Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, including June 28, 1993, through January 27, 1994, an employee of the Department working in the economic services unit of the Department's District XI (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). In 1990, Petitioner occupied a PAS (Public Assistance Specialist) I position that, in or around June of that year, was one of 182 such positions in the District to be reclassified to a PAS II position as part of the Department's implementation of the new FLORIDA computer system. 2/ Those employees occupying these reclassified positions (hereinafter referred to as the "upgraded employees") whose salaries were below the minimum salary for a PAS II received a salary increase to raise their salary to the minimum. Petitioner was among the employees who received such a salary increase. Such action was taken in accordance with the following Department policy set forth at page 11 of HRSP 60-1: When an employee is promoted, a salary increase to at least the minimum salary of the higher level position will be made. How- ever, an increase of up to ten percent above the current base salary or ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be approved. An increase of up to ten percent of the current base salary is normally used when the employee's salary is the same or nearly the same as the minimum for the new class. An increase of up to ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be granted when an employee possesses training or experience substantially above the minimum training and experience required for the higher class and it is determined that the employee is exceptionally well qualified for the position. These increases must be approved by an assistant secretary or district administrator. Because of funding constraints that existed at the time, no other salary increases were given to the upgraded employees. Funds for such additional salary increases became available toward the end of the 1992-1993 fiscal year. The increases were approved at both the Department and District level. Petitioner and the other upgraded employees were advised of the increases by a memorandum dated July 7, 1993, from the District XI District Administrator. The District Administrator's memorandum read as follows: Your position has been identified as one which was upgraded as a result of the FLORIDA implementation in 1990/1991. At the time, our records indicate that you received a partial increase, or none at all, because of budgetary constraints. Due to the identification of available monies prior to the end of the Fiscal Year, we are pleased to inform you that you will be receiving a pay increase in your salary warrant on July 9, 1993. The amount of the increase will be either 10[percent] or the difference between what you received in 1990/1991 and 10 [percent], and was effective June 28, 1993. Should you have any questions about this increase or how it was calculated, please call Arelis Valero at 377-5197. Your continued dedication and service to HRS is sincerely appreciated. District personnel miscalculated the amount of Petitioner's approved salary increase (which was "the difference between what [she had] received in 1990 . . . and 10[percent]" of her pre-reclassification base salary). As a result, following June 28, 1993, the effective date of the increase, for the pay periods ending January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $1,144.72. The District discovered the error and revised its payroll records to reflect Petitioner's correct salary. In addition, by memorandum, it notified Petitioner of the mistake that had been made and advised her that it was her responsibility to repay the amount she had been overpaid. By letter dated November 1, 1995, the District XI District Administrator informed Petitioner that the overpayment would be recovered through payroll deductions beginning January 12, 1996, amounting to "10[percent] of [her] gross salary each pay period, unless [she] prefer[red] a single lump sum, until the balance [was] paid." The letter further provided, in part, as follows: If you do not dispute the overpayment, but feel that the repayment schedule of 10 [percent] of your gross salary per pay period is overly burdensome, please call Thomas Franklin at 377-5055 Number135 and he will review with you what must be documented and submitted to the Comptroller's Office (Capitol Building, Suite 1201, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350) to request a modification. While the total amount eventually repaid to the State cannot be adjusted, the Comptroller may be convinced to lengthen the repayment schedule by lessening the percentage withheld each pay period. If you do not agree that you were overpaid this amount, you have the right to an adminis- trative hearing under 120.57(1) or (2), Florida Statutes, and Rules 10-2.036 and 28-5, Florida Administrative Code. You may request a formal or an informal hearing. If a request for a formal hearing is made, your petition must be in compliance with Rule 28-5.021, Florida Administrative Code. Please note that Rule 28-5.201(2) specifies that your petition should contain a concise discussion of the specific item in dispute. Informal hearings are governed by Rules 28-5.501-503, Florida Administrative Code. Your request for either a formal or informal hearing must be received by this office, attention Thomas Franklin, within thirty (30) days of your receipt of this letter, in accordance with Rule 10-2.036, Florida Administrative Code. Failure to request a timely hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to hearing. Petitioner subsequently requested, by memorandum, a formal hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department: find that, from June 28, 1993, until January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $1,144.72; notify the Department of Management Services of this finding; and refer the matter to the Comptroller so that the Comptroller may take appropriate action to recover these moneys owed to the state. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black female who has been continuously employed by the Respondent, at the Gretchen Everhart School since approximately February of 1975. Prior to that time she worked for approximately seven years as a licensed practical nurse. The Respondent is a public employer within the meaning of Section 760.02(6), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner initially interviewed for an employment position with the Respondent in February, 1975. She was hired as a "pupil personal services worker," a combination social worker and guidance counselor. She was paid out of the Respondent's "social worker budget" and was not hired specifically as a nurse. The Petitioner maintains that upon her hiring she requested that her beginning salary be adjusted to reflect her prior work experience as a licensed practical nurse and that request was denied. However, the record reflects that she did not make any formal request for prior work experience pay credit at that time. Her formal complaint was not actually filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations until October 28, 1985, well in excess of the 180 day requirement for filing such an action imposed under Section 760.10(10), Florida Statutes. Thus, even if she had made a formal request for such pay credit in 1975, its denial then would not now be actionable. Moreover, the Petitioner did not establish that any salary schedule, implementing regulation or collective bargaining agreement existed which provided for a salary adjustment of this type in 1975. On October 9, 1984, the Petitioner filed a written supplemental salary request with Dr. Paul Onkle, then the director of employee relations for the Respondent. She requested that she be given experience pay credit for seven years of prior experience as a licensed practical nurse at Sunland Hospital in Tallahassee, Florida. That request was denied. There is no evidence which would establish the date on which an initial, collective bargaining agreement between the Respondent and the Leon Classroom Teachers Association (LCTA), was first ratified. The Petitioner has been employed in a position included in that bargaining unit represented by the LCTA ever since the date of the first collective bargaining agreement, however. Accordingly, the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment have been fixed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, ever since ratification of the initial agreement. On April 8, 1985, the Petitioner again wrote to Dr. Paul Onkle requesting his review of certain experience pay credit granted to Carolyn Peterson and Joanne Cox Arnette, in conjunction with which she requested his reconsideration of her request for experience pay credit. Ms. Peterson and Ms. Arnette are white female employees of the Respondent. Dr. Onkle instructed her on the proper means of filing a grievance and thereafter she executed a "Level I grievance" document on April 23, 1985, and delivered it to her immediate supervisor, Mrs. Susan Raker, the principal of Gretchen Everhart School. On April 24, 1985, Mrs. Raker denied the Level I grievance request on the ground that the Petitioner's salary had been set in compliance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect. Thereafter, pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement then in effect, the Petitioner filed a "Level II grievance" with Dr. Onkle, who was then the director of Employee Relations. Dr. Onkle denied that grievance on June 24, 1985. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time, the responsibility to pursue the grievance after this denial was upon the Petitioner and the LCTA. No further review of Petitioner's request was ever formally sought, however. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect when the requests for salary credit were filed in 1984 and 1985, no prior work experience credit was permitted for any non-teaching position, except for military service and certain work experience for vocational certification. The position in which the Petitioner was employed at that time did not involve any verified work experience which was required for vocational certification and there were no other provisions in the collective bargaining agreement in effect at that time by which the Petitioner would be entitled to receive a salary increase based upon her prior, non-teaching, licensed practical nurse employment. The Petitioner has alleged that the Respondent discriminated against her on account of her race by refusing to compensate her for prior work experience, while allegedly compensating similarly situated white employees an additional amount based upon similar work experience, thus violating Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. In view of this allegation, the work experience credit granted to a number of white employees, and the circumstances under which it was granted, must be examined. Carolyn Peterson was a white employee who began working with the Respondent in 1974 and became a full-time Occupational Specialist in 1976. In 1979, she was granted a salary increase based upon her prior work experience as an area sales manager and assistant buyer for Maas Brothers Department Store. Her position with the Respondent that year required her to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education, and she was so certified. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time she was granted the salary increase for prior work experience specifically allowed such credit for each year of verified work experience above that required for certification of vocational teachers. The Petitioner, on the other hand, has not, in her employment position with the Respondent, ever been required to be vocationally certified by the Florida Department of Education. Thus, the Petitioner and Ms. Peterson are not "similarly situated" nor or they comparable employees with respect to their entitlement to any salary adjustment for prior work experience. Joanne Cox Arnette is a white person employed by the Respondent who was initially employed as a teacher in 1977. On approximately April 21, 1977, she requested credit for certain prior work experience, including four years of teaching in a public school system in Florida, four years of employment with the Florida Department of Education, and one year of teaching experience at the Florida A & M University. Her position was among the positions included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. The collective bargaining agreement in existence at the time Ms. Arnette requested that credit specifically included and allowed for such credit for prior employees of the Florida Department of Education, by virtue of Section 238.01, Florida Statutes (1977) having been incorporated by reference in the terms of that collective bargaining agreement. That particular provision providing salary adjustment for prior work experience as an employee of the Department of Education terminated with the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the Respondent and the LCTA in 1979. It has been the practice and policy of the Respondent, however, at least as early as 1977, to continue to maintain experience credit for prior employment to an individual employee who was initially qualified for such a salary increase based upon prior employment experience; even though subsequent collective bargaining agreements, entered into after that employee obtained that salary increase, no longer included provisions authorizing such increases. Further, it has been the policy and practice of the Respondent, at times pertinent hereto, to consider and determine any requests for salary increases, based upon prior work experience, in the context of the collective bargaining agreement or other appropriate provisions prevailing and applicable at the time the request is made. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the Petitioner and Ms. Arnette are also not "similarly situated" employees and their positions are not comparable, within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Gary Coates is a white person who was employed by the Respondent in March of 1976. In 1982, he requested and was granted a salary increase based upon credit for certain prior work experience. He was employed at that time in a position which was included in the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. He was granted a salary increase for three years of teaching experience in a public hospital. An examination of the collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time Mr. Coates requested the salary increase reflects that credit was allowed for prior teaching experience in a public hospital or public institution. Mr. Coates met those requirements and was granted work experience credit for those three years. He also requested a salary increase for other work experience, and that request was denied by reason of the Respondent's determination that the experience involved did not qualify him under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, the Petitioner and Mr. Coates are not "similarly situated" employees and their prior work experience was not comparable within the meaning of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Mr. Tom Heiman, a white person, was hired in September, 1985. He was hired as a social worker, which is a non-teaching position, also included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA. Social workers have been included within that unit since the unit was first certified by the Public Employees Relations Commission. In administering the collective bargaining agreement with respect to social workers, the Respondent has followed a policy and practice of interpreting that collective bargaining agreement to allow credit for prior social work experience as if such experience was in fact prior "teaching" experience. Mr. Heiman was granted work experience credit for six years of prior social work, although he was denied work experience credit for other prior work experience. Under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement in effect in 1985, he was entitled to be credited with each year of teaching or social work experience in a public hospital or a public institution which required teacher certification in an area "in field" with a corresponding teaching position assignment. He was properly certified in that field and was otherwise entitled to receive work experience credit for his six years prior social work experience. Thus, Mr. Heiman and the Petitioner are not "similarly situated" employees either, and their work experience is not comparable. Mr. Gerald Torano, a white person, was first hired in October, 1985, as a social worker. His position with the Respondent was also included within the LCTA bargaining unit. He was granted a salary increase in 1985 based upon five years experience as a social worker in a public institution, as well as with the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. He was granted a salary increase pursuant to the same collective bargaining agreement by which Mr. Tom Heiman became eligible for such an increase. Just like Mr. Heiman, Mr. Torano requested additional work experience credit for other past experience which the Respondent denied, based upon the fact that such additional work experience did not qualify him for increased salary credit under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement prevailing at the time he made the request. Thus, the Petitioner and Mr. Torano are also not "similarly situated" employees, nor was their prior work experience comparable. Ms. Jean Schneggenberger is a white person first hired by the Respondent in February, 1985. She was a registered nurse and was hired in that capacity as a Registered School Nurse. Her position is not included within the bargaining unit represented by the LCTA, rather, she is known as a "classified employee," which is a term used by the Respondent to describe those employees whose positions are not included within any accepted bargaining unit, for which there is a collective bargaining agreement in force. Although the Petitioner never asserted in these proceedings that Ms. Schneggenberger was an example of another white employee who had been treated differently and more favorably then Petitioner, the Petitioner offered substantial testimony in an attempt to demonstrate that she had in fact engaged in comparable "nursing duties" or in "nursing related duties" while engaged as a counselor and social worker at the Gretchen Everhart School. Thus, an examination of the manner in which Ms. Schneggenberger's salary as a nurse was computed is relevant to this proceeding. The record establishes that for the year 1984-85, the Respondent adopted a separate salary schedule and implementing regulations related to all "classified" employees. Those implementing regulations applicable to Ms. Schneggenberger are found in the Respondent's Exhibit 4, beginning at paragraph 2A. Ms. Schneggenberger is the only person employed by the Respondent in the position of "Registered School Nurse." Accordingly, neither the Petitioner nor any other employee of the Respondent is "similarly situated" or comparable in his position to Ms. Schneggenberger and her position.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief from an alleged unlawful employment practice filed by the Petitioner, Annie M. Francis, be dismissed in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-3185 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1. Accepted. 2-3. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. Accepted, but not for its material import. 6-7. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 8. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 9-13. Accepted generally, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 14-16. Accepted. 17. Rejected as to its material import. 18-20. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 21-22. Accepted. 23. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 24-25. Rejected as immaterial. 26-27. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 28. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings and as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. 29-30. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings. 31-33. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 34. Rejected, as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2. Accepted. 3. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 4-8. Accepted. 9. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings on this subject matter. 10-17. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Danni Vogt, Esquire 308 East Park Avenue, Room 209 Post Office Box 11301 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 C. Graham Carothers, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Margaret Agerton, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Charles Couch, Superintendent Leon County School Board 2727 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Olin Scott Stoutamire is required to repay monies paid to Olin Scott Stoutamire as salary, which is alleged by the Department of Transportation (DOT) to be excess salary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an agency of state government. The Respondent is a career service employee of the Petitioner, and is employed at a site located away from the Petitioner's District Office in Chipley, Florida. The Respondent is the Project Manager of the Petitioner's Thomasville Road and Interstate 10 Intersection Improvement Project in Tallahassee, Florida. The Respondent is paid less than other Petitioner's Construction Project Managers because the Respondent has less tenure. The Respondent's supervisor told Respondent that he would try to correct what appeared to be a salary inequity. The Petitioner initiated a raise for Respondent equal to 5 percent of the Respondent's base rate of pay. The proposed 5 percent salary increase was initiated by his supervisor completing and submitting an "Employee Action" form. The form provides the employee's identification, position, and includes the employee's current base pay rate and the calculated pay rate after the proposed increase becomes effective. The Respondent's base rate of pay and the resulting calculations as to the proposed resulting pay increase were incorrect on the Employee Action form submitted to the Petitioner's Personnel Office (Personnel) in Chipley, Florida. Personnel detected the supervisor's error, but then committed its own error, resulting in an $80 bi-weekly overpayment. The Respondent noticed the apparent overpayment and inquired of his supervisor if there had been a mistake. Respondent told his supervisor that he did not want the State to seek reimbursement for a large amount at a later date. The Respondent's supervisor told Respondent that the payment was correct and to accept it. The Respondent asked him to check and be certain because he did not want to have to repay the money. A short time later, the Respondent's supervisor told Respondent to accept the total amount of the warrant as being correct. His supervisor mentioned other pay increases for which the Respondent was being considered during the same time that the 5 percent pay increase was being processed. The Respondent thought that his supervisor had checked with personnel, and that his pay was correct. The Petitioner did not become aware of the error until an overpayment of $1,200 had accumulated. The Petitioner's Office of Financial Services requested reimbursement in the amount of $771.15 as payment in full within ten days or a payment of $117.00 biweekly pursuant to Sections 110.205(2) and 216.251, Florida Statutes and Chapter 60L-8, Florida Administrative Code. The Respondent's salary was immediately adjusted to show the correct amount. The Respondent contends he did his best to determine if he was being overpaid and was assured the payment was correct. The Respondent changed his budget and spent the money in reliance upon the assurance that the payment to him was correct. The Respondent concedes that Petitioner's records reflect an error and an overpayment. However, the Respondent does not believe he should have to repay the money immediately or in amounts greater than he received the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $40 per pay period to the Department beginning on the effective date of the next annual pay raise and continuing each month thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. The Department refer the case to the Department of Banking and Finance if an agreement cannot be reached. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1997. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 34399-0458 Olin Scott Stoutamire 63 Graham Trail Crawfordville, Florida 32327
Findings Of Fact Harold Thomas Scott obtained a bachelor of science degree in elementary education from Florida A & M University (FAMU) in 1961. He was employed by Petitioner, School Board of Dade County, as an elementary school teacher from 1961 until his suspension without pay in September, 1980. Scott obtained nine graduate credits from FAMU by attending night classes in Miami in 1968 and 1969. He did no further work toward a valid masters degree after that time. He met Eugene Sutton, a FAMU employee, during the 1977-78 school year when Sutton was in Miami to supervise FAMU students interning in education. Sutton discussed a "Graduate Independent Study Program" with Scott, and told him that he could obtain a masters degree working at his own pace in his own home. Sutton also held out the possibility that Scott could become a part-time educational consultant when he obtained the masters degree. During the year following their meeting, Scott gave Sutton a total of $2,500 in cash and checks made payable to Sutton. This amount purportedly represented fees for tuition and "service." Although Scott knew this amount was substantially more than the cost of other graduate programs, he did not question Sutton on this point and obtained only a partial accounting for these fees. Exhibit 3, a receipt for $231 on FAMU form, was the only documentation offered at the hearing. Scott has no contact with any instructor or FAMU representative other than Sutton. He received no course outline or syllabus and was not required to produce a thesis or dissertation, or take any written examinations. Scott prepared assignments given to him by Sutton which he delivered during Sutton's periodic visits to Miami. The assignments consisted mainly of assembling existing teaching materials in a manual or booklet format. Scott received no grades on these assignments nor was he aware of any specific courses which the work related to. He did, however, receive a FAMU transcript on completion of the program. In late 1978 or early 1979, Sutton advised Scott that his degree had been awarded and that he had registered it with the State Department of Education. Scott then applied to Petitioner for the masters degree pay increase and began receiving the higher salary in March, 1979. In September, 1980, Dade County School Board officials learned that Scott's masters degree was fraudulent and confronted him with this information. Scott offered to resign but was suspended instead. Scott concedes that he owes the $2,951.41 in salary overpayments demanded by Petitioner. As a result of criminal charges filed in this and related cases, Scott was arrested in Dade County and ordered to Leon County to stand trial. He entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of uttering a forgery and received three years probation. Scott did not contest the criminal charge as he feared a prison sentence was probable if he had gone to trial and lost. Respondent denies that he knew the masters degree he obtained was fraudulent. This denial is not credible in the circumstances of this case. Scott holds a bachelors degree from FAMU and had obtained nine graduate credits from that institution prior to his involvement with Sutton. Thus, he was thoroughly aware that university credits and degrees are awarded only upon meeting specific educational requirements. Scott's familiarity with the education system, both as a student and as a teacher, precluded his deception by Sutton. The exorbitant fees, the manner of payment, the non-existence of course materials, the absence of faculty and the lack of any substantial academic requirements would have, and did in fact, alert Scott to the fraudulent nature of his undertaking.
The Issue The only remaining count, Count I, attacks Rules 11B-14.01 and 11B-14.02, Florida Administrative Code. The attack is twofold: (1) the agency's rule is not applicable to the Petitioner; and (2) the rule is an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a local school board and political subdivision of the State employing school security officers who meet the definition of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, of law enforcement officers. Respondent is the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement, Police Standards and Training Commission which has adopted Rules 11B-14.01 and 11B- 14.02, Florida Administrative Code, following the procedures required by law, and applies them to the Petitioner and its law enforcement employees. Those rules substantially affect the Petitioner by mandating, in part, the salary which it must pay its school security officers. The Petitioner has standing to challenge the rules in question under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times materiel hereto Petitioner was an inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI), was affected by the challenged rule, and had standing to bring this action. Inmates in Florida prisons earn gain time as authorized in Section 944.275, Florida Statutes. This section provides that prisoners whose behavior is satisfactory shall be granted time off of their sentences (gain time) at the rate of 10 days per month; for each month the prisoner works diligently he may be granted up to 20 days incentive gain time; for the performance of an outstanding deed an inmate may be granted gain time from one to 60 days; and for infractions of discipline gain time may be taken away. Each time an inmate is awarded gain time or gain time is deducted pursuant to these statutory provisions, the amount of gain time awarded or deducted is punched into the correctional institution's computer terminal, from where it is transmitted to Tallahassee to the main computer which keeps an accounting of each inmate's incarceration record. An inmates's initial release date is computed by converting the length of his sentence into days, subtracting the time he was in custody prior to the date of his sentencing plus days off for good behavior, and adding this number of days to the inmate's sentencing date. Each time the gain time is increased or reduced because of the conduct of the inmate, the number of days involved is punched into the computer terminal at the correctional institution, transmitted to Tallahassee, and added to or deducted from the inmate's remaining prison sentence. In 1973 the Legislature amended the statutes involving time off of inmate' sentences for good behavior by reducing the time awarded. However, a judicial decision required the State to compute gain time for inmates convicted prior to 1978 in accordance with the statutes in effect et the time of their sentencing. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977 and his gain time has been computed in accordance with the statutes in effect in 1977.
Findings Of Fact Joe Francis, Orvil Ownby, and Roscoe Cleavenger are all permanent Career Service Commission employees with appeal rights to the Career Service Commission. The appellants each filed a timely appeal of their reduction in pay by the Department of Transportation with the Career Service Commission. The parties stipulated to the following facts: The reduction of the pay of the appellants was not a disciplinary action. Under protest, some employees have paid back money allegedly overpaid, and other employees are in the process of paying back money allegedly overpaid. The performance of all the affected employees was rated as satisfactory or above, and no basis existed for any reduction in pay due to unsatisfactory performance. All the affected employees initially had their pay reduced to the "current" maximum salary. Thereafter, those employees who did not elect to pay the money back in a lump sum had their pay reduced by a fixed amount to repay monies allegedly overpaid, or alternatively, the employees have made similar monthly payments by personal check to the State under protest. Exhibits A through E were admitted into the record together with the entire personnel file of each appellant. In 1972, Jay McGlon, then State Personnel Director, authorized employees in the classes of Maintenance Foreman II to be changed from pay class 16 to pay class 17. Similar authorization was given to change Sign Erector Foreman from pay class 16 to pay class 17. Pay class 17 had a pay range of $544.62 to $744.72. This adjustment in pay class was effective November 16, 1972, pursuant to McGlon's letter of authorization. See Exhibit A. In the instant case, the affected employees were being paid a geographical pay differential. When their pay was increased by the difference between the minimum salary of the class of which they had been a member and the minimum salary of the class to which they were raised, their adjusted pay, together with the geographical pay differential, exceeded the maximum pay range of the new class. On October 30, 1975, Conley Kennison, McGlon's successor as State Personnel Director, wrote David Ferguson, personnel officer of the Department of Transportation. This letter was in response to Ferguson's letter of May 23, 1975, requesting retroactive approval of a $16.00 biweekly pay adjustment, effective November 16, 1972, for all Dade County employees in the classes of Highway Maintenance Foreman II and Sign Erector Foreman II. In this letter, Kennison cites that the pay increases were not in accordance with the final implementation instructions. However, from the text of this letter, it is unclear whether the instructions referred to relate to the salary increases or the geographical pay differentials discussed in the letter. Kennison, in this letter, denies the request made by Ferguson and directs that steps be initiated to recover the overpayments to employees. Two weeks were given for the Department of Transportation to inform Kennison the method by which the overpayments would be recovered and the amounts owed by individual employees to which overpayment had allegedly been made. It was determined that Cleavenger owed $971.74, Francis owed $821.30, and Ownby $600.01. The Department of Transportation reduced the pay of the affected employees by $16.00 per pay period in order to recover the amount of the overpayment. This reduction occurred effective the first pay period following December 5, 1975.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Career Service Commission rescind the action taken by the agency, and that all monies collected from the affected employees be returned to them. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of January, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Phillip S. Bennett, Esquire Mrs. Dorothy Roberts Department of Transportation Appeals Coordinator Haydon Burns Building Career Service Commission Tallahassee, Florida 32304 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Ronald A. Silver, Esquire 2020 Northeast 163rd Street, S204 Joe Francis North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 3830 Day Avenue Coral Gables, Florida Rosco Homer Cleavenger 1901 N.W. 107th Street Miami, Florida 33167
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
The Issue The issue to be resolved is whether Petitioner received more than one increase in pay in any twelve-month period for the category of added duties and responsibilities, Rule 60K-2.006, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Stephen C. Metzler is an Environmental Specialist II in a leadworker position with the Department. Stephen C. Metzler received an Increase to Base Rate of Pay for added duties in the amount of $69.39, on April 7, 1998. Thereafter, Robert Merritt was promoted and there was no one to supervise the employees that he had previously supervised. He asked Petitioner to continue to perform the duties he had been performing, and assume the supervisory duties that Merritt had previously performed. Merritt advised Petitioner that he would be given additional compensation for performing these duties. Petitioner assumed and performed these added supervisory duties, and Merritt administratively initiated the pay increase. Subsequently, the paperwork was prepared by one of Respondent's clerical personnel, reviewed by the personnel officer, and signed by Petitioner's superiors. Petitioner did not see this paperwork at any time prior to its submission and had no part in its preparation. Both of Petitioner's supervisors who had signed and approved the pay-raise testified. They were aware that Petitioner was performing supervisory, leadworker duties and it was their intent to increase his compensation for performing those duties. Metzler received an increase to his base rate of pay for added duties in the amount of $75.86, on October 2, 1998. The Escambia County Health Department was not aware of the rule of prohibiting more than one pay increase in twelve consecutive months for the same category. The Department of Management Services audited the payroll of the Department of Health and found several deficiencies including overpayment to Metzler. The Personnel Action Request Form dated April 7, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. Under the section of the form relating to "Salary," there is no selection under "Salary Additive." The Personnel Action Request Form dated October 2, 1999, indicated that the pay increase being approved was to Petitioner's base rate of pay for the performance of added duties. However, under the section of the form relating to "Salary," salary additive, the block "leadworker" was checked. It was testimony of the personnel officer that, had they known of the Rule restricting two pay increases within twelve consecutive months, they would have checked the block under increase in base rate of pay, Internal Pay Relationships. That, together with the selection of "Leadworker" under "Salary Additive," would have been administratively correct. Both payroll request forms authorize the increase of pay by placing an "X" in the box "added duties." Personnel Action Request one authorized a raise on April 7, 1999, and Personnel Action Request two authorized a raise on October 2, 1999, which is within twelve months of the first raise. McCulough calculated the $1,010.80 overpayment by determining the increases paid prior to the expiration of the twelve-month period of the preceding raise for the same category, added duties and responsibilities. McCullough calculated the amount of overpayment and drafted a letter for the Director of the Health Department's signature. McCullough drafted the letter seeking reimbursement of the $1,010.80, because of the audit exception and the demand of the Department of Management Services to correct the administrative error that had been made.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent correct its paperwork and not attempt to collect the monies involved. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen C. Metzler 4048 Charles Circle Pace, Florida 32571 Rodney M. Johnson, Esquire Department of Health 1295 West Fairfield Drive Pensacola, Florida 32501 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Robert G. Brooks, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue Whether the proper period of time was used by the Florida Department of Transportation in arriving at the Appellant's, Joseph A. Salem, entitlement to payment under The Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act, as implemented by 175-009 Procedure, State of Florida Department of Transportation.
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that Mr. Salem, a relocatee, relocated from a federal aid highway project, is entitled to "in lieu of moving expenses". It was stipulated that it was impossible to relocate Mr. Salem inasmuch as there was no other suitable area for relocation. The Appellant, Mr. Salem, had asked that the years 1971 and 1972 be used as an income guideline rather than the years that were used, 1974 and 1975. Mr. Salem commenced the operation of his store in 1968 on Timuquana under a lease providing for a monthly installment of Ninety Dollars ($90.00) per month. The lease was for a term of six (6) years ending on April 30, 1974 and a renewal was commenced on those terms for a six (6) year period. Notice to vacate was given and Mr. Salem sought to relocate and found that there was nothing in the area that he could afford to operate as a one-owner grocery, so it was necessary for him to close out his business as of June 1, 1976. Mr. Salem sought to have the Florida Department of Transportation use the income for the years 1971 and 1972 in considering the amount of relocation expense due Mr. Salem inasmuch as Mr. Salem had an illness in 1973 so that his income for 1973, 1974 and a portion of 1975 did not properly reflect his earning capacity and earnings from the business at the time of the taking in 1976. He contended that when he was properly and fully operating the store in 1971 and 1972 was more realistic than his actual income in the years 1974 and 1975 when he was working at a reduced speed because of an illness in 1973. The Florida Department of Transportation in figuring the benefits based its final computation for payment under the Relocation Assistance Act on average of the last two (2) years earnings prior to the date that he was required to vacate. The average annual net income during those years was Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Dollars and Nine Cents ($2,380.09). This figure was offered "in lieu of" payments and Mr. Salem's claim was paid for Two Thousand Three Hundred Eighty Dollars and Nine Cents ($2,380.09) plus that amount required to make the payment Twenty-Five Hundred Dollars ($2,500.00) which is the minimum amount paid for relocation assistance under the Uniform Relocation Act. Mr. Salem applied for an exception based on his illness so that his income for the year 1971 and 1972 could be used rather than the years 1974 and 1975. The exception was denied inasmuch as the payment was the minimum payment under the Relocation Act and the rules and regulations only allow an exception to use other years than the two (2) next preceding the taking of the property when the construction project itself causes the vacating of the store's clients. The Florida Department of Transportation determined that the construction did not cause the loss of income but the illness of Mr. Salem caused his loss of income and therefore there could be no exception to using the two (2) years income previous to the taking.
Recommendation Dismiss the appeal. DONE and ORDERED this 6th day of May, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 John Paul Howard, Esquire Post Office Box 7189 Jacksonville, Florida 32210
