The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent discriminated against the Petitioner on the basis of her age, as alleged in her charge of discrimination dated June 6, 1984, and in her petition for relief dated March 6, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Based on the admissions of the parties and on the exhibits received in evidence and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Petitioner has been employed by the Respondent from July 1, 1980 to the present. She was first employed with the Respondent as a Staff Assistant II following the abolition of the Crimes Compensation Commission by the Legislature, effective June 30, 1980. The crimes compensation program was transferred to the Respondent at that time. As a Staff Assistant, Petitioner's duties included reviewing claims submitted by field investigators. After approximately two months in this position, the Petitioner requested permission to do the actual investigation of claims. The Petitioner's Bureau Chief, Herbert Parker, authorized Petitioner to investigate claims because her duties as a Staff Assistant did not keep her busy full time. Respondent's Monthly Field Representative Reports, maintained by Mr. Parker, reflect that the "Claims Examiners," i.e., Staff Assistants, including the Petitioner and Betty Cureton, completed a combined total of 13 reports in August 1980. In October 1980 these Reports began to break out the investigation work performed by the Petitioner and Ms. Cureton, showing the number of reports they completed as well as those completed by the actual Field Representatives. The Monthly Field Representative Reports show that Petitioner's investigations gradually increased in number over the next two years, so that in the six months from May 1983 through October 1983, she averaged almost 15 reports per month. A Field Representative was expected to produce at least 25 reports per month. In October 1983, Petitioner's position was reclassified from Staff Assistant II to Field Representative, reflecting the continuing transition in the Petitioner's duties from those of a Staff Assistant to the duties of a Field Representative. When her position was reclassified in October 1983, the Petitioner's salary was $1,570.S2 per month. The minimum salary for a Field Representative was $1,139.70 per month and the maximum was $1,635.60 per month. Petitioner's salary was not increased at that time. The reason Petitioner's salary was not increased at that time is that she was already earning over the minimum for the new classification and the Respondent was experiencing budget problems. In response to its budget problems, Respondent had taken a number of corrective measures, including a freeze on promotional pay increases. Within the Division of Worker's Compensation, the freeze was lifted in December 1983 but the Bureau Chiefs within the Division were admonished to be sure their respective units had "rate" and "salary" available before granting any increases. Rate Reports for the Bureau of Crimes Compensation show that that Bureau did not have any available rate from the time of Petitioner's promotion in October 1983 through March l984when she received a salary increase. The Rate Reports reflect a rate deficit occurred in March 1984 equal to the amount of Respondent's and Betty Cureton's combined salary increases. By Waiting until March to award pay increases to Petitioner and Ms. Cureton, the Respondent was better able to project its budget status through the end of the fiscal year and determine that the Division of Worker's Compensation would be able to offset the Bureau's rate deficit. In deciding whether to give promotional increases and, if so, in what amount, the Respondent considers a person's individual qualifications, along with budget considerations. Some employees do not receive any increase at all when they are promoted others have received less than Petitioner's five per cent and some have received more. The class specifications for the class of Field Representative contain the minimum training and experience requirements, which include: "graduation from an accredited four-year college or university and two years of professional experience directly involved in the juvenile or adult criminal justice system." The Petitioner had only two years of college and she did not have any past employment that would have satisfied the requirement for two years of professional experience in the criminal justice system. Respondent obtained a substitution of required training and experience for Petitioner by counting the field investigation work she did between August 1980 and October 1983, while employed as a Staff Assistant. This substitution enabled her to qualify as a Field Representative once the position was reclassified. A similar substitution was obtained for another employee, Ms. Cureton. Petitioner is a very capable efficient employee who has always received outstanding evaluations, receiving a score of thirty-six out of a possible thirty-six evaluative points on the performance of her duties on her performance ratings by her superiors. The Petitioner's age was not a factor in any of the Respondent's personnel decisions affecting the Petitioner's promotion or promotional pay increases.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is recommended that a Final Order be issued dismissing the Petition For Relief filed by Geneva Roberts. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of December, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX The following are the specific rulings on each of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: Accepted in part and rejected in part. The accepted portions are incorporated in findings proposed by the Respondent. The rejected portions are rejected either as irrelevant details or because they are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Accepted and incorporated in other findings. The portion up to the first comma is accepted. The portion after the first comma is rejected as irrelevant in light of other evidence in the record, especially when note is taken of the fact that a new employee at ten per cent above the minimum was making substantially less than Petitioner. First sentence is accepted in substance. Second sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Rejected because it incorporates irrelevant details and because to the extent it proposes comparisons between Petitioner and Ms. Raker it incorporates opinions, inferences, and conclusions which are not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. Further, the ultimate conclusion asserted in paragraph 8 of the Petitioner's proposed findings is not supported by the evidence. Rejected as irrelevant and also as misleading in light of other evidence. Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. Rejected as constituting argument or conclusions of law rather than proposed findings of fact. Rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The first unnumbered paragraph under the caption SUMMARY OF FACTS is rejected because most of it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence and the remainder is inconsistent with the greater weight of the evidence. The first sentence of the second unnumbered paragraph under the caption SUMMARY OF FACTS is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The last sentence of that paragraph is accepted. Rulings on Respondent's proposed findings: Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Most of the first six lines are rejected as constituting summaries of the parties' contentions rather than proposed findings. The substance of lines 7 through 11 is accepted. The last sixteen lines of this paragraph are rejected on the grounds that for the most part they constitute legal argument, conclusions of law, and explication of reasons for making findings of fact, but are not themselves findings of fact. [Some of the material on the last sixteen lines is accepted and incorporated in the Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order.] The substance of this paragraph is accepted, with certain minor corrections and deletions. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph C. Jacobs, Esquire ERVIN, YARN, JACOBS, ODOM & KITCHEN Post Office Drawer 1170 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Kenneth H. Hart, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security Suite 131, Montgomery Building 2562 Executive Center Circle, East Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald A. Griffin, Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Betsy Howard, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Robert L. Hazlett, Jr., has been a career service employee of the State of Florida for more than twenty years and is employed by the Department of Transportation (DOT) in the Division of Tolls. In 1988, Petitioner was classified as a Regional Toll Manager with the Pay Grade 20. In the spring of 1988, DOT requested that the Department of Administration (DOA) adjust the pay grade for Regional Toll Managers from Pay Grade 20 to Pay Grade 23. This adjustment was granted on May 3, 1988. The instructions which accompanied this adjustment specified that no employee whose position was allocated to the class of Regional Toll Manager on the effective date of the pay grade change was to receive an increase in base rate of pay. Said adjustment in pay was not communicated to the DOT personnel office for several months and on June 17, 1988, based on the assumption that DOA had not approved the pay adjustment for Regional Toll Managers, DOT reclassified the position of Regional Toll Manager to the class of Operations and Management Consultant I, Pay Grade 21. Effective June 17, 1988, Petitioner's job classification was changed from Regional Toll Manager, pay grade 20, to Operations and Management Consultant I, Pay Grade 21. As a result, his biweekly salary changed from $965.06 to $1,093.42. On September 7, 1988, the Secretary of Administration advised that the Department of Transportation's action on June 17, 1988 reclassifying Petitioner's job classification actually resulted in a demotion from pay grade 23 to pay grade 21, but with an increase in his base rate of pay. This action was in violation of Section 22A-2.004(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code. In the letter, the Secretary of the Department of Administration directed the Respondent to take corrective action by reducing the Petitioner's salary to the amount he was receiving prior to the Respondent's June 17 pay action and recalculate all proper subsequent changes to his base rate of pay. On October 18, 1988, Respondent reversed the promotional actions, implemented the pay grade adjustments as approved by the Department of Administration, recalculated the Petitioner's July 1 pay increase, and notified Petitioner of the corrective action taken. In addition, Respondent's Personnel Officer filed a request with the Department of Administration, on November 9, 1988, for a special pay increase for Petitioner, and others, because the reclassification of Petitioner's position was processed as a promotion, not a demotion. This request was denied on December 29, 1988. Petitioner, through no fault of his own, has been overpaid for the period of June 17, 1988 through October 13, 1988 the total sum of $204.26. This sum must be repaid to the treasury of the State of Florida.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended Petitioner reimburse the State of Florida the sum of $204.26 for overpayment of salary in the fiscal years 1988 and 1989. RECOMMENDED this 19th day of November, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Lou Hazlett, Sr. Post Office Box 1415 Green Cove Springs, FL 32043 DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1990. Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
The Issue The issues in this case are whether former Hillsborough County Administrator Patricia G. Bean (Respondent) violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes (2011),1/ and, if so, what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Beginning in 2003, and at all times material to this case, the Respondent was employed as the county administrator for Hillsborough County, Florida. In Spring 2006, various departments of the Hillsborough County government were engaged in reviewing their responsibilities and developing proposals to increase efficiencies and reduce costs for upcoming budget years. An "executive team" of county employees met periodically to determine which of the proposals met or exceeded efficiency goals that were targeted towards reducing costs while maintaining services. In the Summer or Fall of 2006, the Respondent, Deputy County Administrator Walter Hill, and County Budget Director Eric Johnson began to discuss ways to encourage and reward department directors who met efficiency goals. At that time, the county government had three existing "award" options that could be used to reward employees for exceptional service. One award consisted of a paper certificate called the "Extra Mile Award." There was no monetary gain associated with receiving an "Extra Mile Award." The second award (the "Productivity Award") included a monetary bonus and was available to most employees (with some exceptions) for exceptional performance. The third award was the "Discretionary 1% Merit Increase" available to senior management employees. This award consisted of a one percent "merit" salary increase over and above any regular pay raise that the employee would have received. The Respondent, along with Deputy County Administrator Hill and County Budget Director Johnson, decided to use the "Extra Mile Award" and the merit salary increase to reward department directors who met efficiency goals. The Respondent was responsible for the final determination as to which employees would receive awards. The "Extra Mile Certificate" awards were announced at a budget "kick-off" meeting on the morning of February 1, 2007. After the meeting, the Respondent issued a written congratulatory memo to each employee who received a certificate. She also used the memo to notify those employees who had been awarded the salary increase. The Respondent's department met the efficiency goals. At the time of the budget kick-off meeting, the Respondent believed that her employment contract with Hillsborough County precluded her from accepting it, and she excluded herself from the salary increase. The Charter of Hillsborough County provided that the "compensation" for the county administrator "shall be fixed by the Board of County Commissioners by ordinance" and that such compensation "may be set by contract if allowed by and pursuant to ordinance." The Respondent's employment contract with Hillsborough County established her initial salary as $179,000. According to Section 6 of the contract, the Respondent was entitled to receive the same "annual market equity increase" provided to "all other unclassified managerial employees of the County." The section also stated that additional salary or benefit increases could be granted by action of the BCC within 60 days of her annual performance evaluation. Hillsborough County Attorney Renee Lee and Director of the Hillsborough County Environmental Protection Commission Richard Garrity also met the efficiency goals, but their employment contracts with the county contained provisions similar to those of the Respondent, and, so, the Respondent excluded Ms. Lee and Mr. Garrity from receiving the salary increase. Both received the "Extra Mile Award" at the budget kick-off meeting. After the meeting had concluded, Ms. Lee sent an email addressed to the Respondent and Deputy County Administrator Hill wherein she asserted that the terms of her contract allowed her to receive "the award." In the email, Ms. Lee cited a provision in her contract that referenced entitlement to "such other benefits" as were made available to other county employees. Although there appears to have been some confusion regarding the names of the awards available to recognize county employees for their performance, it was clear that the reference to the "Extra Mile Award" in Ms. Lee's email referred to the salary increase. The Respondent's employment contract contained language similar to that cited in Ms. Lee's email, whereby the Respondent was entitled to the "benefits" available to other managerial employees in the county. As the county attorney, Ms. Lee reported directly to the BCC and, pursuant to the county charter, was the chief legal advisor for the BCC on all matters of county business, including personnel matters. The Respondent had no managerial authority over the county attorney at any time relevant to this proceeding. There is no evidence that the Respondent discussed the matter with Ms. Lee. After receiving Ms. Lee's email, the Respondent directed Deputy County Administrator Hill to contact Christina Swanson (director of the Employee Benefits Division in the county's Human Resources Department) and ask her to evaluate Ms. Lee's email. Deputy County Administrator Hill apparently did so, and Ms. Swanson thereafter asked Ms. Lee to provide a written legal opinion addressing whether the salary increase could be awarded under the terms of the contracts. On February 2, 2007, Ms. Lee issued a written legal opinion addressed to Ms. Swanson, stating that both Ms. Lee and the Respondent could receive the salary increases under the terms of their respective contracts. Although she had received a law degree, Ms. Swanson had not worked as a practicing attorney. The issues of the whether the salary increases underlying this case constituted a "benefit" of employment with Hillsborough County, and whether Ms. Lee's written legal opinion was correct, are not at issue in this proceeding. After Ms. Swanson received Ms. Lee's written legal opinion, the Human Resources Department processed the forms required to implement the salary increases for the Respondent and for Ms. Lee. The Respondent testified that she discussed the matter with Ms. Swanson after Ms. Lee issued the legal opinion. Ms. Swanson did not recall the conversation. In any event, the evidence fails to establish that the Respondent directed Ms. Swanson, or any other employee in the Human Resources Department, to process the paperwork required to implement the salary increases. On February 7, 2007, George Williams, the director of the county's Human Resources Department, signed the form ("Report of Change of Status"), approving the one percent salary increase awarded to the Respondent. The Respondent's hourly salary rate was increased from $101.82 to $102.84, effective January 7, 2007. The Respondent did not receive a copy of the form. Deb Dahma, a staff member in the Human Resources Department, signed the form approving the one percent salary increase awarded to Ms. Lee. The signature on that form was undated. There is no evidence that the Respondent directed either Mr. Williams or Ms. Dahma to sign the forms. The executed forms were sent to the county's payroll department, and their salary increases were implemented. On February 8, 2007, Ms. Lee authored another email to Ms. Swanson wherein she opined that, upon review of Mr. Garrity's contract, he was also eligible for the salary increase. There is no evidence that the Respondent participated in any effort to award the salary increase to Mr. Garrity, or that he accepted or received the salary increase. Both the Respondent and Ms. Lee accepted the salary increases. The county administrator's staff was responsible for preparation of agendas for BCC meetings. The Respondent participated in the preparation process and could direct placement of items on the agenda. The Respondent did not provide the BCC with an opportunity to consider the salary increases referenced herein and did not seek the explicit approval of the salary increases from the BCC either prior to or after they were implemented. The Respondent believed that the Human Resources Department, which handled personnel matters, would seek any approval of the salary increases required from the BCC, but the Human Resources Department did not bring the matter to the BCC for review. Although the BCC approved the Respondent's salary, including the increase underlying this case, during the Respondent's subsequent performance review, the evidence fails to establish that the BCC was advised that the salary included an increase that had not been approved by the BCC. At some later point, the Respondent's salary increase apparently became a matter of conflict with the BCC, and her salary was reduced to negate the one percent increase. The Respondent reimbursed Hillsborough County for the funds she received through the salary increase. The Respondent's employment as the Hillsborough County administrator was eventually terminated. An investigation of the circumstances of the raise that was conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement resulted in no criminal charges being filed against the Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order and public report finding that Patricia G. Bean did not violate section 112.313(6) and dismissing the complaint filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of May, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this proceeding is whether Kathryn Williams' request for arbitration should be dismissed for lack of arbitrability.
The Issue The only remaining count, Count I, attacks Rules 11B-14.01 and 11B-14.02, Florida Administrative Code. The attack is twofold: (1) the agency's rule is not applicable to the Petitioner; and (2) the rule is an invalid exercise of validly delegated legislative authority.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a local school board and political subdivision of the State employing school security officers who meet the definition of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, of law enforcement officers. Respondent is the Department of Criminal Law Enforcement, Police Standards and Training Commission which has adopted Rules 11B-14.01 and 11B- 14.02, Florida Administrative Code, following the procedures required by law, and applies them to the Petitioner and its law enforcement employees. Those rules substantially affect the Petitioner by mandating, in part, the salary which it must pay its school security officers. The Petitioner has standing to challenge the rules in question under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact At all times materiel hereto Petitioner was an inmate at Lake Correctional Institution (LCI), was affected by the challenged rule, and had standing to bring this action. Inmates in Florida prisons earn gain time as authorized in Section 944.275, Florida Statutes. This section provides that prisoners whose behavior is satisfactory shall be granted time off of their sentences (gain time) at the rate of 10 days per month; for each month the prisoner works diligently he may be granted up to 20 days incentive gain time; for the performance of an outstanding deed an inmate may be granted gain time from one to 60 days; and for infractions of discipline gain time may be taken away. Each time an inmate is awarded gain time or gain time is deducted pursuant to these statutory provisions, the amount of gain time awarded or deducted is punched into the correctional institution's computer terminal, from where it is transmitted to Tallahassee to the main computer which keeps an accounting of each inmate's incarceration record. An inmates's initial release date is computed by converting the length of his sentence into days, subtracting the time he was in custody prior to the date of his sentencing plus days off for good behavior, and adding this number of days to the inmate's sentencing date. Each time the gain time is increased or reduced because of the conduct of the inmate, the number of days involved is punched into the computer terminal at the correctional institution, transmitted to Tallahassee, and added to or deducted from the inmate's remaining prison sentence. In 1973 the Legislature amended the statutes involving time off of inmate' sentences for good behavior by reducing the time awarded. However, a judicial decision required the State to compute gain time for inmates convicted prior to 1978 in accordance with the statutes in effect et the time of their sentencing. Petitioner was sentenced in 1977 and his gain time has been computed in accordance with the statutes in effect in 1977.
Findings Of Fact In early 1979, the Department of Administration, Division of Personnel, prepared for the Governor a document entitled Recommended Salaries and Benefits for Career Service Employees for the Biennium July 1, 1979, to June 30, 1981. The purpose of this document was to assist the Governor in making recommendations to the 1979 Legislature regarding salaries and benefits for the State's Career Service employees. Approximately one month after publication of its initial recommendations, the Department of Administration published a supplement to those recommendations to reflect the results of collective bargaining negotiations with various bargaining units and to clarify certain points. With respect to merit salary increases, it was recommended that all funds not distributed as guaranteed merit increases in accordance with specific collective bargaining agreements be "distributed at the discretion of management" to employees with six months satisfactory service as of September 1, 1980. For the supervisory bargaining unit of which all Petitioners are members, all merit funds were to be distributed at the discretion of management. The Governor's recommendations contained in the document prepared by the Department of Administration were furnished to legislators and all State agencies prior to adoption of the Appropriations Act. In 1979, in the Appropriations Act for the Biennium 1979-81, as supplemented in 1980 by the 1980 Supplemental General Appropriations Act, the Legislature appropriated certain funds to be used for merit salary increases for Career Service employees. These raises were to become effective September 1, 1980. Funds were allocated in a total dollar amount for each collective bargaining unit within each state agency. The Legislature, in appropriating funds for salary increases and benefits for Career Service employees, specifically provided that such funds were to be distributed in accordance with the Governor's recommendations. Ch. 79-212, Sec. 21, Laws of Florida. The Department of Environmental Regulation received merit increase monies for its Career Service employees within the following bargaining units: supervisory-professional, professional, administrative clerical, operational services, and managerial/confidential. Petitioners Leslee A. Williams, Sylvia E. Sakamoto, and Rosemary Bottcher are Career Service employees employed in the Bureau of Water Analysis, Division of Environmental Programs. Leslee Williams is a Microbiologist III. Sylvia Sakamoto and Rosemary Bottcher are Chemist III's. Petitioners are employees within the Supervsory/professional collective bargaining unit. On July 31, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Administration sent a memorandum to all Department heads with attached instructions for implementation of salary increases for employees in all affected bargaining units, including the supervisory unit. The instructions for distribution of merit salary increases to employees in the supervisory unit provided that the distribution of funds to eligible employees was discretionary with management, subject only to a cap on the maximum amount any employee could receive. This cap of 10, 7.5, or 5 percent of an employee's salary is determined by the employee's official performance evaluation rating. With regard to "discretionary merit salary advancements", the instructions noted that: These increases are provided to reward current employees based upon their performance. These increases are intended to allow employees to progress within the salary range in recognition of their increased worth to the State as an employee. The proper implementation of merit salary advancements is critical to the State's ability to reward tie most competent, qualified and productive employees. While the funds are discretionary as to the actual amount any one employee may receive, management has no discretion as to whether the Funds may or may not be distributed. These instructions were received by DER in early August of 1980, and DER immediately began taking steps necessary to implement the salary increases in time for inclusion in employees' September paychecks. In August, 1980, the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Regulation authorized each of the directors of the three principal divisions within the Department (the Divisions of Environmental Programs, Environmental Permitting, and Administrative Services), as well as the offices of General Counsel and the Secretary, individually, to establish or determine the methods, standards for determining employee merit and employee performance and performance to be used within each division or office for identification of those Career Service employees eligible to receive a merit salary increase. By memorandum dated August 2, 1980 the Director of the Division of Environmental Programs requested that all Bureau Chiefs in his division and certain supervisors meet with him to establish a ranking of employees within the division to be used in determining the amount of merit salary increase each eligible employee would receive. This memorandum provided, in part, as follows: . . . We have available a certain amount of "discretionary" money which can be given as merit raises. This will be over and above those pay increases through pay adjustments or cost of living increases, which are mandated by the Legislature. The discretionary amounts are small; but they are significant enough that we should make every effort to insure fairness recognition of outstanding service and encouragement of those whom the Department needs to keep. The final decision on all increases will be mine alone, but the preliminary ranking and classification of the various persons will be done in collaboration with all of you. We will begin with the personnel evaluations. However, since grading standards for the evaluations differ among various supervisors, we will attempt to bring all evaluation ratings to comparable scales. We will then try to emphasize those qualities, both within the ratings and those not included in the particular categories, which most contribute to the mission of the Department. We must all try to eliminate our personal biases in this process and the biases inherent in the evaluation system. If we succeed, the raises will be both fair and perceived as fair and will be a help to Division and Department morale. I ask your complete cooperation in this process. (Emphasis added) On September 2, 1980, the Director of the Division of Environmental Programs sent a memorandum to all employees of the division explaining the process used in computing merit salary increases for division employees. The September 2, 1980, memorandum contained the following provisions: The raises were awarded based on relative scores given to each employee. This scoring was done by the Director, Deputy Director and Bureau Chiefs (together with independent office heads for those classes which contained their subordinates) in joint session. First, each employee's evaluation was considered and then related to that of ether employees in the class. The employee's other attributes and contribution to his program and the Department was then discussed. His immediate supervisor's rating tendencies were considered (and we, incidentally, gained a very good idea of how different were the different scoring scales used) and the supervisor was called and consulted if there was difficulty in reaching a consensus. In almost every case one or more of the Bureau Chiefs, other than the employee's own, had experience and opinions on that employee to share. We repeatedly examined each other on the possibility of bias and favoritism. Finally, the employee was given a weighted percentage score. Although some discussions were more protracted than others, complete consensus was reached in every case. The Director and Deputy Director then translated the relative scores into both the base salary and the dollars available within the class. Some small further subjective judgements were necessary because of rounding and some inexactness in the formula but they were extremely minor - no more than $1.00 per person and usually much less. The raises given reflect very closely the relative scores from the joint sessions. There is considerable agreement between the curve of the merit raises and the curve of the evaluations. They are far from congruent, however. Some employees with relatively high evaluations got no merit raises; others relatively low got substantial ones. In each case the discussions were very extensive and the decision was made only after all were convinced that an injustice would otherwise result. Such inflated and deflated evaluations will be the subject of much additional scrutiny in the coming year. Merit salary increases for all 192 Career Service employees within the Division of Environmental Programs were determined pursuant to the methods, standards for determining employee merit and employee performance, and procedures contained in the memoranda of August 25, 1980, and September 2, 1980. The three Division directors, the General Counsel, and the Secretary of DER each used different methods to award merit salary increases to employees in their respective offices. The method used by the Director of the Division of Environmental Programs to award merit salary increases for 1980 was different from the various methods used by DER in the past to distribute similar appropriations. Since at least 1975, DER has made a separate determination each year that funds appropriated for merit increases of the manner in which those funds would be distributed. A decision made one year was not prospectively applicable to future appropriations. Since at least 1975, the Department of Environmental Regulation has evaluated the job performance of its Career Service employees on an annual basis pursuant to procedures applicable to the entire Department. Currently, the Department follows the employee performance evaluation procedures contained in Section 3.2, Department of Environmental Regulation, Administrative Services Internal Management Policies and Procedures Manual ("ASIMPP") including exhibits attached thereto. These procedures and criteria were adopted by the Department pursuant to Rule 22A-9.02(1), Florida Administrative Code, and Section 110.201, Florida Statutes, but have never been adopted as "rules" through Section 120.54, Florida Statutes rulemaking proceedings. The policy of the Department, as stated in the ASIMPP, is to use performance evaluations ". . . to award or deny salary increases . . ." In 1976, 1977 and 1978, merit salary increases were awarded to career service employees in the Department based solely upon performance evaluations. In each of those years, the "merit" of employees was determined by the annual performance evaluations, but a differing method of computing the dollar amount was used for each year. However, within categories of employees having the same performance evaluation rating, the method of calculating the dollar amount was uniformly applied. These standards and procedures for awarding merit salary increases in 1976, 1977, and 1978 were in written form, were established by the Secretary of the Department, and were communicated to all employees. There were no merit raises in 1979. Since at least June 19, 1978, the Department of Environmental Regulation has also had in effect a written policy statement which provides in part: The personnel Rules and Regulations provide that merit/anniversary increases be based on performance evaluations Petitioners were given performance evaluations in the summer of 1980 pursuant to the procedures in Sec. 3.2, ASIMPP and each Petitioner was rated "above satisfactory." Petitioners each had at least six months continuous and satisfactory service on September 1, 1980, and were otherwise eligible to receive a merit salary increase on September 1, 1980, but were denied such a salary increase. Neither of the methods and procedures used by the Division of Environmental Programs to distribute merit salary increases to division employees for 1980, as outlined in the memoranda of August 25, 1980 and September 2, 1980, nor the methods used by the other two divisions and the General Counsel and Secretary were adopted through formal rulemaking in accordance with Section 120.54, Florida Statutes. In each case, the procedures used applied only to Career Service employees within that division or office who were eligible for a merit increase and were used only to determine the distribution of those funds appropriated by the Legislature for the biennium 1979-81. Counsel for Petitioners and Respondent stipulated that the methods used by the Division of Environmental Programs to determine merit salary increases affect the private interests of Petitioners, and further, that Petitioners have standing to bring this petition pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Counsel for both Petitioners and Respondent have submitted proposed findings of fact for consideration by the Hearing Officer. To the extent that such findings of fact are not adopted in this order, they have been rejected as being either irrelevant to the issues in this cause, or as not having been supported by the evidence.
The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to training and education at Respondent’s expense in order to return him to suitable gainful employment.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation (Respondent or Department), is the agency of the state of Florida charged with administration of medical care coordination and reemployment services that are necessary to assist employees injured in the workplace to return to suitable gainful employment. Petitioner, Nathan Lavon Florence, is a 37-year-old man residing in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner received his Graduation Equivalent Diploma in 2001, and held a number of different jobs between 2001 and 2007, including line cook, sales associate, construction laborer, and warehouse worker. Petitioner began an electrician apprenticeship program in 2007, which he completed in May 2012. Petitioner began working for Barnes Electrical Company, Inc. (Barnes), as an electrician’s helper in August 2013. Barnes paid Petitioner biweekly at the rate of $13 per hour for regular work and $19.50 per hour for overtime. On July 16, 2014, Petitioner suffered an on-the-job injury in which his right hand was crushed by a light pole. A workers’ compensation claim (the underlying claim) was filed with Amerisure Insurance Companies, Barnes’ workers’ compensation carrier. Petitioner’s authorized treating physician was Dr. Steven Kronlage. On October 22, 2015, following three surgeries and a period of treatment, Dr. Kronlage determined Petitioner had attained maximum medical improvement and referred Petitioner for pain management. Dr. Kronlage assigned Petitioner a permanent impairment rating of 15 percent and assigned the following work restrictions: medium-level work, no use of power tools with right hand, and no lifting more than 20 pounds with right hand. According to the U.S. Department of Labor, medium-level work limits lifting to a maximum of 50 pounds. Barnes was unable to offer Petitioner employment that met his work restrictions. The parties to the underlying claim entered into a joint stipulation on January 14, 2016. The joint stipulation “resolv[ed] all issues” and provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The parties agree that the Claimant’s average weekly wage shall be amended upward by $7.59 resulting in a new average weekly wage of $386.09. The Employer/Carrier shall recalculate Claimant’s past indemnity benefits utilizing the average weekly wage of $386.09 and shall pay past due benefits utilizing this average weekly wage plus penalties and interest. Petitioner was represented by counsel in the underlying claim. On November 8, 2015, Petitioner applied to the Department for a vocational assessment to determine the best way to return Petitioner to suitable gainful employment. On November 19, 2015, the Department issued Petitioner a decision letter determining that the best way to return Petitioner to suitable gainful employment was through job placement assistance. Cynthia Baker was the vocational rehabilitation consultant assigned to Petitioner’s case. Ms. Baker based her recommendation for job placement assistance on Petitioner’s educational background, his pre-injury average weekly wage (AWW), his work restrictions, and the “transferable skills” Petitioner could bring to the job market (e.g., knowledge of the English language; knowledge of materials, methods, and tools used in construction and repair of housing; and knowledge of machines and tools). Ms. Baker conducted a labor market survey to identify job openings appropriate for Petitioner’s skill level and work restrictions. Her goal was to identify jobs which could return Petitioner to employment at, or close to, his pre-injury AWW. The labor market survey identified a variety of jobs available in the Pensacola area which Ms. Baker deemed suitable to Petitioner’s skill level and work restrictions. Potential jobs included customer service representative for Florida Pest Control, retail sales associate for T-Mobile, asset protection/loss prevention specialist for Home Depot, and vehicle transporter for Hertz. Ms. Baker prepared a résumé for Petitioner to utilize in applying for jobs identified in the labor market survey, and she connected Petitioner with Michelle Godson at CareerSource, the customer service specialist who would further assist Petitioner with employment opportunities in the area. Petitioner did not apply for any of the jobs identified by Respondent through the labor market survey. Rather, Petitioner found employment on his own and sought no further assistance from Respondent. Petitioner began work in December 2015 with WIS International (WIS) as an inventory associate. The job entails traveling to, and conducting inventory for, a variety of retail stores in the region. Petitioner utilizes a hand-held scanner to complete retail inventories. Petitioner’s rate of pay is $8.50 per hour and he is paid on a weekly basis. Petitioner works part-time for WIS, thus his earnings are below his pre-injury AWW. Petitioner has no plans to apply for a full-time position with WIS, although full-time work has become available with WIS during his employment. Petitioner invested significant time and effort toward his electrician apprenticeship, and desires a career in a field he enjoyed as much as electrician’s helper. Petitioner has requested the Department provide him with a training and education program to become a radiology (x-ray) technician. Specifically, he would like to attend Pensacola State College’s Radiography Program. Mary Cilek is a senior management analyst supervisor with the Department and reviewed Petitioner’s request for training and education. Ms. Cilek researched information on the internet regarding the personal qualities of, and physical demands on, radiology technicians, as well as the educational requirements to become a radiology technician. No competent evidence was introduced on which the undersigned could make a finding as to the particular educational requirements to become a radiology technician, or whether Petitioner would be able to perform the duties of a radiology technician within his work restrictions.1/ Petitioner’s argument in this case is twofold: First, the Department should assist him to obtain a career, rather than “any old job” that would allow him to earn at or near his pre- injury AWW. Second, Petitioner objects to the Department’s reliance on his pre-injury AWW as the basis for a labor market survey. Petitioner maintains that his pre-injury AWW was artificially low because he was out of work, or working part- time, during some of the weeks prior to the injury due to an illness. Section 440.491(1)(g), Florida Statutes, defines “suitable gainful employment” as employment . . . that is reasonably attainable in light of the employee’s age, education, work history, transferable skills, previous occupation, and injury, and which offers an opportunity to restore the individual as soon as practicable and nearly as possible to his or her average weekly earnings at the time of injury. While Petitioner maintains that none of the jobs identified was reasonably obtainable, given Petitioner’s work history, education, and work restrictions, Petitioner introduced insufficient evidence on which the undersigned could make that finding.2/ In this case, Petitioner’s AWW was established by the stipulation. Petitioner introduced no evidence that he had moved to set aside the stipulation or otherwise challenge the determination of his AWW. Petitioner did not claim that the stipulation was obtained by either fraud or duress, or based on mistake of fact.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a final order determining that Petitioner, Nathan Lavon Florence, is not eligible for training and education services at Respondent’s expense. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S Suzanne Van Wyk Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 2016.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is now, and was at all times material to the instant case, including June 28, 1993, through January 27, 1994, an employee of the Department working in the economic services unit of the Department's District XI (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). In 1990, Petitioner occupied a PAS (Public Assistance Specialist) I position that, in or around June of that year, was one of 182 such positions in the District to be reclassified to a PAS II position as part of the Department's implementation of the new FLORIDA computer system. 2/ Those employees occupying these reclassified positions (hereinafter referred to as the "upgraded employees") whose salaries were below the minimum salary for a PAS II received a salary increase to raise their salary to the minimum. Petitioner was among the employees who received such a salary increase. Such action was taken in accordance with the following Department policy set forth at page 11 of HRSP 60-1: When an employee is promoted, a salary increase to at least the minimum salary of the higher level position will be made. How- ever, an increase of up to ten percent above the current base salary or ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be approved. An increase of up to ten percent of the current base salary is normally used when the employee's salary is the same or nearly the same as the minimum for the new class. An increase of up to ten percent above the minimum for the new class may be granted when an employee possesses training or experience substantially above the minimum training and experience required for the higher class and it is determined that the employee is exceptionally well qualified for the position. These increases must be approved by an assistant secretary or district administrator. Because of funding constraints that existed at the time, no other salary increases were given to the upgraded employees. Funds for such additional salary increases became available toward the end of the 1992-1993 fiscal year. The increases were approved at both the Department and District level. Petitioner and the other upgraded employees were advised of the increases by a memorandum dated July 7, 1993, from the District XI District Administrator. The District Administrator's memorandum read as follows: Your position has been identified as one which was upgraded as a result of the FLORIDA implementation in 1990/1991. At the time, our records indicate that you received a partial increase, or none at all, because of budgetary constraints. Due to the identification of available monies prior to the end of the Fiscal Year, we are pleased to inform you that you will be receiving a pay increase in your salary war- rant on July 9, 1993. The amount of the in- crease will be either 10[percent] or the difference between what you received in 1990/1991 and 10[percent], and was effective June 28, 1993. Should you have any questions about this in- crease or how it was calculated, please call Arelis Valero at 377-5197. Your continued dedication and service to HRS is sincerely appreciated. District personnel miscalculated the amount of Petitioner's approved salary increase (which was "the difference between what [she had] received in 1990 . . . and 10[percent]" of her pre-reclassification base salary). As a result, following June 28, 1993, the effective date of the increase, for the pay periods ending January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39. The District discovered the error and revised its payroll records to reflect Petitioner's correct salary. In addition, by memorandum, it notified Petitioner of the mistake that had been made and advised her that it was her responsibility to repay the amount she had been overpaid. By letter dated November 1, 1995, the District XI District Administrator informed Petitioner that the overpayment would be recovered through payroll deductions beginning January 12, 1996, amounting to "10[percent] of [her] gross salary each pay period, unless [she] prefer[red] a single lump sum, until the balance [was] paid." The letter further provided, in part, as follows: If you do not dispute the overpayment, but feel that the repayment schedule of 10 [percent] of your gross salary per pay period is overly burdensome, please call Thomas Franklin at 377-5055 Number135 and he will review with you what must be documented and submitted to the Comptroller's Office (Capitol Building, Suite 1201, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350) to request a modification. While the total amount eventually repaid to the State cannot be adjusted, the Comptroller may be convinced to lengthen the repayment schedule by lessen- ing the percentage withheld each pay period. If you do not agree that you were overpaid this amount, you have the right to an adminis- trative hearing under 120.57(1) or (2), Florida Statutes, and Rules 10-2.036 and 28-5, Florida Administrative Code. You may request a formal or an informal hearing. If a request for a formal hearing is made, your petition must be in compliance with Rule 28-5.021, Florida Administrative Code. Please note that Rule 28-5.201(2) specifies that your petition should contain a concise discussion of the specific item in dispute. Informal hearings are governed by Rules 28-5.501-503, Florida Administrative Code. Your request for either a formal or informal hearing must be received by this office, attention Thomas Franklin, within thirty (30) days of your receipt of this letter, in accordance with Rule 10-2.036, Florida Administrative Code. Failure to request a timely hearing shall be deemed a waiver of your right to hearing. By letter dated November 6, 1995, Petitioner advised the Department that that she was not in agreement with the "content" of the District Administrator's November 1, 1995, letter, and that she desired to have a hearing on the matter.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department: find that, from June 28, 1993, until January 27, 1994, Petitioner was overpaid a total of $769.39; notify the Department of Management Services of this finding; and refer the matter to the Comptroller so that the Comptroller may take appropriate action to recover these moneys owed to the state. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 29th day of April, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner filed his petition and request for formal hearing approximately December 1, 1992. The attachments thereto suggest that he began requesting redress June 19, 1992. The agency referred his December 1, 1992 petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, pursuant to Section 120.57(1) F.S. The Petitioner alleges that Petitioner's substantial interests are adversely affected by his employing agency paying other employees similarly situated more than Petitioner is paid. The Petition's attachments also obliquely put at issue the agency's refusal to process a special pay increase request for an individual exception in Petitioner's pay rate to the Department of Administration (now Department of Management Services). Such an application was refused by the agency approximately May 21, 1990. (See Petition attachments and Petitioner's Exhibit P-6.) Petitioner has not formally petitioned to invalidate any agency rule. Petitioner was hired by the Department of Corrections on April 6, 1965 in the position of guard. On September 1, 1965, he was promoted to Road Prison Officer I (RPO I), and his salary was increased. On October 27, 1989, he was promoted to Correctional Officer II (CO II). At the time of his promotion to CO II, his biweekly salary was $1,029.07. The maximum biweekly salary for that class was $1,004.14. Salary ranges for a job-class are posted on the job vacancy notice for that position. Petitioner had constructive, if not actual, knowledge of the pay grade range (maximum and minimum) at the time he accepted his October 27, 1989 promotion to CO II. Petitioner remained in the CO II class as of the date of formal hearing, however CO II is now known as Correctional Officer-Sergeant. The Petition herein has not affirmatively put at issue the Respondent agency's failure to promote Petitioner since 1989, however it is noted that at all times material, Petitioner met or exceeded all job performance requirements of a CO II. Petitioner, like all other employees similarly situated, has received salary adjustments and pay raises as appropriated by the legislature since October 27, 1989, even though he exceeded the maximum salary for the class he was occupying at the time. The testimony is clear that, as a CO II, Petitioner's salary is negotiated with the Respondent agency by a bargaining representative of the Police Benevolent Association, and that Petitioner was aware, at least by May 21, 1990, when he was denied an individual pay adjustment above the maximum for his pay grade, that he could file a grievance. He has never done so. From the foregoing, the only reasonable inference is that Petitioner has, at all times material, been subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement for State of Florida career service employees which provides for a grievance procedure. The terms of the collective bargaining agreement are not in evidence, however. As of the date of formal hearing, Petitioner also has filed no action before the Public Employees Relations Commission. The maximum authorized annual salary for a Correctional Officer- Sergeant as of the date of formal hearing was $29,479.84. At the present time, six employees ranked as Correctional Officer-Sergeant receive salaries in excess of Petitioner's salary. These employees in the same class are James Vaughn, Charles Williams, John C. Norman, Glynn H. Dunham, James Newsome and James Hamilton. Some of these employees have been employed by Respondent fewer years total than Petitioner. James Vaughn was promoted to CO II (now Correctional Officer-Sergeant) on April 19, 1974; Charles Williams on November 28, 1975; John C. Norman on February 20, 1976; Glynn H. Dunham on November 9, 1975; James Newsome on January 9, 1976; and James Hamilton originally on December 1, 1975 and then after a separation from employment, rehired as a CO II on January 1, 1985. As of January 1, 1987, all six of these employees were granted an across the board pay raise which equalized their salaries. The excess raise was given to the employees in a lump sum payment. Employees working in certain geographical regions of the state were granted a set pay adjustment for that region, up to $5,000. This amount may cause an employee's salary to exceed the maximum of the pay range for the CO II class. The Petitioner does not work in one of these geographic regions. By the time Petitioner was promoted to the position of CO II on October 27, 1989, the other six employees were earning $1,120.04, biweekly. Although their salaries exceeded the maximum salary for that class ($1,004.14), their pay raises were appropriated by the legislature across the board, regardless of whether the maximum range would be exceeded. Petitioner was also being paid in excess of the maximum for his class (RPO I) and in excess of the promotional class (CO II). Petitioner's biweekly salary at that time was $1,029.07. He also was given a raise in salary whenever it was authorized by a legislative appropriation bill. (See Finding of Fact 5). In early 1993, Petitioner brought to Respondent agency's attention that another employee, Richard E. Cobb, was making a salary in excess of what was permissible. Once the Department became aware of the error, it forwarded the information to the State of Florida, Office of the Comptroller for review. The error was corrected, and Richard E. Cobb's salary was reduced prospectively and the retroactive recovery of the overpayment was begun through deductions to Mr. Cobb's salary. Petitioner also complained about employee Blendage Weeks being promoted on September 1, 1989 with a 3.5 percent pay raise. Mr. Weeks is not a similarly situated employee because he is in a different job class than Petitioner. Also, although Petitioner believed that Mr. Weeks was given a raise in excess of the maximum for his class (Correctional Officer Chief I), in fact, the evidence shows that Mr. Weeks received a raise that brought him up from his then salary of $1,209.55 biweekly to the maximum for his class of $1,253.31 biweekly. 17. Rule 60K-2.002(5), F.A.C. (formerly 22A-2.001) provides: An employee shall not be paid in excess of the maximum of the salary range for a class, unless such payments are authorized by these rules or legislation. 18. Rule 60K-2.004(1)(b), F.A.C. (formerly 22A-2.004) provides: The agency head is authorized to grant a promotional appointment to an individual at a base rate of pay from the minimum to the maximum of the salary range for the class to which promoted provided such increase does not exceed 10 percent of the employee's base rate of pay prior to promotion. Pursuant to the foregoing rules, promotional pay raises are treated differently than legislatively appropriated pay raises and the agency may grant a promotional pay raise as long as it does not exceed the maximum of the salary range for the class into which the employee is being promoted. Petitioner does not fall into any of the protected classes governed by Section 760.10, F.S. and has filed no charge of discrimination with the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the relief sought be denied and the petition therefore dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of December, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The De Soto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of December, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-7417 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted, except as to month and day. Accepted as to content of Rule 60K-2.002(5) [not 60K-1.002(5)] F.A.C. The remainder of PFOF 3 is not properly cited. Accepted. Accepted as to what the salaries are and their names. The remainder of PFOF 5 is rejected as mere argument. Respondent's PFOF: 1-7,9-11,14-15 Accepted. 8,12 Accepted as modified to more accurately reflect the record evidence. 13 Covered in FOF 8; otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as mere argument. Covered except as cumulative; see FOF 16. Rejected as evidentiary rulings or cumulative; see FOF 12. COPIES FURNISHED: Brian T. Hayes, P.A., Esquire 245 East Washington Street Monticello, Florida 32344 Laura S. Leve, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Harry K. Singletary, Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
