Findings Of Fact The following facts are based upon the stipulation of the parties (Exhibit 1): Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Massachusetts in 1979. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was licensed as an optician by the State of Connecticut in 1980. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, was an apprenticed optician with various licensed opticians in the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut for the past four to five years. Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, on or about May, 1980, while living and employed in Connecticut, made a telephone call to the Board of Opticians in the State of Florida, with reference to her eligibility in taking the examination for a dispensing opticians license. After Petitioner detailed her formal training and work experience, she was advised that she was qualified to take the Florida Opticians Examination as the result of her having been licensed in both the States of Massachusetts and Connecticut and having five years apprentice experience. The Board of Opticians then mailed her an application form which she filled out and returned to them with a seventy five dollar ($75.00) money order for the examination and twenty dollars ($20.00) to register with the State of Florida. As a direct result of this telephone conversation with a representative of the Board of Opticians of the Department of Professional Regulations of the State of Florida, the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, quit her job in Connecticut and moved to Florida anticipating taking the aforesaid examination. After she had moved to Florida in reliance of the representations made to her by the Board of Opticians, she was notified that she was not qualified to take the said examination. Petitioner's application was considered by the Board of Opticianry on July 10, 1981 in Tallahassee, Florida and it was found that the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, did not meet the statutory requirements of s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), although at the time she contacted the Board, she did meet the requirements of s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), which was the prior licensing statute for the Board of Opticianry and was no longer in effect at the time. The Board further held that they did not have the authority to admit Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, into the examination .for licensure as an optician in the State of Florida since she did not qualify under the current statute, s. 484.007(1), Florida Statutes (1979), even if they felt she had relied on the Board's prior representations that she would be allowed to take the examination to her detriment. The sole issue for consideration at this hearing is whether the Board of Opticianry has the authority to allow the Petitioner, KAREN G. THIBODEAU, to sit for the next examination for a license to be a dispensing optician in the State of Florida on the basis that the Board of Opticianry is estopped for asserting the new statute as a denial of her right to sit for the next exam since she has detrimentally relied on their representation that her qualifications under the old statute, s. 484.03, Florida Statutes (1977), qualified her to sit immediately for said examination." The following are additional Findings of Fact based upon testimony adduced at the hearing: When Petitioner made her telephone call to the Board of Opticians in May, 1980, she asked to speak to one of the Board members, but was assured by a woman who answered the phone that she could answer any questions Petitioner might have concerning her qualifications. At this time, Petitioner informed the person taking the call that she planned to move to Florida if she was qualified to take the examination for a dispensing optician license. Petitioner thereafter moved to Florida and is now employed by Sheppard Optical at Delray Beach, Florida where she is earning $200.00 a week. She was making approximately $300.00 a week when she left Connecticut and anticipated a higher income when she commenced practicing under her opticians license in Connecticut. (Testimony of Petitioner) Prior to the consolidation of the various state licensing boards into the Department of Professional Regulation in 1979, the practice of the Board of Opticianry, under the apprentice requirements of Section 484.03, Florida Statutes, (1977) was to permit individuals who had apprenticed in another state, but not in Florida, for the specified time of not less than three years, to register with the Board, and then make application for and take the examination for licensure. This was frequently done by means of telephone calls authorizing the individual to make application. In some cases, letters were sent which contained a similar authorization. Subsequent to Petitioner's telephone call to the Board in May, 1980, the new Executive Director of the Board of Opticianry, Herbert F. Varn, changed this practice to conform to the applicable statute which requires individuals to register as an apprentice with the Board and not admit such individuals to examination until after they had thereafter completed the requisite three year period of apprenticeship. In some isolated cases, the Board had permitted individuals who had previously received a letter authorizing them to take the examination, even though they had not been registered in Florida for the requisite three year period, to take the examination. However, after reorganization, the Board did not permit individuals to take the examination based solely upon any oral assurances received from persons in the prior Executive Director's office. (Testimony of Varn) The order of the Board of Opticianry, dated September 2, 1981, denying Petitioner's application stated that she had not met the statutory requirements for licensure by examination pursuant to Section 484.067(1), Florida Statutes, because she had not completed the requisite two school year course of study in a recognized school of opticianry, had not actively practiced as a licensed optician in another state for more than three years preceding the application, and had not registered as an apprentice with the Department and served not less than a three year apprenticeship under appropriate supervision. The present Executive Director of the Board is of the opinion that there would be no detriment to the public if Petitioner was allowed to sit for the examination based on her prior training and experience, but acknowledges that this is a matter for Board determination. (Testimony of Varn, pleadings)
The Issue The issues in this case concern an administrative complaint brought by the State of Florida, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Opticianry (Petitioner) against Samuel Rosenberg (Respondent).The allegations in that administrative complaint are directed to claimed improprieties on the part of the Respondent in his actions as a sponsoring optician for the benefit of David Somerville, an apprentice optician, both men licensed in the state of Florida. Respondent is said to have violated various provisions of Chapters 455 and 484, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 21P, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Part A The following facts are found based upon the stipulation entered into by the parties: Petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of opticianry, pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapter 455, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 484, Florida Statutes. Respondent is a licensed optician in the state of Florida, having been issued license number 0001618. Respondent's last known address is 542 White Street, Daytona Beach, Florida. David Somerville is not a licensed optician in the state of Florida. He is currently registered as an apprentice. A successful completion of this apprenticeship would enable him to sit for the Florida Examination to become licensed as an optician. An individual who is registered as an apprentice can perform no independent opticianry functions. An apprentice optician's activities must be directly supervised by a licensed optician. The Respondent is David Somerville's supervising apprentice sponsor. In February 1985, for a period of two or three weeks, Respondent had been an employee at Brandywine Optical, the business premises of David Somerville. Respondent then agreed to act as Somerville's sponsoring optician, supervising Somerville for forty hours per week. Part B Factual findings based upon the testimony adduced at hearing and in consideration of exhibits admitted at hearing: As reflected in Petitioner's Exhibit 7 admitted into evidence, on March 14, 1985, Samuel Rosenberg made application as sponsor of an apprenticeship program for the benefit of David Somerville. In that application it was indicated that Rosenberg would supervise the apprenticeship of Somerville for a period of forty hours a week. Rosenberg believes that Somerville is capable of performing opticianry work. He states that based upon Somerville's past experience and performance, he, Rosenberg, can afford to step out for a cup of coffee, and while he is out of Brandywine Optical, Somerville can do as fine a job of adjusting a pair of glasses as Rosenberg could. He also feels that it would be acceptable to leave Somerville alone while Rosenberg goes to the post office to mail things. Rosenberg does not feel responsible to monitor Somerville's activities at the Brandywine Optical business other than within the forty hours for which he is involved with Somerville. In supervising Somerville, Rosenberg had an arrangement early on in which twelve hours' supervision was given at a flea market and an additional twenty-eight hours at the Brandywine Optical store. This changed to eight hours on Saturday at the flea market and thirty-two hours a week at Brandywine Optical. The thirty-two hours is from Monday through Thursday. On Friday, Rosenberg understands that an optometrist is in attendance at the Brandywine Optical, and Somerville is only answering the phone and showing frames to customers. Nonetheless, Rosenberg admits that he has never been at the Brandywine Optical on Friday to confirm this arrangement in which Somerville is purported to do no opticianry work. Rosenberg assumes that Somerville in good conscience will not do anything irregular related to activities by an apprentice optician while Rosenberg is not attendance on Fridays. Otherwise, Rosenberg assumes that the optometrist at the business on Friday is responsible for Somervilles activities. Robert Schwalm, a licensed optician in the state of Florida, on March 20, 1985; March 27, 1985; April 3, 1985;. and April 17, 1985, while seated in the parking lot adjacent to the Brandywine Optical store and using 50 power binoculars, observed Somerville without supervision of an optician, optometrist or opthalmologist, practice opticianry, to wit, adjusting, delivering, fitting and collecting money for glasses. Adjustments would include working on frames etc. Rosenberg was not in attendance while these activities were being conducted by Somerville. On these occasions, when Rosenberg would arrive at the store, the witness Schwalm would depart. Similarly, Harry Rowley, licensed optician in the state of Florida, on March 20, 1985; March 27, 1985; April 3, 1985; and April 17, 1985, observed Somerville's participating in the practice of opticianry. Except for one of these instances in which Rosenberg came into the store, Somerville was practicing opticianry outside the presence of Rosenberg. Somerville's practice of opticianry included dispensing glasses, adjusting glasses and collecting fees. On July 22, 1985, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, Philip T. Hundermann, went to the Brandywine Optical store and parked outside the store. He arrived between 9:30 a.m. and 10:00 a.m. At 10:00 a.m. a person was observed leaving the store. At 10:05 a.m. Rosenberg was seen parking his car and then was observed entering the premises. The investigator went into the store at 10:10 a.m. and observed Somerville talking to a male customer while Rosenberg was standing at the counter. The investigator then requested that Rosenberg participate in an interview. Rosenberg and the investigator left the business premises and in another location held a discussion about concerns related to a complaint against Rosenberg's license. Rosenberg told the investigator that he supervised Somerville for a period of forty hours a week as the sponsoring optician. Rosenberg said that typically he would arrive at the Brandywine Optical store at 10:00 a.m. and leave around 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. This would mean that Somerville was unsupervised from 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m. and from 4:00 or 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. On August 27, 1985, Douglas Vanderbllt, an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation, went to the Brandywine Optical store. When he entered the store, Somerville and another customer were the only persons in attendance. The customer was trying on frames and making a selection of frames, with the assistance of Somerville. Vanderbilt picked out some frames that he wanted to buy. Somerville took the glasses that Vanderbilt had and made measurements from those glasses. This was in furtherance of the preparation of a new pair of spectacles at a cost of $1lO. Sixty dollars was paid down. Some of the measurements Somerville made pertaining to Vanderbilt involved bifocals. No prescription had been presented by Vanderbilt and Somerville used the old glasses which Vanderbilt had as a basis for measurement. Vanderbilt was presented with a business card which may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 1 admitted into evidence. The business card reflects Brandywine Optical, prescriptions filled, eye glasses and contact lenses. It gives the business address and indicates that David Somerville is the dispensing optician. This card is similar to a card sitting on the counter where Vanderbilt was seated. Respondent was aware of the information set forth on the card received as an exhibit. Somerville, upon the questioning of Vanderbilt, confirmed that the name Somerville reflected on the card and the Respondent Somerville were one and the same person. On September 9, 1985, Vanderbilt returned to the business premises at Brandywine Optical. At that time, only Somerville was present. Somerville broke the black stainlesse steel frame across the bridge of the new glasses. Consequently, Vanderbilt picked out a brown frame, and Somerville fitted the brown pair of glasses on Vanderbilt.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 463.014, Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.008(15)(a), Florida Administrative Code; violated Section 463.014, Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.008(15)(f), Florida Administrative Code; violated Section 463.016(1)(h), Florida Statutes, by violating Rule 64B13-3.009(2)(b), Florida Administrative Code; and violated Section 463.016(1)(f), Florida Statutes, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Respondent was licensed to practice optometry by the State of Florida, Board of Optometry. On or about April 19, 1998, Respondent entered into a lease agreement captioned "Equipment License," with U.S. Visions, Corp., to lease space and equipment as an optometric office in the J. C. Penney retail store on Mary Esther Avenue, Mary Esther, Florida. This location also constitutes the Santa Rosa Mall. Respondent paid $100.00 monthly rent for this office space. At all times material, Respondent also maintained a separate office for the practice of optometry under the name "Coastal Vision Center" in rental space in Destin, Florida. Respondent paid $2,900.00 monthly rent for the Destin office space. Respondent practiced in both locations during 1998. Respondent practiced under a professional corporation, named Shannon Fowler, O.D., P.A. Respondent's office space at the J.C. Penney location was inside the J.C. Penney retail store. Adjacent to Respondent's office space was the "J.C. Penney Optical Center," in which an optometrist practiced, and in which eyeglasses, contact lenses, and other optical merchandise could be purchased. Respondent personally placed a sign at the entrance to his office space at the J.C. Penney location identifying himself by name, stating that an independent practice of optometry was located there, and stating that he was not affiliated with the J.C. Penney retail store. During the time he practiced at the leased office space located in the J.C. Penney store, Respondent maintained telephones listed in his name at both his office locations. The telephone number for his office in J.C. Penney was different than the telephone number for his Destin office. Only Respondent, himself, answered Respondent's telephone at the J.C. Penney location. This telephone and telephone number were separate and had a different telephone number from the telephones for the J.C. Penney Optical Center. The receptionist at the J.C. Penney Optical Center occasionally made appointments with Respondent for persons who walked into the J. C. Penney Optical Center or who telephoned the J. C. Penney Optical Center telephone, but all such appointments were subject to confirmation by Respondent. There was no formal arrangement or agreement for the J. C. Penney Optical Center receptionist to make appointments over the Optical Center telephone for Respondent, and Respondent did not pay the receptionist. However, Petitioner benefited if the appointments she made were confirmed by him and actually kept by the patient. All of Respondent's patients at either location were advised that Respondent maintained an office in Destin, and all of his patients were advised to call a third telephone number, Respondent's cell phone number, for after-hours or emergency matters. All after-hours matters were handled at the Destin office by Respondent. However, patient files for patients that Respondent saw solely at the J.C. Penney location were stored by Respondent at that location. Respondent had no after-hours access to the J.C. Penney store. If there were an emergency, Respondent would have to obtain the patient's file the following day. At both office locations, Respondent, alone, determined which patients to see, what examinations and procedures to conduct, what optometry services to render, and what fees to charge any patients for his services. The lease agreement for Respondent's office space at J.C. Penney contained provisions precluding U.S. Visions Corp. from interfering with, or regulating, Respondent's independent practice of optometry in the office space he had leased. The lease agreement also contained a provision by which U.S. Vision Corp. covenanted not to violate Florida law. Respondent's lease with U.S. Visions Corp. prohibited his selling "frames, contacts, and related items" at the J.C. Penney location. Respondent did maintain inventory, employ an optometrist, and sell eyeglasses, lenses and frames at the Destin location. Respondent worked out of the J.C. Penney location three half-days per week on Mondays, Tuesdays, and Wednesdays. When requested by the patient, Respondent accepted the J.C. Penney credit card as payment for optometric services rendered at that location. When such card was used by a patient to pay for Respondent's services, J.C. Penney processed the payment and billed the patient directly. J.C. Penney rendered accounting and payment in full to Respondent for services charged on the credit cards on a bi-monthly basis. There is no evidence as to whether payment to Respondent was, or was not, affected by a delinquent payment by a patient to J.C. Penney. Respondent also accepted payment for his services rendered to patients at either location by check, cash, and Visa, Mastercard, and American Express credit cards. The patient elected which manner of payment to tender. Respondent's business records indicate that all of these forms of payment were utilized by patients at both locations. J.C. Penney charged a two-percent (2%) processing fee for the collection and accounting of services charged by patients on their J.C. Penney credit card. This fee, and the manner in which J.C. Penney processed the payments charged to the J. C. Penney credit card, are comparable to, and do not materially differ from, the typical arrangements between small business merchants and issuers of the other major credit cards which Respondent accepted. Unrefuted testimony of a certified public accountant employed by Respondent was to the effect that the financial records of Respondent's two optometry offices for 1998 show no indication that J.C. Penney exercised any influence or control over Respondent's independent practice of optometry or billing practices, and in fact, indicate that J.C. Penney did not. There is no evidence that the Respondent ever used prescription forms or any other forms referring to J.C. Penney at either of his office locations. On July 12, 1998, an advertisement appeared in the Sunday supplement to the "Northwest Florida Daily News" under the heading "J.C. Penney Optical Center," advertising a "FREE eye exam & 50% off frames." In very small print, the advertisement said, "we'll pay for your eye exam for eyeglasses by deducting up to $40 from your prescription eyeglass purchase." The advertisement specified "Santa Rosa Mall." The J.C. Penney Optical Center is not a licensed optometrist. A corporation can never hold an optometrist license. Only an individual can be licensed as an optometrist in Florida. The record is silent as to who or what entity placed the advertisement. Respondent was not named in the advertisement. Respondent did not place the advertisement. There is no evidence that Respondent had any involvement in the text or publication of the advertisement. Respondent did not have any prior knowledge that the advertisement was going to be published. U.S. Visions Corp. had never published any advertisement prior to July 1998, and Respondent did not foresee that the subject advertisement would be published. Respondent had no opportunity or means to prevent the publication of the advertisement. Respondent did not approve of, or consent to, the publication or content of the advertisement. Respondent had no opportunity to review the advertisement prior to publication. The lease for the J.C. Penney office location did not provide for U.S. Vision Corp. to do any advertising for Respondent. Respondent had no arrangements for advertising with either U.S. Vision Corp. or J.C. Penney. Respondent did not contemporaneously see the advertisement. He learned about it only through service of notice of the Department of Health's investigation into the advertisement, which ultimately resulted in this case. No patient or potential patient ever brought the advertisement or the coupon in the advertisement to Respondent or ever requested that the Respondent provide optometry services in accordance with the advertisement or the coupon. Respondent did not provide any optometry services in accordance with the advertisement or coupon, and would not have done so if requested. Respondent received no benefit from the advertisement. Respondent provided no "FREE" eye exams. The Respondent charged $49 per eye exam. The agency's expert witness, a licensed optometrist and former member of the Board of Optometry, testified that he believed that, on its face, the advertisement implied an association or affiliation between Respondent and J.C. Penney; that an optometrist practicing at J.C. Penney could be expected to benefit from the advertisement because of the content of the advertisement; that the advertisement was misleading because a person reading it would expect an eye exam to be "FREE"; and that when there is a lessor-lessee relationship of the type presented in this case, the Respondent optometrist has a responsibility to ensure that advertisements conform to the optometry statute and rules. The same expert witness testified that Chapter 463, Florida Statutes, does not prohibit optometrists from commercial establishments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Optometry enter a final order dismissing Counts II, III, and IV, finding Respondent guilty of Count I of the Second Amended Administrative Complaint, and issuing a reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of March, 2001.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Petitioner's document filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 8, 1992, which was initially construed to be a petition challenging an existing rule, and which was assigned to the undersigned on January 16, 1992, should be dismissed as argued in the motion to dismiss filed by the Respondent on January 28, 1992.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a second year medical student currently enrolled at the University of South Florida, College of Medicine, in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner is a licensed optometrist in the State of Florida and graduated valedictorian from the University of Houston, College of Optometry in May, 1990. In Florida, the Board of Optometry (Board) retains licensed optometrists who write the questions for the licensing examination administered by the Board. In some instances, the same examination drafters are retained by the Board to administer the practical portions of the examination. Thus, the drafter of the questions may proctor the examination given to examinees. Further, in some instances, the examination drafters have working in their employ unlicensed optometrists or optometry students who receive training from such employer. When that occurs, the unlicensed employee may receive assistance from the employer not available to others who would seek licensure by examination. This appearance of assistance or potential assistance is created because the drafter of the examination is also the grader and employer of the unlicensed person who must be tested for licensure. It is the Petitioner's position that licensed optometrists who provide both the content of the written test and administer the practical portions of the examination for licensure should not also serve as mentor or employer of those seeking licensure by the same examination. Petitioner has not cited an existing rule that regulates the activities described. Rule 21Q-4.006, Florida Administrative Code, adopts by reference Rule 21-11.014, Florida Administrative Code, as the rule governing examination security and monitoring for the Board. That rule provides, in pertinent part: Any individual found by the Department or any board within the Department to have engaged in conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process may have his or her scores on the examination withheld and/or declared invalid, be disqualified from the practice of the profession, and/or be subject to the imposition of other appropriate sanctions by the Department or, if administered by a board within the Department, by the applicable board. Conduct which subverts or attempts to subvert the examination process includes: Conduct which violates the security of the examination materials. . . Petitioner has not alleged that anyone violated the foregoing rule. Rather, Petitioner maintains that allowing the activities described above to continue gives the appearance of impropriety or increases the potential for impropriety.
The Issue Validity of Respondent's policy that applicants to retake the examination administered for licensure as an optometrist must have passed all portions of the national board examination within five years prior to the filing of the application. This rule challenge arises under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. It was consolidated for purposes of hearing with another case involving the same parties, DOAH Case No. 84-2647, wherein Petitioner is seeking to have his application to retake part of the state examination for optometrists approved. In that case, the Petitioner has provisionally denied his request based on the policy being challenged as a rule in this proceeding. At the hearing, Petitioner testified in his own behalf and called Mildred Gardner, Executive Director of the Board of Optometry, as a witness. Petitioner submitted 12 exhibits in evidence and the Respondent submitted one exhibit. The parties have submitted posthearing findings of fact pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)4, Florida Statutes. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order, except where such proposed findings of fact have been rejected as subordinate, cumulative, immaterial, or unnecessary.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Samuel Scardino is an optometrist who is currently licensed as such in the states of California, Illinois, Kentucky, and Michigan. He graduated from the Illinois College of Optometry in 1978, and successfully passed all parts of the National Board of Optometry examination in the same year. He has been a practicing optometrist in Battle Creek, Michigan, since 1978. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 4) By application dated May 10, 1983, Petitioner applied to take the Florida optometry examination. His application was received by Respondent on May 13, 1983. Petitioner's application was approved pursuant to Respondent's Rule 21QER83-1 which amended Rule 21Q-4.01, Florida Administrative Code, on May 19, 1983, to provide that an applicant must have obtained a qualifying score on the national examination within five years prior or two years subsequent to the date of passage of the state examination. It also provided that a passing score of 75 must be obtained on the pharmacology section of the national examination in 1983, or subsequent thereto, within five years prior or two years subsequent to passage of the state examination. By letter of May 18, 1983, Respondent acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's application and $250.00 fee, but indicated that the application was incomplete in that a final transcript must be sent by his school, and also that the National Board report of passing grades within the past five years and the pharmacology section in 1983 with a score of 75 or above were required. Petitioner complied with these requirements and received an admission card for the optometry examination to be held in July of 1983. Petitioner took the examination at that time and received notice in September 1983 that he had failed the pharmacology/pathology portion of Part II of the examination with a grade of 61. A review of Petitioner's objections to the grade resulted in a further letter from Respondent, dated December 23, 1983, which advised Petitioner that the Board of Optometry review committee had reviewed the matter and changed his final grade for the pharmacology/pathology portion of the examination from 61 to 65, but that a final grade of 70 percent or better was required to achieve a passing status. He was thereupon advised of his right to a hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. (Testimony of Petitioner, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 5-8, Respondent's Exhibit 1) On March 19, 1984, Petitioner filed an application for optometry reexamination with the Respondent, together with the $250.00 reexamination fee. The state application form for reexamination did not ask for any information concerning the National Board of Optometry examination, as did the original application form. Respondent's Rule 21Q-4.02, Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to reexamination, provided pertinently as follows: 21A-4.02 Reexamination.-- An applicant who fails either Part I or Part II of the state examination for licensure shall be required to retake only that part of the examination on which he failed to achieve a passing grade, provided that the applicant shall be limited to two retakes within a two year period from the date of original failure. If the applicant fails to achieve a passing grade as provided above, he shall be required to take the complete state examination for licensure in order to be entitled to be licensed as an optometrist. Reexamination shall be conditioned on payment of the reexamination fee. Respondent advised Petitioner by an undated letter which he received on April 7, 1984, that his National Board scores were no longer valid to take the Florida examination since they had been obtained more than five years prior to his application to take the 1984 examination. The letter further stated that 1983 was his last year of eligibility for examination under his 1978 National Board scores and that he had not been successful in his 1983 Florida examination. The letter enclosed an application for refund of his $250.00 fee for the 1984 examination. Petitioner thereafter spoke with the Executive Director of the Board of Optometry who indicated that the card would be evaluating his and other questions of candidates at their May 4, 1984 meeting. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 9, 11) The minutes of a meeting of the Board of Optometry on May 3, 1984, contains the following item: Examination 1984 - After discussion with Board Counsel, the Board reiterated that Examination candidates must have passed all parts of the National Board within 5 years prior to application to take the Florida examination in order that all candidates who pass the Florida examination are immediately eligible to apply for licen sure. Any candidate who applies to retake the Florida examination must also meet the requirements of passing the National Board within 5 years of applying to retake the Florida examination. All requirements of 21Q-4.01 apply to all candidates and no waiver of requirements shall be granted. Motion by Dr. Walker, seconded by Mrs. Chambers. Passed unanimously. The Board's Executive Director advised Petitioner of the action taken by the Board in a letter of May 14, 1984. He was also informed by this letter that if he completed the National Board requirements prior to the 1985 examination and applied for such examination, he would be required only to take the practical portion of Part II of the Florida examination, but that if he were not licensed in 1985, he would be required to take the entire Florida examination. After receiving the letter, Petitioner submitted his application for refund of the $250.00 reexamination fee which was approved on April 4, 1984 and thereafter paid to Petitioner. By Petition dated June 19, 1984, Petitioner requested an administrative hearing to contest the Respondent's denial of his application to retake the Florida optometry examination which was scheduled for August 1984. The instant rule challenge was subsequently filed in September 1984. (Testimony of Petitioner, Gardner, Petitioner's Exhibit 10) The policy statement announced by the Board at its May 3, 1984, meeting that applicants for reexamination must have passed the National Board examination within a period of five years prior to such application was first applied in 1984 and was uniformly applied to all applicants for reexamination who had not taken the National Board examination within the requisite period prior to application. (Testimony of Gardner)
Findings Of Fact David R. Ness, Petitioner, attended Southern College of Optometry in Memphis, Tennessee, and graduated in May 1990. Part of his training included a three-month externship with James C. Lanier, O.D., an optometrist practicing in Jacksonville, Florida. Dr. Lanier found him a very competent student, thorough in his fact finding and case histories; and satisfactory, if not above average, in his examination of the patients. Dr. Lanier did not participate in the grading of the examination in issue and has no personal knowledge of Petitioner's performance on the examination. Petitioner sat for the September 1990 Optometry licensure examination. He passed the certification portion of the examination and the laws and rules section; he failed the pharm./ocular portion and the clinical portion. After several challenges to the examination, the Board adjusted some scores, but Petitioner's scores in the pharm./ocular section and the clinical sections were still below passing. Written Examination The pharmacology/ocular written portion of the examination consists of a series of case histories, with five questions directed to each. Petitioner explained that he challenged his score on the following specific questions: History #1, question #4; History #5; question #23; History #7, questions #32-35; and History #10, question #48. Case history #1 describes a 19-year old female soft contact lens wearer with symptoms correctly identified by Petitioner as Giant Papillary Conjunctivitis. The patient relies on her contact lenses because she is an actress. The severity of her condition is 3+ on a scale of 1-4, with four being the most severe. Question #4 requires selection from six choices of the initial management course of choice. Petitioner chose "c", Pred Forte suspension, every two hours. Pred Forte is the strongest commercially available steroid and its application every two hours is reserved for very severe cases. While the condition described is moderate to severe, the better answer is "f", "switch to preservative free system, enzyme cleaning 1 time a week". The patient's cleaning solution, described in the case history, is an old solution with a preservative which is known to cause conjunctivitis. While the safest course would be to discontinue contact lens wear, this is a radical option for a patient who must wear the lenses for her work. The preferred course then is to change the solution to see if the condition improves before moving to a less conservative treatment such as Pred Forte. Case history #5 describes symptoms and includes a color photograph of the eye in issue. Petitioner correctly identified the differential diagnosis as "Essential Iris Atrophy" and "Reiger's Anomaly". The next question, #23, states that the fellow eye shows similar findings in a slit lamp examination, and asks which of the differential diagnoses is the final diagnosis. Petitioner selected "Essential Iris Atrophy". The correct answer is "Reiger's anomaly". Essential Iris Atrophy is almost always unilateral and Reiger's is bilateral. The question required the examinee to know this distinction. Case history #7, describes a 37-year old patient with alleged recent vision field loss which occurred after thoracic surgery. The history describes an examination in which the patient remarks that he "isn't going to sue the physician" and where, with coaxing, his vision is much better than he admits. The patient also presented summary results of carotid artery testing and CT studies, which were normal. In his answers to questions 32-35, Petitioner chose diagnoses and treatment based on his conviction that he should try to help anyone who would come to him. He missed the fact that the patient described in the case history is a malingerer who likely is trying to sue his surgeon, and who requires no treatment. Case history #10 describes a 68-year old patient who is being examined for fitting of an extended wear contact lens. The best corrected vision is 20/50 OD, with or without a contact lens. The examination question includes two photographs, one of the fundus examination, the other of a fluorescein angiogram. An angiogram is obtained by injecting dye in the forearm and taking pictures with a special filter as the dye circulates through the blood vessels within the eye. This process is able to reveal abnormalities in the eye. Petitioner missed the question relating to the final diagnosis, which should have been "age-related macular degeneration with secondary choroidal neovascular membrane". Final diagnosis relied, in part, on the fluorescein angiogram. While Petitioner is not arguing that his answer is correct, he contends that the question itself is invalid, because it depends on a process which optometrists are not licensed to perform and it was too technical for recent graduates. People coming out of school have been exposed to live patients and have seen fluorescein angiograms performed and have seen their photographs. Moreover, in Florida, the number of elderly patients makes it necessary that optometrists be proficient in diagnosing age-related macular degeneration. The Practical/Clinical Examination Section 1 of the clinical portion of the practical examination involves the two examiners' review of the examinee's performance of an actual eye examination of a live patient. The two examiners are briefed extensively prior to the examination as to what to look for, but they do not confer during the examination when scoring various functions. For this reason, there may be disagreement between the two examiners. The scores are averaged. On section 1, item #6, with regard to the patient's case history, "follow-up information", the point spread is 0-7, with points being subtracted for failure to follow up on certain information. One examiner gave Petitioner the maximum number of points for the entire case history section. The other examiner gave Petitioner a "no" (0 points) under "personal ocular history", and commented on the examination score sheet that the examinee did not ask ocular history. The same examiner took off 2 points on item #6, "follow-up information" and commented, "did not ask ocular history". At some point during Petitioner's initial challenge, he was given credit for item #3, because it was determined that he did obtain an ocular history. The additional points were not restored to item #6, but should have been; as the failure to obtain that history is the basis for the reduced score. The examiner was not present at hearing to explain any other basis. Section 2 of the clinical portion of the practical examination requires the examinee to perform a series of functions under the scrutiny of two examiners (not the same two as in section 1). Again, the scores are awarded without consultation and there are discrepancies. In each area the examiner marks "yes" or "no" as to whether the procedure is properly performed. A "no" must be supported with the examiner's comment. Two yes marks entitle the examinee to 2 points; a yes/no is worth one point; and two no's are scored zero. For each function, the examinee must demonstrate twice. That is, he says "ready", and the first examinee views the result, then he prepares again and signals, "ready", for the second examiner. For section 2, the candidate is performing techniques or functions on his own patient, a patient whom he brings to the examination and with whom he is familiar. Petitioner is challenging the grading method for Section 2. In 6 out of 16 techniques or functions, the two examinees disagreed; that is, one gave a "yes", and the other, a "no". Petitioner contends that he should get full credit anytime he got one "yes", since that indicates that two people, the examinee and one examiner, agree. There are several reasons why two examiners may disagree on whether the examinee performed a function or technique properly. In some instances one examiner may give the individual the benefit of the doubt; in other cases the patient might move or blink or the examinee might lose his focus. The fact that two examiners independently assess the results gives the examinee two chances to demonstrate his skill. The third section of the clinical examination requires an examination of a live patient where the refractive error of the patient's vision is determined, and a prescription is made. Before being presented to the examinee, the patient is examined independently by three licensed optometrists serving as "monitors". Their examinations give the refraction results against which the examinee's results are compared. Their examinations also determine whether the patient is suitable; that is, the eye must be refracted correctable to 20/20 and the other eye correctable to 20/50. A fourth monitor reviews the results before the patient is presented to the examinee. In this case the patient was examined by the monitors and was found acceptable. Petitioner had problems with the patient; the best he could read was the 20/25 line. Petitioner felt that the patient should have been disqualified and commented in writing on that at the end of his examination, as was appropriate. The comments were reviewed by Dr. Attaway, who considered that the patient had met the criteria when examined by the monitors. Petitioner's refractions varied significantly from the monitors' refractions, which also varied somewhat from each other. Petitioner received a score of 3, out of possible 20, on this portion of the examination. Dr. Attaway did not, himself, examine the patient and the monitors who performed the examinations were not present to testify. The only evidence to rebut Petitioner's findings was the written report of the monitors. Pass Rate for the Examination Out of 130 candidates, approximately 34 percent passed all parts of the September optometry examination. In 1986, 51 percent passed; in 1987, 33.5 percent passed; in 1988, 59.6 percent passed; and in 1989, 52 percent passed. These figures do not, alone, establish that the test is too technical or unfair, nor does the fact that very good students failed. When the examinations are evaluated, when the examinee's performance is rated, there is no established pass rate; the monitors have no idea how close the individual examinee is to passing, either originally or when a challenge is being addressed. Petitioner was a very articulate and candid witness. His two experts were clearly knowledgeable and were sincerely concerned that he should be licensed. None had the experience of Respondent's witnesses, also well-qualified licensed optometrists, in working with the examination. With the exception of the inconsistent score on Section 1, item #6, Petitioner failed to prove that he is entitled to a higher score on any portion of the examination, or that the examination itself was invalid or unfair.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that Petitioner's final score on Section 1 of the clinical examination be adjusted to reflect full credit for Item #6; that he be permitted to retake Section 3 of the clinical examination; and that his remaining challenges to the examination be denied. RECOMMENDED this 29th day of May, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 91-0700 The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1.-2. Adopted in paragraph 2. 3. Adopted in substance in paragraph 20. 4.-6. Rejected as irrelevant. Adopted in summary in paragraph 2. Rejected as contrary to the evidence. Finding of Fact #15 reflects the grades after adjustment. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as unnecessary. Rejected as irrelevant. This fact does not make the examination invalid so long as it fairly evaluates the qualification of the applicant. 13.-14. Rejected as statements of statutory language rather than findings of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings The Hearing Officer is unable to find where in the record the exact final score of Petitioner is reflected. Adopted in paragraph 1. Rejected as restatement of testimony rather than findings of fact. 4.-5. Rejected as unnecessary. 6.-15. Rejected as restatement of testimony; summary statements, or argument, rather than findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: David R. Ness 611 Poinsettia Avenue Titusville, FL 32780 Vytas J. Urba, Esquire Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Patricia Guilford, Exec. Director Dept. of Professional Regulation Board of Optometry 1940 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Ste. 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an award of additional points sufficient to achieve a passing score on the July 1997 optometry exam.
Findings Of Fact Susan J. Summerton-Madison (Petitioner) took the July 1997 examination for licensure as an optometrist in the State of Florida. A portion of the examination tests the clinical skills of the applicant for licensure. Each applicant performs a number of tasks while two examiners observe. Prior to administration of the test, all examiners receive standardization training providing a baseline for grading the individual performance of each applicant. Examiners grade each applicant independently of each other. During the clinical part of the test, a viewing system known as a "teaching tube" is attached to the optometrist's equipment used by the applicant. The applicant performs each task twice because only one examiner at a time can observe the performance through the tube. Prior to beginning the clinical portion of the exam, the applicant and the examiners set the tube focusing mechanism so that both the applicant and the examiner have a clear view of the procedures being demonstrated. By grade report dated August 27, 1997, the Petitioner was advised that she had scored 68.80 on the clinical portion of the examination. A score of at least 75 points is required to pass the clinical portion of the examination for licensure as an optometrist. The Petitioner challenges the grading of the following questions: Section 1, questions 4a and 4b. Section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 5c, 6a, 7b, 10a, 11a, 11b, 12a, 12b, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18a, 18b, 21a, 21b, 24a, 25a, and 26a. The Petitioner asserts that her pregnancy during the examination resulted in ocular changes which caused focusing anomalies. The anomalies allegedly caused the viewing equipment through which the examiners observed her performance to be out of focus. The Petitioner received score deductions related to lack of focus on numerous questions; specifically section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 5c, 6a, 7b, 10a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18a, 21a, 24a, 25a, and 26a. There are multiple causes of temporary ocular changes, including nervousness. Although there is evidence that pregnancy can result in ocular changes, the evidence fails to establish that any focusing problems which occurred during the Petitioner's performance on the July 1997 examination were related to pregnancy. Refocusing the viewing mechanism takes approximately five seconds. There is no evidence that an applicant is prevented from refocusing the equipment during the clinical examination. Although examiners are under no obligation to advise applicants during the test, one of the examiners observing the Petitioner suggested that she refocus the equipment. The Petitioner asserts that the request caused her to run out of time on section 2, questions 11a, 11b, 12a, and 12b. The evidence fails to establish that any problems related to insufficient time for the examination were related to the examiner's suggestion. The Petitioner asserts that points were deducted for poor focus on tasks which did not include focus as grading criteria. The evidence establishes that because the clinical portion of the test involves examination of ocular systems in a patient, almost all procedures require correct focus. The Petitioner asserts that on section 2, question 21b, ("foveal reflex") she received no points, but that another optometrist's examination of the test patient indicated that the foveal reflex was acceptable. Review of the examination indicates that the Petitioner's score was lowered because of focusing problems. The fact that a qualified optometrist determined the patient to be normal does not entitle the Petitioner to additional points or indicate that the scoring of her performance was unfair. Because examiners view separate procedures, it is not unlikely that examiners may award different scores. It is possible to evaluate the performance of examiners through use of "agreement ratings." Agreement ratings indicate the frequency of which each examiner agrees with the other examiner in testing the same applicant. The Petitioner notes that the examiners grading her performance differed in grading section 1, questions 4a and section 2, questions 3a, 3b, 7b, 10a, 13a, 14a, 15a, 18b, 21a, 21b, and 25a, and asserts that such indicates she was graded unfairly. Although the agreement ratings of the examiners who observed the Petitioner were slightly lower than average, the examiner agreement ratings fail to establish that she was graded arbitrarily or unfairly. The sample size is so small as to be subject to influence by borderline candidates, where one examiner believes an applicant's performance to be more acceptable than does the other examiner. The Petitioner asserts that on section 2, question 18b, the lack of agreement between the examiners reflects arbitrary grading because both supposedly view the same procedure through the viewing tube. The evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner is entitled to additional points or that the scoring of her performance was unfair. The Petitioner asserts that she informed the examiners that she was pregnant prior to administration of the clinical portion of the exam and that she should have received special accommodation of some type based on her condition. Procedures set forth in Rule 61-11.008, Florida Administrative Code, address special assistance to certain persons submitting to examination by the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Office of Examination Services, which administered the examination in the instant case. Such assistance is available to persons with learning disabilities or physical handicap as defined in the rule. There is no evidence that the Petitioner sought to utilize such procedures. There is no evidence that the Petitioner's condition would have been regarded as a learning disability or physical handicap by the agency. The Petitioner asserts that an examiner exited the room while she was addressing section 1, questions 4a and 4b, and that the confusion of the departure caused the examiners to err. The evidence establishes that the scores reflect the inappropriate performance of the task involved, which involved measurement of the patient's pupil.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Department of Health enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's challenge to the grading of the July 1997 examination for licensure as an optometrist. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan J. Summerton-Madison 559 99th Avenue North Naples, Florida 34108 Anne Marie Williamson, Esquire Department of Health Building 6, Room 102 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Angela T. Hall, Agency Clerk Department of Health Building 6, Room 136 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Eric G. Walker, Executive Director Board of Optometry Department of Health 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Respondent Hagen violated Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, and Rule 21P-4.01, Florida Administrative Code, by allowing his license to be used by an unlicensed person to engage in the occupation of dispensing optician without his presence and direct supervision. Whether the license of Respondent Hagen should be revoked, annulled, withdrawn or suspended for violation of Chapter 484, Florida Statutes, and Rule 21P-4.01, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Wayne L. Hagen, the licensed optician in the Pearl Vision Center, Tyson Square Mall, St. Petersburg, Florida, holds License No. 180, a license in good standing, issued by the Florida Board of Dispensing Opticians pursuant to Chapter 484, Florida Statutes. The Board in formal meeting on March 28, 1975, directed Mr. Allen R. Smith, Jr., a coordinator for the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulations, Division of Occupations, to file the subject Administrative Complaint against Respondent Hagen. The charge in the Complaint is the violation of Rule 21P-4.01, Florida Administrative Code, in that an unlicensed person engaged in "dispensing optical goods while Mr. Hagen was absence for the premises". Respondent received a copy of the Administrative Complaint, Explanation and Election of Rights containing notice that said Complaint was mailed the 29th day of April, 1975. Respondent had no notice by certified mail or actual notice of these proceedings or an opportunity to show that he had complied with all lawful requirement for the retention of his license, prior to the receipt of the Administrative Complaint, Explanation and Election of Rights. Petitioner admitted that no notice prior to the mailing of the Administrative Complaint, Explanation and Election of Rights was sent to Respondent giving notice of the facts or conduct which are delineated in the Administrative Complaint, Explanation and Election of Rights. Petitioner admitted that prior to the initiation of the Administrative Procedures Act in former proceedings the Board had given notice of receipt of Complaints against licensees. Respondent Hagen had posted in the office of Pearl Vision Center signs indicating that no fittings or adjustments would be made while Respondent was off duty. The unlicensed employee of Respondent, Lynda Vickers, performed acts in violation of the Rules and Regulations of the Board without the knowledge or permission of Respondent and was discharged prior to the filing of the Complaint against Respondent. Respondent did not allow his license to be used by an unlicensed person to engage in the trade or occupation of dispensing optician without his presense and direct supervision. Respondent through his attorney moved to dismiss the Complaint on the grounds that the Board of Dispensing Opticians failed to give him prior notice and and an opportunity to rectify in accordance with the requirements of the licensing statute, Section 120.60(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr., has never completed a course of study at a recognized school of opticianry. On April 2, 1957, however, he began working and training under Ralph C. Cronbaugh, a licensed optician, at Daytona Optical Center in Daytona Beach, Florida. He learned how to read a lensometer, interpret prescriptions for eyeglasses, figure base curves, measure the seg height and various physiognomic features, cut and edge lenses, fit lenses to the frame and so forth. Petitioner worked under Mr. Cronbaugh's supervision an average of 48 or 50 hours a week continuously until June of 1961, even though the training program as such ended after three years. Some time before June of 1961, petitioner registered as an apprentice with and paid a fee to the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. On June 3, 1961, petitioner became a member of the Florida Association of Dispensing Opticians. Some 15 years later the Florida Board of Opticianry instituted its own apprenticeship program for the first time. From June of 1961 until at least June of 1963, petitioner remained at the Daytona Optical Center under the supervision of Steve Stevenson, a licensed optician. For nine months or a year longer, he worked under a third licensed optician at the Daytona Optical Center, Andrew H. Hollaway. Petitioner moved to Alabama from Daytona Beach. There he managed an office for Bausch-Lomb in Birmingham, then went into business for himself under the name Jasper Optical Center in Jasper, Alabama. He actively practiced as a dispensing optician in Jasper for more than three years immediately preceding his application for licensure in Florida. Petitioner is a past vice-president of the Alabama Society of Dispensing Opticians and a former member of the board of directors of the International Society of Dispensing Opticians. He is now licensed as a dispensing optician in Alabama and has been for the last 18 years. Petitioner's Exhibit Nos. 3 and 4. Although the licensing scheme in Alabama is different from Florida's, petitioner's uncontroverted testimony was that he holds and has held a state occupational license in Alabama. This is corroborated by the affidavit of an Alabama judge, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4, and a copy of petitioner's 1981-1982 license. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. For the past six years, petitioner and other dispensing opticians have worked to establish a state board to regulate opticianry in Alabama, but these efforts have been stymied by optometrists who have successfully opposed the legislation. As a matter of policy, respondent refuses to let dispensing opticians licensed in Alabama and other states with similar regulatory arrangements take the Florida dispensing opticianry examination. In preparing the foregoing findings of fact, the hearing officer has had the benefit of petitioner's post-hearing correspondence and respondent's proposed recommended order. Proposed fact findings that have not been adopted have been rejected as irrelevant or unsupported by the evidence.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent admit petitioner to the dispensing opiticanry examination and license petitioner as a dispensing optician if he successfully completes the examination. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dyer Kemp Garvin, Jr. Post Office Box 1127 Destin, Florida 32541 Chris D. Rolle, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Suite 1602 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Fred Varn, Executive Director Board of Opticianry 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION DYER KEMP GARVIN, JR. Petitioner, vs. DOAH CASE NO. 82-484 STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF OPTICIANRY, Respondent. /
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's opticianry license should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Max A. Vinson is currently a licensed optician, holding license No. DO 601. On December 24, 1986, the Board of Opticianry entered a Final Order in DPR Case No. 0060708 and therein assessed a fine of $500.00 against Vinson. The fine was to have been paid within thirty days of the Final Order. Vinson never paid the fine. On October 17, 1989, the Board of Opticianry again entered a Final Order in Case No. 0106315. This Final Order was based on the failure to pay the fine from the first action. Another fine of $1,000.00 was assessed and Vinson's license was suspended until the fines were paid. Vinson never paid this fine. Vinson is charged with violating Section 484.014(1)(i), Florida Statutes, based on his failure to obey these two lawful orders of the Board of Opticianry.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Opticianry enter a Final Order and therein revoke license No. DO 601 issued to Max A. Vinson. Vinson may not reapply for a license until all fines have been paid. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: E. Renee Alsobrook, Senior Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Max A. Vinson 12512 Caron Drive Jacksonville, FL 32258 Jack McRay General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 LouElla Cook Executive Director Board of Opticianry 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
