is hard to interpret her untimely transfer to insurance as part of a conspiracy to rid Respondent of her for reasons of gender. If Respondent were discriminatorily focusing on the female employee of a male- female dating duo, it is not apparent from the record how Respondent would have addressed its "problem" by retaining Petitioner in parttime employment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. ENTERED on December 20, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-321 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1, 4, 6, 8: rejected as subordinate. 2-3, 5, 7, 10: rejected as recitation of testimony and subordinate. (additional evidence): stricken as outside the record. (first): adopted. 9 (second): rejected as legal argument. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3, 13-15, 17-18, 20-26, 30-39: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as legal argument and recitation of testimony. 5-7, 9, 11-12, 16 (except for fact that Petitioner approached Messrs. Rinehart and Britton): rejected as subordinate. 8: rejected as repetitious and recitation of testimony. 10, 27-29: rejected as recitation of testimony. 19: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-43: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Peggy J. Thornton, pro se 6802 North Branch Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 W. Reynolds Allen Kevin O'Toole Hogg Allen 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606
The Issue The issue presented is whether the bid of Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., is responsive to and complies with Respondent's Invitation to Bid No. SB 97C-85R.
Findings Of Fact On August 15, 1996, Respondent The School District of Palm Beach County, Florida (hereinafter "School District") issued an Invitation to Bid entitled "Term Contract for Uncooked Pizza Products," soliciting vendors for the 1996-97 school year. Both Petitioner Jukebox Express Drive-In Restaurants of America, Inc. (hereinafter "Jukebox Express"), and Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc. (hereinafter "Velda Farms"), timely submitted bids. The School District opened the bids on September 11, 1996, and determined that Jukebox Express and Velda Farms, as well as five other vendors, had submitted responsive bids. The School District prepared a list of approved vendors for that contract and included Jukebox Express and Velda Farms and the other responsive vendors on that list. The cafeteria manager for each school in the School District can select any vendor from that approved list to supply pizza products to that school. Jukebox Express timely filed its protest to the School District's determination that Velda Farms should be included on the list of approved vendors for pizza products, alleging that the bid of Velda Farms was not responsive and that Velda Farms is not a responsible bidder as to the subject bid. The School District is purchasing pizza products "off-bid" from Velda Farms during the pendency of this proceeding. Velda Farms does not manufacture or prepare the pizza products it currently supplies and would supply pursuant to the School District's Invitation to Bid. It is the distributor. The pizza is manufactured by Mimmo's Gourmet Pizza, a business currently located in Pompano Beach, Florida. During the 1995-96 school year Mimmo's supplied pizza to the School District through Jukebox Express. That pizza was manufactured by Mimmo's in its Fort Lauderdale location. Jukebox Express stopped supplying Mimmo's pizza to the School District in March 1996 due to deficiencies in the quality of the product. On May 7, 1996, Mimmo's Fort Lauderdale facility was inspected by the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services. Mimmo's received an overall rating of poor, with several critical sanitation items cited for correction within 48 hours. When the Department returned to that Fort Lauderdale facility on May 28, it discovered that Mimmo's was no longer doing business out of that facility. Instead, Mimmo's had begun doing business out of its Pompano Beach facility. It is from that facility that Mimmo's began supplying pizza products to the School District through Velda Farms in June 1996 and continuing through the time of the final hearing in this cause. No evidence was offered as to when Mimmo's obtained a permit to commence construction of its Pompano Beach facility. The records of the City of Pompano Beach reveal that on April 10, 1996, Mimmo's received approval for temporary electrical service for 30 days to test equipment. That approval did not permit operating a business at the site. That approval for temporary electrical service was never extended or renewed. Mimmo's August 6, 1996, request for a temporary certificate of occupancy for its Pompano Beach facility was denied. On September 12, 1996, Mimmo's Pompano Beach facility was "red-tagged" for failure to have a certificate of occupancy. On the following day Mimmo's applied for and received a temporary certificate of occupancy. Mimmo's did not obtain a final certificate of occupancy from the City until November 7, 1996. On September 19, 1996, the City of Pompano Beach received Mimmo's application for an occupational license which represents that Mimmo's opened for business in September 1996. The City issued an occupational license to Mimmo's that same day. Special Condition H.3. of the subject Invitation to Bid provides as follows: Vendors must have a system in place that provides for quality control and the delivery of product at consistent and specified quality levels. Vendors must have in place a system for safety and sanitation inspections assuring the delivery of product that is free from contamination and product degradation. At the time it submitted its bid and through the time of the final hearing in this cause, Velda Farms had no system in place for quality control of Mimmo's product and had no system in place for safety and sanitation inspections of Mimmo's product. Velda Farms performed no investigation of Mimmo's product or manufacturing facility before it commenced supplying Mimmo's product to the School District. Velda Farms relied solely on the fact that Mimmo's pizza was listed as an approved product in the School District's Invitation to Bid. The School District's employee who prepared the Invitation to Bid included Mimmo's pizza in the approved product list pursuant to oral information given by the director of food services that Mimmo's was tested and accepted as an approved product by the School District in May 1996 for the 1996-97 school year. That same employee is not aware of any written test report to that effect. When Velda Farms submitted its bid to the School District, it attached a letter on Velda Farms stationery which read as follows: As per our conversation, Velda Farms [sic] ability to fulfill the obligations of the Pizza Bid No. SB 97C-85R is contingent upon the following: Mimmo's Pizza's ability to supply the required amounts at the agreed pricing. Mimmo's Pizza's ability to meet the nutritional specifications and requirement of the Palm Beach County School District. I appreciate your understanding in this matter. Should you have any questions, please contact me. The statements in that letter are directly contrary to the requirements contained in Special Condition H.3. of the Invitation to Bid. Indeed, the statements in that letter render the bid submitted by Velda Farms only a conditional offer to supply pizza products. Special Condition B of the Invitation to Bid provides that the contract will be awarded to the lowest and best responsive, responsible multiple bidders. Section 6.14 of the School District's Procurement Department Purchasing Procedures were adopted as School Board policy on November 21, 1995. Section 6.14(5) provides, in part, as follows: Responsible bidder or offeror is defined as a person/firm who has the capability, in all respects, to perform the contract requirements fully and the moral and business integrity and reliability to assure good faith performance. Responsive bidder or offeror is defined as a person/firm who has submitted a bid that conforms in all material respects to the invitation for bids or request for proposals. As to the subject bid, Velda Farms is neither a responsible bidder nor a responsive bidder. Its letter attachment to its bid form represents that Velda Farms does not have the capability to fully perform the contract and that Velda Farms will not assure good faith performance. Further, its bid does not conform in all material respects to the subject Invitation to Bid. Although the School District's Procurement Department Manager suggests that the deficiencies in Velda Farms' bid can be waived by the School Board, those deficiencies are not minor. They are material deficiencies in that they involve the quality of the food in the School District's schools and the price of Velda Farms' bid. No other bidder included a condition giving itself the right to cease performance of its agreement to supply pizza products to the School District. No other bidder was advised by the School District's Procurement Department employees that the bidders could condition their bids in such a fashion. At the time Velda Farms submitted its bid and at the time the bids were opened and the School District announced the award, Mimmo's was operating illegally from a building which had not been approved for occupancy and without benefit of an occupational license. Although Velda Farms may not have known that the pizza product it was supplying to the School District at the time of the bid submittals and bid opening was manufactured without the necessary government approvals, General Condition 19 provides as follows: Legal Requirements: Federal, State, county, and local laws, ordinances, rules, and regulations that in any manner affect the items covered herein apply. Lack of knowledge by the bidder will in no way be a cause for relief from responsibility.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., is not a responsible or responsive bidder for Respondent The School District of Palm Beach County, Florida's term contract for uncooked pizza products, Bid No. SB 97C-85R, and deleting Intervenor Velda Farms, Inc., from the list of approved multiple bidders under that bid award. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael B. Small, Esquire Small and Small, P.A. 324 Royal Palm Way, Suite 231 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Robert A. Rosillo, Esquire Palm Beach County School Board 3318 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5813 Jim E. Solomon, Esquire Jim E. Solomon and Associates, P.A. 1180 South Powerline Road Suite Nos. 207-209 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Dr. Joan Kowal Superintendent of Palm Beach County Schools 3340 Forest Hill Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-5869
The Issue Whether Petitioner's bid for Lot III of Bid NO. J88A-924C was responsive to the Invitation to Bid?
Findings Of Fact On June 8, 1988, Respondent issued an Invitation to Bid for BID NO. J88A-GLYC (ITB). The ITB was for the purchase of Indefinite quantities of animal feed for animals used in research. The ITB called for vendors to quote prices for estimated quantities of forty different items. In the past, Respondent had evaluated the bids received in response to similar ITBs based on the total cost for all the items in the ITB. Prior to issuing the ITB, Respondent decided to allow bidders to bid in lots. Therefore, the ITB divided the forty items into three lots. Lot I consisted of eight items; Lot II of two items; and Lot III of thirty items. The ITB contained the following language: GENERAL CONDITIONS * * * 9. AWARDS: As the best interest of the University of Florida may require, the right is reserved to make award(s) by individual item, group of items, all or none, or any combination thereof; to reject any and all bids or waive any minor irregularity or technicality in bids received.... SPECIAL CONDITIONS * * * Items included in this bid may be bid in LOTS as follows: Joint exhibit 1 at pp. 2 and 11. In response to the ITB, Respondent received four bids. The bidders and the totals (rounded to the nearest dollar) of their bids for the items in each lot were as follows: Bidder Lot I Lot II Lot III Boyer's (Petitioner) $53,179 $49,238 $68,018 Brownlee (Intervenor) 53,190 47,880 68,730 Teklad 51,104 47,393 No Bid Jonesville 74,908 69,978 79,247 Petitioner's bid contained a unit price and a total (determined by multiplying the unit price by the ITB's estimated amount of units needed) for thirty-nine of the items. The space where the unit price and total for item 25 of Lot III was blank. Petitioner made a mistake in leaving the space blank; the blank was not left intentionally, and Petitioner's President, who signed the bid, did not know the blank was there until after the bids were opened by Respondent. The evaluation of the bids was done by Ms. Whitley, Respondent's Associate Director of the Purchasing Division, and Dr. Moreland, a Doctor of Veterinary Medicine employed by Respondent. Ms. Whitley and Dr. Moreland determined that the blank for item 25 of Lot III meant that Petitioner could not deliver Item 25 and decided that the contract for Lot III should be awarded to Intervenor, the second lowest bidder for Lot III. On July 5, 1988, after meeting with Dr. Moreland, Ms. Whitley notified the bidders that Teklad would be awarded the contract for Lots I and II, and that Intervenor would be awarded the contract for Lot III. The bid tabulation sheet showing the awards was posted on July 6, 1988. The bid tabulation sheet contained the following language: Notice of Intended Award to: Teklad, Boyer. Failure to file a protest within the time prescribed in Section 120.53(5), Florida Statutes, shall constitute a waiver of proceedings under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. Also on July 6, 1988, Mr. Boyer, Petitioner's President, came to see Ms. Whitley. Mr. Boyer stated that he intended for the space on Item 25 to be left blank and that he would give Item 25 to Petitioner for free. Based on the statement by Mr. Boyer, Ms. Whitley decided that the contract for Lot III should be awarded to Petitioner, since she felt her duty was to get the best price for Respondent. Therefore, the notice of intent to award was changed in the afternoon of July 6, 1988, and posted on July 7, 1988. On July 7, 1988, Intervenor, Brownlee, filed a protest to the proposed award of Lot III to Petitioner. Ms. Whitley forwarded Brownlee's protest to James Thereoux, Respondent's Director of Purchasing. Mr. Thereoux requested that Joseph T. Barron, Jr., Respondent's Associate General Counsel, review the protest. By memorandum dated September 15, 1988, Mr. Barron advised Mr. Thereoux that the bid should be awarded to Brownlee, as was originally done. Mr. Barron considered the blank space on Petitioner's bid to be the equivalent of Petitioner not bidding on that item. Therefore, Petitioner would be unable to deliver an item in Lot III, in violation of the bid document which required the winning bidder to be able to supply all the items requested. Also, Mr. Barron considered the blank space to give Petitioner an advantage over other bidders, since by not pricing an item, Petitioner's total price for Lot III would be lower than if all items were priced. Mr. Barron did not consider the blank space to be a minor irregularity which could be waived. Based on Mr. Barron's memorandum, Respondent determined that the bid should be awarded to Brownlee. On September 16, 1988, the bidders were advised of this decision and a notice of intended award was posted on September 19, 1988. By letter dated September 19, 1988, Petitioner notified Respondent that it intended to protest the disqualification of its bid. On October 3, 1988, Petitioner filed its formal protest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent issue a Final Order awarding the contract for Lot III of Invitation to Bid for Bid No. J88A-924C to Intervenor, Brownlee Feed and Seed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-5953BID Petitioner's Findings of Fact Petitioner submitted a proposed recommended order which contains unnumbered paragraphs and does not separate findings of fact from conclusions of law. The findings of fact set forth in the proposed order are supported by the evidence. However, the facts that are not set forth in this Recommended Order are irrelevant or subordinate to facts found. Respondent's Findings of Fact 1-3. Irrelevant. 4. Accepted. 5-10. Subordinate to facts found. 11. Accepted. 12-13. Irrelevant. Whether the bid could be awarded by lots is not at issue in this case. See Conclusions of Law section of this RO. Accepted. Irrelevant. Accepted. 17-18. Subordinate to facts found. Accepted. Accepted. Not a finding of fact. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. Accepted. 24-25. Subordinate to facts found. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Subordinate to facts found. 30-31. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Irrelevant. See Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Supported by competent evidence but unnecessary to the decision reached. Intervenor's Finding of Fact 1. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph T. Barron, Jr., Esquire University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, Florida 32611 Tyrie A. Boyer, Esquire Boyer, Tanzler & Boyer Independent Life Building Suite 3030 Jacksonville, Florida 32602 John P. O'Neal, Esquire Post Office Drawer O Gainesville, Florida 32602 =================================================================