Findings Of Fact Parties Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating insurance and insurance related activities in Florida. Petitioner regulates persons engaged in activities prohibited under Chapters 626 and 627, Florida Statutes. 1/ Respondent, Koontz, is licensed as a general lines agent for property, casualty, surety, and miscellaneous insurance. 2/ His agent number is 300429666. Mr. Koontz is the primary agent and vice president for Cash Register Auto Insurance of Polk County, Inc., ("Cash Register"). Cash Register sells insurance and is an insurance agency within the meaning of Section 626.094. Respondent, Davis, is employed by Cash Register. She is licensed under customer service representative number 534548407. Mr. Koontz is the appointing and supervising agent for Ms. Davis. He is responsible for her acts and representations pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 4-213.100. 3/ Cash Register is a Florida corporation wholly owned by Mr. Lloyd Register III and LR3 Enterprises, Inc. ("LR3"). 4/ Cash Register's principal place of business is 2810 South Florida Avenue, Number B, Lakeland, Florida 33803. Background Prior to August, 1994, Mr. Ernest C. Carey maintained automobile insurance on his 1987 Toyota truck through Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate"). Allstate cancelled the policy. During August, 1994, Mr. Carey obtained replacement insurance. Mr. Carey telephoned five insurance agencies to obtain premium quotes for the minimum insurance required by law. One of the insurance agencies that Mr. Carey telephoned was Cash Register. Mr. Carey sought to finance the insurance premium, make the minimum down payment, and obtain the minimum monthly payment available. The quote given to Mr. Carey was stored in the Cash Register computer. On August 17, 1994, Mr. Carey went to the Cash Register office and discussed the purchase of insurance with Respondent, Davis. Ms. Davis retrieved Mr. Carey's quote from the computer and offered Mr. Carey the same premium, down payment, and terms that were quoted to Mr. Carey by telephone. The quoted premium was $275 for personal injury protection, a $2,000 deductible, and $10,000 in liability insurance. The insurer was Armor Insurance Company ("Armor"). The down payment was $67. The quote was based on Mr. Carey's purchase of two additional policies. One policy was a $1,000 accidental death benefit ("ADB"). The second was hospital indemnification. The additional premium for the ADB policy was $10. The additional premium for the hospital indemnity policy was $100. Mr. Carey had the option of rejecting the two additional policies. His down payment on the cost of automobile insurance alone would have increased to $97.50, and his monthly payment would have also increased. However, the finance charge and total cost would have decreased. Mr. Carey was unhappy with his financing alternatives but did not choose to pay the premium in full rather than finance it. Nor did he choose to reduce his total cost by purchasing automobile insurance only. Mr. Carey chose a lower down payment, lower monthly payment, ADB, and hospital indemnification. Mr. Carey paid $67 to Respondent, Davis, signed the appropriate documents including a premium finance agreement, and left. Premium Financing Respondents are each charged with violating former Sec. 627.8405(3), Fla. Stat. (1994 Supp.)("former Section 627.8405(3)"). 5/ Former Section 627.8405 provided inter alia: No premium finance company shall, in a premium finance agreement, provide financing for the cost of: * * * (3) Any amount in excess of 70 percent of the original premium . . . on any insurance contract . . . of 12 months' or more duration . . . . Respondents did not violate former Section 627.8405(3) in the Carey transaction unless they satisfied three conjunctive requirements. Respondents must have: provided financing; in a premium finance agreement; for more than 70 percent of the original premiums. Respondents satisfied only one of the foregoing requirements. Provided Financing The term "financing" is not defined in Chapter 627, Part XV. The plain and ordinary meaning of the term "finance" is to supply money, credit, or capital ("money or credit"). 6/ Respondents did not supply money or credit to pay insurance premiums in the Carey transaction. Equity Premium, Inc. ("Equity") 7/ provided financing in the Carey transaction. Equity supplied money to the insurer or insurance agent, supplied credit to Mr. Carey, and imposed a finance charge for the money and credit supplied. Equity is a premium finance company, within the meaning of Section 627.826, and, on August 17, 1994, was subject to the provisions of former Section 627.8405(3). However, Equity is not a party to this proceeding. Respondents do not own stock in Equity. Nor do they own stock in Cash Register or LR3. Equity, Cash Register, and LR3 may be related entities because the stock of each corporation may be owned by common shareholders. However, any such relationship does not include Respondents. Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents provided financing as principals. Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents were authorized as agents to bind Equity irrevocably without the subsequent consent and approval of Equity. In A Premium Finance Agreement The financing document used in the Carey transaction was labeled a premium finance agreement. However, a written agreement is not a premium finance agreement merely because of the label affixed to the document. To be a premium finance agreement, a written agreement must satisfy the statutory definition of a premium finance agreement. A premium finance agreement is defined in Section 627.827 8/ as: . . . a written agreement by which an insured promises or agrees to pay to . . . a premium finance company the [amount advanced] . . . to the insurer or insurance agent, in payment of premiums on an insurance contract, [together with a service charge]. . . . [emphasis supplied] In relevant part, a premium finance agreement is a written agreement in which the insured promises to pay the amount advanced together with a service charge A written agreement in which the insured promises to pay the amount advanced without a service charge is not a premium finance agreement. Section 627.826(3) 9/ clearly states: The inclusion of a charge for insurance on a bona fide sale of goods or services on installments is not subject to the provisions of this part Section 627.826(3) makes it clear that financing provided without a service charge was not subject to the prohibition in former Section 627.8405(3). Former Section 627.8405(3) prohibited only financing in a written agreement in which the insured agreed to pay the amount advanced together with a service charge The amount advanced in the Carey transaction was $319.40. The amount advanced was determined by reducing original premiums of $375 by $57 of the down payment and by increasing the $318 remainder by D.O.C. stamps of $1.40. Of the amount advanced, Mr. Carey agreed to pay only $137.69 together with a service charge. The $43.66 service charge was calculated at an annual interest rate of 31.71 percent. 10/ If Mr. Carey had agreed to pay the entire $319.40 together with a service charge of 31.71 percent, he would have agreed to pay a service charge of $101.28. 11/ If Respondents provided financing in the Carey transaction, they provided financing in a premium finance agreement for only $137.69 because that is the only part of the amount advanced that Mr. Carey agreed to pay together with a service charge. Respondents did not provide financing in a premium finance agreement for $181.71 because Mr. Carey agreed to pay that part of the amount advanced without a service charge. 12/ The single written agreement that was labeled a premium finance agreement was, by statutory definition, a dual-use document. That part of the document in which Mr. Carey agreed to pay $137.69 together with a service charge was a premium finance agreement within the meaning of Section 627.827. That part of document in which Mr. Carey agreed to pay $181.71 without a service charge did not satisfy an essential requirement in the statutory definition of a premium finance agreement. Financing provided in that part of the document that was not a premium finance agreement was not prohibited by former Section 627.8405(3). Section 627.826(3) provides that such financing is not subject to the finance provisions of Chapter 627, Part XV, including the prohibition in former Section 627.8405(3). More Than 70 Percent Of The Original Premium If Respondents provided financing in the Carey transaction, they did not violate former Section 627.8405(3) by providing financing in a premium finance agreement for more than 70 percent of the original premiums. The $137.69 that Mr. Carey agreed to pay together with a service charge is only 37 percent of the $375 in original premiums. Respondents failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that a disproportionate share of the $137.69 represented more than 70 percent of the $100 premium for hospital indemnification. Nor did Petitioner show that Mr. Carey agreed to pay the $100 premium together with a service charge. All of the $137.69 and the $43.66 service charge arguably could have been attributable to the $275 automobile premium. Even if the $100 premium for hospital indemnification were actually a charge for products other than insurance, $137.69 comprises only 50 percent of the $275 automobile premium. As the premium finance agreement stated, "FINANCE CHARGES HAVE BEEN CALCULATED ON NO MORE THAN 70 PERCENT OF THE PREMIUM." Automobile Club Section 627.8405(1) 13/ provides, in relevant part: No premium finance company shall, in a premium finance agreement, provide financing for the cost of: A membership in an automobile club. The term "automobile club" means a legal entity which, in consideration of dues, assessments, or periodic payments of money, promises its members or subscribers to assist them in matters relating to the ownership, operation, use, or maintenance of a motor vehicle. . . Respondents did not violate Section 627.8405(1). Respondents did not provide financing in a premium finance agreement for the cost of a membership in an automobile club. Both the ADB and hospital indemnification policies Mr. Carey purchased were issued by Home Insurance Company ("Home") to Colonial Touring Association, Inc. ("CTA") as group policies for CTA members. 14/ CTA is an automobile club within the meaning of Section 627.8405(1). 15/ Ms. Beverly Robinson operates CTA and maintains its books and records. Ms. Robinson is licensed as an insurance agent pursuant to agent number 081505068. On August 17, 1994, Ms. Robinson was authorized to sell ADB and hospital indemnity group insurance for Home. 16/ Respondents did not charge Mr. Carey for the cost of a membership in an automobile club. 17/ Respondents charged Mr. Carey $110 for ADB and hospital indemnification premiums. Respondents paid the entire $110 to CTA. CTA paid Home for the amount owed Home and retained the balance as commissions earned on the sale of group insurance. The ADB and hospital indemnification premiums were high commission items. Of the $10 charged to Mr. Carey for ADB, CTA paid only $1 to Home. CTA retained the remaining $9 as commission. Of the $100 charged to Mr. Carey for hospital indemnification, CTA paid Home only $10 and retained the balance. Neither Respondents, Ms. Robinson, nor the books and records of CTA treat any portion of the $99 commission included in the premiums for ADB and hospital indemnification as the cost of a membership in CTA. Mr. Carey was covered for ADB and hospital indemnification from August 17, 1994, through August 16, 1995. Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence the portion of the $99 commission, if any, that should be treated as the cost of the CTA membership. Similarly, Petitioner failed to show the portion of the $99 commission that should be treated as commission earned on the sale of insurance. Even if some or all of the $99 commission retained by CTA should be treated as the cost of membership in CTA, Respondents did not provide financing in a premium finance agreement for that cost. Petitioner failed to show by clear and convincing evidence that Mr. Carey agreed to pay the amount advanced for a CTA membership together with a service charge. 18/ ADB Section 627.8405(2) provides, in relevant part: No premium finance company shall, in a premium finance agreement, provide financing for the cost of: * * * (2) An accidental death and dismemberment policy sold in combination with a personal injury protection and property damage only policy. Respondents did not violate Section 627.8405(2). Respondents did not provide financing in a premium finance agreement for the cost of an ADB policy irrespective of whether it was sold in combination with a personal injury protection and property damage policy. The $10 premium for the ADB policy was paid entirely from Mr. Carey's $67 down payment. CTA received the $10 from Cash Register, retained a $9 commission, and transmitted the $1 cost for the group ADB policy to Home. No part of the $10 premium for the ADB policy was financed. Mr. Carey did not agree to pay any part of the amount advanced for the ADB premium together with a service charge. Informed Consent, Unfair Practices, And Deception Respondents did not violate Sections 626.611(7) or (9). Respondents did not demonstrate a lack of fitness or a lack of trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Nor did they commit fraudulent or dishonest practices in their business. Respondents did not violate Sections 626.611(13) and 626.621(2). Respondents did not willfully fail to comply with applicable statutes, rules, or Petitioner's final orders. Respondents did not violate Section 626.611(5). Respondents did not willfully practice deception with regard to an insurance policy. Respondents did not violate Sections 626.621(6) and 626.9541(1) and (2). Respondents did not engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices including misrepresentation and sliding. Respondents did not otherwise show themselves to be a source of injury or loss to the public or to be detrimental to the public interest. The Insured Mr. Carey made his choices for his own economic convenience. He was interested solely in complying with state requirements for insurance at the minimum down payment and at the minimum monthly cost. Mr. Carey was not interested in the details of the insurance he purchased. He was not interested in reading the documents he signed, and he chose not to do so. Mr. Carey does not travel frequently and has little or no need for the benefits of the ADB and hospital indemnity policies. However, he did have an economic need to obtain automobile insurance for the lowest down payment and for the lowest monthly cost. The Documents Mr. Carey signed a confirmation of coverages form disclosing his purchase of the ADB and hospital indemnity policies. The confirmation of coverage form signed by Mr. Carey expressly states that the ADB and hospital indemnity premiums are high commission items. The confirmation of coverages form made the following disclosure to Mr. Carey concerning his ADB policy: Separate in the price of some of our policies is separate coverage for accidental death and dismemberment resulting from an auto accident. Yours includes 1 THOUSAND DOLLARS coverage for 12 months and the premium is $10 . You may increase this coverage if you desire. Remember coverage is subject to the terms and conditions in the policy. If you do not wish this coverage please advise the agent. This is a high commission item that allows us to sell you auto insurance at the lowest possible premium. We will have to change your options if you do not wish this coverage. The confirmation of coverages form made the following disclosure to Mr. Carey concerning his hospital indemnification policy: Separate in the price of some of our policies is separate coverage for hospital indemni- fication resulting from an auto accident. Yours includes 1 THOUSAND DOLLARS coverage for 12 months and the premium is $100. You may increase this coverage if you desire. Remember coverage is subject to the terms and conditions in the policy. If you do not wish this coverage please advise the agent. This is a high commission item that allows us to sell you auto insurance at the lowest possible premium. We will have to change your options if you do not wish this coverage. Mr. Carey also signed an insurance application for automobile coverage with Armor Insurance, a premium finance agreement with Equity, and CTA forms including a designation of beneficiary form. Respondent, Davis, submitted each document to Mr. Carey separately. He signed each document in her presence in separate "intervals." Ms. Davis did not rush Mr. Carey through the transaction. The premium finance agreement adequately discloses the terms of financing. The agreement discloses: the types of premiums financed; the amount of premiums for each policy; a down payment of $57; an unpaid balance of $318; an amount financed of $319.40; a finance charge of $43.66; total payments of $363.06; a total sales price of $420.06; an annual percentage rate of 31.71; and nine monthly payments of approximately $40.30 each. 19/ Mr. Carey had a reasonable opportunity to read the documents he signed but declined to do so. Mr. Carey understood that by signing the confirmation of coverages form he certified that he understood the insurance he purchased even though he chose not to read the documents. Respondent, Davis, provided Mr. Carey with a copy of all of the documents that Mr. Carey signed except the confirmation of coverages form and the CTA forms. Both were available for Mr. Carey to review at the Cash Register office. 20/ Mr. Carey never requested copies of the confirmation of coverages form or the CTA forms. Nor did he object to not receiving copies of those forms. The Explanation Even though Mr. Carey did not read the documents he signed, Respondent, Davis, explained each document to Mr. Carey. Her explanation was adequate, accurate, and did not misrepresent material facts. Her explanation was consistent with the documents signed by Mr. Carey. Respondent, Davis, discussed the confirmation of coverages form with Mr. Carey, including the ADB and hospital indemnification. She explained to Mr. Carey that the ADB and hospital indemnity policies were optional. She further explained that the premium and down payment would be adjusted if Mr. Carey rejected the ADB and hospital indemnification and that an agent would have to provide a new quote to Mr. Carey. Ms. Davis reviewed the premium finance agreement with Mr. Carey. She explained the total premiums, finance charge, down payment, and monthly payments. She explained that the $100 charged in the agreement was the annual premium for the group hospital indemnity policy from Home. Ms. Davis explained that the premium for the ADB policy would not be financed but would be paid from Mr. Carey's $67 down payment. Mr. Carey recognized that he paid $67 as a down payment but received credit on the premium finance agreement for a down payment of only $57. Mr. Carey understood that the $10 difference paid for the ADB policy. Mr. Carey designated Ms. June Wilson, his mother, as the beneficiary of the ADB policy. Mr. Carey understands the meaning of a beneficiary. Mr. Carey is a high school graduate. 21/ He understands, speaks, and reads English as his primary language. At the time of the transaction, Mr. Carey was alert and was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Mr. Carey received his automobile insurance policy from Armor and kept the coverage until his first monthly payment was due. He failed to make the first payment and allowed the policy to lapse. Mr. Carey was covered for ADB and hospital indemnification from August 17, 1994, through August 16, 1995. Supervision Respondents did not violate Rules 4-213.100(1) and (2). Respondent, Koontz, did not fail to properly supervise Respondent, Davis, in her transaction with Mr. Carey. Neither Respondent knowingly aided, assisted, procured, advised, or abetted the other in violating applicable statutes or rules. Respondent, Davis, has extensive experience as a customer representative. She processes approximately six customers a day or approximately 1,000 to 1,500 customers a year. 22/ She has had only two complaints from customers other than Mr. Carey concerning her customary practice. Ms. Davis followed her customary practice in dealing with Mr. Carey. She did not conceal any documents from Mr. Carey, did not misrepresent material facts, and is not trained to do so by Respondent, Koontz. Apparent Authority Respondents did not violate Rule 4-213.130(5). Respondent, Davis, did not allow Mr. Carey to form the impression that she is an insurance agent rather than a customer service representative. Respondent, Koontz, did not allow Ms. Davis to create such an impression or to misrepresent herself as an insurance agent. Ms. Davis stated to Mr. Carey that if he elected to decline the ADB and hospital indemnity policies, an agent would need to quote Mr. Carey's new down payment and monthly payments. She explained to Mr. Carey that she would need to have an agent provide that information.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondents not guilty of the charges in the administrative complaints. RECOMMENDED this 17th day of December, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL S. MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 1996.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Department of Insurance, was the state agency responsible for the licensure of insurance agents and the regulation of the insurance business in Florida. Respondent, Richard M. Rinker, was licensed by the Petitioner as a health insurance agent engaged in the business of soliciting, selling and servicing health insurance policies for National States Insurance Company. Levon H. and Joan D. Sprague, husband and wife, moved to Florida from New York in August, 1991. Prior to moving to Florida, the Spragues operated a restaurant in New York and purchased health insurance from Blue Cross/Blue Shield for themselves and some of their employees. They also owned a H.I.P. policy which was similar to a health maintenance organization, but both that coverage and the Blue Cross/Blue Shield coverage were dropped when they moved to Florida. Because both Mr. and Mrs. Sprague were getting older, and because both had indications of possible future health problems based on experience and family history, upon the recommendation of Mrs. Sprague's father, who had purchased coverage from Respondent and was satisfied with the service received, they contacted Respondent and met with him about purchasing health insurance. The first meeting was on January 6, 1992. At that time, the Sprague's made Respondent aware of the fact that they had no health insurance coverage at that time and that they wanted to purchase coverage which would give them 100 percent reimbursement of all bills for medical care rendered. After some discussion, they agreed to accept less coverage for doctors' bills and other professional services, but were quite adamant in reiterating they wanted a policy that would cover 100 percent of the cost of hospitalization. They emphasized this because of Mr. Sprague's family's history of heart problems and they wanted to be sure the hospital expense would be covered in full. They felt the doctors could wait a while for payment of the full amount of their bills. During the course of his presentation, Respondent utilized a document called a National States Limited Medical-Surgical Hospital Confinement Plan which purportedly outlined the specifics of policy coverage. Under that portion entitled "Specific Benefits", the form read, "This policy pays percent of usual and customary expenses of the following type:". Under the blank space, in smaller type, were the numbers "10, 20, 30, 40". In the blank area, Respondent, by hand, inserted 80 percent. Above, and to the right of that insertion, he also placed the numbers, "100 percent" and "40 percent." Respondent explains this as being his attempt to provide answers to questions asked of him by Mrs. Sprague. He noted that his company does not offer a major medical policy such as desired by the Spragues, and that the only way he could provide coverage close to that which they wanted was to combine policies. Using a yellow highlighter, he also highlighted the words, "Doctor's charges", "doctor's office", "clinic", "hospital", "home", and "surgical or medical center." He also highlighted the terms "annual mammography screening" because Mrs. Sprague had specifically inquired about coverage of that procedure. On that visit, Respondent sold the Spragues two policies each. These were "MSH-1" and "MSH-2" policies which, the Spragues recall, Respondent indicated would provide the total coverage they wanted. Initially, the premium was to be $3,600.00 for the year, but when the Spragues indicated they could not afford that much, after calling his office, Respondent was able to offer them 6 months coverage for one half the price. They were satisfied with this and accepted the policies. Mr. Rinker received as his commission 45 percent of the premium paid in by the Spragues for the first year of the policy. When he departed the Spragues' home, he left with them the policy outline he utilized in his presentation, a large manila envelope containing information regarding his office hours and phone number, and a MSP form required by law. The coverage was not heavily used at first. When, during the first six month period, claims were initially denied because of the waiting period, the Spragues accepted that. After the expiration of the waiting period, all claims submitted for doctors' visits and mammography were covered to at least 80 percent of the amount expected by the Spragues. This was, however, because of the combined benefits paid by the two policies. Neither policy, alone, paid 100 percent percent of the claim. The Spragues were satisfied with this because it was not hospitalization. Later on, however, it became apparent that Mr. Sprague would have to enter the hospital for coronary bypass surgery, and he was admitted on an emergency basis. Before the surgery was done, however, the Spragues wanted to be sure the hospital bills would be paid in full, and they had their daughter- in-law, who had extensive experience in the insurance business prior to that time, to examine the policies. Her review of the policies generated some questions in her mind as to whether they provided 100 percent coverage of all hospital costs. To satisfy herself and her in-laws, utilizing the telephone number for Respondent on the materials left by him with the Spragues, she contacted him and asked, specifically, whether the policies he had sold to the Spragues, provided the 100 percent coverage they desired. His answer was somewhat evasive and non- responsive to her inquiry. He said, "Don't worry. She'll [Ms. Sprague] be able to sleep at night. She has a good policy." This did not satisfy either Ms. Sprague or her mother-in-law, and so she called Respondent again. During this second conversation he admitted that for at least a part of the cost, there was a 40 percent coinsurance provision. Respondent claims that during these calls, Ms. Sprague did not tell him that her father-in-law was to have surgery but only told him about tests. The tests were covered and the bills therefor paid by National States. By the time of these calls, however, Mr. Sprague was already in the hospital and facing the surgery the following morning. There was little that could be done. Mr. Sprague wanted to cancel the surgery but his wife would not allow this and the operation was accomplished. The hospital bills received by the Spragues amounted to approximately $140,000. Of this, the insurance company paid approximately $18,000. Ultimately, the Spragues and the hospital were able to reach an agreement for settlement of the obligation for $40,000. In order to satisfy this, Mr. Sprague was required to liquidate all his investments. He still owes the doctors a substantial sum but is making periodic payments to liquidate those obligations. The policies which Respondent sold to the Spragues were limited medical and surgical expense policies which pay only a limited percentage of incurred medical expenses over a limited period of time. Neither policy pays 100 percent of any medical or surgical expense. Respondent did not clearly communicate this fact to the Spragues. They suffered from the misconception that the policies sold to them by the Respondent paid 100 percent coverage for hospital expense, 80 percent for doctor fees, and 40 percent for medication. Petitioner presented no evidence that what Respondent did was below the standards accepted of sales agents within the health insurance industry. On the other hand, James Quinn, an insurance agent since 1975, who has taught life and health insurance and the legal responsibility of agents in the health insurance area with the approval of the Department since 1985, testified on behalf of Respondent. Mr. Quinn noted that there are three types of medical policies in use, including basic medical expense, major medical, and comprehensive major medical. The first of these, basic medical expense, permits liberal underwriting and pays policy limits. In Mr. Quinn's opinion, based on the age and preexisting conditions that the Sprague's have, major medical coverage, like they wanted, would cost between seven and ten thousand dollars annually, excluding deductibles. Health insurance coverage outlines, such as used by Respondent in his presentation to the Spragues are, according to Mr. Quinn, reasonably self-explanatory and are left with the insured either when the policy is applied for or is delivered. In the former case, the client is able to read the outline and cancel the policy before delivery, if he so desires. In the latter case, the insured has a set number of days to read the policy after delivery and cancel if he so desires. These outlines do not substitute for the policy, however, and generally, the agent prefers to deliver the policy personally so he can go over it again with the insured. According to Mr. Quinn, it is difficult to explain coverage to prospective insureds because of their unfamiliarity with the terminology and the available benefits. He concluded that the action of the Respondent, in issue here, whereby he used the coverage outline to explain the coverages to the Spragues, was consistent with proper agent conduct and was within industry standards. He also concluded that based on what Respondent had available to sell to the Spragues, he sold them the best package he could, at the time.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this matter finding Respondent, Richard Michael Rinker, guilty of a violation of Sections 626.611(5), (7), (9), and (13); 626.621(2) and (6); 626.9521, and 626.9541(1)(a)(1), (1)(e)(1), and (1)(k)(1), Florida statutes, and suspending his license as a health insurance agent for nine months. RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 94-0089 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. 3. & 4. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 6. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 10. Accepted and incorporated herein. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted as to finding Mr. Quinn is an expert regarding insurance standards and business practices, but rejected as insinuating those opinions are binding on the Hearing Officer. Rejected notwithstanding the opinions of Mr. Quinn. Accepted, as there is no evidence to the contrary. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. First sentence rejected as contra to the evidence. Second sentence accepted as to the furnishing, but the quality of the information was less than clear. Balance accepted. & 8. Rejected. COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel T. Gross, Esquire Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdery 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") properly disallowed Petitioners' expense for liability insurance and accrued contingent liability costs contained in AHCA's audit of Petitioners' Medicaid cost reports.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners operate licensed nursing homes that participate in the Florida Medicaid program as institutional providers. The 14 Palm Gardens facilities are limited liability companies operating as subsidiaries of New Rochelle Administrators, LLC, which also provides the facilities with management services under a management contract. AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. One of AHCA's duties is to audit Medicaid cost reports submitted by providers participating in the Medicaid program. During the audit period, Petitioners provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreements that they entered into with AHCA. The Provider Agreements contained the following relevant provision: (3) Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002)1, provided in relevant part: Reimbursement of Medicaid providers.-- Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. These methodologies may include fee schedules, reimbursement methods based on cost reporting, negotiated fees, competitive bidding pursuant to s. 287.057, and other mechanisms the agency considers efficient and effective for purchasing services or goods on behalf of recipients. . . . * * * (2)(a)1. Reimbursement to nursing homes licensed under part II of chapter 400 . . . must be made prospectively. . . . * * * (b) Subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, the agency shall establish and implement a Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Medicaid) for nursing home care in order to provide care and services in conformance with the applicable state and federal laws, rules, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to ensure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable geographic access to such care. . . . AHCA has adopted the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the "Plan") by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. The Plan incorporates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") Publication 15-1, also called the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual" or "PRM"), which provides "guidelines and policies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of l965, as amended." CMS Pub. 15-1, Foreword, p. I. The audit period in these cases spans two versions of the Plan: version XXIII, effective July 1, 2002, and version XXIV, effective January 1, 2003. It is unnecessary to distinguish between the two versions of the Plan because their language is identical as to the provisions relevant to these cases. Section I of the Plan, "Cost Finding and Cost Reporting," provides as follows, in relevant part: The cost report shall be prepared by a Certified Public Accountant in accordance with chapter 409.908, Florida Statutes, on the form prescribed in section I.A. [AHCA form 5100-000, Rev. 7-1-90], and on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as incorporated by reference in Rule 61H1-20.007, F.A.C., the methods of reimbursement in accordance with Medicare (Title XVIII) Principles of Reimbursement, the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB. 15-1)(1993) incorporated herein by reference except as modified by the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan and State of Florida Administrative Rules. . . . Section III of the Plan, "Allowable Costs," provides as follows, in relevant part: Implicit in any definition of allowable costs is that those costs shall not exceed what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer pays for a given service or item. If costs are determined by AHCA, utilizing the Title XVIII Principles of Reimbursement, CMS-PUB. 15-1 (1993) and this plan, to exceed the level that a prudent buyer would incur, then the excess costs shall not be reimbursable under the plan. The Plan is a cost based prospective reimbursement plan. The Plan uses historical data from cost reports to establish provider reimbursement rates. The "prospective" feature is an upward adjustment to historical costs to establish reimbursement rates for subsequent rate semesters.2 The Plan establishes limits on reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement ceilings and targets. AHCA establishes reimbursement ceilings for nursing homes based on the size and location of the facilities. The ceilings are determined prospectively, on a semiannual basis. "Targets" limit the inflationary increase in reimbursement rates from one semester to the next and limit a provider's allowable costs for reimbursement purposes. If a provider's costs exceed the target, then those costs are not factored into the reimbursement rate and must be absorbed by the provider. A nursing home is required to file cost reports. The costs identified in the cost reports are converted into per diem rates in four components: the operating component; the direct care component; the indirect care component; and the property component. GL/PL insurance costs fall under the operating component. Once the per diem rate is established for each component, the nursing home's reimbursement rate is set at the lowest of four limitations: the facility's costs; the facility's target; the statewide cost ceiling based on the size of the facility and its region; or the statewide target, also based on the size and location of the facility. The facility's target is based on the initial cost report submitted by that facility. The initial per diem established pursuant to the initial cost report becomes the "base rate." Once the base rate is established, AHCA sets the target by inflating the base rate forward to subsequent six- month rate semesters according to a pre-established inflation factor. Reimbursement for cost increases experienced in subsequent rate semesters is limited by the target drawn from the base rate. Thus, the facility's reimbursement for costs in future rate semesters is affected by the target limits established in the initial period cost report. Expenses that are disallowed during the establishment of the base rate cannot be reclaimed in later reimbursement periods. Petitioners entered the Medicaid program on June 29, 2002. They filed cost reports for the nine- month period from their entry into the program through February 28, 2003. These reports included all costs claimed by Petitioners under the accrual basis of accounting in rendering services to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. In preparing their cost reports, Petitioners used the standard Medicaid Cost Report "Chart of Accounts and Description," which contains the account numbers to be used for each ledger entry, and explains the meaning of each account number. Under the general category of "Administration" are set forth several subcategories of account numbers, including "Insurance Expense." Insurance Expense is broken into five account numbers, including number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party," which is described as "[c]osts of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or a non-profit service corporation."3 Petitioners' cost report stated the following expenses under account number 730810: Facility Amount Palm Garden of Clearwater $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Gainesville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Jacksonville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Largo $171,188.00 Palm Garden of North Miami $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Ocala $217,712.00 Palm Garden of Orlando $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Pinellas $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Port St. Lucie $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Sun City $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Tampa $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Vero Beach $217,712.00 Palm Garden of West Palm Beach $231,151.00 Palm Garden of Winter Haven $145,042.00 AHCA requires that the cost reports of first-year providers undergo an audit. AHCA's contract auditing firm, Smiley & Smiley, conducted an examination4 of the cost reports of the 14 Palm Gardens nursing homes to determine whether the included costs were allowable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has promulgated a series of "attestation standards" to provide guidance and establish a framework for the attestation services provided by the accounting profession in various contexts. Attestation Standards 101 and 601 set out the standard an accountant relies upon in examining for governmental compliance. Smiley & Smiley examined the Palm Gardens cost reports pursuant to these standards. During the course of the audit, Smiley & Smiley made numerous requests for documentation and other information pursuant to the Medicaid provider agreement and the Plan. Petitioners provided the auditors with their general ledger, invoices, audited financial statements, bank statements, and other documentation in support of their cost reports. The examinations were finalized during the period between September 28, 2006, and October 4, 2006. The audit report issued by AHCA contained more than 2,000 individual adjustments to Petitioners' costs, which the parties to these consolidated proceedings have negotiated and narrowed to two adjustments per Palm Gardens facility.5 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the first adjustment at issue is AHCA's disallowance of Palm Gardens' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of GL/PL insurance, where Palm Gardens could not document that it had purchased GL/PL insurance. The second adjustment at issue is ACHA's disallowance of a portion of the premium paid by Palm Gardens for the Mature Care Policies. The total amount of the adjustment at issue for each facility is set forth in the Preliminary Statement above. Of that total for each facility, $18,849.00 constituted the disallowance for the Mature Care Policies. The remainder constituted the disallowance for the accrual of GL/PL related contingent liabilities. Janette Smiley, senior partner at Smiley & Smiley and expert in Medicaid auditing, testified that Petitioners provided no documentation other than the Mature Care Policies to support the GL/PL entry in the cost reports. Ms. Smiley testified that, during much of the examination process, she understood Petitioners to be self-insured. Ms. Smiley's understanding was based in part on statements contained in Petitioners' audited financial statements. In the audited financial statement covering the period from June 28, 2002, through December 31, 2002, Note six explains Petitioners' operating leases and states as follows, in relevant part: The lease agreement requires that the Company maintain general and professional liability in specified minimum amounts. As an alternative to maintaining these levels of insurance, the lease agreement allows the Company to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount. The Company chose to self-insure, and has recorded litigation reserves of approximately $1,735,000 that are included in other accrued expenses (see Note 9). As of December 31, 2002, these reserves have not been funded by the Company. . . . The referenced Note nine, titled "Commitments and Contingencies," provides as follows in relevant part: Due to the current legal environment, providers of long-term care services are experiencing significant increases in liability insurance premiums or cancellations of liability insurance coverage. Most, if not all, insurance carriers in Florida have ceased offering liability coverage altogether. The Company's Florida facilities have minimal levels of insurance coverage and are essentially self-insured. The Company has established reserves (see Note 6) that estimate its exposure to uninsured claims. Management is not currently aware of any claims that could exceed these reserves. However, the ultimate outcome of these uninsured claims cannot be determined with certainty, and could therefore have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company. The relevant notes in Petitioner's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2003, are identical to those quoted above, except that the recorded litigation reserves were increased to $4 million. The notes provide that, as of December 31, 2003, these reserves had not been funded by Petitioners. Ms. Smiley observed that the quoted notes, while referencing "self-insurance" and the recording of litigation reserves, stated that the litigation reserves had not been funded. By e-mail dated April 21, 2005, Ms. Smiley corresponded with Stanley Swindling, the shareholder in the accounting firm Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A., who had primary responsibility for preparing Petitioners' cost reports. Ms. Smiley noted that Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the company "chose to self-insure" and "recorded litigation reserves," then wrote (verbatim): By definition from PRM CMS Pub 15-1 Sections 2162.5 and 2162.7 the Company does in fact have self-insurance as there is no shifting of risk. You will have to support your positioning a letter addressing the regs for self-insurance. As clearly the financial statement auditors believe this is self- insurance and have disclosed such to the financial statement users. If you cannot support the funding as required by the regs, the provider will have to support expense as "pay as you go" in accordance with [2162.6] for PL/GL. * * * Please review 2161 and 2162 and provide support based on the required compliance. If support is not complete within the regulations, amounts for IBNR [incurred but not reported] will be disallowed and we will need to have the claims paid reports from the TPA [third party administrator] (assuming there is a TPA handling the claims processing), in order to allow any expense. Section 2160 of the Manual establishes the basic insurance requirement: A. General.-- A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider's financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self-insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. . . . . . . If a provider is unable to obtain malpractice coverage, it must select one of the self-insurance alternatives in §2162 to protect itself against such risks. If one of these alternatives is not selected and the provider incurs losses, the cost of such losses and related expenses are not allowable. Section 2161.A of the Manual sets forth the general rule as to the reimbursement of insurance costs. It provides that the reasonable costs of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or nonprofit service corporation are allowable to the extent they are "consistent with sound management practice." Reimbursement for insurance premiums is limited to the "amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Section 2162 of the Manual provides as follows, in relevant part: PROVIDER COSTS FOR MALPRACTICE AND COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE General.-- Where provider costs incurred for protection against malpractice and comprehensive general liability . . . do not meet the requirements of §2161.A, costs incurred for that protection under other arrangements will be allowable under the conditions stated below. . . . * * * The following illustrates alternatives to full insurance coverage from commercial sources which providers, acting individually or as part of a group or a pool, can adopt to obtain malpractice, and comprehensive general liability, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and employee health care insurance protection: Insurance purchased from a commercial insurance company which provides coverage after a deductible or coinsurance provision has been met; Insurance purchased from a limited purpose insurance company (captive); Total self-insurance; or A combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. . . . part: Section 2162.3 of the Manual provides: Self-Insurance.-- You may believe that it is more prudent to maintain a total self- insurance program (i.e., the assumption by you of the risk of loss) independently or as part of a group or pool rather than to obtain protection through purchased insurance coverage. If such a program meets the conditions specified in §2162.7, payments into such funds are allowable costs. Section 2162.7 of the Manual provides, in relevant Conditions Applicable to Self-Insurance.-- Definition of Self-Insurance.-- Self- insurance is a means whereby a provider(s), whether proprietary or nonproprietary, undertakes the risk to protect itself against anticipated liabilities by providing funds in an amount equivalent to liquidate those liabilities. . . . * * * Self-Insurance Fund.-- The provider or pool establishes a fund with a recognized independent fiduciary such as a bank, a trust company, or a private benefit administrator. In the case of a State or local governmental provider or pool, the State in which the provider or pool is located may act as a fiduciary. The provider or pool and fiduciary must enter into a written agreement which includes all of the following elements: General Legal Responsibility.-- The fiduciary agreement must include the appropriate legal responsibilities and obligations required by State laws. Control of Fund.-- The fiduciary must have legal title to the fund and be responsible for proper administration and control. The fiduciary cannot be related to the provider either through ownership or control as defined in Chapter 10, except where a State acts as a fiduciary for a State or local governmental provider or pool. Thus, the home office of a chain organization or a religious order of which the provider is an affiliate cannot be the fiduciary. In addition, investments which may be made by the fiduciary from the fund are limited to those approved under State law governing the use of such fund; notwithstanding this, loans by the fiduciary from the fund to the provider or persons related to the provider are not permitted. Where the State acts as fiduciary for itself or local governments, the fund cannot make loans to the State or local governments. . . . The quoted Manual provisions clarify that Ms. Smiley's message to Mr. Swindling was that Petitioners had yet to submit documentation to bring their "self-insurance" expenses within the reimbursable ambit of Sections 2161 and 2162 of the Manual. There was no indication that Petitioners had established a fund in an amount sufficient to liquidate its anticipated liabilities, or that any such funds had been placed under the control of a fiduciary. Petitioners had simply booked the reserved expenses without setting aside any cash to cover the expenses. AHCA provided extensive testimony regarding the correspondence that continued among Ms. Smiley, Mr. Swindling, and AHCA employees regarding this "self-insurance" issue. It is not necessary to set forth detailed findings as to these matters, because Petitioners ultimately conceded to Ms. Smiley that, aside from the Mutual Care policies, they did not purchase commercial insurance as described in Section 2161.A, nor did they avail themselves of the alternatives to commercial insurance described in Section 2162.A. Petitioners did not purchase commercial insurance with a deductible, did not self- insure, did not purchase insurance from a limited purpose or "captive" insurance company, or employ a combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. Ms. Smiley eventually concluded that Petitioners had no coverage for general and professional liability losses in excess of the $25,000 value of the Mutual Care Policies. Under the cited provisions of the Manual, Petitioners' unfunded self- insurance expense was not considered allowable under the principles of reimbursement. Petitioners were uninsured, which led Ms. Smiley to further conclude that Section 2162.13 of the Manual would apply: Absence of Coverage.-- Where a provider, other than a governmental (Federal, State, or local) provider, has no insurance protection against malpractice or comprehensive general liability in conjunction with malpractice, either in the form of a limited purpose or commercial insurance policy or a self-insurance fund as described in §2162.7, any losses and related expenses incurred are not allowable. In response to this disallowance pursuant to the strict terms of the Manual, Petitioners contend that AHCA should not have limited its examination of the claimed costs to the availability of documentation that would support those costs as allowable under the Manual. Under the unique circumstances presented by their situation, Petitioners assert that AHCA should have examined the state of the nursing home industry in Florida, particularly the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, and further examined whether Petitioners had the ability to meet the insurance requirements set forth in the Manual. Petitioners assert that, in light of such an examination, AHCA should have concluded that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may properly be invoked to render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Keith Parnell is an expert in insurance for the long- term care industry. He is a licensed insurance broker working for Hamilton Insurance Agency, which provides insurance and risk management services to about 40 percent of the Florida nursing home market. Mr. Parnell testified that during the audit period, it was impossible for nursing homes to obtain insurance in Florida. In his opinion, Petitioners could not have purchased commercial insurance during the audit period. To support this testimony, Petitioners offered a study conducted by the Florida Department of Insurance ("DOI") in 2000 that attempted to determine the status of the Florida long-term care liability insurance market for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and continuing care retirement communities. Of the 79 companies that responded to DOI's data call, 23 reported that they had provided GL/PL coverage during the previous three years but were no longer writing policies, and only 17 reported that they were currently writing GL/PL policies. Six of the 17 reported writing no policies in 2000, and five of the 17 reported writing only one policy. The responding insurers reported writing a total of 43 policies for the year 2000, though there were approximately 677 skilled nursing facilities in Florida. On March 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature's Joint Select Committee on Nursing Homes issued a report on its study of "issues regarding the continuing liability insurance and lawsuit crisis facing Florida's long-term care facilities and to assess the impact of the reforms contained in CS/CS/CS/SB 1202 (2001)."6 The study employed data compiled from 1999 through 2003. Among the Joint Select Committee's findings was the following: In order to find out about current availability of long-term care liability insurance in Florida, the Committee solicited information from [the Office of Insurance Regulation, or] OIR within the Department of Financial Services, which is responsible for regulating insurance in Florida. At the Committee's request, OIR re-evaluated the liability insurance market and reported that there has been no appreciable change in the availability of private liability insurance over the past year. Twenty-one admitted insurance entities that once offered, or now offer, professional liability coverage for nursing homes were surveyed by OIR. Six of those entities currently offer coverage. Nine surplus lines carriers have provided 54 professional liability policies in the past year. Representatives of insurance carriers that stopped providing coverage in Florida told OIR that they are waiting until there are more reliable indicators of risk nationwide to re-enter the market. Among the Joint Select Committee's conclusions was the following: In the testimony the Committee received, there was general agreement that the quality of care in Florida nursing homes is improving, in large part due to the minimum staffing standards the Legislature adopted in SB 1202 during the 2001 Session. There was not, however, general agreement about whether or not lawsuits are abating due to the tort system changes contained in SB 1202. There was general agreement that the long-term care liability insurance market has not yet improved. After hearing the testimony, there is general agreement among the members of the Joint Select Committee that: * * * General and professional liability insurance, with actual transfer-of-risk, is virtually unavailable in Florida. "Bare- bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory insurance requirement are available; however, the cost often exceeds the face value of the coverage offered in the policy. This situation is a crisis which threatens the continued existence of long-term care facilities in Florida. To further support Mr. Parnell's testimony, Petitioners offered actuarial analyses of general and professional liability in long-term care performed by AON Risk Consultants, Inc. (AON) on behalf of the American Health Care Association. The AON studies analyzed nationwide trends in GL/PL for long-term care, and also examined state-specific issues for eight states identified as leading the trends in claim activity, including Florida. They provided an historical perspective of GL/PL claims in Florida during the audit period. The 2002 AON study for Florida was based on participation by entities representing 52 percent of all Florida nursing home beds. The study provided a "Loss Cost per Occupied Bed" showing GL/PL liability claims losses on a per bed basis. The 2002 study placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $10,800 per bed for the year 2001. The 2003 AON study, based on participation by entities representing 54 percent of Florida nursing home beds, placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $11,810 per bed for the year 2002. The studies showed that the cost per bed of GL/PL losses is materially higher in Florida than the rest of the United States. The nationwide loss per bed was $2,360 for the year 2001 and $2,880 for the year 2002. The GL/PL loss costs for Texas were the second-highest in the country, yet were far lower than the per bed loss for Florida ($5,460 for the year 2001 and $6,310 for the year 2002). Finally, Petitioners point to the Mature Care Policies as evidence of the crisis in GL/PL insurance availability. The aforementioned SB 1202 instituted a requirement that nursing homes maintain liability insurance coverage as a condition of licensure. See Section 22, Chapter 2001-45, Laws of Florida, codified at Subsection 400.141(20), Florida Statutes. To satisfy this requirement, Petitioners entered the commercial insurance market and purchased insurance policies for each of the 14 Palm Gardens facilities from a carrier named Mature Care Insurance Company. The policies carried a $25,000 policy limit, with a policy premium of $34,000. These were the kind of "bare bones" policies referenced by the Joint Select Committee's 2004 report. The fact that the policies cost more than they could ever pay out led Mr. Swindling, Petitioners' health care accounting and Medicaid reimbursement expert, to opine that a prudent nursing home operator in Florida at that time would not have purchased insurance, but for the statutory requirement.7 The Mature Care Policies were "bare bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory liability insurance coverage requirement. The policies cost Petitioners more than $37,000 in premium payments, taxes, and fees, in exchange for policy limits of $25,000. In its examination, AHCA disallowed the difference between the cost of the policy and the policy limits, then prorated the allowable costs because the audit period was nine months long and the premium paid for the Mature Care Policies was for 12 months. AHCA based its disallowance on Section 2161.A of the Manual, particularly the language which states: "Insurance premiums reimbursement is limited to the amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Petitioners responded that they did not enter the market and voluntarily pay a premium in excess of the policy limits. They were statutorily required to purchase this minimal amount of insurance; they were required to purchase a 12-month policy; they paid the market price8; and they should not be penalized for complying with the statute. Petitioners contend they should be reimbursed the full amount of the premiums for the Mature Care Policies, as their cost of statutory compliance. Returning to the issue of the contingent liabilities, Petitioners contend that, in light of the state of the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, AHCA should have gone beyond the strictures of the Manual to conclude that GAAP principles render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Under GAAP, a contingent loss is a loss that is probable and can be reasonably estimated. An estimated loss from a loss contingency may be accrued by a charge to income. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS No. 5"), Accounting for Contingencies, provides several examples of loss contingencies, including "pending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and assessments." Petitioners assert that the contingent losses reported in their cost reports were actual costs incurred by Petitioners. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, provides: The ultimate costs of malpractice claims, which include costs associated with litigating or settling claims, are accrued when the incidents that give rise to the claims occur. Estimated losses from asserted and unasserted claims are accrued either individually or on a group basis, based on the best estimates of the ultimate costs of the claims and the relationship of past reported incidents to eventual claims payments. All relevant information, including industry experience, the entity's own historical experience, the entity's existing asserted claims, and reported incidents, is used in estimating the expected amount of claims. The accrual includes an estimate of the losses that will result from unreported incidents, which are probable of having occurred before the end of the reporting period. Section 8.10 of AICPA Guide provides: Accrued unpaid claims and expenses that are expected to be paid during the normal operating cycle (generally within one year of the date of the financial statements) are classified as current liabilities. All other accrued unpaid claims and expenses are classified as non-current liabilities. As noted above, Petitioners' audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, showed that the accrual was incurred and recorded by Petitioners during the audit period. Mr. Swindling prepared Petitioners' cost reports, based on information provided by Petitioners, including trial balances reflecting their costs, statistics on patient days, cost data related to square footage, and revenue information. Mr. Swindling advised Petitioners to include the accrued losses. He believed that the loss contingency was probable and could be reasonably estimated. The losses were probable because it was "a given in the state of Florida at that time period that nursing homes are going to get sued." Mr. Swindling testified that the accrual reflected a per bed loss amount of $1,750, which he believed to be a reasonable estimate of the contingent liabilities faced by Petitioners during the audit period. This amount was much less than the per bed loss indicated by the AON studies for Florida. Mr. Swindling used the criteria set forth in Section 8.05 of the AICPA Guide to establish the estimate. He determined that the lesser amount was adequate based on his discussions with Petitioners' management, who indicated that they had a substantial risk management program. Management also disclosed to Mr. Swindling that Petitioners' leases required $1,750 per bed in liability coverage. See Finding of Fact 22, supra. Mr. Swindling believed that the estimated loss per bed was reasonable based on the AON studies and his knowledge and experience of the state of the industry in Florida during the audit period, as further reflected in the DOI and Joint Committee on Nursing Homes materials discussed above. Mr. Swindling's opinion was that the provisions of the Manual relating to GL/PL insurance costs do not apply under these circumstances. The costs at issue in this proceeding are not general and professional liability insurance costs subject to CMS Pub. 15-1; rather, they are loss contingencies related to general and professional liability, including defense costs, litigation costs, and settlement costs. Mr. Swindling placed the loss contingency under number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party" because, in the finite chart of accounts provided by Medicaid, that was the most appropriate place to record the cost.9 Despite the initial confusion it caused the agency's auditors, the placement of the loss contingency under number 730810 was not intended to deceive the auditors. Mr. Swindling opined that, under these circumstances, Sections 2160 through 2162 are in conflict with other provisions in the Manual relating to the "prudent buyer" concept, and further conflict with the Plan to the extent that the cited regulations "relate to a retrospective system as opposed to prospective target rate-based system." Mr. Swindling agreed that the application of Sections 2160 through 2162 to the situation presented by Petitioners would result in the disallowance of the loss contingencies. Mr. Swindling observed, however, that Sections 2160 through 2162 are Medicare regulations. Mr. Swindling testified that Medicare reimbursements are made on a retrospective basis.10 Were this situation to occur in Medicare -- in which the provider did not obtain commercial insurance, self-insurance, or establish a captive insurer -- the provider would be deemed to be operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though its costs might be disallowed in the current period, the provider would receive reimbursements in subsequent periods when it could prove actual payment for its losses. Mr. Swindling found a conflict in attempting to apply these Medicare rules to the prospective payment system employed by Florida Medicaid, at least under the circumstances presented by Petitioners' case. Under the prospective system, once the contingent loss is disallowed for the base period, there is no way for Petitioners ever to recover that loss in a subsequent period, even when the contingency is liquidated. During his cross-examination, Mr. Swindling explained his position as follows: . . . Medicare allows for that payment in a subsequent period. Medicaid rules would not allow that payment in the subsequent period; therefore you have conflict in the rules. When you have conflict in the rules, you revert to generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles are what we did. Q. Where did you find that if there's a conflict in the rules, which I disagree with, but if there is a conflict in the rules, that you follow GAAP? Where did you get that from? I mean, we've talked about it and it's clear on the record that if there is no provision that GAAP applies, but where did you get that if there's a conflict? Just point it out, that would be the easiest way to do it. A. The hierarchy, if you will, requires providers to file costs on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If there's no rules, in absence of rules -- and I forget what the other terms were, we read it into the record before, against public policy, those kind of things -- or in my professional opinion, if there is a conflict within the rules where the provider can't follow two separate rules at the same time, they're in conflict, then [GAAP] rules what should be recorded and what should be reimbursed. * * * Q. [T]he company accrued a liability of $2 million for the cost reporting period of 2002-2003, is that correct? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you have any documentation supporting claims paid, actually paid, in 2002-2003 beyond the mature care policy for which that $2 million reserve was set up? A. No. Q. So what did Medicaid pay for? A. Medicaid paid the cost of contingent liabilities that were incurred by the providers and were estimated at $1,750 per bed. Generally accepted accounting principles will adjust that going forward every cost reporting period. If that liability in total goes up or down, the differential under [GAAP] goes through the income statement, and expenses either go up or they go down. It's self-correcting, which is similar to what Medicare is doing, only they're doing it on a cash basis. Mr. Swindling explained the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. The highest governing law is the Federal statutory law, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Subsection. 1396-1396v. Below the statute come the federal regulations for implementing Title XIX, 42 C.F.R. parts 400-426. Then follow in order Florida statutory law, the relevant Florida Administrative Code provisions, the Plan, the Manual, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, GAAP. Mr. Swindling testified that in reality, a cost report is not prepared from the top of the hierarchy down; rather, GAAP is the starting point for the preparation of any cost report. The statutes, rules, the Plan and the Manual are then consulted to exclude specific cost items otherwise allowable under GAAP. In the absence of an applicable rule, or in a situation in which there is a conflict between rules in the hierarchy such that the provider is unable to comply with both rules, the provider should fall back on GAAP principles as to recording of costs and reimbursement. John A. Owens, currently a consultant in health care finance specializing in Medicaid, worked for AHCA for several years up to 2002, in positions including administrator of the audit services section and bureau chief of the Office of Medicaid Program Analysis. Mr. Owens is a CPA and expert in health care accounting and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that AHCA's disallowance of the accrued costs for GL/PL liability was improper. Mr. Owens noted that Section 2160 of the Manual requires providers to purchase commercial insurance. If commercial insurance is unavailable, then the Manual gives the provider two choices: self-insure, or establish a captive program. Mr. Owens testified that insurers were fleeing the state during the period in question, and providers were operating without insurance coverage. Based on the state of the market, Petitioners' only options would have been to self-insure or establish a captive. As to self-insurance, Petitioners' problem was that they had taken over the leases on their facilities from a bankrupt predecessor, Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). Petitioners were not in privity with their predecessor. Petitioners had no access to the facilities' loss histories, without which they could not perform an actuarial study or engage a fiduciary to set up a self-insurance plan.11 Similarly, setting up a captive would require finding an administrator and understanding the risk exposure. Mr. Owens testified that a provider would not be allowed to set up a captive without determining actuarial soundness, which was not possible at the time Petitioners took over the 14 IHS facilities. Thus, Petitioners were simply unable to meet the standards established by the Manual. The options provided by the Manual did not contemplate the unique market situation existing in Florida during the audit period, and certainly did not contemplate that situation compounded by the problems faced by a new provider taking over 14 nursing homes from a bankrupt predecessor. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that, under these circumstances, where the requirements of the Manual could not be met, Petitioners were entitled to seek relief under GAAP, FAS No. 5 in particular. In situations where a loss is probable and can be measured, then an accounting entry may be performed to accrue and report that cost. Mr. Owens concluded that Petitioners' accrual was an allowable cost for Medicaid purposes, and explained his rationale as follows: My opinion is, in essence, that since they could not meet -- technically, they just could not meet those requirements laid out by [the Manual], they had to look somewhere to determine some rational basis for developing a cost to put into the cost report, because if they had chosen to do nothing and just moved forward, those rates would be set and there would be nothing in their base year which then establishes their target moving forward. So by at least looking at a rational methodology to accrue the cost, they were able to build something into their base year and have it worked into their target system as they move forward. Steve Diaczyk, an audit evaluation and review analyst for AHCA, testified for the agency as an expert in accounting, auditing, and Medicaid policy. Mr. Diaczyk was the AHCA auditor who reviewed the work of Smiley & Smiley for compliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, and to verify the accuracy of the independent CPA's determinations. Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Mr. Swindling's description of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Mr. Diaczyk affirmed that Petitioners employed GAAP rather than Medicaid regulations in preparing their cost reports. Mr. Diaczyk testified regarding the Notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements, set forth at Findings of Fact 22-24, supra, which left AHCA's auditors with the understanding that Petitioners were self-insuring. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that Section 2162.7 of the Manual requires a self- insurer to contract with an independent fiduciary to maintain a self-insurance fund, and that the fund must contain monies sufficient to cover anticipated losses. The fiduciary takes title to the funds, the amount of which is determined actuarially. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, in reimbursing a provider for self-insurance, Medicaid wants to make sure that the provider has actually put money into the fund, and has not just set up a fund on its books and called it "self-insurance" for reimbursement purposes. AHCA's position is that it would be a windfall for a provider to obtain reimbursement for an accrued liability when it has not actually set the money aside and funded the risk. Medicaid wants the risk transferred off of the provider's books and on to the self-insurance fund. Mr. Diaczyk testified as to the differing objectives of Medicaid and GAAP. Medicaid is concerned with reimbursing costs, and is therefore especially sensitive regarding the overstatement of costs. Medicaid wants to reimburse a provider for only those costs that have actually been paid. GAAP, on the other hand, is about report presentation for a business entity and is concerned chiefly with avoiding the understatement of expenses and overstatement of revenue. Under GAAP, an entity may accrue a cost and not pay it for years. In the case of a contingent liability, the entity may book the cost and never actually pay it. Mr. Diaczyk described the self-insurance and liquidation provisions of 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100, "Special treatment of certain accrued costs." The federal rule essentially allows accrued costs to be claimed for reimbursement, but only if they are "liquidated timely." Subsection (c)(2)(viii) of the rule provides that accrued liability related to contributions to a self-insurance program must be liquidated within 75 days after the close of the cost reporting period. To obtain reimbursement, Petitioners would have had to liquidate their accrued liability for GL/PL insurance within 75 days of the end of the audit period. Mr. Diaczyk also noted that, even if the 75-day requirement were not applicable, the general requirement of Section 2305.2 of the Manual would apply. Section 2305.2 requires that all short-term liabilities must be liquidated within one year after the end of the cost reporting period in which the liability is incurred, with some exceptions not applicable in this case. Petitioners' accrued liability for general and professional liability insurance was not funded or liquidated for more than one year after the cost reporting period. It was a contingent liability that might never be paid. Therefore, Mr. Diaczyk stated, reimbursement was not in keeping with Medicaid's goal to reimburse providers for actual paid costs, not for potential costs that may never be paid. Petitioners responded that their accrued liabilities constituted non-current liabilities, items that under normal circumstances will not be liquidated within one year. Mr. Parnell testified that there is great variation in how long it takes for a general and professional liability claim against a nursing home to mature to the point of payment to the claimant. He testified that a "short" timeline would be from two to four years, and that some claims may take from eight to eleven years to mature. From these facts, Petitioners urge that 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100 and Section 2305.2 of the Manual are inapplicable to their situation. As to Section 2305.2 in particular, Petitioners point to Section 2305.A, the general liquidation of liabilities provision to which Section 2305.2 provides the exceptions discussed above. The last sentence of Section 2305.A provides that, where the liability is not liquidated within one year, or does not qualify under the exceptions set forth in Sections 2305.1 and 2305.2, then "the cost incurred for the related goods and services is not allowable in the cost reporting period when the liability is incurred, but is allowable in the cost reporting period when the liquidation of the liability occurs." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners argue that the underscored language supports the Medicare/Medicaid distinction urged by Mr. Swindling. In its usual Medicare retroactive reimbursement context, Section 2305.2 would operate merely to postpone reimbursement until the cost period in which the liability is liquidated. Applied to this Medicaid prospective reimbursement situation, Section 2305.2 would unfairly deny Petitioners any reimbursement at all by excluding the liability from the base rate. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, where the Medicaid rules address a category of costs, the allowable costs in a provider's cost report are limited to those defined as allowable by the applicable rules. He stated that if there is a policy in the Manual that addresses an item of cost, the provider must use the Manual provision; the provider cannot use GAAP to determine that cost item. In this case, Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Ms. Smiley as to the applicable rules and the disallowance of Petitioners' contingent liability costs. According to Mr. Diaczyk, GAAP may be used only if no provisions farther up the chain of the "hierarchy" are applicable. In this case, the Medicaid rules specifically addressed the categories of cost in question, meaning that GAAP did not apply. Under cross-examination, Mr. Diaczyk testified that the accrual made by Petitioners in their cost reports would be considered actual costs under GAAP, "[a]ssuming that they had an actuarial study done to come up with the $1.7 million that they accrued." Mr. Diaczyk acknowledged that AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, does not limit the provider to an actuarial study in estimating losses from asserted and unasserted claims. See Finding of Fact 49, supra, for text of Section 8.05. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that the problem in this case was that Petitioners gave AHCA no documentation to support their estimate of the accrual, despite the auditor's request that Petitioners provide documentation to support their costs. Mr. Diaczyk's testimony raised a parallel issue to Mr. Swindling's concern that Medicaid's prospective targeting system permanently excludes any item of cost not included in the base rate. Mr. Swindling solved the apparent contradiction in employing Medicare rules in the Medicaid scenario by applying GAAP principles. Responding to the criticism that GAAP could provide a windfall to Petitioners by reimbursing them for accrued costs that might never actually result in payment, Mr. Swindling responded that GAAP principles would adjust the cost for contingent liabilities going forward, "truing up" the financial statements in subsequent reporting periods. This truing up process would have the added advantage of obviating the agency's requirement for firm documentation of the initial accrual. Mr. Swindling's "truing up" scenario under GAAP would undoubtedly correct Petitioners' financial statements. However, Mr. Swindling did not explain how the truing up of the financial statements would translate into a correction of Petitioners' reimbursement rate.12 If costs excluded from the base rate cannot be added to future rate adjustments, then costs incorrectly included in the base rate would also presumably remain in the facility's rate going forward.13 Thus, Mr. Swindling's point regarding the self-correcting nature of the GAAP reporting procedures did not really respond to AHCA's concerns about Petitioners' receiving a windfall in their base rate by including the accrual for contingent liabilities. On April 19, 2005, Petitioners entered into a captive insurance program. Petitioners' captive is a claims-made GL/PL policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $3 million in the aggregate. Under the terms of the policy, "claims-made" refers to a claim made by Petitioners to the insurance company, not a claim made by a nursing home resident alleging damages. The effective date of the policy is from April 21, 2005, through April 21, 2006, with a retroactive feature that covers any claims for incidents back to June 29, 2002, a date that corresponds to Petitioners' first day of operation and participation in the Medicaid program. The Petitioners' paid $3,376,906 for this policy on April 22, 2005. Mr. Parnell testified that April 2005 was the earliest time that the 14 Palm Gardens facilities could have established this form of insurance program. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the contingent liabilities established that Petitioners took over the 14 Palm Gardens facilities after the bankruptcy of the previous owner. Petitioners were faced with the virtual certainty of substantial GL/PL expenses in operating the facilities, and also faced with a Florida nursing home environment market in which commercial professional liability insurance was virtually unavailable. Lacking loss history information from their bankrupt predecessor, Petitioners were unable to self-insure or establish a captive program until 2005. Petitioners understood that if they did not include their GL/PL expenses in their initial cost report, those expenses would be excluded from the base rate and could never be recovered. Petitioners' leases for the facilities required them to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount of $1,750. Based on the AON studies and the general state of the industry at the time, Petitioners' accountant concluded that, under GAAP principles, $1,750 per bed was a reasonable, conservative estimate of Petitioners' GL/PL loss contingency exposure for the audit period.14 Based on all the evidence, it is found that Petitioners' cost estimate was reasonable and should be accepted by the agency. Petitioners included their GL/PL loss contingency expenses in their initial Medicaid cost report, placing those expenses under a heading indicating the purchase of insurance from a third party. The notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the facilities were "essentially self- insured." These factors led AHCA to request documentation of Petitioners' self-insurance. Petitioners conceded that they were not self-insured and carried no liability insurance aside from the Mature Care policies. The parties had little dispute as to the facts summarized above. The parties also agreed as to the applicability of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Their disagreement rests solely on the manner in which the principles of the hierarchy should be applied to the unique situation presented by Petitioners in these cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order that allows Petitioners' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of general and professional liability ("GL/PL") insurance, and that disallows the Mature Care policy premium amounts in excess of the policy limits, prorated for a nine- month period. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2008.
The Issue The issue for consideration is whether Respondent's licenses and eligibility for licensure as a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, a health agent and a dental health care contract salesman in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed herein.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the matters in issue herein, the Department of Insurance and Treasurer was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance agents and regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Michael Charles Peppe was and is currently licensed and eligible for licensure in Florida as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, a general lines agent and a health insurance agent. He was an officer and director of M. Peppe Agency, Inc., a Florida corporation. During the period in issue herein, Respondent's agency had a brokerage agreement with William Sanner and Mary Lou Sanner who were employed as sub- agents. Constance Abraham, an 85 year old widow first met William Sanner when she moved to Ft. Lauderdale, some 20 or so year ago. They were neighbors in the same apartment building. At that time she was insured with Mutual of Omaha and her policy was transferred to him, an agent for that company, for service. Over the years she purchased quite a bit of other insurance from him. They were all different kinds of health insurance policies and over time, she estimates, she purchased somewhere around 50 policies. During the period between 1985 and 1991, Mrs. Abraham purchased numerous health policies for both herself and her son through Mr. and Mrs. Sanner, though she does not recall ever having dealt with Mrs. Sanner. Records disclose that her coverage was placed with nine different companies and provided coverage in such areas as Medicare Supplement, nursing home insurance, cancer insurance, and hospital expense - indemnity insurance. Over the years approximately 60 policies were issued through Respondent's agency to either Mrs. Abraham or her son. The applications were taken by Sanner who would collect the initial premiums and forward both to Respondent's agency for processing to the various insurers. Some policies were signed by Sanner as agent of record and some were signed by Respondent in that capacity. Only a few were signed by Mrs. Sanner. Mrs. Abraham claims she didn't realize how much health insurance she had. Mr. Sanner would come to her apartment and talk to her about a new policy and she would abide by his advice. Her purchases amounted to approximately $20,000.00 per year in premiums which she would pay by check to Mr. Sanner. At no time did she ever deal with or meet the Respondent, Mr. Peppe. She did not question Sanner deeply about why he was selling her so much insurance. Whenever she asked about a new policy, he would usually have what appeared to he to be a good reason for it such as something was lacking in her coverage. Even when she recognized he was selling her duplicate coverage, he told her it was a good idea to have more. At no time did he or anyone else tell her she had too much insurance. Mrs. Abraham claims to know nothing about insurance herself. However, she was cognizant of the nature of the policies she had, utilizing without prompting the terms, "indemnity", "supplemental", and "accident." Mr. Sanner would come to her home at least once a month She trusted him to help her with her health insurance and would talk with him whenever a policy came up for renewal. On some occasions he would recommend she renew and on others would recommend she drop that policy in favor of another. At no time was she aware, however, of the fact that she was duplicating policies. She also claims she never had to tell Mr. Sanner what she wanted from her coverage. He always seemed to know and would handle not only the purchase of her policies but also the filing of her claims. She can recall no instance where she asked for any coverage and he tried to talk her out of it. Mrs. Abraham denies she was the person who complained to the Department. It was her daughter who noticed what was going on and took matters into her own hands. At no time did either Sanner or the Respondent attempt to contact her after the complaint was filed. Mrs. Abraham and her husband had four children. Her son, Lewis, who is somewhat retarded, lives with her and she also purchased some policies for him. Over the years she has had many occasions to file claims under her policies. It is important to her that she have protection to provide full time care if necessary because she has no family locally to provide that care for her. She had coverage that provided nursing care, a private room in the hospital, and some policies which provided for extended or nursing home care. She recognizes that such care is expensive and wanted enough policies to give her total coverage without out of pocket expense if the care was needed. She keeps track of the policies she has on her personal computer and has been doing so for some six or seven years. She apparently is sufficiently computer literate that she knows what she has and what she is doing. Mrs. Abraham owns a condominium at the Galt Ocean Mile apartment in Ft. Lauderdale. The $20,000.00 figure in policy premiums she mentioned were for her policies only. Those for her son were extra. She has sufficient income from stocks and bonds to pay her premiums, pay her mortgage, and still live comfortably. Her son has his own income from a trust fund and his own investments. At one point in time, when Mrs. Abraham had some recurring health problems and was in and out of hospitals regularly, she received in benefits far more than her actual expenses and made a tidy profit. Nonetheless, she adamantly disclaims she purchased the policies she had for that purpose claiming instead that she wanted merely that both she and her son be able to pay for the best medical care possible in the event it is needed. To that end, Lewis Abraham has filed very few claims against his carriers. Most, if not all, of the companies which provided the coverage for Mrs. Abraham and her son have limits on the amount of total coverage any one policy holder can have in any line of insurance. The limit is cumulative and not limited to policies with a specific company. Taken together, the policies in force for Mrs. Abraham in some cases exceeded that limit and had the insurers been made aware of the totality of her coverage, their policies would not have been issued. This information was not furnished to the companies, however, by either Sanner or Respondent. In addition, on many of the policies the mental condition of a policy holder must be disclosed if that person is retarded or not fully competent. Respondent did not know of Lewis' condition though Mr. Sanner was fully aware of it both as it related to his retardation and his drop foot. On none of the policy applications relating to him, however, was either ever mentioned. Some companies indicated that if Lewis's mental and physical condition had been properly disclosed on the application, they either would not have issued the coverage or, at least, would have referred the matter to the underwriter for further evaluation and a determination as to whether to issue the policy and if so, at what premium. Even more, Lewis' physical and mental condition may have caused the company to decline payment of a claim within two years of issuance of any policy actually written. Respondent received monthly statements from the various insurers with whom his agency did business detailing the transactions for that month. Commissions on each sale were paid by the insurers to Respondent's agency and thereafter, pursuant to an agreement between Respondent and Sanner, the commissions were divided. The commissions paid to Respondent's company by the insurers on all these policies amount to in excess of $18,000.00. Respondent asserts that Mrs. Abraham knew exactly what she was doing and was, in effect, conducting if not a scam, at least an improper business activity through the knowing purchase of duplicative policies and redundant coverage. This well may be true, but even if it is, Mr. Sanner was a knowing accomplice and participant. In addition, while it is accepted that Respondent might not know the status of every policy purchased through his agency or the total activity with any particular client, when his name appears as signatory on policy applications forwarded to a company for whom he accepts or solicits business, as here, it is hard to find he did not have at least a working familiarity with the business written by his sub-agents . This finding is supported by the analysis done of Respondent's pertinent activities here by Milton O. Bedingfield, a 39 year insurance agent and broker for 10 companies, a Certified Life Underwriter, and an expert in life and health insurance. Mr. Bedingfield concluded, after a review of all the policies written for the Abrahams through Respondent's agency, there was a gross oversale of policies and repeated omissions of pertinent information on policy applications. He found a duplication of benefits and overlapping coverage, all without legitimate purpose, especially for an 85 year old woman. Since the average hospital stay is less than 2 weeks, she would not likely benefit from her insurance for the stay. He could not see where Mrs. Abraham would get back in benefits what she has paid in premiums. In Mr. Bedingfield's opinion, this is the worst case of oversale he has seen in his 39 years in the insurance business. He contends the agent stands in almost a fiduciary capacity to his clients - especially the aged who rely on their agent to properly advise them on adequate coverage. There is often an element of fear involved that the unscrupulous agent can profit from. Here, he feels, Respondent's practice falls far short of the state's standard of acceptability on the sale of Medicare Supplemental insurance. On balance, however, Mr. Bedingfield does not know if all the policies he saw stayed in force throughout the period of the policy. Many could have lapsed or been cancelled. In all fairness, as well, where insurance is brokered, as here, the ultimate placing agent normally does not meet the client but must rely on what he is told by the offering agent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the Respondent in this case, Michael C. Peppe, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 11th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-2708 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. - 9. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 12. Accepted and incorporated herein. 13. & 14. Accepted and incorporated herein. 15. - 18. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted. Accepted. & 22. Accepted. Rejected as not supported by evidence or record except for the fact that Respondent sign and processed applications and premium payments and received a financial benefit from the sales. Accepted. FOR THE RESPONDENT: Accepted so far as it relates Ms. Abraham was well informed and aware of her coverage. Not established, but insufficient evidence of actionable misconduct. Accepted. - 6. Not proper Findings of Fact but more Conclusions of Law. Accepted. Not a proper Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Thomas F. Woods, Esquire Gatlin, Woods, Carlson & Cowdrey 1709-D Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the School Board of Broward County's award of a contract for Excess General and Auto Liability insurance coverage to United National Insurance Company is barred because of illegality?
Findings Of Fact The Parties Ranger Insurance Company, Petitioner, is the holder of a Certificate of Authority dated September 9, 1996 and issued by the Department of Insurance and Bill Nelson, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer. Good through June 1, 1997, the certificate authorizes Ranger to write in a number of lines of insurance business, including, Private Passenger Auto Liability, Commercial Automobile Liability, Private Passenger Automobile Auto Physical Damage, Commercial Auto Physical Damage and Other Liability. As such, Ranger is an "authorized" or "admitted" insurer in the State of Florida. L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., is a joint venture and co- petitioner with Ranger in this proceeding through whom Ranger proposed to procure the Excess General and Auto Liability (“Excess GL/AL”) coverage. A timely proposal under Request for Proposal 97- 072S was submitted to the School Board of Broward County by the petitioners to provide the Excess GL/AL Insurance Coverage sought by the RFP. United National Insurance Company is an "eligible" surplus lines insurer, approved by the Florida Department of Insurance to transact all surplus lines coverages in the State of Florida and licensed as such. The Department has notified insurance agents of United Nation's eligibility as a surplus lines insurer since 1978. It is the insurer of the Excess General and Excess Auto Liability insurance coverage awarded by the School Board under RFP 97-072S. Arthur J. Gallagher & Company ("Gallagher,") is the eighth largest insurance broker in the world. It has four sales offices, nine service offices, and approximately 150 employees in the State of Florida alone. The office from which it conducted business related to this proceeding is in Boca Raton, Florida, an office for which Area President David L. Marcus is responsible. Gallagher submitted a timely proposal (the "Gallagher proposal,") in response to the RFP on behalf of United National. The School Board of Broward County is the authority that operates, controls, and supervises all free public schools in the Broward County School District, "[i]n accordance with the provisions of s. (4)(b) of Article IX of the State Constitution ...". Section 230.03(2), F.S. In accord with its powers, the School Board may contract directly to purchase insurance. It is not required by its purchasing rules to use a competitive bidding or procurement process to purchase insurance. Nonetheless, on Friday, April 26, 1996, it issued a request for proposals, the RFP at issue in this proceeding, for insurance coverages including for Excess GL/AL insurance coverages. Siver Insurance Management Consultants Siver Insurance Management Consultants ("Siver,") are the drafters of RFP 97-072S. The School Board relied on Siver to draft the RFP, particularly its technical sections. Technical review of the proposals made under the RFP was conducted by Siver. And Siver put together for the School Board's use a summary of the policies proposed by both United National and Ranger. The summary was considered by the School Board's Evaluation Committee when it evaluated the competing proposals. The determination of whether the competing proposers were properly licensed was made by Siver. The School Board's Evaluation Committee, indeed the School Board, itself, played no role in determining the licensing credentials of the proposers while the proposals were under consideration. Under the arrangement between Siver and the School Board, however, the School Board retained the primary responsibility for administering the RFP. The RFP Request for Proposal 97-072S was mailed to 324 vendors (prospective proposers) the same day as its issuance, April 26, 1996. None of the vendors knew the contents of the RFP until it was issued. The RFP sought proposals for seven coverages, each of which was severable from the remainder of the coverages and was allowed to be proposed separately. The scope of the request was described in the RFP as follows: The School Board of Broward County, Florida ... is seeking proposals for various insurance coverages and risk management services. To facilitate distribution of the underwriting data and the requirements for each of the coverages, this consolidated Request for Proposals ... has been prepared. However, each of the coverages is severable and may be proposed separately. The following are included: Boiler & Machinery Excess General and Automobile Liability Excess Workers' Compensation School Leaders Errors & Omissions Crime Including Employee Dishonesty - Faithful Performance, Depositor's Forgery Claim and Risk Management Services (Including Managed Care Services) Statutory Death Benefits Petitioner's Ex. 1, pg. I-1. Since the seven coverages are severable and no proposer had to submit a proposal on all seven coverages, one way of looking at RFP 97-072S is as a consolidated RFP composed of seven, separate proposals, each for a different type of insurance coverage. Of the 324 vendors to whom the RFP was sent, only two, Gallagher, on behalf of United National, and Ranger, through the action of the joint venture, submitted proposals with respect to the Excess GL/AL coverages. Reasons for Using an RFP The School Board, under the auspices of Siver, chose to seek insurance coverage through an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid, or what is colloquially referred to as a "straight bid," for a number of reasons. As one familiar with RFPs and Invitations to Bid might expect, the School Board and Siver were attracted to the RFP by the increased flexibility it offered in the ultimate product procured in comparison to the potentially less flexible product that would be procured through an invitation to bid. More pertinent to this case, however, Siver chose to use an RFP for the School Board in this case because "as explained ... by the Department of Insurance over the ... years, while there may... [be a] prohibition against any surplus lines agents submitting a straight bid, there would not be a prohibition against a ... [surplus lines] agent responding to a request for proposal " (Tr. 149.) The RFP approach was not chosen, however, in order to avoid any legal requirement or to circumvent the Insurance Code. As explained by Mr. Marshall, the approach was born of hard reality: Id. [O]ne of the primary motivations [for using an RFP rather than an Invitation to Bid] was to allow us [The School Board and Siver] to consider surplus lines companies because of the fact that very often they were the only insurers that would respond on the number of coverages and clients that we were working for. The Insurance Code and the Surplus Lines Law The Insurance Code in Section 624.401, Florida Statutes, requires generally that an insurer be authorized by the Department of Insurance (the "Department,") to transact business in the State of Florida before it does so: (1) No person shall act as an insurer, and no insurer or its agents, attorneys, subscribers, or representatives shall directly or indirectly transact insurance, in this state except as authorized by a subsisting certificate of authority issued to the insurer by the department, except as to such transactions as are expressly otherwise provided for in this code. One place in the code where transactions are "expressly otherwise provided for ...," is in the Surplus Lines Law, Section 626.913 et seq., Florida Statues. The purposes of the law are described as follows: It is declared that the purposes of the Surplus Lines Law are to provide for orderly access for the insuring public of this state to insurers not authorized to transact insurance in this state, through only qualified, licensed, and supervised surplus lines agents resident in this state, for insurance coverages and to the extent thereof not procurable from authorized insurers, who under the laws of this state must meet certain standards as to policy forms and rates, from unwarranted competition by unauthorized insurers who, in the absence of this law, would not be subject to similar requirements; and for other purposes as set forth in this Surplus Lines Law. Section 626.913(2), F.S. Surplus lines insurance is authorized in the first instance only if coverages cannot be procured from authorized insurers: If certain insurance coverages of subjects resident, located, or to be performed in this state cannot be procured from authorized insurers, such coverages, hereinafter designated "surplus lines," may be procured from unauthorized insurers, subject to the following conditions: The insurance must be eligible for export under s. 626.916 or s. 626.917; The insurer must be an eligible surplus lines insurer under s. 626.917 or s. 626.918; The insurance must be so placed through a licensed Florida surplus lines agent; and The other applicable provisions of this Surplus Lines Law must be met. Section 626.915, Florida Statutes, and then only subject to certain other conditions: No insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets all of the following conditions: The full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state ... . Surplus lines agents must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring a properly documented statement of diligent effort from the retail or producing agent. However, to be in compliance with the diligent effort requirement, the surplus lines agent's reliance must be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the risk. Reasonableness shall be assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by-risk basis. It is not possible to obtain the full amount of insurance required by layering the risk, it is permissible to export the full amount. Section 626.916, F.S. Authorized vs. Unauthorized Insurers Unlike authorized insurers, unauthorized insurers do not have their rates and forms approved by the Department of Insurance, (the "Department.") Similarly, unauthorized insurers are not member of the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association, which guarantees payment of claims if an insurer becomes insolvent. Unauthorized insurers may qualify to transact Florida insurance business under the Surplus Lines Law and so, for purposes of the Surplus Lines Law, be considered "eligible" to transact surplus lines business in Florida. When a Surplus Lines insurer is eligible, Department of Insurance employees refer to the insurer in Surplus Lines terms as "authorized," a term in everyday English that is synonymous with "eligible." But an eligible surplus lines insurer remains an "unauthorized" insurer when compared to an "authorized" insurer for purposes of the Insurance Code and that part of the code known as the Surplus Lines Law. Submission and Review of Proposals Both L.B. Bryan & Company, Alexander & Alexander, Inc., and Benefactor Financial Group, Inc., (the "Joint Venture") and Gallagher submitted timely proposals with regard to Excess GL/AL coverage in response to the RFP. The Joint Venture's proposal was submitted, of course, on behalf of Ranger, an authorized insurer, and Gallagher's was submitted on behalf of United National, an insurer eligible to transact insurance in the State of Florida as a surplus lines insurer but otherwise an unauthorized insurer. The School Board's Insurance Evaluation Committee met on May 30, 1996, to evaluate proposals received pursuant to the RFP. Although briefly discussed by the Evaluation Committee, the issue of proper licensing was not determined independently by the committee. Instead of making that determination, the committee turned to its insurance consultant, Siver. Siver had determined that both proposers, Ranger and United National, were properly licensed for purposes of responding to the RFP and being considered by the committee. Siver communicated that determination to the committee. The committee relied on Siver's determination. Aside from receiving Siver's determination of proper licensing when "briefly discussed" (Tr. 108,) the Evaluation Committee did not address whether either Ranger or United National were properly licensed. Certainly, no issue of whether Ranger should take precedence over United National by virtue that it was an authorized insurer when United National was an unauthorized insurer and a mere eligible Surplus Lines insurer was ever discussed by the committee. In evaluating the proposals, the Committee awarded 73 points to the Gallagher proposal and 69 points to the Ranger proposal. Points were awarded on the basis of three criteria or in three categories: Qualifications (20 points maximum); Scope of Coverages/Services Offered (30 points maximum); and, Points for Projected Costs (50 points maximum.) The Ranger proposal outscored the Gallagher proposal in the "projected cost" category, 50 to 23, but it scored lower in the "qualifications" category, 14 versus 20 for Gallagher, and significantly lower in the "scope of coverages" category, five points versus 30 for Gallagher. The United National coverage was more than twice as costly as Ranger's, a $491,000 annual premium as opposed to Ranger's $226,799, which explains the points awarded in the "projected cost" category. The Gallagher proposal received more points than the Ranger proposal in the "qualifications" category because United National has provided the School Board with Excess GL/AL coverage for a number of years and Ranger has never provided the School Board with such coverage. The Ranger proposal fell so drastically short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/services offered" category primarily because of an athletic participation exclusion appearing in a rider to the specimen policy appearing in its proposal. Ranger had intended to cover athletic participation and the rider was included with the Ranger proposal in error. Ranger notified the School Board of its intent immediately after the tabulations were released. Nonetheless, the Evaluation Committee was never informed of the error and no attempt was made by the School Board to negotiate with Ranger to improve the coverages offered, despite authority in the RFP for the School Board to negotiate with any of the proposers. (The language used in the RFP is "with one or more" of the proposers.) The Ranger proposal also fell short of the Gallagher proposal in the "scope of coverages/service offered" category because the Gallagher proposal was made in several ways. One way was as to only Excess GL/AL coverage. Another way included School Leaders' Errors and Omissions ("E & O") coverage. The E & O coverage was offered by United National in the Gallagher proposal together with the Excess GL/AL coverage in a "combined lines" package, similar to United National coverages already existing for the School Board. Furthermore, the Ranger proposal expressly excluded coverage for Abuse and Molestation, a needed coverage due to the School Board's prior claims history. On June 5, 1996, the Evaluation Committee submitted its recommendations to the School Board's Purchasing Department. With regard to GL/AL coverage, the Evaluation Committee recommended the purchase of the GL/AL/E & O "combined lines" coverage offered by Gallagher through United National. The School Board posted its Proposal Recommendation/Tabulations adopting the recommendation, two days later, on June 7, 1996. Ranger Seeks Redress from the Department Following the School Board's award, Ranger, thinking that it should have received the award under the RFP as the only authorized insurer to submit a proposal for Excess GL/AL coverage, sought redress from the Department. On June 14, 1996, Ranger personnel met with the head of the Department's Surplus Lines Section, Carolyn Daniels, alleging a violation of the Insurance Code's Surplus Lines Law. On June 18, 1996, Ranger reiterated its complaint in writing and asked Ms. Daniels to find a violation that day. On June 24, 1996, Ranger, now through its attorneys, met with Ms. Daniels and her supervisor. Again, on July 4, 1996, Ranger's attorneys wrote to Ms. Daniels, further pleading for her to find a violation and asking for an administrative hearing if Ms. Daniels did not find in favor of the Ranger position. On a fifth attempt, Ranger wrote Ms. Daniels on July 11, 1996, requesting that she adopt Ranger's position. Ms. Daniels reviewed Ranger's five complaints with her supervisor, the Chief of the Bureau of Property and Casualty Solvency and Market Conduct. In a letter dated August 14, 1996, to the School Board's Purchasing Agent, Ms. Daniels announced her determination: I did not find any evidence to indicate that Mr. David L. Marcus of Arthur J. Gallagher & Company or United National Insurance Company violated the Surplus Lines Law in providing a quote for the School Board. Intervenor's Ex. No. 2. Ms. Daniel's determination was based on a number of factors, including the School Board's position in the transaction as an "informed consumer," (Tr. 422-423,) and that the School Board had possessed a United National policy for 13 years. But, the determination was primarily based on the fact that Gallagher had received three declinations from authorized insurers to provide Excess GL/AL coverage and so had performed that which was required prior to deciding that the coverage was eligible for export and provision by a surplus lines insurer: due diligence. Due Diligence Section 626.916(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides, [n]o insurance coverage shall be eligible for export unless it meets ... the following condition[]: ... [t]he full amount of insurance required must not be procurable, after a diligent effort has been made by the producing agent to do so, from among the insurers authorized to transact and actually writing that kind and class of insurance in this state, and the amount of insurance exported shall be only the excess over the amount so procurable from authorized insurers. (e.s.) The statute goes on to require that the diligent effort, "be reasonable under the particular circumstances surrounding the export of that particular risk." Reasonableness is assessed by taking into account factors which include, but are not limited to, a regularly conducted program of verification of the information provided by the retail or producing agent. Declinations must be documented on a risk-by- risk basis. Section 626.916(1)(a), F.S. "'Diligent effort' means seeking coverage from and having been rejected by at least three authorized insurers currently writing this type of coverage and documenting these rejections." Section 626.914(4), F.S. Under this definition, the "producing agent should contact at least three companies that are actually writing the types of clients and the business in the area [that they are] wanting to write." (Tr. 268.) A specific form to help insurance agents document their three rejections is adopted by Department rule. The rule provides: When placing coverage with an eligible surplus lines insurer, the surplus lines agent must verify that a diligent effort has been made by requiring from the retail or producing agent a properly documented statement of diligent effort on form DI4-1153 (7/94), "Statement of Diligent Effort", which is hereby adopted and incorporated by reference. Rule 4J-5.003(1), F.A.C. Fully aware of the requirement for documentation of diligent effort to find authorized insurers, and cognizant that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer could be found based on experience, Gallagher began soliciting proposals for coverage in the middle of April, 1996, several weeks before the School Board had issued the RFP. In fact, at the time that Gallagher started soliciting bids, the School Board had not yet assembled or distributed the underwriting data needed by bidders. Nonetheless, with good reason based on experience, Gallagher expected that the School Board would seek a "combined lines" package of GL/AL/E & O coverages like the School Board then received through United National, and that it would be unlikely that an authorized insurer would step forward to propose coverage. Gallagher, therefore, used the policy form current in April of 1996, that is the form providing Excess GL/AL/E & O coverage in a "combined lines" package, "as an example of what the School Board had been looking for this type of program and seeking a program similar to that and similar in coverage." (Tr. 242.) But it also sought Excess GL/AL without combination with E & O coverage. As Mr. Marcus testified, when seeking coverage from authorized insurers beginning in April of 1996, Gallagher "would be looking at a variety of different ways, whether they were package or not." (Tr. 243.) One authorized insurer, Zurich-American, declined to quote because it could not offer a combined line SIR program (a package of excess general liability and excess auto liability coverages) as requested by the RFP. Furthermore, the School Board risk was too large for Zurich-American to handle. A second authorized insurer, American International Group, declined to quote due to the School Board's adverse loss experience. A third authorized insurer, APEX/Great American, declined to provide a quote to Gallagher due to the large size of the School Board account. The responses of these three authorized insurers were listed in a Statement of Diligent Effort provided to Ms. Daniels, which she considered in determining that Gallagher and Mr. Marcus had committed no violation of the Surplus Lines Law. Gallagher also provided Ms. Daniels with a second Statement of Diligent Effort. The statement documented the attempt to attract quotes by adding a school leaders errors and omission component to the Excess GL/AL coverage. It, too, was used by Ms. Daniels in making her determination of no violation of the Surplus Lines Law by Gallagher. The same three insurers refused to quote for the "combined lines" program. Attempts by other Authorized Insurers Gallagher requested that any responses to its requests for quotes be submitted by May 10, 1996, so that it could prepare and submit its proposal by the RFP's deadline for submission of original proposals by all vendors, 2:00 p.m. May 16, 1996. One insurer, Discover Re/USF&G attempted to submit a quote on May 15, 1996, one day before the RFP deadline but five days after May 10. By then, Gallagher had already started printing its 625 page proposal. Furthermore, the company failed to provide the required policy forms until the day after the School Board's deadline for filing proposals. Coregis Insurance Company offered coverage of up to $700,000 for each claim and for each occurrence, but like Discover Re/USF&G, failed to provide the required policy forms until after the RFP deadline. Furthermore, definitive coverage under the Coregis policy would only be provided on the condition that the Florida Legislature pass a Legislative Claims bill, a limiting condition not authorized in the RFP or requested by Gallagher. American Home Assurance Company never responded to Gallagher with the School Board's required quote or policy forms. Rather, the company merely provided an "indication" that the company declined to provide a quote. An "indication" consists of an approximate premium rate, without any terms or conditions. A "quote," on the other hand, includes the terms and conditions of a policy. The Department places with the producing agent the responsibility of determining whether an insurer's communication constitutes and "indication" or a "quote." An agent, according to Ms. Daniels, can only violate the Surplus Lines Law if the agent receives a reliable quote. Gallagher even requested a quote from Ranger, despite never having been appointed to transact insurance on its behalf. But Ranger declined. In response to a request by Gallagher's minority business partner, McKinley Financial Services, Ranger, through E. Michael Hoke on American E & S letterhead, wrote in a letter dated May 6, 1996, "[w]e have received a prior submission on this account so we are returning the attached." Intervenor's Ex. No. 7. The Petition Ranger's petition for formal administrative hearing is the letter dated June 19, 1996, to the Director of Purchasing for the School Board under the signature of E. Michael Hoke, CPCU, Assistant Vice President of AES/Ranger Insurance Company. The letter asks its readers to "bear[] in mind we are not attorneys," p. 1 of the letter, before it outlines three protest issues. The third protest issue is the one about which Ms. Daniels made her determination that no violation of the statute had been committed by Gallagher or its employees: "3) Florida Statute 626.901 (Representing or aiding unauthorized insurer prohibited)." The other two issues deal not with the propriety of Gallagher's actions but the legality of the School Board's award to an unauthorized insurer, United National, when coverage was available from an authorized insurer, Ranger: Florida Statute 626.913 (Surplus Lines Law). . . Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer ... Its proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested coverage was procurable. United National Insurance Company is an unauthorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida ... . The United National Insurance Company proposal and/or its offer to extend it's current policies appear to us as "unwarranted competition." Ranger Insurance Company is protected from unwarranted competition from United National Insurance Company in accordance with the Florida Statute 626.913. Florida Statute 626.913 (Eligibility for Export) ... Our Position * * * Ranger Insurance Company is an admitted authorized insurer under the laws of the State of Florida. ... It's proposal for excess general and auto liability is proof that the Board requested amounts were available. The proposal and/or contract extensions offered by United National are for the full amount of coverage sought and not excess over the amount procurable from Ranger, an authorized insurer. The petition, therefore, set in issue not just whether Gallagher acted illegally but whether the School Board acted illegally when it made the award to United National, an unauthorized insurer when Ranger, an authorized insurer, had also submitted a proposal. Extension As soon as the School Board was made aware of the Ranger protest, it extended the existing insurance contracts procured under RFP 92-080S, awarded approximately five years earlier. The extension was on a month-to-month basis until resolution of the protest. The extension was necessary to avoid a lapse in the School Board's coverage during this proceeding.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the award to United National under the Gallagher proposal in response to RFP 97-072S be rescinded. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of January, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of January, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul R. Ezatoff, Esquire Christopher B. Lunny, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Marks, Bryant & Yon, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Edward J. Marko, Esquire Robert Paul Vignola, Esquire Office of the School Board Attorney K.C. Wright Administrative Building 600 Southeast Third Avenue - 11th Floor Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 A. Kenneth Levine, Esquire Blank, Risby and Meenan, P.A. Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-3068 Dr. Frank Petruzielo, Superintendent Broward County School Board 600 Southeast Third Avenue Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301-3125
The Issue The issues for consideration are those promoted by an administrative complaint brought by the Petitioner against the Respondent in which the Petitioner alleges that the Respondent has violated various provisions of the insurance code, Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, in conducting business in Florida under licenses held with the Petitioner agency. The particulars of the administrative complaint are more completely set forth in the conclusions of law section to this recommended order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's exhibit 1 admitted into evidence is a document from Bill Gunter, Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer for Florida, announcing that the Petitioner, State of Florida, Department of Insurance and Treasurer, has records pertaining to the Respondent, Terry Vernon Smith, about his residence and business addresses. Those addresses are respectively, 4000 Southwest 5th Avenue, Ocala, Florida, 32670, and Silver Point Complex, Northeast 3rd Street and Silver Springs Boulevard, Ocala, Florida, 32670, effective April 9, 1979. Effective April 8, 1980, those addresses are, respectively, 4000 Southwest 5th Avenue, Ocala, Florida 32670, and 3423 Northeast Silver Springs Boulevard, Suite 5, Ocala, Florida 32670. At times relevant to the administrative complaint, Respondent was an independent insurance agent representing Nationwide Insurance in Florida. At times relevant to the administrative complaint, Respondent financed insurance premiums through Premium Service Company of Florida, Jacksonville, Florida. In this process, Respondent received from the insuring companies or through their managing or general agents, certain unearned refunds associated with three of the four contracts that the Premium Service Company of Florida had financed. That company attempted on numerous occasions to have those refunds given to it to make the company, Premium Service Company of Florida, whole concerning its exposure as finance agent for the insurance premiums. Eventually it was necessary for Premium Service Company of Florida to secure the assistance of the Petitioner agency to try to rectify the problem with the Respondent pertaining to the refunds. There was also a problem in which Respondent was responsible for paying over an unearned commission to the finance company in order to resolve a remaining balance in a customer account of Premium Service Company of Florida which had been financed by Premium Service Company of Florida. The details of the resolution of these problems with Respondent are set forth in the succeeding discussion. In the transactions involving Premium Service Company of Florida, Respondent would use that organization for premium financing by utilizing application materials furnished by the finance company. He would have the customers sign one of Premium Service Company of Florida's finance agreements in order to secure part of the payment of the premium. The finance company would prepay the premium to the insuring company on behalf of the customer to place the insurance in effect and the customers were to reimburse Premium Finance Company a monthly amount to satisfy the finance debt. One of the individuals who sought Premium Service Company of Florida's assistance in financing his insurance premium was William C. Erney. The details of that finance agreement are set forth in the composite Petitioner's Exhibit 3 admitted into evidence. On October 24, 1983, Erney completed a premium finance agreement with the Respondent's insurance agency which was known as Terry V. Smith Insurance Agency. Erney paid down $127 and financed an additional $236 through the Premium Service Company of Florida. The premium finance company was due the $236 borrowed plus documentary stamp charges and finance charges for the use of their money. The total amount to be reimbursed was $270.60. Six equal installments were to be paid at $45.10 per month starting on November 24, 1983, for Erney to satisfy his indebtedness to Premium Service Company of Florida. Erney did not make the installment payments, and as a consequence the premium finance company issued a notice of cancellation to the insuring company. The policy was cancelled effective November 24, 1983. This left the gross amount of unearned premium as $277. The net unearned refund in the policy was $242.38, which the insuring company sent to the Respondent on February 24, 1984. Respondent needed to add his unearned commission of $34.60 to the $242.38 in order to make the premium service company whole in the amount owed to it, which was $277. This total amount was not satisfied until after the premium service company had complained to the Petitioner agency on October 19, 1984, on the subject of Respondent's tardiness in remitting the $277 to the finance company. The payment which satisfied the Erney account outstanding with Premium Service Company of Florida came about on November 16, 1984, when Respondent paid that item off, together with others which will be subsequently discussed. A copy of the check paying off the account may be found as part of Petitioner's composite Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence. From March 1984 until receipt of its money in the Erney account in November 1984, the premium finance company made proper demands of the Respondent's insurance agency on a monthly basis, without positive results. On May 13, 1983, Herbert Holt bought insurance through the Respondent's insurance agency. The details of that purchase may be found in Petitioner's composite Exhibit 4 admitted into evidence. The purchase price of the insurance was $246 with a cash downpayment of $86. One hundred sixty dollars of the premium was financed through Premium Service Company of Florida, together with documentary stamps and a finance charge. Holt was to pay six equal installments of $31.65 beginning June 15, 1983, in order to pay off his financing arrangement with Premium Service Company of Florida. Holt did not honor the terms of his contract for repayment to the Premium Service Company of Florida, causing the cancellation of the policy effective October 23, 1983. That left owning to the premium finance company $76.46 for unearned refund. One hundred thirty-one dollars, the amount of gross unearned premium, had been credited to Respondent's agency effective October 1983. The premium finance company did not get its $76.46 refund from the Respondent's company until November 1984. On June 9, 1983, Edna A. Irmie purchased insurance from the Respondent's insurance agency. The cost of the policy was $299 with a cash downpayment of $104 and an unpaid balance financed in the amount of $195 plus documentary stamps and finance charges by Premium Service Company of Florida. The agreement between the premium service company and the purchaser of insurance was for a payment of six installments in the amount of $37.86 beginning July 9, 1983. The particulars of this purchase may be found in Petitioner's composite Exhibit 5 admitted into evidence. Ms. Irmie did not honor her agreement for payment of the installments in accordance with the repayment schedule, and on October 5, 1983, a notice of cancellation was issued by Premium Service Company of Florida, requesting cancellation due to nonpayment of the premium financing. The insuring company effected the cancellation on October 19, 1983, and returned a gross unearned premium in the amount of $191 to the Respondent's insurance agency in October 1983. The balance owed to the premium finance company from Respondent for its participation in the finance of the Irmie insurance was $161.44. That remittance was not presented to the premium finance company until November 1984. On June 30, 1983, D. N. S. Sharma, d/b/a Country Cupboard, purchased insurance from the Respondent's agency in which the price of the insurance was $1,003.50. Petitioner's composite Exhibit 6 admitted into evidence contains the details of this purchase. Three hundred fifty-three dollars and fifty cents was paid down and $650 plus documentary stamps and finance charges were financed through the Premium Service Company of Florida concerning this purchase of insurance. The insurance consumer was to pay six equal installments in the amount of $118.35 beginning August 1, 1983. None of the scheduled installment payments were paid, and on August 30, 1983, notice of cancellation was issued to the insurance company requesting cancellation for nonpayment of the premium financing. On October 5, 1983, $558 was received by Premium Service Company of Florida related to net unearned premiums/refund. The balance owed by Sharma related to the insurance premium financing was $720.10. This left a deficit in the amount of $77.13 which was due the finance company from the Respondent's unearned commission. That money from the Respondent was not received until November 1984 as a part of the settlement of all the aforementioned premium finance cases. The balance of the money owed to the premium service company, $720.10, excluding the net unearned refund and the Respondent's unearned commission, was written off as a bad debt loss when the Premium Service Company was unable to get the purchaser to pay the difference between $720.10 and the $635.51 collected in the two categories described. The settlement check was written in the amount of $592.03, which is set forth in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence. In the Petitioner's composite Exhibit 7 which includes a copy of the check satisfying the Premium Service Company of Florida on the various accounts set forth recently, there is a copy of the letter which accompanied the check, and in this letter Smith acknowledges the lateness of payment in these accounts. His acknowledgment is confirmation of inordinate and unacceptable delay in the payment of monies to Premium Service Company of Florida which should have been presented much earlier. Respondent, in his association with Nationwide Insurance, was involved with that affiliation for seven years. During that time, his supervisor from Nationwide Insurance was Kenneth Collett. As established by the witness Collett, on September 20, 1985, Linda L. Humbertson purchased automobile insurance through the Respondent's agency from Nationwide Insurance. She paid $103.10 for the policy. That policy was later cancelled for nonpayment of the premium, when in fact Ms. Humbertson had paid the $103.10 for the insurance premium to Respondent's insurance agency. Petitioner's exhibit 8 admitted into evidence contains a receipt dated September 20, 1985, in the amount of $103.10 pertaining to the automobile insurance purchased by Humbertson and signed with the Respondent's name as receiving those moneys. What had happened in this instance is that Humbertson had renewed her insurance with Nationwide by paying the premium payment to Respondent's agency and that money had not been remitted to Nationwide. According to Collett, and his testimony is accepted, it was incumbent upon Respondent in the ordinary course of business to send the premium payment to Nationwide as Respondent had done in the past; however, in this situation with Humbertson, Respondent did not remit as required. Subsequently, Humbertson's policy which had been cancelled was reinstated and Respondent's account on commissions with Nationwide was debited for future commissions earned to make up the $103.10. On December 11, 1984, Econsul Corporation of Ocala, Florida, purchased a workers compensation policy from the Respondent's agency through Nationwide. The $785 check paid to the Respondent's agency may be found as Petitioner's exhibit 10. Respondent never submitted the application for the workers compensation insurance after completing the application form, nor the check related to the insurance purchase. This circumstance was later discovered by Collett. The consequence of the failure to submit the application form was that Econsul was without workers compensation coverage from December 11, 1984, through August 2, 1985. The Econsul premium payment of $785 was placed in the checking account of Respondent's insurance agency. On October 28, 1985, and again on November 7, 1985, Collett, in behalf of Nationwide, inquired of the Respondent concerning the whereabouts of the check from Econsul for workers compensation benefits. Respondent did not reply to these letters. The letters are set out in Petitioner's composite Exhibit 9 admitted into evidence. Subsequently, Nationwide Insurance Company charged a minimum premium to Econsul to comply with the laws related to workmen's compensation and refunded the balance of its premium payment, Econsul having made other arrangements for workmen's compensation insurance. The money which was associated with the coverage for Econsul in the requisite period for compliance with workmen's compensation was charged against the commission account of the Respondent, thereby satisfying the demands of Nationwide. From the evidence presented, it is inferred that Respondent is licensed by Petitioner to sell insurance in Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was licensed as a General Lines Insurance Agent at all times material hereto. He generally wrote insurance for the various insurance companies he represented through General Agents such as Frank MacNeill and Son, Inc. and Amalex, Inc. The Respondent operated his insurance agency under the corporate name Pennington Insurance Agency, Inc. The Respondent was owner and President of Pennington Insurance Agency, Inc. and exercised supervision and control over its employees, and in particular the employee Earnest L. Middleton. All funds collected from insured pertinent to this proceeding were premium payments and represented trust funds held by the Respondent in a fiduciary capacity on behalf of his General Agent or the insurance companies whose policy contracts generated the premiums. From August through December, 1981, the Respondent engaged in negotiations with representatives of Amalex, Inc. and specifically, Mr. Walter Gibson, President of Amalex, Inc. and Mr. Larry Durham of Durham and Company Insurance Agency. These negotiations ultimately led, in November of 1981, to the Respondent becoming an employee-agent of Amalex, Inc. The Respondent was to be paid a salary which was to be an advance upon commissions earned at the rate of 75% on new policies and 60% on "renewals." This commission-salary arrangement was entered into pursuant to an oral agreement between the Respondent and Walter Gibson of Amalex. There was never any written contract between the Respondent and Amalex, Inc. delineating the employment arrangement or the compensation which Respondent was to be provided by Amalex, Inc. in return for his "brokering" business for Amalex, Inc. There was never any written contract concerning the method of forwarding of premium payments to Amalex, Inc. This oral agreement was modified at the behest of Amalex, Inc. on or about March 19, 1982, so as to reduce the compensation of the Respondent. The Respondent's new compensation under the modified arrangement provided for a 60% draw against commissions for new business and a 50% draw against commissions on renewal business. The Respondent received payments from Amalex, Inc., totaling $5,980 as advances on commissions for times pertinent to the allegations in the Complaints. The regular course of business practice established by Amalex, Inc. with the Respondent, required the Respondent to forward premium collections within 45 days of receiving a statement or bill from Amalex, Inc. During the period August, 1981, until December, 1981, numerous discussions and negotiations were had between the Respondent and Mr. Gibson in an effort to work out the details of the employment terms between Respondent and Amalex, Inc. Additionally, these negotiations hinged somewhat upon a proposed merger of Durham and Company and Amalex, Inc., which never occurred. In any event, the Respondent held the good faith belief that during the period of time from August, 1981, through December, 1981, until their business relationship got successfully started, that he had been authorized by Mr. Gibson to retain all premiums on commercial lines policies written by his office. In his testimony, Mr. Gibson disagreed with the Respondent's version of their arrangement concerning business insurance premiums. There was clearly a disagreement between Gibson and Respondent as to what the terms of the Respondent's compensation were to be. In fact, the Respondent received notice no later than March 19, 1982, in a letter from Gibson to the Respondent, that indeed there was a dispute as to his compensation arrangement and the manner in which he was to remit premium payments to Amalex, Inc. In a letter to Mr. Gibson of May 27, 1982, the Respondent reveals his recollection of the oral agreement and states it to be his belief that he was authorized to retain commercial account premiums only from September 1, 1981, through December, 1981. The letter reveals, by its content, that he was aware that Amalex, Inc. opposed his retention of commercial policy premiums, at least after December, 1981 (Respondent's Exhibit 5, in evidence). The Respondent was clearly not permitted by Amalex to retain all premiums collected on commercial policies sold by him during the entire period of their business relationship. Indeed, many of the commercial accounts were, in fact, paid when collected, in whole or in part, by the Respondent during the business relationship with Amalex which extended through most of 1982. One account, the American Legion Policy Account, eventually was paid in full by Respondent to Amalex. The Respondent's testimony and that of his former employee, Ernest Middleton, is at odds with that of Mr. Gibson, the president of Amalex and the Respondent's own testimony, in different portions of the record, is to some extent, inconsistent. At one point the Respondent indicated that he was authorized to retain all commercial premiums for coverage of his office operating expenses. At another point, both he and Middleton testified there was an allowance of $1,200 a week from Amalex for expenses to run the office. At still another point, by way of an exhibit (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 13 in evidence), the Respondent appeared to be of the belief that the expense allowance from Amalex was to be $400 per week for operating his office. In any event, by his letter of May 27, 1982, to Amalex and Mr. Gibson, the Respondent clearly reveals it to be his belief that the authorization to retain all commercial account premiums did not extend beyond December, 1981, which arrangement is more logical since it was, in the Respondent's own words, an arrangement to cover expenses until the business "got rolling." Thus the Respondent knew no later than May 27, 1982, by his own admission, that he was expected, after December, 1981, to forward all premium payments, both on personal lines and commercial lines policies to Amalex or the policies would be cancelled. This letter, the letter of March 19, 1982, from Mr. Gibson to the Respondent, portions of the Respondent's testimony, as well as the testimony of Mr. Gibson and his employee Mary Stratton, taken together, belies the Respondent's assertion that he could retain the commercial premiums to cover his own office expenses without accounting for them and forwarding them to Amalex. Such was clearly not the case after December 31, 1981, at the very latest. The Respondent additionally had agency contracts with Frank MacNeill and Son, Inc., a General Agent, for which concern the Respondent wrote insurance policies. These contracts required him to forward premium collections within 30 days of receipt of them from the insured. On or about March 20, 1984, the Respondent sold to Ollie Rodgers an automobile insurance policy and collected $211 from Mr. Rodgers as a down payment and also received $428 from National Premium Budget Plan for financing the balance of the premium payment over time. Count 1 of the Administrative Complaint involves solely the Ollie Rodgers policy. That policy was brokered through Frank MacNeill and Son, Inc. This only count concerning the MacNeill business arrangement with the Respondent does not charge a general failure to remit premiums to MacNeill in violation of the agency agreements and Chapter 626, Florida Statutes. Thus, although evidence is of record concerning the Ollie Rodgers incident and several thousand dollars in disputed other premium amounts MacNeill maintains the Respondent owes it, the charge in the Administrative Complaint concerning MacNeilles and the Respondent's business arrangement, and the question concerning the withholding of premiums due MacNeill, only concerns the Ollie Rodgers' policy and account. The alleged failure of the Respondent to remit several thousand dollars in premiums owed to Frank MacNeill contained in the testimony of Petitioner's witnesses at hearing, specifically Joe McCurdy, the secretary- treasurer of Frank MacNeill and Son, Inc., is not the subject matter of any charge or allegation in the Administrative Complaint. Mr. McCurdy testified that the Respondent had ultimately paid all monies due Frank MacNeill except for $734.23 in court costs and attorneys fees. He was the only witness testifying concerning the Frank MacNeill business arrangement and none of his testimony linked the premiums paid by Ollie Rodgers to the Respondent with any delinquent premium amount actually owed Frank MacNeill and Son, Inc. There was no testimony tying the account balance which Pennington ultimately paid MacNeill, after litigation ensued, with the Ollie Rodgers account and premium amount paid to the Respondent by Rodgers. There is no specific proof that the Ollie Rodgers account itself was unpaid by the Respondent. From March 4, 1982, to November 9, 1982, the Respondent received premium payments from one Irving Herman in the amount of $7,161 on a commercial insurance premium account. The Respondent forwarded some of these funds to Amalex, Inc., but an outstanding balance of $2,353 remains which has not been paid by the Respondent to Amalex. The Respondent has asserted that he could lawfully retain this balance because it was a commercial account and he was authorized to keep all premiums for commercial insurance to pay his office expenses. For the reasons found above, the Respondent was not authorized to retain any commercial premium funds in his own account and in his own business after December, 1981, as he admits himself in his letter of May 27, 1982, to Gibson of Amalex, Inc. The Respondent was required to forward all the premium payments attributable to the Herman policy, and in this instance, he forwarded only some of them, without accounting to Amalex as to why he retained the balance of the Herman premiums. The Respondent also collected $799 in premium payments from Irving Herman on an individual insurance policy. The Respondent forwarded most of this premium to Amalex, Inc. but retained $95 of it. The business practice of Amalex was to send a monthly statement to the Respondent detailing amounts payable on new business. When a policy was sent to the Respondent for coverage he had written, an invoice was included. Additionally, Amalex and its president, Mr. Gibson, sent numerous letters to the Respondent requesting payment of the large amount of past due accounts. The premium amounts paid by Mr. Herman for his individual policy and his commercial policy to Respondent was received on behalf of his General Agent, Amalex, a substantial amount of which he failed to remit. Since the above amounts were not remitted to Amalex, Inc. by the Respondent, it can only be inferred that he used the unremitted funds for his own purposes. On September 23, 1982, or thereafter, the Respondent collected premium payments from Joseph S. Middleton on behalf of his company, Florida Lamps, Inc., in the amount of $1,467. The Respondent remitted a portion of this to Amalex, but retained $917.55. This premium, for insurance for that business, was collected for insurance written well after the Respondent was on notice from Amalex that he was not authorized to retain premiums collected on commercial lines or business insurance, as found above. A monthly statement, invoice, as well as numerous letters were directed from Amalex to the Respondent requesting payment of this past due amount, to no avail. Thus, the above- referenced balance of the premiums related to the Florida Lamps, Inc. insurance policy and account were retained by the Respondent for his and his agency's own benefit and use rather than remitted to Amalex, the entity entitled to them. The Respondent failed to properly account to Amalex regarding the use of or the whereabouts of these funds. On or about October 20, 1982, the Respondent received from Eric Gunderson, on behalf of Eric's Garage, $182, which represented the premium down payment on a garage liability policy, a type of commercial-lines insurance. About the same time, the Respondent also received $438 as the remaining balance., on the premium on this policy from the Capitol Premium Plan, Inc., a premium financing company. This premium payment was received by the Respondent well after notice by Amalex, his General Agent, that it was not acceptable for the Respondent to retain commercial account premiums on policies written for companies for whom Amalex was General Agent. None of this premium payment was ever forwarded to Amalex, even after repeated demands for it. Rather, the premium funds were retained by the Respondent and used for other purposes. On March 3, 1982, the Respondent sold to Citiweld Welding Supply, a package business policy including workers' compensation coverage issued by the Insurance Company of North America through Amalex, Inc., as its General Agent. The Respondent collected a total of $2,162.62 in premium payments from Citiweld. He collected those payments in six monthly installments following a down payment of $500. The Respondent made monthly payments of $163 to Amalex, Inc., and then later monthly payments of $153. The Respondent collected a total of $2,162.62 which was $80.62 in excess of the actual premium due on the policy. This policy was not financed by a financing agreement, which might be characterized by an additional financing fee, thus the Respondent collected $80.62 in excess of the amount of premium due on the policy. The Respondent ultimately remitted to Amalex a total of $1,275. Thus, $807 is still due and owing to Amalex by the Respondent. The Respondent, according to his own former employee, Earnest Middleton, was collecting an additional $20 a month service charge on the Citiweld account. There is no evidence that he was authorized to collect the additional $20 per month service charge, and no portion of that service charge was ever forwarded to Amalex. It was retained by the Respondent. The fact that the Respondent was making periodic monthly payments to Amalex during this period, without the existence of a financing agreement with the insured, corroborates the position of Amalex, established by Mr. Gibson and Ms. Stratton, that there was no authority to withhold commercial account premium payments at this time, and that premiums due Amalex from the Respondent were to be paid pursuant to monthly statements or billings sent to the Respondent. Ms. Stratton's and Mr. Gibson's testimony in this regard is corroborated by the letter of March 19, 1982, to the Respondent from Gibson (in evidence), wherein he was informed that such commercial insurance business and related premiums should be billed and paid for on a monthly basis. On or about August 31, 1981, Respondent sold a package workman's compensation policy to B & L Groceries, Inc. to be issued through Amalex, Inc., who represented the insurance company for whom the policy was written. The Respondent received approximately $3,350 from B & L Groceries, which represented the premium on the above policies. The premium payments were not forwarded in the regular course of business to Amalex, the General Agent. On or about December 17, 1981, the Respondent sold to B & L Seafood Restaurant, Inc., a package commercial insurance policy and endorsement also issued through Amalex. The Respondent collected $2,112 premium on that policy. That premium was not forwarded in the regular course of business to Amalex. On September 1, 1981, the Respondent sold to Parker's Septic Tank Company, a general liability and business automobile insurance policy, also issued through the General Agent, Amalex, Inc. He collected from that business approximately $2,542 as premium payment on the insurance policies. The automobile policy was cancelled thereafter, such that a total net premium of $1,056 remained due and owing to Amalex, which the Respondent failed to forward in the regular course of business. These policies sold to B & L Groceries, B & L Seafood Restaurant and Parker's Septic Tank Company, were sold during the time when the Respondent believed that he was authorized by Amalex, Inc., and its president, Mr. Gibson, to retain premiums on all such commercial or business insurance policies to cover his office expenses, and thus it cannot be found that he willfully retained and misappropriated those premiums, although Amalex's entitlement to those premiums was later the subject of a civil action between the Respondent and Amalex, Inc., such that Amalex did demand payment of those premiums, which the Respondent failed to do. On or about March 4, 1982, the Respondent sold to The Cypress Gallery a package business insurance policy and endorsement issued through Amalex, Inc. The Respondent collected at least $883 from The Cypress Gallery, representing the earned premium on that policy which was cancelled on July 22, 1982. He failed to forward the earned premium in the regular course of business to Amalex, the General Agent. On March 16, 1982, Respondent sold to Eurohouse Custom Builders, Inc., fire, general liability, automobile and builder's risk policies together with several endorsements issued through Amalex, Inc. He collected premium payments on those policies in the earned amount of $1,197, although the policies were later cancelled after that amount of premium was earned by the insurance company and Amalex. He failed to forward the $1,197 earned premium to Amalex in the regular course of business. On July 9, 1982, the Respondent sold to Byron Hood, a package commercial insurance policy and automobile policies issued through Amalex, Inc., on which the Respondent collected a total premium amount of $1,430 from IMAC, a premium finance company. The Respondent failed to forward this premium amount in the regular course of business to Amalex, Inc. On May 14, 1982, the Respondent sold to Jeanes Swap Shop, a package commercial insurance policy with an endorsement which was issued through Amalex, Inc., and upon which the Respondent collected and received a $314 premium. The Respondent forwarded most of the premium to Amalex, but failed to forward $39 of it. On or about March 31, 1982, the Respondent sold to Lawns Unlimited a commercial policy issued through Amalex, Inc. The Respondent collected and received from Lawns Unlimited $816, which represented the premium payment for that policy. This premium payment was never forwarded to Amalex in its entirety and an earned premium of $242 is still due Amalex as General Agent. On or about July 2, 1982, the Respondent sold to Robert Lewis a package commercial insurance policy issued through Amalex. The Respondent received $500 from Lewis as a premium payment for that policy. The Respondent failed to forward $150 of that premium to Amalex. On or about April 1, 1982, the Respondent sold to Joe Strickland a homeowners and boat insurance policy issued through Amalex, Inc. He collected a premium from Mr. Strickland in the amount of $353 which he failed to forward in the regular course of business to Amalex, the General Agent. This was a personal homeowners and marine insurance policy issued to Mr. Strickland, and the $353 premium could not possibly have been the subject of any misunderstanding concerning Respondent's retention of it for coverage of office expenses. On April 30, 1982, the Respondent sold to "Pop-a Top Lounge" a general liability and fire insurance policy issued through Amalex, Inc. The Respondent collected a premium of $647 on that policy and failed to forward it in the regular course of business to Amalex, the party entitled to it as General Agent. Near the end of 1982, the Respondent sold to Arnold Construction Company various endorsements on its existing business insurance coverage so as to add coverage for additional motor vehicles. That policy and the endorsements were issued through Amalex, Inc. The Respondent collected from Arnold Construction Company a premium payment in the amount of $1,302 and failed to forward it in the regular course of business to Amalex, the General Agent. Numerous requests were made of the Respondent by Amalex, Inc. for the payment of the delinquent premiums the Respondent owed it on all outstanding accounts beginning in March, 1982. In October, 1982, Amalex began requiring cash remissions with applications for insurance written by the Respondent. The Respondent has failed to pay the outstanding account balances representing premium trust fund payments due to Amalex, Inc., such that in excess of $18,000 in outstanding premium payments have not been remitted to that firm. It is true that two of the amounts billed and depicted on Exhibit No. 12 as constituting that approximate $18,000 outstanding premium payment amount, represent $1,368 and $174 for business written in November and December of 1981, during which time the Respondent was under the genuine belief that he had an agreement with Amalex, Inc., to retain in his office all business insurance premium payments. Even though that is the case, and the B & L Groceries, B & L Seafood and Parker Septic Tank Co. premiums are attributable to this time period, the fact remains that the greater portion of the disputed approximate $18,000 amount remains outstanding and has never been paid by the Respondent to Amalex, Inc., the entity entitled to the funds. The amounts collected and not remitted by the Respondent on the insurance accounts delineated above constitute trust funds held in a fiduciary capacity by the Respondent on behalf of the General Agent, Amalex, Inc., who is General Agent for the insurance companies for whom the Respondent wrote the policies.1 The Respondent thus misappropriated these trust funds by failing to remit them in a timely fashion to the General Agent, Amalex, Inc., in the regular course of business. Although the Respondent clearly failed to properly account for and deliver the subject funds, there is no evidence to show that the Respondent was guilty of faulty record keeping in his own agency. In fact, Petitioner did not adduce any competent, substantial evidence to indicate what manner of record keeping the Respondent engaged in, good, bad or indifferent.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent, John Wayne Pennington's General Lines Insurance Agent's license be suspended for a period of two years, in accordance with Section 626.641, Florida Statutes. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of March, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1986.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to this hearing, Petitioner held a license issued by the Florida Department of Insurance as a general lines insurance agent. On or about April 3, 1979, Steven B. Atkinson entered the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in West Palm Beach, Florida, from whom he had purchased his auto insurance for approximately three years. His intention at this time was to purchase only that insurance necessary to procure the license tags for his automobile, a seven-year-old Vega. He told the person he dealt with at that time at the insurance agency that this was all he wanted. He did not ask for auto club membership, did not need it, and did not want it. He asked only for what he needed to get his tags. However, he was told by a representative of the agency that he needed not only "PIP" insurance, but also auto club membership and accidental death and dismemberment insurance. Of the $144 premium, $31 was for the required "PIP" coverage, $75 was for auto club membership (not required), and $38 was for accidental death and dismemberment (AD&D) (not required). Representatives of the agency told him that he needed all three to get the tags and, though he knew what he was getting and knew he was purchasing all three, he agreed because he was told by the agency representatives that he needed to have all three in order to get his tags. 3 Diane Phillipy McDonald contacted the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because she had heard on the radio that their prices were inexpensive. All she wanted was personal injury protection (PIP), which was what she thought the law required to get tags on her automobile. When she first called the agency and asked how much the coverage she wanted would be, she was told she could pay a percentage down and finance the rest. When she entered the agency, she was waited on by a man whose name she cannot remember. However, she did not ask for auto club coverage or accidental death and dismemberment coverage, nor did those subjects ever come up in the conversation. She asked only for PIP, and she paid a $50 deposit on her coverage. In return for her deposit, she was given a slip of paper that reflected that she had purchased PIP coverage. She was not told she was charged for auto club membership or accidental death and dismemberment. The forms that she signed, including those which reflect a premium for all three coverages in the total amount of $137, bear her signature, and though she admits signing the papers, she denies having read them or having them explained to her before she signed them. In fact, she cannot recall whether they were even filled out when she signed them. In regard to the papers, the premium finance agreement signed by the witness on April 3, 1979, reflects in the breakdown of coverage total premium of $137. However, immediately below, the total cash premium is listed as $158, $21 more than the total of the individual premiums for the three coverages, and the financing charge is based on that amount1 less the down payment. Marvin W. Niemi purchased his auto insurance from the Okeechobee Insurance Agency in March, 1979, after he heard their advertisement on the radio and went in to get the insurance required by the State in order to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he asked personnel there for the minimum insurance required to qualify for tags because he was strapped for money at the time and could not afford anything else. He definitely did not want auto club membership. In fact, discussion of that did not even arise, nor did he want the accidental death policy. When he left the agency, he thought he was only getting what he had asked for; to wit, the PIP minimum coverage. All the forms that he signed were blank when he signed them. This application process took place very quickly during his lunch hour from work. He admits giving his son's (David Robert) name as the beneficiary on his insurance, but did not realize at the time that he was purchasing coverage other than the minimum coverage required. His rationale for giving his son's name as beneficiary was that agency personnel asked and the witness felt if there was any money involved, it should go to his son. In fact, Mr. Niemi was sold not only the PIP, but membership in an auto club and PIP coverage with an $8,000 deductible. Again, the total premium was $137, when the actual premium for the coverage he asked for was only $24. Frank Johnson purchased his insurance from Okeechobee Insurance Agency in April, 1979, because he had heard and seen their advertisement on radio and television and it appeared to be reasonable. He wanted only PIP coverage as required by law sufficient to get his license tags. When he entered the agency, he spoke with a man whose name he does not know, who after consulting the books came up with the premium for the coverage to be purchased. During this meeting, the question of motor club or AD&D coverage was not mentioned. His signature does not appear on the statement of understanding, which outlines the coverage and the premium therefor. In this case, because Mr. Johnson had had some prior traffic tickets, his total premium came to $243. His coverage, however, included bodily injury liability, property damage liability, PIP, and auto club. After paying a $50 down payment, he made two additional payments which totaled approximately $50, but thereafter failed to make any additional payments. On August 1, 1980, Marguerite and Steven von Poppel entered the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth, Florida, to purchase their automobile insurance coverage. They purchased policies which included bodily injury and property damage liability, PIP coverage, and comprehensive and collision coverage. The PIP coverage had a deductible of $8,000, and the comprehensive and collision coverage both had $200 deductibles. Mrs. von Poppel indicates that it was not their intention to have such large deductibles on their coverage. In any event, on that day, they gave a check for down payment in the amount of $320 and advised the employee of the agency that upon billing for the balance due of the $915 total premium, they would send the check. Neither Mrs. von Poppel nor Mr. von Poppel desired to finance the balance due of $595, and Mrs. von Poppel did not affix her signature to an application for premium financing with Devco Premium Finance Company dated the same day which bears the signature of Kevin D. Cox as agent. This premium finance agreement lists a cash premium of $966, as opposed to $915. The receipt given to the von Poppels initially reflects a down payment of $320, which is consistent with the receipt, and an amount financed of $646, as opposed to $595, which would have been the balance due under the cash payment intended and desired by the von Poppels. Somewhat later, Mrs. von Poppel received a premium payment booklet from Devco in the mail. When she received it, she immediately went to the Federal Insurance Agency, told them she did not desire to finance the payments, and that day1 September 3, 1980, gave them a check in the amount of $595, which was the balance due on their insurance coverage. This check was subsequently deposited to the account of Federal Insurance Agency and was cashed. This did not end the von Poppel saga, however, as subsequently the von Poppels were billed for an additional amount of $116.18, which reflects the interest on the amount ostensibly financed. When the von Poppels received this statement, they contacted the Federal Insurance Agency and were told that there was some mistake and that the matter would be taken care of. They therefore did not make any further payments, except a total payment of $20, which they were told was still owing. This $20 payment was made on May 29, 1981, after their insurance had been cancelled for nonpayment of the balance due on the finance agreement. The policy was, however, subsequently reinstated, back-dated to the date of cancellation, after the von Poppels complained. Their complaints, however, did nothing to forestall a series of dunning letters from a collection agency to which Devco had referred the von Poppels' account. It is obvious, therefore, that Federal Insurance Agency did not notify Devco of the fact that the amount due and payable had been paid, and did not clear the von Poppels with Devco or with the collection agency thereafter. As a result, the von Poppels filed a complaint with the Insurance Commissioner's office. That terminated their difficulty on this policy. On September 15, 1980, Federal Insurance Agency submitted a check in the amount $595, the amount paid to them by the von Poppels in full settlement of their account, to Devco. There appears to have been no additional letter of explanation, and though Devco credited this amount to the von Poppel account, it did not know to cancel the finance charges since the von Poppels' decline to finance their premium. Of the total amount of the von Poppel premium, the majority, $636, was attributable to the basic insurance in the amount of $10,000-$20,000 liability written by American Risk Assurance Company of Miami, Florida. The supplemental liability carrying a premium of $180 and covering $40,000-$80,000 liability was written by Hull and Company, Inc., out of Fort Lauderdale for Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company. The third portion of the coverage carrying a charged premium in the amount of $150 covered the AD&D covered by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company (RSLIC) of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This coverage, in the principal sum of $10,000 in the case of Mr. von Poppel and $5,000 in the case of Mrs. von Poppel, was included without the knowledge or the cosnet of the von Poppels. The policies, numbered 10753 R and 10754 R, were never delivered to the von Poppels as, according to an officer of RSLIC, they should have been, but are in the files of the Federal Insurance Agency. Further, the von Poppels were overcharged for the coverage. Respondent, however, did not remit any of the premium to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company Instead, on August 1, 1980, the same day the von Poppels were in to purchase their insurance, he issued a sight draft drawn on Devco Premium Finance Company to Reliance Standard Life in the amount of $150. Reliance Standard Life was not the same company as Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, was not controlled by Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company, and in fact had no relation to Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company. Reliance Standard Life was a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Florida in which Kevin D. Cox was president and Howard I. Vogel was vice president-secretary. Of the $150 premium, 90 percent was retained by Respondent or his company as commission and 10 percent was transmitted to Nation Motor Club along with a 10 percent commission on policies written for other individuals. Nation Motor Club would then transmit the bona fide premium of 24 cents per $1,000 coverage to RSLIC. More than a year later, on October 16, 1981, Federal Insurance Agency reimbursed the von Poppels with a check for $42.50, representing the unearned portion of the unordered AD&D coverage. Clifford A. Ragsdale went to the Federal Insurance Agency in Lake Worth on April 19, 1982, to purchase his auto insurance because after calling several agencies by phone and advising them of the coverage he wanted, this was the least expensive. To do this, he would read off the coverage from his old policy and get a quote for the identical coverage. After getting this agency's quote, he went to the office where, after talking with two different ladies to whom he described the coverage he desired, he got to the person with whom he had talked on the phone and read his current coverage, and who already had some of the paperwork prepared. During all his discussions with the agency's employees on the phone and in person, he did not speak of, request, or desire auto club membership. He has been a member of AAA since 1977, and his membership there covers all the contingencies he is concerned with. Additional auto club membership in another club would be redundant. He gave the agency representative a check for $247 as a down payment and agreed to finance the balance due through Premium Service Company. Though he was given a receipt for the $247 deposit, the premium finance agreement he signed that day at the Federal Insurance Agency reflected a cash down payment of only $147, thus falsely inflating the balance due to be paid by the client. The $100 difference was refunded to Mr. Ragsdale by Federal Insurance Agency on October 25, 1982, some six months later after he complained to the Insurance Commissioner's office and was told that the $100 difference was for membership in a motor club that he did not desire or agree to. As late as December 29, 1982, over eight months later, the agency had still not remitted the $147 to Premium Service Company, who then added this deposit already paid by the client back to the account balance. Mr. Ragsdale did not read all the documents he signed at the agency, and he never received the policy he ordered. He was told he was signing an application for insurance and signed several instruments in blank at the request of the personnel at Federal Insurance Agency. He was told they would later fill in what wad needed. Respondent was the general lines agent of record for the Okeechobee Insurance Agency, located at 1874 Okeechobee Boulevard, West Palm Beach, Florida, during March and April, 1979, and at the Federal Insurance Agency, 3551 South Military Trail, Lake Worth, Florida, during the period which included August, 1980, and April, 1982. In each agency, he had instructed his' personnel how to serve and handle customers who came to the agency requesting the lowest minimum required insurance in which the agency specialized and which the agency, through its advertising program, purported to offer. As testified to by Linda Holly, an employee of Federal Insurance Agency, and as admitted by Respondent, when a prospective customer entered the agency requesting the minimum required coverage, the agent was to ask if the customer knew what the minimum was. The agent would then explain what was required and quote a premium which included not only the minimum required insurance, but also some additional service which, depending on the time, could be AD&D, towing, motor club, or the like, none of which was required by the State of Florida. Respondent instructed his employees to do this on the rationale that the premiums and commissions on the minimum required insurance were so low that the agency could not make sufficient profit on the sale of it, alone, to stay in business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent's license as a general lines agent in the State of Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of August, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1983 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire William W. Tharpe, Jr., Esquire Department of Insurance Legal Division 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Kevin Denis Cox 1483 S.W. 25th Way Deerfield Beach, Florida 33441 The Honorable Bill Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
