Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Respondent William C. Widner has been with the City of Clearwater Fire Department for 21 years. For the past ten years, he has been assigned to Engine 48 as a fire lieutenant. His record is free from any type of disciplinary action. When a call is received concerning a medical emergency, it is proper to dispatch both a rescue unit and a fire engine to the scene. The standard operating procedure for emergency calls for fire vehicles is that the time to clear the station should not exceed 45 seconds. If there are questions concerning the dispatch, the officer in charge is to contact the dispatcher while in route to the scene of the emergency and make inquiry at that time. Also, a lieutenant, by himself, cannot change, modify or refuse to respond to a dispatch. Only a captain or the dispatcher can change the required response, or, another unit can announce that they are closer to the scene and will respond. The average response time between dispatch and arrival at the scene is four minutes. When a dispatch is given, a grid number for the destination is announced. All fire engines are equipped with map books demonstrating the location of the scene in relationship to the grid number given. On August 5, 1985, at approximately 2050 hours, the Clearwater Police Department Communications Center received an emergency call reporting a subject having a heart attack at 2720 Morningside Drive. Safety Harbor Rescue 52 and an ambulance were dispatched by telephone. At approximately 2055 hours, Engine 48 was radio dispatched to 2720 Morningside Drive. Respondent advised by radio that Engine 48 was responding to the call. Approximately 22 seconds after receiving the dispatch and 14 seconds after initially responding to the dispatch, respondent Widner telephoned the dispatcher and advised him that 2720 Morningside Drive was Engine 49's territory. Respondent did offer to go, however. The dispatcher stated that "this was a screwed up mess," but advised respondent that the computer recommended Engine 48. Respondent replied that he should go if Engine 49 was out. After further conversation, the dispatcher stated, "it made sense to me that 49 would go but it said 48." When respondent inquired as to who was to go, the dispatcher said "Oh hell, I might as well page somebody else." This conversation between the respondent and the dispatcher lasted 43 seconds and concluded 1 minute, 9 seconds from the end of the original dispatch. The dispatcher then radio-dispatched Engine 49 to 2720 Morningside Drive. Engine 49 advised that it was responding at approximately 2057 hours, 38 seconds, or two minutes, 22 seconds after the original dispatch was given to Engine 48. After speaking with the dispatcher, respondent and his superior officer, Captain Evans, checked the map for the 2720 Morningside Drive address. Upon learning that that address was, indeed, within Engine 48's territory, respondent and his crew immediately got in the truck and left the station. Captain Evans notified the dispatcher at 2059 hours that Engine 48 was responding to the call. When respondent arrived at the scene, Engine 49 and the rescue unit were already there. He attempted to radio in his arrival as soon as he got there, but the air waves were busy. He announced his arrival on his portable unit as he was walking up to the house. The evidence does not conclusively establish the exact time that respondent's arrival on the scene was reported to the dispatcher. Engine 49 did report its arrival before Engine 48's arrival was reported. Based upon the totality of the evidence, it is found that between 7 1/2 and 8 1/4 minutes elapsed between the time of the original dispatch to Engine 48 and the time of Engine 48's arrival at the scene. There are two Morningside Drives in the City of Clearwater. The residence located at 2720 Morningside Drive is within Engine 48's response zone, and is located 2.1 miles from Engine 48 and 3.0 miles from Engine 49. The other Morningside Drive is located in Morningside Estates and is within the response zone of Engine 49. When respondent first received the dispatch, he thought the address was located within the Morningside Estates subdivision. Upon leaving the station, an immediate right or left turn is required, dependent upon which Morningside Drive is being sought. Respondent's Captain Evans immediately conducted a fact finding session upon respondent's return to the station, and determined that respondent had failed to follow a direct order. A follow-up interview was conducted. It was determined that, upon receiving the initial dispatch, respondent should have proceeded directly to the engine and looked at the grid map, should have cleared the station within 45 seconds in accordance with standard operating procedures, should have reached the scene within 4 to 4.5 minutes and that, due to respondent's phone conversation with the dispatcher, two fire engines were sent on a call that required only one engine. Based upon those findings, the Fire Department concluded that respondent's productivity, workmanship, and efficiency with regard to the emergency response were not up to required standards for performance, and a two-day suspension was requested. The request for a two-day suspension was referred to the Affirmative Action Office, which conducts a fairness review of proposed disciplinary action and makes a recommendation to the City Manager, who takes final disciplinary action. After interviewing respondent concerning the August 5th incident, the Affirmative Action Office initially concluded that a two-day suspension was very harsh under the circumstances and recommended a letter of reprimand instead. Thereafter, Assistant Fire Chief Meyer contacted the Affirmative Action Office and provided the investigator with further information. The investigator was informed by Assistant Chief Meyer that respondent had been at that station for 10 years and should have been familiar with the addresses within his territory. He further advised her that the computer system utilized to determine which station should receive a particular call had been in effect for two years and discrepancies had been corrected. Meyer informed the investigator that lieutenants had been instructed not to argue with the dispatcher, to immediately respond to a call and that the proper response time in this instance should have been 4 minutes. This information from Meyer caused the Affirmative Action Office to amend its recommendation for disciplinary action to a suspension for 11.2 hours. The City Manager followed that recommendation and gave Notice of Suspension in accordance therewith. The Notice listed the three charges referenced in the Introduction as grounds for the disciplinary action taken, and established the date and time for the suspension to occur. In a separately related incident occurring in 1983, Lieutenant Handura with the City of Clearwater Fire Department received a letter of reprimand for not responding to a dispatch. In that incident, Handura was dispatched but, because he had a tour group of school children at his station and knew that a rescue unit had also been dispatched, he called the rescue unit and determined that he was not needed. He thereupon called the dispatcher and advised him that the rescue unit was responding to the call and that he would not respond.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent's appeal be dismissed and that a Final Order be entered confirming the disciplinary action of an 11.2 hour suspension, without pay. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th of July 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July 1986. APPENDIX (CASE NO. 86-0236) The proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties have been carefully considered and are accepted and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below: Petitioner 11. Partially rejected as being argumentative as opposed to a factual finding. Respondent 3-5. While these findings are partially correct, they are an incomplete recitation of the events which transpired. 6. Rejected; See Paragraph 5 in Findings of Fact. 7 and 8. Rejected as a legal conclusion as opposed to a factual finding. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles A. Lance Assistant City Attorney City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Stuart M. Rosenblum, P.A. 220 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 City Manager City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748 Civil Service Board City of Clearwater Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518-4748
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was employed as a fire inspector by the City of Clearwater with permanent status in the civil service system. Respondent has approximately nine years experience with the City of Clearwater as a fire inspector, and prior to this incident had never been the subject of disciplinary action. As a permanent civil service employee, Ordinance 1831 of the City of Clearwater, Guidelines of Disciplinary Action dated October 23, 1978, and Civil Service Rule 14 dealing with Suspensions, Demotions and Dismissals are applicable to the facts of this case and govern disciplinary action taken against Respondent. On September 17, 1985, Respondent was suspended for three (3) working days, without pay, and given forty (40) disciplinary points. In the Notice of Suspension the grounds for this action are stated as follows: Inspector Christopher Kingsley violated Rule 14, Section 1, Paragraph (k) of the Civil Service Rules and Regulations: "Has violated any lawful and reasonable official regulation or order or failed to obey any lawful and reasonable direction made and given to him by his superior officer when such violation or failure to obey amounts to insubordination or serious breach of discipline which may reasonably be expected to result in a lower morale in the department or to result in loss, inconvenience, or injury to the City or to the public. * * * On June 15, Captain Yaudes dispatched Inspector Kingsley to 1468 Belleair Road to observe and assist Inspector Mattheus with the fire investigation. When Inspector Kingsley arrived at the fire scene he more or less worked independently. He did not provide the assistance or opinion to Inspector Mattheus when requested. This is further violation of the Guidelines for Disciplinary Action, Level 4, #3 offense: "Insubordination by refusal to perform work assigned or by failure to comply with written or verbal instructions of the supervisory force." Based upon the testimony and documentary evidence presented, the following findings of fact are made about Respondent's actions relative to the fire at 1468 Belleair Road on June 15, 1985: Between approximately 7:30 a.m. and 7:40 a.m. on June 15, 1985 Respondent arrived at work, although his shift did not begin until 8:00 a.m. When Respondent arrived, Captain Gordan Yaudes was talking with Captain Coleman about a radio transmission they had just overheard indicating that Inspector Harry Mattheus had been dispatched to investigate the Belleair Road fire. Since neither Captain Yaudes or Captain Coleman knew Inspector Mattheus, Captain Yaudes called Respondent into the office to see if Respondent knew anything about Mattheus' qualifications or background. Although Respondent and Mattheus had been working out of the same office for two months at the time, Respondent had only a brief acquaintance with Mattheus. They had never been introduced after Mattheus had been hired, their shifts and assignments were different and Mattheus had not yet done a fire scene investigation in the City of Clearwater. Therefore, Respondent told Captain Yaudes he did not know about Mattheus' qualifications. Captain Yaudes ordered Respondent to go to the Belleair fire scene, find out what was going on, and assist Inspector Mattheus, if necessary. Captain Yaudes testified that he wanted Respondent to take command of the investigation if Respondent determined that Mattheus was not properly certified. He specifically denied that he ordered Respondent to do a joint investigation with Mattheus. This order was given prior to 8:00 a.m., and thus prior to either Respondent or Captain Yaudes being on duty. Captain Coleman, who was on duty at the time, concurred in the order. Mattheus had been on the scene for thirty minutes before Respondent arrived. When Respondent arrived he put on protective pants, boots and gloves and entered the premises, a small flower shop. The fire had already been extinguished. Fire damage was confined to a twelve foot by twelve foot area at the front of the store where the cash register had been. Mattheus was not wearing protective gear since he had not been issued any at the time, although he was wearing his own steel reinforced boots. Upon approaching Mattheus at the scene, Respondent asked why he was there and on whose authority. Mattheus indicated he had been placed on the "call list" the night before by Fire Marshal Nic Lewis, and he was responding to a call to investigate the scene he received that morning at home. In making this inquiry, Respondent was responsive to Captain Yaudes' order that he go to the scene, find out what was going on and assume command of the investigation if he determined Mattheus was not qualified. Inspector Mattheus had been employed as a life safety inspector approximately two months prior to this incident. He is a certified fire inspector and was therefore qualified to be on the "call list" and to investigate fires. This was his first investigation for the City of Clearwater. After determining what was going on at the scene and that Mattheus was qualified to do the investigation, Respondent proceeded to assist Mattheus in several ways, including: surveying and discussing the scene together examining electrical wire and sockets, as well as the floor at the scene for possible causes of the fire clearing the area where the cash register had been and suggesting initially that Mattheus keep an aerosol can that had been punctured by a nail as possible evidence. Later, when arson was ruled out, he concurred in Mattheus' decision to discard the can. Respondent also helped clean up the scene since he was wearing protective clothing and Mattheus was not, and discussed an early morning thunderstorm with Mattheus as a possible cause of the fire. In this manner Respondent was responsive to Captain Yaudes' order that he render assistance, if necessary. On several occasions during the approximately thirty minutes when Respondent was at the fire scene, Inspector Mattheus asked him his opinion on the cause of the fire. Respondent responded by saying he did not know, or by shrugging his shoulders. He told Mattheus to list the cause as "unknown" if Mattheus could not determine a cause. Respondent also said to Mattheus on several occasions, "This is your fire." When Mattheus asked if Respondent was going to write a report on this fire, Respondent replied in the negative since this was Mattheus' fire. It is standard operating procedure for the first inspector on the scene to be the primary investigator who writes the report, and for other inspectors to assist the primary investigator. Mattheus was the primary investigator in this fire, and was in charge of the investigation. The terminology, "It's your fire," is commonly understood among firefighters and inspectors to mean that "you are in charge and will write the report." Respondent's use of this phrase in responding to Mattheus was therefore accurate and in recognition of standard operating procedures, and does not indicate any lack of cooperation on his part. Respondent was not ordered to conduct a "joint investigation," according to Captain Yaudes. When the term "joint investigation" is used, it is understood by firefighters and inspectors to mean an investigation which involves another agency, such as the State Fire Marshal's Office or the Electrical Department, in which the other department assists the Fire Department in trying to determine the cause of a fire. On June 14, 1985, the day prior to the Belleair fire, Respondent had called Inspector Jeff Daniels and expressed concern that life safety inspectors would be used to investigate fires since he felt they were not qualified. He also expressed concern about Inspector Mattheus' qualifications. Despite this prior expression of concern, when Respondent was ordered to the fire scene the next day, he did determine that Mattheus was qualified and assisted him as ordered. The testimony of Lieutenant Frank Hill and Firefighters John Milano and Charles Daniels, who were all at the scene on June 15, 1985, specifically confirms that Respondent and Mattheus worked together on the investigation without discord.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the disciplinary charge against Respondent be dismissed, and that Respondent receive three days back-pay and the removal of all disciplinary points in his record arising from this charge. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Miles Lance, Esquire Assistant City Attorney Post Office Box 4748 Clearwater, Florida 33518 Stuart M. Rosenblum, Esquire, 220 South Garden Avenue.C3 Clearwater, Florida 33516 APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(c) and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 4(g). Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(a). Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(f). 4-6 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant, unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(h) and 6. Rejected in Finding of Fact 4(g). 10,11 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(h), but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(i). Rejected in Finding of Fact 4. Respondent did cooperate and assist as necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4(h) and 6, but otherwise rejected as erroneously stating Respondent failed to aid Inspector Mattheus. 15,16 Rejected as simply a summation of testimony rather than a proposed finding of fact. 17 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(e), but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 18,19 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 8 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact, as contained in Sections A and B of Respondent's Memorandum, Proposed Findings and Conclusions of Law: Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4 but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 4,5 Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 8-12 Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(a)-(e). Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 4(g), but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4(h), (i). Adopted in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3.
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to be certified as a Firefighter based upon examination results through an examination administered by Respondent? See Section 633.35, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner applied for certification as a Firefighter on June 19, 1998. Subsequently he completed the Firefighter training program administered at Volusia County Fire Science Institute commensurate with the requirements set forth in Section 633.35(1), Florida Statutes. On December 15, 1998, Petitioner took the state examination following completion of the "Minimum Standards Course." The state examination was administered by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. That examination was constituted of a written and practical portion with the expectation that a minimum score of 70% was required in both aspects of the examination. See Rule 4A-37.056(6)(b), Florida Administrative Code. When the December 15, 1998 examination was graded, the Petitioner passed the practical with a score of 90. Petitioner did not pass the written, receiving a score of 66. Officials within the Respondent's agency were persuaded that some portions of the examination given on December 15, 1998, were arguably beyond the abilities of a beginning Firefighter. This decision was arrived at recognizing that material on the test had been presented in the "Minimum Standards Course." Nonetheless, adjustments were made to the scores of the candidates in recognition of the difficulty of some of the examination questions. The re-scoring improved Petitioner's written score from 66 to 67. On February 9, 1999, Petitioner retook the written portion of the state examination and received a score of 59. That score was adjusted on the same basis as has been described in relation to the December 15, 1998, examination session. With the adjustment Petitioner received a score of 62. Petitioner took a third written examination on May 12, 1999. This examination was given, having purged the examination instrument of the more difficult questions that had been presented on the occasion of the December 15, 1998, and the February 9, 1999, examinations. In the instance of the May 12, 1999 examination, Petitioner received a 66 on the written portion. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the nature of the examinations, taking into account the adjustments in the scoring, were beyond the expectation of the competence of a candidate who had undergone the "Minimum Standards Course" in preparation for this state examination or that Respondent failed to appropriately administer and grade the examinations given Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered upholding the examination results in the several examinations administered to Petitioner in relation to the written portion, as adjusted, and finding that Petitioner has exhausted his opportunities for examination in this cycle. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Elenita Gomez, Esquire Department of Insurance 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Anthony Robert Shuta, II 3043 Pine Tree Drive Edgewater, Florida 32141 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill Nelson, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capital, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant and material to these proceedings, the Petitioner has been employed as a firefighter with the Metro-Dade Fire Department. The Petitioner's primary function with the Metro-Dade Fire Department is as a firefighter. By letter dated May 30, 1991, and received on June 10, 1991, the Petitioner applied to the Respondent for Firefighters Supplemental Compensation at the Bachelor degree level. Three transcripts were submitted with the Petitioner's application. The first was from Miami-Dade Community College, and showed that an Associate of Science degree in Fire Science was awarded to the Petitioner on May 4, 1991. The second transcript was from Broward Community College, showing many courses taken by Petitioner, but no degree awarded. 3/ The third transcript was from Florida International University, and showed that a Bachelor of Science degree with a major in Industrial Technology was awarded to Petitioner on December 12, 1980. Petitioner's Bachelor degree from Florida International University is not based upon, and does not include, any of the courses in fire science that formed the basis for Petitioner's Associate degree from Miami-Dade Community College. 4/ Petitioner's transcript of her Bachelor degree does not reveal a major study concentration area of at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours which is readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. On or about June 24, 1991, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that she was eligible for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Associate degree level by virtue of her Associate of Science degree in Fire Science from Miami-Dade Community College. On or about June 26, 1991, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that she was not eligible for the Firefighters Supplemental Compensation Program at the Bachelor degree level because Petitioner's major in Industrial Technology from Florida International University was not a recognized Major Study Concentration Area in Rule 4A-37.084. The denial letter cites and quotes the definition of "Bachelor's Degree" at Rule 4A- 37.084(3), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 4A-37.084(3)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the rule which is the subject of this rule challenge proceeding, reads as follows (with the challenged portion underscored [<> --Ed.]): "Bachelor's Degree" means a Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Science degree conferred by an accredited post-secondary institution provided the major study concentration area is readily identifiable and applicable as fire- related. A firefighter may receive Supplemental Compensation based on possession of a Bachelor's Degree regardless of whether or not an Associate Degree was previously earned. <In no event shall receipt of a transcript for an Associate Decree be used in consideration for qualification of the Bachelor's Degree Supplemental Compensation.> The major study concentration area, at least 18 semester hours or 27 quarter hours, must be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related. Those major study concentration areas specifically defined in this rule chapter are considered to be readily identifiable and applicable as fire-related.
The Issue The issue presented is whether the Department committed an unlawful employment practice by terminating Petitioner's employment due to her age or her sex or by retaliating against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Fred Chaplin supervises the fire protection specialists (fire inspectors) for the southeast region of the Bureau of Fire Prevention, Division of State Fire Marshal, Department of Financial Services. The headquarters for the southeast region is in West Palm Beach, with a field office in Plantation. For approximately five months there had been a vacant fire inspector position in the southeast region, and Ashley Caron, a fire protection specialist, was covering all of the counties in the southeast region during that time. She worked out of the Plantation field office where Amy Peebles was the administrative assistant. Michael Long, another fire protection specialist, worked out of the West Palm Beach office. He, like Ashley Caron, was responsible for inspecting state-owned and state-leased buildings and new construction. He was also responsible for all fire alarms in the southeast region whether they were in new construction or in existing buildings. He investigated fire alarm systems when he received complaints from outside contractors or other fire inspectors. When Petitioner Andrea Spainhour interviewed for the vacant position in the southeast region, she was interviewed by Caron, Long, and Joe Furiatto from the Department's Tallahassee personnel office. Prior to her interview, Long had talked with Peebles about whether they should re-post the vacancy since there were only two candidates. He erroneously thought there had to be a minimum of three applicants for a vacancy in order to fill it. Long, Caron, and Furiatto were impressed with Petitioner during her interview. She had an excellent background and extensive experience. The three interviewers rated Petitioner, a 50-year-old female, as superior to the other applicant, a younger male, and recommended that she be hired. When Petitioner accepted the offer of employment, Long, Caron, Peebles, and Chaplin were all excited that Petitioner would be working with them. Petitioner's first day of work was May 7, 2001. She reported to the Plantation office where Chaplin spent time with her in orientation over the next several days. He advised Petitioner that Caron would train her during May and June and that Petitioner would become responsible for the inspections in Miami-Dade County. He further advised Petitioner, as he had before she began work, that she was a probationary employee and that the Legislature was considering "privatizing" fire protection specialists. He further advised Petitioner that hers was a job "out in the field," but that she was expected to come into the office to pick up phone messages and mail, turn in inspection reports, and sign documents. He told Petitioner the guideline was that it would take approximately eight hours a week to take care of duties in the office. Amy Peebles assisted Petitioner by answering her questions, showing her how to use her Nextel telephone and the computer, and creating forms on the computer so that Petitioner could fill them out and e-mail them to her when Petitioner was out of the office. Caron also assisted Petitioner by answering questions and showing her how to fill out forms. Long told Petitioner to call on him if she had any questions. Everyone tried to make Petitioner feel part of "the team." On May 10 Petitioner sent Chaplin an e-mail saying that Caron and Peebles had given her a plant for her office and that she already felt like part of the family. Although not mentioned in the e-mail, Caron also gave Petitioner some shirts like Caron and Long wore when they made inspections identifying Petitioner as a fire inspector so she would be recognized as a member of the fire inspectors team. Caron also gave Petitioner a mapping program of Miami-Dade County that Caron had purchased to assist Petitioner in becoming familiar with the locations of facilities she would be inspecting. When Chaplin advised Long and Caron by e-mail that they had been complimented for their professionalism by the construction administrator at the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), Long immediately advised Chaplin by e-mail that Petitioner was also present at the referenced meeting and had acted professionally and been an asset to the inspection team. Chaplin forwarded those e-mails to Petitioner to let her know that Long had included her in the compliment. When Petitioner began making inspections, she did not always submit the proper forms to Peebles or fill them out properly so that Peebles could send the required letters to those responsible for the inspected facilities. Peebles reported this problem to Chaplin. Petitioner also made mistakes on her vehicle logs that Chaplin corrected for her before forwarding them to Tallahassee. On June 12, Caron and Long car-pooled down to Miami- Dade County to attend a meeting at Florida International University (FIU). After the meeting, Long, who was responsible for fire alarm systems in the region, took the opportunity of being in Miami-Dade to evaluate the fire alarm system at the DJJ, which was located close to FIU, in order to ascertain how long his final inspection of the system would take. Their visit to DJJ was not an official visit and did not include an inspection. When Petitioner learned that they had gone to one of "her buildings" without her, she thought they intentionally excluded her from official business. She concluded they did not want her in her position due to her experience. At about that same time, Caron asked Long for assistance at one of her facilities in Broward. Prior to Petitioner's employment, Caron had told Long she had some concerns regarding a fire alarm system at the Coconut Grove Playhouse. When they finished in Broward, Long reminded Caron he needed to look at the Playhouse; so, they car-pooled down to Miami-Dade. This was an informal visit, and no official inspection took place. Again, when Petitioner learned they had gone to the Playhouse without her, she assumed they were intentionally excluding her from official business meetings. On July 25, 2001, Petitioner asked Chaplin to come to the DJJ in Miami-Dade because she had some questions about the Code. After they went through the facility and were in the parking lot, Petitioner began making allegations that gave Chaplin concern. She said that Long and Caron were trying to make her quit because they did not like her. She said she resented their making courtesy visits without her. She told him that Long and Caron were intentionally excluding her from meetings. Chaplin told her that she was misinterpreting their behavior and that he was sure there was a reasonable explanation for their attending meetings without Petitioner. She also told Chaplin that she had had a problem in the past working with other females. The following morning Chaplin directed Long and Caron to cancel their appointments and come to his office. He told them what Petitioner had said. They told him that the courtesy visits were not scheduled meetings but spur-of-the-moment visits when Long was in Miami-Dade. They were shocked at Petitioner's accusations because they had selected her for her position and had thought their relationships with Petitioner were good. Chaplin directed them to make Petitioner feel part of the team. That same day Petitioner sent Chaplin an e-mail that included a reminder that she was concerned about the matters she had discussed with him the previous day. On the following day, Chaplin received a call from Caron, who advised him that Peebles was quite upset and he should call her. When Chaplin called, Peebles sounded distraught and on the verge of tears. She told him that Petitioner had been in the office and was really mad at Chaplin, Long, and Caron. Peebles told him the negative things Petitioner had said about her co-workers and her supervisor. Peebles said she was somewhat afraid for her safety due to Petitioner's behavior. Chaplin told her to write a report, and she did. Based upon the description of the incident between Petitioner and Peebles, his own concerns from his meeting with Petitioner two days earlier, and Petitioner's failure to consistently submit accurate and timely vehicle logs and inspection reports, Chaplin made the decision to terminate Petitioner. He was concerned that Petitioner was creating a hostile atmosphere among her co-workers and with him. Chaplin contacted his supervisor and then sent a memo regarding Petitioner's behavior. A few days later he sent a follow-up memo detailing other concerns he had regarding Petitioner's job performance: inspection reports turned in late or not at all, vehicle logs with errors, and failure to follow standard office procedures. Petitioner's age and her sex were not considered when Chaplin made his decision. Chaplin's recommendation that Petitioner be terminated was processed and approved through his chain of command. Petitioner's employment by the Department was terminated August 23. Since she was terminated during her probationary period, she did not have any career service appeal rights. Petitioner was replaced by a 50-year-old male who was even more qualified for the position than was Petitioner. Only administrative assistants had access to the TMIC computer program. Although Petitioner wanted access, no fire protection specialists could access that program. Petitioner was told several times that she did not need to access TMIC and that no inspector had access. The "red book" contains information about the various facilities in a geographic area that are inspected. It is only a guide for inspectors to track when they last inspected a facility. It is not a necessary tool for an inspector to perform his or her job duties and only contains information also available in the office files. Petitioner was not discriminated against by not being given an updated red book until the end of July since the information in it exists elsewhere in the office. Petitioner believes that Chaplin discriminated against her because he did not like her, did not want to hire her, and provided her with a faulty vehicle. Prior to assigning the car to Petitioner, he drove that vehicle for a few days, had it cleaned, and had it serviced and inspected. He knew of no problems with that vehicle. When Petitioner later questioned the condition of the tires, he told her to get the car checked and bring him something in writing. He never received anything in writing from her regarding the condition of the tires.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Petitioner failed in her burden of proof and dismissing the petition filed in this cause. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINDA M. RIGOT Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Andrea Spainhour 400 North Main Avenue Clermont, Florida 34712 Mechele R. McBride, Esquire Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 23201 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 23201
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following facts are found: The Largo Fire Department is comprised of approximately 70 employees and maintain three stations, with a fourth station apparently in the planning stage. The chief administrative officer in full command of the entire Department is the fire chief, who is directly responsible to the City Manager. In descending order of command are two assistant chiefs, three fire captains and twelve fire lieutenants. There are also two fire inspectors, forty-six fire fighters, three or four dispatchers and one secretary. (Exhibit No. 6). Assistant Fire Chiefs - Second in the line of command are the two assistant fire chiefs. They work a standard forty-hour week, 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., five days a week. Their office is one half block away from the main fire station. If the chief is out of town or unavailable, one of the assistant chiefs assumes command. When the chief and both assistant chiefs are unavailable, either a captain or a lieutenant is designated to be in command. With regard to the personnel evaluations made by either captains or lieutenants, assistant chiefs normally accept the recommendations made by them. On occasion an assistant chief will attach an additional memo to a recommendation submitted by an inferior officer. Assistant chiefs have no authority to fire Department personnel or to prevent merit pay increases. Only the chief has these powers, subject to review by the City Manager. There was testimony that after an applicant goes through certain testing procedures with the City's personnel department, the chief and assistant chiefs make the ultimate decision as to who is hired. Assistant chiefs receive input from captains and lieutenants with regard to purchasing new equipment and personnel transfers. With regard to the budget, assistant chiefs may purchase items within the guidelines of the budget. They make recommendations respecting the formulation of the budget, but the chief makes the ultimate decision as to what will be submitted to the City for the budget. If everything is going well at a fire scene, assistant chiefs stand back and observe rather than assume control. Equipment placements and transfers are made by the assistant chiefs. With regard to collective bargaining, assistant chiefs would directly assisting administering the outcome of the negotiations. Fire Captains - Like fire fighters, captains work a 24-hour shift and then are off 48 hours. They wear the same work uniform as fire fighters, but their dress uniform includes a white, rather than a blue, shirt. The captains eat their meals with and sleep in the same quarters as fire fighters. Each captain is responsible for a third of the combat portion of the Fire and directs the operations of the officers and men on their particular shift. On the fire scene, captains are the working supervisor and perform the normal functions of search and rescue. Around the station, captains participate in the minimal domestic and maintenance duties and tasks as part of a team effort. In the event that both the chief and assistant chief are absent, a captain designated by the chief assumed the duties and responsibilities of an assistant chief. With regard to authority to transfer men, discipline men and make policy, there was testimony that such authority is solely in the form of making recommendations in those areas. A lower grade officer or fire fighter can also submit written reports or charges concerning disciplinary action. While the job description for captain's requires them to make thorough weekly inspections of each station, apparatus and personnel the chief has been personally making such inspections for the past several months. While captains are required to keep records of sick leave, the the administrative secretary actually handles all leave records. Captains do have the authority to visit persons on sick leave if there is reason to believe a sick leave is not legitimate. The job description requires captains to forward to headquarters every six months a written personnel evaluation report on all personnel under their command. This is done by a standardized form sent to the captains by City's personnel department. Captains also have the authority to give mutual aid assistance when requested by a neighboring unit by sending men and equipment. While captains have the authority to make changes within their subordinates' command, in emergency situations, most changes in command come out in the form of memos from the administrative chief. In the captain's absence, his duties are assumed by a lieutenant. If a lieutenant is not present the lieutenant's duties are assumed by what is known as a lead fire fighter - a senior fire fighter by virtue of tenure and training. Captains do not formulate policies applicable to the Fire Department nor do they prepare of administer the budget. They can make recommendations with regard to the budget, as can lieutenants and other officers. They cannot buy equipment, nor can they move equipment between stations without written permission. Changes in the organizational structure are not discussed with captains. Any type of procedural recommendation which is made is discussed among the three captains and is then presented to the assistant chiefs and chief for final action. It was opined by Captain Lambert that captains would have no duties or responsibilities to management with respect to collective bargaining and that, as a member of a union, there would be no conflict of interest between the performance of their duties and the possibility of grievances filed within the union. It was Captain Lambert's opinion that policy' decisions were implemented, rather than formulated, by him. Fire Lieutenants - There is one lieutenant assigned to work each of three shifts at each of the stations. Lieutenants report to and perform under the general direction of the captain, also known as the shift commander, who reviews the decisions of the lieutenants. In addition to the job description contained in Exhibit No. 6, there was testimony that lieutenants and fire fighters work on the same time schedule, sleep in the same quarters, eat at the same table, prepare meals jointly and perform fire fighting duties jointly. Lieutenants are in charge at the scene of a fire until a senior officer arrives. There was testimony that although lieutenants participate in the normal evaluation procedure which is used as a basis for merit pay increases and they supervise the duties of the men in the station to which they are assigned, their basic duties are fighting fires. Lieutenants do not have anything to do with preparing or administering the budget nor would they work in the City's behalf with regard to collective bargaining negotiations. They have no authority in actually formulating the policy of the Largo Fire Department. If a fire fighter wants to change his schedule or get time off, he would submit a request to a lieutenant or a captain, depending on who was on duty that day. If both were on duty, he would go to a lieutenant. Fire Inspectors - With respect to inspectors, the petitioner simply submitted the job classification contained in Exhibit No. 6 and suggested that none of the tasks enumerated therein meet the statutory criteria of management employees of F.S. Ch. 447. As noted above, it was the City's position that inspectors do not share a community of interest with line personnel that are responsible for fire suppression in that they do not work the same shift and their duties are primarily fire code enforcement rather than fire combat. Dispatchers - The primary duties of dispatchers are to receive and dispatch fire and emergency calls. They dispatch calls solely for the fire department and do not dispatch for the police department or any other city agency. Another of their duties is to maintain files on equipment usage. Dispatchers work eight-hour shifts and eat with the fire fighters when a meal is served during their eight-hour shift. Their uniform is the same as the fire fighters. When a dispatcher is absent from work, a fire fighter fills in for him; although a dispatcher would never fill in for a fire fighter. Dispatchers have nothing to do with formulating policies of the department nor with preparing or administering the budget. They would not assist management in collective bargaining negotiations. Dispatchers are immediately responsible to the lieutenant, then the captain and on up the line of command. One of the four dispatchers of the Largo Fire Department is presently a member of and is represented by the Largo Employees Association, which presently has a collective bargaining agreement with the City. (Exhibit No. 5) This agreement includes public safety dispatchers in the unit. At the time of the hearing the LEA had not yet been certified by PERC. The one dispatcher who testified would prefer to be represented by petitioner, rather than the LEA. Fire Fighters and Chief - As noted above in the introduction, the parties stipulated that fire fighters were properly included in the proposed unit and that the chief is properly excluded from the unit. Recognition history - In the first letter from petitioner's president to the City Manager, recognition was requested for a unit consisting of captains, lieutenants and fire fighters. After the petitioner first spoke to representatives of the City regarding the bargaining unit, the staff assistant to the City Manager first recommended to the Manager that a unit consisting of fire fighters and lieutenants be approved. The City Commission questioned the inclusion of lieutenants. At that point, communications apparently broke down and unfair labor practice charges were filed by both the petitioner and the City. Their charges were subsequently dismissed. After that the petitioner filed its petition for Certification of Representation requesting inclusion of assistant chiefs, captains, inspectors and dispatchers, in addition to lieutenants and fire fighters, since the issue would then be before PERC and PERC could then rule on everybody once and for all. Although petitioner's constitution and by-laws speaks of a unit consisting of the ranks of captain, lieutenant and fire fighter, the same is in the process of being amended. In accordance with F.S. Section 447.307(3)(a) and F.A.C. Rule 8H-3.23, no recommendations are submitted. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: G.R. McClelland, Esquire City Attorney City Hall Largo, Florida 33540 Mr. Robert Jewell City Hall Largo, Florida 33540 Terry A. Furnell 501 South Fort Harrison Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mr. Barry Burkhart 2320 East Bay Drive, No. 135 Clearwater, Florida 33516 Mrs. Lawrence C. Black 152 8th Avenue Southwest Largo, Florida 33540
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 69A- 62.001, 69A-62.003, 69A-62.006, and 69A-62.007, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined in Sections 120.52(8)(d), 120.52(8)(e), and 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is and, at all times material to this case, was a volunteer firefighter. The size of the volunteer firefighter population is dependent on the ability of volunteer fire departments to attract and keep volunteers. People are willing to volunteer as firefighters if the experience is rewarding, training is not excessive, and conflict is minimized. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the subject rules do not detract from the volunteer experience, impose excessive training, or create between conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Petitioner testified that a reduction in volunteer population will result in increased hazards to volunteers and a reduction in the delivery of services to citizens. This testimony is not persuasive for two reasons. First, there is no persuasive testimony that the subject rules will result in a reduction of the number of volunteer firefighters. Second, the most persuasive evidence indicates that the subject rules will reduce hazards to volunteers without impairing the delivery of services to Floridians. Some labor unions that represent career firefighters discourage their members from volunteering their services with volunteer fire departments. The competition between the unions and the volunteer fire departments is commonly referred to as the "turf-war." There is no persuasive evidence that the subject rules contribute to the tension between the two groups of firefighters. The firefighter labor unions are usually very active in the political arena. It is undisputed that the unions support legislation that benefits their members. However, the subject rules were not promulgated to eliminate or place hardships on volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters. The safety needs and concerns of firefighters have evolved over time. Technology has improved firefighting equipment to such an extent that the greatest threat to firefighters is from heart attacks and transportation accidents. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject rules focus on safety enhancement at the scene of a fire instead of firefighter health and transportation safety does not render them invalid. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003 provides as follows in pertinent part: (3) With respect to 29 C.F.R. Section 1910.134(g)(4), the two individuals located outside the immediately dangerous to life and health atmosphere may be assigned to an additional role, such as incident commander, pumper operator, engineer, or driver, so long as such individual is able to immediately perform assistance or rescue activities without jeopardizing the safety or health of any firefighter working at an incident. (a)1. Except as provided in subparagraphs 2., 3., and 4., no firefighter or any other person under the authority of the firefighter employer at the scene of a fire is permitted to participate in any operation involving two-in, two-out as one of the two or more persons inside the IDLH atmosphere or as one of the two or more persons outside of the IDLH atmosphere unless such firefighter or other person at the scene of a fire is certified in this state by the division as a Firefighter I or a Firefighter II, as established in subsections (1) and (2) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. Such training shall consist of the training described in subsection (6) of Rule 69A-37.055, F.A.C. This requirement specifically applies to volunteer fire departments and volunteer firefighters but is also applicable to any other person working under the authority of the Firefighter Employer at the scene of a fire. 2.a. A volunteer firefighter who possesses the State Basic Volunteer certificate previously issued by the division is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1. The training encompassed in the basic volunteer certificate in itself may not meet “trained commensurate to duty” as defined depending upon duties or tasks assigned or undertaken in the exclusionary zone. A volunteer firefighter who provides evidence of having completed curriculum equivalent to the Florida Firefighter I course of study as provided in subsection 69A-37.055(6), F.A.C., prior to January 1, 2004, is exempt from the Firefighter I and Firefighter II requirement in subparagraph 1., if The fire chief or other chief administrative officer of the fire department of which the firefighter is a member files with the State Fire Marshal form DFS-K4-1594, “Firefighter I Training Exemption Application,” which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, and The said form is accepted by the State Fire Marshal after confirmation of the evidence provided. Form DFS-K4-1594 may be obtained by writing the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Any volunteer exempted by sub- subparagraph a.or b. is permitted to take the Florida Firefighter I examination until December 31, 2005, upon the completion and filing with the division of form DFS-K4- 1380, “Firefighter I Training Record,” Rev. 03/00, adopted in Rule 69A-37.039, F.A.C., by a Florida certified instructor that verifies equivalent training and demonstration of competency. The above-referenced rule sets forth ways that a firefighter, trained prior to the current regulations, may keep his or her interior-firefighter status without becoming certified as a Firefighter I or Firefighter II. The rule will not disqualify all previously qualified firefighters as long as they are "trained commensurate to duty" for any type of work they are requested to perform. There is no persuasive evidence that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a) will cause a reduction in the number of volunteer firefighters due to newly created administrative hurtles. The rule, which has its basis in safety enhancement, clearly is not arbitrary or damaging to the safety of volunteers. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)(a)4. states as follows: 4. Volunteer firefighters having NWCG S- 130, S-190, and Standards for Survival certification by the Florida Division of Forestry are permitted to participate in wild land fire suppression without the Firefighter I certification. The above-referenced rule allows a volunteer to fight wild-land fires without earning Firefighter I certification. The rule sets forth an exception to the Firefighter I certification requirement; it does not mandate that the NWCG courses are the exclusive means to qualify as a wild-land firefighter. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.003(3)4. is not invalid or arbitrary because it requires volunteers to pass training courses that are accepted as setting national standards or because the training courses teach firefighting techniques that are applicable across the nation as well as Florida. Petitioner presented no persuasive evidence to the contrary. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006 states as follows: 69A-62.006 Requirements for Recognition as a Fire Department. To be recognized as an organized fire department by the division, compliance with the following must be documented: Capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day, seven days a week; Responsibility for response in an area capable of being depicted on a map; and Staffing with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters who are employed full-time or part-time or serve as volunteers and who shall have successfully completed an approved basic firefighting course recognized by the Bureau of Fire Standards and Training. (2)(a) A fire department shall meet the requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 Protection, the 2003 edition, the Fire Suppression Rating Schedule, effective February, 2003, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference and which may be obtained from Insurance Services Office (ISO), 545 Washington Blvd., Jersey City, NJ 07310-1686 or at www.iso.com. If the fire department does not meet the requirements of this section, the fire department shall submit a plan of compliance which provides for meeting these requirements within 90 days of the date of submission of the plan. ISO measures the major elements of a community’s fire-suppression system and develops a numerical grade ranging from 1 to 10. Class 1 represents the best public protection rating and Class 10 indicates no recognized protection. The requirements for ISO 9 may be obtained at the ISO website located at www.iso.com, or it may be obtained by writing to the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(a) is not invalid because it requires fire departments to document their capability of providing fire protection 24 hours a day/seven days a week. The requirement for full-time availability will provide significant safety enhancement for the communities being served. This is true because some voluntary fire departments in rural communities historically have provided only part-time service. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring full- time fire protection will result in the following: (a) the creation of a fire-suppression performance standard that is unauthorized by law; (b) the closing of some volunteer fire departments; (c) a reduction in services to the public; and (d) uncorrectable rule-violations; an increase in conflict between professional and volunteer firefighters. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(1)(c) requires that each fire department be staffed with a sufficient number of qualified firefighters. The rule is not vague because it uses the word "sufficient" to determine the number of firefighters that are required. One must read the applicable rules in their entirety and consider the needs of each community to determine adequate staffing. There is no persuasive evidence that the staffing requirement fails to establish adequate standards for determining compliance. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.006(2) requires fire departments to meet certain requirements of the Insurance Services Office (ISO) for Class 9 protection. This requirement determines the minimum equipment that is necessary to safely fight a structure fire. There is no persuasive evidence that requiring a fire department to provide Class 9 protection will make it impossible to start a new voluntary fire department. The rule clearly is not arbitrary in setting this minimum standard. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(1) states as follows in pertinent part: 69A-62.007 Minimum Requirements for Class 9 Protection. To be considered for Class 9 protection, the following minimum facilities must be available: Organization: The fire department shall be organized on a permanent basis under applicable state or local laws. The organization shall include one person responsible for operation of the department, usually with the title of chief. The fire department must serve an area with definite boundaries. If a municipality is not served by a fire department solely operated by or for the governing body of that city, the fire department providing such service shall do so under a contract or resolution. When a fire department’s service area involves one or more jurisdictions, a contract shall be executed with each jurisdiction served. Membership: The department shall have a sufficient number of firefighters/members to assure the response of at least 4 firefighters/members that can assemble at the scene of a fire as contemplated by subsection (1) of Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., to be compliant with Rule 69A-62.003, F.A.C., the two-in, two-out rule. The fire chief may be one of the 4 responding firefighters/members. The above-referenced rule does require fire departments to have four "interior-qualified" firefighters at the scene of a structure fire. The requirement is necessary to comply with the longstanding "two-in, two-out" rule. However, the rule does not preclude a fire department from relying on mutual-aid from other fire departments in order to comply with the rule. The rule clearly is not vague. Florida Administrative Code Rule 69A-62.007(4)(a) states as follows in relevant part: (4)(a) The chief of any fire department that includes volunteer firefighters shall annually submit a Roster of Volunteer Firefighters to the State Fire Marshal utilizing form DFS-K4-1581, effective 05/04, which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference, no later than June 30 of each year. Form DFS-K4-1581 may be obtained by contacting the Division of State Fire Marshal, Bureau of Fire Standards and Training, 11655 Northwest Gainesville Road, Ocala, Florida 34482-1486 or at the division’s website located at http://www.fldfs.com/SFM/. The roster shall include: The fire department name, The fire department identification number (FDID), The complete fire department address, The fire department contact person, telephone number and the fire department fax number, if any, The certification level for each firefighter reported and, if any equivalency exemption has been issued, the number of persons for whom such exemption has been issued, and The firefighter certification number, the issue date of the certification, the status of the certification, i.e., volunteer or career, and the status of each firefighter who has been issued an equivalency exemption, i.e., volunteer or career, if any. The above-referenced rule requires the chief of a fire department to submit an annual roster of volunteer firefighters. Petitioner objects to the rule because some career firefighters volunteer their off-duty hours with the local volunteer fire department. Career firefighters who also perform volunteer work may do so contrary to their union rules. Publication of the roster might keep some professional firefighters from volunteering their services. Nevertheless, there is no persuasive evidence that losing some speculative number of career/volunteer firefighters will undermine the safety of firefighters or the public. The information that the roster contains is a public record. The information is necessary so that Respondent can perform statutorily-mandated studies involving injuries to firefighters. The rule clearly is not arbitrary.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the bachelor's degree curriculum by which the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, earned his degree "includes a major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects," as set out in Section 633.382(2)(a)2., Fla. Stat. (1991), so as to entitle him to the firefighter supplemental compensation for which he has applied.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner has a bachelor's degree in Communication Arts awarded by Judson College in Illinois on or about June 11, 1978. Judson College is accredited. The Petitioner's official sealed transcript from Judson College reveals that the Petitioner took no "fire-related" courses to get his degree. He did take courses in language arts and communication arts, such as: "English Language: Uses and Resources"; "Oral Interpretation and Mass Media"; "Language and Society"; "Man and Women"; "Analysis of Literature"; and "Mass Media in Contemporary America." Courses such as these are certainly compatible with and useful for work in the field of firefighting. But they, along with his other general study courses, do not reflect a "major study concentration area readily identifiable and applicable to fire-related subjects."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Florida Insurance Commissioner, in his capacity as State Fire Marshal, and agency head of the Department of Insurance and Treasurer, Division of State Fire Marshal, enter a final order denying the application of the Petitioner, James E. Dalrymple, for firefighters supplemental compensation. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of June, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of June, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-2150 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the following rulings are made on the Department of Insurance and Treasurer's proposed findings of fact: 1.-5. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 6.-7. Accepted and incorporated. 8. Accepted but conclusion of law. 9.-12. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Dalrymple 2816 Weston Terrace Palm Harbor, Florida 34685 Elizabeth J. Gregovits, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Office of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
