The Issue The issue is whether Charles C. Burlingame's request to purchase and upgrade prior regular service with the City of Panama City under the Senior Management Service Class should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this retirement dispute, Petitioner, Charles C. Burlingame (Burlingame), seeks to have certain prior service with Petitioner, City of Panama City (City), upgraded under the Senior Management Service Class (SMSC) so that his retirement benefits will vest at an earlier date. Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement (Division), has denied the request on the ground that "the duties of [Burlingame's former] position were different from the duties of [his] current position," and that under these circumstances, Section 121.055(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1997), required that the request be denied. Burlingame was first hired by the City on February 14, 1994, as Human Resources Director/Safety. As such, he was one of approximately 16 City department directors. At that time, Burlingame was enrolled in the "regular" class of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). In 1998, the Legislature authorized local governments (as well as state agencies) who employed at least 200 individuals to designate an additional employee under the SMSC. Because the City employed that number of individuals, it was allowed to designate another employee for SMSC. Burlingame was selected as the employee, and he was promoted to a new position with the title Assistant City Manager/Human Resources/Safety Director. At the same time, his old position was abolished. In conjunction with his promotion, Burlingame prepared a job description for his new position. The old and new duties are described in the documents attached to Respondent's Exhibit 2. They reflect, at least on paper, that the functions and illustrative duties of the two positions are not identical. For example, in his new position, Burlingame is now in charge when the City Manager is absent from the City. He also assists the City Manager "in directing the overall operations of the City," as well as performing his former duties. According to Burlingame, however, these new duties account for no more than five percent of his total duties. The remainder coincide with the duties performed under his old position. Under the terms of the City's retirement system, the retirement benefits for a SMSC employee vest after 7 years of service, while a regular employee does not vest until after 10 years of service. Therefore, Burlingame wished to upgrade his prior service between February 14, 1994, and September 29, 1998, when he was changed to SMSC, since this would allow him to vest in fewer years. It would also allow him to accumulate more retirement points (2 per year) under the FRS for each year of service than he would have earned as a regular employee (1.6 per year). When Burlingame was approved for membership in the SMSC in October 1998, the City began processing an application with the Division on his behalf for the purpose of determining the "cost to upgrade past service to [SMSC] to 2-14-94." Because of a large backlog of work caused by Deferred Retirement Option Program applications, the Division was unable to act on Burlingame's request until the early fall of 1999. After the City made several inquiries concerning its pending request, a Division Benefits Administrator, David W. Ragsdale, wrote the City on September 15, 1999, and advised that "[s]ince the position Mr. Burlingame filled as Human Resources/Safety Director had different duties than the Assistant Manager/Human Resources/Safety Director, he is ineligible to upgrade because the position of Human Resources/Safety Director no longer exists." This was followed by another letter on November 4, 1999, which reconfirmed the earlier finding and offered Petitioners a point of entry to contest the proposed action. Petitioners then initiated this proceeding. There is no rule or statute which provides that if the job duties of a position upgraded from regular to SMSC do not remain the same, prior regular service cannot be upgraded. However, since the inception of the SMSC in 1987, the Division has consistently ascribed that meaning to the words "within the purview of the [SMSC]" in Section 121.055(1)(i), Florida Statutes (1997), and Rule 60S-2.013(2), Florida Administrative Code. Thus, if the new duties are "not within the purview" of the past regular service class, that is, they are different in any respect, the employee cannot purchase and upgrade the prior service. This interpretation of the statute and rule was not shown to be clearly erroneous or outside the range of possible interpretations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement, enter a final order denying Petitioners' request for an upgrade of Charles C. Burlingame's service under the Senior Management Service Class. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2000. A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Emily Moore, Chief Legal Counsel Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Cecilia Redding Boyd Bryant & Higby, Chartered Post Office Box 860 Panama City, Florida 32402-0860 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center, Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Thomas D. McGurk, Secretary Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's statements as set forth in a letter dated April 30, 2001, are rules as defined in Section 120.52(15), Florida Statutes, which have not been promulgated as required by Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida. At all times relevant here, the Florida Capitol Police was a division within Respondent's Facilities Program. The Florida Capitol Police is an accredited law enforcement agency. Its purpose is to provide building security and other law enforcement services. The State of Florida employs individuals in one of four distinct, statutorily defined services: Senior Management Service, Selected Exempt Service, Career Service, or Other Personal Services. At all times relevant here, the Director of Florida Capitol Police was an employment position that was classified within the Senior Management Service. Petitioner is a sworn law enforcement officer. On February 24, 1998, Respondent offered Petitioner an appointment to the position of Director of Florida Capitol Police. At that time, Petitioner understood that the appointment was to a position classified within the Senior Management Service. To the extent possible, Petitioner negotiated the terms of his employment. However, he understood that his position as Director of Florida Capitol Police included all of the benefits and all of the terms of employment of a position established within the Senior Management Service. He knew that he would serve at the pleasure of Respondent's Secretary, as the agency head, if he accepted the job. On February 25, 1998, Petitioner accepted the appointment to Director of Florida Capitol Police. He executed a document acknowledging that he was relinquishing his career service rights. From that time forward, Petitioner was compensated and evaluated as a Senior Management Service employee. He enjoyed all the benefits of his new position. Petitioner was the highest-ranking sworn law enforcement officer in the Florida Capitol Police, holding the "rank" of colonel. He did not report to any higher sworn law enforcement officer. As Director of Florida Capitol Police, Petitioner was responsible for leading and directing the operation of a statewide law enforcement organization, including the administration and oversight of a $6.2 million-dollar budget. Part of Petitioner's duties required him to maintain appropriate relationships with the Sheriff of Leon County and the Chief of the Tallahassee Police Department for support in joint operations when necessary. Petitioner was a member of the Florida Police Chiefs' Association, the State Law Enforcement Chiefs' Association, and the National Police Chiefs' Association. In 1999, a former employee of the Florida Capitol Police commenced a legal action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against Respondent. The former employee alleged sex discrimination and sexual harassment by the Florida Capitol Police, specifically by Petitioner. A trial was conducted in the lawsuit, Goldwich v. Department of Management Services, USDC ND Fla., Case No. 99-CV-512 (1999) in early February 2001. Petitioner testified as a defense witness at the trial. Several other Florida Capitol Police officers were interviewed as potential witnesses or called to testify at the trial. Respondent prevailed in the district court action. On February 2, 2001, Respondent's Secretary transferred the internal affairs investigation function of the Florida Capitol Police from the Florida Capitol Police to Respondent's Office of Inspector General. Thereafter, the Chief Investigator, Captain Joe Wallace, worked out of the Inspector General's office. On February 15, 2001, Petitioner and Respondent's Inspector General entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the "credentialing" of Chief Investigator Wallace. The purpose of the memorandum was to formulate and establish a commitment between the Office of the Inspector General and the Florida Capitol Police to support the training and educational requirements for sworn law enforcement personnel assigned to each entity. On March 2, 2001, Respondent's Office of the Inspector General received an internal complaint from Sergeant Edwin Maxwell, a subordinate officer of the Florida Capitol Police. Said complaint alleged that Petitioner had retaliated against Sergeant Maxwell for testifying at the Goldwich trial. Sergeant Maxwell's allegations also implicated Petitioner's subordinate, Major Robert G. Tippett, as having participated in the alleged retaliation. On or about March 7, 2001, Respondent's Inspector General instructed Petitioner to report to the Florida Capitol Building, specifically to the offices of the Governor's Chief Inspector General. Respondent's Inspector General, Chief Investigator Wallace, and an Assistant Florida Inspector General from the Governor's Office of Inspector General were present when Petitioner arrived at the Capitol. At that time, Petitioner was presented with a memorandum advising that he was the subject of a formal investigation. The March 7, 2001, memorandum stated that Respondent's Inspector General initiated the investigation pursuant to a complaint. According to the memorandum, the principal allegation that formed the basis of the investigation was that Petitioner had engaged in one or more of the following: retaliation, conduct unbecoming, and/or violation of law. Sergeant Maxwell's complaint and a copy of Section 112.532, Florida Statutes, was attached to the memorandum. During the March 7, 2001, meeting at the Capitol, Respondent's Inspector General advised Petitioner that he had a right to representation by counsel. After a brief discussion, Petitioner elected to seek private counsel. Later on March 7, 2001, Petitioner and his attorney returned to the Governor's suite at the Capitol. Upon their arrival, Petitioner was advised again of his rights under the law enforcement officers' and correctional officers' rights, which are codified at Section 112.532, Florida Statutes. Respondent's Inspector General and Chief Investigator Wallace then proceeded to interview Petitioner. Respondent's Inspector General inquired into the complaint against Major Tippett, performed an investigation, and issued an Executive Summary of the investigation dated March 22, 2001. This report concluded that Major Tippett's alleged violations related to conduct unbecoming, retaliation, and violation of law were unfounded. Respondent's Inspector General inquired into the complaint against Petitioner, performed an investigation, and prepared a draft report of the investigation. After consulting with the Chief Inspector General in the Office of the Governor, Respondent's Inspector General issued an Executive Summary of the investigation dated March 26, 2001. This report concluded that Petitioner had engaged in conduct unbecoming. The report also concluded that other alleged violations by Petitioner, including retaliation and violation of law, were unfounded. According to the March 26, 2001, Executive Summary, Respondent's Inspector General recommended that Petitioner be removed from his position as Director of Florida Capitol Police. The report states as follows in relevant part: This recommendation is made after carefully considering the following factors and informed by the fact that the Director serves entirely at the discretion of the secretary: The previous OIG report related to Capitol Police and the issues raised therein. (See attached) The finding of the jury in the US District Court case, filed by Officer Lisa Goldwich, that her working conditions were made so intolerable, by the defendant, that she was forced to resign. (See attached) The finding of "conduct unbecoming an employee/officer" contained in the report above. The likelihood that future retaliation will be attempted against those individuals who participated in the Goldwich trial and against those who testified in the OIG investigation reported above. The ongoing morale problem within the Florida Capitol Police. Subsequently, Respondent's Inspector General prepared a Memorandum of Investigation dated April 2, 2001. This memorandum states again that allegations against Petitioner relative to retaliation and violation of law were unfounded but that allegations relative to conduct unbecoming were founded. The April 2, 2001, memorandum cites Respondent's Policies and Procedures Manual, Section 3.27, Discipline of Career Service Employees, as it relates to conduct unbecoming a public employee. It also cites to Section 110.403(1)(a), Florida Statutes, for the proposition that Respondent's Secretary had discretion to discipline Senior Management Service employees. On or about April 3, 2001, Petitioner and Major Tippett filed a civil suit in the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida, Case No. 01-821. This suit included an Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunctive and Declaratory Relief. It alleged violations of Sections 112.532, 112.533, and 112.534, Florida Statutes. Petitioner subsequently voluntarily dismissed this civil action. On or about April 3, 2001, the General Counsel in the Office of the Governor, requested the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) to review and complete Respondent's internal investigation. Thereafter, FDLE's Inspector General performed an investigation into the complaint against Petitioner and Major Tippett. FDLE's Inspector General eventually prepared an undated report of its review and investigation. The FDLE report states as follows in relevant part: As mentioned previously, the OIG report concludes that the alleged violations against Major Tippett were all unfounded. The alleged violations against Colonel Meek for (1) Retaliation and (2) Violation of Law were unfounded. The violation against Colonel Meek for Conduct Unbecoming was founded. Conduct Unbecoming a public employee is a violation of DMS Policy, Section 3.27(C)(2)(e). There is no definition of "Conduct Unbecoming" in DMS' policies or administrative rules. Based upon the interview of the subordinate supervisors regarding the statements made by Colonel Meek, the conclusions rendered by OIG are reasonable. Near the completion of the OIG investigation, IG Varnado prepared a draft report and discussed it with the Chief Inspector General, Marcia Cooke. The draft report did not contain any recommendation regarding a recommended action for the founded violation of Conduct Unbecoming. CIG Cooke instructed IG Varnado to include such a recommendation. IG Varnado recommended that Colonel Meek be removed from his position and discussed the recommendation with Secretary Cynthia Henderson. This RECOMMENDATION was included in the INVESTIGATIVE REPORT dated April 2, 2001. The RECOMMENDATION contained five cited reasons to support Colonel Meek's removal. The OIG investigative report does not specifically support reasons (1), (4), and (5). However, based upon the below recommendation, further discussion of these items is rendered moot. Generally, an investigation regarding possible administrative misconduct is handled independently from the determination to impose action following a sustained finding of a violation. IG Varnado acknowledged that he does not routinely recommend action following an administrative violation. However, according to IG Varnado, the rank of the person involved led him to seek assistance from the Chief Inspector General's Office. It is recommended that the RECOMMENDATION regarding the proposed administrative action be removed from the investigative report. The determination of any action resulting from the OIG investigation should be left solely to the discretion of the Secretary for the Department of Management Services. The FDLE report also addresses Respondent's violations of Sections 112.532(1)(b), 112.532(1)(g), and 112.533, Florida Statutes, which were the subject of the civil suit filed by Petitioner and Major Tippett. The report concludes that these statutory provisions were applicable to Major Tippet but that the question whether they were applicable to Petitioner, as the head of the Florida Capitol Police, was also the subject of the civil suit. By letter dated April 30, 2001, Respondent's Secretary advised Petitioner that the investigation of Sergeant Maxwell's complaint was complete. The letter states as follows in relevant part: [B]ased on the investigation conducted by the DMS Inspector General, as reviewed and completed by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement Inspector General, it has been determined that allegations against you relating to retaliation and violation of law are unfounded, and that allegations against you relating to conduct unbecoming a public employee are founded. Attached hereto for your reference is a copy of the pertinent report of the FDLE Inspector General's Office. As set forth in the attached report (page three), the basis for the conclusions that you are guilty of conduct unbecoming a public employee is that you made statements in the days or weeks following the trial of the civil suit filed by former officer Lisa Goldwich to subordinate officers regarding the removal of duties involving Sgt. Maxwell--who testified for the plaintiff at the trial--and possible adverse action for him and others who testified. Because of this conduct unbecoming a public employee, you are hereby suspended without pay for a period of fourteen (14) days, after which you will return to your post. You are also hereby required to participate in supervisor training with (sic) ninety (90) days. Respondent's agency head, in the exercise of her discretion, made the ultimate decision to suspend Petitioner. In taking the disciplinary action, the agency head did not reference or assert any reliance on career service rules to support Petitioner's discipline. The April 30, 2001, letter was not disseminated to other agencies or to other Senior Management Service employees. The agency head's April 30, 2001, letter was an action taken exclusively regarding Petitioner. It did not affect or impact any other agency, employee, or class of employee. The administration of personnel matters regarding Respondent's Senior Management Service employees did not change following Petitioner's April 30, 2001, discipline. Respondent has not promulgated rules regarding the discipline, suspension, or termination of Senior Management Service employees because such rules are not required. Petitioner resigned his appointment as Director of Florida Capitol Police on July 31, 2001. He is no longer employed by the State of Florida.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner’s position was properly reclassified by Respondent under the Service First Initiative from Career Service to Select Exempt Service.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Blow-Beasley was employed with DCFS, formerly known as Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, hereinafter HRS, in Broward County, Florida from February 1, 1988 to June 7, 2002. From August 3, 2000 to July 2001, as part of her employment with DCFS, Ms. Blow-Beasley worked for Economic Services. On September 29, 2000, Ms. Blow-Beasley was hired as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor by DCFS, which was a Career Service position. From September 29, 2000 to July 2001, a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor was a supervisory position with HRS and/or DCFS. From September 29, 2000 to July 1, 2001, in her role as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley supervised two or more employees. As part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed and approved employee time (work time, sick leave, annual leave, vacation, etc.) of employees under her supervision. Also, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed the work and performance of employees under her supervision. Additionally, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision met certain DCFS’ performance standards and measures. Further, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision complied with certain state and federal laws. Furthermore, as part of her duties as a Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor, Ms. Blow-Beasley conducted, approved and/or executed performance evaluations for those persons whom she supervised. By letter dated June 15, 2001, Ms. Blow-Beasley was notified by DCFS that her position in Career Service was being “transferred” to SES, effective July 1, 2001. Her position in Career Service was reclassified as a SES position. Ms. Blow-Beasley informed her supervisor that she did not want to remain in SES and would accept a demotion to be in Career Service. Her request was not granted. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, as part of her employment with DCFS, Ms. Blow-Beasley worked for the Economic Self-Sufficiency, hereinafter ESS, Program. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, Ms. Blow-Beasley’s position title was, and she was employed as, ESS Supervisor Specialist. From July 2001 to June 7, 2002, an ESS Supervisor Specialist was a supervisory position with DCFS. As part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed and approved employee time (work time, sick leave, annual leave, vacation, etc.) of employees under her supervision. Also, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley reviewed the work and performance of employees under her supervision. Additionally, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision met certain DCFS’ performance standards and measures. Further, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley was responsible for ensuring that employees under her supervision complied with certain state and federal laws. Furthermore, as part of her duties as an ESS Supervisor Specialist, Ms. Blow-Beasley conducted, approved and/or executed performance evaluations for those persons whom she supervised. Ms. Blow-Beasley does not dispute that, from September 29, 2000 to June 7, 2002, she was a supervisor and had been in both Career Service and SES as a supervisor. Ms. Blow-Beasley does not dispute that, when her position was reclassified from Career Service to SES, her duties and responsibilities did not change, but remained the same. No direct evidence was presented to demonstrate that Ms. Blow-Beasley had the authority to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees. However, an inference is drawn and a finding of fact is made that, based on her duties, she had the authority to effectively recommend the action to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline subordinate employees. Approximately one year after the reclassification, on June 7, 2002, Ms. Blow-Beasley was dismissed from employment with DCFS. On the said date, she signed a letter acknowledging receipt of the notice of dismissal from DCFS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a final order finding that Ms. Sherry A. Blow-Beasley’s Career Service position was properly reclassified as a Select Exempt Service position. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondent should receive back-pay for the period of time he was suspended without pay by the School Board of Highlands County, Florida (Board) under the facts and circumstances of this case.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to these proceedings, the Respondent was employed by the Board as a guidance counselor at Sebring High School, Sebring, Highlands County, Florida. Sometime around November 1989, N.S., a student in the Respondent's peer counseling class at Sebring High School notified Rebecca Clark (Clark), Assistant Principal, Sebring High School, that Respondent had engaged in inappropriate behavior with her and other students in the class. Thereafter, in early January 1991, J.N.A., another student in Respondent's peer counseling class, met with Clark to confirm N.S.'s allegations. As a result of the allegations by N.S. and J.N.A., Clark notified Jim Bible, (Bible) Principal, Sebring High School, of the nature of the allegations. Bible contacted John Martin, (Martin) Associate Superintendent for Administration by phone concerning the necessity of discussing the allegations, and both Bible and Clark met with Martin. Bible was instructed by Martin to interview the Respondent about the allegations, and on January 5, 1990 a conference was held which included Bible, Clark and the Respondent wherein the Respondent was confronted with the allegations. With the Respondent's approval, the conference was electronically recorded by a tape recorder. The tape was transcribed, and the transcript received into evidence as Petitioner's exhibit 5. During the conference, the Respondent talked candidly about the allegations, and although he did not deny specific allegations such as, kissing a female student on the lips or whispering to students about being pretty, or sexy or that he or some one loved them, he did not recall any specific incident where he kissed a female student on the lips or just breathed heavily into their ears or licked their ears or kissed them on the ear. Additionally, he did not recall any student pulling away from him or telling him to stop. In fact, it was Respondent's recollection that most of the contact was initiated by the students, and he had had no indication from the students that they were uncomfortable with his mannerisms or behavior. Following the January 5, 1990 conference, Martin was furnished a copy of the tape which he and the Superintendent reviewed. Following this review, the Superintendent asked Martin to talk with the Respondent. During this conference with Martin, Respondent assured Martin that there was nothing beyond what had already transpired, and Martin assured Respondent that if there wasn't then there would probably be only a letter of reprimand, but that PPS and HRS would have to be notified. Following Martin's conference with the Respondent, the Superintendent issued a letter of reprimand to the Respondent. This letter of reprimand was dated January 8, 1990 and advised the Respondent that: (a) his behavior in regards to the allegations was "totally inappropriate and unacceptable" and "enough to indicate a possible violation of Section 6B-1.06(sic), Principles of Professional Conduct for the Education Profession in Florida"; (b) he was to "consider this an official reprimand which will be placed in your personnel file upon completion of the investigation"; (c) "any future or similar behavior may result in action to terminate your teaching contract with the Highlands County School Board"; and (d) "the matter must be reported to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and the Professional Practices Services of the Florida Teachers Profession". There was no evidence that Respondent repeated the conduct discussed in the January 5, 1990 conference, or the conduct referred to by the Superintendent in her letter of reprimand on January 8, 1990, or the conduct discussed with Bible in the informal conference referenced in Finding of Fact 29. The Superintendent reported the matter to HRS and PPS, and although Martin was kept abreast of the pending investigations by HRS and PPS, neither the Board nor the Superintendent made any further investigation of the Respondent's conduct which formed the basis for the Superintendent's action set out in her letter of reprimand of January 8, 1990, before the Board's suspension of the Respondent without pay on February 13, 1990. In early February 1990, HRS informed Martin that "a confirmed finding of sexual abuse had been reached by the HRS". On February 5, 1990, solely as a result of the disclosure by HRS that sexual abuse had been "confirmed", the Superintendent suspended the Respondent with pay and recommended to the Board that the Respondent be suspended without pay. In apparent disregard of the confidentiality provided for such records in Section 415.51, Florida Statutes, a copy of the complete entire HRS files in this matter was given to Martin who in turn had the files reproduced, and provided a copy to each Board member and the Board attorney before the Board's February 13, 1990 meeting. No written or other notification was provided to the Respondent that the contents of the confidential files were being provided to the Board. As a result of its receipt and review of the HRS file, the Board on February 13, 1990, acting pursuant to the Superintendent's recommendation, suspended the Respondent from employment without pay effective February 14, 1990, and such suspension to continue "until investigations have been completed by the Professional Practices Services and other agencies". The Board provided that should the Respondent be "exonerated of all charges, he will receive back pay". The Board at its February 13, 1991 meeting did not have before it any of the PPS investigatory file or any other facts found by the PPS in its investigation and, therefore, in that sense, the PPS investigation was not a factor in the Board's decision to suspend the Respondent without pay. Although the Board did have the unlawfully disclosed contents of the HRS file at the time of its decision, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the file contained any facts evidencing any misconduct by the Respondent other than those facts known by the Superintendent when she issued her official letter of reprimand. In fact, when Martin was asked at the meeting to elaborate on the facts in the HRS file, other than those facts known by the Superintendent at the time she issued her official letter of reprimand, that the Board considered in making its decision to suspend the Respondent without pay, he declined to answer on the basis of the HRS file being confidential. Yet, Martin's testimony was that the information in the HRS file was a "significant factor" in the determination by the Superintendent and the Board to effect the suspension without pay of the Respondent. Apparently, the only additional fact known by the Board at its February 13, 1990 meeting was that HRS had reached "a confirmed finding of sexual abuse" in regards to the Respondent's conduct and that fact was a significant factor in its determination to suspend Respondent. In the late summer of 1990, Martin recommended to the Superintendent that Respondent be reinstated, but assigned to a position that did not involve student contact. The Superintendent made such recommendation to the Board, and the Board, acting on the Superintendent's recommendation, reinstated Respondent at the beginning of the 1990/91 school year but declined to award back pay. The Respondent was assigned to work with an adult school. Subsequently, the Respondent voluntarily resigned his position with the Board, and accepted a position with South Florida Community College. Martin's recommendation to reinstate the Respondent was based on the following: (a) the Respondent being on a continuing contract and nothing being done to terminate this continuing contract; (b) the resolution of the allegations made against Respondent by HRS and PPS were taking longer than anticipated; and (c) the indication that Martin had from the school board attorney that the "confirmed" report of abuse would most likely be reclassified downward, and, as such, would not warrant terminating Respondent's continuing contract. On May 8, 1991, a final order was entered by HRS in the child abuse case involving the Respondent, granting the Respondent's request for expunction, and reclassifying the report from "confirmed" to "unfounded". The final order was the result of HRS adopting a recommended order of the Hearing Officer from the Division of Administrative Hearings who had conducted a formal evidentiary hearing in the child abuse case on February 19, 1991. The PPS commenced its proceedings on June 27, 1990 by filing an administrative complaint against the Respondent, and concluded those proceedings before the Educational Practices Commission with a final order dated May 20, 1991 adopting a settlement agreement dated February 19, 1991. The Respondent chose not to contest the allegation in the administrative complaint, and neither the settlement agreement nor the final order make any findings of wrongdoing against the Respondent. As a result of the PPS action, the Respondent received a reprimand to be placed in his personnel file and his certification file, and upon re- employment in the education profession in Florida, in a position which requires state certification, to be placed on probation for a period of three years under conditions set out in the agreement. Notwithstanding Martin's understanding that Respondent's teaching certificate was suspended for short period (2-3 weeks), the Respondent's teaching certificate was never suspended for any period of time, and no action was taken which deprived the Respondent of his ability to continue teaching in the public school system of Florida. N.S. was a minor female student at Sebring High School, and a member of Respondent's peer counseling class during the 1988/89 school year (S/Y) and the fall semester of 1989/90 S/Y. Often, during the time N.S. was in Respondent's class, Respondent would give her an affectionate hug or squeeze, and would give her a kiss or peck on the cheek, forehead, or the back of the head, and whisper such things in her ear as "love you" or "you're sweet" or "you're pretty" or "you're sexy". There were occasions when Respondent was whispering in N.S.'s ear that his lips brushed against her ear. When Respondent was hugging, whispering or making remarks to N.S. it was always in the presence of staff or students in a public area of the school such as the hallway, classroom or guidance area, but never in private or off campus. Although N.S. testified that Respondent's behavior made her uncomfortable, she did not ever ask Respondent to stop or tell him or anyone else that his behavior made her feel uncomfortable. J.N.A. was a minor female student at Sebring High School, and a member of Respondent's peer counseling class during the 1988/89 S/Y and 1989/90 S/Y. Basically, J.N.A. experienced the same type of behavior from Respondent as did N.S. as set out in Finding of Fact 25, and likewise, did not ever tell the Respondent to stop or that his behavior made her feel uncomfortable. As with N.S., the incidents with J.N.A. always occurred in the presence of staff or other students in the public areas of the school, but never in private or off campus. Y.W. was a female student at Sebring High School, and a member of Respondent's peer counseling class during the fall semester of the 1989/90 S/Y. On one occasion, while Y.W. was standing next to Respondent in the class where other students were present, Respondent asked Y.W. to sit on his knee and talk about a problem, and after some protest N.S. sat on his knee. Although Y.W. considered Respondent as a "father-figure", this made her uncomfortable because it was not usual for her to sit on her father's or grandfather's lap. Y.W. also testified that Respondent probably kissed her on the cheek one time as he did with all his students, but found nothing unusual about this. There was no evidence that Respondent made any sexual overtures to any student or touched any of the females on their breasts, inner thighs, genital areas or buttocks. Clark came to Sebring High School as assistant principal at the beginning of 1988/89 S/Y (having completed three years as assistant principal at the end of the 1990/91 S/Y), and observed the Respondent exhibiting behavior similar to that expressed by N.S. and J.N.A. through late November or early December 1989 (about a year and a half). Although Clark considered Respondent's behavior as being inappropriate, enough so that she counselled her daughter not to go near him, she never told him he should stop or counsel him as to her views on his behavior even though she was his supervisor. In fact, Clark did not report the Respondent's behavior to Bible until after the beginning of the 1989/90 S/Y, sometime around November, and again when N.S. and J.N.A. came to her in late December 1989 and early January 1990. After Clark advised Bible on the first occasion around November 1989, Bible had an informal conference with the Respondent. Although Clark did not sit in on this conference she heard the tail end of the conversation between Bible and Respondent wherein Bible told Respondent "you can't do that" or "it doesn't look right" or "people will misinterpret it". Carolyn Shoemaker, guidance secretary, Sebring High School, observed Respondent exhibiting behavior similar to that expressed by N.S., J.N. and Clark, which she considered inappropriate, for about the same period of time as Clark, but she never expressed to the Respondent that he should stop or that his behavior was inappropriate. However, she did report it to Clark and Bible. Natalie Smith, Chairman, Guidance Department, Sebring High School, observed Respondent exhibiting similar behavior as that expressed by N.S., J.N.A., Clark and Shoemaker, which she considered inappropriate, for about the same period of time as Clark and Shoemaker. Although Smith was head of the department where Respondent worked, and felt this behavior to be inappropriate, she did tell him to stop or express her views on this behavior with Respondent. Smith remembers telling Bible about Respondent's behavior, but doesn't recall when she told Bible. Until Respondent's informal conference with Bible referred to in Finding of Fact 30 and the January 8, 1990 letter of reprimand, the Respondent was never disciplined, counselled or otherwise directed to refrain from his affectionate interaction with students. The Respondent's suspension without pay by the Board in February 13, 1990 was premised on the same facts and conduct which had resulted in the January 8, 1990 letter of reprimand being issued to the Respondent by the Superintendent. While the Respondent may have used poor judgment in his method of establishing rapport with the some 400 students in any given year for which he had counseling responsibilities, and his conduct may have been inappropriate under the circumstances, his conduct as established by the substantial competent evidence in the record does not rise to the level of being so serious as to impair the Respondent's effectiveness in the Highlands County School system, notwithstanding the opinion of both Clark and Smith to the contrary.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the Respondent's suspension, reimbursing him for any pay lost as a result of the suspension, and restoring any benefits that the Respondent may have lost as a result of the suspension. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of July, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1991. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3758 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner 1. Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(4,5); 3(5,6); 4(7); 5(7,8); 6(10,11); 7(12,15); 8(18,19); 9(25,26); 10(27); 11(28); 12(30); 13(31); 14(32); 15(21,22,23,24). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Each of the following proposed findings of fact and adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The member in parenthesis is the Finding(s) of Fact which so adopts that proposed finding of fact: 1(2); 2(3); 3(4); 4(5); 5(5); 6(7); 7(8); 8(8); 9(9); 10(10); 11(16,17,34); 13(11); 14(12); 15(13); 16(13); 17(14); 18(15); 19(16); 20(17); 21(17); 22(20); 23(20); 24(21); 25(22); 26(23); 27(24); 28(18,19); 29(18); 30(34); 31(25,27,28); 32(30); 33(30); 34(25, 27); 35(33,9); 36(29). Proposed findings of fact 12 and 37 are unnecessary or subordinate. Copies furnished to: Donald H. Wilson, Esquire P.O. Box 1578 Bartow, FL 33830 Ronald G. Meyer, Esquire P.O. Box 1547 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Ruth E. Handley, Superintendent Highlands County School Board 426 School Street Sebring, FL 33870 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner is entitled to creditable service in the Florida Retirement System for service in the Florida Virtual School from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a regular class member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS). On October 23, 2003, Petitioner entered the Deferred Retirement Option Program (DROP) and left her employment on June 30, 2004. Petitioner worked most of her career as a teacher and an administrator for the Pasco County School Board (School Board). The School Board is a local education association (LEA) and a local agency employer within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(42)(a), Florida Statutes (2001). Beginning with the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner undertook additional employment by working in the Florida Virtual School (FVS) in accordance with former Section 228.082, Florida Statutes (2000).1 Petitioner undertook additional employment to increase the average final compensation (AFC) that Respondent uses to calculate her retirement benefits. From September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2004, Petitioner worked for the LEA and served in the FVS. During the 2001-2002 school year, Petitioner was a full-time employee for the LEA and also served part-time in the FVS. Beginning with the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner served full-time in the FVS and also worked for the LEA during the summer. The LEA paid Petitioner annual salaries as a full-time employee for all relevant school years and made the necessary contributions to the FRS. The AFC includes compensation Petitioner received from the LEA, and that compensation is not at issue in this proceeding. With one exception, the AFC includes the compensation Petitioner received for service in the FVS. The AFC does not include $6,150 (the contested amount) that Petitioner earned during her first year of service in the FVS from September 15, 2001, through June 30, 2002 (the contested period).2 Sometime prior to April 2004, Petitioner requested that Respondent include the contested amount in her AFC. In a one- page letter dated April 6, 2004 (the preliminary denial letter), Respondent notified Petitioner that Respondent proposed to deny the request. The grounds for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position and that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. In relevant part, the preliminary denial letter states: . . . you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor whose employment was contingent on enrollment and funding pursuant to Section 60S- 1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C., copy enclosed. As such, you are ineligible for . . . FRS . . . participation for the time period in question. The School joined the FRS on December 1, 2001 and past service was not purchased for you since you filled a temporary position. Effective July 1, 2002, you began filling a regularly established position with the Florida Virtual High School and were correctly enrolled in FRS. The School has reported your earnings from July 1, 2002, to the present to the FRS. Respondent's Exhibit 2 (R-2). A two-page letter dated June 23, 2004 (the denial letter), notified Petitioner of proposed final agency action excluding the contested amount from her AFC. The only ground for denial stated that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position. The denial omits any statement that FVS did not join the FRS until December 1, 2001. However, the denial letter includes a copy of the preliminary denial letter and is deemed to include, by reference, the stated grounds in the preliminary denial letter. In relevant part, the denial letter states: By letter dated April 6, 2004 (copy enclosed). . . [Respondent] advised you filled a temporary instructional position as an adjunct instructor from September 15, 2001 through June 30, 2002. We have reviewed the information submitted in your recent letter and maintain our position that you were an adjunct instructor from September 2001 through June 2002, pursuant to Section 60S-1.004(5)(d)3, F.A.C. (copy enclosed). Your employment with the Florida Virtual School during the time period in question was contingent on enrollment and funding. Since you filled a temporary position, the School was correct in excluding you from the [FRS]. This notification constitutes final agency action. . . . R-3 at 1. The legal definition of a temporary position varies depending on whether the employer is a state agency or a local agency. If the employer is a state agency, a position is temporary if the employer compensates the position from an account defined as "an other personal services (OPS) account" in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001) (OPS account). If the employer is a local agency, a position is temporary if the position will exist for less than six consecutive months; or as otherwise provided by rule. § 121.021(53), Fla. Stat. (2001). The distinction is based, in relevant part, on the practical reality that local agencies do not maintain OPS accounts for "the fiscal affairs of the state." § 216.011(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). The employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was not an LEA. Three different employers may have been responsible for payment of the contested amount. Some evidence supports a finding that the employer was the Board of Trustees of FVS (the Board). Contracts of employment for service in FVS identify the employer as the Board.3 The Board has statutory authority over personnel serving FVS and has statutory authority to govern FVS. Other evidence supports a finding that the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount was FVS. The record evidence identifies the employer that enrolled in FRS and made contributions on behalf of Petitioner as FVS. Finally, there is evidence that the Orange County School Board, acting as the statutorily designated fiscal agent for FVS (the fiscal agent), was the employer that paid Petitioner the contested amount. The contested amount was paid from funds administered by the fiscal agent in the name of FVS. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each exemplify distinct characteristics of a state agency defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(qq), Florida Statutes (2001). The Board consists of seven members appointed by the Governor for four-year staggered terms. The Board is a public agency entitled to sovereign immunity and has authority to promulgate rules concerning FVS. Board members are public officers and bear fiduciary responsibility for FVS. The Board has statutory authority to approve FVS franchises in each local school district. §§ 228.082, Fla. Stat. (2000) and 1002.37, Fla. Stat. (2001). FVS is administratively housed within an office4 of the Commissioner of Education, as the Head of the Department of Education (Commissioner). The fiscal year of FVS is the state fiscal year. Local school districts cannot limit student access to courses offered statewide through FVS.5 The fiscal agent of FVS is a state agency. The fiscal agent receives state funds for FVS and administers those funds to operate FVS for students throughout the state. The Board, FVS, and the fiscal agent each satisfy judicial definitions of a state agency pursuant to "territorial" and "functional" tests discussed in the Conclusions of Law. Each agency operates statewide in accordance with a statutory mandate to serve any student in the state. Each serves students in public and private schools; in charter schools; in home school programs; and in juvenile detention programs. Unlike an LEA, the scope of authority and function of the employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was not circumscribed by county or other local boundaries; regardless of whether the employer was the Board, FVS, or the fiscal agent (collectively referred to hereinafter as the employer). The employer did not pay the contested amount from an OPS account. The fiscal agent for FVS is the presumptive repository of funds appropriated for FVS. The fiscal agent is organically structured as a local agency even though it functions as a state agency in its capacity as fiscal agent. Unlike a state agency, an organic local agency does not maintain an OPS account, defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001), for the "fiscal affairs of the state." The legislature funded FVS during the contested period in lump sum as a state grant-in-aid provided in a line item appropriation pursuant to Subsection 228.082(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2000). The legislature subsequently began funding of FVS through the Florida Education Finance Program (FEFP). Each FVS student with six-credit hours required for high school graduation is included as a full-time equivalent student for state funding. Each student with less than six-credit hours counts as a fraction of a full-time equivalent student. A local LEA cannot report full-time equivalent student membership for courses that students take through FVS unless the LEA is an approved franchise of FVS and operates a virtual school. As student enrollment in FVS increased, the legislature changed the funding formula to avoid paying twice for students in FVS; once to fund FVS and again to fund local LEAs that were authorized to earn FTE funding for students enrolled in FVS. The employer that paid the contested amount to Petitioner was a state agency that did not compensate Petitioner from an OPS account defined in Subsection 216.011(1)(dd), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner did not earn the contested amount in a temporary position within the meaning of Subsection 121.021(53)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(62). Respondent argues that Petitioner earned the contested amount in a temporary position in a local agency defined in Subsection 221.021(42), Florida Statutes (2001), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(36). A temporary position in a local agency is generally defined to mean a position that will last less than six months, except as otherwise provided by rule. By rule, Respondent defines a temporary position to include temporary instructional positions that are established with no expectation of continuation beyond one semester. Fla. Admin. Code R. 60S-1.004(5)(d)3. Respondent supports its argument with limited documentary evidence (the documents). The documents consist of several items. An undated FVS Information Sheet indicates the employer started Petitioner as an adjunct instructor on September 15, 2001. An FVS memorandum dated several years later on March 16, 2004, indicates Petitioner started an adjunct position on September 6, 2001, and includes a parenthetical statement that it was seasonal employment.6 The employer paid Petitioner $3,150 during 2002 as miscellaneous income and reported it to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on a "Form 1099-Misc." An undated letter of intent for the 2002-2003 school year, which requests submission before March 8, 2002, indicates that Petitioner intended to continue her adjunct employment status and requested a full-time position if one became available.7 Use of labels such as "adjunct" to describe employment status during the contested period would be more probative if the duties Petitioner performed were limited to the duties of a part-time, on-line instructor. As discussed hereinafter, Petitioner earned the contested amount while occupying a dual- purpose position in which she performed both the duties of an instructor and significant other duties unrelated to those of an instructor. The trier of fact would be required to disregard a substantial body of evidence to find that Petitioner's position was limited to that of a part-time, on-line instructor. The IRS requires taxpayers to report miscellaneous income paid to independent contractors on Form 1099-Misc. Neither the denial letter nor the preliminary denial letter includes a statement that Petitioner occupied a non-employee position as an independent contractor. Judicial decisions discussed in the Conclusions of Law give little weight to the use of IRS Form 1099-Misc in cases such as this one where there is little other evidence of independent contractor status or where the evidence establishes an employer-employee relationship. The record evidence discussed hereinafter shows that Petitioner and her employer enjoyed a continuing employment relationship within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-6.001(32)(f). Respondent was not a party to the employment contract and did not witness the employment relationship between Petitioner and her employer. Nor did Respondent call a witness from FVS who was competent to testify about events that occurred during the contested period. The testimony of Petitioner is supported by the totality of evidence. In relevant part, Petitioner disclosed to her supervisors at FVS at the time of her employment that she sought employment to enhance her retirement benefits. The proposed exclusion of the contested amount from the AFC is inconsistent with a material condition of employment. Respondent asserts that the documents satisfy requirements for notice and documentation of a temporary position in Florida Administrative Code Rule 6.1004(5). The rule requires an employer to notify an employee at the time of employment that the employee is filling a temporary position and cannot participate in the FRS; and to document the intended length of the temporary position. However, the terms of the documents from Respondent are ambiguous and insufficient to provide the required notice and documentation. The documents did not expressly notify Petitioner she was filling a temporary position that did not qualify as a regularly established position in the FRS. None of the documents use the term "temporary" or "temporary position." The notice and documentation requirements of the rule must be satisfied, if at all, by implication from terms on the face of the documents such as "adjunct," "adjunct position," and "adjunct employment status." Unlike the term "temporary position," neither the legislature nor Respondent defines the term "adjunct." One of the several common and ordinary uses of the term "adjunct" can mean, "Attached to a faculty or staff in a temporary . . . capacity." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, at 21-22 (4th ed. Houghton Mifflin Company 2000). The employer used an undefined term such as "adjunct" as an ambiguous euphemism for a temporary position. The ambiguity of the term "adjunct" is underscored when each document from Respondent is considered in its entirety. The letter of intent form requested Petitioner to indicate whether she intended to continue her "adjunct employment status" and whether she would be interested in "a full-time position." The form did not refer to either a "temporary position," or a "part-time position." Petitioner reasonably inferred that "adjunct employment status" was the part-time alternative to "a full-time position." The inference was consistent with the announced purpose for serving in FVS and the evidence as a whole. Respondent also does not define part- time employment to exclude a regularly established position. The FVS utilized different contracts for adjunct and part-time instructors. The contracts of record pertaining to Petitioner are not contracts for adjunct instructors (adjunct contracts). The contracts are annual contracts. Even if Petitioner were to have signed a contract for adjunct instructors, the contract used for adjunct instructors was ambiguous. In relevant part, the adjunct contract included a caption in the upper right corner labeled, "Terms of Agreement for Part-Time Instructional Employment." (emphasis supplied) As previously found, a part-time position may be a regularly established position. Use of the term "part-time employment" on a contract for an adjunct instructor supported a reasonable inference that the employer was using the terms "adjunct" and "part-time" synonymously to differentiate part-time employment from full-time employment. The employer required Petitioner, unlike adjunct instructors, to sign in on an instructor log sheet and to attend training sessions and staff meetings. Petitioner attended training sessions on September 8 and 22, and October 24, 2001. Petitioner attended other training sessions on February 26 and 27, 2002, and on March 27 and April 10, 2002. The employer also issued office equipment to Petitioner that the employer did not issue to adjunct instructors. Petitioner performed significant duties in addition to those required of a part-time instructor. Petitioner wrote grant applications and assisted in writing a procedures manual for FVS. By November 30, 2001, Petitioner had completed and submitted a federal "Smaller Learning Communities Grant" for $230,000. On December 27, 2001, Petitioner began working on the procedures manual, finalized the work on January 3, 2002, and was listed in the credits in the manual. The additional duties assigned to Petitioner continued through the second semester of the contested period. On February 26 and 27, 2002, FVS asked Petitioner to develop their "FCAT" course for the eighth grade. Petitioner wrote and developed the course. By May 30, 2002, Petitioner had written and submitted three more grant applications and was a member of a team that developed strategies for additional fundraising. For the 2002-2003 school year, Petitioner entered into an annual contract for a full-time non-instructional position, as Grants Manager, and a separate contract for employment in a part-time instructor position. Each contract was terminable only for "good cause" within the meaning of Subsection 1002.33(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002). The expectation of continued employment is further evidenced by the general business experience of FVS leading up to the contested period. In the 1997-1998 school year, approximately 25 students were enrolled statewide in FVS. In the next three years, enrollment grew to 5,564. Professional staff grew from 27 teachers to 54 full-time teachers. Legislative funding was adequate for the growth FVS experienced, and the legal contingency of enrollment and funding was not a realistic condition of continued employment. There was nothing temporary in the expectations of the employer and Petitioner during the contested period. FVS staff had legitimate business reasons to expect continued student enrollment and legislative funding during the contested period. The employer also had legitimate reasons to expect continued employment of Petitioner based on the individual experience the employer enjoyed with Petitioner, the ongoing and continuous nature of Petitioner's work, and the significant additional duties assigned to Petitioner. The employer, in fact, employed Petitioner continuously after the contested period. When FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, some employees purchased past credit. Petitioner was not on the list of employees for whom past credit was purchased. That omission is consistent with Petitioner's understanding that she was already receiving FRS credit. By rule, Respondent required the employer to make an affirmative disclosure that Petitioner did not occupy a position qualifying for FRS credit. After FVS enrolled in the FRS on December 1, 2001, FVS was required to make contributions to the FRS on behalf of Petitioner for approximately 208 days during the remainder of the contested period. FVS did not make the required contributions to the FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order including in the AFC that portion of the contested amount earned on and after December 1, 2001, and excluding the remainder of the contested amount from the AFC. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 2005.
The Issue The issue to be determined is whether Petitioners' layoffs from employment by the Respondent were lawful and if not, what remedies should be awarded.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 2, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that their positions were recommended for transfer from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. On July 1, 2001, the Petitioners' positions were transferred from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Prior to Special Legislative Session C of 2001, the Department's Office of Prevention and Victim Services consisted of 94 positions, organized into four bureaus: the Office of Victim Services; the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services; the Prevention Office; and the Intensive Learning Alternative Program. During Special Legislative Session C, the Florida Legislature passed Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 2-C, which reduced appropriations for state government for fiscal year 2001-2002. This special appropriations bill was approved by the Governor on December 13, 2001, and was published as Chapter 2001- 367, Laws of Florida. As a result of Chapter 2001-367, 77 positions were cut from the Office of Prevention and Victim Services budget entity. The appropriations detail for the reduction from the legislative appropriations system database showed that the reduction of positions was to be accomplished by eliminating the Intensive Learning Alternative Program, which consisted of 19 positions; eliminating the Office of Victim Services, which consisted of 15 positions; eliminating the Office of Partnership and Volunteer Services, which consisted of 23 positions; and by cutting 20 positions from the Office of Prevention. Seventeen positions remained. Immediately after conclusion of the Special Session, the Department began the process of identifying which positions would be cut. A workforce transition team was named and a workforce transition plan developed to implement the workforce reduction. The workforce reduction plan included a communications plan for dealing with employees; an assessment of the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the residual program; a plan for assessment of employees, in terms of comparative merit; and a placement strategy for affected employees. Gloria Preston, Stephen Reid and Carol Wells were Operations and Management Consultant II's and worked in the Partnership and Volunteer Services Division. According to the budget detail from Special Session C, all of the positions in this unit were eliminated. Titus Tillman was an Operations and Management Consultant II and worked in the Prevention and Monitoring division. According to the budget detail provided from Special Session C, 20 of the positions in this unit were eliminated. On December 7, 2001, the Department notified Petitioners that effective January 4, 2002, each of their positions were eliminated due to the Florida Legislature's reduction of staffing in a number of Department program areas during the special session. Petitioners were provided with information regarding what type of assistance the Department would provide. Specifically, the notices stated that the employees would be entitled to the right of a first interview with any state agency for a vacancy to which they may apply, provided they are qualified for the position; and that they could seek placement through the Agency for Workforce Innovation. The notice also provided information regarding leave and insurance benefits, and identified resources for affected employees to seek more clarification or assistance. At the time Petitioners were notified that their positions were being eliminated, Florida Administrative Code Rules 60K-17.001 through 60K-17.004 remained in effect. These rules required agencies to determine the order of layoff by calculating retention points, based upon the number of months of continuous employment in a career service position, with some identified modifications. However, by the express terms of the "Service First" Legislation passed in the regular session of 2001, the career service rules identified above were to be repealed January 1, 2002, unless otherwise readopted. § 42, Ch. 2001-43, Laws of Fla. Consistent with the legislative directive new rules had been noticed and were in the adoption process. On January 4, 2002, each of the Petitioners were laid off due to the elimination of their positions. At the time the layoff became effective, new rules regarding workforce reductions had been adopted. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60K-33, effective January 2, 2002, did not allow for the "bumping" procedure outlined in Rule 60K-17.004. Instead, it required the Department to appoint a workforce transition team for overseeing and administering the workforce reduction; assess the positions to be deleted and the mission and goals of the remaining program after the deletion of positions; identify the employees and programs or services that would be affected by the workforce reduction and identify the knowledge, skills and abilities that employees would need to carry out the remaining program. The workforce transition team was required under one of the new rules to consider the comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience of each employee, and consider which employees would best enable the agency to advance its mission. Although the Department created a workforce reduction plan and Career Service Comparative Merit Checklist, it did not complete a checklist for any of the Petitioners because it had previously reclassified their positions as Selected Exempt Service. No checklist is expressly required under Rule 60L-33. While no checklist was completed on the Selected Exempt Service employees, each employee in the Office of Prevention and Victim Services was assessed based on the positions remaining and the mission of the Department in order to determine which employees to keep and which to lay off. Of the 17 remaining positions, the Department considered the legislative intent with respect to the elimination of programs and the individuals currently performing the job duties that were left. It also evaluated the responsibilities remaining, which included overseeing the funding of statewide contracts and grants. The Department also considered which employees should be retained based upon their ability to absorb the workload, their geographic location, and their skill set. The Department determined that the employees selected for the remaining positions were the strongest in their field, had fiscal management and programmatic experience, and were best equipped to undertake the workload. At the time of the layoff, Petitioners were each long- serving, well-qualified and highly rated employees of the State of Florida. Each was prepared to move in order to retain employment. In April 2002, AFSCME Florida Public Employees 79, AFL- CIO (AFSCME), filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Public Employees Relations Commission (PERC) against the Departments of Management Services and Juvenile Justice. AFSCME alleged that the Department failed to bargain in good faith over the layoff of Department employees. The parties entered into a settlement agreement, effective June 28, 2002. The settlement agreement required the Department to provide timely notice to AFSCME of impending layoffs, bargain over the impact of workforce reductions, and provide assistance for employees who were laid off between December 31, 2001, and January 4, 2002, but who had not attained other full-time Career Service employment. There is no evidence the Petitioners in this case were members of AFSCME. Nor is there any evidence that the Department failed to assist Petitioners in seeking new employment. In July of 2003, the First District Court of Appeal decided the case of Reinshuttle v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 849 So. 2d 434 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003), wherein the court held that employees whose employee classifications were changed from Career Service to Selected Exempt Service must be afforded a clear point of entry to challenge the reclassification of their positions. The Department notified those persons, including Petitioners, whose Career Service positions had been reclassified to Selected Exempt Service, that they had a right to challenge the reclassification. Each of the Petitioners filed a request for hearing regarding their reclassifications, which was filed with the Agency Clerk in August of 2003. However, the petitions were not forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings until May 2007. All four cases were settled with an agreement that their positions were reclassified as Selected Exempt Service positions in error, and that they should have been considered Career Service employees at the time their positions were eliminated. Petitioners and the Department also agreed that any challenge by Petitioners to the layoffs would be forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Gloria Preston began work for the State of Florida in 1975. Her evaluations showed that she continuously exceeded performance standards, and she had training and experience in managing and monitoring grants and contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, and it is unclear whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Stephen Reid began work for the State of Florida in 1977. He left state government for a short time and returned in 1984. With the exception of his initial evaluation with the Department of Corrections, he has received "outstanding" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Reid has experience in contract creation and management. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Carol Wells began employment with the State of Florida in 1975. Similar to Mr. Reid, all of her evaluations save her first one were at the "exceeds" performance level, and she has experience in writing and managing contracts. However, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points she would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether she was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of her employment with the State. Titus Tillman began employment with the State of Florida in 1993. He was subject to a Corrective Action Plan in May 2000, but received "above average" or "exceeds" performance evaluations. Like the other Petitioners, no evidence was presented regarding how many retention points he would have been awarded under former Rule 60K-17.004, or whether he was in a Career Service position during the entire tenure of his employment with the State. Likewise, no evidence was presented regarding the retention points that were earned by any of the people who were retained by the Department to fill the remaining positions. No evidence was presented regarding the qualifications of those retained employees, in terms of their comparative merit, demonstrated skills, and experience in the program areas the Department would continue to implement.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the petitions for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LISA SHEARER NELSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of February, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerry G. Traynham, Esquire Patterson & Traynham 315 Beard Street Post Office Box 4289 Tallahassee, Florida 32315-4289 Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-100 Lezlie A. Griffin, Esquire Melissa Ann Horwitz, Esquire AFSCME Council 79 3064 Highland Oaks Terrace Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Manny Anon, Jr., Esquire AFSCME Council 79 99 Northwest 183rd Street, Suite 224 North Miami, Florida 33169 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300
The Issue The issues to be determined are whether the Florida educator’s certificate of Respondent, Carmen Komninos, is subject to discipline for violating section 1012.795(1)(j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A- 10.081(2)(a)1, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the appropriate penalty therefor.
Findings Of Fact Ms. Komninos holds Florida Educator’s Certificate No. 985529, which covers Elementary Education, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), and World Language – Spanish, and is valid through June 2021. Ms. Komninos began her 42-year career as an educator in New Jersey. She moved to Florida in 2006 and started working for the School District. She primarily taught Spanish at the School from 2007 until she retired in 2019. During the 2017-2018 school year, Ms. Komninos served as a Spanish teacher and taught B.T. and C.M., among other students. The Administrative Complaint focuses on two separate incidents in which Ms. Komninos allegedly grabbed B.T. and C.M. by their arms. Neither B.T. nor C.M. reported the alleged incidents to the School when they happened. Rather, they only disclosed them during the School’s investigation of complaints made by other students. That investigation began on March 22, 2018, when a teacher received the following two documents from an unidentified student: (1) a handwritten letter of unknown origin purportedly signed by several students complaining about Ms. Komninos1; and (2) a copy of a photograph posted to Snapchat. The photograph clearly depicts Ms. Komninos standing behind B.T. and holding onto his left arm with both of her hands. She does not appear to be exerting any force. B.T. is facing away from her and clearly smiling. The photograph contained the following two captions: how aggressive Hey Look! “Los novios” The use of the cry-laughing emoji multiple times seems to reflect that the students who posted the photograph found the incident humorous. But, the record contains neither evidence as to who took the photograph, posted it to Snapchat, or drafted the captions, nor evidence as to when that occurred. The teacher brought the documents to a guidance counselor who gave them to the assistant principal. The assistant principal brought them to the principal and Corporal Soto, the School’s youth relations deputy. The principal notified the School District and immediately removed Ms. Komninos from teaching duties pending the investigation. Mr. Ghelman, the School District’s coordinator for secondary schools and human resources at the time, directed the principal to obtain statements from the students. In his statement, B.T. acknowledged that he got out of his seat to sharpen his pencil after being told not to do so by Ms. Komninos and then refused to heed her directive to sit down. At that point, she grabbed his arm and tried to pull him back into his seat while his classmates yelled. 1 The record is silent as to the letter’s author, no student who signed it testified, and it focuses on allegations beyond the scope of the Administrative Complaint. Thus, the undersigned excluded the letter and has not relied on it in making any finding of fact. In her statement, C.M. indicated that she got up out of her seat to throw a piece of paper in the recycling bin and did so without permission because Ms. Komninos did not have a rule requiring them to ask first. C.M. stated that Ms. Komninos approached her at the recycling bin, grabbed her arm forcefully, and pushed her down to pick up the paper from the bin. C.M. said she picked up the paper and walked back to her desk. In their written statements, neither B.T. nor C.M. indicated when their respective incidents occurred or stated that they suffered (or could have suffered) any harm. Upon receipt of the statements, Mr. Ghelman met with Ms. Komninos. Contrary to C.M.’s statement, Ms. Komninos confirmed that she required the students to ask permission before getting up from their seats. She also said that she never placed her hands on a student. When shown the photograph, she ultimately agreed that it depicted her and B.T., but she did not recall the incident. She noted that she met with B.T.’s parents earlier that year to address B.T.’s struggles in her class. As to C.M., Ms. Komninos recalled the incident, but said that she never pushed C.M. and only told her to sit down when she got up without permission. Around the same time, Corporal Soto interviewed B.T. B.T. conceded that he wrongly got up without permission and refused to sit after being told to do so. B.T. said that, at that point, Ms. Komninos grabbed his arm to prevent him from continuing to walk towards the pencil sharpener and he went back to his seat. B.T. confirmed he suffered no injuries. Corporal Soto contacted B.T.’s father, who did not know about the incident. After viewing the photograph and speaking to his son, he informed Corporal Soto that they did not want to press charges. However, he remained concerned because he had met with Ms. Komninos and the guidance counselor before the incident to address concerns with her teaching style. In early April 2018, the principal met with B.T., his father, and Ms. Komninos. B.T.’s father wanted to ensure that Ms. Komninos would not treat his son differently if she returned to the class. She apologized for the incident and promised to help B.T. with the class. The principal believed that B.T.’s parents accepted the apology and welcomed her assistance. On April 18, 2018, after concluding its investigation, the School District suspended Ms. Komninos for one day without pay. She accepted the discipline and returned to the classroom. B.T.’s father confirmed that she treated B.T. fairly and that he passed her class. Notwithstanding the discipline already imposed, the Commissioner conducted its own investigation and obtained additional written statements from the students in November 2018. In B.T.’s statement, he indicated that he stood up to sharpen his pencil during a test, after Ms. Komninos told him he could not do so, and she then grabbed his arm and pulled to get him back to his seat. This statement largely mirrored the one he gave in March 2018. In C.M.’s statement, she indicated that Ms. Komninos forcefully grabbed her arm when she got up to throw away trash, pulled her, and told her to return to her seat. C.M. did not believe she needed permission since they were doing independent study. She was upset that Ms. Komninos grabbed her, instead of asking her to sit down. This statement conflicted with the one she gave in March 2018, in which she never accused Ms. Komninos of pulling her. Much like their first statements, neither B.T. nor C.M. indicated when their respective incidents occurred or stated that they suffered (or could have suffered) any harm. Several other students also submitted statements, though none of them testified at the hearing. A.A. indicated that B.T. got out of his seat after the bell rang, at which point Ms. Komninos grabbed B.T.’s arm and would not allow him to leave until he handed in his work. M.C. indicated that Ms. Komninos grabbed B.T.’s arm and pulled him over to her desk. C.R. indicated that Ms. Komninos grabbed C.M.’s wrist and pulled her to the front of the room, yelling that she would not give C.M. respect without it being returned. Most of these accounts conflicted with the details described in the statements of B.T. and C.M. In the meantime, Ms. Komninos continued teaching at the School until her retirement in July 2019. Upon her retirement, the School District issued a “Resolution in Recognition of Outstanding Service Leading to Retirement” to recognize her excellent service, contributions to the School District, and devotion to the school system. The resolution recognized that Ms. Komninos served the School District in a meritorious, faithful, and outstanding manner. The honor bestowed on her is not surprising. The principal who evaluated Ms. Komninos’s performance for many years, including at the time of the alleged incidents, believed she was a strong educator, a hard worker, and a rule follower based on his observations of her in the classroom. According to him, she clearly communicated her rules to the students, had a great rapport with them, and maintained control over the classroom. After Ms. Komninos already had been disciplined by the School, received an award from the School District for her years of dedicated service, and retired from teaching, the Commissioner issued its Administrative Complaint seeking to discipline her educator’s certificate as a result of the two incidents. Specifically, the Commissioner alleged that she violated the Principle of Professional Conduct requiring her to make reasonable efforts to protect the students from conditions harmful to their learning, mental and physical health, and/or safety. In its PRO, the Commissioner seeks to issue a letter of reprimand, place Ms. Komninos on probation for two years, and levy a $750 fine against her. Only three witnesses who were in the classroom when the incidents allegedly occurred testified at the hearing—B.T., C.M., and Ms. Komninos. Ms. Komninos generally explained that she required students to raise their hands before getting out of their seat for any reason. They knew the rules because she wrote them on the bulletin board and repeated them verbally. However, some of the students pushed the envelope. As to the incident concerning B.T., Ms. Komninos credibly testified that she did not recall the incident even after seeing the photograph, which she agreed depicted her holding onto B.T.’s arm. She said the same thing to both the principal and Mr. Ghelman during the investigation. She credibly explained that the photograph must have been taken in the Fall of 2017 based on the items posted on the cabinet doors in the background. She agreed that she met with the principal and B.T.’s father after the investigation began, reassured them that she would harbor no ill will towards B.T., and offered to help him better his grade. The undersigned credits Ms. Komninos’s testimony and found her to be forthcoming and truthful. B.T. testified that he thought the incident occurred within a month or two before the March 2018 investigation. He explained that Ms. Komninos would not allow him to sharpen his pencil during a test, so he violated her rules and got up without permission. Instead of walking to the back of the room to the sharpener, he started walking to the front. Ms. Komninos then grabbed his arm to stop him from walking. She held onto his arm for a matter of seconds and let go. He initially confirmed that she never pulled him back into his seat, contrary to his prior written statements, but later waivered and agreed that his memory was better back then. B.T. confirmed that he suffered no injuries in the incident and felt embarrassed more than anything else. That is why he smiled. He definitively testified that he never felt there was even a chance of Ms. Komninos harming him, though he waivered when counsel for the Commissioner later asked whether he could have been harmed had he continued to walk forward. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Ms. Komninos held onto B.T.’s arm for a few seconds to stop him from further violating the rules by walking around during a test, but she did not pull him back into his seat. B.T. suffered no harm and the credible evidence established that Ms. Komninos never acted in a manner that could be seen as failing to make reasonable efforts to protect B.T. from conditions harmful to learning, mental and physical health, and/or safety. As to the incident concerning C.M., Ms. Komninos credibly explained that it occurred in March 2018. Ms. Komninos testified that C.M. got out of her seat without permission and, when Mr. Komninos instructed her to sit down, she further defied her order by continuing to walk to the recycling bin. Ms. Komninos walked to the recycling bin, instructed C.M. to remove the paper, and followed her back to her seat to ensure that she did not walk around the room and disturb the other students. Ms. Komninos credibly confirmed that she never touched C.M., pushed her down towards the recycling bin, or pushed her into her seat. She stayed at least a foot away from C.M. the entire time. C.M. testified that Ms. Komninos pushed her down towards the recycling bin, grabbed her arm for a brief period of time, and pulled her back to her seat. However, C.M.’s testimony conflicted with her prior written statements. In the first statement, she indicated that Ms. Komninos forcefully grabbed her arm and pushed her down to pick up the paper from the bin. In the second statement, she accused Ms. Komninos of forcefully grabbing her arm, pulling her, and telling her to sit down. When confronted with these inconsistencies, C.M. said the first statement—that omitted any reference to pulling her—more accurately reflected the incident. She also could not recall on what day the incident occurred. Nevertheless, C.M. confirmed that she suffered no harm and only got upset because Ms. Komninos could have asked her nicely to sit down. Based on the weight of the credible evidence, the undersigned finds that Ms. Komninos did not forcefully grab C.M.’s arm, push her down towards the recycling bin, or pull her back to her seat. C.M. suffered no harm and the credible evidence established that Ms. Komninos never acted in a manner that could be seen as failing to make reasonable efforts to protect C.M. from conditions harmful to learning or to her mental and physical health, and/or safety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission, issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, Carmen Komninos. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of March, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of March, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert J. Coleman, Esquire Coleman and Coleman Post Office Box 2089 Fort Myers, Florida 33902-2089 (eServed) Ron Weaver, Esquire Post Office Box 770088 Ocala, Florida 34477-0088 (eServed) Gretchen Kelley Brantley, Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears. General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Randy Kosec, Jr., Chief Office of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times material to this proceeding, the Petitioner was an employee of the state of Florida employed by the Department. On May 10, 1991 the Petitioner was arrested and placed in isolation without any outside contact except in the evenings by phone. By letter dated May 15, 1991, mailed to Petitioner's home address, the Department advised Petitioner that having been absence from work for three consecutive days without authorized leave of absence the Department assumed that the Petitioner had abandoned his position and resigned from career services. Additionally, this letter advised the Petitioner that he had 20 calendar days from receipt of the notice to petition the State Personnel Director for a review of the facts to determine if the circumstances constituted abandonment of position. The return receipt for this letter appears to be signed by Vickie Carpenter but does not indicate the date it was signed by her. A copy of this same letter was mailed by the Department to the Petitioner at the jail but no return receipt was ever received by the Department. However, the Petitioner testified at having received the letter around May 23, 1991. On May 23, 1991 the Respondent was released from jail and was available for work beginning on May 24, 1991. However, the Department had already terminated the Petitioner based on abandonment of position. By letter dated June 6, 1991 the Petitioner requested the State Personnel Director to review his case. By letter dated June 12, 1991 and received by Petitioner on June 14, 1991, the Department again advised Petitioner that the Department assumed that he had abandoned his position and again outlined the review process. On June 20, 1991 the Secretary of the Department of Administration entered an Order Accepting Petition and Assignment to the Division of Administrative Hearings. By letter dated August 27, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that it was withdrawing the action of abandonment of position, and that he was reinstated to his position effective August 30, 1991. However, by letter dated August 29, 1991 the Department advised Petitioner that he was to report for work on September 3, 1991 rather than August 30, 1991, and that he was to report to Ft. Myers rather than to his old job in Punta Gorda. Additionally, Mark M. Geisler, Subdistrict Administrator, the author of the letter, advised the Petitioner that since the issue of back pay had been discussed with DeLuccia it was best for Petitioner to contact him in that regard. Petitioner was reinstated by the Department on September 3, 1991. Petitioner did not at any time agree to forego any back pay in order for the Department to reinstate him. The Petitioner has never received any back pay for the period beginning Friday, May 24, 1991 (the day he was able and ready to return to work) through Monday, September 2, 1991 (the day before Petitioner returned to work). Petitioner's wife, Vickie L. Carpenter was, at all times material to this proceeding, employed by the state of Florida, and because she and Petitioner both were employed by the state of Florida their health insurance was furnished by the state of Florida at no cost to them. Upon the Department terminating the Petitioner his wife was required to pay for her health insurance until Petitioner was reinstated on September 3, 1991. Petitioner was unable to report to work during the period from May 10, 1991 through May 23, 1991, inclusive, due to being incarcerated, and was on unauthorized leave of absence during this period. Therefore, Petitioner is not entitled to any back pay for this period, and so stipulated at the hearing. However, Petitioner is entitled to receive back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive. There is sufficient competent substantial evidence to establish that the Department was aware of Petitioner's incarceration and that it was not Petitioner's intent to abandon his position with the Department.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Administration enter a Final Order (1) confirming the action of the Department that Petitioner did not abandon his position with the Department, and (2) reimbursing Petitioner for back pay for the period from May 24, 1991 through September 2, 1991, inclusive, and for any other benefit that Petitioner was entitled to during this period, including, but not limited to, health insurance benefits. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Carpenter 1669 Flamingo Blvd. Bradenton, FL 34207 Susan E. Vacca, Qualified Representative Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 1415 Punta Gorda, FL 33951-1415 Augustus D. Aikens, General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 John A. Pieno, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Robert B. Williams, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Blvd. Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Anthony N. DeLuccia, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services P.O. Box 06085 Fort Myers, FL 33906
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Petitioner was employed as a Clerk Specialist in the Medical Records Department of Respondent's Mental Health Institute and held permanent status in the Florida career service system. On June 3, 1986, Petitioner received a telephone call from her mother relating the substance of a bizarre telephone call she had received the previous night from her son-in-law, Petitioner's estranged husband. This caused Petitioner to fear for the safety of her children and she left her job around 3:00 P.M., went to school and to a day nursery to pick up her children and took them to her mother's house where she stayed while away from work. Petitioner frequently left the office during working hours but made up the time so lost by working through her lunch hour or before or after her regular working hours. Sometimes she took annual leave for this time off. Petitioner and her supervisor expected Petitioner to return to work June 4, 1986. During the next few days Petitioner or her mother frequently called Petitioner's supervisor to report that Petitioner was still concerned about the safety of her children but would return to work. On June 9, Petitioner spoke to the office supervisor, Carol Foster, who had just returned from a week long HRS convention in Miami, and told Foster that she would not return to work until Wednesday, June 11. Foster asked if she could come in and work that night (Monday), to which Petitioner agreed. Petitioner later called and said she could not come in that night. On Tuesday, June 10, 1986, Petitioner's mother called in and advised Foster that Petitioner would not return to work until the following Monday, June 16, 1986. Foster replied that no leave was authorized and Petitioner was expected to report to work the following day, Wednesday, June 11, at 8:00 a.m. Later on this same day Foster repeated this message to Petitioner. On Wednesday, June 11, 1986, Petitioner called Foster and said she could not come in to work. Foster replied that no leave was authorized. On Thursday, June 12, 1986, Foster told Petitioner that unless she reported to work on Friday, June 13, 1986, she would have no choice but to consider Petitioner to have abandoned her job. On Friday, June 19, 1986, Petitioner did not report to work and made no effort to contact Foster. On the morning of June 13, Petitioner attended a job interview for another position on Respondent's campus. Upon learning of this, Foster then prepared and sent to Petitioner by certified mail a letter containing notification that she was deemed to have resigned her position by abandonment and notifying Petitioner of her right to petition for review. (Exhibit 2)
The Issue The issue to be determined in this case is whether Respondent violated section 1012.795(1)(f), (g), and (j), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rules 6A-10.081(2)(a)1., 5., and 8., and, 6A- 10.081(2)(b)1., and 3., as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint. If it is found that Respondent has committed any of the statute or rule violations alleged, the penalty that should be imposed must also be determined.
Findings Of Fact Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the documentary evidence admitted, and the record as a whole, the following facts are found: Respondent held Florida Educator's Certificate Number 1294936, covering the areas of English, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL), and Reading, which was valid through June 30, 2020. At all times material to the allegations in the Amended Administrative Complaint, Respondent was employed as a Reading Teacher at Don Estridge High Tech Middle School ("Don Estridge") in the Palm Beach County School District. C.V.'s Relevant Background During the 2017-2018 school year, C.V. was an eighth-grade student at Don Estridge. Respondent was his intensive reading teacher. Intensive reading is a remedial course for students who are reading below grade level. Prior to working with Respondent, C.V.'s grades were below average. He received D's and F's in school. In 2016, C.V.'s mother, Renee Horn, married C.V.'s stepfather, Charles Horn. Prior to that marriage, C.V. was an only child living alone with his mother from the time he was two years old. C.V.'s stepfather also had children from a previous relationship. At the time C.V. met Respondent, his parents observed that he was having a difficult time adjusting to their newly- blended family. C.V.'s parents allowed him to spend time with his biological father. However, in their parental judgment, they believed that it was in C.V.'s best interest to limit visitation with his biological father. C.V.'s parents observed that C.V. displayed signs of non-characteristic fragility and volatility while he was under the instruction of Respondent, which concerned them. C.V.'s parents believed that the demonstrated emotional changes in C.V. were related to his friendship with Respondent and his resistance to the parents' desire to draw more boundaries with respect to that friendship. C.V. did not testify. Therefore, the source, or sources, of the behavioral issues observed by his parents and other adults around him were not conclusively established. Respondent's Relevant Background Respondent viewed herself as a teacher who was relatable to her students. She was an enthusiastic and energetic educator who enjoyed taking the time to help students whom she described as having previously slipped through the cracks. Respondent regularly provided extra help to students who requested it. Her door was open to any of her students who desired additional assistance with their school work. She regularly provided academic help to students during her lunch break. Tutoring C.V. first began receiving extra help with his school work from Respondent during his lunch period. In addition to C.V., Respondent regularly had between five and 15 other students in her classroom during the seventh-grade lunch period. This was also the time allotted to Respondent for her own lunch break. There was also a group varying between five and ten students whom she allowed to come to her classroom to work while she was teaching another class. Additionally, C.V. came to Respondent for help with his work in the mornings before school started. After C.V. began spending extra time working with Respondent, his grades improved. C.V.'s parents were aware of the correlation between the help from Respondent and the improvement in C.V.'s academic performance. In December of 2017, C.V.'s mother contacted Respondent and asked her to tutor C.V. outside of school on a private basis in exchange for payment. Respondent communicated with C.V.'s mother through email and text messages. Respondent authorized C.V.'s mother to give Respondent's cell phone number to C.V. so that he could communicate with her directly for educational purposes while the mother was at work. There was no evidence of the content of any text messages between Respondent and C.V. C.V. rode the school bus as his mode of transportation to return home after school. He was unable to stay after school for tutoring and still take the bus to get home. Although it was common for teachers to tutor students at a public library located near Don Estridge, Respondent found that when doing so, she often had to wait with students after tutoring sessions at the library for parents to arrive to provide transportation. This sometimes interfered with Respondent's ability to pick up her own children from preschool on time. For that reason, Respondent tutored C.V. after school at his home. She ensured that others were present at the home during tutoring sessions. Respondent also continued helping C.V. at school outside of his scheduled time in her class on an unpaid basis. With the consent of C.V.'s mother, Respondent transported C.V. from the school to his home either after helping him at school or when she was going to his home to tutor him. There was one occasion when Respondent drove C.V. to school for which it was unclear whether the parents gave her permission to do so. Believing that C.V. had developed an unhealthy attachment to Respondent, C.V.'s parents desired to limit his interaction with her. However, they did not terminate the tutoring sessions. Additionally, C.V.'s mother initiated contact between Respondent and C.V. on matters unrelated to academics amid the parents' efforts to create boundaries in the relationship. C.V.'s Time Spent in Respondent's Classroom In order to come to her classroom during their designated lunch periods, students were required to have a pass signed by Respondent. Those students who came to Respondent's classroom during lunch regularly reused the same pass to eliminate the need for her to create a new pass each time. C.V., along with other students, had such a pass issued by Respondent. Several witnesses testified that C.V. had a sticker on the back of his student identification card, which they characterized as a permanent pass placed there by Respondent, enabling C.V. to visit her classroom at any time. However, the provenance and meaning of the sticker were never conclusively established. On several occasions, C.V. left his elective music class to do work from other classes in Respondent's classroom. He did so with the coordinated permission of Respondent and the music teacher. Respondent believed that it was reasonable for C.V. to do so because her classroom provided a quieter environment for his studies and he was ahead in the music class because of his existing background in piano. When C.V.'s parents learned how much time C.V. was spending in Respondent's classroom during the school day, they thought that it was excessive. Church Attendance and Sharing Religious Beliefs Respondent served as an unpaid worship leader and co-runner of the children's ministry at a church where her father was the pastor. Neither she, nor any other person, served in a role designated to recruit members to the church. Respondent did not receive any incentive from the church to bring in new members. Respondent played music of various genres in her classroom. Sometimes she played Christian music. Respondent wore a cross necklace to school. When asked, she was open with students about the general fact that she was a Christian and that she attended church. Witnesses observed flyers with information about Respondent's father's church on her desk. It was not established that any students received, or even saw, the flyers. Some of Respondent's students have attended her father's church. When a student expressed interest in the church, Respondent did not give the student information about the church without express permission from a parent. With the permission of his parents, C.V. attended Respondent's father's church on several occasions. His parents attended the church with him on one occasion. Also, with the permission of his parents, C.V. was transported to and from church by Respondent or her husband and spent time with Respondent's family at her home after church. At some point, C.V. told some of his classmates that he attended Respondent's church. The nature of C.V.'s comments to his classmates about attending church with Respondent remains unclear. The evidence did not establish that Respondent directed him to do so. Admittedly out of frustration, Respondent posted a Psalm on the door outside of her classroom before leaving Don Estridge on her last day. She had contemplated handing the Psalm to Principal Capitano, but chose to place it on the door instead. A teacher observed the Psalm on the door, and an assistant principal removed it. Overnight Visits On one occasion, C.V. spent the night at Respondent's home with her family while his mother was out of town on a business trip. Having the impression that C.V. was unhappy at the prospect of going on the trip, Respondent and C.V.'s mother arranged for C.V. to stay with Respondent and her family for the weekend. C.V. spent the night at Respondent's home on a second occasion, which was also coordinated between Respondent and C.V.'s mother. C.V. expressed that he wanted to live with Respondent and that he knew more about her than her husband. Exchanging Gifts C.V.'s mother gave Respondent a number of gifts during the time when she was C.V.'s teacher. As a Christmas gift, C.V.'s mother gave Respondent a $100 gift card and two lipsticks. Later, she gave Respondent dresses for her daughters. Finally, for Valentine's Day, she gave Respondent a stuffed animal and a thermal water bottle. Respondent considered the series of gifts to be very generous. C.V.'s birthday was in February. Respondent wanted to reciprocate the generosity of C.V.'s mother by buying C.V. clothes for his birthday. Respondent sought permission from C.V.'s mother to purchase him clothing, which his mother declined. Believing that C.V.'s mother declined the gifts out of social politeness, Respondent ultimately bought him clothing for his birthday. Virginity Conversation One day during class, some of Respondent's students were discussing the topic of virginity among themselves. Respondent was not a party to the conversation until C.V. asked her at what age she thought kids should lose their virginity. Respondent believed that this was an age-appropriate topic for her 12- and 13-year old students to be curious about, but she declined to answer the question. She then told C.V. that it was not an appropriate question for her and that he should ask his mother instead. Although numerous witnesses testified to what they thought Respondent said to her students about virginity, Respondent is the only witness who was present during the conversation. Her testimony on the subject was credible. Principal Capitano testified that if a student brings up the topic of virginity to a teacher, the teacher should respond by saying that it is not an appropriate conversation to have. Meeting with the Guidance Counselor and Aftermath On March 12, 2018, Respondent became concerned that C.V. was exhibiting behavior that caused her to fear that he was considering harming himself. Although she did not believe that C.V. wanted to go, Respondent escorted him to see one of the school's guidance counselors, Kristen Saffici. Respondent took this action because she believed it was her obligation to do so based on C.V.'s behavior, which she considered potentially self-injurious. Counselor Saffici and Principal Capitano agreed that bringing C.V. to a guidance counselor was the appropriate course of action for Respondent under the circumstances. Respondent remained in the meeting with Counselor Saffici and C.V. Respondent told Counselor Saffici about her impressions of the problems C.V. was having. Over the course of explaining the background of what she believed to be C.V.'s problems, Respondent stated that she "loved him like a son." Counselor Saffici thought that the statement was inappropriate. From Respondent's perspective, saying that she loved C.V. like a son was a device she regularly employed with students to offset, or soften, a concurrent critical statement. During the meeting, Counselor Saffici observed that C.V. appeared withdrawn and sullen. He had his backpack on the table with his head down on the backpack and did not make eye contact. Respondent consoled C.V. by rubbing his head. Counselor Saffici believed that Respondent's behavior toward C.V. was not appropriate. Counselor Saffici, however, did not perceive the behavior to be sexual in nature. Based on her observations, Counselor Saffici believed that Respondent had no mal intent. It was her opinion that Respondent had C.V.'s best interest at heart. Following the meeting with Counselor Saffici, the school resource officer, Gary Chapman, interviewed C.V. independently to determine whether C.V. was a threat to himself or others. Officer Chapman concluded that C.V. was not considering self-harm at that time. Based on the interview, Officer Chapman's understanding was that C.V.'s emotional distress was related to his desire to see his biological father more often. C.V.'s parents met with Principal Capitano, Counselor Saffici, and Officer Chapman. Having determined that there was no reason to suspect a sexual relationship between Respondent and C.V., Officer Chapman closed his investigation. Principal Capitano told Respondent not to have further contact with C.V. The next day, C.V. came, unexpectedly, to Respondent's classroom to see her. Respondent spoke to him, but tried to get him to leave without alarming him or being rude. After C.V. left, Respondent immediately advised Principal Capitano and Counselor Saffici that he came to her classroom, and Respondent sought their guidance on what to do. Feeling that she did not have clear direction on what to do if C.V. came back, Respondent posted a Psalm on her door and left Don Estridge after her first-period class. In a letter dated March 16, 2018, Principal Capitano recommended Respondent's termination as a probationary employee at Don Estridge, effective March 27, 2018. The letter did not specify a reason for Respondent's termination, but stated: "Probationary Contract Employees may be dismissed without cause or may resign without breach of contract." Principal Capitano, however, testified that she recommended Respondent's termination because she believed that Respondent had violated the Code of Ethics. Specifically, Principal Capitano thought that Respondent put herself in a position where her relationship with a student was causing him duress. Following the events of March 12, 2018, C.V.'s parents arranged for C.V. to talk to a therapist. Thereafter, they observed improvements in his behavior. The content of the discussions C.V. had with his therapist was not conclusively established. Overall Nature of C.V. and Respondent's Relationship C.V.'s parents believed that C.V. saw Respondent as a girlfriend. However, they never thought that Respondent considered the relationship romantic or that anything sexual occurred. Some of Respondent's colleagues thought that her relationship with C.V. was uncomfortable or lacked appropriate boundaries. C.V.'s mother, viewed Respondent as a positive role model. In encouraging Respondent's relationship with C.V. in some respects, while attempting to establish more boundaries in others, C.V.'s parents were trying to balance the dramatic improvement in C.V.'s grades with what they believed to be C.V.'s unhealthy attachment to Respondent. Respondent believed that C.V. was very bright, but not applying himself in school. It was her desire to help him fulfill his potential. On a social level, she thought that he was a polite young man who shared hobbies with her husband and interacted well with her daughters.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Education Practices Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the Amended Administrative Complaint and all charges contained therein. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of January, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of January, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire Charles T. Whitelock, P.A. 300 Southeast 13th Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 (eServed) Mark S. Wilensky, Esquire Dubiner & Wilensky, LLC 1200 Corporate Center Way, Suite 200 Wellington, Florida 33414-8594 (eServed) Lisa M. Forbess, Interim Executive Director Education Practices Commission Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 316 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Matthew Mears, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed) Randy Kosec, Jr., Chief Office of Professional Practices Services Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 224-E 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 (eServed)
