The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent's application for renewal of his certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor should be granted. Preliminary to that determination is the issue of whether Petitioner has failed to pay in excess of $10,000 in unemployment compensation taxes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Ernest J. Grant, a farm labor contractor and holder of a certificate of registration issued by Petitioner at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Respondent's latest certificate of registration was issued by Petitioner on December 14, 1988, and expired on July 18, 1989. On November 28, 1989, Respondent applied for renewal of his certificate of registration. By letter dated January 5, 1990, Petitioner requested Respondent to contact Petitioner'srepresentative within 14 days regarding Respondent's nonpayment of unemployment compensation taxes totalling in excess of $10,000. Petitioner's correspondence further stated that applicable Florida law prevented the renewal of a certificate of registration absent Petitioner's satisfaction that the applicant for renewal is compliant with Petitioner's administrative rules regulating farm labor contractors. Petitioner's rules require compliance by farm labor contractors with applicable rules and statutes, both state and federal, relating to the payment of unemployment compensation taxes. Respondent's history of nonpayment of unemployment compensation taxes to Petitioner is lengthy, dating back to 1978 when his tax account was established with Petitioner's Bureau of Tax. Numerous checks written by Respondent for payments for previous taxes to Petitioner have been dishonored upon presentment for payment. Petitioner's attempts to resolve Respondent's tax payment deficiencies through the establishment of "time payment accounts" for the benefit of Respondent have failed or yielded only marginal results as a result of Respondent's noncompliance with those agreements. Respondent's last token payment on such an agreement in the amount of $50 was received by Petitioner on January 11, 1985. Respondent has made no contributions for unemployment compensation taxes for the previous 18 calendar year quarters of tax liability. Respondent presently owes Petitioner $10,642.22 in unpaid unemployment compensation taxes; $6,128.36 in interest; $85 in unpaid penalties; $25 in service fees for bad checks; and $28 in filing fees. The total amount currently owed by Respondent to Petitioner is $16,928.58.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Respondent's application for renewal of his certificate of registration as a farm labor contractor. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Ernest J. Grant 204 Sally Blvd P.O. Box 1222 Bowling Green, FL 33834 Moses E. Williams, Esq. Suite 117 Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Hugo Menendez, Secretary 206 Berkeley Building 2590 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152 Stephen Barron, Esq. 131 Montgomery Building 2563 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, FL 32399-2152
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's Certificate of Registration may lawfully be revoked.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.21. The Department has the responsibility of administering the revenue laws of the state, including the laws relating to the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use tax, pursuant to Chapter 212. Spin and Marty is a Florida corporation doing business as Crabbit's Pub whose principal address is 10513 Spring Hill Drive, Spring Hill, Florida. Spin and Marty is a "dealer" as that term is defined in Chapter 212. It holds a certificate of registration issued by the Department that is numbered 37-8012056472-7. Spin and Marty initially registered with the Department on January 30, 1992. The sales and use tax collected by a registrant, such as Spin and Marty, become the property of the state at the moment they are collected. A registrant is an agent of the state when collecting the sales and use tax. Spin and Marty was required to remit the sales and use tax collected to the state on or before the 20th of each month. From November 1999 until December 2003, Spin and Marty filed no returns and paid no sales and use taxes to the Department. Also, Spin and Marty, in November 2005, did not file a return or pay sales and use taxes. In a letter dated November 20, 2001, Spin and Marty was notified that the Department was going to audit its records. The Department received no response. In a letter dated April 3, 2002, Spin and Marty was again asked to contact the Department's auditor so a mutually agreed date could be set to conduct the audit. The Department received no response to this letter. The Department thereafter conducted an audit. The result of the audit was a notice of proposed assessment which stated that Spin and Marty owed $146,044.74 in back taxes, penalties, and interest through September 4, 2002. Neither Spin and Marty, nor its principal, Mr. McNiff, contested the audit findings. A letter from the Department addressed to "Dear Taxpayer," dated August 5, 2002, was received by Spin and Marty. This letter stated that the Department wished to arrange a meeting in its office for the purpose of reviewing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated June 18, 2002. Spin and Marty did not avail itself of this opportunity. Six tax warrants were filed with the Clerk of Court in Hernando County against Spin and Marty. These warrants indicate that as of the day of the hearing Spin and Marty owed $175,299.93 to the Department. This amount includes the actual tax due, or in the case of warrant 1000000029678, the estimated tax due, penalties, interest, and filing fees. Interest continues to accrue. Pursuant to notice from the Department, on July 31, 2006, Theodore Faugno, who works for Mr. McNiff's CPA, and Mr. McNiff met with Debra B. Smith, a Revenue Specialist III with the Department. Neither Mr. McNiff nor Mr. Faugno contacted Ms. Smith following the meeting. This resulted in the Administrative Complaint seeking to revoke Respondent's Certificate of Registration. Mr. McNiff related that during the period he failed to submit returns and remit the taxes then due, he experienced adverse health issues and the unplanned birth of a baby. However, he was able to operate Spin and Marty and make a profit. It is indubitably concluded that he could have also reported and remitted the tax due, had he been so inclined.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue revoke Certificate of Registration No. 37-8012056472-7, held by Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Warren J. Bird, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Jarrell L. Murchison, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 J. Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 James McNiff Spin and Marty, Inc., d/b/a Crabbit's Pub 10050 Sleepy Willow Court Spring Hill, Florida 34608 James McNiff Crabbit's Pub 10513 Spring Hill Drive Spring Hill, Florida 34608-5047 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the "Administrative Complaint for Revocation of Certificate of Registration" (Administrative Complaint) filed with DOAH on September 13, 2011, and, if so, the action that should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida responsible for administering the revenue laws of the State of Florida, including the imposition and collection of the state's sales and use taxes pursuant to chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and the state's corporate income taxes pursuant to chapter 220. Petitioner provides unemployment compensation tax collection services under contract with the Agency for Workforce Innovation through an interagency agreement pursuant to section 443.1316. Respondent is an active for-profit corporation with its principal address at 4401 Annette Street, West Palm Beach, Florida 33409. Respondent is a "dealer" as that term is defined by section 212.06(2), and holds certificate of registration number 60-8014787127-3. Respondent failed to timely file sale tax returns for the months of February and June 2011. Petitioner assessed Respondent an estimated tax liability of $2,000 for the months of February 2011 and June 2011. Respondent filed returns but failed to timely remit payment for the sale and use tax in the amount of $24,529.84 due and owing for the months of June, September, and December 2008; March, June, September, and December 2009; January through December 2010; and January, April, and May 2011. Due to its failure to timely file and/or remit taxes due, Respondent is liable for interest in the sum of $2,505.56, penalty in the sum of $2,526.36, and fees in the sum of $2,687.47, as of July 1, 2011. Respondent is an employing unit as defined in subsection 443.036(2), and is subject to the unemployment compensation tax provisions of chapter 443, as provided in section 443.1215. Respondent failed to timely file unemployment compensation tax reports for the calendar quarters ending June 30, September 30, and December 31, 2009; March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, 2010; and March 31 and June 30, 2011. As a result, Petitioner assessed Respondent an estimated unemployment compensation tax liability of $4,500.00 as of July 1, 2011. Due to its failure to timely file the unemployment compensation tax reports, Respondent is liable for interest thereon in the sum of $490.06, penalty in the sum of $450.00, and fees in the sum of $443.31, as of July 1, 2011. Respondent issued Petitioner worthless checks for the unemployment taxes due for the calendar quarters ending June 30, 2006; December 31, 2008; and March 31, 2009. As a result, Respondent still owes Petitioner unemployment compensation taxes in the sum of $425.34, interest in the sum of $119.09, and fees in the sum of $111.70. Respondent is required to file with Petitioner corporate income tax returns each year pursuant to the provisions of chapter 220. Respondent failed to timely file corporate income tax returns and/or pay the tax due to Petitioner for the tax years 2008, 2009, and 2010. Due to its failure to timely file corporate income tax returns and/or pay the tax due, Respondent is liable for penalties in the sum of $450.00 and fees in the sum $25.00, as of July 1, 2011. Petitioner has issued and filed against Respondent delinquent tax warrants, notices of liens, or judgment lien certificates in the public records for the collection of delinquent sales and use tax, delinquent unemployment compensation tax, and delinquent corporate income tax. Petitioner served upon Respondent a Notice of Conference on Revocation of Registration via mail on May 23, 2011, advising Respondent of a conference to be held June 22, 2011. No one appeared on behalf of Respondent at the conference scheduled on June 22.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order that revokes Respondent's certificate of registration. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 2012. COPIES FURNISHED: Nancy Terrel, Acting General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Joseph Mellichamp, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Michael Lawrence Cohen, Esquire Michael L. Cohen Law Offices 1803 South Australian Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 Carrol Y. Cherry, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Revenue Litagation Bureau The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is liable for corporate income and excise taxes that have been assessed by Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a subsidiary of PBS Building Systems America, Inc. (PBS- A). PBS-A and Petitioner filed consolidated Florida income and excise tax returns during the time in question. During the years in question, PBS-A had no tax nexus with Florida, but incurred losses that were available to offset gross income. During the years in question, Petitioner had nexus with Florida and incurred taxable income. The filing of the consolidated return reduced the taxable income of Petitioner by the losses of PBS-A. On December 19, 1990, Respondent issued two notices of proposed assessment for years ending December 31, 1985, through March 31, 1989. One notice identifies $8273 of unpaid corporate excise tax, plus $2798 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest would continue to accrue at the daily rate of $2.27. The second notice of proposed assessment identifies $55,480 of unpaid corporate income tax, plus $20,254 of interest through September 15, 1990. The notice states that interest continues to accrue at the daily rate of $15.20. Petitioner filed a notice of protest dated February 15, 1991. By notice of decision dated October 17, 1991, Respondent rejected the protest and sustained the proposed deficiencies. The claimed deficiency for unpaid corporate income tax, however, was revised to $75,039. A notice of reconsideration dated July 21, 1992, restates the conclusions of the notice of decision. By petition for formal hearing dated September 16, 1992, Petitioner requested a formal hearing concerning the tax liabilities in question and specifically the conclusion that PBS- A was ineligible to file a consolidated return in Florida due to the absence of tax nexus with Florida. The September 16 letter recites facts to establish tax nexus with Florida through the establishment of financing relationships. However, it is unnecessary to consider the sufficiency of these factual assertions because they represent mere allegations. Petitioner failed to produce any evidence in the case and, when noticed for a corporate deposition, failed to appear. Additionally, Petitioner's failure to respond to requests for admission results in admissions that, during the relevant period, PBS-A was not a bank, brokerage house, or finance corporation and did not lend money to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order sustaining the above-described assessments against Petitioner. ENTERED on February 12, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Attorney Lisa Raleigh Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, Capitol Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Kathryn M. Jaques Arthur Andersen & Co. Suite 1600 701 B Street San Diego, CA 92101-8195
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Omni International of Miami, Limited (Omni), is the owner of a large complex located at 1601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. The complex is commonly known as the Omni complex, and contains a shopping mall, hotel and parking garage. On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed two applications for refund with Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, seeking a refund of $57,866.20 and $4,466.48 for sales tax previously paid to the Department of Revenue on sales of electricity and gas consumed by its commercial tenants from April, 1978 through March, 1981. On November 22, 1982, Respondent denied the applications. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. The shopping mall portion of the Omni complex houses more than one hundred fifty commercial tenants, each of whom has entered into a lease arrangement with Omni. The utility companies do not provide individual electric and gas meters to each commercial tenant but instead furnish the utilities through a single master meter. Because of this, it is necessary that electricity and gas charges be reallocated to each tenant on a monthly basis. Therefore, Omni receives a single monthly electric and gas bill reflecting total consumption for the entire complex, and charges each tenant its estimated monthly consumption plus a sales tax on that amount. The utility charge is separately itemized on the tenant's bill and includes a provision for sales tax. Petitioner has paid all required sales taxes on such consumption. The estimated consumption is derived after reviewing the number of electric outlets, hours of operations, square footage, and number and type of appliances and lights that are used within the rented space. This consumption is then applied to billing schedules prepared by the utility companies which give the monthly charge. The estimates are revised every six months based upon further inspections of the tenant's premises, and any changes such as the adding or decreasing of appliances and lights, or different hours of operations. The lease agreement executed by Omni and its tenants provides that if Omni opts to furnish utilities through a master meter arrangement, as it has done in the past, the tenant agrees to "pay additional rent therefor when bills are rendered." This term was included in the lease to give Omni the right to invoke the rent default provision of the lease in the event a tenant failed to make payment. It is not construed as additional rent or consideration for the privilege of occupying the premises. Omni makes no profit on the sale of electricity and gas. Rather, it is simply being reimbursed by the tenants for their actual utility consumption. If the applications are denied, Petitioner will have paid a sales tax on the utility consumption twice -- once when the monthly utility bills were paid, and a second time for "additional rent" for occupancy of the premises.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's applications for refund, with interest, be approved. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1983.
The Issue Whether the University can require that Mr. Haywood repay $7,487.52?
Findings Of Fact Jim C. Haywood is a Certified Public Accountant and has several years experience in financial and administrative positions. Mr. Haywood has earned a Masters in Accounting Degree. From 1959 through April, 1968, Mr. Haywood served as the Director of Financing and Accounting for the Florida Board of Regents. From April, 1968, through September, 1969, Mr. Haywood served as the Associate Director of Planning and Evaluation and the Budget Administrator for the State University System under the Florida Board of Regents. From September, 1969, through August, 1970, Mr. Haywood served as Comptroller of the University. From August, 1969, through January, 1986, Mr. Haywood served as Dean, Associate Vice President or Vice President and as head of administrative affairs at the University. Mr. Haywood was employed by the University from September 1, 1969, through August 30, 1987. Mr. Haywood is familiar with the policies of the Florida Board of Regents concerning accrued annual leave and the payment therefore upon retirement. In August and September of 1987, Mr. Haywood refamiliarized himself with these policies. Mr. Haywood retired from the University in August of 1987. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Haywood met with Art Cozart, University Classification and Pay Coordinator. Mr. Cozart provided Mr. Haywood with a certificate (hereinafter referred to as the "Certificate") which described the amount of accrued annual and sick leave Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for upon his retirement. The Certificate provided, in pertinent part, the following: This is to certify that Mr. Jim C. Haywood, S.S.#252-52-7270, has a leave balance with the University of North Florida as follows: Annual Leave: 352.0 hours $7,458.96 Sick Leave: 2,328.50 hours $14,599.62 The stated amount will be laid upon termination of service with the University. [Emphasis added]. The total amount to "be paid upon termination of service" according to the certificate is $22,058.58. This is the gross amount of pay attributable to Mr. Haywood's accrued leave. The actual amount Mr. Haywood was entitled to receive, the net amount payable, was $22,058.58 less twenty percent federal income tax withholding. The Certificate does not, however, distinguish between the gross amount of pay and the net amount which Mr. Haywood was to receive. Nor did Mr. Haywood and Mr. Cozart discuss whether the amounts on the Certificate were gross amounts or net amounts to be paid to Mr. Haywood. Mr. Haywood was provided a Leave Payment Clearance Form dated September 14, 1987, indicating that Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for only 240 hours of annual leave. Mr. Haywood used the Certificate to obtain a thirty-day loan of $22,893.00 from a private institution. Mr. Haywood borrowed this amount because of the amount listed on the Certificate. Mr. Haywood intended to use the money he received for his accrued leave to repay this loan. Mr. Haywood intended to use this money for living expenses between his retirement and the time when his retirement benefits were to begin. On September 25, 1987, Mr. Haywood received two checks from the Florida Office of Comptroller. One check was in the amount of $5,939.15 and the other was in the amount of $5,990.02. There was no indication on the checks as to what they were in payment for. On October 8, 1987, Mr. Haywood received a check from the Florida Office of Comptroller in the amount of $11,831.00. There was no indication on the check indicating what the payment was for. The total amount of the three checks received by Mr. Haywood on September 25, 1987, and October 8, 1987, was $23,760.17. The total amount Mr. Haywood received was consistent with what Mr. Haywood expected to receive because it was similar to the amount listed on the Certificate. What Mr. Haywood expected, however, was the gross amount he was entitled to before federal income tax withholding. The amount of the three checks Mr. Haywood received, however, was the net amount payable on a gross amount of $29,764.00. One of the two checks received by Mr. Haywood on September 25, 1987, constituted the net amount owed to Mr. Haywood for annual leave. The other check received on September 25, 1987, was an overpayment of accrued annual leave. This overpayment was made in error by the University. Mr. Haywood was paid twice for annual leave. The evidence failed to prove why there was a discrepancy in the amounts of the two checks or which check constituted the overpayment. The W-2 form provided to Mr. Haywood for the 1987 tax year included the amount of gross income for which Mr. Haywood received an overpayment. Mr. Haywood therefore, included $7,487.52 in his gross taxable income for federal income tax purposes for 1987, attributable to the overpayment of accrued annual leave he received. As a result of the inclusion of the overpayment in Mr. Haywood's taxable income, approximately $2,665.00 of federal income taxes attributable to the $7,487.52 of gross income and its effect on taxable income were paid by Mr. Haywood. Mr. Haywood has not filed an amended federal income tax return for 1987. Nor has Mr. Haywood communicated with the Internal Revenue Service concerning this matter. Mr. Haywood has not been provided with an amended W-2. In April of 1988, the University determined that Mr. Haywood had been overpaid for accrued annual leave. On May 3, 1988, the University notified Mr. Haywood of the overpayment of accrued annual leave and demanded reimbursement. On May 12, 1988, Mr. Haywood disputed the amount of the overpayment and requested an administrative hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Mr. Haywood has not repaid any amount of the overpayment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the University's demand for repayment of $7,487.52, from Mr. Haywood be denied until the University determines from the Department of Banking and Finance the amount of the gross overpayment which should be refunded by Mr. Haywood. It is further RECOMMENDED that, once the University determines from the Department of Banking and Finance what amount of the gross overpayment should be refunded, the University should demand payment of the refund from Mr. Haywood and Mr. Haywood should pay the refund to the University. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Norman R. Haltiwanger Director, Office of Human Resources University of North Florida 4567 St. Johns Bluff Road South Jacksonville, Florida 32216 John E. Duvall, Esquire Post Office Box 41566 Jacksonville, Florida 32203 Stephen K. Moonly, Esquire Suite 2501, Independent Square Jacksonville, Florida 32202 APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The University's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 4-6 and 8. 2-3 Hereby accepted. 4 11. 5 16. 6 See 23. 7 21. 8 22. 9 17. 10 See 18. 11-12 19. Irrelevant. Speculative. Argument and not totally correct. 15 23. Hereby accepted. 1-7. The eighth, ninth and tenth sentences are irrelevant. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Mr. Haywood's testimony did not lack credibility. 19 9. 20 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Certificate did not indicate that Mr. Haywood was entitled to payment for only 240 hours of annual leave. 21-22 12. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. See 11. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant and not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 27-28 Hereby accepted. 29-31 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection See 6. See 9. 3-4 16. 5 21. 6 22. 7 23. 8 8. 9 20.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be denied on the basis of his having pled guilty and been convicted of a felony. Embodied within that general issue are the issues of whether the felony involved is one of moral turpitude and whether the conviction, and the circumstances surrounding it, demonstrate that the Petitioner lacks fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Preston Hursey, Jr., filed an application for qualification in Florida as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities agent. The application was filed on November 13, 1989. On April 9, 1990, the Department of Insurance issued a letter of denial with regard to that application based upon a felony conviction of the Petitioner in the past. The Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged, in pertinent part, with enforcing the licensure, admission and continuing practice standards for insurance agents of all types, embodied in Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, and with regulating the admission of persons to licensure as insurance agents in the State of Florida. On August 12, 1988, an Information was filed with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, charging the Petitioner with three felony counts involving "aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return". That is a felony violation of Title 26 U.S.C., Sections 7206(2). On November 15, 1989, the Petitioner was found guilty of three counts of aiding or assisting presentation of false income tax return in violation of that statutory section. The actual conduct for which he was convicted occurred prior to the charges. Prior to 1984, the Petitioner worked for some years as a medical examiner for insurance companies, taking medical histories, blood pressures, pulses and the like, for purposes of establishing insurance coverage for clients of the companies. Some time in early 1984, the Petitioner approached American Dynamics Corporation, as a client, with the intent of availing himself of the financial planning services of that company with the intent of saving on income taxes. The company was apparently counseling clients as to tax shelters in which they could invest or which they could claim, as a means of' avoidance of federal income tax. The Petitioner became very interested in that tax saving procedure and sometime in 1984 became involved with the firm as one of its financial counselor employees. The firm trained him in the service they offered to taxpayers, which involved financial planning by using trusts to defer taxes, as well as other means of sheltering income from tax liability. The company and the Petitioner counseled numerous clients and assisted them in taking advantage of alleged tax shelters, including the final act of preparing their tax returns. During the course of going to hearings with his clients, when their tax returns came under question by the Internal Revenue Service, the Petitioner became aware that apparently the service would not accept the tax shelter devices being used by his company and him as a legitimate means of avoiding taxes. He then sought legal advice from a tax attorney and received an opinion from him that the tax avoidance counseling methods, devices and tax return preparation the Petitioner and his employer were engaging in were not legal, and that the Petitioner should advise anyone he knew involved in such schemes to terminate their relationship. The Petitioner acted on that advice, terminated his relationship with the company and recommended to his clients that they terminate their relationship with the company and the tax avoidance devices being used. Through hindsight and learning more about relevant tax law in the last four to five years since the conduct occurred, the Petitioner realizes that the tax shelter schemes marketed by his employer at that time and, by himself, did not make financial or legal sense. The Petitioner at that time had very little training in financial counseling or advising and very little training in the Federal income tax laws arid regulations. In retrospect, after receiving much more such training as an agent of New York Life Insurance Company since that time, he realized the significance of the error he and his former employer committed. When the tax returns were prepared by the Petitioner and others employed with the firm involved, the tax return accurately reflected the gross income of he taxpayer, the "W2 forms", and all appropriate documentation. Then, the gross income of the taxpayer was shown as reduced by the amount of funds affected by the tax shelter system marketed by the Petitioner's former employer and the Petitioner. There was a statement on the tax return itself explaining the disparity in taxable income so that basically the Internal Revenue Service had the facts and circumstances of such situations disclosed to it. It, however, deemed anyone marketing such tax shelters as engaged in marketing "abusive tax shelters", in effect, in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. Ultimately, the Petitioner was prosecuted along with others involved in the transactions and suffered a felony conviction of three counts of violation of the statute referenced above. The Petitioner has steadfastly maintained both before and after his conviction that he had no intent to violate the tax laws of the United States, but rather believed, until he sought a legal opinion from a qualified attorney, that the service he was marketing was a legal one. After he came under prosecution by the Justice Department for the violation, the Petitioner cooperated fully with the Internal Revenue Service and the Justice Department. The felony violation of which he was convicted, by guilty plea, carried a sentence of three years imprisonment, one year for each tax return involved. That sentence was reduced by the court; however, in consideration of the circumstances of the Petitioner's offense and his cooperation with the prosecuting authorities, to one month of "work release", which he served by working during the day for senior citizens organizations and returning to a confinement facility in the evening. He also was required to render 200 hours of community service, which he has completed, and three years probation. Because of his excellent attitude and behavior and his demonstrated activities designed to further his education in the insurance and securities field, his successful pursuit of the insurance and securities marketing profession in other states and his obviously-positive motivation, his probation officer has recommended that his probation be terminated early, after only two years of it would have been completed in November, 1990. The sentence was reduced because of the Petitioner's positive record in his community, the fact that he had no prior criminal history and because of widespread support by responsible members of the community and by the probation officers who reviewed his case and situation. The judge, upon sentencing, also noted that he was impressed by the fact that the Petitioner wanted to continue to work in the insurance and securities field and was the sole support of a young son whom he was supporting and caring for as an active parent. He continues to do that. The record establishes that the Petitioner's conviction was the result of a guilty plea. That plea resulted from a negotiated "plea bargain" settlement with the prosecuting authorities. The Petitioner established with unrefuted testimony, that he never had any willful intent to commit a crime or defraud the Federal government and the Internal Revenue Service. While he had a general intent to offer the tax advice involved to clients and assist them in engaging in tax shelter arrangements and in preparing the related tax returns, he had no specific intent to commit acts which he knew to be illegal when he committed them, nor which he believed amounted to fraud or deceit of the Internal Revenue Service. Although he pled guilty to a crime involving, by the language of the above--cited statute, the element of falsity, which bespeaks of deceit or fraud, the evidence shows that the Petitioner harbored no such fraudulent or deceitful intent. This is corroborated by the fact that the Petitioner and his clients disclosed all income on the tax return and simply disclosed that a portion of it was sheltered, which procedure was determined by the Internal Revenue Service to be illegal. There was no evidence of record to indicate that the Petitioner sought to conceal income or otherwise commit a false or fraudulent act in the course of his financial and tax advice to these clients, nor in the preparation of their tax returns for submittal. While the statute he is convicted of violating appears to involve the element of moral turpitude because it refers to false or fraudulent tax returns, it is a very general type of charge which can cover many types of activities or conduct. Consequently, one should consider the specific conduct involved in a given instance, such as this one, to determine whether the crime committed factually involved moral turpitude. Based upon the unrefuted evidence of record culminating in the findings of fact made above, it is clear that the Petitioner committed no conduct involving moral turpitude at the time the activity in question was engaged in for the above reasons. The Petitioner has been in no legal altercation, criminal or otherwise, before or since the instance which occurred in 1984. He has become licensed in Washington DC, Maryland and Virginia as an insurance agent and as a broker agent. He represents numerous insurance companies, including, for approximately five years, the New York Life Insurance Company and other reputable companies. He has pursued his continuing education requirements and has earned more requirements than he needs for licensure in Florida and Maryland. He is actively seeking to improve his professional standing and competence in the insurance and securities field and is highly motivated to continue doing so. A great deal of his motivation comes from the fact that he is the sole support of his young 11-year-old son. He enjoys the insurance profession because it gives him time to participate in his son's many school-related and extracurricular activities, such as football. The Petitioner's testimony, and the proven circumstances of the situation, establish without question that he is an honest, forthright person who has candidly admitted a past mistake and who has worked actively, in the approximate six years which have elapsed since the conduct was committed, to rectify that blemish on his record. His efforts to rehabilitate himself personally and professionally involved his active participation as a parent for his son in his son's school life and otherwise, and participation in church and community activities. During the time period which has elapsed since the conduct in question occurred, he has sufficiently rehabilitated himself both personally and professionally so as to justify the finding that he has demonstrated trustworthiness and fitness to engage in the business of insurance. Indeed, three other states, after having the circumstances of his conviction fully disclosed to them, have licensed him or retained him as a licensee insurance agent. The Petitioner is a navy veteran of Vietnam, having served three tours in the Vietnam war, for which service he was decorated. He had a number of security clearances, including a top secret security clearance based upon his work in the field of communications and cryptology during that war. This honorable service, the efforts he has made to improve himself personally and professionally before and since the subject conduct occurred, the fact that it was an isolated incident on his record, the fact that it did not involve any established intent to defraud or deceive on his part, the fact that he is an active, positive parental role model, community member and church member, and his general demeanor at hearing of honesty and forthrightness convinces the Hearing Officer that the isolated incident of misconduct he committed did not involve a demonstrated lack of fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance. Quite positively, the Petitioner has demonstrated his fitness and trustworthiness to engage in that business.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for licensure as a nonresident life, health and variable annuities insurance agent should be granted. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-3069 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. 6-14. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-4. Accepted. 5. Rejected, as not clearly established by the evidence of record. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Don Dowdell, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Preston Hursey, Jr., pro se Post Office Box 43643 Washington, DC 20010 Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esq. Andrew Levine, Esq. Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
The Issue Whether the Petitioner should receive benefits for the services requested.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a 20-year-old male who has been diagnosed with mental retardation. The Petitioner resides with his parents who provide for his care. Currently the Petitioner receives medical benefits through the father's health insurance. He also receives some funding through social security benefits. The Petitioner is a client of the Developmental Disabilities Program and his eligibility to receive benefits is not disputed by the Department. The Petitioner is eligible for benefits. The Petitioner applied for, and has been denied, dental, companion, personal care assistance, and respite benefits. The Petitioner would have received the benefits requested but for the lack of funding in the appropriations for the Department. Because of the lack of funding, the Department prioritizes those who will receive benefits. Unfortunately, the Petitioner is on a waiting list for the Medicaid Waiver Program, and the Individual and Family Support Program does not have sufficient funds appropriated to pay for the services requested by the Petitioner. The Department may not use general revenue funds to fund services for persons awaiting enrollment in the Medicaid Waiver program. The Petitioner's parents need assistance in providing for the care of their son. The Petitioner must be attended lest he be considered "at risk." The parents have incurred debt to provide for their son, have pursued all avenues for assistance known to them, and have unselfishly tended to his needs. The only way the Petitioner may now receive additional benefits would be if the parents abandon their son so that he might be deemed "in crisis." The Petitioner did not become a client of the Developmental Disabilities Program until after July 1, 1999.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Children and Family Services enter a Final Order denying the benefits sought by the Petitioner at this time. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Hilda Fluriach, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue Suite N-1020 Miami, Florida 33128 Alejandro A. Penaloza c/o Alejandro O. Penaloza 12205 Northwest 6th Street Miami, Florida 33182 Jerry Reiger, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 202 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Paul F. Flounlacker, Jr., Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in the case is whether supplemental payments made to the Petitioner by Brevard Community College constitute creditable compensation for purposes of determining retirement benefits under the Florida Retirement System.
Findings Of Fact From 1970 until his retirement in June 1998, Brevard Community College employed Stephen J. Megregian at an executive level. The State of Florida, Division of Retirement, manages and oversees operation of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) in which Brevard Community College (BCC) participates. In June 1990, the college adopted an Employee Benefit Plan for BCC Executive Employees. The provisions of the plan covered Mr. Megregian, an executive employee. In fact, Mr. Megregian drafted the plan, which was adopted by the college's Board of Trustees. The executive benefit plan included a severance pay benefit for plan participants. The severance benefit was calculated according to a formula using the employee's daily base pay as multiplied by the sum of "benefit days." Benefit days were earned according to employment longevity. A "severance day" calculation determined the amount of severance pay a departing employee would receive. Apparently, at some point in 1994, participants in the FRS learned that the Division of Retirement would exclude some types of compensation, including severance pay, from the "creditable compensation" used to determine retirement benefits. In June 1995, the college amended the plan to provide a severance pay "opt-out" provision to plan participants. The provision entitled plan participants who were within five years of eligibility for FRS retirement benefits to "opt-out" of the severance package and instead immediately begin to receive supplemental payments. Mr. Megregian drafted the "opt-out" provision, which was adopted by the college board. The decision to "opt-out" was irrevocable. A plan participant could not change his or her mind and take the severance package once the "opt-out" decision was made. The supplemental payments were calculated based upon the "severance days" that the employee would have otherwise earned during the year. The payments were made along with the employee's salary payment. The "opt-out" plan did not require a participant to retire after the fifth year of receiving the supplemental payment. The Petitioner asserts that the creation of the "opt- out" provision was in accordance with information provided by the Division of Retirement. There is no evidence that the Division of Retirement provided any information suggesting that the "opt-out" provision would result in an increase in creditable compensation for purposes of determining FRS benefits, or that the "opt-out" provision was an acceptable method of avoiding the severance pay exclusion. There is no evidence that, prior to March of 1998, the college specifically sought any direction or advice from the Division of Retirement as to the supplemental payments made to employees under the "opt-out" provision. The evidence as to why the college did not simply increase base salaries for employees to whom supplemental payments were being made is unclear. There was testimony that the plan was designed to avoid unidentified tax consequences. There was also testimony that the supplemental plan was designed to avoid increasing some employees base salaries beyond the percentage increases awarded to other employees. There was apparently some concern as to the impact the supplemental payments would have on other college employees who were not receiving the additional funds. There is no evidence that the Petitioner performed any additional duties on the college's behalf in exchange for the supplemental payments. The Petitioner was eligible to participate in the "opt- out" plan beginning in the college's 1995-1996 fiscal year, and he elected to do so. As a result of his election, supplemental payments were made in amounts as follows: Fiscal Year 1995-1996, $7,938.46. Fiscal Year 1996-1997, $8,147.13. Fiscal Year 1997-1998, $8,395.40. On March 21, 1998, Brevard Community College requested clarification from the Division of Retirement as to how the supplemental payments would affect a plan participant's benefit. On April 30, 1998, the Division of Retirement notified the college that the supplemental payments would not be included within the calculation of creditable compensation. The Petitioner retired from his employment at Brevard Community College on June 30, 1998. The Petitioner is presently entitled to retirement benefits under the FRS. The Division calculates FRS retirement benefits based on "creditable compensation" paid to an employee during the five years in which an employee's compensation is highest. Some or all of the three years during which the Petitioner received supplemental payments are included in the calculation of his creditable compensation. The evidence fails to establish that the supplemental payments made to the Petitioner should be included within the creditable compensation upon which FRS benefits are calculated. Under the statutes and rules governing FRS benefit determinations, the supplemental payments made to the Petitioner are "bonuses" and are excluded from the "creditable compensation" calculation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the State of Florida, Division of Retirement, enter a final order finding that supplemental payments made to Stephen J. Megregian are bonus payments and are excluded from calculation of creditable compensation for FRS benefit purposes. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Pearson, Esquire Dean, Mead, Egerton, Bloodworth, Capouano & Bozarth, P.A. Post Office Box 2346 Orlando, Florida 32802-2346 Robert B. Button, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 A. J. McMullian, III, Director Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Building C 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1560 Paul A. Rowell, General Counsel Department of Management Services 4050 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950
Findings Of Fact On September 30, 2010, Petitioner submitted an online application for a tax registration as a new business entity. Respondent began the process of creating an internal "account" for Petitioner on October 1, 2010. On October 2, 2010, Respondent's database system created a delinquency notice advising Petitioner that sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, and 2009 had not been received. On October 4, 2010, Respondent received an envelope from Petitioner containing sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010, as well as Petitioner's signed Tax Amnesty Agreement. No remittance accompanied the tax returns (or the remittance check was misplaced), so the Department's system generated a billing notice to Petitioner dated December 10, 2010, and a Notice of Final Assessment dated January 25, 2011. Petitioner advised Respondent that a check had been sent along with the tax returns. Discussions between the parties ensued, and Petitioner was asked to provide a replacement check. On or about March 11, 2011, Respondent received a replacement payment from Petitioner. Petitioner, by way of his replacement check, paid the Department the sum of one thousand eighty-nine dollars and forty-three cents ($1,089.43) in full settlement of all amounts due and owing under Petitioner's sales and use tax returns for calendar years 2007, 2008, 2009, and, although not included in the initial petitions, 2010. Respondent accepted the payment made by Petitioner in full settlement of the sales and use taxes owed for the years in question. Petitioner is not liable for any further penalties, interest, or other payments on the aforementioned tax returns.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that the petitions for administrative hearing in this case be dismissed, as there are no further disputed issues of material fact. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of April, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 2011. COPIES FURNISHED: Lisa Vickers, Executive Director Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 104 501 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Marshall Stranburg, General Counsel Department of Revenue The Carlton Building, Room 204 501 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 6668 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6668 Patrick John McGinley, Esquire Law Office of Patrick John McGinley, P.A. 2265 Lee Road, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32789 John Mika, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
