Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are made: At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Joseph W. Miklavic was licensed as a certified building contractor in the state of Florida, holding license number CB C006615, qualifying Security Home d/b/a Security Homes of Clearwater (Security). Since March, 1989 the Respondent's license has been on active status qualifying, Individual. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was a salaried employee of Security. Ronald MacLaren was president of Security and also sole owner and president of Yankee Construction Inc. d/b/a Olympic Homes of Citrus County (Olympic). In accordance with a management agreement between Security and Olympic, the Respondent was assigned by Ronald MacLaren to oversee the operation of Olympic. Olympic was licensed to engage in construction having been qualified by Wilmon Ray Stevenson through license number RB A035005 which was in effect from June, 1987 until October, 1988 when Stevenson filed a change of status application with the Construction Industry Licensing Board (Board) requesting license number RB A035005 be changed to inactive status qualifying, Individual. While this application was not acted upon until February, 1989, the Board considered license number RB A035005 in effect as qualifying Olympic only until October, 1988. Effective September 26, 1988, the name of Yankee Construction, Inc. was changed to Rivercoast Homes, Inc. (Rivercoast) which apparently ceased doing business under the fictitious name of Olympic Homes of Citrus County. On September 19, 1988 Wilmon Ray Stevenson advised the Citrus County Building Department that he was no longer the "qualifier for Olympic Homes". Around this same time, the Respondent, Ronald MacLaren and the management of Olympic became aware that Stevenson would no longer be the qualifying agent for Olympic. There was no evidence that Rivercoast Homes, Inc. a/k/a Yankee Construction Inc. ever advised the Board of the name change or the termination of Stevenson as its only qualifying agent affiliation in accordance with Section 489.119(2)(3), Florida Statutes. Nor was there any evidence that Rivercoast was ever qualified by another qualifying agent pursuant to Section 489.119, Florida Statutes. In accordance with the agreement between Security and Olympic, referred to in Finding of Fact 4, the Respondent continued to oversee the Rivercoast operations until sometime around December 1988 when all of MacLaren's operations in Florida, including Security, closed down. Under Security's agreement with both Olympic and Rivercoast, Respondent's duties included working with management and subcontractors to develop construction schedules and to advise Ron MacLaren of the financial aspect of the company so that MacLaren could make funds available to pay subcontractors, etc. Respondent did not have any control over the finances of either Olympic or Rivercoast such as receiving, depositing or disbursing funds. Either in late September or early October of 1988, Respondent approached Larry Vitt, Citrus County Building Department, as to whether the Respondent could pull permits under his license for Olympic or Rivercoast. Vitt advised Respondent that unless he qualified the company he could not pull permits for that company under his license. Respondent advised MacLaren that Rivercoast would have to have a qualifying contractor in order to engage in contracting. MacLaren did not get Rivercoast qualified to engage in contracting at anytime. Respondent did not qualify Rivercoast under his contractor's license at anytime. Sometime around the last of September or the first part of October of 1988, Respondent became aware that Rivercoast a/k/a Yankee Construction, Inc. was no longer qualified under Section 489.119, Florida Statutes, and therefore, not authorized under law to engage in contracting. On August 16, 1988 Ernest and Marjorie Ellison met with Ken Smith and Gloria Stevenson of Olympic to discuss Olympic building the Ellisons a home. The Ellisons picked out a floor plan at this time and gave Olympic a $100.00 deposit to hold the price until a contract could be executed. On October 1, 1988 the Ellisons met again with Ken Smith and was introduced to the Respondent who gave them a brief run down on the status of the company and advised them that the company was in "good shape". At this meeting, Ken Smith advised the Ellisons of certain things that were required of them before construction began, including a survey. On October 31, 1988 the Ellisons signed a contract with Rivercoast to construct their home. In his capacity as a representative of Security, under the agreement between Security and Rivercoast, the Respondent signed this contract on the line designated Contractor/Representative. There is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent intended to sign the contract as contractor of record as the term contractor is defined in Section 489.105(3), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), and thereby impose upon himself the responsibility for the entire project. The contract price was $44,634.00. On November 1, 1977 the Ellisons delivered to Rivercoast a check for $4,363.40 which along with the $100.00 deposit paid in August represented a total down payment of $4,463.40. Respondent did not personally receive any funds from the Ellisons for Rivercoast or receive any funds for himself from the Ellisons under this contract. No permit was ever pulled or any work performed by Rivercoast under the aforementioned contract. Ernest Ellison met with Respondent on November 21, 1988 and requested that the contract be cancelled. Under the authority granted Respondent through the agreement between Security and Rivercoast, the Respondent and Ernest Ellison signed the contract as being cancelled on November 21, 1988. Although the Ellisons were offered an opportunity by the Respondent to transfer their deposit of $4,463.40 to Security and enter into a contract with Security to build their house, they declined and contracted with another contractor. On the date the contract was cancelled, Respondent advised Ernest Ellison that the down payment of $4,463.40 would be reimbursed. Although Respondent attempted to obtain a refund for the Ellisons from MacLaren and was advised by MacLaren that a refund was forthcoming, no refund of the Ellison's down payment was ever made by Rivercoast, Ronald MacLaren, the Respondent or anyone else. Respondent was aware during the negotiation and at the time the Ellison's contract was executed, that Rivercoast was not authorized by law to engage in contracting. However, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent ever advised the Ellisons that he would be the contractor responsible for building their home under the contract with Rivercoast or that he would be the contractor to pull the necessary permits for construction of their home. There is no evidence that Respondent had any financial interest or owned any stock or held any office in Rivercoast a/k/a Yankee Construction, Inc. Around October 1, 1988, after Stevenson had withdrawn as qualifying agent for Olympic, Rivercoast was no longer authorized to engage in the practice of contracting since it had not been qualified by another qualifying agent in accordance with Section 489.119, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the demeanor of the witnesses and the disciplinary guidelines set out in Chapter 21E- 17, Florida Administrative Code, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and for such violation it is recommended that the Board assess the Respondent with an administrative fine of $1,000.00. It is further recommended that Counts I, II, IV and V be dismissed DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1990. APPENDIX CASE NO. 90-2046 The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Not necessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7 but modified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 8, and 10. Adopted in Findings of Fact 9 and 14 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17 but modified. Adopted in Findings of Fact 17 and 18. Rulings of Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent 1. - 2. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 7 and 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 8. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. - 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. - 16. Not material or relevant. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Findings of Fact 13, 14 and 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19 but modified. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4 but modified to show license effective until October, 1988 rather than February, 1989. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Findings of Fact 1, 7 and 20. - 26. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4 but modified to show from June, 1987 until October, 1988. - 29. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 13. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 4. - 32. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 8 and 9 but modified. Not material or relevant. - 36. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 8, and 9 but modified. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Not material or relevant. - 40. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8, and 17, respectively. Rejected as there is no substantial competent evidence in the record to show any other contract than the one Respondent signed on October 31, 1988. Not material or relevant. Not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Not material or relevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Restatement of testimony not a Finding of Fact but see Finding of Fact 9. - 50. Not necessary to the conclusion reached since this matter was covered in the Preliminary Statement wherein the motion was denied. COPIES FURNISHED: G. W. Harrell, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0750 Geoffrey Vining, P.A. 2212 South Florida Avenue Suite 300 Lakeland, FL 33803 Daniel O'Brien, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Kenneth D. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice contracting, license number CC C057275, based on the violations of Section 489.129(1), Florida Statutes, as charged in the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent in this proceeding.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was a certified contractor, having been issued license number CC C057275 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. At all times material, Respondent was registered or certified with the Construction Licensing Industry Board doing business as Comtec Coatings Company (Comtec). At no time material hereto did Respondent apply for or obtain a certificate of authority for Comtec. Respondent has previously been disciplined for violations of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes, in Department of Business and Professional Regulation Case Number 2001-03759, including the failure to honor a warranty. On or about March 29, 1996, Respondent, doing business as Comtec Coatings Company, contracted with Kopp to re-roof her home located at 1010 Terry Drive, Melbourne, Florida, for the contract price of $8,600. Respondent's contract contained a five year warranty. Respondent was paid-in-full on or about April 6, 1996. Shortly after Respondent performed the roofing work, the roof experienced significant problems including excessive leakage and material deterioration. Eventually, the roof lost its ability to repel water and large portions rotted. Immediately, Respondent was advised of the problems yet failed to repair them. Kopp, along with her concerned friends and neighbors, expended hundreds of labor hours and at least $896.61 above the original contract price to mitigate the damage to her roof and home as a result of Respondent's workmanship. An independent roofing contractor estimated that it would cost $3,000 to temporarily repair the leaks and approximately $33,000 to replace it and completely correct the problem. As of the date of the administrative hearing, the roof has not been repaired, remains in poor condition and continues to leak. Kopp is legitimately concerned that her home may be condemned. The total investigative costs of this case to the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, excluding costs associated with counsel's time, are $399.30.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order as follows: Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(i), Florida Statutes, for failing to file for a certificate of authority as required by Section 489.119(2), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Count I of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1,000. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(m), Florida Statutes, for incompetency and misconduct as alleged in Count II of the Administrative Complaint, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $2,000, revoking all licensure under the auspices of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. Finding Respondent guilty of having violated Section 489.129(1)(g)(3), Florida Statutes, for having Kopp pay significantly more than the roofing repair contract price, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000, revoking all licensure under the auspices of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, and ordering Respondent to pay financial restitution to consumer Judith Kopp in the amount of $33,896.61 for consumer harm suffered. Assessing costs of investigation and prosecution in the amount of $399.30, which excludes costs associated with any attorney's time. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of December, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. PFEIFFER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of December, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian A. Higgins, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Larry S. Olson 3451 Riva Ridge Place Fort Collins, Colorado 80526 Robert Crabill, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues presented in this case concern certain allegations made by the Petitioner against the Respondent through an Administrative Complaint. In particular, it is alleged that on or about April 23, 1980, the Respondent's contractor's license issued by the Petitioner was suspended and subsequent to that time, the Respondent continued to perform contracting services through a company, David H. Hamilton, Inc., a corporation which was not properly qualified by the Petitioner to provide contracting services. It is further alleged by the Petitioner that the Respondent obtained building permits Nos. S2740-80B 1/ and 3214-80B from the Osceola County Building Department with the use of another contractor's license, namely: Louie S. Winchester, license #RR003839. For the reason of these facts, the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has violated Subsection 489.127(1)(e), Florida Statutes, in that he attempted to use a suspended registration. It is further alleged, based upon the facts as reported in this Issues statement, that the Respondent has violated Subsection 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes, by acting in a capacity as a contractor under a certificate of registration not in his name. Finally, it is alleged, based upon the facts as reported hereinabove, that the Respondent has violated Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes, by failing to comply with Subsection 489.119(2), Florida Statutes, by not properly qualifying a corporation under which he performed contracting services.
Findings Of Fact The case presented concerns license disciplinary action by the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, against the Respondent, David H. Hamilton, who holds a residential contractor's license issued by the Petitioner, #RR0014037. The prosecution of this action is through the offices of the Department of Professional Regulation and the outcome of the matter could lead to the revocation, suspension or other disciplinary action against the Respondent, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter 489, Florida Statutes. This case was presented before the Division of Administrative Hearings following a decision on the part of the Respondent to request a formal hearing pursuant to Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The facts reveal that a Final Order of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board was issued on April 23, 1980, and this order established disciplinary action against the current license of David H. Hamilton. (A copy of this Final Order may be found as a part of the record in this proceeding and official recognition of that Final Order is made by the Recommended Order process.) This Final Order was entered after review of a Recommended Order of a Division of Administrative Hearings' Hearing Officer. By the terms of the Final Order, Hamilton's license was suspended "until such time as his Lake County Certificate of Competency is reinstated by the Lake County Board of Examiners." This contingency referred to the fact that the Respondent had his Lake County Certificate of Competency Card removed prior to the entry of the April 23, 1980, order of the Construction Industry Licensing Board. On September 2, 1980, at a time when the Respondent's residential contractor's license was under suspension by the State of Florida, the Respondent through a corporation applied to the Osceola County Building Department for a building permit to construct a residence in Osceola County, Florida. This permit number was #2740-80B. The permit was issued on September 4, 1980, and was granted in the name of David Hamilton, Inc., a corporation in which the Respondent was a principal. To obtain the permit in the sense of an effort to meet the requirements that the permit be applied for by a licensed Florida contractor, the Respondent used the registered residential contractor's license of one Louie Stevens Winchester who held license #RR003839 issued by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On the occasion of the issuance of the permit by Osceola County, Winchester was an officer of David Hamilton, Inc. Through the action of "pulling" this permit and the utilization of the permit in his construction of the residence, the Respondent was acting in the capacity of contractor under Winchester's license and the offices of the corporation, as opposed to the Respondent's suspended license. Prior to the request for permit, neither Hamilton nor Winchester had attempted to properly qualify David Hamilton, Inc., as a contracting corporation with the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. In this case, to properly qualify the corporation, it would have entailed the use of Winchester as the qualifying agent, in view of the fact that Winchester still held a valid contractor's license from the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. No effort was made to qualify David Hamilton, Inc., in its own right, through the agency of Winchester, until some time shortly beyond December 1, 1980. On October 28, 1980, the Respondent in his individual capacity, that is to say unconnected with his business pursuits as David Hamilton, Inc., went to the Osceola Building Department and applied for the issuance of a building permit for a home remodeling project for a customer of his. The permit in question on this occasion was #3214-80B. That permit was issued on October 29, 1930, and was used by the Respondent in his building project. An official in the Osceola County Building Department had checked with an employee in the Lake County Building Department on the status of Hamilton's rights to be employed as a building contractor in Lake County, Florida, and was informed that Hamilton's status in Lake County was acceptable. Based upon these representations, the Osceola County employee issued the permit discussed in this paragraph to Hamilton. The Osceola County employee also asked that the Lake County employee formally confirm Hamilton's status. The correspondence in response to Osceola County employee, John Pate, Assistant Building Director, as issued by an official in Lake County, one Herb Dudgeon, may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. This letter was received by Pate after the permit was issued. That correspondence indicates that Hamilton had been given the privilege of reinstating his Lake County Competence Card, contingent upon "providing bond, insurances, occupational license, etc.," which had not been received by Lake County as of the date of the correspondence. The correspondence goes on to mention that the State, meaning the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, was waiting for confirmation of the completion of the contingencies referred to. Subsequent to this correspondence, the Respondent having completed all the necessary steps for reinstatement of the Lake County Competency Card, had his license suspension removed and was reinstated by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, as verified by that body.
Recommendation Based upon a full consideration of the findings of fact and conclusions of law reached herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board issue a Final Order which absolves the Respondent of any responsibility for a violation of Subsection 489.127(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1980); that finds the Respondent in violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1979), and imposes a penalty of a 60-day suspension; and that finds the Respondent in violation of Subsection 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1979), and imposes a suspension of 60 days to run concurrently with the other suspension in this paragraph of recommendation. 2/ DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of November, 1981.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to these proceedings, Respondent Farrall was licensed as a certified general contractor in Florida, and held license number CG C040234. In addition, the Respondent was licensed as a certified roofing contractor and held license number CC C024398. Mr. Farrall was the qualifying agent for Sunmaster Roofing Company. On May 25, 1987, Sunmaster Roofing Company entered into a contract with Clarence A. Miller and Emily Miller to reroof their residence in Naples, Florida. After the project was completed, Mr. and Mr. Miller filed a complaint with the Collier County Contractors' Licensing Board on December 7, 1987. Essentially, the complaint alleged as follows: 1) that the contractor abandoned the job without adequately completing construction; 2) that the roof materials were incorrectly installed; 3) that the contractor failed to obtain a building permit; and 4) that the contractor failed to adequately perform the contract due to his failure to correct faulty workmanship on the job. On December 11, 1987, copies of the complaint and a notice of hearing was sent to Respondent Farrall by certified mail to two different addresses. The items were promptly received at both locations. On January 15, 1988, the Respondent acknowledged that he was personally aware of the hearing scheduled for January 20, 1988. The Respondent requested a continuance until after January 29, 1988, because he had to attend to urgent family matters which required his presence in Canada. A continuance was not granted, and the hearing proceeded as scheduled. The Respondent was aware that the hearing was not continued prior to his departure for Canada. On January 20, 1988, a hearing was held, and the local board received evidence regarding the Miller complaint. As a result of the hearing, the local board found that the Respondent violated specific county ordinances in the following manner: by abandoning the job without legal excuse; disregarding or violating the building code by failing to obtain a building permit; and by failing to make good, faulty workmanship obviously performed in evasion of performance of the contract. The Respondent was disciplined by the Collier County Contractors' Licensing Board on January 20, 1988. His permit privileges were suspended in Collier County until the contractor makes restitution and appears before the Board for reinstatement. The Respondent was given fifteen days to appeal the decision. The Respondent personally received a copy of the disposition of the hearing by certified mail on January 28, 1988. An appeal was not taken of the decision.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the charges set forth in the Administrative Complaint against the Respondent, John W. Farrall, in Case No. 89-3291 be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-3291 The proposed findings of fact set forth in Petitioner's proposed recommended order are addressed as follows: 1. Accepted. See HO #1. 2. Accepted. See HO #2. 3. Accepted. See HO #1 and #2 4. Accepted. See HO #8 and #9. 5. Accepted. See HO #8. Rejected. Irrelevant to the charges filed. Rejected. Irrelevant to the charges filed. The proposed findings of fact filed by the Respondent are addressed as follows: Accept the first two sentences. See HO #1. The rest of paragraph 1 is rejected as improper argument which is not based upon material evidence presented at hearing. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. The issue in this proceeding involves the discipline by the local government board and not the underlying facts upon which the board based its findings. Immaterial. 4. Rejected. Immaterial. See above. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected. Rejected. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Rejected. Rejected. Rejected. Irrelevant. Irrelevant. Contrary to fact. See HO #6. Rejected. Rejected. Contrary to Irrelevant. fact. See HO #9. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack M. Larkin, Esquire 806 Jackson Street Tampa, Florida 33602 John W. Farrall 316-2 Tudor Drive Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 111 East Coastline Drive, Room 504 Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Harry L. Wilson is the holder of a registered roofing contractor's license from the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. The license, Number RC 0041328, was first issued in March of 1982. The license was issued in the name of Harry L. Wilson Roofing, 1943 Hardy Street, Jacksonville, Florida, with the Respondent as qualifier. The Respondent has been the qualifier of Harry L. Wilson Roofing at all times relevant to this proceeding. On December 6, 1984, the Respondent and Robbie L. Hicks, entered into a written contract (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2). Pursuant to this written contract (hereinafter referred to as the "Contract"), the Respondent agreed to perform the repair work specified in the Contract in a "professional manner" and Ms. Hicks agreed to pay the Respondent $2,395.00. The property to be repaired is rental property owned by Ms. Hicks. The property is located at 1508 Eaverson Street, Jacksonville, Florida. The Respondent commenced work sometime during the early part of 1983. Shortly after commencing work, however, the Respondent and Ms. Hicks began having disagreements as to the work to be performed and the quality of the Respondent's work. These disagreements continued after the Respondent completed the work in November of 1983. Ms. Hicks testified that the work that the Respondent completed was done in an unprofessional manner and that the Respondent had not completed all of the work that he had agreed to perform. In particular, Ms. Hicks testified that the Respondent had failed to paint the interior of the house beige as required by the Contract, had failed to remove saw dust and other debris from the house following completion of the work, had failed to finish cabinets installed in the house, had failed to repair screens and generally had not performed in the manner he had agreed to perform. Ms. Hicks paid the Respondent all but $410.00 of the contract price. The Respondent testified that all off the work called for pursuant to the Contract had been performed. According to the Respondent, he had performed some work not required by the Contract and had not performed other work requested by Ms. Hicks because the work was beyond the scope of the Contract. The Respondent also stated that the work which Ms. Hicks expected would have cost considerably more than the price agreed upon in the Contract. The Respondent did not perform all of the work specified in the Contract in a "professional manner" as required by the Contract. Based upon the testimony of Mr. Claude Bagwell, Deputy Chief, Building and Zoning, Inspection Division of the City of Jacksonville, it is clear that no permit was issued by the City of Jacksonville to perform the work required by the Contract. The only permits issued with regard to Ms. Hicks' rental property was a permit issued in 1961 and the original building permit issued in 1949. Additionally, due to the fact that no Florida registered roofing contractor's license in the name of "Harry L. Wilson Roofing" had been filed with the City of Jacksonville, no permit could be issued to Harry L. Wilson Roofing with regard to the Contract. The Respondent admitted that he had not obtained a permit to perform the work required by the Contract. The Respondent indicated that he had not obtained a permit because he was not aware that one was required in order to perform the work. He did indicate that he had obtained permits to perform other jobs. The Respondent could not, however, have obtained permits for other jobs because no license issued in the name of Harry L. Wilson Roofing had been filed with the City of Jacksonville. The Respondent did take the examination required in order to obtain a registered roofing contractor's license. The Petitioner suggested in its Proposed Findings that the "permit requirement was explained" when the Respondent took the exam. No evidence to support such a finding was presented at the hearing. The Respondent in entering into the Contract clearly used the name "Wilson Recycling". Nowhere on the Contract is the name "Harry L. Wilson Roofing" used. The Respondent ultimately admitted that no Florida license authorizing the use of the name "Wilson Recycling" had been obtained by him. The Respondent, however, when initially asked whether a Florida license in the name of "Wilson Recycling" had been obtained indicated that such a license had been issued. On further examination, however, the Respondent testified that an occupational license in the name of "Wilson Recycling' had been obtained by him and not a Florida license. The work to be performed pursuant to the Contract was beyond the scope off the Respondent's license. As pointed out by Mr. Bagwell the work to be performed pursuant to the Contract would require licensure as a registered residential contractor or more.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That count I of the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent be dismissed. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 489.129 (1)(g), Florida Statutes (1983), by contracting in a name other than the name as set forth on the Respondent's license. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1983), by failing in a material respect to comply with the provisions of Section 489.119(2) and(3), Florida Statutes (1983), in that the Respondent failed to qualify the business name "Wilson Recycling" with the Construction Industry Licensing Board. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Respondent be found guilty of violating Section 489.129(1)(j), Florida Statutes (1983), when he failed in a material respect to comply with the provisions of Section 489.117(2), Florida Statutes (1983), by contracting to perform and actually performing work beyond the scope of his Florida contracting license. It is further RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner suspend Respondent's roofing contractor's license for a period of three (3) months. DONE and ENTERED this17th day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Reynolds Sampson, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Harry L. Wilson 1943 Hardee Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Mr. Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Fred M. Strickland's general contractor's license #RG 0024700 should be revoked or Respondent otherwise disciplined for alleged violation of Section 489.129(1)(h) and (k), Florida Statutes (1979). 1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent Fred M. Strickland holds currently active general contractor's license #RG 0024700. On April 24, 1976 Wiley D. Whitaker and Respondent Fred M. Strickland entered into an agreement whereby Respondent was to furnish materials and labor to construct a dwelling for Whitaker for the sum of $29,675.00. (Petitioner's Exhibit V - Transcript, pages 28 and 29) Construction commenced and funds were paid in the amount of $19,172.23 to Strickland by three (3) checks: Check dated May 14, 1976 in the amount of $7,500.00; check dated May 27, 1976 in the amount of $8,821.00; and check dated June 24, 1976 in the amount of $2,851.23. (Transcript, pages 29, 30, 31 and 32) Respondent Strickland did not return to the construction of the Whitaker house after the third check was paid to him on June 24, 1976. (Testimony of Whitaker - Transcript, page 32; Testimony of Strickland - Transcript, page 65) Respondent Strickland had another house under construction at the time he had the Whitaker house under construction. (Testimony of Strickland - Transcript, page 42) At the time Strickland requested the third "draw" or payment on June 24, 1976 a dispute arose between Whitaker and Strickland. Whitaker said that he thought (1) that he had paid in more money than had been used for labor and materials in the house but regardless made the third payment to Strickland, and (2) that he asked Strickland to go back to work and complete the house. (Testimony of Whitaker - Transcript, page 31) Respondent stated (1) that he was paid for the job and no more; and (2) that he did not walk off the job but they (the Whitakers) had been hard to please, that Mrs. Whitaker had more than once made his work crew leave the job, and that he was willing to finish the job but they insisted that he leave. (Testimony of Strickland - Transcript, pages 44, 45 and 65) The testimony of Witness Whitaker and Respondent Strickland is in conflict as to whether Respondent was asked to remain and finish the construction job or whether he was asked by the owner to leave. Considering the circumstances of the case, the evidence produced and the demeanor of the parties testifying it is found that the testimony of Witness Whitaker is credible and the testimony of Respondent Strickland is not worthy of belief. It is therefore found that Respondent Strickland abandoned the Whitaker construction project without notice of his intention to quit the job after requesting a third draw and receiving the payment on June 24, 1976. It is further found that the disagreements, if any, with the wife of Whitaker over subject construction project are not sufficient grounds to justify a breach of the construction contract between the owner and Respondent contractor. On or about December 9, 1976 the Jackson County Building Official of the Jackson County Board of Commissioners and Construction Industry Licensing Board, James W. Grant, made a personal inspection of the subject property. He estimated the construction to be forty-three percent (43 percent) complete and that the total estimated value of the completed contractor work was $12,470.00. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibits II and III) No testimony or evidence to refute the estimate of construction completed or the value thereof was offered by Respondent except his statement that he was paid for the work and materials that he had put into the job and no more. (Testimony of Strickland - Transcript page 65) It is found that Respondent had completed forty-three percent (43 percent) of the construction for Whitaker before he abandoned the project and that the value of the completed contract work was $12,470.00. Based upon this finding Respondent would have been entitled to $12,470.00 at the time he stopped work on the dwelling but had received from Whitaker the sum of $19,172.23. Therefore, it is found that Respondent was paid $6,702.23 more than was due to him under the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the Administrative Complaint filed against Respondent Fred M. Strickland be dismissed. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1981.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ronald Mustari, violated Section 489.129(1)(r), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice contracting.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent, Ronald Mustari, was a certified residential contractor, having been issued license number CR C036684 by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board in 1986. On or about April 29, 1991, Respondent was licensed as the qualifying agent for Whitehall Development Corporation (Whitehall Development), and served in this capacity at all times material to this proceeding. As the qualifying agent, Respondent was responsible for all of the contracting activities of Whitehall Development. Furthermore, at all times pertinent hereto, Respondent was president of Whitehall Development. On or about October 9, 1989, Whitehall Development entered into a subcontract agreement with Anchor Air Conditioning, Inc. (Anchor Air Conditioning), whereby Anchor Air Conditioning would provide services for Whitehall Development. Subsequently, a dispute arose between Anchor Air Conditioning and Whitehall Development regarding the subcontract agreement. As a result thereof, in 1993, Anchor Air Conditioning filed a civil complaint against Whitehall Development in the Manatee County Circuit Court, Case No. CA-93-4210. The complaint alleged that Whitehall Development owed money to Anchor Air Conditioning pursuant to the terms of the subcontract agreement. Whitehall Development contested liability and responded by filing counterclaims against Anchor Air Conditioning. After contesting the issue of liability for more than two years and incurring more than $20,000 in attorney fees, Respondent concluded that continuing to litigate this matter was not a viable option given Whitehall Development's insolvency at that time. Furthermore, Respondent determined that it would be futile for Whitehall Development to pursue its counterclaims in the civil matter because Anchor Air Conditioning was insolvent. On May 9, 1996, the Circuit Court for the Twelfth Judicial Circuit in and for Manatee County, Florida, entered a Final Judgment in Case Number CA-93-4210, in favor of Anchor Air Conditioning against Whitehall Development in the amount of $18,118. The Final Judgment was the result of a negotiated, stipulated Settlement Agreement entered into between Whitehall Development and Anchor Air Conditioning. Currently, Whitehall Development has no funds or assets and is no longer doing business. In 1992, and prior to Anchor Air Conditioning's filing the complaint against Whitehall Development, the Internal Revenue Service placed a lien on all property and rights to property owed to Anchor Air Conditioning. The lien was to cover outstanding assessments owed by Anchor Air Conditioning to the Department of Treasury-Internal Revenue Service for the tax periods ending December 31, 1988; December 31, 1989; and June 30, 1990. In September or October 1992, Whitehall Development received a copy of Notice of Levy dated September 25, 1992. According to the Notice of Levy, Whitehall Development was required to pay any money it owed to Anchor Air Conditioning to the Internal Revenue Service. As of June 13, 1997, this Notice of Levy remained in effect. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, Whitehall Development has not satisfied the Final Judgment in Case No. CA-93-4210. Whitehall Development has failed to pay the funds due and owing to Anchor Air Conditioning pursuant to the Final Judgment to the Internal Revenue Service.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Construction Industry Licensing Board enter a final order finding that Respondent violated Section 489.129(1)(r), Florida Statutes; imposing a fine of $1,000; placing his license to practice contracting on probation, under such terms and conditions as prescribed by the Construction Industry Licensing Board; and assessing the costs associated with the investigation and prosecution of this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUMCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul F. Kirsch, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Robert E. Messick, Esquire Icard, Merrill, Cullis, Timm, Furen and Ginsburg, P.A. 2033 Main Street, Suite 600 Sarasota, Florida 34237 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Rodney Hurst, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Business and Professional Regulation 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-7467
The Issue The Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, Petitioner, seeks to revoke the registered contractor's license of Stephen J. Borovina, Respondent, based on allegations, which will be set forth in detail hereafter, that he engaged in conduct violative of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. The issue presented is whether or not the Respondent aided or abetted and/or knowingly combined or conspired with Mr. Howard North, an uncertified or unregistered contractor, to evade the provisions of Chapter 468.112(2)(b), and (c), Florida Statutes, by allowing North to use his certificate of registration without having any active participation in the operations, management, or control of North's operations. Based on the testimony adduced during the hearing and the exhibits received into evidence, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a certified general contractor who holds license no. CGC007016, which is current and active. On or about July 25, 1976, Mr. and Mrs. Julius Csobor entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. Howard North for the construction of a home in Martin County, Florida, for a total price of $35,990. Neither Mr. or Mrs. North are certified or registered contractors in the State of Florida. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #2). Respondent applied for and was issued a permit by the Martin County Building Department to construct a residence for the Csobors at the same address stipulated in the contract between the Csobors and the Norths, i.e., Northwest 16th Street, Palm Lake Park, Florida. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit #1). Howard North, a licensed masonry contractor for approximately nine (9) years was contacted by the Csobors through a sales representative from a local real estate firm. It appears from the evidence that North had previously constructed a "spec" house which the local realtor had sold and thus put the Csobors in contact with Mr. North when they were shown the "spec" house built by North. Evidence reveals that North contacted Borovina who agreed to pull the permit "if he could get some work from the job and could supervise the project". Having reached an agreement on this point, North purchased the lot to build the home for the Csobors and he orally contracted with the Respondent to, among other things, pull the permit, supervise construction, layout the home and do trim and carpentry work. North paid Respondent approximately $200 to layout the home for the Csobors. By the time that North had poured the slab and erected the subfloor, the Csobors became dissatisfied with his (North's) work and demanded that he leave the project. According to North, Respondent checked the progress of construction periodically. Prior to this hearing, the Csobors had never dealt with Respondent in any manner whatsoever. According to Csobor, North held himself out as a reputable building contractor. A contractor is defined in relevant part as any person who, for compensation, undertakes to, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by others, construct, repair, etc. . . . real estate for others. . . Chapter 468.102(1), Florida Statutes. Applying this definition to the facts herein, it appears that the Respondent, at least in a literal sense, satisfied the requirements and obligations of a contractor, as defined in Chapter 468.102, Florida Statutes. Thus, he contracted with North to oversee and/or supervise the project for the Csobors which he fulfilled, according to the testimony of North. Said testimony was not refuted and thus I find that no effort was made by Respondent to evade any provision of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby recommended that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of November, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barry S. Sinoff, Esquire 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Stephen J. Borovina 2347 Southeast Monroe Street Stuart, Florida 33494 J. Hoskinson, Jr. Chief Investigator Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, DOCKET NO. 77-1442 STEPHEN J. BOROVINA, CG C007016, 2347 S. E. Monroe Street, Stuart, Florida 33494, Respondent. / This cause came before the FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD at its regular meeting on February 10, 1978. Respondent was sent the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendations and was given at least 10 days to submit written exceptions to the recommended order. Respondent was notified of the meeting so that respondent or counsel might appear before the Board. Respondent did not appear The FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD on February 10, 1978, after reviewing a complete transcript of the Administrative Hearing, by motion duly made and seconded voted to revoke the certified general contractor's license of STEPHEN J. BOROVINA. It is therefore, ORDERED that the certification of respondent STEPHEN J. BOROVINA, Number CG C007016, be and is hereby revoked. Respondent is hereby notified that he has 30 days after the date of this final order to appeal pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Appellate Rules. DATED this 13th day of February, 1978. FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD BY: JOHN HENRY JONES, President ================================================================= SECOND AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD STEPHEN J. BOROVINA, CG C007016, Respondent/Appellant, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, DOCKET NO. 77-1442 FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner/Appellee. / This cause came before the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board at its regular meeting on August 3, 1979. The respondent was sent the Hearing Officer's findings and recommendations and was given at least 10 days to submit written exceptions to the recommended order. Respondent was notified of the meeting so that respondent or counsel might appear before the Board. Respondent did appear. The Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board, on August 3, 1979, after reviewing a complete transcript of the Administrative Hearing, by motion duly made and seconded, voted to revoke the certified general contractor's license of Stephen J. Borovina, No. CG C007016. On February 13, 1978, the certification of respondent, Stephen J. Borovina, No. CG C007016, was revoked by order of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. On April 25, 1979, the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, in Case Number: 78-527, reversed the final order of the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. That Court remanded the above captioned case to the Board to further consider the matter and enter such order as it may be advised in conformity with Section 120.57(1)(b)(9), Florida Statutes (1977). In accordance with the decision of the Florida District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, the Board has reconsidered the above captioned matter and finds as follows: The Board rejects the recommended order as the agency's final order. The Board adopts the first paragraph of the hearing officer's finding of fact. The Board, however, rejects the findings of fact found in the second paragraph of the hearing officer's findings. The second paragraph states as follows: A contractor is defined in relevent(sic) part as any person who, for compensation, undertakes to, or submits a bid to, or does himself or by others, construct, repair, etc. real estate for others...Chapter 468.102(1), Florida Statutes. Applying this definition to the facts herein, it appears that the Respondent, at least in a literal sense, satisfied the requirements and obligations of a contractor, as defined in Chapter 468.102, Florida Statutes. Thus, he contracted with North to oversee and/or supervise the project for the Csobors which he fulfilled, according to the testimony of North. Said testimony was not refuted and thus I find that no effort was made by Respondent to evade any provision of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety. The findings of fact found in the above-quoted paragraph were not based upon competent substantial evidence. The competent substantial evidence supports a finding that the respondent, Stephen J. Borovina, did not supervise the project and that Borovina evaded the provisions of Chapter 468, Florida Statutes. The following evidence supports the Board's position: There was no written agreement entered into between Howard North and the respondent which indicated that the respondent was to supervise the construction of the Csobors' house (T- 14); It was conceded at the hearing that the only subcontractors or draftmen who worked on the Csobors' house were contracted solely by Howard North and they had no contract whatsoever with the respondent (T-19, 25); The respondent never advised or informed Mr. and Mrs. Csobor that he was the contractor on the job. (T-51); At all times during the act of construction of the house, Mr. and Mrs. Csobor were under the impression that Howard North was the contractor (T-44-51). It is, therefore, ORDERED: That the certification of respondent, Stephen J. Borovina, Number CG 0007016, be and is hereby revoked. Respondent is hereby notified that he has thirty (30) days after the date of the Final Order to appeal pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Appellate Rules. Dated this 3rd day of August, 1979. FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD BY: JOHN HENRY JONES, President
The Issue The central issue in this case is Petitioner's challenge to part III of the licensure examination as set forth in his letter dated September 8, 1994.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert E. Rosser, is a candidate for licensure as a general contractor. Petitioner has taken the examination to become a licensed general contractor consecutively over the last four years. As a result of the twelve attempts at the examination, Petitioner has passed parts I and II on two separate test dates. In his attempts to pass the examination Petitioner has enrolled in and studied for the examination with two approved construction schools. Petitioner scored a 68 on part III of the general contractor's examination for the June 16, 1994 test date. Petitioner timely challenged questions related to part III (Project Management) of the general contractor's examination given on June 16, 1994. Petitioner attended a review session and claimed that as to question 2 his scratch sheet from the examination demonstrates he had used formulas properly and that he had inadvertently marked the incorrect response on the answer grid sheet. The minimum score required to pass part III of the examination was 70. For each of the challenged questions in part III (2, 4, 7, 9, 11, 17, 18, and 20) Respondent presented competent evidence to support the correct answer as scored by the Department. The Petitioner did not present credible evidence to dispute the accuracy of the answers which had been deemed correct by the Department. Based upon those answers, the Petitioner's score sheet was tabulated correctly. The questions challenged were clearly and unambiguously worded and contained sufficient factual information to reach a correct answer. The examination was open book and applicants were allowed to use reference materials. All current techniques were considered before the correct answer was chosen. All knowledge needed to reach a correct answer was within a candidate's expected range of expertise. The Department's scoring of part III was not arbitrary, capricious, or devoid of logic. For each of the challenged questions, the correct answer was scored at a higher percentage than the answers marked by Petitioner. In fact, for question 4, for example, 79 percent of the examinees scored the correct answer while only 3 percent marked the same answer as Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the general contractor's examination. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of January, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5214 Rulings on the Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Petitioner did not number the paragraphs denoted as "STATEMENT OF FACTS AND FINDINGS". The lettered paragraphs are addressed as listed; but where no letter identified the paragraph, the rulings are as to the paragraphs in the order of presentation. Paragraph [A] is accepted. Paragraph [B] is accepted to the extent it identifies Petitioner as a candidate otherwise rejected as not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.005 is an error. It is accepted that the minimum passing grade for the challenged part is 70 percent out of 100 percent. Paragraph [C] is accepted in substance; however, Petitioner's citation to Rule 21E-16.003 is an error. The next paragraph is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is accepted as a correct statement of procedural review. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 4 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 7 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 9 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 11 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 17 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected as not a statement of fact. Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 18 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. The next paragraph is rejected regarding question 20 is rejected as not a statement of fact or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph [D] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. Paragraph [E] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is not supported by the evidence. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Department and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [F] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [G] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. The next paragraph is merely an address for the Division and is not a statement of fact. Paragraph [H] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [I] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [J] is accepted as statement of procedural information but is irrelevant. Paragraph [K] is rejected as contrary to the record in this case since an order of prehearing instruction was not entered in this case and interrogatories were not served. Paragraph [L] is rejected as irrelevant, not a statement of fact, and contrary to the record. Moreover, Petitioner's scratch sheets have been received as Petitioner's exhibit 1. Paragraph [M] is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [N] is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [O] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph [P] is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Paragraphs 4 through 11 are accepted. Paragraph 1 is accepted as statement of procedural information. Paragraph 2 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. Paragraph 3 is accepted as to the substance but is not a statement of relevant fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert E. Rosser P.O. Box 560541 Miami, Florida 33256-0541 William M. Woodyard Assistant General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Richard Hickok Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board 7960 Arlington Expressway, Suite 300 Jacksonville, Florida 32211-6310
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent be found guilty of violating Subsection 489.129(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and that he be given a public reprimand and fined $1,000. DONE and ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Xavier J. Fernandez, Esquire P. O. Box 729 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Michael H. Merrill, Esquire Suite 10 - 2502 Second Street Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
