The Issue At issue is whether respondent should have a $200 civil penalty imposed for the alleged violation set forth in the administrative complaint. Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined:
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Almira C. Morgan, operates an adult congregate living facility under the name of Morgan Retirement Home at 432 South F Street, Lake Worth, Florida. The facility is licensed by petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), and as such, is subject to that agency's regulatory jurisdiction. On or about February 17, 1986, James Valinoti, an HRS program analyst, conducted a routine inspection of respondent's facility. During the course of the inspection, Valinoti requested documentation verifying that Morgan's employees were free of communicable diseases. This documentation is normally presented in the form of a certificate from a medical doctor. The requirement that employees be free of communicable disease was then embodied in Rule 10A- 5.19(5)(g), Florida Administrative Code [now renumbered as Rule 10A-5.019(5)(g) Since Morgan had no documentation to comply with the rule, Valinoti prepared a "Notification of Deficiencies" which recited the deficiency, class of violation, and date on which the deficiency had to be corrected. Morgan acknowledged receiving a copy of the same on March 14, 1986. According to the notice, Morgan had until April 12, 1986, in which to comply with the regulation. Sometime in April 1986 a nurse who was employed by Dr. David H. Kiner, a West Palm Beach internist, visited Morgan's facilities and administered skin tests for tuberculosis to Morgan and another employee named Violet Shepard. As agreed to by the parties, and for purposes of this proceeding only, this test was all that Morgan needed to comply with the rule. Dr. Kiner then prepared two small typewritten notes stating that the two were "free from communicable diseases." Through inadvertence, he did not place a date on the notes. When Valinoti returned to reinspect the facility on May 21, 1986, Morgan gave him the two notes. Because they were undated, Valinoti would not accept the notes. He did agree, however, that Morgan was making a good faith effort to comply with the rule. Nonetheless, he cited her for a Class III violation, a violation which "indirectly" or "potentially" threatens the safety, health or security of the residents. The administrative complaint was thereafter issued proposing that respondent be fined $200. Shortly after the administrative complaint was issued, Morgan obtained a third note from Dr. Kiner stating that the date had been omitted by "inadvertence." Morgan then contacted an HRS dietary inspector (Ms. Perez) who advised her to mail the notes to her, and she would give them to Valinoti. Although Morgan mailed the dated notes to Perez, the agency did not consider this to be timely correction of the deficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of violating Rule 10A- 5.19(5)(g), and that a $100 civil penalty be imposed. DONE AND ORDERED this 27th day of March 1987 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of March 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: K. C. Collette, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 111 Georgia Avenue, Third Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 James A. Cassidy, Esquire 120 South Olive Street Suite 711 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 393.0673(1), Florida Statutes (2018), Respondent, which holds a license to operate a group home facility, was identified in a verified report by the Department of Children and Families (DCF) as the perpetrator of exploitation of a vulnerable adult, failed to disclose on a renewal application a perpetrator of "the . . . abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult" (Maltreatment),1 and allowed a new employee to begin working at the group home before completing all of the background screening requirements; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, as authorized by the License, Respondent, a Florida not-for-profit corporation, has provided services to intellectually disabled persons residing at the Group Home. At all material times, Respondent's directors have been Etha Griffith, her daughter Kim Griffith, and Francis Griffith. The record does not disclose if Respondent has any members. Etha Griffith, who is 79 years old, serves as an officer and the onsite manager of the group home, for which Kim Griffith and Francis Griffith serve as the backup managers or supervisors of the Group Home. Petitioner presented no admissible evidence in support of Count I. Prominent among the excluded evidence is the Verified Report, as to which Petitioner failed to demonstrate its relevance, as explained in the Conclusions of Law, or its authenticity, given that it is unsigned and bears other indicia of an investigation that, although closed, was never completed.5 In support of Count II, Petitioner introduced the Application,6 which was filed on November 12, 2018. Etha Griffith7 completed the Application by providing the information requested on Petitioner's application form, which serves a natural person or legal entity who or that is an applicant or licensee seeking the issuance or renewal of a group home facility license (Application Form). Etha Griffith signed the Application as Respondent's designated representative, and her signature was notarized on November 8, 2018. The Application states the answer, "no," to the question posed in Section V, Item 2: "Have you or ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application ever been identified as responsible for the abuse, neglect, or abandonment of a child or the abuse, neglect, or exploitation of a vulnerable adult?" For several reasons, Petitioner failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the material facts in support of Count II. First, "no" was correct because the question refers to a determination, not allegation, of Maltreatment. The Application Form does not define "identified," whose common meaning is not "alleged," but "established,"8 such as after a completed investigation. As explained in endnote 5, the evidence fails to establish that DCF determined that Etha Griffith is the perpetrator of Maltreatment. Second, even if there had been a determination of Maltreatment in the Verified Report by November 12, 2018, "no" was not a willful or intentional misstatement or a false statement because neither Etha Griffith nor any other agent of Respondent knew about the Verified Report or DCF's determination of Maltreatment--and not for a lack of inquiry. Aware that an investigation had taken place during the summer of 2018, in October 2018, Kim Griffith contacted the DCF protective investigator who had conducted the investigation and asked for any findings. The investigator returned to her, not the Verified Report, but a Notice of Conclusion, stating only that the investigation was "complete" and "closed," and DCF had recommended no additional services. Etha Griffith has never received a copy of the Verified Report. No agent of Respondent knew anything about the Verified Report until preparing for the hearing in this case. On these facts, Etha Griffith and Respondent's other agents had no reason to think, as of November 12, 2018, that DCF had determined that Etha Griffith had perpetrated Maltreatment. Third, even if, by November 12, 2018, Etha Griffith were aware that DCF had determined that she had perpetrated Maltreatment, the failure to disclose this fact or the Verified Report was not material. An audit of the Group Home by Petitioner led to DCF's protective investigation, and the findings of the protective investigation, such as they were,9 implied that any misappropriation involved substantially smaller sums than those specified in the audit.10 Knowledge of the audit findings would thus include knowledge of the protective investigation findings. Fourth, as discussed in the Conclusions of Law, "no" is correct because, in the question posed in Section V, Item 2, "you" refers to the applicant or licensee, and "ownership controlling entity affiliated with this application" does not effectively refer to Etha Griffith. The Application Form does not define these terms. Items 1, 3, and 4 also contain questions posed to "you." The questions in Items 1 and 3 alternatively address a "controlling entity affiliated with this application," so, except for dropping "ownership," the questions in Items 1 and 3 are directed to the same addressee as is the question in Item 2. The question in Item 4 is directed only to "you." All four of these items frame questions seeking potentially important information about past license discipline and adverse action involving the Medicaid and Medicare programs.11 Judging from her testimony at the hearing, Etha Griffith possesses modest language skills. Given the level of analysis required to determine the meaning of "you" and "ownership controlled entity affiliated with this application," Etha Griffith could not possibly have understood that the question in Section V, Item 2 addressed her. The two key issues in Count III are whether Ms. Meliard was an employee or a covered volunteer, as defined in the Conclusions of Law, and, if so, whether she had completed her local screening. Ms. Meliard did not testify, nor did Petitioner direct any questions to Kim Griffith as to Count III. Petitioner's investigator testified that, upon his unannounced arrival at the Group Home at 2:05 p.m. on January 1, 2019, he found Ms. Meliard "seated in a chair by the front window," presumably in a common area of the house, such as a living room. Tr., p. 63. Ms. Meliard was alone in the Group Home, as the residents typically returned from their day programs around 3:00 p.m. Tr., p. 63. On the investigator's arrival, Ms. Meliard called Etha Griffith, who arrived at the Group Home very shortly after the call. Tr., p. 64. On her arrival, Etha Griffith told the investigator that she was "trying to give [Ms. Meliard] a job." Tr., p. 64. The testimony recited in this paragraph is credited. Petitioner's witnesses were in conflict as to the screening that Ms. Meliard had cleared. Petitioner's operations management consultant testified that Ms. Meliard had not cleared level 1 or 2 screening. Tr., p. 44. Petitioner's investigator testified to the same effect, but immediately corrected himself by saying that she had cleared Level 2 screening, but not local screening. Tr., pp. 65-66. Petitioner is unable to produce documentary evidence of screenings because this material is confidential, even in hearings of this type, according to Petitioner's counsel. Tr., p. 46. When asked if Ms. Meliard had cleared her level 2 screening, Etha Griffith testified, "That is the one we got, yeah." Tr., p. 95. No one asked Etha Griffith directly if Ms. Meliard had not yet passed her local screening. In a clear-and-convincing case, no finding is possible based on the negative implication inherent in Etha Griffith's statement. Her modest communication skills and laconic communication style betray a lack of mental acuity, so no inference is possible by Etha Griffin's use of the definite article, "the." A personnel file, which may be opened for a candidate for employment, typically contains evidence of a local screening, which comprises an inquiry to the relevant local law enforcement agency and a response from the agency. Tr., p. 83. Proof of a failure to obtain a local screening thus depends on a negative-- the absence of documentation in the personnel file. Unable to recall clearly whether he had seen evidence of a level 2 screening, Petitioner's investigator testified that he recalled not seeing evidence in Ms. Meliard's personnel file of clearing the local screening. Tr., p. 83. The testimony on the issues of employment and local screening is too vague and uncertain to support findings by clear and convincing evidence that, on January 10, 2019, Ms. Meliard was employed by Respondent and had not passed her local screening. The investigator presented himself as exceptionally capable and articulate, but nothing in the record suggests that he investigated with any diligence the employment or local screening issues involving Ms. Meliard.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Persons with Disabilities enter a final order finding Respondent not guilty of all counts set forth in the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of November, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of November, 2019.
The Issue Whether the named Respondent is guilty of an unlawful employment practice to wit: race, religion, national origin, and retaliation.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Pakistani citizen, female, and a practicing Muslim. Petitioner came to the United States in July 2003, and was employed by Alachua Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, a nursing home. As a practicing Muslim, Petitioner wore her traditional Pakistani robes to work on Fridays so that she could go to her mosque in her off-duty hours. At some point, Carl Young, a white male American, was hired as administrator of the facility. Petitioner's unrefuted testimony was that, at various times, Mr. Young said to her, "Oh, I hope you're not a terrorist"; "I'll kill you"; and "Shut up." On one occasion, Mr. Young told her about her robes, "You look like a terrorist. You have to stop wearing that." In March 2004, Steve Strawn, whom Petitioner believed to be one of the people buying the nursing home, told Petitioner she should make an application for employment to the purchasing entity or she could not stay employed after May 1, 2004. Petitioner claims Steve Strawn and Shelby Parker, whom Petitioner also believed to be buying the nursing home, took over the nursing home on February 1, 2004, but she had no solid information to corroborate that belief. The after-filed authorization for Ms. Bennett's representation of Respondent in this proceeding shows Ms. Shelby Parker as the "Director" of "The Manor at Gainesville." Petitioner claimed to have made her new employment application before May 1, 2004, but she had no copy of her application to put in evidence, and it is not clear to what corporate entity she applied. On or about March 29, 2004, Petitioner filed an internal grievance against Mr. Young. At Mr. Strawn's instruction, Petitioner was interviewed by third parties concerning her complaint. (See Finding of Fact 11.) On April 6, 2004, Integrity Health Care Systems, Inc., wrote Global Compliance Services concerning its investigation of Petitioner's foregoing allegations against Mr. Young. There is no competent evidence to explain the relationship of either of these entities to the Alachua Nursing and Rehabilitation Center or to The Manor at Gainesville. It appears that Petitioner did not provide the page of this exhibit (P-1), giving a final conclusion of the Integrity Health Care investigators, but most of their report points to Mr. Young's "shut up" incident being the only allegation of Petitioner against Mr. Young corroborated by the investigators. At some point, Mr. Young told Petitioner that there had been a complaint of abuse against her by three patients and he was putting her on leave. The Department of Children and Family Services investigated this complaint and returned a report that no indicators of abuse by Petitioner could be found. Petitioner testified, without refutation, that Mr. Young allowed her to return to work, and when she returned to work, on April 13, 2004, he fired her because she had complained against him to management. Petitioner certainly has not worked at the nursing home since May 1, 2004 and probably not since April 13, 2004. Alachua Nursing and Rehabilitation Center was renamed The Manor at Gainesville, effective May 1, 2004. Ms. Bennett did not know what corporate entity initially appointed Carl Young administrator or what corporate entity he worked for from February to May 2004. She did not know if he had been appointed under a Bankruptcy Court Order. She was unsure whether Mr. Young had worked for The Manor at Gainesville after May 1, 2004. Respondent offered Exhibit R-1, an Allocation Agreement, to which Petitioner objected. The exhibit is clearly hearsay (an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of its contents). It was considered here only pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(c), Florida Statutes, to explain or supplement other evidence. The Allocation Agreement was entered in facilitation of a transfer of property on or about May 1, 2004, between Healthcare Properties, Inc., a Florida S-corporation (Purchaser), The Manor at Gainesville, Inc., a Florida S Corporation (Lessee), and Marshall Preston Sweeney, an individual as court-appointed receiver. It states: Effective as of the Transfer Date, Lessee, at its sole discretion, may hire any or none of the former Nursing Home employees ("Employees") who complete a job application. Neither Purchaser nor Lessee shall be responsible for the Employees' accrued wages, salaries, sick leave, vacation time, and other benefits that have accrued and are due to the Employees as of 11:59 p.m. on the day immediately preceding the Transfer Date. Neither Purchaser nor Lessee shall be responsible for any claims, liabilities, losses, damages, demands, causes of action, suits (whether actual, pending, threatened, or suspected) or liability costs or expenses of any kind relating to any and all Employees and/or employment matters including, without limitation, Employee claims, employment discrimination, harassment, back pay, accrued time off, qui-tam issues, garnishments, and COBRA issues, or any other Employee or employment issues (herein referred to as "Employment Issues") that occurred or accrued prior to the Transfer Date. Neither Purchaser nor Lessee shall have any responsibility for any Employment Issues arising for such Employment Issues occurring on or after the Transfer Date for its own employees. Receiver shall identify all actual, pending, threatened, or suspected Employment Issues in the attached Schedule 2. No pending threatened or suspected employment issues are identified in the document. The document recites that due to failure to meet debts, a foreclosure resulted in the Purchaser tendering the highest and best bid on the Alachua Nursing and Rehabilitation Center nursing home property, and that the Purchaser will take title to the real property, lease the nursing home, and hold the state nursing home license. The Allocation Agreement was signed by Steve Strawn, as President of Healthcare Properties, Inc., Purchaser. Mr. Strawn also signed as President of the Lessee, The Manor at Gainesville, Inc. Marshall Preston Sweeney, the receiver, also signed the Allocation Agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Charge of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Noreen Abrar 309 Southwest 16th Avenue, No. 157 Gainesville, Florida 32601 Angi R. Hill Kimnie Bennett The Manor At Gainesville, Inc. 1000 Southwest 16th Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601
Findings Of Fact During times material hereto, Respondent, Ray C. Dorman, is the owner and administrator of Scarlet Manor. Scarlet Manor is an adult congregate living facility at 13009 Lake Carl Drive in Hudson, Florida. The facility has a census of 40 beds and of that census, two residents are elderly patients and the remaining 38 residents are "hard core" mental patients who require intensive and specialized nursing care. Ray Dorman (Respondent) is named as the confirmed perpetrator of neglect (FPSS No. 90-091417) based on a finding that Respondent neglected a resident at the ACLF. A certified letter from Petitioner dated September 22, 1990, which was received by Respondent on September 27, 1990, advised Respondent that he could challenge the confirmed finding of neglect if he considered that the classification was inaccurate or that it should otherwise be amended or expunged. Although Petitioner maintains that Respondent failed to challenge the confirmed finding of neglect, Respondent and his wife, Winifred Dorman, credibly testified that on October 10, 1990, she accompanied Respondent to an HRS office in Clearwater to deliver a written request to challenge the finding of neglect. While the office which would have addressed Respondent's challenge (Mr. Morton's office) is situated in St. Petersburg, on that point, it appears that Respondent's wife was either unclear as to exactly where the Respondent's challenge to the confirmed classification was delivered and nothing more. Respondent's facility has been the subject of regular survey reports wherein it was determined that Respondent's facility was deficient in maintaining minimum licensure requirements based on inspection surveys dating back to September, 1989. Mrs. Diane Cruz, a human services surveyor specialist employed by Petitioner, was part of a three (3) member team of surveyors at Respondent's facility during late September, 1989. During the September, 1989 survey, it was determined that Respondent's facility was deficient in several areas including fiscal policies, facility records, client records, medication records, staffing, food service standards, maintenance and housekeeping standards, resident care, admission criteria and fire safety standards. In all of the cited areas, Respondent corrected the deficiencies and no cited deficiency was outstanding at the time of the hearing herein. Significantly, of the numerous deficiencies that Respondent was cited, only three of the deficiencies were repeat deficiencies during the annual 1990 annual survey. Respondent's facility is a fairly new and modern facility and Respondent prides himself in providing his residents the high degree of nursing services which the residents of his ACLF require. In this regard, in each instance wherein Respondent was cited for deficiencies, the matter was corrected by the time that the follow-up survey was conducted with only two exceptions. Regarding those exceptions, Respondent credibly testified that he had undertaken a good faith effort to correct the deficiency by the time of the follow-up survey. In any event, all of the cited deficiencies were corrected and Respondent has abided by the terms of any restrictions including the payment of any administrative fines which were imposed by Petitioner. Such conduct evidences that Respondent is conscientious in the operation of his adult congregate living facility and, to his credit, more than one of and Petitioner's witnesses testified that Respondent operates a good ACLF.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner enter a final order granting Respondent a conditional license to operate Scarlet Manor as an adult congregate living facility. 1/ Afford Respondent an opportunity to challenge the confirmed classification naming him as the perpetrator in FPSS Report No. 90-091417 as soon as practical. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1991.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the petitioner should be dismissed from the Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida pursuant to legal authorities cited herein and for the factual reasons cited herein.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Veterans' Affairs is an agency of the State of Florida charged by the Legislature with administering and regulating various benefits and assistance programs for Florida resident veterans. The Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida (Home) is an assisted living facility as defined in Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. It provides shelter, sustenance and incidental medical care or temporary care for eligible veterans who suffer from a disability, disease or defect that incapacitates them from earning a living but who do not need hospitalization or skilled nursing services. It attempts to assist them in attaining maximum physical mental and social well-being through rehabilitative programs so as to restore into their highest level of functioning. Under the provisions of Chapter 296, Florida Statutes and Section 55-11.005, Florida Administrative Code, a veteran cannot be mentally ill, habitually inebriated or addicted to the use of controlled substances in order to be eligible to be admitted to the Home and to remain a resident therein. The Home is also licensed by the Agency for Health Care Administration as an Assisted Living Facility. It is also mandated to follow the statutes and rules administered by the Department of Elder Affairs contained in Chapter 58A, Florida Administrative Code. Under certain circumstances, as stated herein, the Executive Director of the Department of Veterans' Affairs refers dismissal decisions from the home administrator to the Division of Administrative Hearings for formal adjudication. Pursuant to Section 400.424, Florida Statutes, an assisted living facility is required to offer a contract to all residents which sets forth financial matters, rights, and obligations of the residents of the assisted living facility. Rule 58A-5.024(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a resident contract shall be given to all residents, and that the rights, duties and obligations of residents other than those specified in Section 400.428, as to residents rights, may be placed in that contract. Rule 58A-5.0181, Florida Administrative Code, states that prior to or at the time of admission, a new resident shall enter into a contract which meets the requirements of Rule 58A-5.024(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. On June 13, 1996, the Petitioner was given a Certificate of Eligibility for pre-screen examination prior to his admittance to the Home. Because he was identified as a substance abuser, based upon his "driving under the influence" conviction in Broward County, the Certificate of Eligibility made clear to him that he would be required to sign a six-month Addiction Recovery Support Contract and a "Mental Health Contract Supplement" as a stipulation for his admission. That letter also notified him that he would be required to have his sobriety verified by a mental health or substance abuse professional prior to pre- screening. See Respondent's Exhibit 9 in evidence. Thereafter on July 3, 1996, as provided by the relevant Florida Statutes and rules cited herein, the Home and the Petitioner entered into a contract, as a condition of the Petitioner's admission into the Home, which has a supervision of Self-Administered Medication requirement and an Addiction Recovery Support Supplement Contract as a requirement. The Supervision of Self-Administered Medication Supplement specifically provides that individuals under such contract are not allowed to secure their own narcotic medication from a nursing station for self-administration. They must have the drugs dispensed to them for self-administration by a nursing staff employee at the Home. The six month Addictions Recovery Support Contract which was signed by the Petitioner on June 26, 1996, provides that upon reasonable suspicion of being under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs the Petitioner must consent to testing, either through blood, saliva, or supervised urine tests. That contract further provides that if the Petitioner refuses to allow such tests or interferes in any way with the staffs performance of these tests, he may be dismissed from the Home. Thereafter, in the late evening hours of September 17th and 18th, 1996, Ms. Donna Harris and Sharon Johnson, LPN's who were then on duty at the Home, observed the Petitioner, without authority, reaching into a drug bin which contained narcotic substances, ostensibly to retrieve his own medications. This is a violation of the Self-Administered Medication Supplement Contract and other procedures of the Home. Later that same evening, Ms. Donna Harris detected the odor of alcohol on the Petitioner's person and thus, having a reasonable suspicion that he had been drinking, requested that he test for alcohol. The Petitioner refused testing in violation of his Addiction Recovery Support Contract. On October 8, 1996, Ms. Michelle Dicks, an LPN, also had reasonable suspicion that the Petitioner had been drinking due to the odor of alcohol and his behavior, she observed, and said she asked him to test based on this suspicion. The Petitioner refused to test again, in violation of his Addiction Recovery Support Contract. On September 18, 1996, Lawrence Davis, a counselor at the home, observed the Petitioner standing in line at a liquor store, apparently to make a purchase. Since Mr. Davis had information concerning the Petitioner's alleged alcohol use from the previous evening, he requested that the Petitioner test for alcohol use. The Petitioner agreed to test, the test was performed and was positive for alcohol consumption. Alcohol consumption is a violation of the Addiction Recovery Support Contract as well as the terms of the Petitioner's probation adjudged against him as a result of the criminal conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol, with property damage, in Broward County, Florida. Other conditions of his probation were attendance at AA meetings, restitution regarding the property damage and attendance at "DUI school." Lawrence Davis, the Petitioner's counselor, upon determining that the Petitioner had apparently relapsed into alcohol abuse, attempted to make arrangements for him to attend a VA rehabilitation program at the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs Medical Center in Lake City, a short distance up the street from the Home. Although various appointments were made by Mr. Davis for the Petitioner, the Petitioner refused to enroll in the rehabilitation program at the Lake City VA Medical Center. The field test for alcohol consumption has a high probability of correctness. Certain "false positives" are possible, based upon leaving the sample out untested for more than two minutes. The Petitioner's sample, however, according to credible testimony, was tested within a two minute period and tested positive. The test within the two minutes is the acceptable norm for a correct testing procedure promulgated by the manufacturer of the test kit, Roche Pharmaceuticals. The Petitioner was accordingly given a notice of dismissal from the Home on October 2, 1996, for violations of the Addiction Recovery Support Contract and for attempting to retrieve his narcotic medications out of the bin or basket without authority, in violation of his Self-Administered Medications Contract. A dismissal decision was made by Executive Director of the Department by letter of October 30, 1996 which ultimately resulted in this proceeding. Respondent's Exhibit 10 in evidence establishes the strict alcohol and drug testing policy at the Home. It is properly constituted in the statutory and regulatory authority referenced herein and was appropriately followed during the testing procedures of the Petitioner for alcohol consumption. The use of alcohol by individuals on Addiction Recovery Support Contracts or refusal by individuals to be tested for alcohol when engaged in such contracts and residence in the Home, is inimical to the proper operation of the Home. It frustrates its efforts to rehabilitate its members and to return them as better functioning members of society, as mandated by the requirements of Chapter 296, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED That a final order be entered by the Department of Veterans' Affairs dismissing Robert Thomas a resident of the Veterans' Domiciliary Home of Florida. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of June, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Major General Earl G. Peck Executive Director Department of Veteran's Affairs Post Office Box 31003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Ronald Frankel, General Counsel Department of Veteran's Affairs Post Office Box 31003 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Robert Thomas c/o Veterans Domiciliary Home 1300 Sycamore Lane Lake City, Florida 32025
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner's applications to renew licenses for two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport, Florida, should be denied and a $2,500.00 fine imposed for the reasons given in the Department of Children and Families' (Department) Amended Denial of Applications & Imposition of Fines issued on February 8, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Background The Department is charged with the responsibility of regulating the licensing and operation of residential treatment facilities pursuant to chapter 397, Florida Statutes (2017). Petitioner is a Delaware limited liability corporation authorized to conduct business in the State of Florida. Subject to the outcome of this proceeding, Petitioner is licensed to operate two Residential Level II facilities in Davenport under the name Cares Treatment. One facility is located at 146 Sunset View Drive (Case No. 18-0230), the other at 389 Sand Ridge Drive (Case No. 18-0234). The licenses were issued on December 15, 2016, and were to expire on December 14, 2017. Each license authorizes Petitioner to "provide substance abuse services for Adults and/or Children/Adolescents for the following component: Residential Level 2 (6 beds)."4/ Resp. Ex. 2. The Torres family home is not a licensed facility and services cannot be provided to residents who reside at that location. Petitioner is not licensed to provide services under the Partial Hospitalization Program (PHP), the Outpatient Program (OP), or the Intensive Outpatient Program (IOP).5/ These services require a separate license from the Department. In December 2017, Petitioner filed with the Department new applications to provide those services. However, the applications were denied and no appeal was taken. According to the renewal applications, Petitioner provides a "residential treatment facility for children and adolescents." Resp. Ex. 3. Each facility "is a free-standing residential facility which provides a structured living environment within a system of care approach for children, adolescents and adult[s] who have a primary diagnosis of mental illness or emotional disturbance and who may also have other disabilities." Id. Petitioner's facilities are a family-run business. Roberto Torres, Jr. (Mr. Torres), is the Chief Executive Officer and manager of the limited liability corporation; Cecilia Torres, his wife, is the Treasurer/Chief Financial Officer; Karla Torres, a daughter, is the Vice President/Chief Administrative Officer; Roberto Torres, III (the son), is the Secretary/Chief Information Officer; and Kristina Torres, a daughter, is the Ambassador/Chief Relationship Officer. Resp. Ex. 4. On November 27, 2017, Petitioner filed its applications for renewal of the two licenses. On December 1, 2017, the Department issued separate, but identical, letters denying both applications on the grounds they were not timely filed and they were incomplete. Resp. Ex. 5. On February 16, 2018, the Department was authorized to amend its letters of denial with a single amended denial document, which combined the original charges in the two letters into Counts I and II and added new Counts III, IV, and V. Resp. Ex. 1. The amended denial letter also seeks to impose a $2,500.00 administrative fine for violating various Class II rules. The specific rules are not identified in the original or amended charging documents, but the Department's PRO cites Florida Administrative Code Rule 65D- 30.003(1)(a) and "rules set forth in 65D-30" as the rules on which it relies. Because proper notice of the specific rules was not given, the rule violations have not been considered. The charges in the amended denial letter can be summarized as follows: Count I - The application for the facility at 146 Sunset View Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count II - The application for the facility at 389 Sand Ridge Drive was not timely filed and was incomplete in violation of sections 397.403 and 397.407(8). Count III - In November 2016, O.G., a 16-year-old female who had been recently discharged from a Baker Act facility, was admitted for treatment of substance abuse and mental health issues. After residing a few months at the Sunset View location, she was moved to the Torres family home, an unlicensed facility, where she remained for one or two months. By providing services at that unlicensed location, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1). She was then moved to the Sand Ridge location for two or three months before being returned to the Torres family home. She continued to receive substance abuse treatment at the family home until her discharge two or three months later. This constitutes a second violation of the same statute. While under the care of Petitioner, O.G. was subjected to actions which resulted in verified abuse reports against Mr. Torres and his son and contributed to the delinquency and exploitation of a child. Such conduct constitutes a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count IV - On October 19, 2017, J.W., who transferred from a Baker Act facility, was accepted by Petitioner for care and to receive "partial hospitalization program" services, which Petitioner is not licensed to provide. This constitutes a violation of sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. J.W. was later discharged in contravention of his wishes and desires, which resulted in him relapsing and again being Baker Acted. This conduct constitutes a threat to J.W.'s health or safety in violation of section 397.415(1)(d). Count V - On January 23, 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection at both licensed facilities to review J.W.'s files, but was denied access to the premises. Petitioner later failed to respond to a written request by the Department for records relating to J.W. and O.G. This conduct constitutes a violation of section 397.411. The charging document asserts the conduct in Count III violates four Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a $500.00 fine should be imposed for each violation; and the conduct described in Count IV violates "applicable" Class II rules (not otherwise identified), for which a single $500.00 penalty should be imposed. Rule 65D-30.003(1)(a), the only rule cited in the Department's PRO, requires in relevant part that "all substance abuse components" be provided "by persons or entities that are licensed by the department pursuant to Section 397.401, F. S." The Charges Counts I and II Section 397.407(8) provides that "the Department may deny a renewal application submitted fewer than 30 days before the license expires." For Petitioner to meet this deadline, license renewal applications were due on or before November 15, 2017. An application is not considered filed until an application with the signature of the chief executive officer is submitted by the applicant. Around 3:30 p.m. on November 27, 2017, Mr. Torres spoke by telephone with Ms. Harmon, the Department System of Care Coordinator, regarding three new licensure applications he was filing. During the conversation, he was reminded that renewal applications for his two existing licenses had not been filed. Mr. Torres responded that he "would have to get on that." Properly signed renewal applications were submitted electronically at 5:00 p.m. and 5:42 p.m. that afternoon. In his cross-examination, Mr. Torres attempted to establish that the Department's website, the Provider Licensing and Designation System (PLADS), was periodically inoperative, and this prevented him from filing his on-line applications in a timely manner. However, there is no credible evidence to support this claim. In fact, after Mr. Torres raised this issue early on in the case, Ms. Harmon reviewed the activity log of Mr. Torres' two on-line applications and found that he began the application process in late August or early September 2017, but did nothing further until he hit the submit button after speaking with her on November 27, 2017. Also, during this same period of time, the PLADS program (to which all applicants have access) indicated that the applications were in "Waiting Approval" status, which meant the applications were "in process" but had never been submitted. Therefore, the applications were not timely filed.6/ Section 397.403(1)(f) requires license applications to include, among other things, "proof of satisfactory fire, safety, and health inspections." Neither application filed on November 27, 2017, included an updated Treatment Resource Affidavit, a current Fire and Safety Inspection form, and a complete and current Health Facility and Food Inspection form. Therefore, the applications filed on November 27, 2017, were incomplete. Count III On November 17, 2016, O.G., then a 16-year-old female, was admitted for treatment at the facility. O.G. had a history of bi-polar episodes, depression, and drug abuse. Before seeking treatment at Petitioner's facility, she had been Baker Acted twice. After learning about Petitioner's facility through another provider, O.G.'s family placed her in the facility to address her substance abuse and behavior problems. Upon admission, a treatment plan was devised by a licensed mental health counselor (LMHC), with a target completion date of May 17, 2017. Resp. Ex. 10. The treatment plan listed four staff members overseeing her case: Karla Torres (case manager); the LMHC; and S.F. and K.V., two "caregivers" or interns. Id. O.G. was discharged from the facility nine months later on August 14, 2017. Petitioner was paid approximately $166,000.00 by O.G.'s parents for her nine-month stay. O.G. was initially placed in the facility located at 146 Sunset Drive, where she remained for approximately three months. She was then moved to the Torres family home at 2347 Victoria Drive in Davenport for two or three months. The Torres home is not a licensed facility. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing services during that period of time, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1), which makes it unlawful to provide substance abuse services at an unlicensed location. O.G.'s parents were unaware that their daughter was residing in the unlicensed family home. After Mr. Torres and O.G. "got into an argument," she was moved to the facility at 389 Sands Drive for several months. She then returned to the Torres home, where she remained for two or three months until she was discharged. By housing her at an unlicensed location and providing substance abuse services, Petitioner violated section 397.401(1) a second time. During her stay at the Torres home, Mr. Torres discussed "sex" with O.G.; he told her that he cheated on his wife; and he complimented her "quite a few times" for having "a nice body." He also told her that "18" was a special age and if she were 18 years old, things would be different. He added that her parents were "too strict." These highly inappropriate comments were especially egregious in nature, given the fact that O.G. was a minor with mental health and substance abuse issues, and she was living in the licensee's family home. One photograph of O.G. taken in the home shows Mr. Torres standing in the background donned in his pajamas. Resp. Ex. 16. These actions constitute a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2., which makes it unlawful to commit an intentional or negligent act materially affecting the health or safety of an individual receiving services from the provider. Mr. Torres occasionally escorted O.G. to two local bars (Miller's Ale House and Marrakesh Hooka Lounge) in Champions Gate. On one visit to Miller's Ale House in April or May 2017, he purchased her a Blue Moon beer, even though she was a minor and in a substance abuse program. She consumed the beer in his presence while the two sat at the bar. Although Mr. Torres attempted (through argument) to deny the incident, O.G. filmed the event on her cell phone. Resp. Ex. 13. This action by him also constitutes a violation of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Petitioner argues in its PRO that the whole incident was a fabrication and the result of a conspiracy by O.G.'s father, the Tampa Police Department, and Department counsel. The contention is rejected. When O.G. was discharged from the residential treatment facility in August 2017, Petitioner enrolled her in another program, IOP, which required her to periodically return to the facility on weekends for further treatment. Her first return visit was the weekend of August 26, 2017. During the weekend visit, the son gave her a cell phone. O.G.'s admission document for the IOP program indicated she would be given IOP services for 60 to 90 days, with a goal of her being substance free at the end of that period. Resp. Ex. 24. There is no record of her being discharged from the program. The Department argues in its PRO that by providing IOP services to O.G., Petitioner was providing a service beyond the scope of its license. However, this allegation was not included in the amended charging document and has not been considered. See, e.g., Trevisani v. Dep't of Health, 908 So. 2d 1108, 1109 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)(a licensee may not be disciplined for an offense not charged in the complaint). After being discharged from her original treatment plan on August 14, 2017, O.G. returned to her mother's home. Except for one weekend visit to Petitioner's facility for IOP services, she remained at home until September 16, 2017. That day, O.G. ran away from home with Preston, a resident she had met at Petitioner's facility. After leaving home, she went to Melbourne, and then to West Palm Beach. A Missing/Endangered Runaway Juvenile bulletin was posted by law enforcement on October 5, 2017. Resp. Ex. 11. During this period of time, Petitioner’s records show that O.G. was still enrolled in the unlicensed IOP program. Resp. Ex. 24. While in the West Palm Beach area, O.G. contacted the son on the cell phone he had given her and told him she had run away from home. She asked him to send her some money so that she could go to Tampa to work in a strip club. Because O.G. was not old enough to accept a wire money transfer, the son wired $600.00 to a friend of O.G., who gave her the money. Using the money provided by the son, O.G. traveled to Tampa and met the son on September 30, 2017. The two went to Todd Couples Superstore, where he purchased several adult entertainment outfits she could wear to audition for a job in a strip club. Resp. Ex. 12. He also purchased her various personal items at a Walgreens. The son then drove her to several clubs to audition for a job. After several auditions, she was hired by Scores Tampa, a local strip joint where "people take off their clothes for money." O.G., who was only 17 years old at the time, signed an employment contract on September 30, 2017, using a borrowed driver's license of S.F., a 21-year-old female. Resp. Ex. 15. S.F. was a former intern at Petitioner's facility and is listed as a member of the team staff on O.G.'s initial treatment plan. By that time, S.F. had left Petitioner's facility and moved back to Tampa. That same evening, O.G. began working in Scores Tampa. O.G. says she took off her clothes while performing. The son remained in the club while she worked. After she got off work at 2:00 a.m., he drove her to S.F.'s house. O.G. continued working at the club for the next few days. With the assistance of local law enforcement, O.G. returned to her mother's home on October 7, 2017. After she ran away from home, and even while working in the club, O.G. maintained contact with Mr. Torres through texts and Facetime and asked him not to report her whereabouts to anyone. Although O.G.'s mother spoke to Mr. Torres on several occasions after O.G. went missing in September 2017, neither Mr. Torres nor the son informed her of the daughter's whereabouts. On November 30, 2017, the Department received a report of alleged human trafficking and sexual exploitation of a child. The alleged perpetrator was the son, while the victim was identified as O.G. Because the son was an employee of Petitioner, an institutional investigation was conducted. The investigation was closed on December 26, 2017, with a confirmed report of Human Trafficking-Commercial Exploitation of a Child against the son. Resp. Ex. 17. During the investigation, Mr. Torres and members of his family declined to be interviewed or answer any questions. Instead, they referred all questions to their attorney. On February 6, 2018, the Department received another report of abuse involving Mr. Torres. The report alleged that in April or May 2017, Mr. Torres transported O.G. to a bar at Miller's Ale House in "Davenport" [sic] and purchased her a beer. After an institutional investigation, the file was closed on March 1, 2018, as verified for Substance Misuse – Alcohol against Mr. Torres. Resp. Ex. 18. See also Finding of Fact 18. Mr. Torres declined to participate in the investigation. By clear and convincing evidence, the Department established that the actions of Mr. Torres and his son presented a threat to the health or safety of O.G. in contravention of section 397.415(1)(d)2. Count IV J.W., who did not testify, is a 42-year-old male who was discharged from a hospital on October 9, 2017 (after being Baker Acted), and admitted to Petitioner's facility the same day to receive PHP services. He was diagnosed as having mental health and substance abuse issues and a history of suicidality. He voluntarily left the facility on November 9, 2017. In its PRO, Petitioner characterizes J.W. as "a disgruntled addict." While a resident at the facility, J.W. received a few video sessions with a Miami Springs psychiatrist, who was identified on the renewal applications as the facility medical director, and he was given online counseling sessions for two weeks by an LMHC, who resided in Palm Bay and worked as an independent contractor with the facility. Neither professional was told by Mr. Torres that Petitioner was not licensed to provide PHP services. By providing PHP services to J.W., Petitioner violated sections 397.401(1) and 397.415(1)(a)2.c. According to the LMHC, on October 24, 2017, she was directed by Mr. Torres, who is not a licensed clinician, to "discharge" J.W. from the PHP program and place him in a lower level of care, Sober Living. Resp. Ex. 25. This would still allow J.W. to remain a resident at the facility but not receive the PHP services. Although the charging document alleges that J.W. did not wish to be discharged from the PHP program, and this caused him to have a relapse in his condition and later Baker Acted again, there is no competent evidence to establish this string of events. Count V Section 397.411 requires all licensees to provide Department representatives access to their facilities and to allow the inspection of pertinent records. Based upon information from a provider in Jacksonville that Mr. Torres had requested its assistance in providing PHP services to J.W., the Department instituted an investigation of Petitioner. In January 2018, the Department attempted to conduct an onsite inspection of Petitioner's facilities and to review the files relating to J.W. The inspectors were denied entry. Thereafter, the Department sent a written request to Petitioner for the records of J.W. and O.G. No records were provided and Petitioner failed to respond to the request. These actions constituted a violation of section 397.411. At hearing, Mr. Torres contended (through argument) that because the Department had already taken preliminary action on December 1, 2017, to deny his applications, there was no requirement that he provide access to the facility or respond to written requests for records. This assertion has been rejected. See § 397.411(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (an application for licensure as a service provider constitutes full permission for an authorized agent of the department to enter and inspect at any time).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Families enter a final order denying the applications for renewal of Petitioner's two licenses. An administrative fine should not be imposed. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S D. R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 2018.
The Issue In Case No. 99-2748, should Elvira Demdam, d/b/a San Juan Retirement Home, be administratively fined for operating an unlicensed facility, and if so, in what amount? In Case No. 99-2755, should Elvira Demdam, d/b/a Ingleside Retirement Home, be administratively fined for exceeding the home's licensed capacity, and if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulation of ALFs in Florida. Respondent, Elvira Demdam, operates both Ingleside Retirement Home and San Juan Retirement Home in Jacksonville, Florida. Gloria Wolfe is employed by AHCA to inspect ALFs for compliance with state and federal regulations for such facilities. Elvira Demdam is the licensee for Ingleside Retirement Home. The effective date of the license for Ingleside was October 27, 1997. Its expiration date was October 26, 1999. On April 26, 1999, Ms. Wolfe surveyed a facility doing business as San Juan Retirement Home due to a complaint that San Juan was operating as an unlicensed ALF. During Ms. Wolfe's inspection, San Juan Retirement Home had four residents, all of whom were being provided personal services by the home, including assistance with meals, administration of medications, and assistance with other essential activities of daily living. Therefore, the San Juan facility was being operated as an ALF on April 26, 1999. In a letter dated April 27, 1999, AHCA imposed a moratorium on admissions, effective April 26, 1999, on Ingleside Retirement Home, because Ms. Demdam had an interest in Ingleside Retirement Home and an interest in San Juan Retirement Home, which was operating without a license. The moratorium for Ingleside was to remain in force until the unlicensed facility (San Juan) ceased operation, and no residents could be readmitted without approval of AHCA. On April 27, 1999, Ms. Wolfe's superior, Mr. Robert Dickson, recommended a $1,000.00 sanction, based on Ms. Wolfe's report and because he believed that previous sanctions had been recommended against the Ingleside Retirement Home within the licensure period for the same type of deficiency. However, at hearing, he did not specify any previous sanctions against Ingleside, similar or otherwise. Elvira Demdam is the licensed administrator of Ingleside Retirement Home and should have known of the legal requirement that San Juan Retirement Home be licensed. Indeed, by her own admission, Ms. Demdam had been a nursing home administrator for four years, knew of the licensure requirement, and had been attempting to license the San Juan facility since at least 60 days before the property was transferred to her. San Juan was licensed to another person at the time Ms. Demdam took it over. That prior license had expired in December 1998, and Ms. Demdam did not get San Juan Retirement Home licensed in her name until July 1999. Ms. Demdam's exhibits support her testimony that much of her license application paperwork for San Juan Retirement Home was lost in the mail or within AHCA and that ACHA repeatedly required that she re-submit the same documents. However, she did not establish that the Agency failed to grant or deny her application within 90 days of submission of all necessary application items. The fact remains that on April 26, 1999, Ms. Demdam was operating San Juan Retirement Home without a valid ALF license. Although Ms. Demdam asserted that one or more of the San Juan residents were non-blood relatives who had lived with her as family members since 1995, she offered no corroborative evidence on this issue, and this assertion is not found to be credible. Ms. Wolfe also participated in a May 4, 1999, monitoring visit and survey of Ingleside Retirement Home. At that time, she found Ingleside to be operating in excess of its licensed capacity. Ingleside Retirement Home is licensed for 18 residents, but in fact, had 19 residents on that date. Ms. Wolfe personally reviewed residents, room by room, and made a census of Ingleside Retirement Home on May 4, 1999. Her census shows that a nineteenth resident, S.W., had been admitted to Ingleside in March 1999. Ms. Wolfe's investigation revealed that this resident was not noted in Ingleside's admissions/discharge log. Despite arguments that this deficiency constituted a Class III violation, an A-004 "not classified" deficiency was actually issued. (See ACHA Exhibit 4, page 3) Ms. Demdam's explanation for the extra resident in Ingleside Retirement Home was that she had taken in S.W. at the request of a case worker for the Department of Children and Family Services (DCF) as an emergency placement on a weekend for a projected stay of only two to four weeks but that due to unforeseen circumstances, DCF had not removed S.W. timely. It is unclear from this record whether the patient, S.W., put the census of Ingleside over 18 patients in March, the time that she was first taken in. It is also unclear exactly how long S.W. caused Ingleside's census to exceed the 18 patients provided for on its license, but as of May 1999, Ms. Demdam was providing care for S.W. and another Ingleside resident, J.J., without pay. Mr. Dickson testified that he recommended a $1000.00 fine as a sanction for having the one extra resident in Ingleside Retirement Home on May 4, 1999, because of prior sanctions recommended within the licensure period for the same type of deficiency. However, the only similar deficiency or sanction he noted during his testimony was the Ingleside moratorium which had been based upon the lack of licensure of the San Juan facility. By a letter dated May 7, 1999, AHCA notified the Respondent of the findings supporting the imposition of a moratorium at Ingleside. Ms. Demdam testified credibly that she moved S.W. out of Ingleside Retirement Home as soon as she was notified and that she cleared-out the four residents of San Juan Retirement Home as soon as possible. Mr. Dickson views both ALF citations very seriously because operating an ALF without a license can be prosecuted by the State Attorney as a third-degree felony (see Section 400.408(1)(b)-(c), Florida Statues, (Supp. 1998) and because he views Ms. Demdam's long practice and licensure in the ALF field to demonstrate her knowing and willful disregard of the law.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of operating an unlicensed facility and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000 in DOAH Case No. 99-2748; and That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of exceeding her licensed capacity at Ingleside Retirement Home, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 in DOAH Case No. 99-2755. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of January, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael O. Mathis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3408D Mail Stop 3 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elvira Demdam, Administrator San Juan Retirement Home Un-Licensed 6561 San Juan Avenue Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Elvira Demdam, Administrator Ingelside Retirement Home 732 Camp Milton Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32220 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
