The Issue An administrative complaint dated January 24, 1991, alleges that Respondent violated Chapter 450, F.S., Part III, by acting as a farm labor contractor without an active certificate of registration and by contracting with an unregistered individual. The issue for disposition is whether those violations occurred, and if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Gabriel Bain, the Respondent, has worked in citrus fields for 37 years. At various times he has been registered as a farm labor contractor. He had his own company, Mid-Florida Harvesting, but became bankrupt in 1990 after the citrus freeze disaster. Bain's business address is 30 South Ivey Lane, Orlando, Florida. On or about December 14, 1990, Compliance Officers, Henry Parker and Marshall Carroll were at Nevins Fruit Company in Mims, Brevard County, checking leads on unregistered farm labor contractors. In the course of an interview with Steve Schaffer, Harvest Manager for Nevins, Gabriel Bain was called in as the man who was in charge of the harvesting job. Bain identified himself to the officers with a driver's license and did not have his certificate of registration with him. Schaffer produced the certificate that Bain had submitted when he was hired by Nevins. The certificate was in the name of General Traders, Inc., and had an expiration date of February 28, 1991. "G. Bain" was handwritten on the signature line. During the meeting with Carroll and Parker, on December 14, 1990, Bain freely admitted hiring Jerome Pender as a sub-contractor. Pender was not registered as a farm labor contractor, but had shown Bain papers that he had applied for his certificate. Bain signed a notarized statement attesting to this fact and gave it to the compliance officers. The compliance officers issued a summary of violations to Bain for utilization of an unregistered crewleader. At the time, they were unaware that Bain was, himself, unregistered. Gabriel Bain's registration in the name of Mid-Florida Harvesting expired on June 30, 1990. His application, in the name of General Traders, Inc., was approved on March 1, 1991. In December 1990, he was working for General Traders but was not included in that company's registration. He was not registered in any other name in December 1990, and a subsequent summary of violations was issued, citing "fail to register." In December 1990, at the time of the compliance officers' investigation, Gabriel Bain was working for Nevins Fruit Company as a farm labor contractor and was paid for his work in that capacity. In this work he subcontracted with other labor contractors who provided crews. At the hearing Bain claimed that he lied to the compliance officers about hiring Jerome Pender. He claimed he lied because he had actually hired Willie Simmons, someone whom the Nevins people had told him they did not want "within 100 miles" of their groves. This self-impeachment in no way advances Respondent's averment of innocence.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby recommended that a final order be entered, finding Gabriel Bain guilty of violating Sections 450.30(1), F.S. and 450.35, F.S., and assessing a civil fine of $1250.00 to be paid within thirty (30) days. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. MARY W. CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of July, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Francisco Rivera, Sr. Atty. Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. 307 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0658 Gabriel Bain 30 S. Ivey Lane Orlando, Florida 32811 Frank Scruggs, Secretary 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Cecilia Renn Chief Legal Counsel 307 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152
The Issue The issue is whether the claims of $98,935.20 and $19,147.70, filed by Petitioner under the Agricultural Bond and License Law, are valid. §§ 604.15 - 604.34, Fla. Stat. (2008).
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Petitioner has been a producer of agricultural products located in Plant City, Florida. At all material times, American Growers has been a dealer in agricultural products. Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Company, as surety, issued a bond to American Growers, as principal. American Growers is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services ("DACS"). Between December 16, 2008, and February 4, 2009, Petitioner sold strawberries to American Growers, each sale being accompanied by a Passing and Bill of Lading. Petitioner sent an Invoice for each shipment, and payment was due in full following receipt of the Invoice. Partial payments have been made on some of the invoices, and as of the date of this Recommended Order, the amount that remains unpaid by American Growers to Petitioner is $117,982.90, comprising: Invoice No. Invoice Date Amount Balance Due 103894 12/16/08 $7,419.00 $1,296.00 103952 12/22/08 $18,370.80 $1,944.00 103953 12/23/08 $3,123.60 $648.00 193955 12/26/08 $8,164.80 $1,728.00 103984 12/28/08 $28,764.40 $28,764.40 104076 12/31/08 $17,236.80 $17,236.80 104077 1/5/09 $17,658.00 $17,658.00 104189 1/5/09 $1,320.90 $1,320.90 104386 1/20/09 $16,480.80 $16,480.80 104517 1/29/09 $17,449.20 $17,449.20 104496 2/4/09 $13,456.80 $13,456.80 TOTAL $117,982.90
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order requiring Respondent, American Growers, Inc., and/or its surety, Respondent, Lincoln General Insurance Company, to pay Petitioner, Crown Harvest Produce Sales, LLC, the total amount of $117,982.90. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of May, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of May, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capital, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Glenn Thomason, President American Growers, Inc. 14888 Horseshoe Trace Wellington, Florida 33414 Katy Koestner Esquivel, Esquire Meuers Law Firm, P.L. 5395 Park Central Court Naples, Florida 34109 Renee Herder Surety Bond Claims Lincoln General Insurance Company 4902 Eisenhower Boulevard, Suite 155 Tampa, Florida 33634 Glenn C. Thomason, Registered Agent American Growers, Inc. Post Office Box 1207 Loxahatchee, Florida 33470
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent possessed a Certificate of Registration as a Farm Labor Contractor, issued under the provisions of Chapter 450, Part III, Florida Statutes. The Certificate number is C-04-387166-D-88-R. It was issued on June 15, 1987, and expired on April 30, 1988. The Department of Labor and Employment Security is the state agency charged with regulating farm labor contractors. At the time Respondent applied for his certificate, on June 4, 1987, he gave as the address for sending documents, P.O. Box 2186, Lake Placid, Florida, 33852. At approximately 9:00 am on June 4, 1987, Larry Coker, a DLES Compliance Officer, observed the Respondent drive his 1980 Ford van up to a convenience store in the town of Ona, on State Road 64, in Hardy County, Florida. At the time, Respondent had thirteen migrant workers in the van with him. Mr. Coker's examination of the van at the time revealed that the seats in the van were not secured to the floor or the frame of the vehicle, and the vehicle was not insured. Mr. Coker attempted to discuss the matter with the Respondent, who had stopped at the store to purchase gas and ice, and to give the workers an opportunity to purchase food for lunch. However, Respondent indicated that he had to get to work, and Mr. Coker followed Respondent to a watermelon field where he and the other workers were to cut watermelons. Though at the hearing, Respondent denied that he was the contractor for the workers in question, at the field, on June 4, 1987, he had indicated that he paid his workers in cash on a daily basis, did not deduct for social security, did not keep names, addresses, or other records, nor did he give a wage statement to the workers. At the hearing, Mr. Crowl admitted making the statement, but contended that he was referring to his routine practice on those occasions when he served as a labor contractor. He unequivocally denies, however, that the workers in his van on June 4, 1987, were his employees. He insists they were the employees of another contractor whose van had broken down beside the road and to whom he was giving a ride, merely to assist them in getting to work. When Mr. Coker discussed the matter with the grower, Randall Roberts, and the crew leader in the field, Mr. McGahey, Roberts indicated that he had just hired Respondent, and that he paid Respondent, who was responsible for paying the workers. Under the circumstances, and considering the relative probabilities of the testimony, it is found that the workers in question were Respondent's employees, and that he did improperly manage them under the terms of Chapter 450, Florida Statutes. It is also found that Mr. Crowl's prior Farm Labor Contractor Certificate of Registration expired in February, 1987. Even though expired, it should have been posted either at the work site or in the van, but was not. Respondent, also, was not authorized to transport workers in his van. As a result, Mr. Coker cited Respondent for failing to register as a contractor, (based on the expired certificate); failing to make, keep or preserve records; failing to provide wage statements to workers; failing to assure the safety of transportation vehicles; failing to obtain prescribed vehicle insurance; and failing to post his certificate of registration as required. The complaint was forwarded to DLES headquarters in Tallahassee. On June 29, 1987, Rod Willis, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Programs for the DLES, by letter, notified Respondent that the Department was assessing a civil money penalty against him for the above cited six violations in the total amount of $2,450.00. Under the terms of the letter, Mr. Crowl was given twenty-one days to remit the amount of penalty due, or to request a hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. The letter was sent by certified mail to the address listed by Mr. Crowl in his application for registration, but was subsequently returned undelivered. Mr. Crowl contends that he never received the letter because shortly after the date of the incident here, he left for New York and did not return until November, 1987. Because requirements outlined in the certified letter referenced above were not complied with, on January 25, 1988, the acting director of the DLES entered a Final Order imposing the $2,450.00 fine, and advising Respondent of his right to appeal. No appeal was taken. On January 28, 1988, Mr. Willis, again by letter, notified Respondent of the Division's intention to revoke his Florida Farm Labor Contractor's Certificate of Registration, citing his failure to pay the previously assessed civil money penalty or to request a hearing. Mr. Crowl was again advised of his right to request a hearing on the revocation, and this hearing was the result. At the hearing, counsel for Petitioner indicated that if Respondent was willing to make arrangements for the payment of the $2,450.00 civil money penalty assessed, he would consider recommending to the Division Director a settlement that might result in allowing Respondent to retain his Contractor's Certificate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED, that Respondent, Erastious Crowl, be ordered to pay the previously assessed civil money penalty in the amount of $2,450.00, with the condition that if the payment of the penalty is not paid within a time period satisfactory to the Department, his Certificate be revoked. Recommended in Tallahassee, Florida, this 9th day of May, 1988. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: MOSES E. WILLIAMS, ESQUIRE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY MONTGOMERY BUILDING, SUITE 117 2562 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399 ERASTIOUS CROWL POST OFFICE BOX 2186 LAKE PLACID, FLORIDA 33852 HUGO MENENDEZ, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 206 BERKELEY BUILDING 2590 EXECUTIVE CENTER CIRCLE, EAST TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-2152
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondents owe Petitioner $13,512.09 for watermelons, as alleged in the Amended Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made. Cook Brown Farms is a melon farm in Punta Gorda, Florida. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Cook Brown Farms was a "producer" as defined in Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes, of agricultural products in the State of Florida. Melons come within the definition of "agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(3), Florida Statutes. J.G.L. Produce is a Florida Corporation, owned by John W. Johnson, Jr., and located in Pompano Beach, Florida. At times pertinent to this proceeding, J.G.L. Produce was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Andrew J. Cook, a principal owner of Cook Brown Farms, and Mr. Johnson of J.G.L. Produce entered into an oral agreement regarding the sale of watermelons grown at Cook Brown Farms. The core of this case is a dispute concerning the nature of this agreement. Mr. Cook testified that, under the agreement, J.G.L. Produce would purchase the melons at the farm at their daily market price, plus 1/2 cent to cover Cook Brown Farms' cost of picking, sorting, and placing the melons in special bins and in special pallets required by the ultimate purchaser, Kroger Supermarkets. J.G.L. Produce would provide the bins and pallets and would provide the trucks to ship the melons. Mr. Johnson testified that the agreement was not for purchase but for brokerage of the melons. J.G.L. Produce would act as broker of Cook Brown Farms' watermelons, use its best efforts to sell the melons at the highest price available, and pay Cook Brown Farms the proceeds of the sale, minus expenses and a brokerage fee of one cent per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that J.G.L. Produce never took title to or purchased the melons, and that the risk of loss always remained on Cook Brown Farms. Mr. Johnson testified that he approached Mr. Cook about the melons because he had a ready buyer in another local dealer, Delk Produce, which had a longstanding arrangement to provide melons to Kroger. Mr. Johnson agreed with Mr. Cook that the arrangement included the provision of bins and pallets by J.G.L. Produce, though Mr. Johnson stated that the arrangement also called for J.G.L. Produce to retain $0.015 per pound from the amount paid to Cook Brown Farms to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. J.G.L. Produce took approximately 24 truck loads of watermelons from Cook Brown Farms. J.G.L. Produce deducted a one cent per pound brokerage fee from each load of melons it took, except for certain loads noted below, without contemporaneous objection from Cook Brown Farms. The Amended Complaint claims that J.G.L. Produce owes money to Cook Brown Farms for five of the loads taken by J.G.L. Produce. In sum, the Amended Complaint states that J.G.L. Produce owes Cook Brown Farms $19,991.74 for the five loads, less $6,479.65 already paid, for a total owing of $13,512.09. Item One of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,438.54 for a load of 38,596 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 20, 2000. Item Two of the Amended Complaint alleges that J.G.L. Produce owes $4,625.30 for a load of 40,220 pounds at a price of $0.115 per pound, sold on April 21, 2000. The Amended Complaint alleges that the melons on these two loads were inspected and approved for shipment during loading by Delk Produce employee Freddie Ellis. The Amended Complaint states that Cook Brown Farms was paid in full for the loads on May 3, 2000, but that the contested amounts were deducted from subsequent settlements by J.G.L. Produce. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item One were initially sold to Delk Produce for delivery to Kroger. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $4,438.54, which constituted the price for 38,596 pounds of melons at $0.125 per pound, less $385.96 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Jay Delk, the principal of Delk Produce, testified that this load was rejected by Kroger's buyer in Virginia due to "freshness," meaning that the melons were unsuitably green. Mr. Delk stated that the melons were taken to North Carolina to ripen and eventually sold at $0.06 per pound. The final return on this load, less the brokerage fee, was $1,543.84. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $4,438.54 and the final payment of $1,543.84. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Two were initially sold to Delk Produce. On May 3, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $5,809.80, which constituted the price for 50,520 pounds of watermelons at $0.125 per pound, less $505.20 for the one cent per pound brokerage fee. Seminole Produce purchased 10,300 pounds of this load at $0.145 per pound, or $1,493.50. The remainder of the load was rejected by Kroger due to freshness and had to be resold at a lesser price of $0.0346 per pound, or $1,391.00. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $5,809.80 and the final payment (after deduction of the brokerage fee) of $2,576.11. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Item Three were sold to Delk Produce. On May 9, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid Cook Brown Farms the amount of $2,731.30, which constituted the price for 42,020 pounds of watermelons at $0.0675 per pound, less $105.05 for the brokerage fee, reduced to $0.0025 per pound. Mr. Johnson testified that he decided to forego the full brokerage fee to save money for Mr. Cook and his farm, because it was "hurting" due to the rapidly plummeting price for watermelons. Mr. Johnson discovered at this time that Delk Produce had not been retaining the agreed- upon $0.015 per pound to cover the cost of bins and pallets and decided not to lose any more money on that item. In its final settlement with Cook Brown Farms on May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce deducted the difference between the original payment of $2,731.30 and $2,206.05, deducting $525.25 from the original payment to cover the cost of the bins and pallets. The evidence established that the melons claimed under Items Four and Five were originally shipped to Wal-Mart in Kentucky on April 29, 2000, and were rejected on the ground that the melons were not packed to specifications. The melons were trucked back to Florida at J.G.L. Produce's expense. The melons claimed under Item Four totaled 41,100 pounds. J.G.L. Produce divided the melons into four loads and sold them to four local dealers at an average price of $0.775 per pound, totaling $3,185.41. J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets, reducing the total to $2,671.51. J.G.L. Produce then deducted $1,750.00 from the total as reimbursement for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $921.51 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The melons claimed under Item Five totaled 45,600 pounds. J.G.L. Produce sold 2,426 pounds to Seminole Produce at $0.10 per pound, or $242.60. J.G.L. Produce sold the remaining 43,174 pounds to Belle Glade Produce at $0.065 per pound, or $2,800. From the total for Item Five, J.G.L. Produce deducted its $0.015 charge for bins and pallets and $1,950.00 for the freight charge it paid to bring the melons back to Florida after their rejection by Wal-Mart. J.G.L. Produce did not include a brokerage fee on this load of melons. On May 26, 2000, J.G.L. Produce paid the remaining $416.64 to Cook Brown Farms as part of the final settlement. The weight of the credible evidence, excluding the hearsay that was not supported by the direct testimony of Mr. Johnson, leads to the finding that there was a brokerage arrangement between the parties. J.G.L. Produce routinely deducted brokerage fees from its payments, without objection by Cook Brown Farms. This course of dealing strongly indicates a brokerage arrangement. Mr. Cook testified as to prior dealings with J.G.L. Produce, which also involved a brokerage arrangement. The evidence indicated that J.G.L. Produce fully accounted for the five loads of melons at issue, and paid Cook Brown Farms the full amounts due and owing for those loads.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order dismissing the Amended Complaint filed by Gin Brown Matthews, d/b/a Cook Brown Farms. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Redland Insurance Company 222 South 15th Street, Suite 600, North Omaha, Nebraska 65102 Brenda D. Hyatt, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 John W. Johnson, President Post Office Box 1123 Pompano Beach, Florida 33061 Harold M. Stevens, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1440 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Edward L. Myrick, Jr., Esquire Beighley & Myrick, P.A. 1255 West Atlantic Boulevard Suite F-2 Pompano Beach, Florida 33069 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Terry L. Rhodes Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Wallace Moorehand, was an employee of Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, as defined by the Florida Civil Rights of 1992, at the time alleged discriminatory employment practice(s) took place.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Wallace Bruce Moorehand, is an African- American male residing in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida. Petitioner holds Florida insurance agent license A183690, which was issued on February 27, 1991. Petitioner studied extensively and was subject to a formal examination in order to obtain his license. Respondent, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm),1/ is a private entity headquartered in Bloomington, Illinois, engaged in the business of selling and servicing various types of insurance products including auto, health, and fire insurance for personal and business customers. Petitioner maintains that he is an employee of State Farm, rather than an independent contractor therefore, allowing him to bring a claim of unlawful employment discrimination under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Between March 1991 and February 1993, Petitioner worked as a Trainee Agent with State Farm. It is undisputed that Petitioner was a State Farm employee during his tenure as a Trainee Agent. On March 1, 1993, Petitioner executed a State Farm Agent’s Agreement. Among the relevant contractual provisions are the following: The purpose of this Agreement is to reduce to writing the objectives, obligations, and responsibilities essential to the relationship between the Agent, operating as an independent contractor, and State Farm. [State Farm] believe[s] that agents operating as independent contractors are best able to provide the creative selling, professional counseling, and prompt and skillful service essential to the creation and maintenance of successful multiple-line companies and agencies. We do not seek, and will not assert, control of your daily activities, but expect you to exercise your own judgment as to the time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. You have chosen this independent contractor relationship, with its opportunities for financial reward and personal satisfaction, in preference to one which would place you in an employee status. * * * Section 1 – MUTUAL CONDITIONS AND DUTIES * * * You are an independent contractor for all purposes. As such you have full control of your daily activities, with the right to exercise independent judgment as to time, place, and manner of soliciting insurance, servicing policyholders, and otherwise carrying out the provisions of this Agreement. State Farm will furnish you, without charge, manuals, forms, records, and such other materials and supplies as we may deem advisable to provide. All such property furnished by us shall remain the property of [State Farm]. * * * Information regarding names, addresses, and age of policyholders of [State Farm]; the description and locations of insured property; and expiration or renewal dates of State Farm policies acquired or coming into your possession during the effective period of this Agreement, or any prior Agreement, except information and records of policyholders insured by [State Farm] pursuant to any governmental or insurance industry plan or facility, are trade secrets wholly owned by [State Farm]. All forms and other materials, whether furnished by State Farm or purchased by you, upon which this information is recorded, shall be the sole and exclusive property of [State Farm]. The expense of any office, including rental, furniture, and equipment; signs; supplies not furnished by us; the salaries of your employees; telegraph; telephone; postage; advertising; and all other charges or expense incurred by you in the performance of this Agreement shall be incurred at your discretion and paid by you. * * * L. We retain the right to prescribe all policy forms and provisions; premiums, fees, and charges for insurance; and rules governing the binding, acceptance, renewal, rejection, or cancellation of risks, and adjustment and payment of losses. Petitioner testified that it was his intent to enter into an independent contractor relationship with State Farm. On January 1, 1997, Petitioner entered into a second State Farm Agent’s Agreement, containing similar, if not identical, provisions. The record was not clear why Petitioner entered into a second Agent’s Agreement in 1997. Petitioner testified that State Farm eliminated some retirement benefits in 1997, requiring all agents to execute a new Agreement. However, on cross-examination, Petitioner testified, “I misspoke”2/ and admitted that the original Agent’s Agreement does not refer to a pension or other retirement benefit. Petitioner has conducted business as an agent of State Farm at the same location in Mary Esther, Florida, for 21 years. State Farm compensates Petitioner through commission on sales of insurance policies and other products. According to the Agent’s Agreement, State Farm also offers a sales incentive of five percent of production earnings in the prior year. State Farm has never paid Petitioner a salary. Pursuant to the Agent’s Agreement, State Farm also compensates Petitioner by providing a life insurance policy of $100,000 payable to his designated beneficiary upon his death, provided that Petitioner has not obtained age 70 or terminated the Agent’s Agreement. Petitioner has his own Federal employer tax ID number. Petitioner owns the building in which his State Farm office is located. Petitioner pays all the expenses of his office, including telephone, electricity, water, furniture, office supplies, and office equipment. Petitioner currently has two employees, but has previously employed up to nine people at his State Farm office. Petitioner pays his employees a salary, rather than on an hourly basis, at his choosing. Petitioner sets his employees’ work schedules. Petitioner pays his employees’ payroll taxes, decides whether they will receive commissions, and, if so, the amount of said commissions. Petitioner offers his employees paid holidays, vacation time, and sick leave. Petitioner does not receive either vacation time or sick leave from State Farm. Petitioner has elected to secure health insurance through State Farm for himself and his family. Petitioner offers his employees the opportunity to participate in the same health insurance plan he has elected to purchase. State Farm reports Petitioner’s earnings to the Federal Government on IRS Form 1099, not Form W-2. State Farm does not withhold social security, Medicare, or federal income taxes, from Petitioner’s commission checks. Despite overwhelming evidence of Petitioner’s independent contractor relationship with State Farm, Petitioner maintains that State Farm exercises a degree of control over Petitioner’s livelihood that renders the independent contractor status a sham. Petitioner testified that State Farm controlled Petitioner’s business, not only by contract, but also “by innuendo, by assertion, by intimidation.”3/ First, Petitioner testified that there was no difference between the way State Farm managed Petitioner’s business as a Trainee Agent and as an independent contractor. However, Petitioner admitted that only as a Trainee Agent was he required to submit daily time logs and weekly accountings of his activities. Petitioner offered into evidence a letter in which a State Farm Agency Manager criticized Petitioner’s priorities, time utilization, attitude, and required him to attend a series of training meetings. However, the letter was clearly written when Petitioner was a Trainee Agent. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm controls whom he hires at his agency, as well as the hours his agency must be open to the public. Any employee of Petitioner who will be licensed to sell State Farm products on behalf of Petitioner is required to undergo background screening and enter into an Agent’s Licensed Staff Agreement. The Agreement defines the nature of the employment as with the Agent, rather than State Farm; defines the scope of the employee’s authority, i.e., the Agent may delegate to employees in-office binding authority on motor vehicle, residential risks, and personal property-casualty insurance coverage. Petitioner’s clerical staff, and any other non- licensed staff, is not required to undergo background screening or enter into an Agent’s Licensed Staff Agreement. Petitioner’s office is open 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. each weekday. Petitioner testified that he chose those hours because those are the ones “clients most wanted.” State Farm does not dictate the particular hours Petitioner works. State Farm provides an after-hours call center from 5:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. on weekdays to take calls from clients and potential clients when Petitioner’s office is closed. Petitioner maintains that because the call center is only available after 5:00 p.m., State Farm dictates that his office remains open until 5:00 p.m. daily. If Petitioner chose to close his office before 5:00 p.m. on weekdays, the only consequence would be missed business opportunities. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm controls his business by requiring Petitioner to sell “multiple lines” of insurance, rather than selling only automobile or homeowners’ policies. Petitioner testified that State Farm pressures him to sell life and health insurance policies, as well as banking products more recently-available through State Farm. State Farm does not set quotas for any product line. Agents are free to choose which products they will sell as part of their overall business decisions. State Farm encourages its Agents to sell all products offered by the company in order to service the needs of clients. Some State Farm products require special licenses, such as a securities license to sell mutual funds offered by State Farm. State Farm does not require agents to obtain any specialty license. Petitioner voluntarily obtained a securities license to offer mutual funds to his clients. Next, Petitioner argues that State Farm does not allow him to operate his agency in a truly independent manner. Rather, Petitioner maintains that he is required to submit a business plan for approval by State Farm and attend extensive trainings which interfere with the independent nature of his relationship with State Farm. State Farm requires agents to attend one training session per year. The training is on compliance with State Farm customer service guidelines. Agents may access the training online and do not need to travel to take the training. State Farm provides a number of incentives to encourage agents to maximize their performance. For example, if an agent submits a business plan, laying out the goals and direction for his or her agency, the agent is eligible to receive leads on prospective clients that are received through the State Farm website. However, there are no negative consequences to those agents who choose not to submit a business plan. Finally, Petitioner argues that State Farm restricts Petitioner from writing policies for other insurer’s products. The parties offered a great deal of testimony regarding Petitioner’s authority to write policies for “take-out companies” assuming coverage previously provided by Citizens’ Insurance, and flood insurance policies through the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The undersigned finds this testimony irrelevant to the issue at hand. Petitioner is an agent of State Farm insurance company. He chose that relationship. He could have chosen to work with an independent insurance agency which writes policies for any number of companies. Petitioner did not.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Complaint of Discrimination No. 2014-00242 filed by Wallace B. Moorehand on August 14, 2014. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2015.
The Issue Whether State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and State Farm General Insurance Company ("State Farm") made a material misrepresentation or material error in connection with the rate filing that is the subject of this proceeding. For the purpose of this proceeding, a misrepresentation or error would be material if it resulted in the Department approving "ex-wind" (meaning without windstorm coverage) homeowners insurance rates that are excessive for policyholders whose wind coverage is being non-renewed in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties.
Findings Of Fact The parties in this proceeding have stipulated to the following findings of fact. Based upon a review of the record in this case, these stipulated facts appear to be accurate and are adopted. In December 1995, State Farm submitted a homeowners insurance rate filing effective April 1, 1996, for new business, and May 1, 1996, for renewal business. With regard to the December 1995, homeowners rate filing, the Department of Insurance approved a 13.8 percent statewide rate increase on February 12, 1996. On February 18, 1996, State Farm formally announced that it would non- renew over three years the wind coverage for 62,000 policies in Dade, Broward, and Pinellas Counties in Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association eligible areas. On February 22, 1996, the Department issued a Notice of Withdrawal of Rate Approval ("Notice") to State Farm with regard to homeowner rates approved for Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. Subsequent to the issuance of the Notice, the Department requested that State Farm submit to the Department actuarial information giving further consideration to the proposed non-renewal of wind coverage to policyholders in Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The evidence adduced in this matter consisted of an affidavit of Douglas S. Haseltine, a Department actuary, on behalf of the Department, and of pre-filed testimony of Mark Brannon, a State Farm actuary, and of the rate filing that is the subject of this litigation and of certain actuarial information that had been provided by State Farm to the Department pursuant to the request described in paragraph 5 above. The record in this matter otherwise includes the Request For Formal Proceedings filed in this matter by State Farm, with attachments, which include the Notice, and the stipulation filed by the parties on May 31, 1996. The Haseltine affidavit provides in pertinent part that: "For policyholder whose wind coverage is non-renewed, their remaining premium for coverage ex-wind is not excessive." The Brannon testimony and the attachments to it establish the methodology by which State Farm establishes rates for policyholders in different territories throughout Florida for homeowners insurance, including both homeowners insurance policies that included wind coverage and policies that excluded wind coverage (hereinafter "ex-wind policies"). The Brannon testimony also provided that the rate filing did not reflect the distributional changes that would result from the non-renewal plan that was subsequently announced on February 20, 1996. Mr. Brannon further testified that, in his expert opinion, the failure to point out this non-renewal program did not constitute a material error or material misrepresentation because when the filing was made the decision to initiate these non-renewals had not been made, and because: Even if the non-renewal program had been announced prior to December 15, 1995, it would not have changed the rate request. State Farm's original rate request was a 24 percent increase. The approved rate request included a 40 percent wind or hail exclusion discount. This discount applied to the FWUA eligible areas of Dade, Broward and Pinellas Counties. The amount of this discount was not changed by the non-renewal program. Thus, the non-renewal program would not have had a material effect on the filing, even if I had known of the program at the time the filing was made. Mr. Brannon further testified that the rates proposed in the filing are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory, stating: Q: Are the rates you have proposed in this filing excessive or unfairly discriminatory? A: It is my expert opinion that the proposed rates are reasonable and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. Specifically, the proposed rates for both those policies which exclude windstorm or hail coverage, and the rates for those policies which include wind- storm or hail coverage, meet the statutory requirements and are not excessive or unfairly discriminatory. It appears that there is no misrepresentation or error in the rate filing itself, because the decision that the Department contends should have been disclosed had, as a matter of fact, not yet been made at the time of the filing. Moreover, if State Farm had an obligation to disclose this decision to the Department prior to the Department's approval of the rate filing, any misrepresentation or error flowing from the failure to disclose would not be material to the filing because the data subsequently provided to the Department and other evidence in this matter show that: Policyholders whose wind coverage will be non-renewed will receive a discount that is actuarially sound and commensurate with the reduction in coverage: and hence, Policyholders whose coverage will be renewed "ex-wind" will not be charged rates that are excessive.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered: (1) finding that there was not a material misrepresentation or material error made by the insurer or contained in the rate filing; and (2) dismissing the Notice. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Vincent J. Rio, III, Esquire TAYLOR, DAY & RIO Suite 206 311 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301-1807 Daniel Y. Sumner, Esquire General Counsel Department of Insurance The Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1300 Bill Nelson State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue Whether Respondent should be assessed a civil money penalty of $1,000.00 for alleged violations of Sections 450.33(10), and 316.620(3) and (4)(d) and (k), Florida Statutes (1993).
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Michelle A. Blount, is a farm labor contractor licensed in Florida. On January 14, 1994, a vehicle transporting members of Respondent's farm labor crew was involved in an accident in St. Lucie County, Florida which resulted in the death of one passenger and serious injury to eight others. Respondent was hired by Willie J. Lampkin to transport, supervise, recruit and provide a crew for harvesting and loading fruit. Elva Ochoa was employed by Respondent to recruit, transport, supervise and provide a crew, in connection with Respondent's contract with Willie J. Lampkin. On January 14, 1994, ten farm workers were being transported to the groves of Lampkin at the direction of Ochoa. The vehicle used to transport the workers was a pickup truck with a cab covering the bed. It did not have secured seating, the tires were worn out and unsafe, and it did not have any means of communication between the passengers and the driver. The vehicle was not approved or insured to transport workers, nor did it have an inspection certificate on record with the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent has violated Sections 450.33 and 316.620, Florida Statutes. It is further RECOMMENDED that Respondent be fined $1,000.00 and such fine to paid within thirty days from date of the final order entered by the Division. Should Respondent fail to pay fine, Respondent's license as a farm labor contractor should be suspended until the fine is paid in full. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1994. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-7. Respondent did not submit proposed findings. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley Gooding, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Edward A. Dion, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 303 Hartman Building 2012 Capital Circle, S.E. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Francisco R. Rivera, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2012 Capital Circle, Southeast Suite 307 Hartman Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2189 Michelle A. Blount 531 North Dollings Avenue Orlando, Florida 32805
The Issue Whether Respondent is indebted to Petitioners for agricultural products and, if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Petitioners are producers and sellers of tomatoes. They own and operate Sunfresh Farms in Florida City, Florida. Respondent is a dealer in agricultural products. The Controversy The instant case involves two separate transactions involving the sale of tomatoes pursuant to verbal agreements between Petitioners (as the sellers) and Respondent (as the buyer). Both transactions occurred in January of 1995. The First Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5270) Under the terms of the first of these two verbal agreements (First Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box (which was the market price at the time). In accordance with the terms of the First Agreement, Petitioners delivered 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 23, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold these 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a local produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to another local produce house. The tomatoes were eventually sold to a company in Grand Rapids, Michigan. On January 28, 1995, five days after Petitioners had delivered the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent, the tomatoes were inspected in Grand Rapids, Michigan. According to the inspection certificate, the inspection revealed: "Decay (3 to 28 percent)(mostly early, some advanced stages);" "Checksum;" and "Average approximately 85 percent light red to red." Petitioners have yet to be paid any of $1,214.40 Respondent owes them (under the terms of the First Agreement) for the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The Second Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5299) Under the terms of the second verbal agreement at issue in the instant case (Second Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 132 boxes of ("no grade") cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box. In accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement, Petitioners delivered 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 27, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold 84 of these 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a Florida produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to a company in Houston, Texas. These 84 boxes of cherry tomatoes were inspected in Houston, Texas, on January 31, 1995, four days after Petitioners had delivered them to Respondent. The defects found during the inspection were noted on the inspection certificate. Petitioners have yet to be paid in full for the 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement. Respondent tendered payment (in the form of a check) in the amount of $811.20, but Petitioners refused to accept such payment because it did not represent the full amount ($1,669.80) Respondent owed them (under the terms of the Second Agreement) for these cherry tomatoes. (Although they have not endorsed or cashed the check, Petitioners are still holding it in their possession.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20, (2) directing Respondent to make payment to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, (3) indicating that the $811.20 check that was previously tendered to Petitioners by Respondent (and is still in Petitioners' possession) will be considered partial payment of this $2,884.20 indebtedness, if Respondent advises Petitioners, in writing, that it desires the check to be used for such purpose and if it provides Petitioners written assurance that the check is still a valid negotiable instrument; and (4) announcing that if payment in full of this $2,884.20 indebtedness is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from the Farm Bureau, Respondent's surety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of February, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1996.
Findings Of Fact During January and February, 1987, Respondent acted as a farm labor contractor without a certificate of registration having been issued to him by Petitioner. Specifically, he was hired by Goodson Farms as a farm labor contractor, after holding himself out as such, and did act as a farm labor contractor by supplying and transporting 55 to 75 farm workers for the harvesting of cauliflower at Goodson Farms. He received payment for his services and disbursed payments to these workers. Respondent has failed to possess, for a period of three years, proof of payments he has made to each farm worker for whom he has acted as a farm labor contractor. Records he did provide to Herb Mize, crew chief compliance officer, were incomplete and did not include a record of payments for social security, income taxes withheld, and deductions for food and transportation.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order assessing an administrative penalty of $1400.00 against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Moses E. Williams, Esquire Department of Labor and Employment Security 2562 Executive Center Circle East Montgomery Building, Suite 117 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 James Quillen, II, Esquire 509 North Morgan Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Hugo Menendez, Secretary Department of Labor and Employment Security 2590 Executive Center Circle East 206 Berkeley Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2152 Kenneth Hart, Esquire General Counsel Department of Labor and Employment Security 2562 Executive Center Circle East 131 Montgomery Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2151
