The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner is entitled to additional compensation for fishing nets that he sold to the State of Florida under the Net Buy-Back Program.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a commercial fishers who is an affected person under the Florida Net Ban, which is set forth in the Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 16. Section 370.0805(5), Florida Statutes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, establishes the Net Buy-Back Program. The program enables eligible persons previously engaged in the commercial fishing industry to sell fishing nets to the State of Florida. The Legislature appropriated $20 million to the Seafood Workers Economic Assistance Account (the Account) to fund the payments authorized in Section 370.0805, as well as agency expenses in administering the program. Section 370.0805(3)(b) directs Respondent to purchase nets "according to the availability of funds on a first-come, first-served basis determined by the date of receipt of each completed application." By Net Buy-Back Application signed on July 5, 1995, and filed with Respondent on the same day, Petitioner applied to sell nets to the State of Florida. His application form is completely filled out and shows two saltwater-product license numbers, one for an individual and one for a vessel. The application form calls for the applicant to list the "TOTAL NUMBER OF YARDS OF EACH NET TYPE THAT YOU INTEND TO SELL." The form lists five categories of nets: gill (49 meshes or less); gill (50 meshes or more); beach, purse, seine; trawl; and trammel. The former gill net is a shallow-water gill net. The latter gill net is a deepwater gill net. Petitioner listed on his application 800 yards of shallow-water gill nets, 4600 yards of deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and 600 yards of trammel nets. After checking a data base maintained by the Department of Environmental Protection, Respondent found only one of Petitioner's two listed saltwater-product licenses. Respondent thus processed Petitioner's application as though he had only one license. By letter dated August 8, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was eligible "to receive compensation for 8 nets" and set an appointment for him to turn in the nets on September 6, 1995. On September 6, 1995, Petitioner appeared at the appointed site with nets to sell to the State of Florida. He delivered 4800 yards of seine nets, for which he received a voucher for $27,998.40. Prior to paying the voucher, Respondent discovered that the Account might be exhausted before Respondent had paid for all of the nets that fishers might lawfully seek to sell to the State. Respondent thus dishonored Petitioner's voucher, as well as the vouchers held by numerous other fishers, while Respondent considered changes in its administration of the program. The purpose of the Net Buy-Back Program, as provided by Section 370.0805(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was to allow, "[a]ll commercial saltwater products licensees and persons holding a resident commercial fishing license" to apply to Respondent "to receive economic assistance to compensate them for nets rendered illegal or useless by the constitutional limitation on marine net fishing." The emphasis was on economic assistance. Section 370.0805(5)(a) authorizes Respondent to make payments only "in nonnegotiable amounts not intended to reflect the actual value of the nets." Section 370.0805(5)(a) assigns payment amounts of $3500 for beach, purse, or seine nets of at least 600 yards in length; $500 for trawls and shallow-water gill nets of at least 600 yards in length; and $1000 for trammel nets of at least 600 yards in length and deepwater gill nets of at least 600 yards in length. Section 370.0805(5)(a) states that, except for trawls, nets of less than 600 yards in length shall be "valued proportionately." Section 370.0805(5)(c) limits the number of nets that a commercial fishers could sell, based on his annual earnings from the sale of eligible saltwater products. The limits range from four nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average from $2500 to $4999 in earnings, to ten nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average more than $30,000. Respondent relied on another data base from the Department of Environmental Protection to determine the average yearly earnings of applicants. The Department of Environmental Protection maintains records of each licensee's trip tickets, which disclose earnings. The only other limit in the statute as to the type and number of nets to be purchased is that, under Section 370.0805(5)(d), "[n]o licensee may be paid for more than two. . . trawls." Respondent reviewed the applications that it received from the initial 951 fishers who filed applications. This was a large majority of the 1104 fishers who would eventually sell their nets to the State under the Net Buy-Back Program. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the funds in the Account would be sufficient to cover the nets that the State was to be purchasing. Respondent found from the applications that seine nets represented only about five percent of the nets that fishers intended to sell to the State. Relying on this information, Respondent calculated the potential encumbrance of $6.5 million on the Account, based on an average payment of $1000 per net. Applications contained few seine nets because commercial fishers initially resisted selling their best nets to the State of Florida. The Net Buy-Back Program provided for payment of only $3500 per seine net, even though many seine nets were worth $10,000. And commercial fishers were optimistic at first that their legal challenges to the constitutional amendment would succeed. Applying liberal eligibility criteria, such as calculating the number of nets that each applicant could sell based on the number of licenses that he held, Respondent raised its estimate of the potential encumbrance to $8.775 million. But in recalculating the potential encumbrance on the Account, Respondent still assumed that the average payment per net would be $1000. Respondent began receiving nets on August 3, 1995. Through the first three weeks of August, Respondent purchased seine nets in roughly the same five-percent mix that it had used in calculating the potential encumbrances on the Account. After this point, however, fishers started turning in much larger numbers of seine nets than they had listed in their applications. During this first phase of the program, Respondent paid fishers for whatever types of nets they presented at their net buy-back appointment. Respondent would pay a fishers entitled to sell eight nets for seine nets if he turned in seine nets, even though he had listed only gill nets on his application. This policy jeopardized the solvency of the Account because the payments to fishers turning in all seine nets were 3.5 times greater than the figures that Respondent had used in calculating the potential encumbrance on the Account. From the fishers's perspective, the program acquired an element of chance, as applicants with earlier appointment times-which did not necessarily correspond with earlier-filed applications-netted fine catches of economic assistance at the expense of their counterparts, upon whom destiny had bestowed later appointment times. By late August, the applicants, less sanguine about their litigation prospects (as the fishers suggest) and more inventive in recasting old gill nets as seine nets (as Respondent suggests), began turning in seine nets in large numbers, so that Respondent was purchasing nearly all seine nets. Eventually, the cumulative effect of this trend raised the total mix of seines purchased from five percent, during the first three weeks, to sixty percent. After a brief period of trying to stay the course, Respondent decided on September 6, 1995, that it had to take action or else the Account would be exhausted before the State had purchased all of the nets listed on the applications. Respondent immediately suspended further payments on issued vouchers and applied new criteria to persons holding unpaid vouchers, as well as to applicants who had not yet received vouchers. This action stopped payment on all vouchers issued from around August 28 through September 6. At the time that it stopped payment on outstanding vouchers, Respondent had approved the purchase of nets from about 750 fishers. About 450 of these applicants received their money prior to the suspension of payments, leaving about 300 applicants, including Petitioner, holding worthless vouchers. However, a large number of the 450 applicants who were actually paid for their nets prior to September 6 sold a relatively large percentage of gill nets rather than seine nets. As of September 6 (retroactive to August 28), Respondent began the second phase of the Net Buy-Back Program. In this phase, Respondent paid for seine nets, but only up to the greater of the number of seines shown on the application or the number of seines based on past use of seines. Respondent determined the latter figure from the trip tickets, which also contained information as to types of catch, from which Respondent could infer the type of net used. As in the first phase, Respondent continued to insist the fishers turn in seines if they were being paid for seines. The 300 fishers holding dishonored vouchers filed a class action suit. Petitioner's voucher for his first eight nets was covered in this legal action and is not the subject of this case. Petitioner received slightly more than $10,000 on his claim for about $28,000. In the meantime, Respondent discovered that Petitioner in fact held two licenses, as he had represented on his application. By letter dated October 5, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that it had reconsidered his application and determined that he had the right to sell 16 nets, not eight nets, but none could be a seine net. Respondent issued Petitioner a new voucher for these additional eight nets. This voucher is in the amount of $7996.80 for 4800 yards of deepwater gill net. On October 13, 1995, Petitioner turned in eight nets and received his money. Petitioner's application lists no seine nets. His application, as noted above, lists one and one-third shallow- water gill nets (i.e., 800 yards), eight deepwater gill nets, two trawls, and one trammel net. Petitioner claimed that he turned in seine nets. If turned in during the first or second phase of the program, Respondent would have treated these nets as seine nets. But it is Petitioner's unique fortune to have been intimately involved with all three phases of the Net Buy-Back Program. Evidently dissatisfied with the effects of the restrictions introduced by the second phase of the program, Respondent added a third phase by promulgating an emergency rule defining "seine nets," effective October 2, 1995. This third phase, which did not change Respondent's policy of paying for the greater number of seines as shown on the application or the trip tickets, restricted the kinds of nets that fishers could turn in as seine nets. Rule 38BER95-1 provides that, for the purpose of "the implementation of the Net Buy-Back Program" described in Section 370.0805(5): "Gill net" means a wall of netting suspended vertically in the water, with floats across the upper margin and weights along the bottom margin which captures fish by entangling them in the meshes, usually by the gills. Any net offered for the net buy- back program that consists of at least fifty- one percent (51 percent) gill net, shall be considered a gill net. "Seine" means a small-meshed net suspended vertically in the water, with floats along the top margin and weights along the bottom margin, which encloses and concentrates fish, and does not entangle them in the meshes. No net offered for the net buy-back program shall be considered a seine if the wings are composed of entangling mesh. * * * THIS RULE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Effective Date: October 2, 1995 Under the emergency rule, Respondent's nets were not seines, but were gill nets because they were at least 51 percent, by area, gill net. At the time of the final hearing, Respondent estimates that the Account balance is about $300,000 with about 160 contested claims remaining to be resolved.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order dismissing the petition for additional payment from the Account. ENTERED on October 3rd, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this October 3rd, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Secretary Douglas L. Jamerson Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 John Wayde Campbell 1103 67th Street Northwest Bradenton, Florida 34209 Louise T. Sadler Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue At issue herein is whether or not the Petitioner, Kelly Boat Service, Inc.'s and Cape Kennedy Charter Boats, et al's activities fall within the admissions tax liability imposed by Section 212.04, F.S. (1973). Based upon the pleadings filed herein, the documentary evidence introduced during the course of the hearing, the other evidence of record including the arguments of counsel, the following relevant facts are found.
Findings Of Fact In the instant matter, the Department of Revenue issued two sales tax assessments. The first such assessment is against Cape Kennedy Charter Boats and covers the audit period of March 1, 1973, through February 29, 1976. The Department also assessed Kelly Boat Service, Inc., in a series of three separate assessments covering the audit periods August 1, 1970, through January 31, 1976. Based on such assessments, a tax liability resulted in the amount of $25,072.37. Of this amount, $10,000 was paid by the tax payer on July 21, 1976 (Respondent's Composite Exhibit No. 1). The remaining tax liability plus interest which has accrued from July 21, 1976, is outstanding and continues to accrue. During the course of the hearing, the parties agreed that the specific liabilities as set forth in the assessment were not at issue. Rather, Petitioner solely challenged the legal authority of the Department of Revenue to impose the assessments in question. The Petitioners are owners and operators of a fleet of deep sea fishing boats in and around Destin, Florida, which, for a fee, carry individual fishermen to certain fishing banks which lie beyond the three-league limit in the Gulf of Mexico. While there, the Petitioners sell food and drinks to the fishermen and rent them fishing equipment. The fishing is done at the snapper banks in the Gulf of Mexico or in the vicinity of those banks. The fishing equipment and tackle used on these trips are mainly used beyond the three-league limit in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico; and most, if not all, of the food and drinks sold at the galley of the refreshment stand on the boat was outside the three-league limit of the State of Florida. In an earlier summary final judgment, the Circuit Court of Appeal declared, as authorized by Chapter 86, Florida Statutes, 1973, the liability of Kelly Boat Services, Inc., for payment of the admissions tax by Section 212.04, F.S., 1973, from which the Department of Revenue filed an appeal. In that decision, the Court held that Kelly, whose boats take on passengers at Destin for fishing in the Gulf of Mexico beyond the territorial limits of Florida, is taxable at the statutory rate on the admission fare charged at the dock, but that the State is foreclosed from assessing Kelly for taxes that should have been paid between August, 1970, and the first day of August, 1973, the period in which the Department demanded the production of Kelly's records for audit. Section 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. Kelly cross-appealed and urged that its activities were not subject to the tax, citing Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., 210 So.2d 266 (Fla.App. 1st 1968). In its decision, the First District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly B Boat Service, Inc., 324 So.2d 351 (Fla. 1976), indicated that the trial court was correct in its reading of its decision in Dept. of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corp., 257 So.2d 56 (Fla.App 1st 1972), Cert. Denied, 262 So.2d 682 (Fla. 1972), Cert. Dismissed, 287 So.2d 93 (Fla. 1974), and in hold that Kelly's commercial activities, as evidenced by the record, render it liable to assessment for the admissions tax. The Court noted that the trial court was incorrect, however, in foreclosing the Department of Revenue from making the assessment for the full three-year period authorized by Subsection 212.14(6), F.S., 1973. The decision goes on to read that the State is not foreclosed by reason of the Court's 1968 decision in Straughn v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., or otherwise to assert that on the facts evidenced by record, Kelly should satisfy its full tax liability incurred three years prior to August 1, 1973. North American Company v. Green, 120 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1960); Jackson Grain Company v. Lee, 139 Fla. 93, 190 So. 464 (1939). Based on the above decision of the First District Court of Appeal, the Department's assessment, which the parties admit is factually correct, is valid both as to the August 1, 1970, through July 31, 1973, and the August 1, 1973, through January 31, 1976, audit periods. Since this matter has previously been adjudicated, the same is res judicata as to the legal validity of the Department's assessment. Further, since the assessment relative to Cape Kennedy Charter Boats is based upon the same factual circumstances and legal authority as the one against Kelly Boat Service, Inc., which was upheld as aforementioned in the case of the Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, there is no factual challenge to the validity of the Department's assessment and there being no assertion by the Petitioner that any rules of law other than those enunciated by the District Court of Appeal in Dept. of Revenue v. Kelly Boat Service, Inc., supra, are applicable, such assessment must likewise be upheld. I shall so recommend. 1/
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Revenue's assessment in the instant matter against the Petitioners be UPHELD. Additionally, in view of the Petitioners' letter of April 11, 1979, Petitioners' motion to treat this matter as a class action is hereby DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 31st day of May, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated to the following facts: Petitioner is an employee of the Boromei-Mirabella Seafood Company, a licensed fish dealer located in Tampa, Florida. The scope of Petitioner's employment included the vehicular transport of fish for sale or purchase. While engaged in his employment, Petitioner was apprehended and arrested by officers of the Commission, and charged with violation of Rules 39-10.02(4) and 39- 10.02(5), Florida Administrative Code. Petitioner's arrest occurred in Highlands County, Florida, on or about December 11, 1980. Petitioner, for purposes of this proceeding, admits to the factual behavior alleged in the arrest citation issued by Respondent's offices. The rules challenged in this proceeding were promulgated by Respondent in accordance with the procedures set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, also known as the Administrative Procedure Act. The challenged rules became effective on August 11, 1979. Both rules cite Article IV, Section 9, of the Florida Constitution and Section 372.021, Florida Statutes, as "specific authority" for promulgation of the rules. In addition, Section 372.65, Florida Statutes, is listed in the Florida Administrative Code, as the "law implemented" by the two challenged rules.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 370.142(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The terms of the settlement agreement between the parties are set forth in the following paragraphs. The parties stipulated to the factual basis alleged in Case No. 97-4209. As set forth in the citation dated August 7, 1997, Respondent Jorge Cabrera (Cabrera) was fishing 130 untagged crawfish traps. This was the second time within a 24-month period that Cabrera was in violation of Section 370.142(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), agrees to abate the notices that form the basis for Case Nos. 97-4416, 97-4485, and 97-5005 on the following terms and conditions: Cabrera shall immediately pay a fine of $5,000 to the Department. Cabrera shall have his Saltwater Products License (SPL-44525) and all endorsements thereto, C-9049, X-1615, V-7859, ML-887 and RS (current RS expiring June 30, 1999), suspended for five years beginning July 1, 1998, and continuing through the end of the 2002/2003 license year. It is specifically recognized by the parties that the SPL and endorsements currently held by Cabrera remain active until and through the close of business hours (5:00 p.m.) June 30, 1998. The parties agree that the license is suspended for five years, but that at the end of the five-year period, Cabrera is otherwise eligible to reapply for an SPL and the endorsements currently held on the 1997/1998 SPL license, which are the Restricted Species (one-year eligibility remaining), Crawfish, Blue Crab, Stone Crab, and Marine Life endorsements. In this case only, as part of the parties' settlement agreement, the Department agrees that the statutory requirements for renewal of the Crawfish and Stone Crab endorsements and specifically the currently mandatory every September 30-renewal-application deadline for the Stone Crab renewal are tolled during the suspension period. The qualifying period for the RS endorsement is tolled only as to the time currently remaining for requalification on the existing license, which would be one year remaining eligibility. Upon renewal of the SPL with endorsements application for the 2002/2003 license year, eligibility and time remaining will resume from what Cabrera had at the time the suspension became effective. The time periods tolled begin to run again on July 1, 2002, whether the SPL holder has applied for reactivation of his SPL with endorsements or not. Specifically, if there is no application for an SPL with RS endorsement within one year of July 1, 2002, the one year's eligibility remaining from the 1997/1998 license expires. Any time that has expired after July 1, 2002, counts, and the time remaining to requalify for the RS will be whatever time remains from the one-year eligibility which begins to run on July 1, 2002, and expires on June 30, 2003. For example, if the application is received by the Department in September 2002, the applicant would have only nine months of RS eligibility remaining. Under current license application procedures, the earliest reapplication that may be submitted will be in April 2002 for the 2002/2003 license year. Cabrera shall have only until the close of the current year transfer-period to transfer his lobster-trap certificates. Any certificates not transferred are subject to forfeiture if they are not maintained pursuant to Section 370.142, Florida Statutes, during the license suspension period. All fines and fees must be paid to the Department before the transfers can be made. The Department will expedite the providing of forms, processing, and record activity, and Cabrera will expedite submittal of completed application(s) to allow reasonable time to accomplish any transfers or other record activity prior to the close of the transfer period. All traps (lobster and stone crab) must be removed from the water by the end of the fishing season. Any of Cabrera's traps that may become subject to disposition under the trap retrieval program (Section 370.143, Florida Statutes) must be handled as appropriate, even if the circumstances occur after the time the license suspension becomes effective. The parties agree to bear their own costs and attorney's fees associated with these proceedings. The parties agree that breach of the settlement agreement between the parties will revive all rights and remedies available to the non-breaching party that the party had against the other prior to entering into the settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which incorporates the provisions of the Settlement Agreement between the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 M. B. Adelson, IV, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John A. Jabro, Esquire 90811 Overseas Highway, Suite B Tavernier, Florida 33070
The Issue Whether Respondent, The MG Herring Group, Inc. (MG Herring), was an employer of Petitioners.
Findings Of Fact Xencom provides general maintenance, landscaping, housekeeping, and office cleaning services to retail facilities. In September of 2015, Xencom entered three contracts for services with CREFII Market Street Holdings, LLC (CREFII). The contracts were to provide maintenance, landscaping, and office cleaning services for a mall known as Market Street @ Heathbrook (Market Street) in Ocala, Florida. Michael Ponds, Xencom’s president, executed the contracts on behalf of Xencom. Two individuals executed the contracts on behalf of CREFII. One was Gar Herring, identified as Manager for Herring Ocala, LLC. The other was Bernard E. McAuley, identified as Manager of Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC. MG Herring was not a party or signatory to the contracts. MG Herring does not own or operate Market Street. A separate entity, The MG Herring Property Group, LLC (Property Group) operated Market Street. The contracts, in terms stated in an exhibit to them, established a fixed price for the year’s work, stated the scope of services, and detailed payment terms. They also identified labor and labor-related costs in detail that included identifying the Xencom employees involved, their compensation, and their weekly number of hours. The contract exhibits also identified operating costs, including equipment amortization, equipment repairs, fuel expenses, vacation costs, health insurance, and storage costs. The contracts ended December 31, 2016. The contracts specify that Xencom is an independent contractor. Each states: “Contractor is an independent contractor and not an employee or agent of the owner. Accordingly, neither Contractor nor any of Contractor’s Representatives shall hold themselves out as, or claim to be acting in the capacity of, an agent or employee of Owner.” The contracts also specify that the property manager may terminate the contract at any time without reason for its convenience. The contracts permit Xencom to engage subcontractors with advance approval of the property manager. They broadly describe the services that Xencom is to provide. Xencom has over 80 such contracts with different facilities. As the contracts contemplate, only Xencom exerted direct control of the Petitioners working at Market Street. Property Group could identify tasks and repairs to be done. Xencom decided who would do them and how. In 2013, Xencom hired Michael Harrison to work as its Operations Manager at Market Street. He was charged with providing services for which Property Group contracted. His immediate supervisor was Xencom’s Regional Manager. In 2016, that was David Snell. Mr. Snell was not located at Market Street. Property Group also did not have a representative on site. Before Xencom hired him, Mr. Harrison worked at Market Street for Property Group. Xencom hired the remaining Petitioners to work at Market Street under Mr. Harrison’s supervision. Each of the Petitioners completed an Application for Employment with Xencom. The application included a statement, initialed by each Petitioner, stating, “Further, I understand and agree that my employment is for no definite period and I may be terminated at any time without previous notice.” All of the Petitioners also received Xencom’s employee handbook. As Xencom’s Operations Manager and supervisor of the other Petitioners, Mr. Harrison was responsible for day-to-day management of Petitioners. He scheduled their work tasks, controlled shifts, established work hours, and assigned tasks. Mr. Harrison also decided when Petitioners took vacations and time off. His supervisor expected him to consult with Property Group to ensure it knew what support would be available and that he knew of any upcoming events or other considerations that should be taken into account in his decisions. As Operations Manager, Mr. Harrison was also responsible for facilitating payroll, procuring supplies, and managing Xencom’s equipment at the site. Xencom provided Petitioners work uniforms that bore Xencom’s name. Xencom required Petitioners to wear the uniforms at work. Xencom provided the supplies and equipment that Petitioners used at work. Only Xencom had authority to hire or fire the employees providing services to fulfill its contracts with the property manager. Only Xencom had authority to modify Petitioners’ conditions of employment. Neither MG Herring, Property Group, nor Xencom held out Petitioners as employees of MG Herring or Property Group. There is no evidence that MG Herring or Property Group employed 15 or more people. Property Group hired Tina Wilson as Market Street’s on- site General Manager on February 1, 2016. Until then there was no Property Group representative at the site. The absence of a Property Group representative on-site left Mr. Harrison with little oversight or accountability under the Xencom contracts for Market Street. His primary Property Group contact was General Manager Norine Bowen, who was not located at the property. Ms. Wilson’s duties included community relations, public relations, marketing, leasing, litigation, tenant coordination, lease management, construction management, and contract management. She managed approximately 40 contracts at Market Street, including Xencom’s three service agreements. Ms. Wilson was responsible for making sure the contracts were properly executed. Managing the Xencom contracts consumed less than 50 percent of Ms. Wilson’s time. During the last weeks of 2016, Mr. Harrison intended to reduce the hours of Kylie Smithers. Ms. Wilson requested that, since Ms. Smithers was to be paid under the contract for full- time work, Ms. Smithers assist her with office work such as filing and making calls. Mr. Harrison agreed and scheduled Ms. Smithers to do the work. This arrangement was limited and temporary. It does not indicate Property Group control over Xencom employees. Ms. Wilson was Xencom’s point of contact with Property Group. She and Mr. Harrison had to interact frequently. Ms. Wilson had limited contact with the other Xencom employees at Market Street. Friction and disagreements arose quickly between Mr. Harrison and Ms. Wilson. They may have been caused by having a property manager representative on-site after Mr. Harrison’s years as either the manager representative himself or as Xencom supervisor without a property manager on-site. They may have been caused by personality differences between the two. They may have been caused by the alleged sexual and crude comments that underlie the claims of discrimination in employment. They may have been caused by a combination of the three factors. On November 21, 2016, Norine Bowen received an email from the address xencomempoyees@gmail.com with the subject of “Open your eyes about Market Street.” It advised that some employees worked at night for an event. It said that Ms. Wilson gave the Xencom employees alcohol to drink while they were still on the clock. The email said that there was a fight among Xencom employees. The email also said that at another event at a restaurant where Xencom employees were drinking, Ms. Wilson gave Ms. Smithers margaritas to drink and that Ms. Smithers was underage. The email claimed that during a tree-lighting event Ms. Wilson started drinking around 3:30 p.m. It also stated that Ms. Wilson offered a Xencom employee a drink. The email went on to say that children from an elementary school and their parents were present and that Ms. Wilson was “three sheets to the wind.” The email concludes stating that Ms. Wilson had been the subject of three employee lawsuits. On December 14, 2016, Ms. Wilson, Ms. Bowen, and Mr. Snell met at Property Group’s office in Market Street for their regular monthly meeting to discuss operations at Market Street. Their discussion covered a number of management issues including a Xencom employee’s failure to show up before 8:00 to clean as arranged, security cameras, tenants who had not paid rent, lease questions, HVAC questions, and rats on the roof. They also discussed the email’s allegations. The participants also discussed a number of dissatisfactions with Mr. Harrison’s performance. Near the end of a discussion about the anonymous email, this exchange occurred:2/ Bowen: Okay, so I know that David [Snell], I think his next step is to conduct his own investigation with his [Xencom] people, and HR is still following up with John Garrett, and you’re meeting with Danny [intended new Xencom manager for Market Street] tonight? David Snell: Yes. Bowen: To finish up paperwork, and, based on his investigation, it will be up to Xencom to figure out what to do with people that are drinking on property, off the clock or on the clock, you know, whatever, what their policy is. * * * Bowen: So, I don’t know what to make of it. I’m just here to do an investigation like I’m supposed to do and David is here to pick up the pieces and meet with his folks one-on- one, and we’ll see where this takes us. This exchange and the remainder of the recording do not support a finding that Property Group controlled Xencom’s actions or attempted to control them. The participants were responsibly discussing a serious complaint they had received, their plan to investigate it, and pre-existing issues with Mr. Harrison. The exchange also makes clear that all agreed the issues involving Xencom employees were for Xencom to address, and the issues involving Property Group employees were for Property Group to address. At the time of the December 14, 2016, meeting, the participants were not aware of any complaints from Mr. Harrison or Mr. Smithers of sexual harassment or discrimination by Ms. Wilson. On December 15, 2016, Gar Herring and Norine Bowen received an email from Mr. Harrison with an attached letter to Xencom’s Human Resources Manager, and others. Affidavits from Petitioners asserting various statements and questions by Ms. Wilson about Mr. Harrison’s and Mr. Smithers’ sex life and men’s genitalia and statements about her sex life and the genitalia of men involved were attached. Xencom President Michael Ponds received a similar email with attachments on the same day. On December 21, 2016, Mr. Ponds received a letter from Herring Ocala, LLC, and Tricom Market Street at Heathbrook, LLC, terminating the service agreements. Their agreements with Xencom were going to expire December 31, 2016. They had been negotiating successor agreements. However, they had not executed any. Xencom terminated Petitioners’ employment on December 21, 2016. Xencom no longer needed Petitioners’ services once MG Herring terminated the contract with Xencom. This was the sole reason it terminated Petitioners.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order denying the Petitions of all Petitioners. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a commercial fisher who is an affected person under the Florida Net Ban, which is set forth in the Florida Constitution, Article X, Section 16. Section 370.0805(5), Florida Statutes, which became effective on July 1, 1995, establishes the Net Buy-Back Program. The program enables eligible persons previously engaged in the commercial fishing industry to sell fishing nets to the State of Florida. The Legislature appropriated $20 million to the Seafood Workers Economic Assistance Account (the Account) to fund the payments authorized in Section 370.0805, as well as agency expenses in administering the program. Section 370.0805(3)(b) directs Respondent to purchase nets "according to the availability of funds on a first-come, first-served basis determined by the date of receipt of each completed application." By Net Buy-Back Application signed on July 5, 1995, and filed with Respondent at 7:39 am on the same day, Petitioner applied to sell nets to the State of Florida. His application form is completely filled out and shows two saltwater-product license numbers, both for vessels. The application form calls for the applicant to list the "TOTAL NUMBER OF YARDS OF EACH NET TYPE THAT YOU INTEND TO SELL." The form lists five categories of nets: gill (49 meshes or less); gill (50 meshes or more); beach, purse, seine; trawl; and trammel. The former gill net is a shallow-water gill net. The latter gill net is a deepwater gill net. Petitioner listed on his application "maximum allowed." He did not otherwise fill in the blanks as to types or yardage of nets. After checking a data base maintained by the Department of Environmental Protection, Respondent found that Petitioner held three saltwater- product licenses. Respondent thus processed Petitioner's application as though he had three licenses, not two. By letter dated August 8, 1995, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was eligible "to receive compensation for 18 nets" and set an appointment for him to turn in the nets on September 14, 1995. A few days prior to September 14, a representative of Respondent telephoned Petitioner and told him that the net buy-back appointment was canceled and Respondent had shut down the program temporarily in order to make changes. The problem was that Respondent had discovered that the Account might be exhausted before Respondent had paid for all of the nets that fishers might lawfully seek to sell to the State. Respondent thus canceled Petitioner's appointment and suspended payment on outstanding vouchers while Respondent considered changes in its administration of the program. The purpose of the Net Buy-Back Program, as provided by Section 370.0805(5)(a), Florida Statutes, was to allow, "[a]ll commercial saltwater products licensees and persons holding a resident commercial fishing license" to apply to Respondent "to receive economic assistance to compensate them for nets rendered illegal or useless by the constitutional limitation on marine net fishing." The emphasis was on economic assistance. Section 370.0805(5)(a) authorizes Respondent to make payments only "in nonnegotiable amounts not intended to reflect the actual value of the nets." Section 370.0805(5)(a) assigns payment amounts of $3500 for beach, purse, or seine nets of at least 600 yards in length; $500 for trawls and shallow-water gill nets of at least 600 yards in length; and $1000 for trammel nets of at least 600 yards in length and deepwater gill nets of at least 600 yards in length. Section 370.0805(5)(a) states that, except for trawls, nets of less than 600 yards in length shall be "valued proportionately." Section 370.0805(5)(c) limits the number of nets that a commercial fisher could sell, based on his annual earnings from the sale of eligible saltwater products. The limits range from four nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average from $2500 to $4999 in earnings, to ten nets, for licensees whose annual earnings average more than $30,000. Respondent relied on another data base from the Department of Environmental Protection to determine the average yearly earnings of applicants. The Department of Environmental Protection maintains records of each licensee's trip tickets, which disclose earnings. The only other limit in the statute as to the type and number of nets to be purchased is that, under Section 370.0805(5)(d), "[n]o licensee may be paid for more than two ... trawls." Respondent reviewed the applications that it received from the initial fishers who filed applications. The purpose of the review was to determine whether the funds in the Account would be sufficient to cover the nets that the State was to be purchasing. Respondent found from the applications that seine nets represented a small percentage of the nets that fishers intended to sell to the State. Relying on this information, Respondent calculated the potential encumbrance of $6.5 million on the Account, based on an average payment that reflected the absence of a significant number of the most expensive seine nets. Applying liberal eligibility criteria, such as calculating the number of nets that each applicant could sell based on the number of licenses that he held, Respondent raised its estimate of the potential encumbrance to $8.775 million. But in recalculating the potential encumbrance on the Account, Respondent still assumed that the average payment per net would not be affected by a significant number of seines. Respondent began receiving nets in early August, 1995. Through the first three weeks of August, Respondent purchased seine nets at the relatively low rate that it had anticipated. After this point, fishers started turning in much larger numbers of seine nets than they had listed in their applications. During this first phase of the program, Respondent paid fishers for whatever types of nets they presented at their net buy-back appointment. Respondent paid a fisher entitled to sell six nets for seine nets if he turned in seine nets, even though he had listed only gill nets on his application. This policy jeopardized the solvency of the Account because the payments to fishers turning in all seine nets were much greater than the figures that Respondent had used in calculating the potential encumbrance on the Account. From the fishers' perspective, the program acquired an element of chance, as applicants with earlier appointment times-which did not necessarily correspond with earlier-filed applications-netted fine catches of economic assistance at the expense of their counterparts, upon whom destiny had bestowed later appointment times. By late August, the applicants began turning in seine nets in large numbers, so that Respondent was purchasing nearly all seine nets. Before long, Respondent was purchasing nothing but seines. After a brief period of trying to stay the course, Respondent decided on September 6, 1995, that it had to take action or else the Account would be exhausted before the State had purchased all of the nets listed on the applications. Respondent immediately suspended the program and developed new criteria to apply to all persons not yet paid for their nets. As of September 6 (retroactive to August 28), Respondent began the second phase of the Net Buy-Back Program. In this phase, Respondent paid for seine nets, but only up to the greater of the number of seines shown on the application or the number of seines based on past use of seines. Respondent determined the latter figure from the trip tickets, which also contained information as to types of catch, from which Respondent could infer the type of net used. As in the first phase, Respondent continued to insist the fishers turn in seines if they were being paid for seines. Petitioner's application lists no seine nets. But his application put Respondent on notice that Petitioner sought to sell as many nets, as at high a value, as the law would permit. This would mean seine nets. And based on his possession of three licenses, this would mean 18 seine nets, given Petitioner's earnings during the relevant period. Petitioner claimed that he turned in seine nets. If turned in during the first or second phase of the program, Respondent would have treated these nets as seine nets. But these nets were turned in during what became the third phase of the Net Buy-Buyback Program. After canceling Petitioner's net buy-back appointment, Respondent sent Petitioner a letter, setting another net buy-back appointment for October 2. The letter states that Respondent would purchase a total of 18 nets, but none could be a seine net. Dissatisfied with the effects of the restrictions introduced by the second phase of the program, Respondent added a third phase by promulgating an emergency rule defining "seine nets," effective October 2, 1995. This third phase, which did not change Respondent's policy of paying for the greater number of seines as shown on the application or the trip tickets, restricted the kinds of nets that fishermen could turn in as seine nets. Rule 38BER95-1 provides that, for the purpose of "the implementation of the Net Buy-Back Program" described in Section 370.0805(5): "Gill net" means a wall of netting suspended vertically in the water, with floats across the upper margin and weights along the bottom margin which captures fish by entangling them in the meshes, usually by the gills. Any net offered for the net buy-back program that consists of at least fifty-one percent (51 percent) gill net, shall be considered a gill net. "Seine" means a small-meshed net suspended vertically in the water, with floats along the top margin and weights along the bottom margin, which encloses and concentrates fish, and does not entangle them in the meshes. No net offered for the net buy-back program shall be considered a seine if the wings are composed of entangling mesh. * * * THIS RULE SHALL TAKE EFFECT IMMEDIATELY UPON BEING FILED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. Effective Date: October 2, 1995 Under the emergency rule, Respondent's nets were not seines, but were gill nets because they were at least 51 percent, by area, gill net.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Labor and Employment Security enter a final order directing payment from the Account to Petitioner of the difference between the amount he has already received and the amount he would have received had all 18 of the nets that he delivered to Respondent been valued as seine nets. ENTERED on October 4, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this October 4, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Secretary Douglas L. Jamerson Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle Southeast Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Charles L. Wilson, pro se 9210 West Robson Tampa, Florida 33615 Louise T. Sadler Senior Attorney Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307, Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189
The Issue The issue presented herein is whether or not the Respondent, Henry's Seafoods, Inc., processed and packed a quantity of frozen lobster tails in which the net weight content of the containers were less than that stated on the container label.
Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following relevant findings of fact. Henry's Seafoods, Inc. is a seafood processor in Medley, Dade County, Florida. On August 31, 1983, Frederico Cagigol, D.V.M an inspector employed by the Petitioner, made a routine inspection of the Respondent's processing facility situated at 6901 NW 77 Terrace, Medley, Florida. Inspector Cagigol weighed 5 lots Containing 130 cases of lobster tails all packaged in boxes claiming a net weight of 10 pounds (160 ounces) each. Inspector Cagigol weighed all of the boxes and found an average deficit weight of 3 pounds (48 ounces) in each box whereas the net weight claimed was ten pounds each. Inspector Cagigol issued a citation to Respondent and ordered that the boxes be reweighed and affixed with proper labels reflecting the correct net weight. In connection with the citation to Respondent, Inspector Cagigol also issued a Stop Sale on the lobsters. Respondent reprocessed and relabeled the lots and changed the net weight on each container to reflect a net weight of 7 pounds. Inspector Cagigol rechecked the boxes on September 2, 1983 and found that they, in fact, contained the net weight claimed i.e., 7 pounds. Inspector Cagigol issued a release to Respondent. it is incumbent upon a processor to properly label processed foods once the product is processed and placed in the freezer for sale. Respondent contends that the lobster tails inspected by Inspector Cagigol were for a customer who wanted his name to appear on the boxes as the processor. Respondent admits that the lobsters were packed in a container reflecting a claimed net weight of 10 pounds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is herein recommended: That the Respondent be fined $500 for the violations found herein. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of May, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent's beverage license should be suspended or revoked, or a civil penalty assessed, for an alleged violation of Section 562.12, Florida Statutes, pursuant to Section 561.29(1) Florida Statutes, as set forth in Notice to Show Cause issued by Petitioner. The hearing was originally scheduled for December 8, 1977, but respondent filed a motion for continuance which was granted by the Hearing Officer and the hearing was rescheduled for January 18, 1978. At the hearing, respondent moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the Notice of Hearing issued on November 21, 1977, by the Hearing Officer was defective in that it did not adequately describe the petitioner's Notice to Show Cause or attach it to the Notice of Hearing. The motion was denied upon a determination that respondent had adequately been placed on notice as to the nature of the offense charged and due to the fact that the Notice to Show Cause had been sent by certified mail to respondent and that the receipt thereof on August 13, 1977, by an authorized agent of respondent was not contested. Further, respondent's motion for continuance indicates that her counsel was aware of the subject matter of the charges. Additionally, if such had not been the case, respondent had sufficient opportunity during the period in which the case had been continued to seek amplification or clarification of the issues involved in the case as set forth in the Notice of Hearing.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jennie E. Harrell, d/b/a W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, holds license Number 30-82, Series 1 COP, issued by petitioner which permits the sale of beer for consumption on the premises. The license was in effect during August, 1976. (Petitioner's Exhibit l) An occupational license for 1975-76 issued by the City of Quincy, Florida, Number 394, was issued to the Lake Talquin Fish Market, 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, on October 15, 1975, to engage in the occupation of merchant. A similar license in the same name at the same address, Number 395, and issued on the same date, authorized the licensee to engage in the occupation or business of retail sale of gasoline. City occupational license 1976-77, Number 298 ,issued by the City of Quincy to Lake Talquin Fish Market at 517 South Roberts Street, to engage in the business or occupation of merchant, was issued on September 30, 1976. The Lake Talquin Fish Market is located at 517 South Roberts Street. The official records show that the license was issued to Jenny Harrell of 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida, and that the 1975-76 license Number 394 was issued in the same name. (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 10, supplemented by Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3) On August 15, 1976, at approximately 10:55 a.m., State Beverage Officers Gary Sams and Fred Miller met with a reliable informant, one Guy Williams, in the vicinity of respondent's licensed premises at 515 South Roberts Street, Quincy, Florida. After searching Williams for any money or alcoholic beverages on his person, Sams gave him $7.20 and instructed him to attempt to purchase whiskey at respondent's place of business, W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle. The officers observed Williams drive to the building in question, but could not see his subsequent actions. He returned approximately fifteen to twenty minutes later with a partially filled one-half pint bottle of Seagram's Seven Crown whiskey. Williams had entered respondent's premises and asked a woman behind the counter if he could purchase a half-pint of whiskey. She told him he would have to go next door. He thereupon entered the adjacent premises, Lake Talquin Fish Market, and ordered a half-hint of Seagram's Seven Crown whiskey from a man there. The man went in the back of the store and returned with a sealed one-half pint bottle labeled Seagram's Seven Crown. Williams paid $2.50 for the bottle, took a drink from it, and found that it was, indeed, whiskey. The bottle was thereafter labeled for identification by the beverage officers and placed in the evidence room of petitioner's Tallahassee office. However, it was destroyed by petitioner prior to the hearing. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Williams) On August 22, 1976, the two beverage agents again met with Williams at the same location at approximately 9:30 a.m. Following the same procedures as before, Sams gave Williams $4.00 and instructed him to go to respondent's state- licensed premises to attempt to purchase liquor. The same sequence of events as on August 15th occurred, involving a woman at W. D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, and a man at the Lake Talquin Fish Market. This time the purchase was for a one-half pint sealed bottle of Seagram's Golden Dry Gin for which Williams paid $2.50. Again, he drank out of the bottle and verified that it was gin. This bottle was turned over to the beverage agents who verified that it was gin by its smell, and it was tagged and placed in petitioner's evidence room in Tallahassee. It, too, was destroyed by petitioner prior to the hearing. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Williams) On August 23, 1976, criminal complaints were filed by petitioner's representatives against respondent and others, and, on August 24, a search warrant was issued authorizing a search of the premises of the Lake Talquin Fish Market at 517 South Roberts Street, and warrants were issued for the arrest of respondent and the individuals who had allegedly sold the alcoholic beverages to Williams. At approximately 5:15 p.m. on August 28, Agent Miller, together with local police officers, served the search warrant on one Isaac Ford at the Lake Talquin Fish Market. A search of the premises failed to reveal the presence of alcoholic beverages. The agents observed a well-worn path leading approximately 15 or 20 feet to an adjacent condemned frame house, and also an electric wire running from the store to the house. Further, they discovered a light switch in the store which controlled a light in the northeast room of the house. They observed a quantity of liquor and wine bottles on the floor of that room. It was noted that the house was secured by a padlock. Upon Inquiry, Ford stated that he did not have the key to the lock. The agents then asked respondent, who was at her place of business, if she had the key. She answered in the negative. When asked if the whiskey that had been observed in the house belonged to her, she said that it did not, but that she owned the house and wanted the whiskey off the premises. The agents thereupon forced entry into the house and seized 265 bottles of alcoholic beverages found inside. The bottles were sealed and strips indicating that tax had been paid were on the bottles. Sixteen of the bottles were assorted brands of wine; the remainder were liquor. (Testimony of Sams, Miller, Fader, Petitioner's Exhibits 5-13)
Recommendation That a civil penalty in the amount of $500.00 be imposed against Jennie E. Harrell, d/b/a D. Harrell Fish Bait and Tackle, License Number 30-82, pursuant to Section 561.29(1)(h) and (4),F.S., for violation of Section 562.12(1), F.S. DONE and ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Francis Bayley,. Esquire Department of Business Regulation The Johns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Jack A. Harnett, Esquire Post Office Box 706 Quincy, Florida 32351 Charles A. Nuzum, Director Division of Beverage Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304
