The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration's denial of Petitioners', Brookwood- Walton County Convalescent Center and Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center (Brookwood), interim rate request for general and professional liability insurance was proper and in keeping with state and federal laws and the rules and regulations governing Florida's Medicaid program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, Brookwood-Washington County Convalescent Center and Walton County Convalescent Center (Brookwood) are licensed nursing homes in the State of Florida. The Brookwood facilities have historically been high Medicaid providers. Both participate in the Florida Medicaid program. Washington County Convalescent Center is currently 90 percent Medicaid and Walton County Convalescent Center is 85 percent Medicaid. The statewide average for all nursing homes in Florida is 50-55 percent Medicaid. Such high Medicaid participation makes Brookwood extremely sensitive to changes in its allowable costs and its ability to recover those costs. Florida's Medicaid program is needs-based, providing nursing home care to persons eligible for such care who fall below a certain level of income and assets. Medicaid is a "prospective" reimbursement program in that reimbursement to a nursing home is based on the facility's cost history adjusted or inflated to approximate future costs. Adjustments are made and reimbursement rates are set based on a nursing home's cost report for allowable costs it has incurred in the past year. In determining allowable reimbursable costs, AHCA utilizes the Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan, Version XIX, dated November 27, 1995 (Reimbursement Plan), the reimbursement principles of the Federal Medicare Program's Health Insurance Manual (also known as the Provider Reimbursement Manual, PRM, or HIM-15), and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) or accepted industry practice. In making determinations as to allowable reimbursable costs, one first looks to the Plan, then HIM-15 and finally, GAAP. With certain exceptions not relevant here, The Florida Medicaid program reimburses all allowable costs, as those costs are defined in the Reimbursement Plan and HIM-15. Premiums paid by a nursing home for liability insurance are an allowable cost under the Reimbursement Plan. Allowable costs are broken out in the categories of property, patient care, and operating expenses. As indicated, in determining the prospective rate, AHCA inflates the reported allowable costs in each category forward subject to various class ceiling limitations and target limitations. A class ceiling is an upper limit on the cost that will be reimbursed. A target limitation is a limit on the rate of increase of costs from year to year. In short, a nursing home provider may be under its class ceilings; however, any increase in its costs that exceeds a certain percentage amount will not be recognized for reimbursement purposes. After applying the inflation factor, the class ceilings and the target limitations to allowable costs, AHCA arrives at a per-patient, per-day rate that the nursing home will be paid during the next year. Because nursing home reimbursement is prospective and subject to target limits, a nursing facility might be unable to recover its allowable costs of providing services if it experiences unanticipated expenses that cause its allowable costs to unexpectedly rise. In such cases, the Plan has provisions that allow, under very limited circumstances, an interim rate adjustment for an unexpected increase in costs. Such interim rate increases are covered in Section IV.J. of the Plan. In 1999, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost was $400,000 for its six Florida facilities and one North Carolina facility. In the year 2000, Brookwood's liability insurance premium cost increased to $4,000,000. Of that amount, the premium cost for Walton County Convalescent Center increased from $56,000 to $546,000 and the premium cost for Washington County Convalescent Center increased from $84,000 to $819,000. The premium increase occurred after Brookwood's rates had been set based on its 1999 insurance costs. Additionally, in September of 2000, Brookwood's liability insurer left the state. Brookwood has since been unable to obtain liability insurance for its Florida facilities. It was possible for Brookwood to self-insure, but it did not. Self-insurance is generally only feasible for facilities larger than Brookwood. However, the evidence did not demonstrate that Brookwood could not self-insure. On May 30, 2000, faced with this unforeseen increase in liability insurance premiums, Brookwood applied to AHCA for an interim rate effective retroactively to January 1, 2000. This was necessary because the large increase in costs would not be covered by the normal rate of inflation allowed by the department and the cost of the increase would not be recoverable through the normal prospective reimbursement methodology due to the lag time between the cost increase and the filing of the cost report. In addition, without an interim rate Brookwood would not receive an adjustment to its target rate, thereby, limiting reimbursement for any increased costs it did report on its cost reports. Brookwood only requested interim rates for these two facilities because its other four facilities were at or above the cost ceilings and could get no relief from an interim rate. In other words, for those four facilities, Medicaid will not participate in payment for the extra costs incurred by the increased liability insurance premiums. Even for the two facilities at issue here, if an interim rate is granted, AHCA will not reimburse for any costs that exceed the cost ceilings. The increase of premiums and subsequent pull out by several insurance companies were part of a reaction to increased loss in the area of nursing home liability. The crisis was, in part, due to an increase in civil litigation against nursing homes being brought under Sections 400.022 and 400.023, Florida Statutes. Indeed, Florida's rate of nursing home liability litigation is significantly above the national average. However, Florida's nursing home population is also significantly larger than the national average. However, the crisis was also due to many other factors which impact liability and rates in Florida. While there may be some debate about the causes of the increased litigation, there is no debate that the cost of liability insurance increased significantly over a short period of time with some insurance companies ceasing to write liability insurance for nursing homes in Florida. The Agency denied Brookwood's request because no new interpretation of law by the state or federal government pertaining to liability insurance had occurred which caused Brookwood's costs to increase. As indicated earlier, the Plan contains provisions that allow a nursing home participating in the Medicaid program to request an interim change in its reimbursement rate when it incurs costs resulting from patient care or operating changes made to comply with existing state regulations and such costs are at least $5,000 or one percent of its per diem. The language of Section IV.J.2 of the Estate's Long- Term Care Reimbursement Plan states that: J. The following provisions apply to interim changes in component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi- annual rate setting process. * * * 2. Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient care or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider's current total per diem rate. Other subsections of Section J of the Reimbursement Plan deal with new requirements or new interpretation of old requirements. Those subsections do not apply in this case. The term standards as used in Section J refers to standards in the Reimbursement Plan, Section IV titled "Standards," the standards of care and operation detailed by the Medicaid program in its provider handbooks and such standards as are detailed in the Code of Federal Regulations, and HCFA/HHS guidelines, as well as state statutes and rules. These standards are the usual or customary method or practice used by the nursing home industry to gain reimbursement from Medicaid. The term standards include reimbursement standards, methods or principles for medicaid providers. In essence, a nursing home would have to incur additional or new costs to receive an interim rate adjustment. Brookwood's increase in insurance premiums was such an increase in costs, which would be allowable subject to ceiling and target limitations. At the time of Brookwood's request, there was no specific requirement in the state Reimbursement Plan, state or federal law requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. Additionally, there was no change to the Reimbursement Plan, state, or federal law or regulation requiring that liability insurance be carried by a nursing home. On the other hand, the reimbursement standards or requirements set forth in HIM-15 make it clear that a prudent Medicaid provider is expected to carry liability insurance or self-insurance in order to be reimbursed for any uninsured losses. Specifically, Section 2160.2 of the Provider Reimbursement Manual states: Liability damages paid by the provider, either imposed by law or assumed by contract, which should reasonably have been covered by liability insurance, are not allowable. Section 2161 of HIM-15 states that the reasonable costs of such insurance are allowable. Section 2162.1 of HIM-15 states that losses in excess of the deductible or co-insurance are allowable costs so long as the amount of insurance was consistent with sound management practices. Section 2162.5 of HIM-15 recognizes the allowability of deductibles, so long as they do not exceed 10 percent of the entity's net worth or $100,000 per provider. It also states that if you set a deductible higher than those amounts (or assume all the risk), any losses exceeding the 10 percent or $100,000 will not be allowable as recognized costs. The general implication of these and other related sections of HIM-15 is that a prudent provider is expected to carry liability insurance or be self-insured. Thus, a provider will be reimbursed for the reasonable costs of liability insurance, any reasonable deductible, and any losses in excess of reasonable insurance coverage. These limitations on loss recovery or reimbursement are standards for purposes of determining whether a interim rate increase is allowable. These standards were in effect at the time Brookwood's premiums increased. Thus, in order to comply with Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood had to remain insured or self-insured. The choice of which type of insurance to utilize to meet the reimbursement standard is left to the provider. Brookwood reasonably chose to insure through an insurance company. Since Brookwood was required to make such a choice in order to comply or conform to Medicaid's reimbursement standards, Brookwood is entitled to an interim rate increase. However, the interim rate provisions of the Plan only recognize such rates submitted within 60 days prior to the date of the interim rate request. Based on this limitation, Petitioners' rate increase is limited to the increase in premium incurred 60 days prior to its interim rate request around May 30, 2000.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that A final order be entered granting Brookwood's interim rate request limited to the 60 days prior to the initial rate request. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Grigas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Powell & Mack 803 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Diane Grubbs, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Julie Gallagher, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building 3, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403
The Issue The issue in these consolidated cases is whether the Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") properly disallowed Petitioners' expense for liability insurance and accrued contingent liability costs contained in AHCA's audit of Petitioners' Medicaid cost reports.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners operate licensed nursing homes that participate in the Florida Medicaid program as institutional providers. The 14 Palm Gardens facilities are limited liability companies operating as subsidiaries of New Rochelle Administrators, LLC, which also provides the facilities with management services under a management contract. AHCA is the single state agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. One of AHCA's duties is to audit Medicaid cost reports submitted by providers participating in the Medicaid program. During the audit period, Petitioners provided services to Medicaid beneficiaries pursuant to Institutional Medicaid Provider Agreements that they entered into with AHCA. The Provider Agreements contained the following relevant provision: (3) Compliance. The provider agrees to comply with local, state, and federal laws, as well as rules, regulations, and statements of policy applicable to the Medicaid program, including Medicaid Provider Handbooks issued by AHCA. Section 409.908, Florida Statutes (2002)1, provided in relevant part: Reimbursement of Medicaid providers.-- Subject to specific appropriations, the agency shall reimburse Medicaid providers, in accordance with state and federal law, according to methodologies set forth in the rules of the agency and in policy manuals and handbooks incorporated by reference therein. These methodologies may include fee schedules, reimbursement methods based on cost reporting, negotiated fees, competitive bidding pursuant to s. 287.057, and other mechanisms the agency considers efficient and effective for purchasing services or goods on behalf of recipients. . . . * * * (2)(a)1. Reimbursement to nursing homes licensed under part II of chapter 400 . . . must be made prospectively. . . . * * * (b) Subject to any limitations or directions provided for in the General Appropriations Act, the agency shall establish and implement a Florida Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (Medicaid) for nursing home care in order to provide care and services in conformance with the applicable state and federal laws, rules, regulations, and quality and safety standards and to ensure that individuals eligible for medical assistance have reasonable geographic access to such care. . . . AHCA has adopted the Title XIX Long-Term Care Reimbursement Plan (the "Plan") by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. The Plan incorporates the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services ("CMS") Publication 15-1, also called the Provider Reimbursement Manual (the "Manual" or "PRM"), which provides "guidelines and policies to implement Medicare regulations which set forth principles for determining the reasonable cost of provider services furnished under the Health Insurance for the Aged Act of l965, as amended." CMS Pub. 15-1, Foreword, p. I. The audit period in these cases spans two versions of the Plan: version XXIII, effective July 1, 2002, and version XXIV, effective January 1, 2003. It is unnecessary to distinguish between the two versions of the Plan because their language is identical as to the provisions relevant to these cases. Section I of the Plan, "Cost Finding and Cost Reporting," provides as follows, in relevant part: The cost report shall be prepared by a Certified Public Accountant in accordance with chapter 409.908, Florida Statutes, on the form prescribed in section I.A. [AHCA form 5100-000, Rev. 7-1-90], and on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles as established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) as incorporated by reference in Rule 61H1-20.007, F.A.C., the methods of reimbursement in accordance with Medicare (Title XVIII) Principles of Reimbursement, the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB. 15-1)(1993) incorporated herein by reference except as modified by the Florida Title XIX Long Term Care Reimbursement Plan and State of Florida Administrative Rules. . . . Section III of the Plan, "Allowable Costs," provides as follows, in relevant part: Implicit in any definition of allowable costs is that those costs shall not exceed what a prudent and cost-conscious buyer pays for a given service or item. If costs are determined by AHCA, utilizing the Title XVIII Principles of Reimbursement, CMS-PUB. 15-1 (1993) and this plan, to exceed the level that a prudent buyer would incur, then the excess costs shall not be reimbursable under the plan. The Plan is a cost based prospective reimbursement plan. The Plan uses historical data from cost reports to establish provider reimbursement rates. The "prospective" feature is an upward adjustment to historical costs to establish reimbursement rates for subsequent rate semesters.2 The Plan establishes limits on reimbursement of costs, including reimbursement ceilings and targets. AHCA establishes reimbursement ceilings for nursing homes based on the size and location of the facilities. The ceilings are determined prospectively, on a semiannual basis. "Targets" limit the inflationary increase in reimbursement rates from one semester to the next and limit a provider's allowable costs for reimbursement purposes. If a provider's costs exceed the target, then those costs are not factored into the reimbursement rate and must be absorbed by the provider. A nursing home is required to file cost reports. The costs identified in the cost reports are converted into per diem rates in four components: the operating component; the direct care component; the indirect care component; and the property component. GL/PL insurance costs fall under the operating component. Once the per diem rate is established for each component, the nursing home's reimbursement rate is set at the lowest of four limitations: the facility's costs; the facility's target; the statewide cost ceiling based on the size of the facility and its region; or the statewide target, also based on the size and location of the facility. The facility's target is based on the initial cost report submitted by that facility. The initial per diem established pursuant to the initial cost report becomes the "base rate." Once the base rate is established, AHCA sets the target by inflating the base rate forward to subsequent six- month rate semesters according to a pre-established inflation factor. Reimbursement for cost increases experienced in subsequent rate semesters is limited by the target drawn from the base rate. Thus, the facility's reimbursement for costs in future rate semesters is affected by the target limits established in the initial period cost report. Expenses that are disallowed during the establishment of the base rate cannot be reclaimed in later reimbursement periods. Petitioners entered the Medicaid program on June 29, 2002. They filed cost reports for the nine- month period from their entry into the program through February 28, 2003. These reports included all costs claimed by Petitioners under the accrual basis of accounting in rendering services to eligible Medicaid beneficiaries. In preparing their cost reports, Petitioners used the standard Medicaid Cost Report "Chart of Accounts and Description," which contains the account numbers to be used for each ledger entry, and explains the meaning of each account number. Under the general category of "Administration" are set forth several subcategories of account numbers, including "Insurance Expense." Insurance Expense is broken into five account numbers, including number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party," which is described as "[c]osts of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or a non-profit service corporation."3 Petitioners' cost report stated the following expenses under account number 730810: Facility Amount Palm Garden of Clearwater $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Gainesville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Jacksonville $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Largo $171,188.00 Palm Garden of North Miami $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Ocala $217,712.00 Palm Garden of Orlando $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Pinellas $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Port St. Lucie $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Sun City $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Tampa $145,042.00 Palm Garden of Vero Beach $217,712.00 Palm Garden of West Palm Beach $231,151.00 Palm Garden of Winter Haven $145,042.00 AHCA requires that the cost reports of first-year providers undergo an audit. AHCA's contract auditing firm, Smiley & Smiley, conducted an examination4 of the cost reports of the 14 Palm Gardens nursing homes to determine whether the included costs were allowable. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants ("AICPA") has promulgated a series of "attestation standards" to provide guidance and establish a framework for the attestation services provided by the accounting profession in various contexts. Attestation Standards 101 and 601 set out the standard an accountant relies upon in examining for governmental compliance. Smiley & Smiley examined the Palm Gardens cost reports pursuant to these standards. During the course of the audit, Smiley & Smiley made numerous requests for documentation and other information pursuant to the Medicaid provider agreement and the Plan. Petitioners provided the auditors with their general ledger, invoices, audited financial statements, bank statements, and other documentation in support of their cost reports. The examinations were finalized during the period between September 28, 2006, and October 4, 2006. The audit report issued by AHCA contained more than 2,000 individual adjustments to Petitioners' costs, which the parties to these consolidated proceedings have negotiated and narrowed to two adjustments per Palm Gardens facility.5 As noted in the Preliminary Statement above, the first adjustment at issue is AHCA's disallowance of Palm Gardens' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of GL/PL insurance, where Palm Gardens could not document that it had purchased GL/PL insurance. The second adjustment at issue is ACHA's disallowance of a portion of the premium paid by Palm Gardens for the Mature Care Policies. The total amount of the adjustment at issue for each facility is set forth in the Preliminary Statement above. Of that total for each facility, $18,849.00 constituted the disallowance for the Mature Care Policies. The remainder constituted the disallowance for the accrual of GL/PL related contingent liabilities. Janette Smiley, senior partner at Smiley & Smiley and expert in Medicaid auditing, testified that Petitioners provided no documentation other than the Mature Care Policies to support the GL/PL entry in the cost reports. Ms. Smiley testified that, during much of the examination process, she understood Petitioners to be self-insured. Ms. Smiley's understanding was based in part on statements contained in Petitioners' audited financial statements. In the audited financial statement covering the period from June 28, 2002, through December 31, 2002, Note six explains Petitioners' operating leases and states as follows, in relevant part: The lease agreement requires that the Company maintain general and professional liability in specified minimum amounts. As an alternative to maintaining these levels of insurance, the lease agreement allows the Company to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount. The Company chose to self-insure, and has recorded litigation reserves of approximately $1,735,000 that are included in other accrued expenses (see Note 9). As of December 31, 2002, these reserves have not been funded by the Company. . . . The referenced Note nine, titled "Commitments and Contingencies," provides as follows in relevant part: Due to the current legal environment, providers of long-term care services are experiencing significant increases in liability insurance premiums or cancellations of liability insurance coverage. Most, if not all, insurance carriers in Florida have ceased offering liability coverage altogether. The Company's Florida facilities have minimal levels of insurance coverage and are essentially self-insured. The Company has established reserves (see Note 6) that estimate its exposure to uninsured claims. Management is not currently aware of any claims that could exceed these reserves. However, the ultimate outcome of these uninsured claims cannot be determined with certainty, and could therefore have a material adverse impact on the financial position of the Company. The relevant notes in Petitioner's audited financial statement for the year ending December 31, 2003, are identical to those quoted above, except that the recorded litigation reserves were increased to $4 million. The notes provide that, as of December 31, 2003, these reserves had not been funded by Petitioners. Ms. Smiley observed that the quoted notes, while referencing "self-insurance" and the recording of litigation reserves, stated that the litigation reserves had not been funded. By e-mail dated April 21, 2005, Ms. Smiley corresponded with Stanley Swindling, the shareholder in the accounting firm Moore Stephens Lovelace, P.A., who had primary responsibility for preparing Petitioners' cost reports. Ms. Smiley noted that Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the company "chose to self-insure" and "recorded litigation reserves," then wrote (verbatim): By definition from PRM CMS Pub 15-1 Sections 2162.5 and 2162.7 the Company does in fact have self-insurance as there is no shifting of risk. You will have to support your positioning a letter addressing the regs for self-insurance. As clearly the financial statement auditors believe this is self- insurance and have disclosed such to the financial statement users. If you cannot support the funding as required by the regs, the provider will have to support expense as "pay as you go" in accordance with [2162.6] for PL/GL. * * * Please review 2161 and 2162 and provide support based on the required compliance. If support is not complete within the regulations, amounts for IBNR [incurred but not reported] will be disallowed and we will need to have the claims paid reports from the TPA [third party administrator] (assuming there is a TPA handling the claims processing), in order to allow any expense. Section 2160 of the Manual establishes the basic insurance requirement: A. General.-- A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider's financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self-insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. . . . . . . If a provider is unable to obtain malpractice coverage, it must select one of the self-insurance alternatives in §2162 to protect itself against such risks. If one of these alternatives is not selected and the provider incurs losses, the cost of such losses and related expenses are not allowable. Section 2161.A of the Manual sets forth the general rule as to the reimbursement of insurance costs. It provides that the reasonable costs of insurance purchased from a commercial carrier or nonprofit service corporation are allowable to the extent they are "consistent with sound management practice." Reimbursement for insurance premiums is limited to the "amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Section 2162 of the Manual provides as follows, in relevant part: PROVIDER COSTS FOR MALPRACTICE AND COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY PROTECTION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, WORKERS' COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE HEALTH CARE INSURANCE General.-- Where provider costs incurred for protection against malpractice and comprehensive general liability . . . do not meet the requirements of §2161.A, costs incurred for that protection under other arrangements will be allowable under the conditions stated below. . . . * * * The following illustrates alternatives to full insurance coverage from commercial sources which providers, acting individually or as part of a group or a pool, can adopt to obtain malpractice, and comprehensive general liability, unemployment compensation, workers' compensation, and employee health care insurance protection: Insurance purchased from a commercial insurance company which provides coverage after a deductible or coinsurance provision has been met; Insurance purchased from a limited purpose insurance company (captive); Total self-insurance; or A combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. . . . part: Section 2162.3 of the Manual provides: Self-Insurance.-- You may believe that it is more prudent to maintain a total self- insurance program (i.e., the assumption by you of the risk of loss) independently or as part of a group or pool rather than to obtain protection through purchased insurance coverage. If such a program meets the conditions specified in §2162.7, payments into such funds are allowable costs. Section 2162.7 of the Manual provides, in relevant Conditions Applicable to Self-Insurance.-- Definition of Self-Insurance.-- Self- insurance is a means whereby a provider(s), whether proprietary or nonproprietary, undertakes the risk to protect itself against anticipated liabilities by providing funds in an amount equivalent to liquidate those liabilities. . . . * * * Self-Insurance Fund.-- The provider or pool establishes a fund with a recognized independent fiduciary such as a bank, a trust company, or a private benefit administrator. In the case of a State or local governmental provider or pool, the State in which the provider or pool is located may act as a fiduciary. The provider or pool and fiduciary must enter into a written agreement which includes all of the following elements: General Legal Responsibility.-- The fiduciary agreement must include the appropriate legal responsibilities and obligations required by State laws. Control of Fund.-- The fiduciary must have legal title to the fund and be responsible for proper administration and control. The fiduciary cannot be related to the provider either through ownership or control as defined in Chapter 10, except where a State acts as a fiduciary for a State or local governmental provider or pool. Thus, the home office of a chain organization or a religious order of which the provider is an affiliate cannot be the fiduciary. In addition, investments which may be made by the fiduciary from the fund are limited to those approved under State law governing the use of such fund; notwithstanding this, loans by the fiduciary from the fund to the provider or persons related to the provider are not permitted. Where the State acts as fiduciary for itself or local governments, the fund cannot make loans to the State or local governments. . . . The quoted Manual provisions clarify that Ms. Smiley's message to Mr. Swindling was that Petitioners had yet to submit documentation to bring their "self-insurance" expenses within the reimbursable ambit of Sections 2161 and 2162 of the Manual. There was no indication that Petitioners had established a fund in an amount sufficient to liquidate its anticipated liabilities, or that any such funds had been placed under the control of a fiduciary. Petitioners had simply booked the reserved expenses without setting aside any cash to cover the expenses. AHCA provided extensive testimony regarding the correspondence that continued among Ms. Smiley, Mr. Swindling, and AHCA employees regarding this "self-insurance" issue. It is not necessary to set forth detailed findings as to these matters, because Petitioners ultimately conceded to Ms. Smiley that, aside from the Mutual Care policies, they did not purchase commercial insurance as described in Section 2161.A, nor did they avail themselves of the alternatives to commercial insurance described in Section 2162.A. Petitioners did not purchase commercial insurance with a deductible, did not self- insure, did not purchase insurance from a limited purpose or "captive" insurance company, or employ a combination of purchased insurance and self-insurance. Ms. Smiley eventually concluded that Petitioners had no coverage for general and professional liability losses in excess of the $25,000 value of the Mutual Care Policies. Under the cited provisions of the Manual, Petitioners' unfunded self- insurance expense was not considered allowable under the principles of reimbursement. Petitioners were uninsured, which led Ms. Smiley to further conclude that Section 2162.13 of the Manual would apply: Absence of Coverage.-- Where a provider, other than a governmental (Federal, State, or local) provider, has no insurance protection against malpractice or comprehensive general liability in conjunction with malpractice, either in the form of a limited purpose or commercial insurance policy or a self-insurance fund as described in §2162.7, any losses and related expenses incurred are not allowable. In response to this disallowance pursuant to the strict terms of the Manual, Petitioners contend that AHCA should not have limited its examination of the claimed costs to the availability of documentation that would support those costs as allowable under the Manual. Under the unique circumstances presented by their situation, Petitioners assert that AHCA should have examined the state of the nursing home industry in Florida, particularly the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, and further examined whether Petitioners had the ability to meet the insurance requirements set forth in the Manual. Petitioners assert that, in light of such an examination, AHCA should have concluded that generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") may properly be invoked to render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Keith Parnell is an expert in insurance for the long- term care industry. He is a licensed insurance broker working for Hamilton Insurance Agency, which provides insurance and risk management services to about 40 percent of the Florida nursing home market. Mr. Parnell testified that during the audit period, it was impossible for nursing homes to obtain insurance in Florida. In his opinion, Petitioners could not have purchased commercial insurance during the audit period. To support this testimony, Petitioners offered a study conducted by the Florida Department of Insurance ("DOI") in 2000 that attempted to determine the status of the Florida long-term care liability insurance market for nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and continuing care retirement communities. Of the 79 companies that responded to DOI's data call, 23 reported that they had provided GL/PL coverage during the previous three years but were no longer writing policies, and only 17 reported that they were currently writing GL/PL policies. Six of the 17 reported writing no policies in 2000, and five of the 17 reported writing only one policy. The responding insurers reported writing a total of 43 policies for the year 2000, though there were approximately 677 skilled nursing facilities in Florida. On March 1, 2004, the Florida Legislature's Joint Select Committee on Nursing Homes issued a report on its study of "issues regarding the continuing liability insurance and lawsuit crisis facing Florida's long-term care facilities and to assess the impact of the reforms contained in CS/CS/CS/SB 1202 (2001)."6 The study employed data compiled from 1999 through 2003. Among the Joint Select Committee's findings was the following: In order to find out about current availability of long-term care liability insurance in Florida, the Committee solicited information from [the Office of Insurance Regulation, or] OIR within the Department of Financial Services, which is responsible for regulating insurance in Florida. At the Committee's request, OIR re-evaluated the liability insurance market and reported that there has been no appreciable change in the availability of private liability insurance over the past year. Twenty-one admitted insurance entities that once offered, or now offer, professional liability coverage for nursing homes were surveyed by OIR. Six of those entities currently offer coverage. Nine surplus lines carriers have provided 54 professional liability policies in the past year. Representatives of insurance carriers that stopped providing coverage in Florida told OIR that they are waiting until there are more reliable indicators of risk nationwide to re-enter the market. Among the Joint Select Committee's conclusions was the following: In the testimony the Committee received, there was general agreement that the quality of care in Florida nursing homes is improving, in large part due to the minimum staffing standards the Legislature adopted in SB 1202 during the 2001 Session. There was not, however, general agreement about whether or not lawsuits are abating due to the tort system changes contained in SB 1202. There was general agreement that the long-term care liability insurance market has not yet improved. After hearing the testimony, there is general agreement among the members of the Joint Select Committee that: * * * General and professional liability insurance, with actual transfer-of-risk, is virtually unavailable in Florida. "Bare- bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory insurance requirement are available; however, the cost often exceeds the face value of the coverage offered in the policy. This situation is a crisis which threatens the continued existence of long-term care facilities in Florida. To further support Mr. Parnell's testimony, Petitioners offered actuarial analyses of general and professional liability in long-term care performed by AON Risk Consultants, Inc. (AON) on behalf of the American Health Care Association. The AON studies analyzed nationwide trends in GL/PL for long-term care, and also examined state-specific issues for eight states identified as leading the trends in claim activity, including Florida. They provided an historical perspective of GL/PL claims in Florida during the audit period. The 2002 AON study for Florida was based on participation by entities representing 52 percent of all Florida nursing home beds. The study provided a "Loss Cost per Occupied Bed" showing GL/PL liability claims losses on a per bed basis. The 2002 study placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $10,800 per bed for the year 2001. The 2003 AON study, based on participation by entities representing 54 percent of Florida nursing home beds, placed the loss cost for nursing homes in Florida at $11,810 per bed for the year 2002. The studies showed that the cost per bed of GL/PL losses is materially higher in Florida than the rest of the United States. The nationwide loss per bed was $2,360 for the year 2001 and $2,880 for the year 2002. The GL/PL loss costs for Texas were the second-highest in the country, yet were far lower than the per bed loss for Florida ($5,460 for the year 2001 and $6,310 for the year 2002). Finally, Petitioners point to the Mature Care Policies as evidence of the crisis in GL/PL insurance availability. The aforementioned SB 1202 instituted a requirement that nursing homes maintain liability insurance coverage as a condition of licensure. See Section 22, Chapter 2001-45, Laws of Florida, codified at Subsection 400.141(20), Florida Statutes. To satisfy this requirement, Petitioners entered the commercial insurance market and purchased insurance policies for each of the 14 Palm Gardens facilities from a carrier named Mature Care Insurance Company. The policies carried a $25,000 policy limit, with a policy premium of $34,000. These were the kind of "bare bones" policies referenced by the Joint Select Committee's 2004 report. The fact that the policies cost more than they could ever pay out led Mr. Swindling, Petitioners' health care accounting and Medicaid reimbursement expert, to opine that a prudent nursing home operator in Florida at that time would not have purchased insurance, but for the statutory requirement.7 The Mature Care Policies were "bare bones" policies designed to provide minimal compliance with the statutory liability insurance coverage requirement. The policies cost Petitioners more than $37,000 in premium payments, taxes, and fees, in exchange for policy limits of $25,000. In its examination, AHCA disallowed the difference between the cost of the policy and the policy limits, then prorated the allowable costs because the audit period was nine months long and the premium paid for the Mature Care Policies was for 12 months. AHCA based its disallowance on Section 2161.A of the Manual, particularly the language which states: "Insurance premiums reimbursement is limited to the amount of aggregate coverage offered in the insurance policy." Petitioners responded that they did not enter the market and voluntarily pay a premium in excess of the policy limits. They were statutorily required to purchase this minimal amount of insurance; they were required to purchase a 12-month policy; they paid the market price8; and they should not be penalized for complying with the statute. Petitioners contend they should be reimbursed the full amount of the premiums for the Mature Care Policies, as their cost of statutory compliance. Returning to the issue of the contingent liabilities, Petitioners contend that, in light of the state of the market for GL/PL liability insurance during the audit period, AHCA should have gone beyond the strictures of the Manual to conclude that GAAP principles render the accrued contingent liabilities an allowable expense. Under GAAP, a contingent loss is a loss that is probable and can be reasonably estimated. An estimated loss from a loss contingency may be accrued by a charge to income. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5 ("FAS No. 5"), Accounting for Contingencies, provides several examples of loss contingencies, including "pending or threatened litigation" and "actual or possible claims and assessments." Petitioners assert that the contingent losses reported in their cost reports were actual costs incurred by Petitioners. The AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, provides: The ultimate costs of malpractice claims, which include costs associated with litigating or settling claims, are accrued when the incidents that give rise to the claims occur. Estimated losses from asserted and unasserted claims are accrued either individually or on a group basis, based on the best estimates of the ultimate costs of the claims and the relationship of past reported incidents to eventual claims payments. All relevant information, including industry experience, the entity's own historical experience, the entity's existing asserted claims, and reported incidents, is used in estimating the expected amount of claims. The accrual includes an estimate of the losses that will result from unreported incidents, which are probable of having occurred before the end of the reporting period. Section 8.10 of AICPA Guide provides: Accrued unpaid claims and expenses that are expected to be paid during the normal operating cycle (generally within one year of the date of the financial statements) are classified as current liabilities. All other accrued unpaid claims and expenses are classified as non-current liabilities. As noted above, Petitioners' audited financial statements for the fiscal years ending December 31, 2002, and December 31, 2003, showed that the accrual was incurred and recorded by Petitioners during the audit period. Mr. Swindling prepared Petitioners' cost reports, based on information provided by Petitioners, including trial balances reflecting their costs, statistics on patient days, cost data related to square footage, and revenue information. Mr. Swindling advised Petitioners to include the accrued losses. He believed that the loss contingency was probable and could be reasonably estimated. The losses were probable because it was "a given in the state of Florida at that time period that nursing homes are going to get sued." Mr. Swindling testified that the accrual reflected a per bed loss amount of $1,750, which he believed to be a reasonable estimate of the contingent liabilities faced by Petitioners during the audit period. This amount was much less than the per bed loss indicated by the AON studies for Florida. Mr. Swindling used the criteria set forth in Section 8.05 of the AICPA Guide to establish the estimate. He determined that the lesser amount was adequate based on his discussions with Petitioners' management, who indicated that they had a substantial risk management program. Management also disclosed to Mr. Swindling that Petitioners' leases required $1,750 per bed in liability coverage. See Finding of Fact 22, supra. Mr. Swindling believed that the estimated loss per bed was reasonable based on the AON studies and his knowledge and experience of the state of the industry in Florida during the audit period, as further reflected in the DOI and Joint Committee on Nursing Homes materials discussed above. Mr. Swindling's opinion was that the provisions of the Manual relating to GL/PL insurance costs do not apply under these circumstances. The costs at issue in this proceeding are not general and professional liability insurance costs subject to CMS Pub. 15-1; rather, they are loss contingencies related to general and professional liability, including defense costs, litigation costs, and settlement costs. Mr. Swindling placed the loss contingency under number 730810, "General and Professional Liability -- Third Party" because, in the finite chart of accounts provided by Medicaid, that was the most appropriate place to record the cost.9 Despite the initial confusion it caused the agency's auditors, the placement of the loss contingency under number 730810 was not intended to deceive the auditors. Mr. Swindling opined that, under these circumstances, Sections 2160 through 2162 are in conflict with other provisions in the Manual relating to the "prudent buyer" concept, and further conflict with the Plan to the extent that the cited regulations "relate to a retrospective system as opposed to prospective target rate-based system." Mr. Swindling agreed that the application of Sections 2160 through 2162 to the situation presented by Petitioners would result in the disallowance of the loss contingencies. Mr. Swindling observed, however, that Sections 2160 through 2162 are Medicare regulations. Mr. Swindling testified that Medicare reimbursements are made on a retrospective basis.10 Were this situation to occur in Medicare -- in which the provider did not obtain commercial insurance, self-insurance, or establish a captive insurer -- the provider would be deemed to be operating on a pay-as-you-go basis. Though its costs might be disallowed in the current period, the provider would receive reimbursements in subsequent periods when it could prove actual payment for its losses. Mr. Swindling found a conflict in attempting to apply these Medicare rules to the prospective payment system employed by Florida Medicaid, at least under the circumstances presented by Petitioners' case. Under the prospective system, once the contingent loss is disallowed for the base period, there is no way for Petitioners ever to recover that loss in a subsequent period, even when the contingency is liquidated. During his cross-examination, Mr. Swindling explained his position as follows: . . . Medicare allows for that payment in a subsequent period. Medicaid rules would not allow that payment in the subsequent period; therefore you have conflict in the rules. When you have conflict in the rules, you revert to generally accepted accounting principles. Generally accepted accounting principles are what we did. Q. Where did you find that if there's a conflict in the rules, which I disagree with, but if there is a conflict in the rules, that you follow GAAP? Where did you get that from? I mean, we've talked about it and it's clear on the record that if there is no provision that GAAP applies, but where did you get that if there's a conflict? Just point it out, that would be the easiest way to do it. A. The hierarchy, if you will, requires providers to file costs on the accrual basis of accounting in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. If there's no rules, in absence of rules -- and I forget what the other terms were, we read it into the record before, against public policy, those kind of things -- or in my professional opinion, if there is a conflict within the rules where the provider can't follow two separate rules at the same time, they're in conflict, then [GAAP] rules what should be recorded and what should be reimbursed. * * * Q. [T]he company accrued a liability of $2 million for the cost reporting period of 2002-2003, is that correct? A. Yes. * * * Q. Do you have any documentation supporting claims paid, actually paid, in 2002-2003 beyond the mature care policy for which that $2 million reserve was set up? A. No. Q. So what did Medicaid pay for? A. Medicaid paid the cost of contingent liabilities that were incurred by the providers and were estimated at $1,750 per bed. Generally accepted accounting principles will adjust that going forward every cost reporting period. If that liability in total goes up or down, the differential under [GAAP] goes through the income statement, and expenses either go up or they go down. It's self-correcting, which is similar to what Medicare is doing, only they're doing it on a cash basis. Mr. Swindling explained the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. The highest governing law is the Federal statutory law, Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Subsection. 1396-1396v. Below the statute come the federal regulations for implementing Title XIX, 42 C.F.R. parts 400-426. Then follow in order Florida statutory law, the relevant Florida Administrative Code provisions, the Plan, the Manual, and, at the bottom of the hierarchy, GAAP. Mr. Swindling testified that in reality, a cost report is not prepared from the top of the hierarchy down; rather, GAAP is the starting point for the preparation of any cost report. The statutes, rules, the Plan and the Manual are then consulted to exclude specific cost items otherwise allowable under GAAP. In the absence of an applicable rule, or in a situation in which there is a conflict between rules in the hierarchy such that the provider is unable to comply with both rules, the provider should fall back on GAAP principles as to recording of costs and reimbursement. John A. Owens, currently a consultant in health care finance specializing in Medicaid, worked for AHCA for several years up to 2002, in positions including administrator of the audit services section and bureau chief of the Office of Medicaid Program Analysis. Mr. Owens is a CPA and expert in health care accounting and Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that AHCA's disallowance of the accrued costs for GL/PL liability was improper. Mr. Owens noted that Section 2160 of the Manual requires providers to purchase commercial insurance. If commercial insurance is unavailable, then the Manual gives the provider two choices: self-insure, or establish a captive program. Mr. Owens testified that insurers were fleeing the state during the period in question, and providers were operating without insurance coverage. Based on the state of the market, Petitioners' only options would have been to self-insure or establish a captive. As to self-insurance, Petitioners' problem was that they had taken over the leases on their facilities from a bankrupt predecessor, Integrated Health Services ("IHS"). Petitioners were not in privity with their predecessor. Petitioners had no access to the facilities' loss histories, without which they could not perform an actuarial study or engage a fiduciary to set up a self-insurance plan.11 Similarly, setting up a captive would require finding an administrator and understanding the risk exposure. Mr. Owens testified that a provider would not be allowed to set up a captive without determining actuarial soundness, which was not possible at the time Petitioners took over the 14 IHS facilities. Thus, Petitioners were simply unable to meet the standards established by the Manual. The options provided by the Manual did not contemplate the unique market situation existing in Florida during the audit period, and certainly did not contemplate that situation compounded by the problems faced by a new provider taking over 14 nursing homes from a bankrupt predecessor. Mr. Owens agreed with Mr. Swindling that, under these circumstances, where the requirements of the Manual could not be met, Petitioners were entitled to seek relief under GAAP, FAS No. 5 in particular. In situations where a loss is probable and can be measured, then an accounting entry may be performed to accrue and report that cost. Mr. Owens concluded that Petitioners' accrual was an allowable cost for Medicaid purposes, and explained his rationale as follows: My opinion is, in essence, that since they could not meet -- technically, they just could not meet those requirements laid out by [the Manual], they had to look somewhere to determine some rational basis for developing a cost to put into the cost report, because if they had chosen to do nothing and just moved forward, those rates would be set and there would be nothing in their base year which then establishes their target moving forward. So by at least looking at a rational methodology to accrue the cost, they were able to build something into their base year and have it worked into their target system as they move forward. Steve Diaczyk, an audit evaluation and review analyst for AHCA, testified for the agency as an expert in accounting, auditing, and Medicaid policy. Mr. Diaczyk was the AHCA auditor who reviewed the work of Smiley & Smiley for compliance with Medicaid rules and regulations, and to verify the accuracy of the independent CPA's determinations. Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Mr. Swindling's description of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Mr. Diaczyk affirmed that Petitioners employed GAAP rather than Medicaid regulations in preparing their cost reports. Mr. Diaczyk testified regarding the Notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements, set forth at Findings of Fact 22-24, supra, which left AHCA's auditors with the understanding that Petitioners were self-insuring. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that Section 2162.7 of the Manual requires a self- insurer to contract with an independent fiduciary to maintain a self-insurance fund, and that the fund must contain monies sufficient to cover anticipated losses. The fiduciary takes title to the funds, the amount of which is determined actuarially. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, in reimbursing a provider for self-insurance, Medicaid wants to make sure that the provider has actually put money into the fund, and has not just set up a fund on its books and called it "self-insurance" for reimbursement purposes. AHCA's position is that it would be a windfall for a provider to obtain reimbursement for an accrued liability when it has not actually set the money aside and funded the risk. Medicaid wants the risk transferred off of the provider's books and on to the self-insurance fund. Mr. Diaczyk testified as to the differing objectives of Medicaid and GAAP. Medicaid is concerned with reimbursing costs, and is therefore especially sensitive regarding the overstatement of costs. Medicaid wants to reimburse a provider for only those costs that have actually been paid. GAAP, on the other hand, is about report presentation for a business entity and is concerned chiefly with avoiding the understatement of expenses and overstatement of revenue. Under GAAP, an entity may accrue a cost and not pay it for years. In the case of a contingent liability, the entity may book the cost and never actually pay it. Mr. Diaczyk described the self-insurance and liquidation provisions of 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100, "Special treatment of certain accrued costs." The federal rule essentially allows accrued costs to be claimed for reimbursement, but only if they are "liquidated timely." Subsection (c)(2)(viii) of the rule provides that accrued liability related to contributions to a self-insurance program must be liquidated within 75 days after the close of the cost reporting period. To obtain reimbursement, Petitioners would have had to liquidate their accrued liability for GL/PL insurance within 75 days of the end of the audit period. Mr. Diaczyk also noted that, even if the 75-day requirement were not applicable, the general requirement of Section 2305.2 of the Manual would apply. Section 2305.2 requires that all short-term liabilities must be liquidated within one year after the end of the cost reporting period in which the liability is incurred, with some exceptions not applicable in this case. Petitioners' accrued liability for general and professional liability insurance was not funded or liquidated for more than one year after the cost reporting period. It was a contingent liability that might never be paid. Therefore, Mr. Diaczyk stated, reimbursement was not in keeping with Medicaid's goal to reimburse providers for actual paid costs, not for potential costs that may never be paid. Petitioners responded that their accrued liabilities constituted non-current liabilities, items that under normal circumstances will not be liquidated within one year. Mr. Parnell testified that there is great variation in how long it takes for a general and professional liability claim against a nursing home to mature to the point of payment to the claimant. He testified that a "short" timeline would be from two to four years, and that some claims may take from eight to eleven years to mature. From these facts, Petitioners urge that 42 C.F.R. Section 413.100 and Section 2305.2 of the Manual are inapplicable to their situation. As to Section 2305.2 in particular, Petitioners point to Section 2305.A, the general liquidation of liabilities provision to which Section 2305.2 provides the exceptions discussed above. The last sentence of Section 2305.A provides that, where the liability is not liquidated within one year, or does not qualify under the exceptions set forth in Sections 2305.1 and 2305.2, then "the cost incurred for the related goods and services is not allowable in the cost reporting period when the liability is incurred, but is allowable in the cost reporting period when the liquidation of the liability occurs." (Emphasis added.) Petitioners argue that the underscored language supports the Medicare/Medicaid distinction urged by Mr. Swindling. In its usual Medicare retroactive reimbursement context, Section 2305.2 would operate merely to postpone reimbursement until the cost period in which the liability is liquidated. Applied to this Medicaid prospective reimbursement situation, Section 2305.2 would unfairly deny Petitioners any reimbursement at all by excluding the liability from the base rate. Mr. Diaczyk explained that, where the Medicaid rules address a category of costs, the allowable costs in a provider's cost report are limited to those defined as allowable by the applicable rules. He stated that if there is a policy in the Manual that addresses an item of cost, the provider must use the Manual provision; the provider cannot use GAAP to determine that cost item. In this case, Mr. Diaczyk agreed with Ms. Smiley as to the applicable rules and the disallowance of Petitioners' contingent liability costs. According to Mr. Diaczyk, GAAP may be used only if no provisions farther up the chain of the "hierarchy" are applicable. In this case, the Medicaid rules specifically addressed the categories of cost in question, meaning that GAAP did not apply. Under cross-examination, Mr. Diaczyk testified that the accrual made by Petitioners in their cost reports would be considered actual costs under GAAP, "[a]ssuming that they had an actuarial study done to come up with the $1.7 million that they accrued." Mr. Diaczyk acknowledged that AICPA Audit and Accounting Guide for Health Care Organizations, Section 8.05, does not limit the provider to an actuarial study in estimating losses from asserted and unasserted claims. See Finding of Fact 49, supra, for text of Section 8.05. Mr. Diaczyk pointed out that the problem in this case was that Petitioners gave AHCA no documentation to support their estimate of the accrual, despite the auditor's request that Petitioners provide documentation to support their costs. Mr. Diaczyk's testimony raised a parallel issue to Mr. Swindling's concern that Medicaid's prospective targeting system permanently excludes any item of cost not included in the base rate. Mr. Swindling solved the apparent contradiction in employing Medicare rules in the Medicaid scenario by applying GAAP principles. Responding to the criticism that GAAP could provide a windfall to Petitioners by reimbursing them for accrued costs that might never actually result in payment, Mr. Swindling responded that GAAP principles would adjust the cost for contingent liabilities going forward, "truing up" the financial statements in subsequent reporting periods. This truing up process would have the added advantage of obviating the agency's requirement for firm documentation of the initial accrual. Mr. Swindling's "truing up" scenario under GAAP would undoubtedly correct Petitioners' financial statements. However, Mr. Swindling did not explain how the truing up of the financial statements would translate into a correction of Petitioners' reimbursement rate.12 If costs excluded from the base rate cannot be added to future rate adjustments, then costs incorrectly included in the base rate would also presumably remain in the facility's rate going forward.13 Thus, Mr. Swindling's point regarding the self-correcting nature of the GAAP reporting procedures did not really respond to AHCA's concerns about Petitioners' receiving a windfall in their base rate by including the accrual for contingent liabilities. On April 19, 2005, Petitioners entered into a captive insurance program. Petitioners' captive is a claims-made GL/PL policy with limits of $1 million per occurrence and $3 million in the aggregate. Under the terms of the policy, "claims-made" refers to a claim made by Petitioners to the insurance company, not a claim made by a nursing home resident alleging damages. The effective date of the policy is from April 21, 2005, through April 21, 2006, with a retroactive feature that covers any claims for incidents back to June 29, 2002, a date that corresponds to Petitioners' first day of operation and participation in the Medicaid program. The Petitioners' paid $3,376,906 for this policy on April 22, 2005. Mr. Parnell testified that April 2005 was the earliest time that the 14 Palm Gardens facilities could have established this form of insurance program. In summary, the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the contingent liabilities established that Petitioners took over the 14 Palm Gardens facilities after the bankruptcy of the previous owner. Petitioners were faced with the virtual certainty of substantial GL/PL expenses in operating the facilities, and also faced with a Florida nursing home environment market in which commercial professional liability insurance was virtually unavailable. Lacking loss history information from their bankrupt predecessor, Petitioners were unable to self-insure or establish a captive program until 2005. Petitioners understood that if they did not include their GL/PL expenses in their initial cost report, those expenses would be excluded from the base rate and could never be recovered. Petitioners' leases for the facilities required them to fund a self-insurance reserve at a per bed minimum amount of $1,750. Based on the AON studies and the general state of the industry at the time, Petitioners' accountant concluded that, under GAAP principles, $1,750 per bed was a reasonable, conservative estimate of Petitioners' GL/PL loss contingency exposure for the audit period.14 Based on all the evidence, it is found that Petitioners' cost estimate was reasonable and should be accepted by the agency. Petitioners included their GL/PL loss contingency expenses in their initial Medicaid cost report, placing those expenses under a heading indicating the purchase of insurance from a third party. The notes to Petitioners' audited financial statements stated that the facilities were "essentially self- insured." These factors led AHCA to request documentation of Petitioners' self-insurance. Petitioners conceded that they were not self-insured and carried no liability insurance aside from the Mature Care policies. The parties had little dispute as to the facts summarized above. The parties also agreed as to the applicability of the "hierarchy" by which allowable costs are determined. Their disagreement rests solely on the manner in which the principles of the hierarchy should be applied to the unique situation presented by Petitioners in these cases.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that AHCA enter a final order that allows Petitioners' accrual of expenses for contingent liability under the category of general and professional liability ("GL/PL") insurance, and that disallows the Mature Care policy premium amounts in excess of the policy limits, prorated for a nine- month period. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of October, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of October, 2008.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to a refund from the State of Florida Group Health Self Insurance Plan of pre-tax supplemental insurance premiums in the amount of $47.46 or $47.45 a month that were deducted from his pay for the 2007 and 2008 insurance plan years.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Detrick Murray ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Murray") was, at all times relevant to this proceeding, employed by the Florida Department of Corrections. As a state employee, he was given the option to participate in a pre-tax supplemental accident/disability insurance plan. Benefits, including insurance plans, are administered by a private contractor, Convergys, through a project called "People First," operated on behalf of Respondent, Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurance ("Respondent or the Division"). During the 2005 open enrollment period for the 2006 plan year, Mr. Murray elected to participate in a state- sponsored supplemental/accidental policy offered by Colonial Insurance Company ("Colonial"). The reverse side of the enrollment provided the following information and instructions: The enrollment form must be used to enroll in or change coverages. No changes will be accepted by e-mail or letter. Enrolling in a supplemental insurance plan, or changing options, does not automatically stop other coverages you currently have. To stop an existing coverage, you must place an "S" in the box provided for that Plan on the front of this form (Part 1). Only complete Part 2 on the front of this form if you wish to stop plans currently not offered. The Supplemental Enrollment Form must be submitted to the People First Service Center. Enrollment changes will not occur if forms and/or applications and the Supplemental Company Application are submitted directly to the supplemental insurance company. If you cancel or do not enroll in supplemental insurance, you will not be able to enroll again until the next annual open enrollment period, unless you experience a Qualifying Status Change. Supplemental premiums are deducted on a pre- tax basis. It is your responsibility to ensure that your enrollment selections are in effect. Check your payroll warrants to ensure that your deductions properly reflect your selections. Contact the People First Service Center immediately if these deductions are not correct. I understand my enrollment and/or changes will be effective the first of the month following a full payroll deduction. I also understand my elections are IRREVOCABLE until the next annual open enrollment period, unless I have a Qualifying Status Change as defined by the Federal Internal Revenue Code and/or the Florida Administrative Code. I understand that I must request such changes within thirty-one (31) calendar days of the Qualifying Status Change. The open enrollment period for the next year, the 2007 plan year, began on September 19, 2006, and ended on October 18, 2006. On October 14, 2006, Mr. Murray notified Colonial that he wanted to cancel the supplemental insurance for the 2007 plan year. He used a Colonial Request for Services form and sent it to the Colonial Processing Center in Columbia, South Carolina. In a letter dated February 14, 2007, Colonial acknowledged receiving Mr. Murray's request to cancel the insurance during the 2006 enrollment period, and informed him of its receipt of an "overpayment" of $47.46 monthly beginning January 1, 2007. Colonial directed Mr. Murray to contact his personnel officer "which will then work through the Division to issue your refund." After the open enrollment period ended, Mr. Murray had also contacted People First on November 14, 2006, and gave notice of his attempt to cancel with Colonial. He was informed that Colonial had not informed People First of the cancellation. Mr. Murray contacted People First again on January 29, 2007, questioning the continued payroll deductions and requesting a refund, as Colonial had suggested. He was told that he would have to cancel with People First during the open enrollment period, but he could send a letter of appeal to try to get a refund of premiums and try to cancel sooner. Despite repeated contacts, requests for refunds, and appeals to People First during 2007, Mr. Murray continued to have premiums for supplemental insurance deducted from his pay check. Ultimately, the Division denied his appeal. Although Mr. Murray was trying to get a refund for 2007 payroll deductions, he again failed to notify People First to cancel the insurance during the open enrollment period between September 17, 2007, and October 19, 2007, for the 2008 plan year. There is no evidence that Mr. Murray had a qualifying status change, as required by federal and state law, that would have permitted him to cancel the insurance at any time other than during open enrollment periods for the 2007 and 2008 plan years. The enrollment period for the 2009 plan year began on September 22, 2008, and ended on October 17, 2008. On September 24, 2008, Mr. Murray cancelled the supplemental insurance for the 2009 plan year by making a telephone call to a People First representative. In a late-filed exhibit produced by a manager for Convergys at the request of Petitioner, the Division showed that payments were made to Colonial to insure Mr. Murray through November 24, 2008. Sandi Wade, the Division's benefits administrator, noted that Colonial should not have canceled Mr. Murray's insurance policy. Colonial had no authority to send the letter of February 14, 2007, incorrectly telling Mr. Murray he was entitled to a refund. Ms. Wade's observations prompted Mr. Murray to question what, if any, remedies he might have with regard to Colonial's error. That issue is not and cannot be considered in this proceeding. In the absence of evidence that the Division or its agents were notified to cancel the supplemental insurance during open enrollment periods for 2007 and 2008, or based on a qualifying status change, Petitioner's request for a refund of premiums must be denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Management Services, Division of State Group Insurnace, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Detrick Murray, a refund of his accident/disability insurance coverage premiums paid in 2007 and 2008. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Sonja P. Mathews, Esquire Department of Management Services Office of the General Counsel 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 260 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Detrick Murray 4370 Northwest 187th Street Miami, Florida 33055 John Brenneis, General Counsel Division of State Group Insurance Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
The Issue Whether Respondents violated various provisions of the Florida Insurance Code, and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them, if any.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent The Administrators Corporation (hereinafter "TAC") has been an authorized administrator, and Respondent Charles N. Zalis (hereinafter "Zalis") has been licensed or eligible for licensure as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent, and a legal expense insurance sales representative in the State of Florida. Zalis is the chief executive officer of TAC. TAC is not licensed in Florida as an insurer. An authorized administrator in Florida may engage in the solicitation, negotiation, transaction and/or sale of insurance in Florida if such activity takes place pursuant to an agreement between the authorized administrator and an authorized insurer. Life and Health Insurance Company of America (hereinafter "Life & Health"), which is not a party to this administrative proceeding, is an authorized insurer in Florida. On April 13, 1988, TAC entered into a contract with Life & Health to market and service group health insurance. The term of that contract was for four years and one month. Life & Health attempted to terminate its Administrator Agreement with TAC by letter dated March 16, 1989, effective immediately. The date on which the responsibilities under that Administrator Agreement terminated, if ever, is an issue in dispute between Life & Health and TAC. The Department takes no position on that issue. That issue is the subject of a civil lawsuit filed in Broward County, between Life & Health and TAC, which is currently being litigated. Although Life & Health's original position was that the contract between it and TAC terminated as of March 16, 1989, that position apparently changed because Life & Health continued paying claims up to July 1, 1989. TAC's position was that Life & Health's responsibilities under that contract did not terminate until September 26, 1989, when George Washington, an authorized group health insurance carrier in Florida, agreed to assume the risk for the block of business retroactive to July 1, 1989. TAC could have obtained a replacement carrier earlier than September 26, 1989, if the Department had advised TAC and Zalis as to the procedure involved to allow Summit Homes, an authorized property and casualty insurer, to broaden the scope of its certificate of authority to include group health insurance. The simple procedure could have been accomplished in as little as 24 to 48 hours. A group health insurance carrier remains on the risk to its policyholders until there has been a valid cancellation or termination of that coverage. In the pending Circuit Court litigation between Life & Health and TAC, the validity of the termination or cancellation and the date of same are ultimate issues in that law suit and have not yet been determined by the Court. On March 27, 1989, Life & Health sent a letter to agents informing them of its termination of its relationship with TAC and that it would not accept any new business written after March 16, 1989. The evidence in this cause, however, indicates that Life & Health did continue to accept new business after that date. The Department became aware of the dispute between Life & Health and TAC on June 8, 1989. The Department knew as of July 12, 1989, that TAC was continuing to write business on Life & Health "paper." At some point after the attempted March 16, 1989, termination of the contract by Life & Health, TAC and Life & Health informally agreed to a July 1, 1989, date after which Life & Health would no longer be responsible for any claims and TAC would have a replacement insurer in place to take over the block of business. That agreement was based upon TAC and Life & Health each agreeing to cooperate with each other and to take certain actions to facilitate the transfer of the book of business. Both the Department and the Circuit Court were aware of the informal agreement whereby Life & Health agreed to remain on the risk for the block of business at least through July 1, 1989, and Zalis and TAC would issue no further policies on Life & Health "paper" and would not remain involved in the processing or payment of claims after July 1, 1989. Prior to July 12, 1989, those matters required to take place in connection with the July 1, 1989, "cutoff" date had not been accomplished, and Zalis and TAC continued writing new business on Life & Health "paper" believing that Life & Health was still legally responsible. Zalis informed the Department's investigator on July 12, 1989, that he was writing and that he intended to continue to write new business on Life & Health "paper." No evidence was presented to show that the Department notified Zalis or TAC that they could not do so, and the Department took no action to stop that activity. Additionally, Life & Health took no action to enjoin TAC or Zalis from writing new business on Life & Health "paper." The evidence does suggest that Life & Health may have continued to accept the benefits and liabilities. The premiums for policies written by TAC on Life & Health "paper" after July 1, 1989, were not forwarded to Life & Health; rather, they were retained by TAC in a trust account. Zalis and TAC offered to deposit those monies with the Circuit Court in which the litigation between TAC and Life & Health was pending or to transmit those monies to the Department to insure that the monies would be available for the payment of claims. Pursuant to an agreement with the Department, the monies representing those premium payments were transmitted to the Department On September 26, 1989, George Washington Insurance Company, an authorized health insurance company in the State of Florida, agreed to take over the block of business from Life & Health, retroactive to July 1, 1989. Life & Health, however, had not yet signed the assumption agreement to transfer its responsibility to George Washington Insurance Company as of the time of the final hearing in this cause. TAC and Zalis did not place any Florida insurance business with any companies not authorized to do business in Florida. Respondent Zalis has been in the insurance business for 26 years and enjoys a good reputation for honesty and integrity. Zalis and TAC have never had prior administrative action taken against them. As of the date of the final hearing in this matter, there had been no Circuit Court determination of the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of Life & Health's termination of the Administrators Agreement nor of the date of that termination, if any.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents not guilty of the allegations contained in the Order to Show Cause and dismissing the Order to Show Cause filed against them. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-5981 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 6-9, 14-17, 20, 21, and 25-27 have been adopted either in substance or verbatim in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 4 and 5 have been rejected as not constituting findings of fact but rather as constituting conclusions of law or argument of counsel. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 10, 11, 13, and 22 have been rejected as being unnecessary for determination of the issues in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 12 and 19 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 18, 23, and 24 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the evidence in this cause. Respondents' proposed findings of fact numbered 1-17 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Peter D. Ostreich, Esquire Office of Treasurer and Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Jerome H. Shevin, Esquire Wallace, Engels, Pertnoy, Martin, & Solowsky, P.A. CenTrust Financial Center 21st Floor 100 Southeast 2nd Street Miami, Florida 33131 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Davis, Marks & Rutledge, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the administrative complaint, and, if so, what action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Peter Gregory Santisteban (Respondent) was licensed as a general lines agent by the State of Florida. At all times material hereto, Southern Associates Insurance Agency (Southern Associates) was a licensed general lines insurance agency by the State of Florida. Southern Associates was incorporated. At all times material hereto, Respondent was the owner, sole stockholder, president, and corporate director of Southern Associates. At all times material hereto, Respondent had sole responsibility for the financial affairs of Southern Associates and had sole signatory authority on Southern Associates’ checking account. AAPCO is a premium finance company. At all times material hereto, Respondent and AAPCO had an arrangement in which policies written by Respondent, which needed financing, would be financed by AAPCO. The arrangement between Respondent and AAPCO was executed as follows: Respondent maintained AAPCO drafts and had signatory authority on APPCO drafts. If a client needed financing, Respondent would receive a down payment from the client on the insurance premium. The down payment was approximately thirty-three percent of the premium. Respondent would receive a commission of approximately fifteen percent. His commission would be taken from the down payment. Respondent would execute an APPCO draft payable to the insurance company for the total premium less his commission. Respondent would forward the down payment less his commission (net) to AAPCO, the premium finance company. In or around 1990 or 1991, the execution of the arrangement changed in that, instead of writing a check to AAPCO for each insured’s net, Respondent would use transmittal forms which permitted Respondent to write one check for the net of multiple insureds. On or about March 25, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1503 from the account of Southern Associates payable to AAPCO in the amount of $1,215.14 for payment of multiple nets due to AAPCO. The check was deposited in the account of AAPCO but was returned for insufficient funds. On or about May 26, 1994, Respondent issued check number 1517 from the account of Southern Associates payable to AAPCO in the amount of $2,706.73 for payment of multiple nets due to AAPCO. The check was deposited in the account of AAPCO but was returned due to the account being closed. On or about July 13, 1994, AAPCO made demand for Respondent to pay the moneys due it. Respondent did not and has not paid AAPCO the moneys due. The total amount owed by Respondent to AAPCO is $3,921.87. Respondent attempted to reach an agreement with AAPCO wherein he would make monthly payments until the moneys due had been paid in full. AAPCO rejected Respondent’s offer and instead requested that Respondent make a lump sum payment of $2,000 and pay the remainder in monthly installments. Due to financial difficulty, Respondent was unable to agree to AAPCO’s payment option.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order Suspending the license of Peter Gregory Santisteban, as a general lines agent, for nine months; and Conditioning the reinstatement of his license after the expiration of the suspension upon his payment of $3,921.87 to AAPCO. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of February, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Bob Prentiss, Esquire Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Miguel San Pedro, Esquire 825 Southeast Bayshore Drive Suite 1541 Miami, Florida 33131 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Daniel Y. Sumner General Counsel The Capitol, LL-26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
The Issue Whether proposed amendments to Rule 4-7.009, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Specifically at issue in this proceeding are the proposed amendments to Rule 4-7.009 which restrict, under certain circumstances, compensation paid to sellers of credit insurance products and which require premium refunds to some purchasers of credit insurance.
Findings Of Fact Credit insurance is a form of group insurance marketed and sold to consumers by creditors or, in the case of motor vehicle financing, by vehicle dealers. The insurance can be purchased by a debtor at the time the debtor enters into a loan agreement. Credit insurance is purchased by debtors as protection against risk of loss caused by unexpected events occurring during the term of the insurance contract. Credit insurance provides for the payment of the balance of the debt upon the death or disability of the insured debtor. Otherwise stated, the benefit of such insurance to the debtor is the assurance that, if the debtor becomes unable, due to death or disability, to make the required periodic payments, the insurer will pay off the balance of a loan or other debt obligation. Sellers of credit insurance products are compensated in the form of commissions paid to sellers by insurers. Additional compensation is periodically paid by some insurers to sellers based upon the profitability of each seller's line of business. Beginning in late 1990, the Department of Insurance ("Department") proposed amendments to administrative rules relating to credit life and credit health and accident insurance products. The Petitioners have challenged the provisions of the proposed rule restricting the level of compensation paid to the sellers of credit insurance products and requiring insurers to make "experience refunds". As set forth in the Department's Notice of Change, published in the November 27, 1991 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly (Vol. 17, No. 48), the proposed rule amendment provides in relevant part as follows: 4-7.009 Determination of Reasonableness of Benefits in Relation to Premium Charge General Standard. Under the Credit Insurance Law, benefits provided by credit insurance policies must be reasonable in relation to the premium charged. In determining whether benefits are reasonable in relation to premium, the Department shall consider loss experience, allocation of expenses, risk and contingency margins, and policy acquisition costs. This requirement is satisfied if the premium rate charged develops or may be reasonably expected to develop a loss ratio of not less than 1. (a) 55% for credit life insurance and 2. (b) 50% for credit accident and health insurance, and either the insurer does not pay compensation in excess of 30% of the net direct written premium based upon the applicable prima facie rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011, or the insurer demonstrates to the satisfaction of the Department that payment of compensation in excess of said 30% is actuarially sound. "Compensation" means money or anything else of value paid by the insurer and/or by any reinsurer to any agent, producer, creditor, or affiliated body. On the basis of relevant experience, uUse of rates not greater than those contained in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 ("prima facie rates") shall be deemed currently reasonable premium rates reasonably expected to develope the required loss ratio, subject to a later determination of experience refunds, if any, as described herein. An insurer may only file and use rates with such forms which are greater than the prima facie rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 upon a satisfactory showing to the Department Commissioner that the use of such rates will not result on a statewide basis for that insurer of a ratio of claims incurred to premiums earned of less than the required loss ratio. Furthermore, the extent to which an actual rate is greater than that set forth may not exceed the difference between (a) claims which may be reasonably expected and (b) the product of the required loss ratio and the prima facie rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 for the coverage being provided. (2) The Department Commissioner shall, on a triennial basis, review the loss ratio standards set forth in subsection (1), above, and the prima facie rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 and determine therefrom the rate of expected claims on a statewide basis, compare such rate of expected claims with the rate of claims for the preceding triennium, determined from the incurred claims and earned premiums at prima facie rates reported in the annual statement supplement, and adopt the adjusted actual new statewide prima facie rates for Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 to be used by insurers during the next triennium. The new rates will be set at levels that would have produced the loss ratios set forth in subsection (1), above. To make this comparison and redetermination, insurers shall report in the annual statement supplement format, each year, claims and earned premiums, separately, for business written with premiums based on Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011. * * * Insurers will calculate a dollar amount of loading each year based upon the insurer's earned credit life and credit accident and health premium in this state for the same year. Loading will be calculated as 45% of earned premium for life insurance and 50% of earned premium for credit accident and health insurance. For this calculation, earned premium shall be based on the rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011. Insurers shall calculate an Experience Refund Amount each year for credit life and credit accident and health insurance written in this state after the effective date of this rule. Experience Refunds can be positive or negative. Positive Experience Refunds are to be refunded in the following manner: Experience refunds are to be allocated to accounts which have positive Experience Refund Amounts in proportion to the ratio of each account's refund amount to the total of all positive refund amounts. For the purpose of this allocation, all individual policies are to be treated as one account. The Experience Refund Amount allocated to a particular account is to be refunded to all certificate holders or individual policyholders of such account in proportion to the premiums earned for each certificate holder or individual policyholder to the total of all premiums earned for such account. Earned premiums for Experience Refund purposes are to be equal to paid premiums for the calendar year less unearned premium reserves at the end of the calendar year plus unearned premiums at the beginning of the calendar year. Unearned premium reserves are to be calculated pro rata. Credit policies issued on a non-contributory basis are excluded. Non-contributory means that individual insureds pay no part of the insurance premium. Premiums are paid by the policyholder out of policyholder funds. Individual credit policies issued on a participating basis are to be excluded. All new loans insured after the effective date of this rule are subject to the Experience Refund calculation and distribution, if any. Individual refunds of less than $10 do not have to be made. Experience Refunds are to be determined for each calendar year as follows: Earned Premium, less Loading as determined above, less Incurred claims, less The sum of any carry forwards for the three previous years. An insurer that uses rates which are 10% or more below the rates set forth in Rules 4-7.010 and 4-7.011 shall not be required to calculate or make an Experience Refund. The Florida Bankers Association ("FBA") is the trade association of the Florida banking industry, many of whom sell credit insurance to their customers. The Florida Automobile Dealers Association ("FADA") is a trade association of franchised new car and truck dealers, approximately 65% of whom sell credit insurance. The Florida Recreational Vehicle Dealers Trade Association ("FRVDTA") is a trade association of recreational vehicle dealers, approximately 35% of whom sell credit insurance. The FBA, the FADA, and the FRVDTA are substantially affected by the proposed rule amendment at issue in this case. Specifically the FBA, the FADA, and the FRVDTA are substantially affected by the proposed regulation of compensation paid to sellers of credit insurance products and by the proposed requirement that, under some circumstances, refunds be made to credit insurance purchasers. The Consumer Credit Insurance Association ("CCIA") is a trade association of credit insurance companies, at least 50 of whom sell credit insurance in Florida. The CCIA is substantially affected by the proposed rule amendment provision related to premium refunds to some insureds. Credit insurance is priced and sold without regard to sex or age of the debtor. There is little underwriting of credit insurance risks. Due primarily to the age of the population and the effect of mandated coverages, Florida's credit insurance claims are higher than in other states. There are currently in excess of eighty million credit insurance policies in force in the United States. Credit insurance is sold under master policies issued by insurers to producers, such as banks and vehicle dealers. Producers sell the insurance product and maintain records of the credit insurance purchasers, who hold certificates issued under each master policy. Credit insurance premiums are based upon the amount financed by the debtor and are calculated according to rates established on a statewide basis by the Department. Credit insurers may not charge more than the prima facie rates for credit insurance, therefore, there is no benefit to consumers to "shop around" for credit insurance. Although credit insurers are not prohibited from charging less than the prima facie rates, there is no evidence that any insurer charges less than the Department's adopted rates. Since 1982, the Department-approved prima facie credit life premium rate was $.60 for every $100 financed. The rate was based on the Department's determination that a $.60 prima facie rate would result in insurers paying out approximately 60% of premium dollars in claims paid to insureds, and that a 60% "loss ratio" was reasonable. The "loss ratio" is the fraction of premium dollars paid out in claims. The $.60 prima facie rate did not yield a 60% loss ratio. The loss ratios for some insurers was substantially less that 60%. On September 1, 1991, the Department reduced the prima facie credit life and credit health and accident rates. In establishing new prima facie rates, the Department established a 55% loss ratio for credit life insurance and a 50% loss ratio for credit disability. The revised prima facie rates are based upon data from calendar years 1986, 1987 and 1988. Such data includes information related to paid claims, earned premium, and insurer administrative overhead expenses. The setting of such rates is an actuarial exercise intended to provide a reasonable projection of premium rates and loss ratios. There is no evidence that the revised prima facie rates result in premiums which are excessive in relationship to the amount of the loans insured. The revised prima facie rates are reasonably expected to yield the revised loss ratios. The rule provides a triennial review mechanism to ascertain whether the expected loss ratios are being met and to adjust prima facie rates if such is indicated. The review is a reasonable method of assuring that such loss ratios are met. Currently, commissions are paid by insurers to producers (i.e. banks and dealers) as compensation for selling the product. The amount of commission is determined by agreement between the insurer and producer. Commissions for the sale of credit insurance vary widely and, in some cases (generally involving the sale of credit insurance related to automobile purchases) may be as high as 60% of the premium paid by the consumer. In addition to payment of commissions, some insurers retrospectively compensate producers by periodically paying an amount based upon the profitability of each producer's business. Compensation levels largely determine which credit insurer's product a producer chooses to sell. The proposed rule limits total compensation levels, absent specific authorization by the Department, to 30% of the net direct written premium based upon the applicable prima facie rates. Compensation levels have no impact on the premiums charged to consumers purchasing credit insurance. Premiums charged are based on the Department's prima facie rates. The proposed rule permits a credit insurance company to exceed the 30% compensation restriction where the insurer can establish that the payment of compensation in excess of the 30% is "actuarially sound". The determination of whether payment of commission in excess of 30% is "actuarially sound" is left to the discretion of the Department. There is no statutory, rule, or commonly accepted definition of the term, although the Department's actuary stated that a product determined to be "actuarially sound" would be a "self-supporting" product, either profitable or "breaking even". He further opined that he would consider investment income in a determination of actuarial soundness, although the proposed rule does not require such consideration. The Department's purpose in enacting the proposed compensation restriction was to protect insurers from insolvency and financial instability. The commission restriction was not designed to protect against excessive charges in relation to the amount of the loan, duplication or overlapping of insurance, or the loss of a borrower's funds by short term cancellation of a policy. The commission restriction was not intended to, and will not, ensure that the loss ratios deemed reasonable by the Department will be met. In adopting a 30% compensation restriction, the Department calculated that, assuming the 55% loss ratio was met, $.55 of each premium dollar would be paid in claims. The Department assumed that $.15 of each premium dollar would cover overhead expenses and profit. According to the Department, the remaining $.30 is the most an insurer could pay as compensation to the producers without affecting the solvency of the insurer. In calculating the commission restriction, the Department did not consider the effect of an insurer's investment income on the ability to pay commission. There is no evidence that payment of commissions in excess of 30% of net direct written premiums has adversely affected the solvency of any credit insurer doing business in Florida. There is, in fact, no history of credit insurer insolvency in Florida. Nationwide, there has been little problem of insolvency in the credit insurer business, with no more than four insurers having become insolvent. In each of those cases, the insolvency resulted from poor management of assets, and was not related to payment of excess commissions to producers. The Department asserts that, absent such restrictions, insurers will pay excessive compensation in order to compete for producers, and that such excess compensation, coupled with administrative expenses and a 55% loss ratio, will threaten the solvency of the companies. The assertion is not supported by the greater weight of credible evidence. The proposed rule also requires insurers, under some circumstances, to make experience-based refunds to credit insurance purchasers. In determining whether a refund is required, an insurer first calculates whether the insurer has met or exceeded the 55% loss ratio for the prior year. If the loss ratio is met or exceeded, no refunds are required. If an insurer determines that the 55% loss ratio was not met, the insurer calculates the difference between targeted 55% loss ratio and the actual percentage of premium dollars paid out in claims. The insurer then identifies each producer account which had a loss ratio of less than 55%, determines the identity and location of each certificate holder (insured) in each producer's account, and makes a refund to each identified certificate holder. Individual refunds of less than $10 to an individual consumer are not required. The proposed rule permits insurers to carry excess losses forward for a period of three year, to offset years when the targeted loss ratio is not met. However, such excess losses may not be carried forward beyond the three year period. Whether a consumer receives a refund is unrelated to the premium paid by the consumer. An individual consumer ("A") purchasing a car and credit insurance at Dealer "A" may receive a refund, while a Consumer "B" purchasing the same car and credit insurance from Dealer "B" may not receive a refund, if Dealer A's line of business with the insurer meets the target loss ratio and Dealer B's line of business with the same insurer fails to meet the loss ratio. The benefit of the credit insurance is the assurance that, under certain conditions, the insurer will pay off the balance of a loan or other debt obligation. If Consumer A receives a refund and Consumer B does not, Consumer A pays more than Consumer B for the same insurance protection. The Department's purpose in enacting the proposed experience refund was to ensure that the 55% loss ratio would be met. However, the experience refund provision, combined with the three year limit for charging off excess losses, will eventually result in loss ratios which will exceed the 55% ratio which the Department has determined to be reasonable. There is no need for experience refunds when the prima facie rates established by the Department are appropriately set. Such rates are designed to produce an acceptable loss ratio. It is reasonable to believe that the Department's revised prima facie rates will result in acceptable loss ratios. The refund proposal was not designed to protect against excessive charges in relation to the amount of the loan, duplication or overlapping of insurance, or the loss of a borrower's funds by short term cancellation of a policy. The proposed rule provides that an insurer charging a premium based on rates at least 10% below the prima facie rates are not required to calculate the experience refund. There is no credible rationale supporting the use of 10% as the threshold under which an insurer escapes the refund calculation, although the resulting loss ratio likely approaches the 60% loss ratio suggested by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners. Of the actuaries testifying at hearing, one opined that a rate 10% less than the prima facie rate was viable, the other opined that it was not. Because the Department's revised prima facie rates are reasonably calculated to result in a 55% loss ratio, an insurer charging less than the prima facie rate will likely exceed the 55% loss ratio. In connection with the final version of the proposed rule, the Department did not prepare an economic impact statement. The Department did not estimate the costs of insurer compliance with the refund provisions. The expense required of insurers in order to establish experience refund payment systems is significant. Information management systems will require extensive modification to permit such data to be maintained. Substantial amounts of data, which is not currently provided to insurers, must be collected and accurately maintained to permit refunds to be made. Such costs were not included in administrative expenses considered by the Department when the revised prima facie rates were established. Presently, credit insurers maintain limited data related to insureds purchasing credit insurance in connection with installment loans. Although such data may be initially collected by producers, insurers are typically provided only with the name of the debtor and loan number. Data is transmitted to insurers either electronically or through paper files. In either case, data must be converted to usable form by insurers. In approximately seventy percent of credit insurance business, addresses of insureds are not transmitted to insurers. There is no credible evidence that current addresses of insureds are continuously maintained by either insurer or producer in installment debt insurance, since there is little need to question original data as long as periodic payments are being timely made. In a form of credit insurance known as "monthly outstanding balance" insurance, bulk accounts are received by insurers, who generally does not receive either names or addresses of insureds. Consumers whose monthly outstanding balance indebtedness is insured are more likely to provide producer/creditors with current addresses, but such data is not provided to insurers. As to credit insurers, although most insurers currently process refund checks, the additional expense of establishing or modifying systems capable of compliance with the proposed refund requirement could amount to as much as five percent of each premium dollar. One bank official estimated that, as to his bank, the expense of complying with the refund provisions would include an initial cost of $1.1 million and an annual cost of $350,000 to $500,000. A credit insurance information systems and processing executive estimated that the 31 producers writing business for his company would incur costs of $1,860,000 to comply with the rule, and that his own company's costs would be in the range of $4-5 million. The Department suggested that, rather than modify existing mainframe computer systems, such data could be maintained by insurers on personal computers and microcomputer networks. The Department asserted that such systems would be less expensive and require less modification than the process outlined by industry representatives. However, there is credible testimony establishing that significant resources would be involved in determining whether such conversion to microcomputers would be feasible or warranted. In any event, there is no evidence that such conversion could be accomplished in a timely manner permitting the insurers to comply with the proposed rule requirements. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that the expenses estimated by the industry representatives are reasonable based upon the existing management information systems maintained by the industry.
