Findings Of Fact The Parties St. Joseph's is a tertiary care hospital located at 3001 West Buffalo Avenue, Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. There is spatial capacity for 703 beds at St. Joseph's, but only 649 beds are licensed, staffed and in use. It is sponsored by the Franciscan Sisters of Allegheny, and is a subsidiary of a holding company, St. Joseph's Health Care Center, Inc. Without CON approval, St. Joseph's cannot increase licensed bed capacity at its current facility on West Buffalo Avenue, or open the satellite facility which is here at issue. St. Joseph's current service area includes Hillsborough County, particularly the central and northern portions of the County. Occupancy rates for St. Joseph's in medical surgical areas have been approximately 80 percent, and at peak times have exceeded 90 percent. However during the last half of 1986, the occupancy rate fell to 74 percent. St. Joseph's provided 16.8 percent of all Medicaid care in Hillsborough County during 1982-83 and 17 percent during 1983-84. It is second to Tampa General in provision of health care to indigents in Hillsborough County. With the exception of Tampa General, St. Joseph's has the largest Medicaid patient admissions of all Hillsborough County hospitals. In 1986, the bad debt/charity care/Medicaid contractual discount for St. Joseph's was approximately $11.3 million. However, while 6.9 percent of all patient days county wide are Medicaid patient days, St. Joseph's has only 5 percent Medicaid patient days. The cost of indigent care is absorbed and offset by paying patients. St. Joseph's decision to seek approval for a satellite in the Carrollwood area is a wise business decision since there is a high percentage of paying patients residing in that area of Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's has a 23 percent market share of all patient days reported in Hillsborough County, the largest market share for all hospital medical- surgical services provided in the County, and also has the largest market share in the proposed service are of the satellite. Its market share of paying patients is much higher than for Medicaid or indigent patients. However, since 1984 St. Joseph's market share has been declining while Tampa General's has been increasing. A relatively high proportion of admissions at St. Joseph's current facility, over 40 percent, are obtained through its emergency room. The proposed satellite will have an emergency room, but it will not offer the same intensity of services as at the current facility on West Buffalo Avenue. The Department is the state agency with the authority and responsibility to consider CON applications. Intervenor Humana of Florida, d/b/a Tampa Women's Hospital (Humana) owns and operates a 192 bed women's hospital in Tampa, Florida, which includes 96 obstetrical beds. Its occupancy rate in 1986 was approximately 50 percent. Intervenor University Community Hospital (University) is an existing hospital with 404 licensed and 320 operating beds located on East Fletcher Avenue, Tampa, Florida, and offers a full range of acute care hospital services. University is located within the service area of the proposed satellite and has been experiencing a decline in patient days from 109,000 in 1983 to 84,000 in 1986. It has had to reduce its number of employees in the last three years by 15 percent-20 percent. University has a 57 percent occupancy rate. Intervenor Tampa General Hospital (Tampa General) operates a publically supported hospital in Tampa, Florida, providing a full range of acute care services, including obstetrical/gynecological services with 707 licensed and 619 operating beds. Tampa General has CON approval for 1000 beds if it completes planned renovations. It has an occupancy rate of 80 percent-82 percent and is treating 70 percent of all Medicaid patients in Hillsborough County. Tampa General has provided $70 million of indigent care, including $40 million in charity, annually. Carrollwood is within its service and marketing area. Intervenor AMI Town and Country Medical Center (Town and Country) is a 201 bed general acute care hospital located at 6001 Webb Road, Tampa, Florida. Its occupancy rate in 1986 was approximately 46 percent. There is no dispute among the parties regarding the standing of Intervenors in this proceeding. The occupancy rates at University, Town and Country and Humana are substantially below optimal levels, and substantial unused capacity exists at each of these hospitals. St. Joseph's proposed satellite will not offer any services that are not currently available to residents of the proposed service area, and will duplicate services at University, Town and Country, and Carrollwood Community Hospital, as well as services provided at St. Joseph's existing facility. The Application and Project On or about October 15, 1985 St. Joseph's filed with the Department an application for CON 4288. This application sought approval for a 150 bed general acute care satellite hospital in Carrollwood, Hillsborough County, Florida, and proposed the transfer of 150 existing licensed beds from St. Joseph's facility on West Buffalo Avenue, Tampa, to the satellite. The estimated total cost of this project was $16,775,000. Specifically, St. Joseph's proposed the transfer of 96 medical/surgical beds, including ICU, CCU and progressive care beds, 15 obstetrical beds and 39 pediatric beds, including PICU. The Department provided St. Joseph's with an omissions letter on or about November 14, 1985, to which St. Joseph's responded on or about December 30, 1985. By letter dated February 28, 1986, the Department preliminarily denied St. Joseph's application for CON 4288 stating, "The project is not justified by the 1985 District VI Health Plan or the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan." The Department's decision to deny this application was published in Volume 12, Number 11, Florida Administrative Weekly, on March 14, 1986, and St. Joseph's filed its petition for formal administrative hearing on April 4, 1986. On or about February 18, 1987 St. Joseph's and the Department executed a Stipulation and Settlement Agreement which, in pertinent part, provides: DHRS finds and agrees that there is a need for St. Joseph's to relocate and transfer 100 acute-care beds (but not any licensed obstetrical beds) and acute-care services (but not any obstetrical services) from its existing acute-care hospital and construct a 100 bed acute-care satellite hospital in Hillsborough County in light of a balance review of all relevant criteria established by Section 381.494 Florida Statutes, including the levels of indigent and Medicaid care agreed to herein. The project will occur entirely within Hillsborough County and not result in any increase in licensed beds for St. Joseph's. DHRS agrees that a partial approval of the St. Joseph's CON Application will satisfy this need and that said application should be partially approved as hereinbelow further specified ... The agreements and commitments made by DHRS in paragraph 1 above are predicated on commitments made by St. Joseph's concerning its intention to provide certain percentages of Medicaid and indigent care in its proposed satellite hospital and to seek only partial approval of its application as specified herein... St. Joseph's commitments, which are relied upon by DHRS and which shall be set forth as conditions in said CON, are as follows: Not less than 3.5 percent of the total number of admissions at St. Joseph's satellite hospital shall be rendered to Medicaid patients. Not less than 3.0 percent of said total admissions shall be rendered to non-Medicaid "charity/uncompensated" patients whose family income as applicable for the twelve months prior to determination of eligibility is equal to or less than 150 percent of the then current Federal Poverty Guidelines. St. Joseph's shall obtain and retain sufficient information to verify this eligibility determination. The 3.0 percent "charity/uncompensated" patients shall be acknowledged as such at admission, shall not include patients receiving third party payments and shall be in addition to St. Joseph's "bad debt" patients... DHRS specifically recognizes the lengthy history and mission of St. Joseph's in providing extensive indigent care services in Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's agrees to undertake a diligent and good faith effort to encourage physicians on its medical staff to admit and treat Medicaid and charity/uncompensated care patients in such numbers as to comply with the minimum percentages established in paragraph (a)above ... (e) St. Joseph's agrees that it will request at hearing and henceforth seek only partial approval of its proposed CON Application, as follows: The satellite facility shall be reduced in scope from 150 licensed beds to 100 licensed beds. The number of licensed beds to be relocated from the existing St. Joseph's Hospital shall be reduced in scope from 150 licensed beds to 100 licensed beds. None of the licensed beds to be relocated to the satellite hospital shall include licensed obstetrical beds, nor shall the obstetrical services, if any, provided at St. Joseph's existing hospital be relocated to the satellite facility. Labor, delivery and nursery facilities shall be deleted from the satellite hospital. DHRS has consistently maintained the proposed square footage and project cost is inadequate for a 150 bed hospital and more appropriate for a 100 bed hospital. Therefore, the total square footage and total project cost shall remain unchanged... The Stipulation and Settlement Agreement referred to in Finding of Fact 21 was executed following, and in consideration of, additional information prepared and submitted by St. Joseph's to the Department on or about January 30, 1987 and February 9, 1987. At hearing, St. Joseph's and the Department sought partial approval of CON 4288 to conform to the terms of the Stipulation and Settlement Agreement. Intervenors opposed such partial approval. The partial approval sought by St. Joseph's and the Department represents an identifiable portion of St. Joseph's original CON application. Originally, St. Joseph's sought approval to transfer 150 acute care beds, including obstetrical, but at hearing St. Joseph's sought approval for a transfer of only 100 acute care beds, without obstetrical. Labor, delivery and nursery facilities have been deleted from the satellite proposal, but total square footage, physical designs and total cost of the project remain the same for the partial approval sought at hearing compared with the original application. The number of operating rooms has also remained the same. The proposed location in Carrollwood, Hillsborough County, remains unchanged. The project at issue in this case is a 100 bed acute care satellite hospital with, 96,500 total gross square footage (965 gross square feet per bed). The schematic plan submitted by St. Joseph's provides for the following beds and includes, but is not limited to, the following facilities: (72 private rooms, 2 Semi-private); pediatric beds (5 private, 5 semi-private), ICU/CCU (9 beds); space for radiology/nuclear medicine, emergency and outpatient services, laboratory, physical therapy, pharmacy, EEG/EKG, inhalation therapy, surgical suite, sterilization suite, cafeteria, laundry, storage, maintenance, chapel, nurses office, and other miscellaneous facilities. Total project costs are estimated at $16,775,000, the same as for the original 150 bed transfer proposal. The land upon which the satellite will be located was purchased for $3 million in cash. The satellite will be able to operate at a higher occupancy level than St. Joseph's existing hospital due to the larger proportion of single bed rooms and less severe cases being treated at the satellite. After review of St. Joseph's original application for the transfer of 150 acute care beds in March 1986, the Department concluded that the proposed gross square footage per bed of 643 was below the standard range of 800-1000 gross square feet per bed, and also that the total project cost estimate of $111,833 per bed was way below the average standard range of $175,000 to $200,000 per bed. After review of the identifiable portion of St. Joseph's application for which approval was sought at hearing, the Department concluded that the total gross square footage of the satellite, square footage per bed, construction estimates, and the total project cost estimates were reasonable and acceptable. The gross square footage was raised from 643 to 965, and the cost per bed was increased from $111,833 to $167,750. The Service Area The area which St. Joseph's proposes to serve with its satellite hospital is the Carrollwood area of northwest Hillsborough County which is located in the Department's District VI. This is the fastest growing area in Hillsborough County, with an average age which is lower than the rest of the County, and an average income level above the County average. Specifically, almost 35 percent of the population in the satellite's proposed primary service area was between 25 and 44 years old in 1980, compared with approximately 28 percent for the County. In the category of 65 years and older, the primary service area had 8.2 percent of its population, while the County had 11.4 percent. A higher percentage of paying patients reside within the proposed service area than for Hillsborough County as a whole. Nevertheless, 6 percent 7 percent of the service area population have incomes below the federal poverty level, compared with 16 percent for the County as a whole. The area is already served by Medicaid providers. St. Joseph's medical roster indicates over 140 of its physicians have offices in the satellite's proposed service area. However, approximately 100 of these physicians are also on the staffs of Intervenors. The site for the satellite was chosen after review of patient origin data and population growth projections for Hillsborough County. St. Joseph's is currently treating at its facility on West Buffalo avenue an average of 64 patients a day who reside within the proposed service area of the satellite and who are not cardiac, cancer or psychiatric patients. St. Joseph's has an average daily census of 519 patients and proposes to serve 64 of these patients, who reside within the satellite's primary service area, at the satellite. Stipulations The parties have stipulated that St. Joseph's is able to provide quality care at the proposed satellite, and also that St. Joseph's is not proposing or relying upon probable economies and improvements in service that may be derived from the operation of joint, cooperative, or shared health care resources, except to the extent that the project includes a satellite facility. Intervenors contend that health services will be most economically provided by not constructing the satellite facility. Finally, the parties stipulate that Section 381.494(6)(c)11., Florida Statutes, relating to the provision of a substantial portion of services or resources to individuals not residing in the service district in which the entities are located, or adjacent thereto, is not applicable in this case. Non-Rule Policy for Bed Transfers The Department currently has no rule governing the transfer of acute care beds. Rule 10-5.011(1)(m), previously Rule 10-5.11(23), does not apply to acute care transfers since it addresses new or additional beds. However, the Department has begun developing a departmental policy for review of acute care transfer applications which do not request additional beds, and is seeking industry and staff input for the concepts expressed in a draft policy. In its current conceptual form, the transfer policy follows the statutory review criteria as they might apply to transfer applications which do not request new beds. The emerging policy, urges review of acute care transfer applications with emphasis upon the following health care planning criteria: reduction of excess beds, better utilization of existing beds, the encouragement of hospital efficiency, improvement of financial and geographic access, the encouragement of quality care, and the encouragement of competition in the hospital industry. St. Joseph's partial approval request was reviewed for conformity with this emerging policy by Robert Sharpe, the Department's Director of Comprehensive Health Planning (the state's chief health planner), who is charged with development of the bed transfer policy. Bed reduction is a key element for consideration in the Department's emerging policy. However, St. Joseph's 79-80 percent occupancy is greater than the Department's 75 percent hospital occupancy threshold contained in the acute care rule (Rule 10-5.011(1)(m)). Application of a bed reduction formula is not reasonable, according to Sharpe, for a facility which is using its beds to a much greater extent than other facilities in the County. The Department's emerging policy would evaluate whether a proposed transfer of beds to a new site would encourage a better use of the beds than at the existing site. The emerging policy contemplates transfers of acute care beds within a single county or subdistrict in an effort to be responsive to the needs of communities. This concept is consistent with the District VI Local Health Plan's stated desire that planning occur on less than a county basis. The Department's emerging policy evaluates the relative efficiency of the hospital proposing a bed transfer. In evaluating the relative charges made by similar Florida hospitals, the Hospital Cost Containment Board has devised hospital groupings for evaluation purposes. Of the 23 hospitals that are characterized as "group nine" hospitals in Florida, St. Joseph's ranks 16th of those 23 and is below the 50th percentile in gross revenues per adjusted admission. This means that St. Joseph's has lower charges per adjusted admission than most of the other comparable hospitals in Florida. Despite the fact that St. Joseph's is a large tertiary facility, Hospital Cost Containment Board data establishes that St. Joseph's is an efficient hospital facility. Another aspect of the Department's emerging policy is that of improving Medicaid and indigent access for patients. Excluding Tampa General, St. Joseph's has more Medicaid patient admissions than all other hospitals in Hillsborough County. During the past four years, St. Joseph's has consistently provided approximately 17 percent of the Medicaid care to hospital patients in Hillsborough County. The Department considers St. Joseph's to be an indigent care facility in Hillsborough County. The Department also considers geographic access when reviewing transfers. The State Health Plan has an objective that 90 percent of the population in an urban area be within 30 minutes drive time to an acute care facility by 1989. The Local Health Plan has concluded that all of Hillsborough County is currently within a 30 minute drive time. The quality of care provided by a facility proposing a transfer is also considered, and the parties have stipulated that St. Joseph's will provide quality health care services. The Department examines the competitive affects of approval of a transfer of acute care beds. In this case, the charge levels, costs per admission, and current inventory of beds at Hillsborough County acute care hospitals were examined. Since St. Joseph's charges and costs are low relative to other hospitals, and since there is an excess of beds in the County, the Department assumed that there would be competition for existing patients, and further concluded that approval of the satellite facility would promote price and non-price competition among hospitals in Hillsborough County. Considering each of the outlined elements of the Department's emerging policy, the state's chief health planner testified that the emerging policy supports the requested approval of an identifiable portion of the St. Joseph's satellite application. Need And Consistency With State and Local Plans Health planning for CON purposes involves the assessment of need on a community-wide, rather, than an institution specific, basis. Planning on less than a county-wide basis is inappropriate in Hillsborough County. In 1986 there was an excess capacity of 1400 acute care beds in Hillsborough County. District VI is overbedded by nearly 700 beds. The Local Health Council projects that in 1992 there will still be a surplus of nearly 800 beds in the County. Since this application proposes the transfer of beds, it neither increases or decreases this excess capacity. The State Health Plan as well as the Department's non-rule policy recommends eliminating excess bed capacity, but this proposal is not consistent with that recommendation. Existing acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County experienced only percent occupancy in 1986, a drop from 71 percent in 1984. Patient days have declined at an average of 2.6 percent per year since 1983 while the population in Hillsborough County actually increased 11.2 percent during this time. In spite of a significant reduction in hospital utilization and average lengths of stay in the area, the number of licensed hospital beds in Hillsborough County increased from 3,028 in 1981 to 3,457 in 1986, an increase of 14.2 percent or 429 beds. The State Health Plan contains a stated goal of 80 percent occupancy by 1989. The Local Health Plan recognizes 80 percent for medical-surgical and ICU/CCU occupancy for all beds in the County and 90 percent occupancy for each institution. Only Tampa General and St. Joseph's are currently achieving these occupancy level goals. In fact, occupancy rates for the five hospitals within, or adjacent to, the proposed satellite's service area range from 40 percent to percent. Based upon review and consideration of the expert testimony and evidence presented at hearing, it is found that an acceptable hospital optimum occupancy rate would be from 75 percent to 85 percent overall, and 90 percent for medical-surgical beds. Of the 649 beds currently at St. Joseph's, on average there are 149 unoccupied beds on any given day. St. Joseph's proposal does not address the key element of the State Health Plan and the Department's non-rule policy which calls for bed reduction when transfers are considered. This failure is particularly significant in view of the substantial overbedding which currently exists in Hillsborough County and which is projected to exist through 1992. To the contrary, the proposal actually would result in a net increase of 3 coronary care unit beds and 3 pediatric intensive care unit beds. The most important stated purpose of the acute care policies in the 1985 District VI Health Plan is "optimizing utilization of existing resources", and this purpose is implemented through a policy that provides, "Suture changes in the hospital facilities and services systems should occur so as to maintain the fiscal and programmatic integrity of all institutions providing a full range of services... " This proposal is inconsistent with this aspect of the Local Health Plan since it does not reduce the number of excess beds, while at the same time it would transfer 100 beds to a predominantly affluent, young and growing area of the County from which St. Joseph's would realize a substantial number of paying, as opposed to indigent or Medicaid, patients. This could reasonably be expected to increase St. Joseph's already very strong patient payor mix, and increase occupancy rates above 80 percent while other facilities are at or below 50 percent. At the same time, this proposal could actually weaken St. Joseph's financial position since its margin of revenue over expenses was 12.5 percent in 1985 and 10 percent in 1986, and the pro forma for the satellite, although overly optimistic as discussed below, shows only a 4.8 percent margin in the second year of operation. Underutilization of existing facilities is not consistent with sound health care planning because it ultimately results in higher costs to patients. Other facilities currently serving the proposed service area will be more likely to achieve optimum occupancy levels if the satellite is not built, than if it is. Another important purpose of the Local Health Plan is "promoting access for the indigent and underserved population to adequate health care," a purpose also stated in the Department's non-rule policy. The service area of the proposed satellite has a median family income of $30,132 which is 26 percent higher than for Hillsborough County as a whole. Locating a hospital in a predominantly affluent area, does not generally increase access for indigents. In fact, by the terms of its Settlement Agreement, St. Joseph's will actually decrease its commitment to Medicaid patients from the current 5 percent to the proposed 3 percent at the satellite. The percentage of charity care to gross revenues at St. Joseph's in 1986 was .6 percent, and was budgeted at .5 percent for 1987. This is not a significant charity commitment in relation to gross revenues, and the satellite proposal will not improve this commitment. The State Health Plan states as an objective achieving a ratio of less than 4.11 beds per thousand by 1989. This proposal does not promote this objective because it does not represent any net reduction in total number of beds. This proposal is also inconsistent with the State Health Plan which recommends a minimum pediatric size of 20 beds since it will have only 18. Need In Relation to Geographic Accessibility According to the 1985 District VI Health Plan, "The geographic distribution of hospital services in Hillsborough County is such that the entire population is within the 30 minute drive time standard of adequate resources." Ernest J. Peters, who was accepted as an expert in traffic engineering, testified that the entire proposed satellite service area is within 30 minutes of at least one existing hospital. The 30 minute drive time standard is set forth as Objective 2.2 in the 1985-87 State Health Plan. Residents of the proposed service area have geographic accessibility to hospital services within a 30 minute drive time. St. Joseph's does not dispute this fact, but rather Barbara Myres-Fernandez, who was not accepted as an expert in traffic studies, testified that at peak travel times the 30 minute standard was exceeded. However, according to Robert Sharpe, the Department's Director of Comprehensive Health Planning, who was accepted as an expert in health care planning, as well as Ward Koutnik and Ernest J. Peters, who were accepted as experts in traffic engineering, all of the proposed service area is within 30 minutes of existing hospital facilities. Peters testified that if the satellite is built, travel times to the nearest hospital would only be improved by 2.77 minutes for Carrollwood residents in 1990. The weighted average travel time, according to Peters, for the entire proposed service area to the nearest acute care hospital is 13.13 minutes, which will only increase to 13.96 minutes in 1990. The evidence therefore establishes that there would be an insubstantial geographic access gain to Hillsborough County residents if the satellite is approved, and in any event need based upon a lack of geographic accessibility has not been established. Need In Relation to Financial Accessibility According to Myres-Fernandez, it is St. Joseph's contention on the issue of accessibility that approval of the satellite will improve financial accessibility to hospital services for indigent and Medicaid patients. In order to maintain its commitment to indigent, Medicare and charity care, St. Joseph's argues it must continue to attract and maintain its market share of private pay patients, and the Carrollwood area provides a growing source of such patients. However, according to St. Joseph's, 64 of the patients to be treated at the satellite are already being treated at West Buffalo Avenue. These 64 do not include cardiac, cancer or psychiatric patients. Therefore, only 16 "new" patients would be served at the satellite if it were to achieve the goal of 80 percent occupancy. Even with St. Joseph's predicted 90 percent occupancy rate, only 26 "new" patients would be served. No evidence was offered to establish that a higher level of indigents should be expected at the satellite hospital than at St. Joseph's existing facility, particularly since in its Agreement with the Department, St. Joseph's has committed to serve a lower percentage of indigents than is presently true at the main facility on West Buffalo. St. Joseph's current payor mix is very favorable, and no reasons have been shown why it should deteriorate in the foreseeable future. In fact, the mix may actually be improving, according to Hospital Cost Containment Board data. Indigent access to health care is not improved by locating a satellite hospital in a predominantly affluent area in which only 6-7 percent of the population is below the poverty level, as compared to 16 percent for the County as a whole. This proposal represents a wise business decision by St. Joseph's because it is an attempt to increase its number of private pay patients. However, it will not improve indigent access. Financial accessibility is a criteria to be evaluated under Section 381.494(6),(c), Florida Statutes, and the Department's non-rule policy. This proposal does not improve access for indigents and therefore is not consistent with this statutory and policy criterion. Availability and Adequacy of Alternatives There are five existing hospitals within, or adjacent to, the proposed service area with substantial unused capacity, including University and Carrollwood Community Hospital which is a 120 bed facility offering general acute care, emergency room and outpatient services. Carrollwood Community Hospital has an occupancy rate of approximately 50 percent, and thus has excess capacity. While one-third of its patients are osteopathic, two-thirds are allopathic; only one-fifth of its physician staff is comprised of osteopaths. The proposed service area of the satellite is within the current service areas of Intervenors. Thus, adequate alternative facilities are available to residents in the Carrollwood area. Since there are existing alternative acute care facilities within thirty minutes of the proposed service area, an ambulatory surgical center might be an appropriate alternative to the satellite proposal. However, St. Joseph's did not explore such an alternative, and presented no evidence to establish the basis for its assertion that this would not be appropriate. Such a facility could maintain and even enhance referral patterns to the main facility on West Buffalo. Additionally, it has not been shown that splitting St. Joseph's 649 beds between two locations will be more efficient than leaving all 649 beds on West Buffalo, and thereby saving the $16,775,000 in capital expense to construct the satellite. Therefore, alternatives to the construction of a satellite facility do exist, and St. Joseph's has not shown that such alternatives are less feasible or less efficient than the satellite proposal at issue. Needs For Special Equipment and Services It has not been established that any need exists within the proposed service area for special equipment and services which this proposal would provide, and which are not reasonably and economically accessible in adjoining areas. Need For Research and Educational Facilities It has not been shown that any need exists in the proposed service area for research and educational facilities which this application would address. Availability of Manpower During the hearing, the parties stipulated to the adequacy of the staffing patterns proposed by St. Joseph's for the 100 bed satellite, and also their ability to recruit and fill those staffing needs. Approval of this satellite would not have an adverse impact on Intervenors' ability to attract or retain qualified staff since the staff for the satellite would be primarily transferred from the West Buffalo Avenue facility along with the transfer of 100 beds. Since 64 patients who reside in the satellite's service area are currently being treated at the West Buffalo Avenue site, staff who serve these patients will be transferred to the satellite when it opens. Additionally, St. Joseph's conducts an extensive recruitment program outside, as well as within, the Hillsborough County area. It is therefore unlikely that staff for the satellite will come in any significant number from any of the Intervenors. It is recognized that there is almost a 20 percent vacancy level for registered nurses in District VI, and a 33 percent vacancy level for critical care nurses. However, St. Joseph's turn-over rate is relatively low, and therefore it is reasonable to expect that the satellite would be staffed predominantly with staff already employed at the West Buffalo location. Availability of Funds St. Joseph's revenues exceeded expenses by $10-$12 million for fiscal year ending June 30, 1986, and it is among the five most profitable hospitals in the State. It has no long term debt, and is the only facility of its size in Florida which has no debt. Financially, St. Joseph's is in an extremely sound position. St. Joseph's has the ability to financially support the satellite facility and to internally finance its construction. Third-party financing is also being considered. However, its operating margin will decrease slightly as a result of the construction of the satellite. Historically, it has realized an operating margin exceeding 10 percent, although it projects a profit margin of slightly under 5 percent for fiscal year 1987. Financial Feasibility St. Joseph's proposed satellite's total gross revenue for the first two years of operation was determined by multiplying the current average bed rate at the facility on West Buffalo by the expected occupancy. Proposed deductions from revenue were also based upon St. Joseph's historical experience. Assumptions utilized to prepare the satellite's pro forma relied upon St. Joseph's historical information, including but not limited to revenues, fixed expenses and variable expenses. St. Joseph's used a patient admission rate of 125 per 1,000, and a proposed average length of stay of 6 days compared with a current average length of stay at the main facility of 7-7.2 days. A basic assumption used by St. Joseph's was that on the first day of operation, 64 patients currently being treated at the main facility who reside in the Carrollwood area, will be transferred to the satellite for treatment, and thereafter an average of 64 of the satellite's beds will be occupied each day by Carrollwood residents who would have sought treatment at the West Buffalo location in the absence of the satellite. St. Joseph's assumed a case mix intensity level of 1.36 for the satellite, compared with 1.46-1.48 at the West Buffalo location. A decrease in the case mix index results in a corresponding decrease in revenues and expenses. Complex hospitalizations receive a high case mix index, and simple procedures receive a low case mix index. St. Joseph's did not conclusively establish that 64 patients presently at the main facility, except for cardiac, cancer and psychiatric patients, who reside in the service area of the satellite could be transferred on the first day of operation, or that this daily census could be maintained. Physician and patient preferences determine where a patient is admitted. Severity of illness or age of the patient are also factors. Admissions through the emergency room, which account for nearly 50 percent of the admissions on West Buffalo, cannot be redirected. It has not been shown that physicians or patients would prefer admission to a satellite, or that the very severe cases or aged patients, as well as emergency room admissions, could be redirected away from the main facility. While the satellite will have an emergency room, the satellite will not be equipped to handle the complexity of cases presently admitted on West Buffalo. Additionally, transferring 64 patients by ambulance on the first day of operation from West Buffalo to the satellite, in the middle of treatment, has not been shown to be reasonable or feasible, or that physicians and patients would tolerate such a procedure. The opening of a satellite usually begins incrementally and gradually while staff becomes familiar with the new facility and equipment. St. Joseph's has not shown that it is feasible to open the satellite with an immediate occupancy of 64 percent on day one, and 82 percent in the first year of operation. Historically, occupancy levels at satellites run between 20 percent-40 percent the first year. Forecasted revenues are unrealistic because St. Joseph's basic assumption about the transfer of 64 Carrollwood residents is unreasonable and unsubstantiated. St. Joseph's has also failed to correctly and fully estimate salary expenses at the satellite because salary estimates do not account for shift and weekend differentials paid to nurses. More than 50 percent of nurses at St. Joseph's receive shift differential pay, which is a 15 percent increase above their base hourly rate. Given the age of the service area population, a more accurate use rate for the satellite would be between 90 and 95 admissions per 1,000 population, rather than the 125 per 1,000 used by St. Joseph's. The lower use-rate reduces the available pool of patients in the service area from 136 estimated by St. Joseph's to 109. 94 Assumptions based on historical data from the main facility are inappropriate for developing the satellite's pro forma because the satellite will treat less complex cases than the main facility, and the age and income levels in the satellite's service area are significantly different from the County as a whole. Rather than a case mix index of 1.36, an average satellite and community hospital case mix index is 1.00. Using a corrected case mix index of 1.00 rather than 1.36, results in a projected loss for the satellite rather than a profit in its second year of operation. Because construction and operation of the satellite will reduce St. Joseph's overall operating margin below 5 percent-6 percent, which is a minimum standard, St. Joseph's will be less able to provide charity, indigent and Medicaid care after construction of the satellite than it is currently. Impact On Health Care Costs St. Joseph's proposal to spend approximately $16 million on construction of the satellite to serve from 16 to 26 "new" patients could reasonably be expected to adversely affect health care costs. This is exacerbated by the shelled-in space at both the satellite and the existing facility. The size of the satellite was not reduced when beds were reduced from 150 to 100, and the St. Joseph's architect testified there is enough square footage to add back the 50 beds. Despite St. Joseph's assertions that it will not increase rates to subsidize the satellite as a business investment in its own future, it appears reasonable to expect that rates would have to be increased if St. Joseph's is to maintain its historical profit margin, and to offset its failure to properly project salaries, use rates and the case mix index at the satellite. The satellite will continue to lose money through its second year of operation, and this would have to be recouped through increased charges, or reduced profit margins, which could then be expected to result in a reduced ability to fund charity, indigent and Medicaid patients. Project Costs Construction cost estimates are reasonable. The estimated cost for fixed equipment for a 150 bed satellite facility was reduced by $250,000 to reflect the decrease cost of moving 50 beds and the obstetrical surgical suite. This $250,000 savings provides an inflationary contingency in case of construction delays, and while it does increase construction costs from $9,650,000 to 9,900,000, it does not have a negative impact on the appropriateness of the proposed construction costs. Equipment cost estimates as well as total project cost estimates, with the exception of salary estimates, are reasonable. Admitting Practices St. Joseph's has a written admissions policy which requires that it receive patients regardless of their ability to pay. There is no evidence that St. Joseph has ever denied admission to any patient in a life threatening situation. It is standard practice at St. Joseph's to request a deposit on admission and to inform patients that arrangements for payment can be made upon discharge. However, inability to pay the deposit or to make financial arrangements does not result in a patient being denied admission. Patients who are unable to pay are sometimes admitted at St. Joseph's through, the emergency room when a physician sends such patients to the emergency room. Effect On Competition Enhancement of future competition is a factor which is considered under the Department's non-rule transfer policy There is substantial competition among acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County which are currently engaged in aggressive marketing campaigns. Dominance by one provider in a market can be anti-competitive, and at the present time St. Joseph's is the dominant provider for paying patients in Hillsborough County. The current market shares for hospitals already serving the satellite's proposed service area are: St. Joseph's - 33.45 percent; University - 28.92 percent; Town and Country - 17.72 percent; Tampa General - 11.06 percent; and Carrollwood Community - 8.86 percent. The satellite will allow St. Joseph's market share to increase and possibly approach 40 percent. Such market dominance is not consistent with a competitive market. St. Joseph's increase in market share will take patients away from the other hospitals now serving the Carrollwood area, particularly University which receives almost 38 percent of all its patients from this area. University is already projecting an operating loss for fiscal year 1987 of $563,000. Tampa General is a disproportionate provider of indigent services in the County. The Local Health Plan has as one of its objectives protecting such providers of indigent care. Tampa General lost $12 million in fiscal 1983, and in order to improve its financial condition embarked on a $160 million renovation and building effort. It is now indebted to bondholders in that amount. Tampa General's payor mix has begun to improve, and it is actively marketing in the proposed service area. Approval of this project will not further the Local Health Plan objective of protecting disproportionate indigent providers, because it will result in the loss to Tampa General of a significant number of paying patients.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying St. Joseph's application for CON 4288 for the establishment of a satellite hospital with the transfer of 100 acute care beds. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of September, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Rulings on St. Joseph's Proposed Findings of Fact are as follows: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 2. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact86. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3, 7. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 54. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 6, 70, 54. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as irrelevant and not supported by competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 38, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 30-34. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 41-43. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as speculative, irrelevent and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 21, 23, 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected in Findings of Fact 59, 68. Rejected in Findings of Fact 65, 71, 97, 106. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 21, 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 67, but rejected in 89, 90. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 67. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected as not based competent substantial evidence, and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. 62-63. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 64-65. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Rejected in Findings of Fact 11, 72. Rejected in Findings of Fact 65, 72. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. 70-71. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Rejected as unnecessary and not based competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 70. Rejected as irrelevant and speculative. 75-76. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 77-78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected in Findings of Fact 59, 60, 68, 70, 95. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6, 70. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 83-91. Rejected in Findings of Fact 7, 105 and otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44 104-105. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Rejected in Findings of Fact 47, 106, 107, 108. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. 111-122. Rejected in Findings of Fact 63, 64, 65, and otherwise irrelevant and cumulative. Rejected in Findings of Fact 68, 70, 71. Adopted in Findings of Fact 29, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 78. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 80. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 81. 131-133. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 134. Adopted in Findings of Fact 78, 83, 98, 99. 135-138. Rejected in Findings of Fact 50, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 71, 108. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 59, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and not based competent substantial evidence. 141-146. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 147. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 148. Rejected in Findings of Fact 50, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 71, 108. Rejected in Finding of Fact 75. Rejected in Finding of Fact 73. Rejected in Findings of Fact 72-75. 152-153. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 89, 90 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 154-155. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 72. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 107. Rejected as unnecessary and speculative. Rejected in Findings of Fact 87, 89. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 166-169. Rejected as irrelevant. 170-171. Rejected in Finding of Fact 106. 172. Rejected as unnecessary. 173-174. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence and irrelevant. 175. Rejected as unnecessary. 176-177. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Adopted in Finding of Fact 83. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Findings of Fact 91-94. Adopted and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 83. Rejected in Findings of Fact 84-95. 185-189. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 85 but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected in Finding of Fact 97. Adopted in Finding of Fact 85. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 194-195. Rejected in Finding of Fact 92. 196-197. Rejected as unnecessary. 198. Adopted in Finding of Fact 85. 199-200. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 86 and rejected in Finding of Fact 93. Adopted in Finding of Fact 86. Adopted in Finding of Fact 87. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Findings of Fact 89, 90, 91. Adopted in Finding of Fact,.88. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88, but rejected in Finding of Fact 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 89. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of fact 43. 213-217. Rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant. 218. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. 219-220. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 98. 224-233. Missing. Adopted in Finding of Fact 98. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 24, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 236-241. Adopted in Finding of Fact 28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 96. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 245-246. Adopted in Finding of Fact 100. 247. Adopted in Finding of Fact 102. 248-250. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100, 101. 251. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100-102. 252-253. Adopted in Finding of Fact 101 Adopted in Finding of Fact 102. Adopted in Findings of Fact 100-102. 256-259. Rejected as cumulative. 260. Rejected as irrelevant. Rulings on Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 48. Rulings on University Community Hospital's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 49. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 48. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50, 56. Adopted in Findings of Fact 51, 52, 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 59. Adopted in Finding of Fact 61. 13-14. Rejected as unnecessary. 15. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 16-17. Adopted; in Findings of Fact 63-65. 18. Rejected as irrelevant 19-21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 68-71. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 72, 76, 77, 104. Adopted in Findings of Fact 56, 81. Adopted in Findings of Fact 80, 81 and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 27-35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85-94 but otherwise rejected, as cumulative and unnecessary. 36-38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85, 94. 39-40. Adopted in Findings of Fact 88, 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92. Adopted in Finding of Fact 73. 44-49. Adopted in Findings of Fact 96, 97 but otherwise rejected as cumulative, irrelevant and not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 69. Adopted in Finding of Fact 69, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 68, 95, 97. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 38, 50. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. 63-65. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 104. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. 70-71. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 72. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 106, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 73-76. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 96, 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 95, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 91, 97, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1,1, 107. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. 82-84. Adopted-in Finding of Fact 107, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Rulings on Tampa General's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 18. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 33, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 8-9. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 1, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 1, 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 12-13. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 82, 83, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7, 29, 57, 69, 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 72. Adopted in Findings of Fact 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 72. Adopted in Findings of Fact 49, 50. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54 and 72, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. 25-26. Rejected as irrelevant. 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 28-35. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 17, 21, 24, 25, 28, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 83, 97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 35. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 39-44. Adopted in Findings of Fact 63-65, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 45-51. Adopted in Findings of Fact 66-71, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 52-55. Adopted in Findings of Fact 36, 38, 50, 56, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Findings of Fact 12, 104. Adopted in Findings of Fact 14, 16, 72, 106. Adopted in Finding of Fact 106. Adopted in Findings of Fact 105, 106, 107. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 74. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. 64-65. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 74, but otherwise rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16 Adopted in Finding of Fact 73. 68-69. Rejected as unnecessary and without specific citations to the record. 70-73. Adopted in Findings of Fact 91, 94, 95, 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in part in Findings of Fact 81, 97. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 57, but otherwise rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 107. 77-83. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and irrelevant. Rulings on Town and Country's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-3. Introductory matters. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 19, 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Findings of Fact 24, 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected as unnecessary. 12-16. Adopted in Findings of Fact 87, 89, 90. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 18-24. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 25-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 67, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 27. Rejected as without citation to the record and cumulative. 28-37. Adopted in Findings of Fact 86, 93, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 38-39. Adopted in Findings of Fact 106-108. Rejected as without citation to record and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15, 50, 51. 42-44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4, 12, 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 11, 13, 72. 48. Rejected as without citation to the record and unnecessary 49-51. Rejected as unnecessary and not based on competent substantial evidence Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Rejected as without citation to the record and unnecessary. 54-55. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. 56. Adopted in Finding of Fact 54. 57-58. Adopted in Finding of Fact 58. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5, 60. 63-64. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 29, 70. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Findings of Fact 71, 95. 68-70. Adopted in Findings of Fact 45, 63-65. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary. Adopted in Findings of Fact 103-108. 73-74. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 75-77. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected as cumulative. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in Finding of Fact 105. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82. Rejected in Finding of Fact 99. 85-92. Rejected in Finding of Fact 98, and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 93-96. Rejected in Finding of Fact 99, and otherwise rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97. Rejected as unnecessary. 99-103. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 104-105. Adopted in Findings of Fact 95, 97, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 95. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 95. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 95, 97. 111-114. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 115-116. Adopted in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 117. Rejected as without citations to the record. 118-119. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. 120-122. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94. 123. Rejected as cumulative and without citations to the record. 124-128. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 129-130. Rejected as not based on competent substantial evidence. 131-133. Rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 134. Adopted in Finding of Fact 14. Rulings on Humana's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 19. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 8-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 13-14. Rejected as cumulative. 15-17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Adopted in Findings of Fact 53, 54. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 55. 24-41. Adopted in Findings of Fact 45, 63-65, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary and cumulative. 42-46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 21. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 59. 50-51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. 52. Rejected as unnecessary. 53-55. Adopted in Findings of Fact 85-95, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 56-57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 90. 58-66. Adopted in Findings of Fact 86, 93, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 67-71. Adopted in Findings of Fact 87, 89, 90, 91. Adopted in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected in Finding of Fact 88. Rejected as cumulative. 75-77. Adopted in Finding of Fact 94, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 78-81. Adopted in Finding of Fact 92. 82-85. Rejected as unnecessary. 86-92. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 97, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. 93-94. Adopted in Finding of Fact 82, but otherwise rejected as unnecessary. 95. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 4, 12. 96-97. Adopted in Findings of Fact 105, 106, 107. Rejected as cumulative. Adopted in Finding of Fact 61. 100-101. Adopted in Findings of Fact 63-65. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. 103-104. Rejected as cumulative. 105-107. Adopted in Findings of Fact 57, 107, 108. 108-109. Adopted in Finding of Fact 60. 110-114. Adopted in Findings of Fact 82, 83, but otherwise rejected as cumulative and unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 108. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as cumulative. 118-119. Adopted in Finding of Fact 62. 120-121. Adopted in Findings of Fact 72-75. 122. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50, 56. 123-125. Rejected in Finding of Fact 28 and as not based competent substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Ivan Wood, Esquire WOOD, LUCKSINGER & EPSTEIN The Park in Houston Center 1221 Lamar Street, Suite 1400 Houston, Texas 77010 Howard J. Hochman, Esquire Southeast Financial Center 200 S. Biscayne Blvd, Suite 3700 Miami, Florida 33131 James C. Hauser, Esquire Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 John Radey, Esquire 101 North Monroe Street, Suite 1000 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Cynthia Tunnicliff, Esquire Post Office Box 190 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Douglas L. Mannheimer, Esquire Post Office Drawer 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, Esquire Acting General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in these cases are whether Certificate of Need (CON) Application No. 10432 filed by East Florida-DMC, Inc. (DMC), to build an 80-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, or CON Application No. 10433 filed by The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida d/b/a Jackson Hospital West (JW), to build a 100-bed acute care hospital in Miami-Dade County, Florida, AHCA District 11, on balance, satisfy the applicable criteria; and, if so, whether either or both should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the parties’ stipulations, the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, other evidence presented at the final hearing, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County d/b/a Jackson Hospital West and Jackson Health System (JHS) JHS is a taxpayer-funded health system located in and owned by Miami-Dade County. It is governed by The Public Health Trust of Miami Dade-County, Florida (PHT), a seven-member board. JHS owns and operates three acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County--Jackson Memorial Hospital (JMH); Jackson North Medical Center (JN); and Jackson South Medical Center (JS)--as well as three specialty hospitals: Holtz Children’s Hospital (Holtz); Jackson Rehabilitation Hospital; and Jackson Behavioral Health Hospital. JHS also owns and operates numerous other non- hospital healthcare facilities within Miami-Dade County. JHS’s applicant in this proceeding is JW which, if approved, will be another acute care hospital in JHS. JHS is an academic teaching institution, and the University of Miami (UM) is JHS’s affiliated medical school. Over 1,000 UM residents staff JMH pursuant to an operating agreement with JHS. JN and JS are not academic medical centers. JHS annually receives sales tax and ad valorem tax revenues from Miami-Dade County in order to help fund its operations. JS and JN are community hospitals operated as part of JHS. JS was acquired in 2001. JS is licensed for 226 beds and is also home to a verified Level II trauma center. The JN facility was acquired by JHS in 2006. The facility is licensed for 382 beds. East Florida (DMC) DMC is an affiliate of HCA Healthcare, Inc. (HCA), the largest provider of acute care hospital services in the world. DMC will operate within HCA’s East Florida Division (EFD), which is comprised of 15 hospitals, 12 surgery centers, two diagnostic imaging centers, four freestanding emergency departments, nine behavioral health facilities, and one regional laboratory, along with other related services. There are three HCA-affiliated hospitals in Miami-Dade County: KRMC; Aventura Hospital and Medical Center (Aventura); and Mercy Hospital, a campus of Plantation General Hospital (Mercy). Kendall Regional (KRMC) KRMC, which is located at the intersection of the Florida Turnpike and Southwest 40th Street in Miami-Dade County, is a 417-bed tertiary provider comprised of 380 acute care beds, 23 inpatient adult psychiatric beds, eight Level II neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) beds, and five Level III NICU beds. It is a Baker Act receiving facility. KRMC is a verified Level I trauma center. It also has a burn program. KRMC is also an academic teaching facility, receiving freestanding institutional accreditation from the Accrediting Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) in 2013. KRMC currently has six residency programs including, among others, surgery, internal medicine, podiatry, anesthesia, and surgical critical care. Its teaching programs are affiliated with the University of South Florida, Nova Southeastern University, and Florida International University. KRMC also participates in scholarly and clinical research. In 2017, KRMC had over 82,000 Emergency Department (ED) visits. It treated over 115,000 total inpatients and outpatients that year. There are 850 physicians on KRMC’s medical staff. It offers a full range of medical surgery services, interventional procedures, obstetrics (OB), pediatric, and neonatal care, among many other service lines. KRMC primarily serves southern and western portions of Miami-Dade County but also receives referrals from the Florida Keys up through Broward County, Palm Beach County, and the Treasure Coast. Its main competitors include, but are not limited to: Baptist Hospital; Baptist West; South Miami Hospital; PGH; Hialeah; CGH; JS, and Palm Springs General Hospital. The Tenet Hospitals PGH, Hialeah, and CGH are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Tenet South Florida. These are all for-profit hospitals. PGH is a 368-bed tertiary facility that opened in the early 1970s. It has 297 licensed acute care beds, 48 adult psychiatric beds, 52 ICU beds, and 15 Level II NICU beds. It is located at the Palmetto Expressway and Northwest 122nd Street in Hialeah, Florida. The hospital employs about 1,700 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH is a tertiary-level facility offering a variety of specialty services, including adult open heart surgery, a comprehensive stroke center, and robotic surgery. It has inpatient mental health beds and serves the community as a Baker Act receiving facility. It also offers OB and Level II NICU services with approximately 1,500 births a year. It has approximately 70,000 ED visits and between 17,000 and 18,000 inpatient admissions per year. In addition to its licensed inpatient beds, PGH operates 31 observation beds. PGH is ACGME accredited and serves a significant teaching function in the community. It has approximately 89 residents and fellows. The hospital provides fellowships in cardiology, critical care and interventional cardiology, and also has rotations in neurology and gastroenterology. Residents from Larkin General Hospital also rotate through PGH. PGH generally serves the communities of Opa Locka, Hialeah, Miami Lakes, Hialeah Gardens, Doral, and Miami Springs. In reality, all of the hospitals in the county are competitors, but more direct competition comes from Palm Springs Hospital, Memorial in Miramar, Mount Sinai, Kendall, and even its sister hospital, Hialeah. Hialeah first opened in 1951 and is a 378-bed acute care facility. It has 356 acute care beds, 12 adult psychiatric beds, and 10 Level II NICU beds. The ED has 25 beds and about 40,000 visits per year. It has approximately 14,000 inpatient admissions and 1,400 babies delivered annually. It offers services including cardiac, stroke, robotic surgery, colorectal surgery, and OB services. The hospital has a Level II NICU with 12 beds. CGH is located in the City of Coral Gables and is near the border between Coral Gables and the City of Miami on Douglas Road. It first opened in 1926. Portions of the original structure are still in use. CGH has 245 licensed beds, over 725 employees, 367 physicians, and over 100 additional allied providers on its medical staff. The hospital has a full-service ED. Its service lines include general surgery, geriatrics, urology, treatment of cardiovascular and pulmonary disease, and others. The hospital has eight operating rooms and offers robotic surgery. The ED has 28 beds divided into the main area and a geriatric emergency room. It had about 25,000 ED visits last year, which is lower than prior years, due in part to the presence of over a dozen nearby urgent care centers. CGH has over 8,500 inpatient admissions per year and is not at capacity. While patient days have grown slightly, the average occupancy is still just a little over 40%, meaning, on average, it has over 140 empty inpatient beds on any given day. The hospital is licensed for 245 beds, but typically there are only 180 beds immediately available for use. Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA) AHCA is the state health-planning agency charged with administration of the CON program as set forth in sections 408.31-408.0455, Florida Statutes. The Proposals Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC proposes to build an 80-bed community hospital situated within the residential district of Doral. The hospital will be located in southwestern Doral in zip code 33126 and will serve the growing population of Doral, along with residential areas to the north and south of Doral. The hospital will be located in the City of Doral’s residential district on Northwest 41st Street between Northwest 109th Avenue to the east, and Northwest 112th Avenue to the west. Doral has seen significant growth in the past 15 years and has been consistently included on the list of the fastest growing cities in Florida. The new facility will have a bed complement of 80 licensed acute care beds, including 72 medical/surgical and eight OB beds. The proposed acute care hospital will be fully accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Healthcare Facilities and licensed by the State of Florida. No public funds will be utilized in construction of the hospital and it will contribute to the state, county, and municipal tax base as a proprietary corporation. DMC will offer a full range of non-tertiary services, including emergency services, imaging, surgery, intensive care, cardiac catheterization, and women's services, including an OB unit, and pediatric care. DMC will be a general medical facility that will include a general medical component and a surgery component. Although DMC will operate an OB unit, NICU services will not be offered at DMC. If DMC’s patients need more advanced services, including NICU, the EFD hopes they will receive them from KRMC. The open medical staff will be largely community-based, but University of Miami physicians would be welcome at DMC. Before the hospital is built, KRMC will construct and operate a freestanding emergency department (FSED) at the location that will eventually become the ED of DMC. Construction of the FSED is now underway, and Brandon Haushalter, chief executive officer (CEO) of KRMC, estimated that it will open in March or April of 2019. Jackson West JHS proposes to build a community hospital to be known as “Jackson West” near the eastern edge of Doral. The proposed 100-bed general acute care hospital would have medical surgical and obstetrical beds and offer basic acute care services. JHS is a public health system owned by Miami-Dade County. All of JHS’s assets, as well as its debts, belong to the county. JHS is a not-for-profit entity, and therefore does not pay taxes, though it receives hundreds of millions of dollars from property taxes and sales taxes in Miami-Dade County. JHS’s main campus is a large health campus located near the Midtown Miami area in between Allapattah (to the north) and Little Havana (to the south). In addition to JMH, the campus includes Holtz Children’s Hospital, a behavioral health hospital, an inpatient rehabilitation hospital, and several specialty clinics. Bascom-Palmer Eye Institute, a Veterans Administration hospital, and University of Miami Hospital are also located adjacent to Jackson West’s main campus. JMH is a 1,500-bed hospital with a wide array of programs and services, including tertiary and quaternary care, and a Level I trauma program, the Ryder Trauma Center. JMH receives patients from throughout Miami-Dade County, elsewhere in Florida, and internationally. JMH is a teaching hospital and has a large number of residents, as well as professors from the University of Miami, on staff. UM and JMH have had a relationship for many years, and in addition to research and teaching, UM provides physician staffing to JMH. JN is a 342-bed community hospital located in between Miami Gardens and North Miami Beach, just off of I-95 and the Turnpike. JS is a 252-bed community hospital located in the Palmetto Bay area just south of Kendall. It has stroke certification and interventional cardiology, and was recently approved for a trauma program, which began in May 2016. Both JN and JS were existing hospitals that were acquired by JHS. JHS has never built a hospital from the ground up. In 2014, JHS leadership directed its internal planning team to review the healthcare needs of county residents. JHS’s analysis identified a need for outpatient services in western Miami-Dade, the only remaining quadrant of the county in which JHS did not have a hospital or healthcare program at the time. As part of its due diligence, JHS then consulted healthcare firm Kurt Salmon & Associates (KSA) to independently evaluate the data. KSA’s investigation validated a need in the west county for adult and pediatric outpatient services, including need for an FSED. This prompted JHS to explore opportunities for expansion of outpatient services where needed: in the western corridor of Miami-Dade. This was also the genesis of JHS’s long-range plan to first build an FSED in the Doral area, to be followed ultimately by the addition of a general acute care hospital at the site. The JW site is a 27-acre parcel of land located just west of the Palmetto Expressway and north of 25th Street. The site is in an industrial area only a short distance from the western end of the runways at Miami International Airport. The site is located in zip code 33122, which is very sparsely populated. JW proposed a primary service area (PSA) consisting of zip codes 33126, 33144, 33166, 33172/33122, 33174, 33178, and 33182, and a secondary service area (SSA) of zip codes 33155, 33165, 33175, and 33184. JW intends to serve general, acute care non-tertiary patients and OB patients. Detailed below, trends in the JW service area do not demonstrate need for its proposed hospital. The location of the JW site will not contribute to the viability of the proposed hospital. According to 2010 census data, only 328 people live within a one-mile radius of the JW site. Since 2000, only 32 total people have moved into that same area around the JW site--an average of three per year. There are virtually no residences within a one-mile radius of the JW site. From 2000 to 2010, the population within a two- mile radius of the JW site decreased by a rate of 9.4%. The JW health planner projects JW’s home zip code of 33122 will have a total population of only eight (8) people in 2022. From 2012 to 2014, the use rate in the JW service area for non-tertiary patients decreased by 3.9%. That decline continued at a steeper pace of 4.2% from 2014 to 2017. This was largely due to the 65+ age cohort, the demographic of patients that utilize inpatient services the most. The 65+ age cohort is growing at a slower pace in the JW service area than in Miami- Dade or Florida as a whole. Non-tertiary discharges in the JW service area are declining at a greater pace than that of Miami- Dade County--negative 4.2% compared to negative 1.9%. The rate of projected population growth in the JW PSA is decreasing. The projected rate of growth for the JW service area is lower than that of Miami-Dade County and Florida as a whole. The OB patient base JW intends to rely on is projected to remain flat. The inpatient discharges for all ages in the JW service area have declined from 2014 to 2017. For ages 0-17, discharges in the JW service area declined 21.4% during that time period. The discharges for ages 18-44 declined by 4.8%, and the discharges for ages 45-64 declined by 8.9%. The discharges for the important 65+ age cohort declined by 0.1%. Specifically, the discharges for ages 65-74 declined by 6.5%, and the discharges for ages 75-84 declined by 3.3%. The discharges for ages 85+ are the only age cohort that has not declined from 2012 to 2017. Overall, the non-tertiary discharges per 1,000 population (i.e., use rate) for all ages in the JW service area declined from 2012 to 2014 by 6%, and from 2014 to 2017 by 7.8%. Despite these declines in discharges in the JW service area, the health planners who crafted the JW projections used a constant use rate for the 0-17, 18-44, and 45-64 age cohorts. The JW health planners used a declining use rate for the 65+ age cohort. These use rates were applied uniformly across all zip codes, despite wide variance in actual use rates in each zip code. Applying the zip code specific use rates in conjunction with the other assumptions used by the JW health planner demonstrates that the JW projections are unreasonable. For instance, JW’s reliance on a uniform use rate over-projects the number of discharges in JW PSA zip code 33178 by nearly 1,000 patients. This occurs because the population is only growing at a 2% rate in the zip code, but JW’s reliance on service area-wide projections cause the discharges to grow at an extraordinary rate of 8.9% per year. Applying actual use rates across all zip codes causes a drastic change in the JW PSA and SSA definition. Section 408.037(2) requires a CON applicant to identify its PSA and SSA by listing zip codes in which it will receive discharges in descending order, beginning with the zip code with the highest amount of discharges, then proceeding in diminishing order to the zip code with the lowest amount of discharges. The zip codes, which comprise 75% of discharges, constitute the PSA; and the remaining zip codes, which consist of the remaining 25% of discharges, makes up the SSA. However, JW did not project its utilization in this manner. In its application, JW did not define its service area, PSA, and SSA zip codes in descending order by number or percentage of discharges. When this correct adjustment is made, its PSA consists of zip codes 33126, 33172, 33178, 33174, 33144, and 33165; and its SSA consists of zip codes 33175, 33166, 33155, 33182, and 33184. Zip codes 33166 and 33182 were in the original JW PSA, and zip code 33165 was in the original JW SSA. As such, JW’s home zip code should actually be in its SSA. JW health planners call this illogical, but it demonstrates that the JW site is located within a zip code that has almost no population of potential patients. JHS is developing an FSED and outpatient/ambulatory facilities on the JW site regardless of whether its CON application for a hospital is approved. Construction has begun on the JW site, and JHS is actually building a “shelled in” structure intended to house a future hospital, notwithstanding lack of CON approval for the hospital. There is no contingency plan for use of the shelled-in hospital space if CON approval is not obtained. JHS executives unequivocally stated that they intend to continue pursuing CON approval for the JW hospital, even if the proposed DMC hospital is approved. Indeed, JHS has filed third and fourth CON applications for its proposed JW hospital. The budget for the JW campus is $252 million. Sixty to $70 million is being funded from a bond issuance approved by voters in Miami-Dade County. Notably, the bond referendum approved by voters made no mention of a new hospital. The remaining $180 to $190 million is being funded by JHS, which has chosen to only keep 50 days cash-on-hand, and put any surplus toward capital projects. This is well below the number of days cash-on-hand ws advisable for a system like JHS. The specific programs and services to be offered at JW have not been finalized, but it is clear that JW will be a small community hospital that will not offer anything unique or different from any of the existing hospitals in the area, nor will it operate NICU beds. Patients presenting to JW in need of specialized or tertiary services will need to be transferred to another hospital with the capability of serving them, most likely JMH. The Applicants’ Arguments Doral Medical Center (DMC) DMC’s arguments in support of its proposed hospital may be summarized as follows: Geographic features surrounding Doral create transportation access barriers for the residents of the area; Doral is a densely-populated community that is growing quickly and lacks a readily accessible hospital; KRMC, which is the provider of choice for Doral residents, is a growing tertiary facility that cannot sufficiently expand to meet its future demands. DMC will serve much of the same patient population currently served by KRMC and help decompress KRMC’s acute care load so KRMC can focus on its tertiary service lines; From a geographic standpoint, the Doral community and its patients are isolated from much of Miami-Dade County to the north, west, and east, and the nearest hospitals. East Florida-DMC is a subsidiary of HCA and would be a part of the HCA EFD. Michael Joseph is the president of the EFD, which includes 15 hospitals and other facilities from Miami north through the Treasure Coast. Mr. Joseph authorized the filing of the DMC CON application, which proposes an 80-bed basic acute care hospital that includes 72 medical surgical and eight OB beds. As noted, there will be neither unique services at DMC nor any tertiary services, such as a NICU. HCA anticipates that DMC patients needing tertiary services would be referred and treated at KRMC. The proposed hospital would be built on 41st Street, between Northwest 109th Avenue and Northwest 112th Avenue. This site is located on the western edge of Doral, just east of the Everglades. When the consultants were retained to write the first DMC CON application, HCA had already made the decision to go forward with the project. Mr. Joseph described Miami-Dade County as one of the most competitive markets in the country for hospital services. There is robust competition in the Miami-Dade market from the standpoints of payors, physicians, and the many hospitals located in the county, including Jackson, HCA, Tenet, Baptist and others. HCA is not proposing this project because any of the existing hospitals in the area do not provide good quality care. HCA is currently building an FSED on the DMC site that will open regardless of whether the DMC hospital is approved. Mr. Joseph acknowledged that there is a trend toward outpatient rather than inpatient care. Inpatient occupancy of acute care hospitals in Miami-Dade County has been declining in recent years. Managed care has added further pressure on reducing inpatient admissions. Surgical advances have also resulted in fewer inpatient admissions. Surgeries that formerly required an inpatient stay are now often done on an outpatient basis. Mr. Joseph agreed that 30 minutes is a reasonable travel time to access an acute care hospital. The home zip code for the proposed DMC hospital is 33178. KRMC’s market share for that zip code is 20%. Individuals in that zip code are currently accessing a wide variety of hospitals. PGH is only 6.7 miles away and has the fourth highest market share in that zip code. HCA’s healthcare planning expert, Dan Sullivan, acknowledged that, if approved, DMC would likely have an adverse financial impact on KRMC and other area hospitals. Several witnesses testified that the travel time from the DMC site to KRMC is about 10 minutes, and that an ambulance could do it in as little as five minutes. As to the argument that the residents of Doral face geographic access barriers, the evidence did not indicate that there is anything unique about Doral from a traffic standpoint compared to other parts of Miami-Dade County. People come in and out of Doral on a daily basis in significant numbers for work and other reasons via various access points. Witnesses agreed that 25 to 30 minutes is a reasonable drive time for non-tertiary acute care services, and the evidence showed that residents of Doral, and the DMC service area, are well within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals providing more intensive services than are proposed by DMC. Indeed, many residents of DMC’s service area are closer to other hospitals than to the DMC site. None of the DMC witnesses were able to identify any patient in Doral who had been unable to access acute care services, or had suffered a bad outcome because of travel from Doral to an area hospital. The evidence did not establish that there currently exists either geographic or financial access barriers within the service area proposed to be served by DMC. Jackson West As in its Batch One application, JW advances six arguments as to why its proposed hospital should be approved. They are: It will serve a significant amount of indigent and Medicaid patients. JHS already serves residents of the proposed service area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented,” in that residents go to a number of different hospitals to receive services. Development of the freestanding ED and ambulatory center is under way. JW would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and FIU. There is physician and community support for the project. JW will add to the financial viability of JHS and its ability to continue its mission. JW presented very little analysis of the types of factors typically considered in evaluating need for a new hospital. JW did not discuss existing providers and their programs and services, the utilization of existing hospitals, and whether they have excess capacity, or other important considerations. Instead, JW advanced the six arguments noted above, for approval of its proposed hospital, none of which truly relate to the issue of need. First, JW states that its proposed hospital will serve a significant level of Medicaid and indigent patients. While it is true that JHS serves a significant amount of Medicaid and indigent patients, there are a number of reasons why this is not a basis to approve its proposed hospital. As an initial matter, JW treads a fine line in touting its service to Medicaid and indigent patients, while also targeting Doral for its better payer mix and financial benefit to JHS. JHS also receives an enormous amount of tax dollars to provide care to indigent and underserved patients. While other hospitals in Miami-Dade County provide care to such patients, they do not receive taxpayer dollars, as does JHS, although they pay taxes, unlike JHS. Also, Medicaid is a good payer for JHS. With its substantial supplement, JHS actually makes money from Medicaid patients, and it costs the system more for a Medicaid patient to be treated at a JHS hospital than elsewhere. More significantly, there is not a large Medicaid or indigent population in Doral, nor evidence of financial access issues in Doral. Second, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because JHS already serves patients from the Doral area, which JW characterizes as “fragmented” because area residents go to several different hospitals for care. This so- called “fragmentation” is not unique to Doral, and is not unusual in a densely-populated urban market with several existing hospitals. The same phenomenon occurs in other areas of Miami-Dade County, some of which actually have a hospital in the localized area. The fact that Doral residents are accessing several different hospitals demonstrates that there are a number of existing providers that are accessible to them. As discussed in greater detail below, residents of the Doral area have choices in every direction (other than to the west, which is the Everglades). JHS itself already serves patients from the Doral area. If anything, this tells us that patients from Doral currently have access to the JHS hospitals. Third, JW argues that its CON application should be approved because development of the JW campus is under way. This is irrelevant to the determination of need, and is simply a statement of JHS’s intent to build an FSED and outpatient facilities on a piece of land that was acquired for that purpose, regardless of CON approval. Fourth, JW argues for approval of its proposed hospital because it would provide an additional opportunity to partner with UM and Florida International University (FIU). However, the statutory criteria no longer addresses research and teaching concerns, and JHS’s relationship with UM or FIU has no bearing on whether there is a need for a new hospital in the Doral area. Moreover, JW did not present any evidence of how it would partner with UM or FIU at JW, and there does not seem to be any set plans in this regard. Fifth, JW claims that there is physician and community support for its proposed hospital, but it is very common for CON applicants to obtain letters in support for applications. Indeed, the DMC application was also accompanied by letters of support. Sixth and finally, JW argues that its proposed hospital will add to the financial viability of HSA and allow it to continue its mission. However, JW provided no analysis of the projected financial performance of its proposed hospital to substantiate this. The only financial analysis in the record is from KSA, a consulting firm that JHS hired to analyze the programs and services to be developed at JW. The KSA analysis posits that the JW FSED project will lose millions of dollars and not achieve break-even unless there is an inpatient hospital co-located there so that JW can take advantage of the more lucrative hospital-based billing and reimbursement. The sixth “need” argument relates to the issue of JHS’s historical financial struggles, which bear discussion. Only a handful of years ago, the entire JHS was in dire financial trouble, so much so that selling all or parts of it was considered. Days cash-on-hand was in the single digits, and JHS fell out of compliance with bond covenants. JHS’s financial difficulties prompted the appointment of an outside monitor to oversee JHS’s finances. Price Waterhouse served in that role, and made several recommendations for JHS to improve its revenue cycle, make accounting adjustments, and improve its staffing and efficiency. As a result of these recommendations, JHS went through a large reduction in force, and began to more closely screen the income and residency of its patients. As a result of these measures, overall financial performance has since improved. Despite its improved financial position, JHS still consistently loses money on operations, including a $362,000,915 loss as of June 30, 2018. JHS clearly depends upon the hundreds of millions of non-operating tax-based revenues it receives annually. JHS’s CEO expressed concerns over decreases in the system’s non-operating revenue sources, and claimed that JHS needs to find ways to increase its operating revenue to offset this. JW is being proposed as part of this strategy. However, JHS’s chief financial officer testified that “the non-operating revenues are a fairly stable source of income.” In fact, JHS’s tax revenues have gone up in the last few years. JHS sees the more affluent Doral area as a source of better paying patients that will enhance the profitability of its new hospital. Beyond this aspiration however, there is no meaningful analysis of the anticipated financial performance of its proposed hospital. This is a glaring omission given that a significant impetus for spending millions of public dollars on a new hospital is to improve JHS’s overall financial position. The KSA analysis referenced above determined that changes to the Hospital Outpatient Prospective Payment System rule would result in the JW campus losing hundreds of millions of dollars and never reaching “break even,” absent an inpatient hospital on the campus for “hospital based” billing and reimbursement. Though a financial benefit to the system, the increased reimbursement JHS would receive by having an inpatient hospital on the JW campus would be a financial burden on the healthcare delivery system since it would cost more for the same patient to receive the same outpatient services in a hospital- based facility. Reports by KSA also state that a strategic purpose of JW is to attract patients that would otherwise go to nearby facilities like PGH and Hialeah, and to capture tertiary or higher complexity cases which would then be sent to JMH. JW’s witnesses and healthcare planning experts fully expect this to happen. In 2015, and again in 2017, JHS conducted a “Community Health Needs Assessment,” which is required by law to be performed by public safety net hospitals. The assessments were conducted by gathering responses to various questions from a wide array of community leaders and stakeholders, including the CEOs of JHS’s hospitals, about the healthcare needs of the community. The final Community Health Needs Assessment documents are lengthy and cover a variety of health-related topics, but most notable for this case is that: (1) nowhere in either the 2015 or 2017 assessment is the development of a new hospital recommended; and (2) expansion into western Miami-Dade County scored by far the lowest on a list of priorities for JHS. In its application and at hearing, JW took the position that JW can enter the Doral area market without impacting existing providers to any meaningful extent. While JW acknowledges that its proposed hospital would impact the Tenet Hospitals, it argues that the impact is not significant. The evidence established that the financial impact to the Tenet Hospitals (calculated based upon lost contribution margin) would total roughly $3 million for lost inpatients, and $5.2 million including lost outpatients. While these losses will not put the Tenet Hospitals in financial peril, they are nonetheless significant and material. The Existing Healthcare Delivery System Miami-Dade County is home to 18 freestanding acute care hospitals, comprising a total of 7,585 licensed and approved acute care beds. With an average annual occupancy of 53.8% in calendar year 2017, there were, on average, approximately 3,500 unoccupied acute care beds in the county on any given day. While the countywide occupancy rate fluctuates from year to year, it has been on a downward trend in the past several years. As pointed out by several witnesses, the lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need. In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. The population of Doral currently is only about 59,000 people. It is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. As set forth in JW’s CON application, the better payer mix in Doral was a significant factor behind its decision to file its CON application. Although there is not a hospital within the Doral city limits, there are a number of healthcare providers in Doral and several hospitals nearby. PGH and Palm Springs Hospital are just north of Doral. KRMC is just south of Doral. Hialeah is northeast of Doral. CGH, Westchester General, and NCH are southeast of Doral. JMH and all of its facilities are east of Doral. And there are others within reasonable distance. KRMC is only six miles due south of the proposed DMC site, and PGH is just eight miles north of the DMC site. As to the JW site, PGH is 6.9 miles distant, CGH is 8.6 miles distant, and Hialeah is 7.4 miles distant. Residents of the Doral area have many choices in hospitals with a wide array of services, and they are accessing them. The parties to this case, as well as other existing hospitals, all have a share of the Doral area market. JW calls this “fragmentation” of the market and casts it in a negative light, but the evidence showed this to be a normal phenomenon in an urban area like Miami, with several hospitals in healthy competition with each other. Among the experts testifying at the hearing, it was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates are on the decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing use rates for inpatient services, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. Recognizing the need for outpatient services in the Doral area, both JW and DMC (or, more accurately, their related entities) have proposed outpatient facilities and services to be located in Doral. Kendall Regional Medical Center KRMC is currently the dominant hospital provider in the Doral area. Regarding his motivation for filing the DMC application, Mr. Joseph readily admitted “it’s as much about protecting what I already currently provide, number one.” KRMC treats Medicaid and indigent patients. KRMC has never turned away a patient because it did not have a contract with a Medicaid-managed care company. The CEO agreed that there is no access problem for Medicaid or charity patients justifying a new hospital. It was argued that KRMC is crowded, and the DMC hospital would help “decompress” KRMC, but the evidence showed that KRMC has a number of licensed beds that are not being used for inpatients. In addition, its ED has never gone on diversion, and no patient has ever been turned away due to the lack of a bed. Moreover, the census at KRMC has been declining. It had 25,324 inpatient admissions in 2015, 24,649 admissions in 2016, and 23,301 in 2017. The most recent data available at the time of hearing reflected that KRMC has been running at a little less than 75% occupancy, before its planned bed additions. KRMC is between an eight to 10 minute drive from Doral, and currently has the largest market share within the applicants’ defined service areas. KRMC is readily available and accessible to the residents of Doral. KRMC currently has a $90 million dollar expansion project under way. It involves adding beds and two new floors to the West Tower--a new fifth floor which will add 24 ICU beds and 24 step-down beds, and a new sixth floor which will house the relocated pediatric unit and 12 new medical-surgical beds. KRMC is also adding a new nine-story, 765 parking space garage and other ancillary space. This expansion will reduce the occupancy rate of KRMC’s inpatient units, and in particular its ICUs. These bed additions, in conjunction with increasing emphasis on outpatient services and the resultant declining inpatient admissions, will alleviate any historical capacity constraints KRMC may have had. There are also a number of ways KRMC could be further expanded in the future if needed. The West Tower is designed so it could accommodate a seventh floor, and the East Tower is also designed so that an additional floor could also be added to it. In addition, KRMC recently completed construction of a new OR area that is built on pillars. The new construction includes a third floor of shelled-in space that could house an additional 12 acute care beds. Moreover, this new OR tower was designed to go up an additional two to three floors beyond the existing shelled-in third floor. It is clear that KRMC has implemented reasonable strategies for addressing any bed capacity issues it may have experienced in the past. Decompression of KRMC is not a reason to approve DMC. Palmetto General Hospital Evidence regarding PGH was provided by its CEO Ana Mederos. Ms. Mederos is a registered nurse and has lived in Miami-Dade County for many years. She has a master of business education from Nova University and has worked in several different hospitals in the county. Specifically, she was the chief operating officer (COO) at Cedars Medical Center, the CEO at North Shore Medical Center, the CEO at Hialeah Hospital, and has been the CEO at PGH since August of 2006. Ms. Mederos is one of the few witnesses that actually lives in Doral. She travels in and out of the area on a daily basis. Her average commute is only about 15 minutes, and she has multiple convenient options in and out of Doral. PGH is located just off the Palmetto Expressway at 68th Street. It opened in the early 1970s and has 368 licensed beds, including 52 ICU beds. The hospital employs about 1,800 people and has over 600 physicians on its medical staff. PGH’s occupancy has declined from 79.8% in 2015 to 64% in 2016, and even further to 56.7% in 2017. There are many reasons for this decline, including pressure from managed care organizations, the continued increase in the use of outpatient procedures, improvements in technology, and increased competition in the Miami-Dade County market. Ms. Mederos expects that inpatient demand will continue to decline into the foreseeable future. PGH recently activated 31 observation beds to help improve throughput and better accommodate the increasing number of observation patients. PGH offers high-quality care and uses various metrics and indicators to measure and monitor what is going on in the hospital. The hospital has also been recognized with numerous awards. Through its parent, Tenet, PGH has contracts with just about every insurance and managed care company that serves the community. The hospital treats Medicaid and indigent patients. PGH’s Medicaid rate of $3,580 per patient is significantly lower than the rate paid to JMH. PGH has an office dedicated to helping patients get qualified for Medicaid or other financial resources, which not only helps the hospital get paid for its services, it also assists patients and families to make sure that they have benefits on an ongoing basis. Roughly 9-10% of PGH’s patients annually are completely unfunded. PGH only transfers patients if there is a need for a service not provided at the hospital, or upon the patient’s request. PGH does not transfer patients just because they cannot pay. PGH pays physicians to take calls in the ED which also obligates those physicians to provide care to patients that are seen at the hospital. PGH is a for-profit hospital that pays income taxes and property taxes, and does not receive any taxpayer subsidies like those received by JHS. Ms. Mederos reviewed the applications of JW and DMC, and articulated a number of reasons why, in her opinion, neither application should be approved. She sees no delays in providing care to anyone in the area, as there are hospitals serving Doral in every direction. There are a multitude of FSEDs available and additional FSEDs are being built in Doral by both applicants. There is another FSED being built close to PGH by Mount Sinai Medical Center. NCH has also opened an FSED that has negatively affected the volume of pediatric patients seen at PGH. There are also multiple urgent care centers. It was Ms. Mederos’ firm belief that persons living in Doral have reasonable geographic access to both inpatient and outpatient medical services. Ms. Mederos’ testimony in this regard is credited. There are no programs or services being proposed by either applicant that are not already available in the area. Ms. Mederos also noted that there is currently no problem with access to OB services in the area. However, she has a particular concern in that both applicants propose to offer OB services, but neither is proposing to offer NICU services. The evidence showed that most all of the hospitals that provide OB services to the Doral area offer at least Level II and some Level III NICU services. Thus, in terms of OB care, both proposed hospitals would be a step below what has developed as the standard of care for OB patients in the county. Ms. Mederos acknowledged that PGH does not have a huge market share in the zip codes that the applicants are proposing to serve, but that does not mean that the impact from either would not be real and significant. If a hospital is built by either applicant, it will need physicians, with some specialists in short supply. There are tremendous shortages in certain medical fields, such as orthopedics and neurology. In addition, there will be additional competition for nurses and other staff, which will increase the cost of healthcare. The loss of $1.3 to $2 million in contribution margin, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, is a negative impact on PGH as hospital margins become thinner, and those numbers do not include costs like those needed to recruit and retain staff. PGH is again experiencing a nursing shortage, and losing nurses, incurring the higher cost for contract labor, paying overtime, and essentially not having the staff to provide the required services is a serious potential adverse impact from either proposed new hospital. JHS also tends to provide more lucrative benefits than PGH, and a nearby JW hospital is a threat in that regard. As a final note, Ms. Mederos stated that her conviction that there is no need for either proposed hospital in Doral is even more resolute than when she testified in the Batch One Case. With continued declines in admissions, length of stay and patient days, the development of more services for the residents of Doral, the shortages of doctors and nurses, the ever increasing role of managed care that depresses the demand for inpatient hospital services and other factors, she persuasively explained why no new hospitals are needed in the Doral area. Coral Gables Hospital (CGH) Maria Cristina Jimenez testified on behalf of CGH, where she has worked in a variety of different capacities since 1985. She was promoted to CEO in March 2017. She has lived in Miami her entire life. Ms. Jimenez has been involved in initiatives to make her hospital more efficient. She is supportive of efforts to reduce inpatient hospitalizations and length of stay, as this is what is best for patients. Overall, the hospital length of stay is dropping, which adds to the decreasing demand for inpatient services. CGH is accredited by the Joint Commission, has received multiple awards, and provides high-quality care to its patients. It also has contracts with a broad array of managed care companies as do the other Tenet hospitals. CGH treats Medicaid patients, and its total Medicaid rate is less than $3,500 per inpatient. The hospital has a program similar to PGH to help patients get qualified for Medicaid and other resources. CGH also provides services to indigent patients, and self-pay/charity is about 6% of the hospital’s total admissions. The hospital does not transfer patients just because they are indigent. Physicians are compensated to provide care in the emergency room and are expected to continue with that care if the patients are admitted to the hospital, even if they do not have financial resources. CGH also pays income and property taxes, but does not receive any taxpayer support. CGH generally serves the Little Havana, Flagami, Miami, and Coral Gables communities, and its service area overlaps with those of the applicants. In order to better serve its patients and to help it compete in the highly competitive Miami-Dade County marketplace, CGH is developing a freestanding ED at the corner of Bird Road and Southwest 87th Avenue, which is scheduled to open in January 2020. This will provide another resource for patients in the proposed service areas. Ms. Jimenez had reviewed the CON applications at issue in this case. She does not believe that either hospital should be approved because it will drain resources from CGH, not only from a financial standpoint, but also physician and nurse staffing. CGH experiences physician shortages. Urologists are in short supply, as are gastrointestinal physicians that perform certain procedures. Hematology, oncology, and endocrinology are also specialty areas with shortages. The addition of another hospital will exacerbate those shortages at CGH. While CGH does not have a large market share in the proposed PSA of either applicant, anticipated impact from approval of either is real and substantial. A contribution margin loss of $1.2 to $2.2 million per year, as projected by Tenet’s healthcare planner, would be significant. The drain on resources, including staff and physicians, is also of significant concern. Hialeah Hospital Dr. Jorge Perez testified on behalf of Hialeah. Dr. Perez is a pathologist and medical director of laboratory at the hospital. More significantly, Dr. Perez has been on the hospital’s staff since 2001 and has served in multiple leadership roles, including chair of the Performance Improvement Council, chief of staff; and since 2015, chair of the Hialeah Hospital Governing Board. Hialeah offers obstetrics services and a Level II NICU with 12 beds. Approximately 1,400 babies a year are born there. Hialeah’s occupancy has been essentially flat for the past three years, at below 40%, and it clearly has ample excess capacity. On an average day, over 200 of Hialeah’s beds are unoccupied. Like other hospitals in the county, Hialeah has a number of competitors. The growth of managed care has affected the demand for inpatient beds and services at Hialeah. Hialeah treats Medicaid and indigent patients. Approximately 15% of Hialeah’s admissions are unfunded. As with its sister Tenet hospitals, Hialeah is a for- profit hospital that pays taxes and does not receive tax dollars for providing care to the indigent. Dr. Perez succinctly and persuasively identified a variety of reasons why no new hospital is needed in Doral. First and foremost, there is plenty of capacity at the existing hospitals in the area, including Hialeah. Second, both inpatient admissions and length of stay continue trending downward. Care continues to shift toward outpatient services, thereby reducing the demand for inpatient care. According to Dr. Perez, if a new hospital is approved in Doral it will bring with it adverse impacts on existing hospitals, including Hialeah. A new hospital in Doral will attract patients, some of which would have otherwise gone to Hialeah. Moreover, Doral has more insured patients, meaning the patients that would be lost would be good payors. There would also be a significant risk of loss of staff to a new hospital. Dr. Perez’s testimony in this regard is credible. Statutory and Rule Review Criteria In 2008, the Florida Legislature streamlined the review criteria applicable for evaluating new hospital applications. Mem’l Healthcare Grp. v. AHCA, Case No. 12- 0429CON, RO at 32 (Fla. DOAH Dec. 7, 2012). The criteria specifically eliminated included quality of care, availability of resources, financial feasibility, and the costs and methods of proposed construction. Lee Mem’l Health System v. AHCA, Case No. 13-2508CON, RO at 135 (Fla. DOAH Mar. 28, 2014). The remaining criteria applicable to new hospital projects are set forth at section 408.035(1), Florida Statutes. Section 408.035(1)(a): The need for the healthcare facilities and health services being proposed. Generally, CON applicants are responsible for demonstrating need for new acute care hospitals, typically in the context of a numeric need methodology adopted by AHCA. However, AHCA has not promulgated a numeric need methodology to calculate need for new hospital facilities. Florida Administrative Code Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) provides that if no agency need methodology exists, the applicant is responsible for demonstrating need through a needs assessment methodology, which must include, at a minimum, consideration of the following topics, except where they are inconsistent with the applicable statutory and rule criteria: Population demographics and dynamics; Availability, utilization and quality of like services in the district, subdistrict, or both; Medical treatment trends; and Market conditions. Both applicants propose to build small community hospitals providing basic acute care and OB services in the Doral area of western Miami-Dade County. Both applicants point to the increasing population and the lack of an acute care hospital in Doral as evidence of need for a hospital. The DMC application focuses largely on geographic access concerns, while the JW application is premised upon six arguments as to why JHS contends its proposed JW hospital should be approved. The lack of a hospital in Doral is not itself an indication of need.3/ In addition, population growth, and the demands of the population for inpatient hospital beds, cannot be considered in a vacuum. Sound healthcare planning requires an analysis of existing area hospitals, including the services they offer and their respective locations; how area residents travel to existing hospitals, and any barriers to access; the utilization of existing hospitals and amount of capacity they have; and other factors which may be relevant in a given case. Doral is in the west/northwest part of Miami-Dade County, in between the Miami International Airport (to the east) and the Everglades (to the west). It is surrounded by major roadways, with US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road running diagonally to the north, US Highway 836/Dolphin Expressway running along its southern edge, US Highway 826/Palmetto Expressway running north-south to the east, and the Florida Turnpike running north- south along the western edge of Doral. To the west of the Turnpike is the Everglades, where there is minimal population and very limited development possible in the future. The City of Doral itself has an area of about 15 square miles, and is only two or three times the size of the Miami International Airport, which sits just east of Doral. Much of Doral is commercial and industrial, with the largest concentration of residential areas being in the northwest part of the city. While there is unquestionably residential growth in Doral, the population of Doral is currently only about 59,000 people. Doral is not as densely populated as many areas of Miami-Dade County, has a number of golf course communities, and is generally a more affluent area with a higher average household income than much of Miami-Dade County. JW proposes to locate its hospital on the eastern side of Doral, just west of Miami International Airport, while the DMC site is on the western side of Doral, just east of the Everglades. JW’s site is located in an industrial area with few residents, while the DMC site is located in an area where future growth is likely to be limited. Both sites have downsides for development of a hospital, with both applicants spending considerable time at hearing pointing out the flaws of each other’s chosen location. Both applicants define their service areas to include the City of Doral, but also areas outside of Doral. Notably, the entire DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, with the exception of one small area. While the population of Doral itself is only 59,000 people, there are more concentrated populations in areas outside of Doral (except to the west). However, the people in these areas are closer to existing hospitals like PGH, Hialeah, KRMC, and others. For the population inside Doral, there are several major roadways in and out of Doral, and area residents can access several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity within a 20-minute drive time, many closer than that. It was undisputed that inpatient acute care hospital use rates continue to decline. There are different reasons for this, but it was uniformly recognized that decreasing inpatient use rates, and a shift toward outpatient services, are ongoing trends in the market. These trends existed at the time of the Batch One Case. As observed by Tenet’s healthcare planner at hearing: “The occupancy is lower today than it was two years ago, the use rates are lower, and the actual utilization is lower.” Both applicants failed to establish a compelling case of need. While there is growth in the Doral area, it remains a relatively small population, and there was no evidence of community needs being unmet. Sound healthcare planning, and the statutory criteria, require consideration of existing hospitals, their availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization. These considerations weigh heavily against approval of either CON application, even more so than in the prior case. Section 408.035(1)(b): The availability, accessibility, and extent of utilization of existing healthcare facilities and health services in the service district of the applicant; and Section 408.035(1)(e): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare for residents of the service district. As stated above, there are several existing hospitals in close proximity to Doral. Thus, the question is whether they are accessible and have capacity to serve the needs of patients from the Doral area. The evidence overwhelmingly answers these questions in the affirmative. Geographic access was a focal point of the DMC application, which argued that there are various barriers to access in and around Doral, such as a canal that runs parallel to US Highway 27/Okeechobee Road, train tracks and a rail yard, industrial plants, and the airport. While the presence of these things is undeniable, as is the fact that there is traffic in Miami, based upon the evidence presented, they do not present the barriers that DMC alleges. Rather, the evidence was undisputed that numerous hospitals are accessible within 20 minutes of the proposed hospital sites, and some within 10 to 15 minutes. All of Doral is within 30 minutes of multiple hospitals. These are reasonable travel times and are not indicative of a geographic access problem, regardless of any alleged “barriers.” In addition, existing hospitals clearly have the capacity to serve the Doral community, and they are doing so. Without question, there is excess capacity in the Miami-Dade County market. With approximately 7,500 hospital beds in the county running at an average occupancy just over 50%, there are around 3,500 beds available at any given time. Focusing on the hospitals closest to Doral (those accessible within 20 minutes), there are hundreds of beds that are available and accessible from the proposed service areas of the applicants. KRMC is particularly noteworthy because of its proximity to, and market share in, the Doral area. The most recent utilization and occupancy data for KRMC indicate that it has, on average, 100 vacant beds. This is more than the entire 80-bed hospital proposed in the DMC application (for a service area that is already served and subsumed by KRMC). Moreover, KRMC is expanding, and will soon have even more capacity at its location less than a 10-minute drive from the DMC site. From a programmatic standpoint, neither applicant is proposing any programs or services that are not already available at numerous existing hospitals, and, in fact, both would offer fewer programs and services than other area hospitals. As such, patients in need of tertiary or specialized services will still have to travel to other hospitals like PGH, KRMC, or JMH. Alternatively, if they present to a small hospital in Doral in need of specialized services, they will then have to be transferred to an appropriate hospital that can treat them. The same would be true for babies born at either DMC or JW in need of a NICU. Similarly, there are bypass protocols for EMS to take cardiac, stroke, and trauma patients to the closest hospital equipped to treat them, even if it means bypassing other hospitals not so equipped, like JW and DMC. Less acute patients can be transported to the closest ED. And since both applicants are building FSEDs in Doral, there will be ample access to emergency services for residents of Doral. This criterion does not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital. To the contrary, the evidence overwhelmingly established that existing hospitals are available and accessible to Doral area residents. Section 408.035(1)(e), (g) and (i): The extent to which the proposed services will enhance access to healthcare, the extent to which the proposal will foster competition that promotes quality and cost-effectiveness, and the applicant’s past and proposed provision of healthcare services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. It goes without saying that any new hospital is going to enhance access to the people closest to its location; but as explained above, there is no evidence of an access problem, or any pressing need for enhanced access to acute care hospital services. Rather, the evidence showed that Doral area residents are within very reasonable travel times to existing hospitals, most of which have far more extensive programs and services than either applicant is proposing to offer. Indeed, the proposed DMC service area is contained within KRMC’s existing service area, and KRMC is only 10 minutes from the DMC site. Neither applicant would enhance access to tertiary or specialized services, and patients in need of those services will still have to travel to other hospitals, or worse, be transferred after presenting to a Doral hospital with more limited programs and services. Although it was not shown to be an issue, access to emergency services is going to be enhanced by the FSEDs being built by both applicants. Thus, to the extent that a new hospital would enhance access, it would be only for non-emergent patients in need of basic, non-tertiary level care. Existing hospitals are available and easily accessible to these patients. In addition, healthy competition exists between several existing providers serving the Doral area market. That healthy competition would be substantially eroded by approval of the DMC application, as HCA would likely capture a dominant share of the market. While approval of the JW application might not create a dominant market share for one provider, it would certainly not promote cost-effectiveness given the fact that it costs the system more for the same patient to receive services at a JHS hospital than other facilities. Indeed, approval of JW’s application would mean that the JW campus will have the more expensive hospital-based billing rates. Florida Medicaid diagnosis related group (DRG) payment comparisons among hospitals are relevant because both DMC and JW propose that at least 22% of their patients will be Medicaid patients. Data from the 2017-18 DRG calculator provided by the Medicaid program office was used to compare JHS to the three Tenet hospitals, KRMC, and Aventura Hospital, another EFD hospital in Miami-Dade County. The data shows that JHS receives the highest Medicaid rate enhancement per discharge for the same Medicaid patients ($2,820.06) among these six hospitals in the county. KRMC receives a modest enhancement of $147.27. Comparison of Medicaid Managed Care Reimbursement over the period of fiscal years 2014-2016 show that JHS receives substantially more Medicaid reimbursement per adjusted patient day than any of the hospitals in this proceeding, with the other hospitals receiving between one-third and one-half of JHS reimbursement. In contrast, among all of these hospitals, KRMC had the lowest rate for each of the three years covered by the data, which means KRMC (and by extension DMC) would cost the Medicaid program substantially less money for care of Medicaid patients. Under the new prospective payment system instituted by the State of Florida for Medicaid reimbursement of acute care hospital providers, for service between July 1, 2018, and March 31, 2019, JHS is the beneficiary of an automatic rate enhancement of more than $8 million. In contrast, KRMC’s rate enhancement is only between $16,000 and $17,000. Thus, it will cost the Medicaid program substantially more to treat a patient using the same services at JW than at DMC. Furthermore, rather than enhance the financial viability of the JHS system, the evidence indicates that the JW proposal will be a financial drain on the JHS system. Finally, JHS’s past and proposed provision of care to Medicaid and indigent patients is noteworthy, but not a reason to approve its proposed hospital. JW is proposing this hospital to penetrate a more affluent market, not an indigent or underserved area, and it proposes to provide Medicaid and indigent care at a level that is consistent with the existing hospitals. JHS also receives the highest Low Income Pool (LIP) payments per charity care of any system in the state, and is one of only a handful of hospital systems that made money after receipt of the LIP payments. HCA-affiliated hospitals, by comparison, incur the second greatest cost in the state for charity care taking LIP payments into consideration. Analysis of standardized net revenues per adjusted admission (NRAA) among Miami-Dade County acute care hospitals, a group of 16 hospitals, shows JHS to be either the second or the third highest hospital in terms of NRAA. KRMC, in contrast, part of the EFD/HCA hospitals, is about 3% below the average of the 16 hospitals for NRAA. DMC’s analysis of standardized NRAA using data from 2014, 2015, and 2016, among acute care hospitals receiving local government tax revenues, shows JHS receives more net revenue than any of the other hospitals in this grouping. Using data from FY 2014 to FY 2016, DMC compared hospital costs among the four existing providers that are parties to this proceeding and JMH as a representative of JHS. Standardizing for case mix, fiscal year end, and location, an analysis of costs per adjusted admission shows that the hospitals other than JMH have an average cost of between a half and a third of JMH’s average cost. The same type of analysis of costs among a peer group of eight statutory teaching hospitals shows JHS’s costs to be the highest. It should also be noted that if JW were to fail or experience significant losses from operations, the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County will be at risk. In contrast, if DMC were to fail financially, EFD/HCA will shoulder the losses. When the two applications are evaluated in the context of the above criteria, the greater weight of the evidence does not mitigate in favor of approval of either. However, should AHCA decide to approve one of the applicants in its final order, preference should be given to DMC because of its lower costs per admission for all categories of payors, and in particular, the lower cost to the Florida Medicaid Program. In addition, the risk of financial failure would fall upon EFD/HCA, rather than the taxpayers of Miami-Dade County. Rule 59C-1.008(2)(e): Need considerations. Many of the considerations enumerated in rule 59C- 1.008(2)(e) overlap with the statutory criteria, but there are certain notable trends and market conditions that warrant mention. Specifically, while the population of Doral is growing, it remains relatively small, and does not itself justify a new hospital. And while there are some more densely populated areas outside of the city of Doral, they are much closer to existing hospitals having robust services and excess capacity. Doral is a more affluent area, and there was no evidence of any financial or cultural access issues supporting approval of either CON application. The availability, utilization, and quality of existing hospitals are clearly not issues, as there are several existing hospitals with plenty of capacity accessible to Doral area residents. In terms of medical treatment trends, it was undisputed that use rates for inpatient hospital services continue trending downward, and that trend is expected to continue. Concomitantly, there is a marked shift toward outpatient services in Miami-Dade County and elsewhere. Finally, both applicants are proposing to provide OB services without a NICU, which is below the standard in the market. While not required for the provision of obstetrics, NICU backup is clearly the most desirable and best practice. For the foregoing reasons, the considerations in rule 59C-1.008(2)(e) do not weigh in favor of approval of either hospital.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Healthcare Administration enter a final order denying East Florida-DMC, Inc.’s CON Application No. 10432 and denying The Public Health Trust of Miami-Dade County, Florida, d/b/a Jackson Hospital West’s CON Application No. 10433. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 2019.
Conclusions Having reviewed the Administrative Complaint, and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration finds and concludes as follows: 1. The Agency has jurisdiction over the above-named Respondent pursuant to Chapter 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and the applicable authorizing statutes and administrative code provisions. 2. The Agency issued the attached Administrative Complaint and Election of Rights form to the Respondent. (Ex. 1) The Election of Rights form advised of the right to an administrative hearing. 3. The parties have since entered into the attached Settlement Agreement. (Ex. 2) Based upon the foregoing, it is ORDERED: 1. The Settlement Agreement is adopted and incorporated by reference into this Final Order. The parties shall comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Respondent shall pay the Agency $2,500.00 in administrative fines. If full payment has been made, the cancelled check acts as receipt of payment and no further payment is required. If full payment has not been made, payment is due within 30 days of the Final Order. Overdue amounts are subject to statutory interest and may be referred to collections. A check made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration” and containing the AHCA ten-digit case number should be sent to: Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 1 Filed November 8, 2011 1:23 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Conditional licensure status is imposed on the Respondent beginning on January 28, 2011 and ending on April 18, 2011. ORDERED at Tallahassee, Florida, on this 7) day of LV. Dieeber , 2011. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the below-named persons by the method designated on this Pay of VA Pe a , 2011. Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg. #3, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Telephone: (850) 412-3630 Jan Mills Finance & Accounting Facilities Intake Unit Revenue Management Unit (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Thomas J. Walsh II Jonathon S. Grout, Esq. Office of the General Counsel Goldsmith & Grout Agency for Health Care Administration Counsel for Respondent (Electronic Mail) 2431 Aloma Avenue, suite 249 Winter Park, Florida 32792 .S. Mail Charles A. Stampelos Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings (Electronic Mail)
Findings Of Fact Introduction Tampa General Hospital is a 530-bed short-term general acute care hospital. Hillsborough County Hospital is a 157 bed-general acute-care hospital. Both are divisions of Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public hospital system located in Tampa, Florida. T. 25; Hearing Officer Ex. 1. Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital filed timely petitions for formal administrative hearings, and have standing to seek such hearings. Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital historically have provided high levels of uncompensated indigent care. T. 26. If Tampa General Hospital prevails on the RPICC issue and the sales tax issue, it will be due a total of $4,713,108, subject to a final adjustment factor. Hearing Officer Ex. 1, ex. C-4. If Tampa General Hospital prevails only upon the RPICC issue as reported in its April 23, 1987, correction to its fiscal year 1986 actual report, it will be due a total redistribution of $3,806,371, subject to the final adjustment factor. Hearing Officer Ex. 1, ex. C-1. If Tampa General Hospital prevails only upon the sales tax issue, by comparison of exhibits C-1 and C-4 to Hearing Officer Ex. 1, the total redistribution due will be increased by the difference between the two amounts in the last two paragraphs, or by $906,737. The Hospital Cost Containment Board's proposed agency action is contrary to the position urged by Tampa General Hospital on the two issues, and the proposed agency action would result in a total distribution of $3,015,907, subject to the final adjustment factor. T. 29; Hearing Officer Ex. 1, ex. C-5. If Hillsborough County Hospital prevails on the single issue that pertains to it, the sales tax issue, its total redistribution will be $315,543, subject to the final adjustment factor. Hearing Officer Ex, 1, ex. D-2. The preliminary determination of the Hospital Cost Containment Board is that Hillsborough County Hospital should receive $247,883 as a total redistribution, subject to the final adjustment factor. Hearing Officer Ex. 1, ex. D-1. Relevant definitions from the FBURS manual Account 5940, "contractual adjustments-other," of the FHURS manual, providers in part that: These accounts must be used to report the differential (if any) between the amount, based on the hospital's full established rates, of contractual patients' charges for hospital services which are rendered during the reporting period and are covered by the contract, and the amount received and to be received from third-party agencies in payment of such charges, including adjustments made at year end, based upon cost reports submitted. * * * In any instance in which the difference between the amount of a patients' [sic] bill and the payment received by the hospital from a third-party agency is recoverable from the patient, any resulting uncollected amounts should be reported in the appropriate bad debt or uncompensated care category and should not be reported in contractual adjustments. (E.S.) Account 5960, "charity/uncompensated care-other," of the FHURS manual, provides in part that: Account 5960 shall be used to report the differential between the amount, based on the hospital's full established rates, of bills for hospital services to charity/ uncompensated care patients and the amounts to be received from patients or on behalf of patients (including amounts received from voluntary agencies or government agencies on behalf of specific indigent patients) in payment for such services. (E.S.) Account 5960 further requires that the hospital have a verifiable process for determining indigency for each individual patient. Indigency is defined generally as a family income for the preceding 12 months less than 150 percent of the federal poverty guidelines. The instructions for account 5960 further provide that: When the hospital receives lump-sum grants or subsidies (rather than specific payments for individual patient's bills) from governmental or voluntary agencies for the care of medically indigent patients, the amount of the lump-sum grant or subsidy must be reported under "Restricted Donations and Grants for Indigent Care." (Account 5970). (E.S.) Account 5970, "Restricted Donations and Grants for Indigent Care," of the FHURS manual, provides: This account is used to report voluntary and governmental agency grants or subsidies for the care of non-specified medically indigent patients during the current reporting period. (E.S.) Account 9130, "Unrestricted Tax Revenue and Appropriated Funds," of the FHURS manual, provides: This account contains the revenue obtained from assignment of unrestricted tax revenue and funds appropriated by governmental entities. The RPICC issue, Tampa General Hospital The April 23, 1987, revision to Tampa General Hospital's 1986 actual report Tampa General Hospital's fiscal year ends on September 30th. On January 29, 1987, Tampa General Hospital filed its prior year report of its fiscal year 1986 actual experience. P. Ex. 2. As originally filed, Tampa General Hospital reported the following on worksheet C-2: $14,466,596 on line 11 as contractual adjustments-other; nothing on line 13, charity/uncompensated care-other; and ($2,633,338) on line 14, restricted donations and grants for indigent care. Id. Included in the amounts on line 11 of the report as a contractual adjustment-other were the total charges for all patients served by the RPICC program at Tampa General Hospital in fiscal year 1986, and included in line 14 as restricted donations and grants for indigent care were all the amounts received by Tampa General Hospital in fiscal year 1986 from the RPICC program. T. 38. Prior to July 1, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board accepted corrections to prior year reports of actual experience. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 6. On about April 23, 1987, Tampa General Hospital filed a revision to worksheet C-2 of its 1986 report of actual experience. P. Ex. 3. The revision reported $2,067,928 on line 11 as contractual adjustments-other, $32,104,116 on line 13, charity/uncompensated care-other, and made no change to line 14. (A negative $2,633,338 was still reported on line 14 as restricted donations and grants for indigent care.) Id. The April 23, 1987, revision moved the RPICC charges from line 11, contractual adjustment-other, to line 13, charity/uncompensated care-other. There was no change to line 14 since Tampa General Hospital had already reported all amounts received from the RPICC program on line 14 as restricted donations and grants for indigent care. T. 39-40. The fortieth day from April 23, 1987, was June 2, 1987. In the 40 days that followed April 23, 1987, and including a reasonable time thereafter for filing of the April 23, 1987, revision, Tampa General Hospital was given no written notice by the Hospital Cost Containment Board that the April 23, 1987, revision to its fiscal year 1986 report did not conform to the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual requirements, or did not otherwise conform to rule or statute. T. 42; Dep. (James Bracher), p. 27. Such written notice was not given until October 28, 1987. James Bracher, Executive Director to the Hospital Cost Containment Board, testified that it was his "understanding" that "we did discuss the possibility with the hospital of having, conducting a site visit to review this information." Dep. (James Bracher), p. 19. But on cross examination, Mr. Bracher qualified the implications of that statement. He was asked: "You earlier testified about some discussions with unnamed hospital people about a site visit on the RPICC issue. When did those discussions occur?" Mr. Bracher testified: "I don't recall that I said I discussed with them. I think I said I discussed with HCCB staff about the need to make site visits as a result of the April submission by Tampa General." (E.S.) Id. at pp. 51-52. The examination continued: Q. So you're not aware of any discussions between staff and the hospital? A. I did not participate in any direct discussions, no. Q. And you're not aware of any? A. I could not give you a date on any specific ones. The only other witness who testified as to oral communications to Tampa General Hospital concerning the issues in dispute in this case was Bill Summers. Mr. Summers was under going examination only with respect to the sales tax issue, not with respect to the RPICC issue. T. 181. Mr. Summers was asked "[W]hat did you do before October 13th, in reviewing this issue. Anything?" He answered in pertinent part: "I made a visit to the facility and reviewed their patient accounting records, in terms of determining medical indigency. I have had numerous conversations with hospital personnel, Mr. Powers, and others." T. 182. In summary, the testimony of Mr. Summers did not clearly pertain to either the April 23, 1987, revision or the RPICC issue. Thus, even if there had been visits or discussions with Tampa General Hospital, there is no evidence that the position of the Hospital Cost Containment Board concerning the RPICC issue was orally conveyed to Tampa General Hospital. Moreover, Mr. Summers provided no dates of such visits or discussions. On this record, one cannot determine if the visits and discussions occurred near the October 13, 1987, the end date used in the question, or in the 40 days following April 23, 1987. Similarly, Mr. Bracher's testimony is insufficient to determine when the Hospital Cost Containment Board orally notified Tampa General Hospital that the April 23, 1987, revision was nonconforming, or, indeed, that such notification in fact did occur. Consequently, there is no credible evidence to infer that within forty days after April 23, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board orally notified Tampa General Hospital that its April 23, 1987, revision was nonconforming. On July 17, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board determined the amount of redistribution due Tampa General Hospital pursuant to section 12, chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida, and advised Tampa General Hospital of its decision by a memorandum of that date. P. Ex. 4. The memorandum states that the redistribution has been determined "based on 1986 actual audited data." The redistribution formula attached to the first page of the memorandum shows the redistribution calculation. One factor accepted by the Hospital Cost Containment Board for its determination of redistribution was the amount of charity care ($32,104,116) contained in Tampa General Hospital's April 23, 1987, revision to its 1986 actual audited data. Id.; T. 40-41. Thus, the initial calculation of redistribution by the Hospital Cost Containment Board was based upon the accounting classifications contained in the April 23, 1987, revision to Tampa General Hospital's 1986 actual report. As a general policy, if, after July 1, 1987, a hospital did not attempt to correct its fiscal year 1986 actual report, the redistribution to that hospital would have been calculated upon the prior actual report of the hospital. T. 174-76. In the case of Tampa General Hospital, however, the magnitude of the change prior to July 1, 1987, was the reason that at some time after July 17, 1987, the staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board decided to subject the change to scrutiny. The prior year report of actual experience contains two parts. The first is a detailed report containing worksheets and must be prepared pursuant to the uniform financial accounting system of the FHURS manual. The first report is not certified by a certified public accountant. See e.g., P. Ex. 2. The second is a summary report certified by the hospital's certified public accountant. Worksheet C-2 is contained in the first report which is not certified by a certified public accountant. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 4-5; P. Ex. 2. The April 23, 1987, revision to the original 1986 prior year report filed by Tampa General Hospital on April 23, 1987, was only a revision to worksheet C-2, and thus was only a revision to the first detailed report. Consequently, the April 23, 1987, revision was a revision to a report that did not require certification by the hospital's certified public accountant. The Hospital Cost Containment Board has a policy that when a hospital requests that a correction be made to a prior year actual report, the staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board asks the hospital to have the correction reviewed by its CPA firm to determine why the correction better conforms to the accounting definitions in the FHURS manual. This policy has been in existence for approximately one year preceding December 1987. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 6. The basis for the policy was not explained in the record. Certification by a CPA, however, is not deemed to be sufficiently reliable to result in automatic approval of the proposed change. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 7. The Hospital Cost Containment Board did not apply this policy to Tampa General Hospital until after forty days from the date the April 23, 1987, revision was filed. The policy was not applied until about August 3, 1987. On that date, Mr. Bracher sent a letter to Newell France, Tampa General Hospital's chief executive officer. The letter stated that "the revised worksheets for your 1986 actual report have been received." P. Ex. 6. At that point, the only "revised worksheets" for the 1986 actual report were the April 23, 1987, revisions. Mr. Bracher's letter stated that the revision had to be verified "by the independent auditor who originally prepared the audited financial report for the fiscal year in question." In response to the letter of August 23, 1987, from Mr. Bracher, by letter dated September 28, 1987, Tampa General Hospital filed a revised worksheet C-2 certified by Price Waterhouse, certified public accountants. Price Waterhouse was the independent certified auditor for Tampa General Hospital for fiscal year 1986. T. 89. The amount of a negative $2,633,338, as "restricted donations and grants for indigent care" on line 13 was the same on both the September 28, 1987, and April 23, 1987, revisions. As discussed above, this amount represented the receipts from the RPICC program in 1986. The amount of "charity/uncompensated care-other" reported on the September 28, 1987, worksheet C-2, line 13, changed to $11,457,248. P. Ex. 6. (It was $32,104,116 on the April 23, 1987, report.) Nonetheless, it is clear from the record that the amount of $11,457,248 on the September 28, 1987, revision contained the RPICC charges for 1986 as reported in the April 23, 1987, revision. First, the parties stipulated that exhibit C-3 to Hearing Officer Ex. 1 contained "Tampa General's 9/28/87 submission, which continues to include the RPICC classification." Exhibit C-2 contains $11,457,248 as "charity care," thus reconciling to the September 28, 1987, worksheet C-2. The amount of $11,457,248 of "charity care" could not "continue to include the RPICC classification" unless it contained the same report and classification of RPICC charges as was contained in the immediately preceding report, which was the April 23, 1987, revision. Moreover, having been given the opportunity to deny such continuity, witnesses for the Hospital Cost Containment Board seemed to agree that the September 28, 1987, revision did not change the amounts and classifications of RPICC charges and receipts from the April 23, 1987, revision. T. 200-201; Dep. (James Bracher), p. 64. As a part of the September 28, 1987, revision Price Waterhouse submitted a letter dated September 25, 1987, to Mr. Bracher that stated that it had been asked by Tampa General Hospital to "review the Hospital's original and amended HCCB 1986 Actual Report for its method of presenting deductions from revenue." (E.S.) P. Ex. 6. The letter appended to the September 28, 1987, revision from Price Waterhouse then explicitly states that "the $11,457,248 reclassified from Contractual Adjustments-Other to Charity/Uncompensated Care- Other is arithmetically accurate and represents a correction to the original submission in order to comply with the definitions contained in . . . the FHURS Manual definitions of account numbers 5940 and 5960." (E.S.) The letter from Price Waterhouse further states on page 2 that the RPICC reclassification relates to "unpaid portion of gross bills for services rendered to patients economically eligible for the RPICC grant funds," and demonstrates that this amount, which has been placed into the Charity/Uncompensated Care-Other category, is $6,141,002. In the same calculation, the review shows that Tampa General Hospital received $2,633,338, in RPICC grants in fiscal year 1986. P. Ex. 6. Upon consideration of findings of fact 24 through 27, it is further concluded that on September 28, 1987, Price Waterhouse, as certified public accountants, independently verified and approved the accounting classifications contained in the April 23, 1987, revision. b. The proper FHURS manual accounting classifications of RPICC charges and receipts: characteristics of the RPICC program The RPICC (Regional Perinatal Intensive Care Center) program is a state program administered by the Children's Medical Services (CMS) program office of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The program is established to provide state funding of services at designated hospitals for high risk pregnant women and infants. These patients typically have long (45 to 50 day) stays in the hospital. T. 29-30. RPICC funds are grant funds. P. Ex. 11; sections 383.17, 383.171, 383.18, and 383.19, Fla. Stat. (1987). RPICC funds do not constitute restricted or unrestricted revenues provided to a hospital by local governments or tax districts. Persons eligible for RPICC services must be indigent, and must be individually qualified. P. Ex. 11, attachment I; T. 75-77. The hospital has to maintain logs of specific patients in the RPICC program, and the patients have to meet certain criteria. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 44. The hospital must maintain detailed records containing information specific to each RPICC patient served. By statute, the procedures for disbursement of RPICC funds must be pursuant to and according to the terms of contracts. Sections 383.117, 383.18, and 383.19(3), Fla. Stat. (1987). These contractual agreements must provide "that parents or guardians of those patients who are financially eligible to participate in the RPICC program shall not be additionally charged for treatment and care which has been contracted for by the [Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services]." Section 383.18, Fla. Stat. (1987). Thus, no hospital bills may be sent to RPICC patients or to their guardians, and these persons may not be charged by the hospital. Tampa General Hospital did not send any bills to its RPICC patients, or to the guardians of those patients. By statute and by contract, a hospital that participates in the RPICC program must serve all patients eligible, regardless of-funding from HRS. T. 35. Tampa General Hospital entered into a contract with HRS to be a Regional Perinatal Intensive Care Center, and received RPICC funds during fiscal year 1986 pursuant to that contract. P. Ex. 11. By contract, Tampa General Hospital was promised what the contract called a "fixed price," subject to availability of state funds. P. Ex. 11. Contracts for administration of RPICC grants do not in effect have a fixed contract price, but provide instead a lump sum that is the maximum amount promised, to be paid according to the conditions of attachment I to the contract. P. Ex. 11, attachment I. Attachment I further provides that the "grant funds" specified in lump sum amount "will be disbursed and accounted for according to the approved RPICC neonatal care (NCG) payment system for hospital services . . . The "payment schedule" requires submission by the hospital of the "expenditure report" which is the form marked exhibit K, P. Ex. 11. Tampa General Hospital was by contract entitled to receive each month the lesser of the prorated portion of the grant or the "total expenditures" for that month. P. Ex. 11. The hospital is normally paid a fixed prorated share of the total grant amount each month. T. 31. The monthly payment does not fluctuate by numbers of patients seen in that month. T. 33-34, 80-81. The RPICC program does not make payments for specific services rendered to specific patients, and does not make payments for specific bills of patients, and thus is not like the Medicaid or Medicare programs, or an HMO contract. Dep. (James Bracher), pp. 47, 60. Instead, the RPICC program has a provision that if certain minimum levels of service are not reached, the total amount of funds will not be disbursed to the hospital. Id. Even when all RPICC funds are not "earned," the result is not patient-specific. Funds which are not earned must, pursuant to the RPICC contract, be paid back to HRS at the end of the year. T. 86; P. Ex. 11, attachment I, paragraph D.1.d. The hospital also has the option of having the shortfall applied to funds due in the next fiscal year. Dep. (James Bracher), pp. 48, 53. The RPICC program requires the submission of a cost report at the end of the year, but monthly payments are not made by cost reports. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 25; T. 32. Medicaid reimbursement is based on cost reports at the end of the fiscal year. T. 33. Under the RPICC program, there is no relationship between actual costs and payments made. Id. With Medicaid and Medicare, the more patients the hospital treats, the more money the hospital receives. The same is true for HMO contracts. Payment is thus made for services rendered to specific patients for these programs. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 47. This is not true in the RPICC program. Although Tampa General was obligated by law and its contract to serve all RPICC eligible patients, the maximum that it would be paid was the fixed price stated in its contract. Tampa General Hospital applied the payments it received from HRS in the RPICC program to its general ledger accounts, not to specific patient accounts. T. 120. A grant may have a contract involved for administration of the grant. Dep. (James Bracher), pp. 44, 46. It is not unusual for a governmental agency that administers a grant program to require the recipient of the grant to substantiate that it used the grant for the purposes intended by the grant program. T. 122. Tampa General Hospital's charges associated with RPICC patients have historically far exceeded the state funding of this program. T. 81; P. Ex. 12. In fiscal year 1986, RPICC charges at Tampa General Hospital were $10,067,448, and Tampa General Hospital received only $2,633,338 in RPICC payments. T. 34; Ex. 12. Tampa General Hospital thus has never had to return overpayments due to unearned funds. The sales tax issue Introduction Pursuant to chapters 84-373 and 85-555, Laws of Florida, Hillsborough County was authorized to enact a 1/4 cent sales tax, the proceeds of which could be allocated to health care providers for certified indigent patients who were residents of the county. Pursuant to this authority, Hillsborough County enacted ordinance 85-2, levying a tax from April 1, 1985, through March 31, 1987. P. Ex. 14. In fiscal year 1986, Hillsborough County Hospital and Tampa General Hospital received funds from this 1/4 cent sales tax. The funds were appropriated to the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority for allocation to both hospitals. Revisions submitted by Hillsborough County Hospital. Hillsborough County Hospital submitted its fiscal year 1986 report of actual experience on January 29, 1987. P. Ex. 22. On worksheet C-2 of that report, Hillsborough County Hospital reported the difference between patient charges and funds received on line 7, bad debts, (FHURS account 5900). T. 52. On about June 9, 1987, Hillsborough County Hospital filed a revision to its fiscal year 1986 report, changing the manner in which the sales tax charges and receipts were accounted on worksheet C-2 of the original prior year report. P. Ex. 23; T. 52. The revision still reported the charges for services provided with sales tax funds on line 7, provision for bad debts, but did not deduct the receipts associated with those services as reported in the original fiscal year 1986 report. Instead, receipts of $647,543 were classified as "unrestricted tax revenue and appropriated funds," FHURS account 9130 (line 39a, worksheet C-4) and were moved to worksheet line 29, non-operating revenue. T. 52. As a result, both lines 7 and 29 increased by $647,543 on the revised worksheet C-2. 55. The June 9, 1987, revision by Hillsborough County Hospital was accompanied by a certification by Price Waterhouse, certified public accountants, verifying the changes in classifications of sales tax patient charges and receipts on worksheet C-2 for Hillsborough County Hospital. P. Ex. Although the verification was submitted by Price Waterhouse in connection with a main penalty issue, the verification concerned only the June 9, 1987, revision as an amendment to the fiscal year 1986 actual report. The verification pertained to the amended report, which itself has multiple uses, including the redistribution at issue in this case. In sum, the verification was not limited to main penalty issues. The Price Waterhouse verification of June 9, 1987, stated that the sales tax funds received by Hillsborough County Hospital were from the special county sales tax that had been appropriated to the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, and then allocated among both Hillsborough County Hospital and Tampa General Hospital. On June 30, 1987, counsel for Hillsborough County Hospital sent to counsel for the Hospital Cost Containment Board a letter with numerous attachments. P. Ex. 14. The letter was sent in connection with the main penalty issue concerning Hillsborough County Hospital, but generally addressed the sales tax issue from the perspective of the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, and expressly mentioned both Hillsborough County Hospital and Tampa General Hospital. The documents were received by the Hospital Cost Containment Board shortly after June 30, 1987. Hillsborough County Hospital filed two revisions to worksheet C-2 after June 9, 1987. P. Exs. 25 and 26. Both revisions were filed by Hillsborough County Hospital at the request of staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board and both contained accounting classifications for the sales tax issue with which Hillsborough County Hospital then disagreed. The September 28, 1987, revision as to the sales tax issue was filed under protest. P. Ex. Likewise, the revision of October 12, 1987, was filed under protest. P. Ex. 26. As to the sales tax issue, neither revision is a revision adopted by, or a revision of, Hillsborough County Hospital. When the September 28, 1987, revision was filed under protest, Price Waterhouse did not renew its verification of the sales tax accounting because the September 28, 1987, submission was incorrect, in its opinion, and because Price Waterhouse believed the June 9, 1987, submission to be correct. P. Ex. 25; T. 91-95. Price Waterhouse has not verified the accounting methods for the sales tax funds in the October 12, 1987, revision, and did not testify during the hearing that those methods are correct. Thus, the Price Waterhouse verification of June 9, 1987, of the classification of sales tax charges and receipts has never changed and remains as the verification of the June 9, 1987, revision relevant to this case. By letter dated October 28, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board notified Hillsborough County Hospital that it rejected Hillsborough County Hospital's method of accounting for sales tax receipts. The letter stated that the FHURS manual required that the difference between indigent patient charges and sales tax receipts be reported as charity/uncompensated care-other, FHURS account 5960. P. Ex. 27. There remains the question of when did the Hospital Cost Containment Board first advise either of the Petitioners that their method of reporting the sales tax issue did not conform to the FHURS manual. Mr. Summers and Mr. Bracher were the only members of the staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board who worked on the calculations to determine the initial distribution of Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund monies and to review corrections filed by hospitals to their 1986 prior year reports. T. 146-47. No one else testified for the Hospital Cost Containment Board. Thus, their testimony on this issue should be examined closely. Mr. Summers testified that in the middle of the summer he told both hospitals that the sales tax charges and receipts should be "grossed up" rather than "netted down." T. 150. He had previously defined "grossing up" in the context of the sales tax as reporting patient charges on line 13 of worksheet C- 2 (charity/uncompensated care-other) and reduction of those charges by a negative amount on line 14 (restricted donations and grants for indigent care) T. 147. Although the communication did take place, the timing of this communication by Mr. Summers is not supported by the preponderance of the evidence in the record. On September 28, 1987, Hillsborough County Hospital filed the first revision under protest. The amount reported in line 7, worksheet C-2, in the September 28, 1987, revision, was the same as reported in the original fiscal year 1986 actual report filed January 29, 1987, less $148. Compare P. Ex. 22 to P. Ex. 25. The letter transmitting the September 28, 1987, revision stated that the sales tax accounting remained "netted in total deductions from revenue," which is the case since the net was still contained on line 7. The letter of transmittal stated that Hillsborough County Hospital filed the September 28, 1987, revision because "of the position that you and your staff have taken on this issue." It was not until sometime between September 28, 1987, and October 12, 1987, that Mr. Summers changed his position, and told Hillsborough County Hospital to "gross up." P. Ex. 26. In summary, from the testimony of Mr. Summers it is unclear as to when he told Hillsborough County Hospital that its June 9, 1987, revision did not conform to the FHURS manual. Mr. Bracher was asked if he was aware of any written notice to either of the Petitioners that anything in the reports submitted June 9, 1987, was not conforming. He answered that he was not aware of any specific notice. He said he thought the issue was wrapped up in the main penalty case, and would be resolved when that case was heard. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 28-29. It is concluded that there is no evidence that within the forty days following June 9, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board communicated written notice to either Petitioner that the June 9, 1987, revision with respect to sales tax associated charges and receipts was not in conformance with the FHURS manual. Nonetheless, on June 30, 1987, counsel for Hillsborough County Hospital sent a letter to counsel for the Board transmitting a package of information concerning the sales tax. P. Ex. 14. It is inferred from the efforts of counsel for Hillsborough County Hospital that there was disagreement between the parties at this stage. It is also inferred that the package of explanatory documents was sent to the Hospital Cost Containment Board by Hillsborough County Hospital on June 30, 1987, because Hillsborough County Hospital and the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority then knew that the Board disagreed with the June 9, 1987, revision. Moreover, on July 17, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board transmitted to Hillsborough County Hospital its initial calculation of the redistribution. The amount of charity care shown on the accompanying calculation ($2,559,133) is obviously from line 7, worksheet C-2, of the original fiscal year 1986 actual report. P. Exs. 22 and 24. From this it is clear that as of July 17, 1987, the Hospital Cost Containment Board had rejected the accounting on that line contained in the June 9, 1987, revision. Thus, from these activities, it is inferred that within forty days of receipt of the June 9, 1987, revision, the Hospital Cost Containment Board did orally communicate to both Petitioners its disagreement with the June 9th revision with respect to the sales tax question. Revisions submitted by Tampa General Hospital Tampa General Hospital originally reported the differential between charges for patients associated with the sales tax funds and receipts of sales tax funds on line 7, of worksheet C-2, FHURS account 5900, "provision for bad debts." T. 52. On September 28, 1987, Tampa General Hospital filed a "revision" to its fiscal year 1986 actual report. P. Ex. 6. The cover letter from Mr. Powers stated that the sales tax monies "remain netted in total deductions from revenue (lines 7-17)." However, the letter made it clear that Tampa General Hospital disagreed with this accounting method, and that the report was submitted "because of the position that you and your staff have taken on this issue." Like the September 28, 1987, "revision" filed by Hillsborough County Hospital, which was submitted with an identical cover letter, the September 28, 1987, report by Tampa General Hospital was not adopted by Tampa General Hospital. Also as discussed above, the September 28, 1987, revision by Tampa General Hospital as to the sales tax issue was not verified by the hospital's certified public accountant. Thus, it is clear that Tampa General Hospital did not file its own formal written revision to its fiscal year 1986 report with respect to sales tax funds within the ninety-day period following July 1, 1987. Nonetheless, it is inferred from the evidence that the Hospital Cost Containment Board was aware that Tampa General Hospital was seeking within 90 days of July 1, 1987, to change its sales tax reporting in the same manner as Hillsborough County Hospital. This inference is based upon the following: The initial revision submitted by Hillsborough County Hospital on June 9, 1987, contained a discussion by Price Waterhouse, and in that discussion of the nature of the sales tax funds, Price Waterhouse stated that the funds were appropriated to the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority and allocated to both Hillsborough County Hospital and Tampa General Hospital. The letter from Price Waterhouse further stated that Price Waterhouse were the auditors for the Authority. It was thus evident from the June 9, 1987, submission that the sales tax issue applied to the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, and thus applied equally to Hillsborough County Hospital and to Tampa General Hospital. The letter of June 30, 1987, from counsel for Hillsborough County Hospital to counsel for the Hospital Cost Containment Board, while concerned with the main penalty and Hillsborough County Hospital, stated that the funds went to the Authority, and noted that the Authority was composed of both hospitals. Much of the communication between the parties in this case was with Paul Powers, who is the Chief Financial Officer for the Authority and for both hospitals. As previously discussed, it is evident that staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board orally advised representatives of the hospitals that the Board disagreed with the June 9, 1987, revision. Both hospitals filed revisions dated September 28, 1987, showing that both hospitals were actively discussing the matter during this period with the Hospital Cost Containment Board. After the September 28, 1987, revisions were filed, staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board advised both hospitals to resubmit worksheets C- 2, "grossing up" the monies by reporting charges for sales tax patients on line 13, and receipts on line 14. T. 54-57. (Staff of the Hospital Cost Containment Board later determined this advice to have been erroneous.) Both hospitals complied under protest. P. Exs. 7 and 26. Further, while Price Waterhouse did not on June 9, 1987, formally certify that the sales tax funds should be accounted for by Tampa General Hospital in the same manner as reported by Hillsborough County Hospital in its June 9, 1987, revision, the identity of the issues discussed above for both hospitals causes that result in effect. The June 9, 1987, certification made it clear that the funds were appropriated to the Authority, and thus the character of the funds, for accounting purposes, would be the same for both hospitals that compose the Authority. Moreover, certification as to the exact dollar amounts involved in the reclassification for Tampa General Hospital was made by Price Waterhouse during the de novo formal administrative hearing. In sum, the record contains a certification by a certified public accountant as to the sales tax accounting change sought by Tampa General Hospital, both as to amount and as to classification. The proper FHURS manual accounting for sales tax funds: characteristics of the sales tax funds In fiscal year 1986, both Hillsborough County and the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority budgeted and appropriated sales tax funds to Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital for indigent care. T. 44, 101-102. Hillsborough County is a governmental agency. As an appropriation, these sales tax funds were set aside for a specific purpose, indigent care, by Hillsborough County. T. 96-100. The method of distribution of sales tax funds was not specified by statute or by contract. T. 79. As discussed above, the enabling statutes simply stated that the funds were to be used for indigent patients who were county residents. The record does not contain any credible evidence to explain how the fiscal year 1986 sales tax appropriations were supposed to have been distributed to the two Petitioners. It might have originally been based on specific patient bills, or it might have been lump sum distribution, but there is no evidence. At least this is known: the sales tax money was not available until ad valorem appropriations were spent, and those appropriations were not being spent because there were insufficient numbers of patients meeting the ad valorem eligibility requirements. T. 66-67. Midway through the fiscal year, it was determined by Hillsborough County that the appropriated funds were not being transferred to the two Petitioners as originally intended. 44-45, 65-67. In fact, no funds had been transferred by June, 1986, the ninth month of the fiscal year. P. Exs. 17 and 18. Hillsborough County then determined to spend the money by a method other than what was originally envisioned. It did so by arbitrarily and substantially loosening eligibility requirements and expanding the distribution to other programs. T. 67, 69-71, 45. Since there is no clear evidence in the record as to how the sales tax program was originally intended to have operated, and since the only clear evidence in the record is that the County chose drastically to alter the method of transferring the sales tax appropriated funds to the two Petitioners, it must be concluded as a matter of fact that for accounting purposes, the only relevant facts are those facts showing how the sales tax program was changed midway through the fiscal year. In particular, due to the change made by the County, references to earlier plans to transfer the money in the May 22, 1985, minutes of the Board of County Commissions, exhibit 3, P. Ex. 14, are not relevant. It is important to note that the change in the manner of transferring the sales tax appropriations to the Petitioners was caused solely by the fact that the original method did not work. Thus, the County had no underlying basis to determine how to loosen eligibility requirements and to select new programs to cover. Requirements were loosened and new programs were covered until the prior appropriated funds were transferred. The only requirement was that the funds pay for patients who were medically indigent. T. 108. Thus, the method of selection of requirements to loosen and programs to cover was essentially arbitrary. T. 69-74, 103-104, 45, 47-48. At least 25 percent of the sales tax funds was paid on a per diem basis, based upon specific patients and days elapsed. T. 72, 68. But not all was based on per diem, contrary to the testimony of Mr. Summers. T. 152. At least 25 percent of the sales tax funds paid for the specific charges of specific patients who suffered catastrophic illnesses (charges in excess of 125 percent of annual income). T. 72-73. Other sales tax funds paid for amounts not paid (funds exhausted or not yet available) in the RPICC program, the tuberculosis program, the Medicaid program, and the Medicare kidney program. T. 45-46. In fact, payments were superficially made based upon charges submitted by specific patients in all cases, although payment was limited to a set per diem rate for those patients who qualified based upon the original indigency criteria. T. 73-74. Although the method of transfer of sales tax funds to the Petitioners was superficially by payments for charges associated with specific patients, that observation does not go far enough. The context of the payments cannot be ignored. Specific patient charges were identified in the transfer process only to give the County assurance that the money was going for indigent services. T. 109. Moreover, the payments were made for specific charges solely pursuant to the arbitrary change in the sales tax program discussed above, which was motivated solely by the desire of the County to expend all of the sales tax funds (the entire lump sum) previously appropriated to the two Petitioners. T. 73-74. Neither of the two Petitioners had any preexisting contract with the County that establish a system of payment of charges for specific patients. Nor is there any evidence that the County itself, as it shifted gears midway in the fiscal year, established a program to pay charges for specific patients based on reasoned criteria for identification of such patients. Instead, as discussed above, the choices of programs and eligibility requirements was driven only by the desire to spend a prior determined lump sum amount. The observed effect was the transfer to the Petitioners of the entire appropriated amount in only three months, the last three months of the County's fiscal year. P. Exs. 17 and 18. In context, then, the payments for charges associated with specific patients was not fundamentally a series of discrete payments of charges for specific patients, but was merely the mode of transfer of a lump sum payment. Exhibit 12, P. Ex. 14, initially relied upon by Board staff, contains a mixture of payments made by the County from ad valorem tax funds and sales tax funds. Compare to P. Ex. 17 and 18. Thus, for this reason, in addition to the discussion above, one cannot conclude from this exhibit that sales tax funds were transferred to the Petitioners as specific payments for specific patients. The proper accounting classification for the sales tax monies (or the RPICC funds, for that matter) depends upon the nature of the payment mechanism. T. 145. Mr. Summers was of the opinion that if Hillsborough County determined to distribute the sales tax funds by an arbitrary method, totally changing the prior method, with the only criteria that the funds pay for services to indigent patients, then receipts from the sales tax funds should be reported on line 14 of worksheet C-2, FHURS manual account 5970, "restricted donations and grants for indigent care." T. 189-90. That is in fact what occurred. The distribution to the Petitioners with respect to the sales tax issue will be the same whether the receipts of sales tax funds are classified on line 29 or on line 14 of worksheet C-2. T. 94-95.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended that the Hospital Cost Containment Board enter its final order: Confirming that the April 23, 1987, revision by Tampa General Hospital to its 1986 actual report conforms to the FHURS manual by operation of rule 27J- 1.010(3). Due to the definition of charity care in section 12, chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida, denying to Tampa General Hospital recalculation of distribution from the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund with respect to the RPICC program. Correcting the 1986 actual reports of Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital with respect to sales tax funds, reporting charges on line 13, "charity/uncompensated care-other," and receipts on line 14, "restricted donations and grants for indigent care," and recalculating the redistribution due the two hospitals based upon these corrections. (The result appears to be stated in findings of fact 6 and 8.) DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of March, 1988. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN DOAH CASE NUMBERS 87-5207H AND 87-5208H The following are rulings upon findings of fact proposed by the parties which have been rejected or adopted by reference in this Recommended Order. The numbers correspond to the numbers of the proposed findings of fact as used by the parties. Findings of fact proposed by the Petitioner: 9. The last half of the paragraph is an issue of law, not fact. All but the first sentence are cumulative and unnecessary. Irrelevant. 17. The motive of the county is irrelevant. 19. Not supported by the record cited. Mr. Bracher qualified his testimony with the phrase "I guess," and then qualified his opinion. Dep. (James Bracher), p. 27. 24. Irrelevant since the April 23, 1987, revision is operative. These findings of fact are adopted by reference. Irrelevant. The first two sentences are true, but are subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. These findings of fact, however, are adopted by reference. The first sentence is not supported by the record. The first sentence is rejected in the conclusions of law. The first sentence is rejected in the conclusions of law. The first sentence is rejected in the conclusions of law. The existence or absence of cost reports is not persuasive that account 5940 is or is not applicable. The phrase "cost reports" in the FHURS manual with respect to account 5940 only appears in a parenthetical, "including adjustments made at year end." As such, it is inclusive of circumstances where adjustments are made at year end based on cost reports, but is not necessarily limited to that circumstance. 38. Blue Cross accounting occurs in account 5930, and thus reference thereto is irrelevant for this case. 40 and 41. Irrelevant. A formal administrative hearing is intended to formulate agency action, not to review prior action. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). 42 and 43. These proposed findings of fact are true but are not relevant. A formal administrative hearing is intended to formulate agency action, not to review prior action. McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569, 584 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). 44. This is an issue of law, not fact. 50. The last sentence is true, but is subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. This finding of fact, however, is adopted by reference. The second sentence is irrelevant. A failure to make the recalculation by October 15, 1987, while a technical violation of the statute, could hardly have been intended by the Legislature to result in no recalculation at all. The last portion of the sentence is incompetent as legislative history. 59. The distributions were initially and superficially calculated on specific patients' charges, but were not ultimately "based" thereon, as discussed in the findings of fact. 63. The second through fifth paragraphs are true, but are subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. These findings of fact, however, are adopted by reference. 63-64. These proposed findings of fact are true, but are subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. These findings of fact, however, are adopted by reference. Irrelevant for lack of sufficient credible evidence showing identity of-circumstance to justify the comparison. Irrelevant for lack of sufficient credible evidence showing the lack of identity of circumstance to justify the comparison. 68-70. These proposed findings are issues of law, not fact. 71-72. Irrelevant. Findings of fact proposed by the Respondent: 2-4. These are issues of law, not fact. The second sentence is contrary to the record. T. 52, 55-56; P. Exs. 7 and 26. The remainder is irrelevant. These proposed findings have been rejected in findings of fact 79-86. The first four sentences, while true, are not adopted as findings of fact because of little help in resolving the question of which expert to believe. Both parties have submitted proposed findings of fact concerning the shifting bases of expert opinion. About all that can be concluded from these proposed findings, all of which are true, is that the accounting definitions are so unclear and loose that experts have difficulty finding their way. The next sentence is true, and is adopted by reference. Although the testimony cited would lead to the finding that the Petitioners originally classified the sales tax differential on line 13, this is in conflict with testimony at T. 52 that the differential was originally reported in bad debts, line 7. Moreover, there is no entry on line 13 on the original submission. P. Exs. 2 and 22. The proposed finding to this extent is rejected for these reasons. While the basis for Mr. Summer's ultimate opinion is relevant to this case, the path he took to that opinion is not. The formal hearing is de novo, and Mr. Summer's opinion at the hearing is the only one relevant. While the proposed finding of fact is true, and is adopted by reference, the ultimate conclusion has been rejected because the payment mechanism was, in effect, by lump sum. The first paragraph is cumulative to other findings of fact, and thus not necessary. 21. There is not sufficient evidence in the record to adopt the proposed finding that the original RPICC accounting by Tampa General Hospital was "consistent with the manner in which other hospitals report it." This paragraph is an issue of law, not fact. The proposed finding that the Hospital Cost Containment Board notified Tampa General Hospital that it "intended to review Petitioner's records" has been rejected by findings of fact 19-21. Moreover, notice of intent to review records is irrelevant. The notice required by the rule is notice that the report of April 23, 1987, did not conform to FHURS manual accounting classifications. While it is true that the July 17, 1987, memorandum was a preliminary document with respect to the amount of distribution that might be received ultimately by a hospital, it was preliminary only with respect to changes that might occur due to corrections filed by individual hospitals that elected to file such a change pursuant to the opportunity afforded by section 12 chapter 87-92, Laws of Florida. There was no reason for it to be preliminary with respect to reliance by the Hospital Cost Containment Board upon the fiscal year 1986 actual reports filed by hospitals that were already final and would not be changed by a new correction. All sentences after the first two are true, but are subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. These findings of fact, however, are adopted by reference. However, the proposed finding that the RPICC cost reports were "like those required by Medicare and Medicaid" is rejected because the RPICC cost reports were not used to settle up at the end of the year. The sentences in this paragraph are true, but are subordinate to findings of fact adopted in the recommended order. These findings of fact, however, are adopted by reference. The record in this case does not explain how the NCG system works. Thus, this proposed finding of fact must be rejected. These proposed findings of fact are not supported by the record. It appears that cost reports were not used to settle up or in the manner used by cost reports in the Medicaid and Medicare programs. 34 and 35. These proposed findings accurately reflect the assumed facts that underlie the opinions at the hearing of Mr. Summers and Mr. Bracher, and are adopted by reference. This is not, however, an adoption as fact of the matters which form the basis of opinions. 36. These proposed findings are essentially arguments of law that have been considered in the conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: John H. Parker, Jr., Esquire 1200 Carnegie Building 133 Carnegie Way Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Gary Walker, Esquire Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Building L, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 James J. Bracher Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Building L, Room 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency”) regarding Certificate of Need (“CON”) Application No. 10202, which sought the establishment of a 100-bed acute care hospital in Broward County, District 10, that had been filed by East Florida Healthcare, LLC (“East Florida”), in the second batching cycle of 2013. The Agency preliminarily denied the application. On December 30, 2013, East Florida filed a petition for formal hearing contesting the denial, which was forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). In January 2014, the above-named intervenors filed motions to intervene, which were granted. On April 15, Filed April 22, 2014 4:57 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 2014, East Florida filed a notice of voluntary dismissal and the DOAH issued an order closing the file and relinquishing jurisdiction back to the Agency. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 1. The denial of CON Application 10202 is upheld. ) ORDERED this 5@Any of pur . 2014, in Tallahassee, Florida. , Secretary Agency For Héalth Care Administration
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (“the Agency") concerning the preliminary approval of Certificate of Need (“CON”) Application No. 10199 submitted by Select Specialty Hospital-Daytona Beach, Inc., (“Select-Daytona”), to establish a 34-bed Long Term Acute Care Hospital (“LTCH”) in District 4. 1. The Agency preliminarily approved Application No. 10199 submitted by Select- Daytona to establish a 34-bed LTCH in District 4. 2. In response to the Agency’s decision, Kindred Hospitals East, LLC (“Kindred”) filed a petition for formal hearing, challenging the preliminary approval. The matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”) where it was assigned Case No. 14-0121CON for hearing. Select-Daytona filed a Motion to Intervene in the DOAH and the case was styled with Select-Daytona being treated as an intervenor. Filed March 17, 2014 2:04 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 3. Subsequently, Kindred filed a corrected notice of voluntary dismissal of its petition in the DOAH, which closed the case. It is therefore ORDERED: 4. The preliminary approval of CON No. 10199 is upheld and will be issued subject to the conditions noted in the State Agency Action Report. ORDERED in Tallahassee, Florida, on this IE day of far ch. Elizabeth Dudelj, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2014,
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review, which shall be instituted by filing one copy of a notice of appeal with the Agency Clerk of AHCA, and a second copy, along with filing fee as prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the Agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. Review of proceedings shall be conducted in accordance with the Florida appellate rules, The Notice of Appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the below- —_— named persons by the method designated on this SL ‘a day of LS ere 4 , 2014. Shoop, Agency Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (850) 412-3630 Facilities Intake Unit Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) Lorraine M. Novak, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) R. Bruce McKibben Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings www.doah.state. fl.us M. Christopher Bryant, Esquire Oertel, Fernandez, Cole cbryant@ohfe.com amooney@ohfc.com (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail) Michael J. Glazer, Esquire James McLemore, Supervisor Ausley and McMullen Certificate of Need Unit mglazer@ausley.com Agency for Health Care Administration (Electronic Mail) (Electronic Mail)
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the methodology for grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB pursuant to Sections 4D- 1.03, 4D-1.12(1) and 4D-1.12(2), F.A.C., constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as being arbitrary or capricious? Mercy has also raised one issue as to whether the grouping methodology is violative of constitutional guarantees of administrative equal protection and due process. This issue, however, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Division of Administrative Hearings.
Findings Of Fact Introduction. The HCCB and Its Hospital Grouping Function. The HCCB was formed pursuant to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1979). The HCCB was created pursuant to the specific authority of Section 395.503, Florida Statutes (1979), in order to further the accomplishment of legislative intent contained in Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): It is the intent of the Legislature to assure that adequate health care is affordable and accessible to all the citizens of this state. To further the accomplishment of this goal, the Hospital Cost Containment Board is created to advise the Legislature regarding health care costs; inflationary trends in health care costs; the impact of health care costs on the state budget; the impact of hospital charges and third-party reimbursement mechanisms on health care costs; and the education of consumers and providers of health care services in order to encourage price competition in the health care marketplace. The Legislature finds and declares that rising hospital costs and cost shifting are of vital concern to the people of this state because of the danger that hospital services are becoming unaffordable and thus inaccessible to residents of the state. It is further declared that hospital costs should be contained through improved competition between hospitals and improved competition between insurers, through financial incentives which foster efficiency instead of inefficiency, and through sincere initiatives on behalf of providers, insurers, and consumers to contain costs. As a safety net, it is the intent of the Legislature to establish a program of prospective budget review and approval in the event that competition-oriented methods do not adequately contain costs and the access of Floridians to adequate hospital care becomes jeopardized because of unaffordable costs. As a part of its responsibilities the HCCB is required, "after consulting with appropriate professional and governmental advisory bodies and holding public hearings, and considering existing and proposed systems of accounting and reporting utilized by hospitals," to specify a uniform system of financial reporting for hospitals. Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes Suppl.) to: In order to allow "meaningful comparisons" of data reported by hospitals under the uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB is required by Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.) to group hospitals according to characteristics, including, but not limited to, a measure of the nature and range of services provided, teaching hospital status, number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff, percentage of Medicare inpatient days, average daily census, geographical differences, and, when available, case mix. In providing for grouping of hospital, the HCCB is required to establish ten general hospital groups and additional speciality groups "as needed." Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). No hospital group can contain fewer than five hospitals, however. Id. Grouping is to be provided by rule. Id. Pursuant to Section 395.509(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), every Florida hospital is required to file its budget with the HCCB for "approval." The budget is required to be filed on forms adopted by the HCCB and based on the uniform system of financial reporting. Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). To determine whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, all hospitals in Florida are to be placed in groups. A hospital's budget is then compared to the budgets of the hospitals assigned to its group. Hospital groups for this purpose are established pursuant to Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The provisions of Section 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), are identical to Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). In determining whether a hospital's budget is to be approved, Section 305.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), establishes two initial "screens" which a hospital must meet based upon the hospital's gross revenue per adjusted admission. The term "gross revenue" is defined as: the sum of daily hospital service charges, ambulatory service charges, ancillary service charges, and other operating revenue. Gross revenues do not include contributions, donations, legacies, or bequests made to a hospital without restriction by the donors. Section 395.502(11), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). "Adjusted admission" is defined by Section 395.502(1), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), as: the sum of acute admissions and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient services to gross revenues. Gross revenues per adjusted admission (hereinafter referred to as "GRAA") is therefore the total hospital ambulatory and ancillary service charges and other operating revenue for all acute and intensive care admissions divided by the ratio of inpatient revenues from acute, intensive, ambulatory and ancillary patient services to gross revenue; or, stated more simply , inpatient revenue per admission. The "screens" which must be met in order for a hospital's budget to be approved upon initial determination are: (1) the hospital's GRAA must not be in the upper 20th percentile of the hospitals within its group; and (2) the rate of increase in a hospital's GRAA as contained in its current budget compared to the hospital's GRAA as reported in its most recently approved budget must not exceed a "maximum allowable rate of increase" if the hospital's GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of the hospitals in its group. If a hospital's GRAA is in the 49th percentile or less of the hospitals in its group, its budget is automatically approved. In determining whether a hospital's GRAA fails the screens, Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), provides: Percentile values for gross operating revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly by the board for each group established pursuant to s. 395.507(2) by ranking projected gross operating revenues per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. In determining the applicability of paragraph (a) or paragraph (b), the board shall consider the basis of the projections by the hospital, including consideration of the following factors: any increase in patient admissions caused by the creation of preferred provider organizations or health maintenance organiza- tions, population increases, changes in the hospital case mix or in services offered, changes in technology, or other similar factors. If a hospital's GRAA fails either of the screens (its GRAA is in the upper 20th percentile of its group or its GRAA rate of increase is excessive and its GRAA is in the 50th to 79th percentile of its group) that hospital's budget must be reviewed by the HCCB "to determine whether the rate of increase contained in the budget is just, reasonable, and not excessive." Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). Pursuant to Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB is authorized, if it first determines under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that the hospital's rate of increase is not just, reasonable and not excessive, to amend or disapprove any hospital's budget which does not meet the two screens of Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to establish a rate of increase which is "just, reasonable, and not excessive." The HCCB's authority under Section 395.509(6), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), applies only if the HCCB first complies with the following pertinent provisions of Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.): The board shall disapprove any budget, or part thereof, as excess that contains a rate of increase which is not necessary to maintain the existing level of services of the hospital or, if the hospital increases its existing level of services, any amount not necessary to accomplish that increase. In making such deterioration . . . the board shall consider the following criteria: The efficiency, sufficiency, and adequacy of the services and facilities provided by the hospital. The cost of providing services and the value of the services to the public. The ability of the hospital to improve services and facilities. The ability of the hospital to reduce the cost of services. The ability of the hospital to earn a reasonable rate of return. The accuracy of previous budget submissions by the hospital compared to the actual experience of the hospital the The number of patient days reimbursed by Medicare or Medicaid. The number of patient days attributable to the medically indigent. The research and educational services provided by the hospital if it is a teaching hospital. The projected expenditures or revenues for or from construction of facilities or new services which are subject to regulation under s. 381.494 may not be included in the budget of a hospital until the construction or services are approved or authorized by the state health planning agency. The cost of opening a new hospital, for first 3 years. The Challenged Rules. In carrying out its duty to establish a uniform system of financial reporting, the HCCB adopted Section 4D- 1.03, F.A.C., which provides: The Board, pursuant to Section 395.505, Florida Statutes, hereby adopts and establishes a uniform system for hospitals to file the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report of financial and statistical information. This system is described and the forms, instructions, and definitions therefor are contained in the Board's publication entitled Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual. The Chart of Accounts adopted pursuant to Section 395.507(1), Florida Statutes, and this Chapter 4D-1, and as hereafter modified, shall be utilized by each hospital for submitting the prior year audited actual data report, the interim report and the budget report. In order to determine whether a hospital's budget should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), the HCCB adopted Section 4D-1.12, F.A.C. Sections 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., provide: The staff shall review the budget report based upon the hospital's ranking for gross revenue per adjusted admission within its group and upon its rate of change in gross revenue per adjusted admission in the proposed budget as required in Section 395.507(6), Florida Statutes, and the most recently Board approved budget. As part of the budget report review process, groupings of hospitals shall be established according to the characteristics and methodology as outlined in Chapter V, Section B, Hospital Unit Uniform Reporting System Manual and as outlined in Section 395.507(2), Florida Statutes. Percentile values for gross revenue per adjusted admission shall be determined monthly for each group by ranking projected gross revenue per adjusted admission contained in the most recently approved or submitted budgets for the hospitals in each group, including any hospital that is contesting its grouping assignment. 12. Sections 4D-1.03 and 4D-1.12(1) and (2), F.A.C., are the rules challenged by Mercy. These rules, as quoted herein, were effective as of November 5, 1984. The rules were originally adopted effective June 30, 1980. The rules were amended to their present wording in response to "major" legislation enacted in 1984 which amended Part II, Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), and granted authority to the HCCB for the first time to approve, disapprove or amend hospital budgets under certain circumstances. Chapter 79-106, Laws of Florida. The challenged rules essentially provide that the HCCB, when grouping of hospitals for purposes of the uniform system of financial reporting and for purposes of reviewing and comparing budgets to determine if they should be automatically approved under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), will apply the grouping methodology outlined in Chapter V, Section B of the Hospital Uniform Reporting System Manual (hereinafter referred to as the "Manual"). Section 4D-1.18, F.A.C., also adopted effective November 5, 1984, incorporates by reference the Manual within each rule in Chapter 4D-1, F.A.C., which references the Manual. This rule has not been challenged in this proceeding. The Hospital Grouping Methodology and Its Development. Generally, Chapter V, Section B of the Manual, sets out the objective of the grouping methodology, the procedure for forming groups, a list of the variables considered in forming groups and the weight to be accorded each variable. The goals of the grouping methodology, as provided in the Manual, are to "facilitate comparison of hospitals with similar patient mix and market conditions" and to "develop groups of sufficient size . . . to assure statistically valid comparisons." Based upon the procedure for forming groups contained in the Manual, hospitals are grouped into nine, non-teaching, short-term hospital groups, one Major teaching hospital group and a number of specialty hospital groups. It is the method of grouping hospitals into nine short-term hospital groups which is at issue in this proceeding. Assignment of hospitals to the nine short-term hospital groups is accomplished through the use of the "McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm included in the cluster analysis t computer program package CLAN developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham (June, 1980 version)." A clustering analysis is a method of grouping a set of objects (in this case, hospitals) into relatively homogeneous groups. The goal of a clustering algorithm is to minimize the differences between the members of the group. The objects are grouped based upon a set of variables which are considered significant for purposes of comparing the objects. In order to account for the significance of each variable, the variables are weighted. The variables have a numerical score and after weighing, the weighted sum of the variables for each object is compared and the objects are grouped based upon their variable scores. There are a number of clustering algorithms which can be used to group hospitals. The HCCB chose to use the "McQueen's K-means" clustering algorithm. The use of McQueens K-means clustering algorithm has not bean challenged in this proceeding. Nor does the evidence establish that the selection of McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm is arbitrary and capricious. The clustering algorithm is performed by computer. The computer program utilized by the HCCB to perform the algorithm is called "CLAN" and was developed by T.D. Klastorin and Robert Ledingham. The evidence at the hearing supports a finding that the selection of this computer program is reasonable. Once hospitals are grouped, they are notified of their group designation and allowed to request reconsideration of their group assignment. The request must made within thirty days after notification. Following the creation of the HCCB in 1979, Price Waterhouse & Company was engaged by the HCCB as a consultant to assist in still establishing an appropriate hospital grouping methodology. The HCCB also created an advisory committee to assist the HCCB and Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology. This committee, designated as the Technical Advisory Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "TAC") was comprised of individuals from the hospital industry and academia and certified public accountants. The TAC worked with Price Waterhouse & Company in developing the grouping methodology and the uniform reporting system. Because of time constraints, the TAC's involvement with evaluating the methodology was limited. The HCCB ultimately decided to pattern the grouping methodology it adopted after the grouping methodology then being used by the State of Washington, as recommended by Price Waterhouse & Company. The Washington system was not adopted exactly; a number of changes to Washington's methodology were made to the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. Mercy has proposed several findings of fact beginning on page 35 and ending on page 38 of its proposed order concerning the "Differences in Washington Hospital Characteristics and Grouping Methodology Model." Those proposed findings of fact can be and are hereby disposed of by the following finding of fact: because of differences in the hospital industries of the States of Florida and Washington and other differences between the two States, Florida's grouping methodology cannot be justified solely on the basis that Washington's grouping methodology was used as a starting point in developing Florida's grouping methodology. Those differences, however, do not support a finding of fact that Florida's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious since the Washington system was not adopted without substantial modifications, including a reduction of Washington's eighteen variables initially to fourteen and ultimately to seven, and the use of unequal weighting of the variables. The TAC reviewed and discussed the grouping methodology initially approved by the HCCB prior to its approval. Some of Mercy's witnesses, who were members of the TAC, indicated during their testimony that the TAC never decided anything because no "vote" was ever taken of TAC members and that the TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. Their testimony in this regard has been given little weight. The fact that no formal "vote" was taken of TAC members does not mean that the TAC did not take a position on matters it discussed. The consensus of the TAC could be, and was, gleaned from its discussions. The staff of the HCCB in fact reported decisions of the TAC to the HCCB verbally and by minutes of TAC meetings. Although the accuracy of staff's reports was sometimes questioned, no question was raised about whether TAC had taken positions. The fact that the HCCB staff reported TAC actions to the HCCB also disputes the testimony to the effect that TAC did not advise the HCCB but instead advised the staff of the HCCB. While it may be true that TAC did not deal directly with the HCCB, its analysis was reported, to the HCCB. The HCCB ultimately adopted rules effective June 30, 1980, which incorporated by reference to the Manual, the general outline of the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB. The TAC ceased to exist following adoption of the HCCB's initial rules. Two new advisory committees were formed: a Technical Advisory Panel (hereinafter referred to as "TAP") on grouping and a TAP for financial analysis. The grouping TAP was made up of individuals from the hospital industry. The grouping TAP met in November and December of 1980 and reviewed the results of test runs of the grouping methodology initially adopted by the HCCB. The results of the initial run were described as "bizarre." This run used equal weighting of the variables. Equal weighting was abandoned and three to four more test runs were made and reviewed by the grouping TAP. After each run the variable weights were adjusted until the results appeared to be "reasonable." The HCCB also established a committee consisting of members of the HCCB designated as the Research and Development Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "R & D Committee"). The R & D Committee reviewed the results of test runs and also found the final groups reasonable. The HCCB met in January, 1981, and adopted the grouping methodology with the adjusted variable weights arrived at as a result of the test runs for use in establishing hospital groups for use in 1981. The grouping methodology was reviewed every year after its initial adoption in 1980. The methodology was reviewed by the HCCB, HCCB's staff, the TAP's and the R & D Committee each year. Throughout the period from 1980 to the present, criticisms of the grouping methodology have been made. Some of these criticisms were agreed with and others were rejected by the HCCB or its staff. Following review of the grouping methodology by the TAP's and the R & D Committee in 1981, the original fourteen variables were reduced to eight. In January, 1982, the weight of one of the variables was changed and one variable was replaced by another variable. In December, 1982, a variable was deleted; seven variables remained. In 1983, clustering analysis was limited in its application to the formation of short-term acute care general hospital groups. In 1984, following the significant amendment of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983), the HCCB adopted the present challenged rules. The rules were effective November 5, 1984. The only change in the grouping methodology approved by the HCCB was the substitution of the Florida price level index variable for percent of population over age 65. The weight assigned to the Florida price level index was the same as the weight that had been assigned to the percent of population over age 65. The changes made to the grouping methodology in 1984 were first suggested by the staff of the HCCB to the grouping TAP in June of 1984. The grouping TAP met on July 11, 1984 and considered and discussed the proposed changes. A number of problem areas were discussed. Although no test run results were presented at this TAP meeting, they were provided to TAP members before the HCCB adopted the grouping methodology changes. Concerns about the geographic or exogenous variables expressed at the grouping TAP meeting suggested a belief that too much or too little emphasis was being placed on geographic considerations. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact beginning on page 33 and ending on page 35 of its proposed order concerning the significance of the changes made by the Legislature in 1984 to Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1983). Those proposed findings of fact essentially deal with the fact that the powers of the HCCB after the 1984 amendments may have a more significant impact on hospitals and that, therefore, the grouping methodology is of greater interest to hospitals. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not, however, relevant in determining whether the challenged rules are arbitrary and capricious. The fact that the effect of the grouping methodology on a hospital may now be different does not mean that the use of the grouping methodology, as modified after the 1984 legislative changes to the law, which was developed when the purpose of grouping was different, is not an appropriate methodology. The evidence does not support such a conclusion. Therefore, to the extent that Mercy's proposed findings of fact under Section II, A, of its proposed order have not already been made, they are rejected as unnecessary. Mercy and the HCCB have proposed findings of fact as to whether Mercy has ever questioned the HCCB's grouping methodology since it was first adopted prior to instituting this proceeding. Those proposed findings of fact are not deemed relevant in determining whether the grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. If the grouping methodology is in fact arbitrary and capricious, the fact that Mercy did not challenge the methodology when it was first adopted will not make it any less arbitrary and capricious today. Mercy's Challenge. A. Introduction. Mercy is a not-for-profit, general acute care hospital with 550 licensed beds located in Dade County, Florida. Mercy has raised a number of points in this proceeding and its proposed order in challenging the rules in question. All of those points, according to Mercy, prove that the rules are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. In determining whether the facts support such a conclusion, the following standard must be kept in mind: [I]n a 120.54 hearing, the hearing officer must look to the legislative authority for the rule and determine whether or not the proposed rule is encompassed within the grant. The burden is upon one who attacks the proposed rule to show that the agency, if it adopts the rule, would exceed its authority; that the requirements of the rule are not appropriate to the ends specified in the legislative act; that the requirements contained in the rule are not reasonably related to the purpose of the enabling legislation or that the proposed rule or the requirements thereof are arbitrary or capricious. A capricious action is one which is taken without thought or reason or irrationally. An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic or despotic. Administrative discretion must be reasoned and based upon competent substantial evidence. Competent substantial evidence has been described as such evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Agrico Chemical Company v. State, Department of Environmental Regulation, 365 So.2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978), cert. denied, 376 So.2d 74 (1979). Additionally, the following must be kept in mind: The well recognized general rule is that agencies are to be accorded wide discretion in the exercise of their lawful rulemaking authority, clearly conferred or fairly implied and consistent with the agencies' general statutory duties. . . . An agency's construction of the statute it administers is entitled to great weight and is not to be overturned unless clearly erroneous. . . . Where, as here, the agency's interpretation of a statute has been promulgated in rulemaking proceedings, the validity of such rule must be upheld if it is reasonably related to the purposes of the legislation interpreted and it is not arbitrary and capricious. The burden is upon petitioner in a rule challenge to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the rule or its requirements are arbitrary and capricious. . . . Moreover, the agency's interpretation of a statute need not be the sole possible interpretation or even the most desirable one; it need only be within the range of possible interpretations. Department of Professional Regulation v. Durrani, 455 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The witnesses who testified in this proceeding who were accepted as experts were qualified in a number of different areas. Those witnesses qualified as experts in statistical analysis or related areas and health care finance rendered opinions as to the appropriateness of the HCCB's grouping methodology. The method of grouping hospitals adopted by the HCCB is a statistical method. Therefore, the determination of whether the HCCB's methodology is arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon whether the methodology is statistically sound. Mercy and the HCCB therefore presented the testimony of witnesses qualified in the area of statistics: Rick Zimmerman, Ph.D., an expert in statistical analysis and social science statistics (for Mercy), and Duane Meeter, Ph.D., an expert in economics and applied statistical analysis and Frank Fox, Jr., Ph.D., an expert in applied statistics (for the HCCB). All three witnesses were knowledgeable and credible. Dr. Zimmerman testified that the HCCB's grouping methodology was "clearly inappropriate." Dr. Zimmerman's opinion was based upon a three step analysis in which he determined: (1) whether the variables selected by the HCCB are appropriate; (2) whether the weights assigned to the variables by the HCCB are appropriate; and, (3) the effect changing the variables and/or weights would have on hospital groups. The results of Dr. Zimmerman's analysis, which formed the basis for his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology is not appropriate, are discussed, infra. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact in its proposed order concerning the credibility of Dr. Meeter's and Dr. Fox's testimony. Some of those proposed findings of fact have been considered in determining the weight given to their testimony. Both Dr. Meeter and Dr. Fox were, however, knowledgeable and credible. In addition to the opinion of its statistical expert, Mercy presented the testimony of three witnesses who were accepted as experts in health care finance: Messrs. Lawrence R. Murray, Jerry A. Mashburn and Anthony Krayer. All three are certified public accountants. All testified that it was his opinion that the HCCB's grouping methodology was arbitrary. The bases for their opinions are discussed, infra. Selection of "Seed" Hospitals. In order to use a clustering algorithm, a starting point is needed; the first object (hospital) to be placed in each group must be selected. The first objects selected are called "seed" objects. Mercy has attached the HCCB's method of selecting the nine "seed" hospitals in initially performing the McQueen's K-means clustering algorithm. Mercy has proposed the following findings of fact with regard to this point: While none of the parties challenged the use of McQueen's and the CLAN program, no support was offered during the hearing for the method by which the HCCB had selected the nine seed hospitals as initial clustering points. The HCCB's own statistician criticized the HCCB's selection method. The Rankis-Zimmerman report indicates that the final groupings based upon the HCCB's seed hospitals were vastly different than groupings based upon the utilization of seed hospitals selected on a statistical basis. Both the HCCB's and Mercy's statisticians proposed statistically sound methods for selecting seed hospitals, which had not been employed by the HCCB in the Grouping Methodology. [Citations omitted] These proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this proceeding. The burden is on Mercy to show that the selection of "seed" hospitals was arbitrary and capricious; the HCCB is not required to show "support" for its method of selecting the seed hospitals. Additionally, whether there are other methods of selecting seed hospitals is not the test. The HCCB's interpretation of the statute need not be the sole interpretation or even the most desirable one; it only needs to be within the range of possible interpretations. Durrani, supra. Therefore, even if the Rankis-Zimmerman report does indicate that the final groupings of hospitals of the HCCB were vastly different than groupings based upon other methods of selecting seed hospitals, it does not automatically follow that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was not "within the range of possible interpretations. The weight of the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's method of selecting seed hospitals was arbitrary and capricious. Selection of the Variables. In delegating legislative authority to the HCCB to establish a grouping methodology, the Legislature provided that the following relevant characteristics are to be taken into account: A measure of the nature and range of services provided; Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff; Percentage of Medicare inpatient days; Average daily census; Geographic differences; and Case mix, "when available." In response to the Legislature's mandate, the HCCB has adopted seven variables or characteristics. The variables selected by the HCCB include five hospital- specific (endogenous) variables and two geographic (exogenous variables). The variables are as follows: Endogenous Variables: Average occupied beds. Available services. Physician mix. Number of residents. Percent Medicare days. Exogenous Variables: Florida price level index. Personal income. The following findings of fact are made with regard to each of the specific characteristics required to be taken into account by the Legislature and the variables adopted by the HCCB: 1. A measure of the nature and range of services provided. The HCCB has provided in the Manual that "available services" or a service index will be considered. The specific services considered are listed on Table B, Chapter V, of the Manual. Table B also weights or provides a score for each of the various services listed. Each hospital gets the specified score if it has a particular service available. The available services listed are based upon a survey of hospital administrators and chief financial officers in New York, New York, made in the 1970's. Problems with the list of available services have been pointed out to the HCCB and its staff. The primary problem is that the volume of services provided is not taken into account. The problems with the service index, however, relate to the fact that the service index is a proxy for case mix. To date, there is no alternative available which would be a better proxy for case mix. The Legislature contemplated this fact by providing that a measure of the services provided by a hospital will be considered and that case mix will be taken into account "when available." Therefore, while there are "problems" with the service index, consideration of available services is mandated by the Legislature and there are no acceptable alternatives available use for by the HCCB. 2. Number of medical specialties represented on the hospital staff. 52. The HCCB has provided that a physician specialties mix be considered in grouping hospitals. This physician specialties mix is based upon a list of twenty- six specialties for which a hospital gets a single credit for each specialty available regardless of the number of physician specialists available in each specialty or the volume of patients admitted by a physician. 52. Like the service index, the physician specialties mix is a proxy for ease mix and has problems associated with its use. Also like the service index, consideration of this factor is mandated and there are no acceptable alternatives available for use by the HCCB. 3. Percentage of Medicare inpatient days. 53. The HCCB has provided that "percentage Medicare days be considered in grouping hospitals. Consideration of this variable has not been shown to be arbitrary and capricious. 4. Average daily census. 53. The HCCB has provided that "average occupied beds" is to be considered in grouping hospitals. It does not appear that this variable's use was proper, as discussed, infra. 5. Geographic differences. The HCCB has provided that geographic differences be considered in grouping hospitals by providing for the inclusion of the Florida price level index, by county, and median income, by county, as variables to be considered. The only thing that the evidence established with regard to these variables was that they are not "very good" predictors, that "if" they are intended as a measure of input prices they are "poor substitutes," and that there may be "better" measures of the cost of doing business. The evidence does not, however, show that the use of these variables is arbitrary and capricious. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact concerning geographic influences in part II, H of its proposed order. The proposed findings of fact begin on page 29 and end on page 33. Most of these proposed findings of fact are not made in this Final Order because they are not deemed relevant or material and are unnecessary to the resolution of this proceeding. The proposed findings of fact contained in part II, H of Mercy's proposed order purportedly show that the HCCB has inadequately accounted for geographic influences. The evidence does establish that the financial characteristics of Florida hospitals and GRAA are affected by the geographic location of a hospital. This is especially true in Florida because of the impact on parts of the State from tourism, language barriers, the number of elderly residents, the available labor markets, and competition. It is also true that the combined weights of the two geographic variables the HCCB has selected for consideration in the grouping methodology--the Florida price level index and median income--is only one-seventh of the combined weights of all the HCCB's variables. It is also true that the grouping methodology results in hospitals from different areas of the State being grouped together, i.e., Mercy's hospital group includes twenty- three hospitals, four of which are located in Dade County and three of which are located in Escambia County. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the HCCB has been arbitrary and capricious in designating only two variables to take into account geographic differences between hospitals. The evidence also does not support a conclusion that it was not proper for the HCCB to limit the weight of the geographic variables to one-seventh of the total weight of the variables. Nor does the evidence demonstrate that the inclusion of hospitals from different areas of the State in the same group is not a proper result just because geographic influences are important. The fact that a large percentage of Dade County and south Florida hospitals do not qualify for automatic approval of their budgets under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), because they are in the upper 20th and the upper 50th to 79th percentiles does not necessarily prove that geographic influences have not been adequately accounted for either, as suggested be Mercy on page 30 of its proposed order. The evidence simply does not support such a conclusion. Nor does it necessarily follow that because Dade County hospitals are "efficient" in the minds of some of Mercy's witnesses and yet are unable to achieve automatic approval of their budgets that the grouping methodology does not adequately account for geographic influences, as suggested by Mercy on pages 30 and 31 of its proposed order. First, the Legislature has provided that factors other than geographic differences are to be considered, which the HCCB has provided for. It may therefore be that some Dade County hospitals do not achieve automatic approval of their budgets because of the other variables. The fact that not all Dade County hospitals fail to achieve automatic approval of their budgets supports such a conclusion. Also, even though a hospital's budget is not automatically approved it does not necessarily mean that it is considered inefficient. If that were the case, its budget would probably be subject automatically to amendment or disapproval. That is not the case. If a hospital's budget is not automatically approved its budget is subject to further review under Section 395.509(5), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). It may still be determined that the hospital is "efficient" based upon this review. The Legislature, in enacting Part II of Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, did indicate that it intended to promote competition and efficiency among hospitals in order to contain hospital costs. Section 395.5025, Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The grouping methodology and, in particular, the comparison of hospitals' GRAA under Section 395.509(2), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), does not alone achieve that intent. Therefore the opinion of several of Mercy's witnesses that Dade County hospitals and in particular, Mercy, are efficient does not support a conclusion that the methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic influences are not adequately considered. On pages 31 and 32 of its proposed order, Mercy suggests that Dade County hospitals only compete with other Dade County hospitals and therefore grouping hospitals from all sections of the State is illogical. In support of this suggestion, Mercy proposes findings of fact to the effect that the HCCB has recognized that consumers are interested in comparing hospital charges on a regional basis and has provided information about hospital cost on a county-by- county basis in the past. Mercy's proposed findings of fact are not accepted for essentially the same reasons that its proposed findings of fact with regard to the efficiency of hospitals were rejected. These proposed findings of fact do not support a finding that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious or that geographic differences have not been adequately taken into account. Mercy's has also proposed findings of fact with regard to geographic differences to the effect that after the Legislature specifically required that "geographic differences" be considered in an amendment to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes (1981), in 1982, the HCCB has not added any additional geographic factors to be considered. Although no additional geographic variables have been added, geographic variables have been reviewed and have been changed since 1982. More importantly, these proposed findings of fact do not prove that the existing variables are not adequate. 6. Case Mix. 66. Case mix is to be taken into account "when available." The evidence does not establish that case mix is available at this time. 7. Other variables. The HCCB is not limited to a consideration of the factors which the Legislature specifically provided are to be considered. Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.). The only other variable the HCCB has provided for consideration is "number of residents." No evidence of significance concerning this variable was presented at the hearing. There was testimony at the hearing that there are other variables which would be appropriate for consideration in grouping hospitals. The evidence does not, however, establish that failure to consider other variables means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman opined that he had determined that the variables selected by the HCCB were not appropriate. Dr. Zimmerman based his opinion upon the fact that he had conducted a "multiple regression analysis." According to Dr. Zimmerman, a "multiple regression analysis is a statistical procedure used to evaluate the relationship of a given set of independent, predictor variables (the HCCB's seven variables) to a single dependent variable (GRAA)." Based upon his application of multiple regression analysis, Dr. Zimmerman concluded that three of the variables used in the HCCB's grouping methodology are not statistically significant predictors of GRAA: available services, average occupied beds and median income. Two of these variables (available services and average occupied beds) are required by Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), to be taken into account in the grouping methodology. These Sections also require that geographic factors, which median income is, be taken into account. This does not, however, mean that median income must be included as a variable by the HCCB. Dr. Meeter testified that the statistical significance of the HCCB's variables can be determined by the use of "log transformation." Based upon Dr. Meeter's use of log transformation, median income and available services are statistically significant variables; average occupied beds is not statistically significant. Although the HCCB was required to include "average daily census" as a factor in grouping hospitals, the HCCB was not required to use "average occupied beds." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's and Dr. Meeter's testimony, the use of average occupied beds as a variable was not proper. Whether the use of available services and median income as variables was proper depends upon whether log transformation is a proper method of determining the statistical significance of variables. Although the evidence on this question was in conflict, it appears that the use of log transformation was proper. The inclusion of available services and median income is therefore not arbitrary and capricious. A second problem with the variables used by the HCCB suggested by Dr. Zimmerman involves the correlation between the seven predictor variables or "multicollinearity." The existence of multicollinearity can invalidate a clustering program. Dr. Zimmerman determined that the correlation between the physician mix, available services and average occupied beds variables and between the Florida price level index and median income variables is large enough that there is a "potential" problem. Dr. Zimmerman's determination that there is a "potential" problem was made through two techniques. He first used "paired correlation." Based upon paired correlation, Dr. Zimmerman used a "rule of thumb" that a paired correlation of 0.7 or higher should be looked at closer. Finding a paired correlation between physician mix, available services and average occupied beds of .74 and between the Florida price level index and median income of .71, Dr. Zimmerman then calculated "R squared" to determine if a potential problem did in fact exist. Dr. Zimmerman indicated that the calculation of R squared is the most highly recommended method of determining if multicollinearity is a problem but agreed there are other methods of making such a determination. Dr. Meeter indicated that Dr. Zimmerman's rule of thumb that based upon paired correlations of 0.7 or higher indicates the problem should be looked at more closely is too strict. Other than Dr. Zimmerman's "experience" (which according to Dr. Zimmerman, consisted of a class he took), Dr. Zimmerman did not cite any authority which supported his rule of thumb. The only other source Dr. Zimmerman referred to--the "SPSS" manual--only indicates that the .82-1.0 range indicates that extreme collinearity exists. Another problem raised by Dr. Meeter with Dr. Zimmerman's conclusions as to multicollinearity, involves the use of "variance inflation factors" (hereinafter referred to as VIF is another technique used by statisticians to determine if multicollinearity is a problem. Dr. Zimmerman did not look at VIF. VIF can be determined by transforming R squared: VIF 1/1- R2. A VIF in excess of 5 or 10 is an indication that multicollinearity exists. One source quoted by Dr. Meeter even indicates that a much higher VIF is necessary to conclude that multicollinerity exists. Transforming Dr. Zimmerman's R squared calculations indicates that VIF is in excess of 5 in only one instance. As discussed more fully, infra, Dr. Zimmerman used a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals which he designated as "Schemes." Based upon Dr. Zimmerman's "Scheme 3," Dr. Zimmerman found an R squared value of .819. The VIF for an R squared value of .819 is in excess of 5. Scheme 3, however, is not an application of the HCCB's grouping methodology; it is a grouping methodology in which the variables are assigned different weights. As indicated by Dr. Meeter, the weights used in grouping can effect the correlation of the variables. Therefore, the fact that Scheme 3 indicates a possible multicollinearity problem does not prove that multicollinearity is in fact a problem with the HCCB's grouping methodology. Based upon the foregoing it is found that multicollinearity does not exist sufficiently to conclude that the variables used by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious. Dr. Zimmerman only testified that there was a "potential" problem. Additionally, although multicollinearity may invalidate a clustering program, the evidence does not prove that the HCCB's clustering program is in fact invalid because of any existing "potential" problem. In light of the foregoing findings of fact, it is clear that the HCCB's variables are appropriate with the exception of average occupied beds. The fact that this one variable is not statistically significant, however, does not by itself support a finding that the grouping methodology is inappropriate. The Lack of Testing of the Grouping Methodology. A third point raised by Mercy is entitled "Lack of Testing" in its proposed order and includes several proposed findings of fact on pages 17 and 18 of Mercy's proposed order. Mercy has essentially proposed findings of fact that: (1) it had been recommended to the HCCB when it originally adopted its grouping methodology in 1980 that a statistician be hired to test the grouping methodology; (2) that the failure to do so had been criticized in the past; that it had been recommended that the HCCB obtain assistance of individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate the grouping process but had failed to do so; (4) that the HCCB had not, until just prior to the hearing of this case, hired a statistician; (5) that the HCCB has not used multiple regression analysis or within-cluster co- variance weighting; and, (6) that the State of Washington's State Hospital Commission has employed a statistician to test its methodology and has effectively been advised by individuals knowledgeable with Washington's hospital characteristics. These proposed findings of fact do not establish that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious even if they were all correct findings of fact. All that these proposed findings of fact show is that the HCCB may not have gone about the adoption of its grouping methodology in the most appropriate manner. Any such shortcomings, based upon 20/20 hindsight, in the manner in which the methodology was adopted do not prove that the grouping methodology itself is not appropriate. Additionally, the evidence does not support all of these proposed findings. In particular, as was discussed, supra, the HCCB did in fact look to individuals knowledgeable in Florida hospital characteristics to evaluate its grouping methodology. The Weight of the Variables. The most significant and troublesome challenge made by Mercy to the HCCB's grouping methodology involves the weights assigned to the variables considered in grouping hospitals. The weights assigned by the HCCB to the seven HCCB variables are: Variable Weight Endogenous: Average occupied beds. 1.0 Available services. 2.0 Physician mix. 0.5 Number of residents. 0.5 Percent Medicare days. 2.0 Exogenous: Florida price level index. 0.5 Personal income. 0.5 The determination of whether the weights selected by the HCCB are arbitrary and capricious depends largely upon the evidence presented at the hearing by those witnesses knowledgeable in the field of statistics. Three witnesses were qualified as experts in statistically related fields. All three were well qualified in their fields and were credible and persuasive. According to Dr. Zimmerman, "the weights used currently by the HCCB are clearly inappropriate." In Mercy exhibit 17, Dr. Zimmerman reaches the following conclusion with regard to the HCCB's variable weights: These weights clearly do not reflect the relationship of the various variables to GRAA and thus appear as arbitrary and inappropriate for use in clustering hospitals on the basis of cost-related variables. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion is based upon the use of "multiple regression analysis," which, according to Mercy exhibit 17, "assesses the relationship of each of the predictor variables to the dependent measure (GRAA)." The evidence, however, does not support a finding of fact that multiple regression analysis is the only statistically valid method of establishing weights to be used in clustering analysis. In fact, there are a number of statistically valid methods of establishing variable weights. One of those acceptable methods is the "subjective" method which was used by the HCCB. Doctors Meeter and Fox substantiated this finding of fact. The use of the subjective method involves the participation of individuals knowledgable in the Florida hospital industry in reviewing and commenting on the weights used. The evidence clearly supports a finding that individuals with such knowledge participated in the process of developing the HCCB's grouping methodology including the selection of variable weights. Even one of Mercy's witnesses provided testimony which supports this conclusion: Mr. Kenneth G. McGee testified that "[i] t was just a trial and error process of changing weights until we ended up with something that people considered more reasonable than what had been produced in the past." Mercy has questioned Dr. Meeter's testimony with regard to the use of the subjective method of weighting variables based upon a number of proposed findings of fact. First, Mercy has proposed findings of fact to the effect that Dr. Meeter indicated that the subjective method is "bad" if not carefully applied. What Dr. Meeter actually said was that any method should be applied carefully. Secondly, Mercy has proposed a finding of fact that in a book relied upon by Dr. Meeter in rendering his opinion about the subjective method--John Hardigan's 1975 book, Clustering Algorithms--the author describes the subjective method as an "unsatisfactory" one. What Dr. Meeter's testimony proves is that Hardigan's comment was a tongue- in-cheek comment that there are several appropriate methods of weighting variables all of which are unsatisfactory, including regression analysis (used by Dr. Zimmerman) and the subjective method (use by the HCCB). Dr. Meeter also relied upon other statistical literature in rendering his opinion as to the use of the subjective method in determining variable weights. Finally, Mercy has suggested that Dr. Meeter did not undertake any independent "statistical" analysis which would support his opinions. Based upon the nature of Dr. Meeter's testimony, it does not appear that such a statistical analysis is a prerequisite to concluding that the use of the subjective method is an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Mercy has proposed a finding that the subjective method of weighting is inappropriate based upon Dr. Zimmerman's testimony. Dr. Zimmerman was asked the following questions and gave the following responses concerning the subjective method: Q Now, in your understanding of how the Board arrived at its weights, is it your opinion that that is totally inappropriate methodology for clustering? Yes or no or maybe? A I am looking to counsel for counsel here. MR. PARKER: Do you understand the questions? THE WITNESS: I do understand the question. And let me give you my full answer as I best understand it. The weights -- and I think what I have commented on at great length -- the weights used by the Hospital Cost Containment Board are clearly on statistical grounds inappropriate. There's no question about that. BY MR. COLLETTE: Now, on these clustering grounds, you testified as to your familiarity with clustering grounds, on clustering grounds, are they totally inappropriate? A If the question is -- I wouldn't say that. Hearing that there is no objection, I will continue. I would rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as a final solution for cluster analysis. I think it might be one that would be considered at a very early step, but never used, as kind of a preliminary idea. However, I would clearly rule out the use of a purely subjective weighting scheme as something to be proud of and actually put into application. So, if that means yes to your question, I guess yes in that specific way. Dr. Zimmerman's responses are not totally clear with regard to whether the subjective method is, in his opinion, an acceptable method of determining variable weights. Nor would his response, if totally clear, overcome the weight of the evidence in support of a conclusion that the HCCB's method of determining variable weights is not arbitrary and capricious. Alternative Methods of Grouping Hospitals. Mercy has proposed a number of findings of fact under a section of its proposed order entitled "Alternative Variables and Weights Indicated by Statistical Analyses." Pages 22 to 29 of Mercy's proposed order. Some of the proposed findings included therein have been dealt with in other portions of this Final Order, including those findings of fact dealing with the use of multiple regression analysis and multicollinearity. In Dr. Zimmerman's report (Mercy exhibit 17) and during his testimony a number of alternative methods of grouping hospitals were tested and evaluated. Dr. Zimmerman concluded that a number of these alternative methods would be preferable to the methodology adopted by the HCCB. Dr. Zimmerman tested twelve different methods (referred to as "Schemes" by Dr. Zimmerman): the HCCB's, the State of Washington's and ten other methods which used some or all of the seven variables designated by the HCCB. Scheme 3 used all seven variables selected by the HCCB but with different weights. Dr. Zimmerman rejected this scheme because of multicollinearity. In Scheme 4, Dr. Zimmerman used only the four variables which he found to be statistically significant: physician specialties mix, number of residents, percent Medicare days and the Florida price level index. Dr. Zimmerman recognized that this Scheme was not acceptable because of the statutory mandate as to the types of factors which must be taken into account. In order to recognize the requirement of Sections 395.507(2) and 395.509(4)(a), Florida Statutes (1984 Suppl.), that certain variables be taken into account and to alleviate the purported multicollinearity problem, Dr. Zimmerman combined the variables he considered highly correlated into two "scales." "Scale 1" combined physician specialties mix, available services and average occupied beds and "Scale 2" combined the Florida price level index and median income. The weights assigned to these scale were based upon the weights Dr. Zimmerman felt were more appropriate as discussed, supra. Dr. Zimmerman then used multiple regression analysis and a variety of combinations of variables and Scales in Schemes 6-12. Of these Schemes, Dr. Zimmerman testified that Schemes 6 and 10 were preferable, if Scheme 4 could not be used. Scheme 6 involved the use of all of the variables: percent Medicare days, number of residents and Scales 1 and 2. Scheme 10 involved the use of all of the variables except median income: percent Medicare days, number of residents, the Florida price level index and Scale 1. Dr. Zimmerman compared the results of using the HCCB's grouping methodology to the results from using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. The results showed that more Dade County hospitals had GRAA's, in comparison to the hospitals in the resulting groups under Schemes 3,4,6 and 10, which would result in automatic approval of their budgets than under the HCCB's methodology. Mercy's position within its group also improved as a result of using Schemes 3,4,6 and 10. These proposed findings of and Mercy's proposed findings of fact concerning alternatives considered by Dr. Meeter do not prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. As found, supra, six of the seven variables selected by the HCCB are reasonable. The weights assigned to those variables have also been found to be reasonable and Mercy's suggested findings of fact with regard to multicollinearity have been rejected. Mercy has failed to prove that the HCCB's grouping methodology is arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, any alternative methods or Schemes and the results of using such methods cannot and do not overcome such findings. Conclusions. Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the bases for the opinions that the HCCB's grouping methodology is inappropriate are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Zimmerman's opinion, which was based upon a number of conclusions, was only supported by the fact that one of the variables selected by the HCCB is not proper. The evidence, however, does not support a finding that this fact alone means that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is inappropriate. The facts do not support a conclusion that the grouping methodology adopted by the HCCB is arbitrary and capricious.
Findings Of Fact Introduction Orlando General Hospital applied in April, 1987, for a certificate of need to allow it to convert 24 existing medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 1. It did not explicitly apply for beds limited to serve adults. It did, however, state that adolescent care would not be provided "at this time," leaving open the use of the 24 beds in the future for possible adolescent use. Id. at p. 5. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., applied for a certificate of need for a 50 bed short term psychiatric specialty hospital. It explicitly applied for a specialty hospital having 50 beds of "short term adult psychiatric care." C.M. Ex. 1, application, section I. In the executive summary, it characterized its proposal as a specialty hospital "for adults." Id. at p. 1. Charter does not intend to treat child or adolescent short term psychiatric patients. T. 23. The applications were filed in early 1987 to meet need in the January, 1992, planning horizon. The rule that applies in this case is the one contained in the prehearing stipulation. T. 392. It is rule 10-5.011(1)(o), Fla. Admin. Code. A copy of the rule is contained in O.G. Ex. 7, p. 33. The provisions of the local health plan at issue in this case are accurately reproduced in the State Agency Action Report (SAAR) which is C.M. Ex. 5. Net Short Term Psychiatric Bed Need (Numeric Need) Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4a-c, Fla. Admin. Code, provides that the projected number of beds shall be based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected five years into the future and based, in this case, on the January, 1987, projections for January, 1992. That 1992 population for District VII is projected to be 1,505,564, and thus the gross short term psychiatric bed need is 527 beds. For this batching cycle, the inventory of licensed and approved short term psychiatric beds was 410. These were: General Hospitals Florida Hospital-Altamonte 20 Florida Hospital-Orlando 85 Orlando Regional Med. Center 32 Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital 25 Subtotal 162 Specialty Hospitals Brevard Mental Health Center 52 CPC Palm Bay (began 10/86) 40 Laurel Oaks (began 10/86) 60 Lynnhaven (approved only) 39 Park Place (approved only) 17 West Lake 40 Subtotal 248 TOTAL (Licensed and approved) 410 TOTAL (Licensed only) 354 Thus, there is a net need for 117 short term psychiatric beds In District VII by 1992. The rule further specifies that a minimum of .15 per 1,000 population should be allocated to hospitals holding a general license, and that .20 per 1,000 of the beds may be located in either speciality hospitals or hospitals holding a general license. HRS interprets the word "should" in the rule with respect to .15 per 1,000 allocated to hospitals with a general license as being mandatory. C.M. Ex. 5, pp. 13-14. This is a reasonable construction of the rule. By 1992 there must be 226 short term psychiatric beds located in hospitals holding a general license. Since currently there are 162 beds in such hospitals, there is a net need by January, 1992, for 64 short term psychiatric beds to be opened in hospitals holding a general license. The remainder of the net bed need, 53 beds, may be located in either a specialty hospital or a hospital holding a general license. T. 500-02. The Occupancy Rate for "All Existing Adult Short Term Inpatient Psychiatric Beds" Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, provides in part that "no additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period." (E.S.). Calendar year 1986 is the period of time accepted by all parties as the "preceding 12 month period" as specified by the rule, that is, the period of time to calculate the occupancy rate for this batching cycle. See, e.g., T. 285; C.M. Ex. 5. The State Agency Action Report Occupancy Rate The State Agency Action Report computed the occupancy rate for all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in calendar year 1986 at 70.13 percent. C.M. Ex. 5, p. 10. This figure was based upon data as to patient days as reported by District hospitals to the District VII local health council and was based upon 354 licensed beds in the District during the full calendar year, but excluded 56 beds the re approved but not opened. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 6. Exclusion of CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks have been designated by certificate of need issued by HRS to serve only children and adolescents. T. 507. Since those facilities by law cannot serve adults, their beds are not "adult beds," their patient days are not adult patient days, and their occupancy rate is not an adult occupancy rate. T. 1128. If CPC Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks were excluded from the calculation of the occupancy rate in the SAAR, the occupancy rate would be 73.7 percent. This rate is a weighted average based upon a 86,779 patient days that were possible at 100 percent occupancy of all licensed short term psychiatric beds in District VII in 1986, excluding Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. How Many Adult Patient Days and Beds? HRS often issues certificates of need without age restrictions, allowing the facility to provide short term psychiatric treatment to everyone, regardless of age. Such hospitals can and do serve all ages, and their licensed short term psychiatric beds are not designated as, or restricted to, adults. T. 1128-29. With the exception of Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks, none of the other licensed short term psychiatric hospitals in the District are restricted by HRS by patient age. HRS does not have data to enable it to determine which short term psychiatric beds were used by adult patients in the District in 1986. T. 1169. Use of beds for age cohorts can dramatically and continuously change during a calendar year, and 41 has no reliable means to know about such changes. T. 1229-30. Hospitals issued certificates of need without limitation as to the age of the patient are not required by HRS to report the number of patient days served by the hospital by age or age group of the patient. See T. 1218-19; HRS Ex. 2. HRS Ex. 2. Consequently, the reported short term psychiatric patient days for District VII for calendar year 1986 mix adult patient days with patient days for children and adolescents. Thus, with the exception of Laurel Oaks and Palm Bay, it is impossible in this case for the applicants and other parties in this batching cycle to untangle pure adult psychiatric patient days from the available data. T. 392, 353, 287, 291, 371, 1169-71. It is impossible on this record to make a finding of fact as to what would happen to the mixed occupancy rate all patient days attributable to adolescents and children could be excluded from the adult patient days. The only bit of evidence is found in C.M. Ex. 17, the data from Florida Hospital, which shows for that hospital that the 16 adolescent unit in 1986 had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent, and the open adult unit had an occupancy rate of 82.42 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 3. But that percentage is more a reflection of Florida Hospital's choice in how it set up the beds in the two programs than it is a reflection of need. For example, had Florida Hospital chosen to allocate only 12 beds to its adolescent program, instead of 16, the 1986 occupancy rate for that unit, based on 3,558 patients a day, would have been 81.23 percent. One wonders why Florida Hospital did not simply allocate a lower number of beds to the adolescent unit, since it had only 13 admissions to that unit in 1986. In any event, since a hospital like Florida Hospital has discretion as to how it sets up its beds with respect to the ages of patients. In those beds, the fact that it had an occupancy rate of 60.92 percent in the subunit it called the adolescent unit in 1986 is relatively meaningless when trying to predict which way a pure adult occupancy rate might change if adolescent and child patient days could be excluded. In summary, there is no accurate count of beds licensed only as adult beds, there is no accurate count of beds used only as adult beds, and there is no accurate count of adult patient days. The Problem of West Lake Hospital The record has an additional data problem with respect to calculation of the occupancy rate of adult short term psychiatric beds. West Lake Hospital is licensed for 40 short term beds (not restricted by age), and 30 long term psychiatric beds. Data for calendar year 1986, the only year relevant in this case, is a mixture of short term and long term patient days. C.M. Ex. 17. As will be discussed ahead, additional evidence as to the patient days at West Lake Hospital was excluded from evidence for failure to comply with the prehearing order. The Problem of Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days Occurring in General Hospitals Without Licensed Short Term Psychiatric Beds A general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. T. 1191. In calendar year 1986, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it provided 4,969 psychiatric (MDC 19) patient days of care. O.G. Ex. 7, p. 11. By 1988, it had over 30 psychiatric patients in the hospital at any given time. T. 753. Orlando General Hospital does not have any beds licensed for short term psychiatric care, or for long term psychiatric care, for that matter. Orlando General Hospital's psychiatric patients are currently receiving inpatient psychiatric care that is substantially the same as would be provided in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, with the exception that the care is osteopathic in nature. See T. 797, 1355-58, 1360-62, 788-90, 792-93. HRS Policy as to the Data Problems HRS stated that it "... would not attempt to fix a specific occupancy for a specific age cohort" in this case, T. 1220. A good faith attempt was made, however. Following a new policy, HRS argued that the adult bed occupancy rate should exclude the beds and patient days of hospitals having certificates of need explicitly limited to service of the needs of children and adolescents (Palm Bay and Laurel Oaks), but should include all of the licensed short term psychiatric beds at any other facility that is not restricted by patient age. T. 1127-29. It was acknowledged that the information is faulty, but the Department urges that it is the best that it can do under the circumstances. T. 1174. With respect to patient days, HRS also urges that only the patient days reported to the local health council by hospitals having licensed adult short term psychiatric beds should be counted in the mixed rate. In particular, HRS argues that it should not use patient day data reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board because such data is not limited to hospitals having "designated" psychiatric units. T. 1126-27. This argument is not reasonable. Hospitals that are legally authorized to provide short term psychiatric care to adults (i.e., having a certificate of need and a license) can provide such care in any licensed bed in the hospital, even though the bed is not licensed as a psychiatric bed. Moreover, a general hospital with no licensed short term psychiatric care, according to HRS witnesses, can lawfully provide temporary and sporadic short term psychiatric care in its medical-surgical beds. It may even provide such care on a continuous, ongoing basis, as in the case of Orlando General Hospital, although the legality of doing so is questioned by HRS. The critical question is not whether these licensed hospitals have legal authority to provide short term psychiatric care, but whether the care in fact given results in a short term psychiatric patient day in the District. If the care given is essentially the same as if the patient had been in a licensed short term psychiatric bed, it would be unreasonable not to treat the resulting statistic as a short term psychiatric patient day. What is at stake is a true measurement of District capacity. If tomorrow all of the District short term psychiatric patients and the patient days generated by such patients transferred to the District licensed short term psychiatric beds, these short term psychiatric patient days would certainly be counted in the occupancy rate. When trying to assess the real extent of availability of District capacity, a false picture of excess and unused capacity would be shown if real short term psychiatric patient days are occurring somewhere in the District, but are not counted in determining the occupancy rate. On the other hand, if the facility is not even a licensed hospital, it is presumptively providing an alternative kind of inpatient psychiatric care that is different from a licensed psychiatric hospital. Thus, its patient days are irrelevant absent some specific proof that the care given in such a bed is essentially the same as a short term psychiatric patient day in a licensed general or specialty hospital. What is an "Existing" Adult Short Term Bed? Rule 10-5.011(1)(o)4e, Fla. Admin. Code, calls for the occupancy rate for "all existing" adult short term psychiatric beds in the service district, and does not define the word "existing." Petitioners assert that "existing" adult beds of the facility for purposes of determining occupancy rate is the number of beds characterized by the facility as having been in fact used for psychiatric care during the year, but only if that number is less than the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 391, 354-55. The Respondent and the Intervenor argue that "existing" adult beds is fixed by the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds granted to the facility by the state if available to serve adult patients. Normally, to be licensed a bed must be available within 24 hours. T. 1121. Orlando Regional Medical Center In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center had 32 licensed short term psychiatric beds. T. 348. These 32 beds were not restricted by patient age. In calendar year 1986, Orlando Regional Medical Center characterized as "in service" 32 beds for the first 7 months of 1986, 22 beds for the month of August, 18 beds for the month of September, and 12 beds for the remaining 3 months of the year. The figure of 25 beds used by the Petitioners is the weighted average. T. 348. These licensed short term psychiatric beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center were temporarily not in service because of the construction of new facilities at the hospital. Orlando Regional Medical Facility intended to reopen those beds in the future because the hospital reminded the party seeking discovery that it had 32 licensed beds, and characterized the missing beds as having been "warehoused," that is, saved for future use. T. 509-10; O.G. Ex. 7, appendix 3. Thus, all 32 of Orlando Regional Medical Center's licensed beds would be available and would be used for adult short term psychiatric care if demand existed. Florida Hospital Florida Hospital has two facilities relevant to this case, one in Orlando, in Orange County, and one in Altamonte Springs, in Seminole County. In calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital had 105 beds licensed as short term psychiatric beds. Florida Hospital would serve patients of any age in these 105 beds. C.M. Ex. 18 is a document which was obtained from Florida Hospital through discovery. T. 286. The document is entitled "Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry Monthly Operating Statistics," and thus was assumed by Charter's expert to be Florida Hospital's characterization of its data as psychiatric data. T. 289. C.M. Ex. 18 could not have been obtained by Charter at the time it made application. It was obtainable only through the discovery process after commencement of section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., proceedings. T. 314-16, 386-87. Florida Hospital reported in discovery that in calendar year 1986, it had 113 beds operating in its "Center for Psychiatry." Of these, 16 were substance abuse beds, 13 were beds in an eating disorders unit, and 16 were adolescent beds. That left 24 beds in the intensive care unit, 24 beds in an open unit, and 20 beds at a unit at Altamonte Springs. C.M. Ex. 18. The 16 substance abuse beds clearly were not psychiatric beds. If the 13 eating disorders beds were short term psychiatric beds, Florida Hospital had 97 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. If they were not, Florida Hospital had 84 of its 105 licensed short term psychiatric beds in actual operation in 1986. There is no evidence in this record that Florida Hospital could not and would not have readily opened 8 more short term psychiatric beds during 1986 if demand for those beds had existed, thus having "open" all 105 of its licensed beds. There is no evidence in this record that in 1986, Florida Hospital could not have closed its 16 bed adolescent unit and devoted all of those beds to adult short term psychiatric care, had there been a need. Indeed, it appears that generally speaking, that is how Florida Hospital operates: by shifting beds to other uses within its licensed authority according to demand. See T. 1322-26. Thus, all 105 of Florida Hospital's licensed beds would have been available and would have been used for adult short term psychiatric patients if the demand existed. Counting Patient Days - Are Eating Disorder Patient Days Psychiatric Patient Days? Florida Hospital reported in discovery that it had 2,982 patient days in its eating disorder unit, and that the unit operated with 13 beds. C.M. Ex. 18, P. 3, lines 8 and 26. The eating disorder unit reports to the administrative director of the Florida Hospital Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The administrative director could not explain why the unit reported to the Center for Psychiatry. T. 977. The unit has co-directors, one a psychiatrist, and the other a specialist in internal medicine. Id. The administrative director of the Center for Psychiatry characterizes the 13 eating disorders beds as medical-surgical beds, and classifies patients in those beds as primarily having a medical problem, T. 976, but the psychiatrist co-director of the program hedged, and would not say whether the primary diagnosis is medical or psychiatric. T. 1315. The patients typically are, however, very ill from a medical point of view. T. 1314. Florida Hospital's characterization of the nature of the care given in its eating disorders unit, as summarized in the preceding paragraph, in view of the manner in which the witnesses were unclear as to how to characterize the eating disorder unit, is not evidence that the care given in that unit is not psychiatric care in view of Florida Hospital's interest in these cases in opposition to the applications. Charter's expert concluded from C.M. Ex. 18 that Florida Hospital was serving short term psychiatric patients in its eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs. T. 287. He characterized this as a short term psychiatric service in medical-surgical beds. T. 289. But he also characterized the 13 beds as psychiatric beds. T. 287-88. HRS has issued a certificate of need to a short term psychiatric hospital limiting that certificate of need to treatment of eating disorders, thereby recognizing treatment of eating disorders in that case as a form of psychiatric treatment. T. 1191. From testimony at the hearing, it would appear that HRS's expert would view the eating disorder unit at Altamonte Springs as a short term psychiatric program. T. 1191-1192, 1194. It is concluded that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the care rendered to patients in the eating disorders unit was psychiatric care. The unit is administratively a part of the hospital's Center for Psychiatry. While the patients are very ill, medically speaking, they also have substantial mental health problems. Finally, and most persuasive, HRS has previously characterized such care as short term psychiatric care. If these 2,982 eating disorder patient days are counted as psychiatric patient days in 1986 for District VII, and if the number of beds at Florida Hospital remains as it was in the SAAR calculation (105 licensed beds), then the total patient days for the District changes from 63,976 to 66,958. The result is that the occupancy rate for District VII for 1986 for adult and mixed short term psychiatric beds changes from 73.72 percent to 77.16 percent. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 13. This calculation is the result of a weighted average discussed above. Psychiatric Patient Days Reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital report patient days by Medicare major diagnostic categories (MDC). MDC 19 is the category for psychiatric care. T. 512; O.G. Ex. 7. The data collected in this record was for calendar year 1986. T. 603-604. Relying upon MDC 19 statistics for calendar year 1986, Florida Hospital (Orlando and Altamonte Springs combined) had 28,372 MDC 19 patient days, and Orlando Regional Medical Center had 7,328 MDC 19 patient days. The Florida Hospital MDC 19 patient days shown in table 6, O.G. Ex. 7, are very close to the number of patient days shown on C.M. Ex. 18, the operating statistics from the "Center for Psychiatry" obtained from Florida Hospital in discovery. The MDC 19 patient days, 28,372, exceed the "Center for Psychiatry" reported data by only 452. The Orlando Regional Medical Center's MDO 19 patient days, 7,328, is 618 patient days greater than the patient days reported by Orlando Regional Medical Center to the local health council. If these MDC 19 patient days are assumed to be short term adult psychiatric patient days, following the same mathematical calculation used by HRS both in the SAAR and in testimony during the hearing (with the same weighted averages), the occupancy rate for adult and mixed short term psychiatric care in District VII, using licensed beds, was 78.39 percent in calendar year 1986. O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. This calculation uses the same weighted average (86,779 patient days at 100 percent occupancy) as used by all the other parties. C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11, fn. 9. There is no evidence in the record that the foregoing MDC 19 patient days are limited to short term psychiatric days, or the extent to which the data considers long term patient days as well. Of course, there is also no evidence available to separate the MDC 19 patient days into adult patient days and patient days attributable to children and adolescents. Westlake Hospital Data as to Short Term Psychiatric Patient Days in 1986 The Intervenor, Florida Hospital, has renewed its effort to have F.H. Ex. 3, and testimony based upon that exhibit admitted, into evidence. The exhibit and testimony involves data as to short term psychiatric patient days for 1986 at Westlake Hospital, located in Seminole County. Florida Hospital argues that the ruling excluding F.H. Ex. 3 from evidence, as well as testimony related to that exhibit, is inconsistent with the ruling that allowed Charter Medical to introduce C.M. Ex. 19. It is argued that the only difference is that in the case of Charter Medical, the witness first testified as to the contents of the exhibit, whereas in Florida Hospital's case, the exhibit was admitted, the witness testified, and then the exhibit was excluded. Florida Hospital argues that as a result of this sequence of events, its witness was not afforded an opportunity to present the same evidence from memory without the exhibit. From a review of the sequence of events, it is apparent that there is a substantial difference between the two exhibits, as well as a substantial difference in the procedures used by counsel, and that difference necessitates the two rulings. C.M. Ex. 19 is nearly identical to C.M. Ex. 17, with three exceptions. In C.M. Ex. 19 the patient days at the Florida Hospital eating disorder unit were moved from the Orlando facility to the Altamonte Springs facility. C.M. Ex. 19 also excluded adolescent patient days from the Florida Hospital count changed the number of "existing" beds at Orlando Regional Medical Center to 25 instead of 32. T. 295. C.M. Ex. 19 made no other changes to C.M. Ex. 17 with respect to patient days or number of beds. Two objections were made by Florida Hospital to the admission of C.M. Ex. 19, that C.M. Ex. 19 had not been provided to opposing counsel at the exchange of exhibits, in violation of the prehearing order, and that C.M. Ex. 19 was an impermissible amendment to Charter Medical's application for certificate of need. T. 295-296. Only the first objection is the subject of Florida Hospital's renewed argument. The Hearing Officer at the time overruled the first objection because it was determined that C.M. Ex. 19 merely summarized the testimony of Dr. Luke as to changes he would make to C.M. Ex. 17. That ruling was correct, and should not be changed at this time. All of the underlying data for the expert analysis in C.M. Ex. 19 came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged among the parties. C.M. Ex. 18 contained the data as to adolescent patient days and eating disorder patient days at Florida Hospital in 196. That data came into evidence without objection that it had not been exchanged. T. 316. Dr. Luke's testimony that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 beds operational in 1986 came into evidence without objection. T. 292. Dr. Luke's testimony concerning the location of the eating disorders unit at Altamonte Springs came into evidence without objection. T. 287, 291. Both of these latter evidentiary matters were of a type that easily could have been known to Dr. Luke without reference to a document to refresh his memory. Additionally, the parties were well aware of the argument that Orlando Regional Medical Center had only 25 operational beds in 1986, and that Florida Hospital had only 48 adult beds in operation in 1986, since that evidence and argument was a fundamental part of Orlando General Hospital's basic bed need exhibit, O.G. Ex. 7, and the testimony of Ms. Horowitz. Moreover, the type of analysis of the data contained in C.M. Ex. 19 is the same as that of Ms. Horowitz in O.G. Ex. 7. Thus, Florida Hospital was not caught by surprise by C.M. Ex. 19. The exhibit did not contain new data or new modes of analysis. Florida Hospital's attempt to introduce data as to the actual number of short term psychiatric patient days at Westlake Hospital in 1986 was quite different. The data as to patient days at Westlake had not been produced during the deposition of Florida Hospital's witness, although similar data for 1987 and 1988 was produced. T. 867. Had it been made available in discovery, the failure to exchange the data as an exhibit as required by the prehearing order would have been less serious. But the exhibit had not been given by Florida Hospital to opposing parties, in violation of the prehearing order. T. 869. F.H. Ex. 3 did not reorganize data that otherwise was exchanged between the parties. It attempted to introduce new raw statistical data that had not been furnished opposing counsel as required by the prehearing order. The Hearing Officer initially ruled that F.H. Ex. 3 should be admitted into evidence and allowed the witness to testify concerning the data contained in the document. T. 870-871. That initial ruling was in error. The data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 is not at all simple. The document consists of four pages of numbers representing monthly statistics in 1986 at Westlake Hospital for each of its units. It is highly unlikely that a witness could have remembered all of that data presented the data in testimony without reliance upon the exhibit. Indeed, the witness testified that all of his testimony was based upon F.H. Ex. 3. T. 907. The witness had apparently given a different impression as to Westlake's occupancy rate in 1986 during his deposition, and did so without the benefit of F.H. Ex. 3. T. 910. Florida Hospital could have asked the witness if he could have presented his testimony without reference to F.H. Ex. 3, but it did not ask the witness that critical question. In sum, the witness could not have presented his analysis from memory. He had to have F.H. Ex. 3 in front of him as he testified. On December 2, 1987, an order was entered setting this case for formal administrative hearing beginning on July 11, 1988. That order established prehearing procedures. Paragraph 3 of that order requires counsel to meet no later than 10 days before the hearing to, among other things, "examine and number all exhibits and documents proposed to be introduced into evidence at the hearing." Later in the same paragraph is the requirement that the parties file a prehearing stipulation containing a list of all exhibits to be offered at the hearing. Paragraph 3D of the prehearing order states in part that failure to comply with the requirements of the order "may result in the exclusion of testimony or exhibits." The first time that opposing counsel were given the opportunity to see the data in F.H. Ex. 3 was in the middle of the formal administrative hearing. The exhibit contained detailed raw statistical data. C.M. Ex. 19 did not try to present new raw statistical data. For these reasons, F.H. Ex. 3 and all testimony related to that exhibit by Mr. Menard was excluded from evidence. Later in the hearing, Florida Hospital sought to introduce the same data through the testimony of Wendy Thomas, the planning director and data manager for the local health council. T. 1050. Counsel for Florida Hospital first attempted to show the witness the document that had been excluded from evidence, and counsel for the other parties objected. T. 1047-1049. The Hearing Officer suggested to counsel that counsel should first ask the witness whether she had made a computation and then ask what was the basis of the computation, rather than show the witness the document. T. 1049. Counsel then attempted to do that. But when counsel asked the witness for her computation, it was still unclear whether the witness based her calculation upon data in the excluded document. T. 1053. After a number of other questions, it still was unclear whether the data in the excluded document was the basis for the calculation. T. 1053-1055. The Hearing Officer then asked the witness if she could identify F.H. Ex. 3. The witness said that F.H. Ex. 3 contained the exact type of information that she had in her own files, and that her document looked like F.H. Ex. 3, except it was photocopied smaller. T. 1056. During all of this exchange, the witness was never asked by counsel for Florida Hospital if she ever had an independent memory of the details of the underlying data, or whether, if that memory now had faded, looking at F.H. Ex. 3 would refresh her memory. Since it was apparent that the basis for the witness's calculation was the same raw statistical data as contained in F.H. Ex. 3, the Hearing Officer granted the motion to exclude the testimony. Later, in cross examination of the proffered testimony, the witness testified that the basis for her calculation was the use of a document containing the same data as F.H. Ex. 3. T. 1087-1088, 1091. Thus, counsel for Florida Hospital did not lay a proper predicate for attempting to use F.H. Ex. 3 to refresh the memory of either witness. As discussed above, had it done so, it is unlikely that either witness could have testified from memory as to the statistics because the data contained in F.H. Ex. 3 was too detailed to have ever been in the memory of either witness. Florida Hospital argued that Ms. Thomas's calculation should be admitted because the raw data had been in her possession for over a year. That argument is unpersuasive. The raw data was in the possession of Westlake Hospital as well. The issue is not whether opposing parties might have discovered the data on their own, but compliance with the prehearing order requiring exchange of important exhibits. For these reasons, the Hearing Officer's rulings as to exclusion of the foregoing evidence will remain unchanged. The Local Health Plan Applicability No part of the District VII local health plan was adopted by HRS as a rule when these applications were and reviewed. T. 1214. Several years ago, with respect to applications for certificates of need for short term psychiatric beds, HRS considered need and occupancy rates only on a district-wide basis. T. 1184. See e.g. C.M. Ex. 20, where HRS did not refer to the local health plan as to these issues in District VII. HRS has now changed that policy, however, and considers need and occupancy at the district level and by portions of the District if those issues are effectively required by the local health plan. T. 1184. For purposes of planning for short term psychiatric services, the local health plan divides District VII into county "planning areas." Orange County is thus a local health plan planning area. The local health plan does not use planning areas for substance abuse planning, and it does not explain why there is a difference in planning. Orlando General and Charter both propose to locate their proposed short term adult psychiatric beds in Orange County if granted certificates of need. Counties are convenient units for health planning purposes because population data exists by county. T. 1180. Census tracts and zip code areas are also convenient geographical units for health planning. T. 1180-81. If a proposed facility is to be located very close to the county line, it would make no difference which side of the line it was on with respect to the ability of the facility to serve patients originating in either county. T. 1181. Allocation of Net Need to Orange County The local health plan, policy 3, provides that if the application of rule 10-5.011(1)(o) indicates a need (at the District level), the need is to be allocated among the counties in the district using the state numeric need method by county. T. 1027-29; C.M. Ex. 5. Applying all of the age calculations for the projected populations and bed inventory of Orange County only, the local health plan allocates 55 new short term psychiatric beds to Orange County by 1992. However, applying the allocation ratios of the rule, there is an excess of 18 short term psychiatric beds in general hospitals, and thus none of the 55 beds would be mainly allocable to a general hospital. There is, nonetheless, a potential allocation of need of 73 beds in either a specialty or a general hospital, and the net need of 55 beds could be allocated to either a specialty hospital or a general hospital. The Orange County Mixed Occupancy Rate The local health plan, policy 4, applies the 75 percent occupancy standard to the county level. The policy explicitly calls for an average annual occupancy rate for all existing facilities in the planning area with respect to adult short term psychiatric beds. C.M. Ex. 5. Relying upon the calculation in the SAAR, but deleting Laurel Oaks, the mixed occupancy rate for Grange County in 1986 was less than 58.4 percent. This calculation only includes the beds at Florida Hospital (Orlando) and Orlando Regional Medical Center. The calculation is based upon 18,696 patient days at Florida Hospital (Orlando) in 85 beds, and 6,242 patient days in Orlando Regional Medical Center in 32 beds. There were 4,969 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando General Hospital in 1986. There were 7,328 MDC 19 patient days occurring at Orlando Regional Medical Center in 1986. The eating disorder patient days occurred in Seminole County (Altamonte springs) and should not be counted in an Orlando occupancy rate. The only data as to patient days at Florida Hospital, Orlando only, is that found in C.M. Ex. 18, which is the same as the SAAR, which reports 18,696 patient days. (The MDC 19 data mixes the two units.) The number of licensed short term psychiatric beds in Orange County in 1986 was 117. All of these beds were licensed the entire year, and thus there was no need to do a weighted average of potential patient days for these beds. See C.M. Ex. 17, p. 11; O.G. Ex. 7, table 6. Using all of the foregoing patient days, the number of patient days was 30,993, the number of licensed short term psychiatric beds was 117, and the mixed occupancy rate for Orange County for 1986 was 72.6 percent. If it is not appropriate to count the 4,969 patient days at Orlando General Hospital in the Orange County occupancy rate, the 1986 Orange County occupancy rate was only 60.09 percent. Conversion of Existing Beds and Service to Indigent Patients Policy 5 of the local health plan states that excess bed capacity in, among other types of beds, medical/surgical beds, should be eliminated by reallocation of beds among the services, including psychiatric services. Policy 6 of the local health plan states that primary consideration should be given for project approval to applicants who satisfy to the greatest extent the following priorities: The first priority is to applicants who commit to serving "underserved client groups," including Medicaid, Baker Act, and medically indigent patients. The second priority is to applicants who convert underutilized existing beds. As will be discussed in the conclusions of law, Orlando General's application satisfies these priorities, and Charter Medical's application does not. Other Evidence as to Future Need Historically, health care providers have been reimbursed on a fee- for-service basis. The more services provided, the greater the payment. These insurance arrangements had little incentive to decrease the level of services. T. 720. In the last three or four years, the health insurance industry has changed its methods of providing insurance. A very large percentage of insured patient care is now managed by use of flat rates based upon a per person count (capitation). The rates do not increase related to utilization. Managed health care reimbursement uses a system whereby the health care provider is paid a flat rate annually for each insured person, and agrees to provide for the health care needs of all such persons generally without considering the degree of utilization during the year. T. 722-723. Under the capitation system, the provider has the incentive to provide only such care that, in intensity or duration, is the minimum that is clinically acceptable. T. 724. Psychiatric services have been included in the movement of the industry toward managed health care reimbursement rather than fee-for-service reimbursement. T. 722. The health care industry now offers competitive managed health care plans in central Florida, and the trend is for an increase in the availability of such methods of reimbursement in central Florida. T. 726-727. It is now 40 percent of the insurance market, and in the early 1990's, the percentage of managed health care may be twice that percentage. T. 727. The effect of the new reimbursement system is to substantially lower the length of stay, and to lower the rate of admission as well, at short term psychiatric hospitals. T. 724-725, 881-882, 1319-1320. Orlando General Hospital projected that its average length of stay would be 30 days in 1992. It has discovered from current experience that its average length of stay is about 15 days. T. 433, 464. District VII has recently experienced an increase in the availability of community based mental health facilities. These facilities provide a variety of mental health services, including brief inpatient care. The facilities do not require a certificate of need. T. 1046-1047, 1319. The Nature of the Proposed Programs Orlando General Hospital General Orlando General is a 197 bed acute care general osteopathic hospital located in Orlando, Florida, in Orange County. Orlando General proposes to convert a 35 bed medical-surgical unit to 24 short term psychiatric beds at a capital cost of $689,272. It would relocate 11 of its medical-surgical beds, and convert the remainder to short term psychiatric beds. Orlando General Hospital is located in the southeast portion of Orange County. T. 1107. It is the most eastward facility in Orange County with the exception of a long term psychiatric hospital now under construction. T. 1107. The primary service area of Orlando General by location of physicians offices is the southern half of Seminole County and the northern portion of Orange County. In particular, the hospital serves northeastern Orange County through the location of its physicians' offices. T. 412; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 27. The program of treatment described in Orlando General's application is no longer an accurate description of Orlando General's current program or of the intended program. T. 453. The treatment programs planned for the new short term psychiatric unit are comparable to the programs planned by Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., and are adequate and appropriate programs for short term psychiatric care. Psychiatric Care for the Elderly Orlando General Hospital would provide adequate and appropriate specialized short term psychiatric care for elderly patients, but would not provide such care in a unit physically separated from other patients. There currently is a split of professional opinion as to whether or not geriatric patients should be treated in a psychiatric unit separated (physically as well as programmatically) from other patients. There are benefits from both approaches. T. 1315-1317, 68, 74-76, 43-45, 770. Various Charter Medical hospitals do it both ways. T. 70. Osteopathic Medicine at Orlando General Hospital Osteopathic medicine differs from allopathic medicine in its emphasis upon viewing the interaction of all parts of the body, rather than a single part, and the use of muscular and skeletal manipulation. T. 1349, 753-754. Orlando General Hospital is an osteopathic hospital and has been osteopathic in nature since the 1960's. It was founded by osteopathic physicians, and the hospital abides by osteopathic philosophies. The Board of Trustees at the hospital are all osteopathic physicians. Although it has medical doctors on staff, the majority are osteopathic physicians Orlando General Hospital is accredited by the American Osteopathic Association to train osteopathic physicians, and has such training programs, primarily in family medicine. T. 412-414, 755. There are about 80 osteopathic physicians in Orange County, and the vast majority are on the staff at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Patients who prefer osteopathy, and osteopathic physicians, prefer an osteopathic hospital. Osteopathic physicians believe that they deliver better care to their patients in an osteopathic facility rather than an allopathic facility. About 30 percent of the psychiatric patients treated by Dr. Greene at Orlando General Hospital receive manipulation as a therapy. T. 1351. There is a shortage of osteopathic psychiatrists. T. 756. Other than Randall Greene, D.O., there are no osteopathic psychiatrists in the Orange County area. Id. There is a shortage of places for psychiatric resident training. There is no osteopathic psychiatric residency in Florida, and only a few in the country. T. 764, 1349. Consequently, osteopaths seeking to become psychiatrists often have to go to allopathic hospitals for residencies. T. 1349 Residency in an allopathic hospital is often not approved by the American College of osteopathic psychiatrists. Thus the osteopath who has had his or her residency in an allopathic hospital and lacks such approval will not be readily accepted as an osteopathic psychiatrist on the staff of an osteopathic hospital. T. 1350. Orlando General Intends to have a residency program in osteopathic psychiatric for at least two positions if it is granted a certificate of need. T. 762, 415. The Evolution of Osteo-Psychiatric Care at Orlando General Hospital Dr. Randall Greene came to Orlando in 1982. He is an osteopathic physician and psychiatrist. He initially was on the staff at four hospitals but soon discovered that other osteopathic physicians were referring patients needing psychiatric care to Orlando General Hospital because it was an osteopathic hospital. These physicians frequently asked Dr. Greene to provide psychiatric care at Orlando General. T. 754. Osteopathic physicians who referred their patients to Dr. Greene and to Orlando General Hospital continued to treat the physical ailments of those patients at Orlando General Hospital. T. 760. Dr. Greene now limits his psychiatric practice to Orlando General Hospital because of the large number of psychiatric patients being treated at the hospital. T. 756. Thirty to forty percent of the psychiatric patients come to Orlando General via the emergency room. T. 421, 445. Additionally, patients admitted to the new substance abuse program often need psychiatric care. T. 407. Orlando General has difficulty transferring its psychiatric patients to other hospitals. A number of the patients have no insurance or have only Medicaid coverage. T. 420. Orlando General Hospital is located in a lower economic area, and thus attracts patients of this type. Id. Patients who prefer osteopathic treatment also prefer not to be transferred to an allopathic hospital. T. 759. The increase in numbers of psychiatric patients served at Orlando General Hospital in medical-surgical beds helped to offset the hospital's loss of medical-surgical patient days during the same period. T. 452 Due to the large number of psychiatric patients, and the decline in need for medical-surgical beds, Orlando General hospital decided to apply for the instant certificate of need. Due to the osteopathic nature of the hospital, physicians, patients and the hospital prefer to keep these patients at Orlando General Hospital rather than refer them to an allopathic hospital. It is HRS's position that if a hospital does not advertise itself as having a distinct psychiatric unit and does not organize within itself a distinct psychiatric unit, the admission and treatment of psychiatric patients to medical-surgical beds on an "random" and unplanned basis is proper even the hospital does not have licensed psychiatric beds. T. 1191. Orlando General hospital does not hold itself out to the public through advertising as having a separate psychiatric unit. T. 468. Patient Mix & Commitment to Charity Care Orlando General Hospital currently provides a large portion of charity care for Orange County. T. 1100. In its 26 bed chemical dependency unit, Orlando General reserves 2 beds for indigents. T. 785. The unit also sets aside, as needed, one bed for any Florida nurse whose license is in jeopardy due to chemical dependence and who has no financial means to pay for treatment. Id. Orlando General Hospital typically has a larger amount of bad debt and charity care (for people who do not pay) than other hospitals in the area. T. 423. In 1987, Orlando General Hospital reported to the Hospital Cost Containment Board that it had $141,404 in charity care, and that it had $3,244,530 in bad debt. T. 657, 660. Bad debt constituted 9.7 percent of gross revenue. T. 660. Since it is very difficult to determine at admission whether the patient realistically can pay for services, a lot of this bad debt is, in a functional sense, charity care. T. 659-660. It is concluded from the foregoing that Orlando General Hospital has a genuine commitment to providing health care to persons who cannot pay. T. 422, 662. Orlando General Hospital projects that it will in its proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit 5 percent indigent patients, 8 percent Medicaid patients, 20 percent Medicare patients, 50 percent insured patients, and 17 percent private pay patients. These projections are reasonable and are consistent with Orlando General Hospital's current experience. T. 662-664; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 16. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. General Charter Medical proposes to construct a 50 bed free standing short term psychiatric hospital in Orange County, Florida. The capital cost of the proposed project would $5,85,000. C.M. Ex. 1. Charter Medical would offer adult and geriatric short term psychiatric services in the proposed short term beds. As a free standing specialty hospital devoted entirely to short term psychiatric care, Charter Medical's proposal should be able to provide more space and additional therapies than would typically be found at a general hospital with a short term psychiatric unit. T. 47-50, 890-91. Charter Medical would provide adequate geriatric short term psychiatric care in a separate unit with separate programs consisting of the latest techniques for caring for the mentally ill elderly patient. Charter Medical's proposed facility would not be able to treat short term psychiatric patients who also have serious medical problems, which undoubtedly will include elderly patients. Charter Medical would have adequate transfer arrangements with a general hospital to serve the medical needs of its patients, and would have adequate staffing and equipment within the free standing specialty hospital to meet the routine and emergency medical needs of its patients. Staffing Orlando General and Charter Medical would be able to recruit, train, and retain adequate staff to operate its proposed short term psychiatric unit. T. 635-648, 849-852, T. 137-143. Lone Term Financial Feasibility Orlando General Hospital Charges When these applications were filed, HRS did not have standards for the contents of a pro forma of income and expenses. Orlando General Hospital initially projected a charge rate of $350 in 1987 and $375 in 1988. This charge rate was based upon the charge rate for Orlando General's substance abuse unit at that time, compared with a survey of five other hospitals having short term psychiatric beds. T. 425; O.G. Ex. 2, p. 24, 49. As of the summer of 1988, the Medicaid program reimbursed Orlando General Hospital for its MDC 19 (psychiatric) patients at the rate of $418 per day. T. 585. Charter Medical proposes to charge $475 per day during 1988. Florida Hospital currently charges between $425 and $445 per short term psychiatric patient day, and these charges do not include ancillary charges. T. 992. Westlake Hospital currently charges about $550 per short term psychiatric patient day. T. 888. Winter Park Pavilion is a freestanding psychiatric hospital with 39 adult psychiatric beds. The record does not indicate whether it is licensed for short or long term care. The facility charges about $500 per patient day, which does not include ancillary costs. T. 913, 918. Crossroads University Behavioral Center is a freestanding 100 bed long term psychiatric hospital that is under construction. T. 808. Crossroads has considered charges in the range of $500 to $600 per day, but has not definitely settled on the rate. T. 832-833. The charges proposed by Orlando General Hospital in its application are very reasonable, if not very conservative. Projected Utilization Orlando General Hospital's MDC 19 patient days (psychiatric patient days) have increased steadily from 1986. In 1986, the hospital had 4,969 MDC 19 patient days; in 1987, it had 7,779 MDC 19 patient days; and extrapolating (multiplying by 4) from the data for the first three months of 196, Orlando General could reasonably expect 11,804 MDC 19 patient days in 1988. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11; T. 516. Since a 24 bed unit at 100 percent occupancy would only generate 8,760 patient days, it is unreasonable to use 11,804 as the estimate of patient days in 1988. However, it is concluded that Orlando General Hospital would have no difficulty at all in very quickly filling its proposed 24 bed unit to capacity. Expenses Orlando General Hospital's application estimated that direct expenses of the proposed 24 bed short term psychiatric unit would be $801,505 in 1987, $839,080. In 1988, and $887,030 in 1989. O.G. Ex. 2. These are reasonable projections of direct expenses. The pro forma filed by Orlando General Hospital in its application did not include an estimate of allocated expenses. The allocated expenses would typically have been 60 percent of total expenses, and the direct expenses only 40 percent of total expenses. T. 698. The projected direct expenses for 1988 in Orlando General Hospital's application were $839,080. Since that is only 40 percent of the total expense, the total projected expense (including 60 percent for indirect allocated expense) would be $2,097,700. Long Term Financial Feasibility If Orlando General Hospital charged $375 per patient day in 1988, and had 8,760 patient days, as is reasonable to expect, given its actual experience, Orlando General would have $3,285,000 in gross revenue for 1988. Assuming that net revenue, after additions and after accounting for contractuals and bad debt, will be the same percentage of gross revenue as shown in Orlando General's application, which was 76.74 percent, this would generate a net revenue of $2,520,909. This net revenue would entirely cover not only the direct expenses but also the allocated expenses, and would leave profit of $423,209. All of the remaining issues raised by the parties as to the accuracy of Orlando General's estimates of nursing expense or bad debt are irrelevant given the large amount of leeway Orlando General would have, if necessary, to raise its charges from $375 to something closer to the charges of other area hospitals. In summary, Orlando General Hospital's proposal is financially feasible in the long term. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical's proposed charges include charges for physicians who admit patients, perform histories and physicals, and make daily medical rounds. The proposed charges are reasonable. If there were need, Charter Medical's proposal would be financially feasible in the long term. The need for Charter Medical's proposed facility has not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence, however. See the Conclusions of Law herein. While the numerical need rule as applied to Orange County shows a need for 55 beds, in actual practice that need is a need for osteopathic psychiatric care. The thirty or so patients currently treated on a daily basis at Orlando General Hospital ended up at that hospital, rather than Orlando Regional Medical Center or Florida Hospital, primarily because the patients preferred osteopathic care and were admitted to Orlando General Hospital by osteopathic physicians. Absent action by HRS to stop Orlando General Hospital from treating these patients, the patients would not be available to Charter Medical in its proposed facility. This would leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new 50 bed facility when the county occupancy rate in 1986 was 60 percent in the only two licensed facilities in the area. It would also leave Charter Medical in a situation of opening a new facility in the face of the trend to managed health care and the certainty that the average length of stay for short term psychiatric care by 1992 will decrease from current levels. For these reasons, Charter Medical has not proven financially feasibility in the long term by a preponderance of the evidence. Quality of Care Orlando General Hospital Orlando General Hospital would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Charter Medical. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Charter Medical Corporation is a large corporation that has experience in the operation of a large number of psychiatric hospitals. That expertise would be available to insure that the care provided in Orange County would be of good quality. Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., would provide care of good quality comparable to care that would be provided by Orlando General. Comparative Review as to Important Differences The Orlando General Hospital Application Orlando General Hospital intends to convert 24 underutilized medical and surgical beds to 24 short term psychiatric beds. T. 517. Since the project calls for conversion of existing facilities, the capital cost is $700,000, and does not include the construction of new buildings. T. 517. Since the capital cost is relatively low, the project will not drain away a large amount of reimbursement from reimbursement funding sources, thus making those funds available to other health care facilities. T. 1223. As a licensed general hospital, Orlando General Hospital's patients including the patients that would be served by the proposed short term psychiatric unit, would be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement T. 1224. Orlando General Hospital has a good record in Orange County of serving indigent patients, and currently is providing care to a large portion of the indigents cared for by Orange County. T. 1099-1100. As discussed in the section concerning osteopathic care, Orlando General Hospital's proposal for a short term psychiatric unit would have a number of benefits to the practice of osteopathic medicine in the region, and the availability of osteopathic care to patients desiring that form of care. Patients in the short term psychiatric unit at Orlando General Hospital could be transferred to a medical bed when a medical need arises without having to be transported by an ambulance. The Charter Medical Application Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Charter Medical Corporation. Charter Medical Corporation has been in existence for 20 years and has 81 hospitals. Of these, 68 are psychiatric or substance abuse facilities. Charter Medical thus has extensive resources and experience to provide very good psychiatric care at the proposed facility. As a free standing hospital dedicated solely to short term psychiatric care, it is reasonable to expect that Charter Medical's facility will tend to provide more space, more varied programs, and more intensive patient care than a general hospital. This would occur because in a general hospital, the psychiatric unit must compete with medical units for allocation of resources, and in some hospitals, the psychiatric unit is given a lower priority due to the tendency of such hospitals to emphasize the medical aspect of their services. T. 47-49. Charter Medical's facility would not treat Medicaid patients, and it proposes to serve a very small percentage of indigent patients. Charter proposes in future years after the second year to provide 1.5 percent of gross revenue as charity care, and 5 percent as bad debt. T. 377-79, 197. Charter Medical's facility would serve primarily private pay and insured patients, thus draining away these paying patients from other hospitals, to the detriment of other hospitals. T. 971. The Substantial Interest of Florida Hospital If a certificate of need were granted to Charter Medical, Florida Hospital would suffer an adverse impact by loss of patients and additional competition for staff. T. 971-972, 1318-1321, 1327.
Recommendation For these reasons, it is recommended in case number 87-4748 that a final order be entered denying the application of Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc., to construct and operate a new 50 bed short term psychiatric hospital, and in case number 87-4753 that a final order be entered granting the application of Orlando General Hospital to convert 24 medical-surgical beds to short term psychiatric beds. DONE and ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX 1 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 The following are rulings upon proposed findings of fact which have either been rejected or which have been adopted by reference. The numbers used are the numbers used by the parties. Statements of fact in this appendix or proposed findings of fact adopted by reference in this appendix are additional findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by Charter Medical: 3-5. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The need is for beds in either a specialty or a general hospital. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. Had the beds been restricted as a matter of licensure to children, like Palm Bay or Laurel Oaks, the beds would not have been potentially available for adults. Only in that case would exclusion of these beds have been proper. The operational use of the beds is not relevant to the occupancy rate. The testimony regarding the use of the word "existing" in the health planning field has been rejected as not persuasive. The context of such use was not explained, and thus a finding cannot be made that the use of the word is properly applicable to the way HRS intends the word to be used in its occupancy rule. The equation of "existing" with "operational" confuses capacity and need as discussed elsewhere in this recommended order. The HRS interpretation is the most reasonable construction of the word, and leads to a meaning far more consistent with the purposes of the certificate of need regulatory law than does the equation of "existing" with merely being operational. The certificate of need law is aimed at determining need five years into the future. How a hospital may temporarily operate its licensed beds during that period to respond to fluctuations in demand and operational idiosyncrasies at the particular hospital is irrelevant to the question of whether HRS should grant certificates of need and additional licensed capacity within the District. Dr. Luke's calculation was conservative and correct, but a better calculation is the one by Orlando General's expert (78 percent) that uses MDC 19 patient days. The only relevant count is 105 licensed beds at the two facilities. The last sentence is rejected for lack of credible evidence from which to draw that inference, as explained elsewhere in this recommended order. 20-21. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 22. Orlando General's average daily census was 13.6 based upon 4,969 MDC 19 patient days in 1986. 23-24. The only relevant count is licensed beds. 28. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 30. It is true that the health care needs of the metropolitan Orlando impact counties adjacent to Orange County due to the sprawl of that urban area across several county lines. But there is sufficient expert evidence in this record to conclude that generally speaking, the local health council has not acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its choices of counties as health planning areas for purposes of allocation of bed need and for purposes of applying occupancy rates. Nonetheless, the that the urban extent of the metropolitan Orlando area is important has been accepted in this recommended order with respect to the conclusion that the factor that the Orange County occupancy rate is only slightly below 75 percent is entitled to less weight in this case. 32, 33, 35, 37-63. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 64 (first sentence). It is realistically expected that Charter Medical will devote 1.5 percent of its gross patient revenue to barity care. T. 377- 379. 65-70. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 71-72. Financial feasibility has not been shown due to lack of need. Lack of need will result in insufficient occupancy and revenue. 73-74. The extrapolation from the actual trend of increase in patient days in District VII for the years 1983-1987 to create a projection of patient days in 1988 through 1992 would have been a valid and important way to show need, and would have been accepted had the projection accounted for the trend in the industry toward shorter lengths of stay due to changes in methods of payments for mental health care. The extrapolation simply assumes that the past will continue. In this case, there is substantial reason to believe that the past will not continue, that the base data, 1983-1987, is not valid for predicting patient days in 1992 because the patient days in 1992 will largely be paid for under a new system, a system that discourages inpatient stays beyond that which is absolutely necessary from a clinical point of view. Charter Medical projects that it will rely upon insurance for payment 67 percent of the time, so the changes in insurance payments will substantially affect patient days in 1992 at its proposed facility. 75-85. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 89. While osteopathic psychiatric care is essentially the same as allopathic psychiatric care, there are two critical differences. Osteopathic medicine in general emphasizes consideration of the functioning of the body as a whole; allopathic medicine does not. Secondly, osteopathic medicine utilizes muscular and skeletal manipulation in treatment, including psychiatric treatment, and allopathic medicine does not. These two differences are sufficiently marked for patients to have a preference for one or the other approach. 91-92. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 93-94. These proposed findings are true and are adopted by reference, but the findings do not prove that the quality of care at Orlando General Hospital would not be adequate in 1992. It was apparent that Dr. Greene's heavy caseload was not an optimum circumstance. However, at the time of the , Orlando General had four staff psychiatrists. T. 1355. Dr. Greene testified that the care was "basically" the same, but his testimony clearly reflected his opinion that the "deeper" differences were significant. T. 756, 1350-1354. The record cited does not support a finding that the majority of the patients transferred were indigent. That question was not asked. This proposed finding places the cart before the horse. Osteopathic physicians gravitate to Orlando General Hospital to practice osteopathy. In the practice of osteopathy, they achieve many job satisfactions, including care of patients and making money. 98-99. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant because based upon the past, not upon a future having more staff psychiatrists. Moreover, it is clinically acceptable for other professionals to provide therapy and counseling. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. The program description in the application was superseded by evidence during the formal administrative hearing. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Orlando General Hospital is an existing hospital that already has these functions. It may need some augmentation of staff in these areas, but if it does, it would be an unreasonable conclusion to make that it would fail to add such 103-106. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The only exception is the last sentence in proposed finding 106. The number 18 is not supported by the record cited. This method has not been shown to be unreasonable. It is true that it was the method used. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. There was an accounting for bad debt. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 48. The point is essentially irrelevant. A 10 percent increase based upon 1987 salaries would be only about 20,000. Moreover, Charter Medical stipulated in the prehearing stipulation that the salaries of all personnel are reasonable. The proposed finding of fact is true but irrelevant. A pro forma does not have to comport with generally accepted accounting principles. Even with the addition of these charges, the resultant charge is comparable to charges of other area hospitals, including. Charter Medical's proposed charge of $475, which with inflation would increase rapidly to $500. 113-122, 124. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 125-127. Proof that an existing health care program is in sound financial condition is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether that program has a substantial interest sufficient to permit intervention into a section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., formal proceeding. Proof of competition for the same patients in the same service area is sufficient to show that the existing program will be "substantially affected" to entitle it to intervene. Section 381.709(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1987). Florida Hospital has proven its substantial interest by showing that the addition of new short term psychiatric beds, particularily a new facility like proposed by Charter Medical, will increase competition in Orange County for patients and staff. T. 881, 883, 649, 855-856. 128-129. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference 130. Mr. Holton's testimony was not only based upon consideration of the data mentioned in this proposed finding of fact, but also his experience in general with managed health care plans and the effect such plans have had upon the market place. The proposed finding that his testimony was not credible is rejected. 131 (first two sentences), 132-133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. Findings of Fact proposed by Orlando General Hospital: 7-12, 17, 19, 29. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The statement is true only from the perspective of the osteopathic psychiatrist and with respect to osteopathic care. Allopathic physicians disagree. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 34. The second sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 38-49, 51-60. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposition that separate geriatric units offer no benefits to geriatric patients is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The proposition that there is no problem in mixing the elderly with younger patients, or that an elderly patient does much better in a mixed population, is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The second and third sentences are contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 67-71, 73-80. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 86-87. While these proposed findings of fact are true, they are only marginally relevant since the ratio is measured as of 1992, not 1988. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. It is unclear when Dr. Greene meant when he testified that his census was 35 to 40 patients. For the first 90 days of 1988, the hospital had 2,951 MDC 19 patient days, or 32.8 patients per day. The analysis with respect to "existing" beds and the county analysis have been rejected as explained in this recommended order. The last sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 97-102. The legal argument that beds temporarily not in operation are not "existing" has been rejected as explained in this recommended order. Thus, these findings are not relevant. 105, 107 (last sentence). These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 109. The second sentence is rejected as a finding of fact because the health planning context was not adequately explained. 110-111. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 114-115. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 117. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 118-120. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. 122. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 123, 124, 126, 127, 129-131, 133. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The proposed finding of fact is true, but has not been shown to impact the financial feasibility of the Charter Medical proposal. The indirect costs within a single hospital are more relevant to long term financial feasibility of the proposed project than the indirect costs to a single hospital from a parent corporation that has over 60 such hospitals. 136, 147, 151, 152. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The patient body count for the first three months of 1988 was 32.8. O.G. Ex. 2, p. 11. The "consciousness" of a corporation is difficult . Orlando General Hospital was well aware that its medical-surgical census was decreasing and its psychiatric population was increasing. It is true that the increase of its psychiatric population was largely due to causes outside the control of the hospital, however, and not due to marketing efforts by the hospital. 161 (last sentence), 162. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. This proposed finding of fact is only marginally relevant because the result could be an average caused a minority of states who do things differently. Moreover, there Is no evidence that Florida is like this. The third sentence is subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. It is true, however, and is adopted by reference. 167. The statement is true only if HRS allows Orlando General Hospital to continue to serve this large number of psychiatric patients without having a certificate of need. If the practice were discontinued, some of the patients would be served by other hospitals in the District, including Florida Hospital. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 174, 176. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 177. The current state of access to short term psychiatric services in eastern Orange County was not credibly proven. 179. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. Findings of fact proposed by HRS: 1, 2, 3, 4. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. 5, 6. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 13. The number should be 64, not 63. 22. The occupancy rate is a mathematical attempt to measure the degree to which the District VII capacity to serve adult short term psychiatric patients has been used up. The theory implicit in the rule is that, with respect to adult capacity, the decision to add new capacity should be delayed until the old capacity is at least 75 percent or more used up. The rate has a numerator (patient days) and a denominator (the real capacity). Any argument that tries to ignore real patient days occurring in the District, or real capacity to serve those patients, is unreasonable. Findings of fact proposed by Florida Hospital: The second sentence is true, but the issue is not she license of the beds is, but what type of patient day is generated by that service. The preponderance of the evidence is that those were short term psychiatric patient days. The first sentence is rejected for the reasons stated above. 19-21. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 20-27. F.H. Ex. 3 was excluded from evidence, and the testimony related to that exhibit was also excluded from evidence for the reasons stated elsewhere in this recommended order. 28. This proposed finding fails to consider the MDC 19 evidence of patient days at Florida Hospital and Orlando Regional Medical Center. 29-30. These proposed findings of fact are true, and the reasoning therein is part of the reason why the denominator of the fraction that is the occupancy rate must be licensed beds. 31. A correction to the number of patient days at Westlake Hospital is legally appropriate, but the evidence for such a correction has been excluded from the record for reasons having nothing to do with the legal propriety of such a correction. 33. These are matters of law, and thus not appropriate as proposed findings of fact. 34-39. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The fact that existing facilities may have beds available to treat future patients is not inconsistent with a decision to grant a certificate of need for additional licensed beds. The occupancy rate threshold in the rule is 75 percent occupancy, not 100 percent occupancy. It is to be expected that the District will have 25 percent or less of its beds unoccupied when new beds are approved. 41, 43-44, 46-47. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. These proposed findings of fact are irrelevant. See section 381.705(1)(g) and (h), Fla. Stat. (1987). This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. This proposed finding of fact is contrary to the credible evidence. To the contrary, where need exists, these are grounds for determining which of the competing applicants should be approved. 60. A conclusion that the occupancy rates are "stable" cannot be made from data based only upon calendar year 1986, which was two years ago, and six years from 1992, the time when need is projected. 61-69. These findings of fact are true. Even where there is need, the opening of the new facility normally lures some patients away from existing facilities. But if need exists sufficient to grant a certificate of need, this short term harm to existing providers is irrelevant. Finally, health care costs would not increase if there is need. While it is true that the Charter Medical utilization projections were initially prepared without a close analysis of District VII, the projections are nonetheless reasonable as discussed elsewhere in this recommenced order. Inflation of expenses without projection of inflation in revenues is an incomplete and unreasonable mode of projection. T. 229-230. Given the size of the Charter Medical Corporation and the number of hospitals it owns and operates, the condition of one more hospital will not Increase home office expenses. Those expenses will exist whether this project exists or not. The financial feasibility of the project in Orlando, therefor, need not consider home office expenses. T. 242-244. These proposed findings of fact are subordinate to findings of fact that have been adopted. They are true, however, and are adopted by reference. The quantitative relevancy of this proposed finding of fact has not been shown. The proposed finding of fact is otherwise true. Orlando General Hospital's current patient census is a sufficient basis for a finding that its projected occupancy rate is reasonable. Charges proposed in an application for a certificate of need are not promises binding upon the applicant. In future years, the applicant is reasonably expected to make substantial changes in its charge structure based upon market conditions. Proposed charges, as well as proposed changes to charges to meet altered contingencies beyond the control of the applicant, is entirely appropriate for analysis in a certificate of need case. The only relevant question is whether the altered charge compares favorably with competing applicants. 81-83. Florida Hospital proved that the market for staff is competitive and that hiring staff is difficult at the moment. But it did not prove that the applicants would fail to hire adequate staff to operate their proposed facilities. T. 1327. 92-102. These proposed findings of fact summarize proposed findings of fact which have previously been addressed. APPENDIX 2 TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NOS. 87-4748 and 87-4753 Rule 10-5.008(3), Fla. Admin. Code, provides that "[s]ubsequent to an application being deemed complete by the Office of Health Planning and Development, no further information or amendment will be accepted by the Department." (E.S.) The rule states that the Department will accept no information after the application is deemed complete. The words used are not ambiguous or unclear. Thus, if normal rules of construction were to be followed, the conclusion would be drawn $ha the Department is bound by its own clear rule, and cannot, by interpretation, add exceptions. But an equally valid rule of construction is that absurd results must be avoided. Certificate of need cases, particular ones like the case at bar, are highly competitive and complicated. It would be unreasonable to require the applicants to prove applications that have become erroneous due to the passage of time. While the question is a close one, the Hearing Officer has concluded that it would be better to ignore the clear words of the rule, and attempt to apply the evolving interpretative policy of the Department to avoid an absurd result. The following appear to be the existing final orders of the Department interpreting rule 10-5.008(3), and its predecessor, published in the Florida Administrative Law Reports. Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Palm Beach, 8 F.A.L.R. 4650 (September 24, 1986); Arbor Health Care Company, Inc., d/b/a Martin Health Center, Inc., v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 709 (October 13, 1986); Mease Hospital and Clinic v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 159 (October 13, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Collier County v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 8 F.A.L.R. 5883 (December 8, 1986); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Nursing Center of Highlands County, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1081 (December, 1986); Manatee Mental Health Center, Inc. d/b/a Manatee Crisis Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1430 (February 2, 1987); Health Care and Retirement Corporation of America, d/b/a Heartland of Hillsborouh, v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1630 (February 5, 1987); Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 9 F.A.L.R. 1628 (March 2, 1987); Psychiatric Institutes of America, Inc., d/b/a Psychiatric Institute of Orlando v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 1626a (March 5, 1987) ; Manor Care, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2139 (March 24, 1987); Wuesthoff Health Services, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2110 (April 17, 1987); Hialeah Hospital, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 9 F.A.L.R. 2363 (May 1, 1987); Palms Residential Treatment Center, Inc., d/b/a Manatee Palms Residential Treatment Center v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, et al., 10 F.A.L.R. 1425 (February 15, 1988). These final orders contain the following statements concerning the Department's interpretation of rule 10-5.008(3) and its evolving policy with respect to changes to applications for certificates of need during section proceedings and admissibility of new information not contained in the original applications: Health Care and Retirement, supra, 8 F.A.L.R. 1081: During 120.57 proceedings, an application may be updated to address facts extrinsic to the application such as interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories. An applicant is not allowed to update by adding additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS. Manatee Mental Health Center, supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1431: ... HRS has authority by statute to issue a CON for an identifiable portion of . Section 381.4C4(8), Florida Statutes. MMHC's "amended" proposal reduced the number of beds sought, and was properly considered during the 120.57 proceedings. Manor Care. Inc., supra, 9 F.A.L.R. at 1628: The amended applications [amended to address needs of Alzheimer's disease patients] changed the scope and character of the proposed facilities and services and thus, must be reviewed initially at HRS... [ limited the denovo concept by requiring that evidence of changed circumstances be considered only if relevant to the application. Hialeah Hospital, Inc., 9 F.A.L.R. at 2366: It is recognized that more than a year may pass between the free form decision by HRS and the final 120.57 hearing and this passage of time may require updating an application by evidence of changed circumstances such as the' effect of inflation on interest and construction costs. For the sake of clarity HRS would avoid the use of the word "amendment" to describe such updating. Such evidence of changed circumstances beyond the control of the applicant is relevant to the original application and is admissible at the 120.57 hearing. Taking the easiest first, those items explicitly listed by the Department in the first Health Care and Retirement case, "interest rates, inflation of construction costs, current occupancies, compliance with new state or local health plans, and changes in bed or service inventories," which change after the application is initially filed, are permitted. Not permitted are "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS." The remainder of the Department's incipient policy, as presently articulated, is obscure. The word "extrinsic" without the list of examples is of little guidance. The application is only an idea on paper. Anything new, other than the bare words on the paper as originally filed, is literally "extrinsic" thereto. The concept of whether the new information changes the "scope and character of the facilities and services" originally reviewed in free form action by the Department is similarly of little guidance because the phrase "scope and character" can mean practically anything. Of fundamental difficulty is whether this phrase is intended to select substantial changes to the original application, or all changes. For example, if the original application proposes separate shower stalls and tubs for double rooms, but the amended application proposes a combination shower and tub, has the "scope and character" of the "facilities and services" changed? The phrase "additional services, beds, construction, or other concepts not initially reviewed by HRS" is similarly vague. What is a service or construction or a concept not originally reviewed? Would this include the change in bathing equipment discussed above? The concept of "control" of the applicant over the information that goes into the original application is the only phrase that gives applicants any guidance. The word "control" probably is intended as a "knew or reasonably should have "known" standard. If the applicant reasonably should have known about the information and should have provided the Department with the information as a part of its original application, then the new information cannot be considered during the formal administrative hearing. The Hearing Officer will be guided, thus, by the explicit list of items provided by the Department in the Health Care and Retirement case, and by the concept of "control" provided by the Hialeah case. COPIES FURNISHED: For Agency HRS Theodore D. Mack. Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Building Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (904) 488-8673 Charter Medical-Orange County, Inc. Fred W. Baggett, Esquire Stephen A. Ecenia, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard 101 East College Avenue Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 222-6891 William D. Hoffman, Jr., Esquire Deborah J. Winegard, Esquire King & Spalding 2500 Trust Company Tower Atlanta, GA 30303 (404) 572-4600 Orlando Regional Medical Center, Inc. Steven R. Bechtel, Esquire Mateer, Harbert & Bates, P. A. 100 East Robinson Street Post Office Box 2854 Orlando, Florida 32802 (305) 425-9044 Orlando General Hospital, Inc. Eric J. Haugdahl, Esquire 1363 East Lafayette Street Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 878-0215 Florida Hospital Stephen K. Boone, Esquire Robert P. Mudge, Esquire Boone, Boone, Klingbeil & Boone, P. A. 1001 Avenida del Circo Post Office Box 1596 Venice, Florida 34284 (813) 488-6716 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
