Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Delmar D. Carter purchased the Buccaneer Motel and Woodside Apartments [the motel] from C.E.K., Inc., whom respondents represented in the sale. Respondents agreed to accept less from C.E.K., Inc., as their commission on the sale, that they might have otherwise, because the Carters agreed to give respondents the exclusive right to resell the motel for a period of five years. Two years after they purchased the motel, the Carters asked O.B. Linkous to try to sell the motel, but the Carters sell held the motel when the resale agreement expired in late 1978. One of the obligations assumed by the Carters in exchange for the motel was secured by a mortgage that C.E.K., Inc., had executed in favor of O.B. Linkous Realty, Inc., on December 14, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This assumed obligation required the Carters to make certain monthly payments to the corporate respondent including a payment of $862.19 on January 1, 1979. Under the mortgage agreement, the entire principal (originally $88,247.93) would become due if a "default continue for a space of 30 days." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On January 25, 1979, Mr. Carter delivered to Mr. Linkous a check in the amount of $862.19, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, as payment of the amount due on January 1, 1979. When he handed the check to respondent Linkous, Mr. Carter told him that the funds in the account on which the check was drawn were insufficient for the drawee to pay the check, but that he would deposit sufficient funds on the following day. Respondent Linkous answered that he saw no problem since he intended to deposit the check in his own account in another bank and assumed it would be at least a day before the check was presented to the drawee. On the following day, Mr. Carter deposited $865.96 in the account on which the check was drawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On January 31, 1979, the balance in the account was $1,000.32. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Instead of depositing the check, respondent Linkous took the check, on the same day he received it, to the Flagship First National Bank of Ormond Beach, on which it was drawn, and persuaded a teller there to stamp it so as to indicate that it had been dishonored because sufficient funds were not on deposit. On February 7, 1979, a mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed against the Carters and C.E.K., Inc., (as holder of a junior mortgage), in which respondents' attorney alleged that the Carters had "defaulted under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the payment due January 1, 1979, and all subsequent payments." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Carters retained counsel who filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was alleged, inter alia, that Linkous "deliberately with premeditated design, deceived and tricked [the Carters]." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After these pleadings had been filed, the Carters agreed to respondents' counsel's suggestion that they grant the corporate respondent the exclusive right to sell the motel for another five-year period in exchange for an end to the litigation, and executed an agreement to that effect. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The parties stipulated that both respondents hold real estate licenses issued by petitioner.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondents' licenses for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725
The Issue Whether petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner field applications for registration as a real estate salesman with respondent on October 10, 1977. Question 16 of the application reads as follows: 16. Have you, in this state, operated, attempted to operate, or held yourself out as being entitled to operate, as a real estate salesman or broker, within one year next prior to the filing of this application without then being the holder of a valid current registration certificate authorizing you to do so? The petitioner answered "no" to Question 16. On December 8, 1977, respondent Florida Real Estate Commission issued an order denying the application based on its determination that the applicant had operated, attempted to operate or held himself out as a real estate broker or salesman within the one year period prior to filing his application. Petitioner thereafter requested a hearing in the matter. (Exhibit 1) Petitioner is the president of Marketing Institute Corporation of the Americas, Ltd. of San Jose, Costa Rica. (MICA) The firm operates as a real estate sales organization under the laws of Costa Rica, and is owned by Insco S.A., a Costa Rican holding company. (Testmony of McIntire, Figueredo) In 1975, petitioner became associated with William W. Landa, president of Costa del Sol, a condominium project in Miami, Florida. His function was to produce sales of condominium units as a result of sales efforts in Latin America. Part of the informal arrangement was the petitioner occupied a rental villa at the condominium project. His success in producing sales was limited and, as a result, the association was terminated sometime in 1976. In a letter to Lands, dated January 21, 1977, petitioner sought an accounting of expenses incurred in the operation and stated that he had produced three purchasers for which commissions were payable at the rate of "10% for foreign sales and 5% on domestic sales." Although no explanation of the terms "foreign sales" and "domestic sales" was presented, Landa testified at the hearing that petitioner did not sell in Florida for Costa del Sol. (Testimony of Landa, Figueredo, Exhibits 2-3) On December 1. 1976, the receiver in bankruptcy of the estates of Grandlich Development Corporation and Fisher Development Corporation, Fred Stanton Smith, president of the Keyes Company, Miami, Florida, Wrote petitioner and offered to pay his firm a 10% commission on "all sales closed by you of all Commodore Club Condominiums sold to your prospects." The commission was to be payable to MICA through its agent in the United States, Transcontinental Properties, Inc. of Miami, Florida, a corporate broker, The Commodore Club is a condominium project located at Key Biscayn, Florida. Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. was the registered broker for the sales of the condominiums and kept sales agents on the premises. Smith instructed Hemisphere to cooperate with foreign brokers in the sales of the properties. Petitioner proceeded under this arrangement to obtain and refer prospective foreign purchasers to Transcontinental who arranged to show the condominium units to the clients and consummate any resulting sales. Although petitioner had desk space in the Transcontinental office from September, 1976, to August, 1977, he was not supposed to show properties to clients or be involve in any real estate sales functions. In September, 1976, the president of Transcontinental placed a telephone call to respondent's legal office at Winter Park, Florida and ascertained that commissions could be paid to a foreign broker. However, he was informed by the Commission representative that it was a "gray" area and, although the foreign representative could serve as an interpreter for foreign clients during transactions in the United States, he could not perform any of the sales functions himself in Florida. Sales were made in this manner and commission checks were paid to petitioner's firm during the period January - September, 1977. (Testimony of Smith, McIntire, Figueredo, Exhibits 4, 5, 12, 13, 15) On July 1, 1976, Alexander Sandru purchased a condominium at the Commordore Club through the Keyes Company as broker. He was a friend of petitioner's from Caracas, Venezuela, and the latter had recommended his purchase of the condominium. However, petitioner was not in the United States at the time Sandru viewed the property and purchased it. Petitioner claimed a commission on the sale and it was paid to his firm through Transcontinental's predecessor company. A dispute arose over the payment of the commission because a saleswoman of Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. had shown the property to Sandru and assumed that she would earn the commission on any resulting sale. (Testimony of Lundberg, Nelson, Murragy, Exhibits 8-11) On several occasions in 1976 and 1977, petitioner accompanied Latin American individuals to the Commodore Club where a representative of Hemisphere showed them various condominium units. During this time, petitioner would inquire concerning maintenance charges and the like and transmit such information to the individuals in Spanish. Several of these persons were connected with petitioner's foreign firm and were not prospective purchasers. (Testimony of Lundberg, Figueredo, Exhibit 7) On January 30, 1977, Insco S.A. entered into a purchase agreement for a Commodore Club condominium unit. Petitioner signed the agreement on behalf of his firm MICA as broker for the transaction. However, the deal was never consummated. (Testimony of Figeredo, Exhibit 14)
Recommendation That Petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, be denied. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1978. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard J. Mandell, Esquire 748 Seybold Building Miami, Florida 33132
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Janis K. Hinsch (Hinsch), was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license No. 0350063. Hinsch was the vice president and sole qualifying broker of Respondent, Huntco of Marco, Inc., a Florida corporation, licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, license No. 0222987. During all times material hereto Huntco was the owner of the Sea Oats Beach Club, a condominium located in Charlotte County, Florida. Huntco marketed the Sea Oats Beach Club under a time-share plan. The gravamen of the complaint in this case involves the sale of eight time-share units during the period of April 9, 1983 through August 11, 1983. The purchase agreements executed by the eight purchasers in question provided in pertinent part: 8. CLOSING AND TITLE At closing, . . . Seller shall deliver its warranty deed conveying fee title to the Unit Week(s) to Buyer under a plan of Interval Ownership as defined in the Declaration of Condominium . . . . The closing will be . . . not later than one (1) year from the date of this Agreement. Petitioner contends Hinsch and Huntco are guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, because the deeds for the eight units were not delivered to the clerk of the court for recording within one year of the date the purchase agreements were executed. Petitioner's assertion is ill-founded. The deeds for each of the units in question were executed within 30 days of the date the purchase agreements were executed. The deeds, together with other pertinent documents, were delivered to a title company for closing and for issuance of an owner's title insurance policy. The title company, subsequent to closing, was to have forwarded the deed to the clerk for recording and, upon return of the recorded deed by the clerk, to have delivered the deed to the purchaser(s). However, the title company, through a clerical error, failed to deliver the deeds for these eight units to the clerk for recording. Respondent, upon receiving notice that purchasers had not received their deeds, immediately inquired of the title company to discern the reason, the error was discovered, and the deeds were promptly recorded. Admittedly, the deeds were not recorded within one year of the date the purchase agreements were executed, but the purchase agreements only required that the closing be held within one year. There is no evidence to suggest that the deeds in question were not delivered to the title company, or that these transactions were not closed, within one year of the date the purchase agreements were executed.
Findings Of Fact The following findings of fact are based upon the stipulation of the parties, as well as the evidence presented at hearing, including the demeanor of the witnesses: Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., was a developer of a time-share property, within the meaning of Section 721.05(9), Florida Statutes, in Osceola County in 1984. Bailey M. Weldon was a general partner of Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., and a developer of time-share property known as Polynesian Isles Resort Condominium I from November 23, 1982 to January 16, 1985. Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., submitted certain advertising to Petitioner for approval on January 9, 1984, and was noticed of deficiencies in its Polynesian Isles- Super Bowl advertising materials by notice issued by the Petitioner on January 17, 1984. These advertising materials were distributed in the January 18, 1984 Super Bowl Supplement to the St. Petersburg Times without correction of the noticed deficiencies. No time-share unit weeks were sold as a result of this ad. It was represented in the Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., public offering statement, and its sales contract with purchasers of time-share unit weeks, that purchasers would obtain fee title to purchased unit weeks free and clear of encumbrances. It was also represented in such sales contracts with purchasers of time-share unit weeks that Polynesian Isles Developments, Ltd., as Seller, would provide purchasers with an owner's title insurance policy upon closing Respondent agrees and stipulates that no owner's title insurance policy was issued for some of the unit weeks sold and closed in 1984. The evidence establishes that no title insurance policies were issued for 329 unit weeks. Respondent established an escrow account for the deposit and withdrawal of all funds received from, or on behalf of, time-share purchasers. Daniel Giannini served as escrow agent for Polynesian Isles Developers, Ltd., for the purpose of receiving and disbursing funds pursuant to Section 721.08 Florida Statutes. Respondent agrees and stipulates that some affidavits for release of escrow funds were delivered to Daniel Giannini as escrow agent when all conditions required by Section 721.08, Florida Statutes, had not occurred. The evidence establishes that these affidavits falsely stated that all conditions for closing had occurred when, in fact, closing had not properly occurred on 331 unit weeks in 1984 because title was not conveyed free and clear of all encumbrances. As a result, purchasers' funds in escrow were released to Respondent without the conveyance of free and clear title or the issuance of title insurance policies. Goldome Savings Association held the primary mortgage on the first phase of the Polynesian Isles Development. This mortgage encumbered unit weeks sold by the Development. Respondent failed to obtain partial releases from Goldome of the mortgages on 331 unit weeks which closed in 1984, and therefore the sale of these weeks closed without free and clear title. Deeds to the 331 unit weeks were recorded without disclosure of the underlying mortgage. Title insurance policies were not issued on 329 of these unit weeks as a result of the failure to obtain releases. Respondent Weldon was the general partner who was in charge of legal matters, closings and title insurance. He also supervised the general manager of Polynesian Isles with his other general partner, Richard Barcley. It was Weldon's general practice to sign escrow affidavits in blank and to rely on his employees to insure that they were used properly at closings. The general manager of the development during 1984 was Frank Cuyler. Respondent terminated Cuyler when he learned that Cuyler had agreed to an unfavorable change in the terms of Goldome's mortgage as an inducement to obtaining financing for phase II of the development, and had failed to report such change to Respondent, or obtain his approval. The effect of the change which was agreed to by Cuyler was to increase the amount the development had to pay to Goldome for a partial release on each unit-week from $1800 to approximately $3800. When it became apparent that it was not financially feasible for the development to pay this increased amount for releases, Cuyler simply proceeded to close on 331 unit-weeks without releases. Respondent was unaware of this practice, and when it came to his attention he immediately gave instructions that it be discontinued, and terminated Cuyler. In addition, he raised approximately $1.4 million, including $300,000 of his own money, to obtain the releases on these 331 unit-weeks, and to cure any mortgage default. However, the evidence does not establish that releases were ever obtained.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that Petitioner enter a Final Order assessing an administrative penalty against Respondent Bailey M. Weldon in the amount of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1988. APPENDIX (DOAH Case No. 86-1003) Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1.(a)-(c) Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 1(d) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 1(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 1(f)-(g) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5 1(h)-(i) Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 2(a)-(b) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 2(c)-(e) Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 2(f) Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 2(g)-(h) Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 2(i)-(j) Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 2(k) Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Rejected since this is a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 3A Rejected as irrelevant to the charges in this case. 3B Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. 3C Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 5. 3D Adopted in Finding of Fact 3, assuming typographical error of 229 which should be 329. 3E Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 3F(a) Rejected in Finding of Fact 7. 3F(b) Rejected as not based upon competent substantial evidence in the record. 3F(c) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8. 3F(d) Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 4, 6. COPIES FURNISHED: Pamela S. Leslie, Esquire Eric H. Miller, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Charles Edwin Ray, Esquire 6534 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33707 E. James Kearney Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Van B. Poole Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007
The Issue Whether Petitioners' rental property was licensed under Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2003).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners, Robert Meller, Jr., and Kristine M. Meller, were owners of a rental property (a house located at 4516 Bowan Bayou) in Sanibel, Florida. In addition, they owned a condominium in the same area. Respondent Cross held a valid real estate license at all times material to matters at issue. Respondent Cross had a business relationship with Petitioners, which antedated the purchase of the Bowen Bayou house as a result of being the leasing agent for a condominium association with which Petitioners were associated. Respondent DBPR is the State of Florida agency which represents the FREC in matters such as this matter. In January 2000, Petitioners purchased the house in Sanibel located at 4516 Bowan Bayou. On or about January 20, 2000, Respondent Cross mailed a Rental Property Management Agreement to Petitioners for the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou, Sanibel, Florida. The parties to this contract were Petitioners and Properties in Paradise, Inc. Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., signed the contract and returned the contract to Respondent Cross. Petitioners maintain that the Rental Property Management Agreement was not signed by Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., and that his name is forged. He maintains that he entered into an oral agreement with Respondent Cross, individually, to manage the property. From the purchase of the house in January 2000 through April 2001, Petitioners received correspondence, including a monthly "owner statement" reflecting short-term rental income, commissions, and debits for maintenance, from Properties in Paradise, Inc., regarding all aspects of the business relationship contemplated by the Rental Property Management Agreement. By letter dated January 20, 2000, Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., authorized "Revonda Cross of Properties in Paradise as my agent in establishing telephone and electrical service and so forth for my property on Sanibel Island at 4516 Bowen's [sic] Bayou Road." Thereafter, Petitioners received correspondence from Respondent Cross relative to the subject property wherein she is identified as "Operations Manager, Properties in Paradise, Inc." During the relevant time period, Petitioners' property was rented at least 22 times; once for 17 days, four times for 14 days, once for nine days, thirteen times for seven days, and once for five days. The frequency and term of these rentals qualify for the statutory definition of a "resort dwelling" and transient rental dwelling. Properties in Paradise, Inc., listed the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou in the list of properties it provided the Division of Hotels and Restaurants as licensed in accordance with Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2005). In April 2001, Properties in Paradise, Inc., through an attorney, notified clients that it had effectively ceased doing business. At that time, Petitioners were owed $11,588.06, which went unpaid. Petitioners made a claim in July 2001, against Respondent Cross to recover their loss from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. In October 2003, Petitioners' claim was denied by the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order denying Petitioners' claim for recovery from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Robert L. Meller, Jr., Esquire Best & Flanagan, LLP 225 South 6th Street, Suite 4000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-4690 Revonda Stewart Cross 1102 South East 39th Terrace, No. 104 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
Findings Of Fact The parties to this proceeding have stipulated to the correctness of the following facts: Respondent filed a Consent and Joinder simultaneously with the Declaration of Tuscany Place, a condominium, which was recorded in Official Records Dock 1281, Page 1833, Public Records of Seminole County, Florida, and was filed with the Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums under I.D. #80 CN5742. Respondent accepted deeds in lieu of foreclosure from the Developer, Goehring Development Corp., under paragraph number 16.5 of the Declaration of Condominiums which deeds were dated May 10 and May 12, 1982, and recorded in Official Records Book of Seminole County, Florida. (Copies of the deeds are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts] and are self-explanatory.) Respondent sold Unit 16-E to Huey M. Napier. All remaining units were sold to Larry J. Whittle on January 31, 1983. Copies of contracts for the two purchases are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts]. The term "developer" was defined in paragraph 21.7 of the Condominium Declaration and was approved for filing by the Division including the provision that any successor or alternate developer must indicate its consent to be treated as the developer. Respondent attempted to comply with oral and written communications from the Division as to the regulation relating to "Subsequent Developer," as Respondent could not locate Statutes or Division Rules requiring Subsequent Developer filing. Copies of letters from the Division are attached [to the Stipulation as to Facts]. Respondent admits the sales described above, but denies any liability under Statutes or Rules as a matter of Law. The above-numbered paragraphs constitute the facts stipulated between the parties. Attached to the parties' stipulation are a series of documents. These documents establish that the aforementioned sale from Respondent to Huey M. Napier occurred on or about October 22, 1982. This sale involved a single condominium unit. The remaining ten units obtained by Respondent from the original developer by virtue of a deed in lieu of foreclosure were sold on or about January 4, 1983. On or about November 29, 1982, representatives of Petitioner warned Respondent's counsel that failure to file as a second developer with Petitioner in accordance with Section 718.502, Florida Statutes, would place Respondent in violation of that law. Respondent subsequently filed with Petitioner in accordance with the requirements of Section 718.502, Florida Statutes, on or about January 14, 1983.
