Elawyers Elawyers
Ohio| Change
Find Similar Cases by Filters
You can browse Case Laws by Courts, or by your need.
Find 49 similar cases
ROBERT MELLER, JR. AND KRISTINE M. MELLER vs REVONDA CROSS AND DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, 05-003275 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Sep. 12, 2005 Number: 05-003275 Latest Update: Jun. 01, 2006

The Issue Whether Petitioners' rental property was licensed under Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioners, Robert Meller, Jr., and Kristine M. Meller, were owners of a rental property (a house located at 4516 Bowan Bayou) in Sanibel, Florida. In addition, they owned a condominium in the same area. Respondent Cross held a valid real estate license at all times material to matters at issue. Respondent Cross had a business relationship with Petitioners, which antedated the purchase of the Bowen Bayou house as a result of being the leasing agent for a condominium association with which Petitioners were associated. Respondent DBPR is the State of Florida agency which represents the FREC in matters such as this matter. In January 2000, Petitioners purchased the house in Sanibel located at 4516 Bowan Bayou. On or about January 20, 2000, Respondent Cross mailed a Rental Property Management Agreement to Petitioners for the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou, Sanibel, Florida. The parties to this contract were Petitioners and Properties in Paradise, Inc. Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., signed the contract and returned the contract to Respondent Cross. Petitioners maintain that the Rental Property Management Agreement was not signed by Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., and that his name is forged. He maintains that he entered into an oral agreement with Respondent Cross, individually, to manage the property. From the purchase of the house in January 2000 through April 2001, Petitioners received correspondence, including a monthly "owner statement" reflecting short-term rental income, commissions, and debits for maintenance, from Properties in Paradise, Inc., regarding all aspects of the business relationship contemplated by the Rental Property Management Agreement. By letter dated January 20, 2000, Petitioner, Robert Meller, Jr., authorized "Revonda Cross of Properties in Paradise as my agent in establishing telephone and electrical service and so forth for my property on Sanibel Island at 4516 Bowen's [sic] Bayou Road." Thereafter, Petitioners received correspondence from Respondent Cross relative to the subject property wherein she is identified as "Operations Manager, Properties in Paradise, Inc." During the relevant time period, Petitioners' property was rented at least 22 times; once for 17 days, four times for 14 days, once for nine days, thirteen times for seven days, and once for five days. The frequency and term of these rentals qualify for the statutory definition of a "resort dwelling" and transient rental dwelling. Properties in Paradise, Inc., listed the property located at 4516 Bowan Bayou in the list of properties it provided the Division of Hotels and Restaurants as licensed in accordance with Chapter 509, Florida Statutes (2005). In April 2001, Properties in Paradise, Inc., through an attorney, notified clients that it had effectively ceased doing business. At that time, Petitioners were owed $11,588.06, which went unpaid. Petitioners made a claim in July 2001, against Respondent Cross to recover their loss from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. In October 2003, Petitioners' claim was denied by the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, enter a final order denying Petitioners' claim for recovery from the Florida Real Estate Recovery Fund. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Solla, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801-1757 Robert L. Meller, Jr., Esquire Best & Flanagan, LLP 225 South 6th Street, Suite 4000 Minneapolis, Minnesota 55402-4690 Revonda Stewart Cross 1102 South East 39th Terrace, No. 104 Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Nancy B. Hogan, Chairman Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street, Suite 801N Orlando, Florida 32801 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (6) 120.57475.011475.482475.483475.484509.242
# 1
JOHN K. WHITAKER vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 88-000613 (1988)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 88-000613 Latest Update: Jun. 13, 1988

Findings Of Fact By application dated September 10, 1987, petitioner, John K. Whitaker, III, sought licensure as a real estate salesman by examination with respondent, Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Division). The application was received by the Division on September 14, 1987. Question six on the application requires the applicant to state whether he or she "has ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld." Petitioner gave the following response: Yes. DUI and DWI 1981 and 1982. Upon further investigation by the Division, it learned that Whitaker had been arrested for a DUI in 1982 and that no arrest had occurred in 1981. However, it also learned that Whitaker had been arrested for the following incidents: March 17, 1984 - Arrest for resisting police officer with violence. April 17, 1984 - Arrest for forgery - possession of forged or altered driver's license August 31, 1984 - Burglary of a dwelling; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Grand larceny; adjudication withheld. August 31, 1984 - Arson; adjudication withheld. Armed with this new information, respondent advised petitioner by letter dated December 2, 1987 that his application had been denied. This decision was later reaffirmed by letter dated February 4, 1988 and cited respondent's "criminal record" as the basis for the agency's denial. That prompted this proceeding. Petitioner, who is now twenty-nine years old, is a December, 1982 graduate of Florida State University with a degree in economics. After graduation, he worked eight months as a stockbroker for Alan Bush Brokerage Company in West Palm Beach, Florida. In 1983 petitioner began receiving medical treatment for what he thought was depression. As a part of the treatment, he took an antidepressant drug. He later learned he had a manic-depressive condition, a more serious mental illness, and the antidepressant medication was actually aggravating this condition. Before his real illness was discovered, Whitaker experienced manic episodes which were manifested by grandiose ideas, slurred speech and extremely poor judgment. As a result, Whitaker was arrested in 1984 for the series of incidents enumerated in finding of fact 3. The first two charges were dismissed while adjudication of guilt was withheld as to the remaining three charges. For those latter charges, Whitaker was placed on five years' probation, or to and including August, 1989. Whitaker stated he did not intend to lie about these matters and did not list the 1984 arrests on his application because he thought that if a charge was dropped, or adjudication of guilt withheld, he did not have to disclose the matter. Since having his illness properly diagnosed in 1984, Whitaker has taken medication (lithium) to prevent the recurrence of the symptoms and sees a physician at least once a month. He must remain on medication for the rest of his life in order to control the illness. With the exception of one flare-up about a year ago, his condition has stabilized. After his arrests in 1984, Whitaker was hospitalized for a period of time and then moved into a halfway house. He now lives in his own apartment. He has held several jobs, including a food service job in a West Palm Beach hospital and a timeshare unit salesman for his uncle in California. Presently, he is employed in a public relations capacity for a consumer club in West Palm Beach. He eventually wants to enter the real estate business, and for this reason, desires a license. Because his mother is a broker-realtor in Palm Beach Gardens, he expects no difficulty in obtaining a real estate position. Petitioner presented the testimony of his mother, a retired business executive and a family friend who is also a real estate salesman. The mother described the nature of petitioner's illness while the retired executive recalled petitioner as having "industrious," self-motivating" and "honest" characteristics and being a terrific salesman. The family friend described petitioner's present conduct to be normal now that he had controlled his illness. Finally, a number of letters were offered by various local businessmen, including one from a professional golfer and businessman (Jack Nicklaus), a physician, a stockbroker and a financial planner. However, all letters predate petitioner's arrests and therefore are irrelevant to the issue in this proceeding.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of John K. Whitaker for licensure as a real estate salesman by examination be DENIED. DONE AND ORDERED this 13th day of June, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of June 1988.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.17
# 2
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. PHILIP MARZO AND ALL CITIES REALTY, INC., 81-003221 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-003221 Latest Update: Nov. 01, 1982

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent Philip Marzo was a real estate broker licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217167; and Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., was a real estate brokerage corporation licensed under the laws of the State of Florida, holding license No. 0217166. At all times material hereto, Respondent Marzo was the qualifying broker for Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc. On May 9, 1981, Gladstone Keith Russell entered into a Service Agreement with All Cities Realty, Inc. Pursuant to the terms of that Agreement, Russell paid $75 in cash to Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., as an advance rental information fee in exchange for which All Cities Realty, Inc., agreed to provide Russell with listings of available rentals. On or about May 13, 1981, Respondents provided to Russell one listing, which listing was not suitable to Russell. No other listing information was ever provided by Respondents to Russell. Russell obtained his own rental within thirty days from the date of the Service Agreement. This rental was not obtained pursuant to any information supplied to him by Respondents. Within thirty days of the date that All Cities Realty, Inc., contracted to perform real estate services for Russell, Russell telephoned Respondent All Cities Realty, Inc., to demand a return of his $75 deposit. The salesman who took Russell's advance fee was no longer employed at All Cities Realty, Inc., and Russell spoke with Respondent Marzo. Although Russell demanded a refund of his money, Respondent Marzo did not make a refund to Russell. When Russell spoke with Marzo on the telephone, Marzo, instead of returning Russell's money, used delaying tactics and attempts to keep from making the refund. Since his telephone calls proved unsuccessful, Russell returned to the All Cities Realty, Inc., office to obtain a refund from Marzo. Upon arriving at the office, Russell found that All Cities Realty, Inc., had gone out of business, and he was unable to locate Respondent Marzo. Russell has never received a refund of his $75 advance fee paid to the Respondents.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: Default be entered against Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., and that a final order be entered finding Respondents, Philip Marzo and All Cities Realty, Inc., guilty of the violations charged in the Administrative Complaints and revoking their real estate licenses. RECOMMENDED this 24th day of August, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: James H. Gillis, Esquire Staff Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Philip Marzo 2920 Missionwood Avenue, West Miramar, Florida 33025 Mr. Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Staff Attorney Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (3) 120.57475.25475.453
# 4
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. JEREMIAH C. CLARKE, HELEN N. CLARKE, ET AL., 77-000783 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000783 Latest Update: Nov. 02, 1977

Findings Of Fact Documents introduced into evidence revealed that the Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke is a registered real estate broker and Clarke Real Estate is an entity registered as a partnership broker and authorized to act as such with the Commission. On or about September 15, 1975, Jerry Kent, a salesman with Respondent, Clark Real Estate, obtained an oral open listing from Esther Braverman on a condominium unit denominated as "Apartment B-804, 1111 Crandon Boulevard, Key Biscayne, Florida." Pursuant thereto, salesman Kent showed the condominium unit to Jacques Benoist and Jeanine Benoist, his wife, who executed a deposit receipt contract to purchase a condominium unit on September 27, 1975. Esther Braverman, the seller, executed the contract during October of 1975. The deposit receipt contract provided for a $10,000 earnest money deposit to be held in the escrow account of the law firm of Snider, Young, Barrett, and Tannenbaum, P.A., attorneys for seller Braverman. Said deposit was made on September 27, 1975, by delivering a check to attorney Bruce L. Hollander, a member of the firm, who deposited the deposit in the firm's escrow account. (See Commission's Exhibit No. 9). The deposit receipt contract also obligated the seller, Esther Braverman, to pay Respondent Jeremiah C. Clark a commission of $7,875. Specifically, the contract provides that "I, or we, agree to pay to the above assigned broker a commission for finding the above signed purchaser for the above described property, the sum of $7,875 . . . ." Closing took place on January 19, 1976, at the offices of Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association, Miami Beach, Florida, from whom the Benoists had obtained financing for the purchase. At the closing on January 19, 1976, Esther Braverman signed and delivered a warranty deed made out to Jacques Benoist and Janine Benoist, transferring the property to the Bravermans. The warranty deed was recorded with the clerk of the Dade County Circuit Court by the lending institution, Washington Federal Savings and Loan Association. (See Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) At the closing, Jeremiah Clark was given a check representing the commission to Clarke Real Estate in the amount of $7,875. Thereafter, Jerry Clarke was requested by the lending institution to hold the funds in escrow until the bank dispursed the mortgage proceeds. He was then told that the mortgage proceeds would be paid within the following week. Respondent Clarke agreed, pursuant to a request from the seller's attorney, Bruce Hollander, to hold the commission check until January 27, 1976, without depositing same. Mr. Clarke held the commission check until January 29, 1976, as agree. On that day, he dispursed the proceeds to salesman Jerry Kent and the balance was credited to Clarke Real Estate. The mortgage funds were never disbursed because the lending institution could not obtain a quit-claim deed from the seller, Esther Braverman's former husband and therefore in the lending institution's opinion, the defect was not discovered until after the closing. On May 6, 1976, attorney Hollander acting for his law firm and the seller sent Respondent Jeremiah C. Clarke and Respondent Clarke Real Estate a letter stating that the mortgage proceeds had not been disbursed by the lending institution and requested a demand for the commission check. The Commission takes the position that the closing which occurred on January 19, was an escrow closing and that the Respondent Jeremiah Clarke was not authorized to disburse the proceeds from the commission check until notification that the mortgage proceeds were disbursed by the lending Institution. The Respondents, on the other hand, took the position that their only obligation was to find a purchaser who was ready, willing and able to complete the transaction, which acts were consummated by their salesman, Jerry Kent. Based on my examination of the document introduced herein, and the testimony adduced during the hearing, the undersigned concludes that the Respondent's position that it was entitled to receive the commission monies here in dispute has merit. Although the Commission takes the position that an escrow closing occurred, an escrow has been defined as a written instrument which by its term imports a legal obligation and which is deposited by the grantor, promisor, or obligor, or his agent with a stranger or third party to be kept by the depository until the performance of a condition or a happening of a certain event and then to be delivered over to the grantee, promisee, or obligee. It cannot be seriously contended herein that the Respondent Clarke was acting as an escrow for himself when consideration is given to the above definition of an escrow. See Love v. Brown Development Company, 131 So. 144. It is further essential to an escrow that delivery of the instrument be to a stranger or to a third person, that is, to one who is not a party to the instrument, or a person so free from any personal or legal identity with the parties to the instrument as to leave them free to discharge his duty as a depository to both parties without involving a breach of duty to either. For example, a deed delivered to a grantee cannot be regarded as held in escrow. Here, Respondent Clarke was in no way acting for anyone other than himself or as agent for his salesman, Jerry Kent, both of whom had a direct stake in the commission proceeds. Additionally, upon examination of the deposit receipt contract, the broker became entitled to the commission proceeds when the buyer (purchaser) was found. Additionally, and as an aside, it was noted that the lending institution in fact recorded its mortgage the day following the closing This would lead any examiner of the public records to believe that the lending institution was satisfied with the title as conveyed on the closing date. It was further noted that the Respondents had no indication that there was a problem with the title until approximately five months following the closing. Finally, the undersigned received a letter from attorney Lipcon dated August 1, 1975, advising that the civil case which was pending before the Dade County Circuit Court involving similar issues as posed herein before the commission had been fully and finally settled. There was a stipulation for dismissal signed by attorneys for each of the parties including the attorney for the firm that made the complaint against the Respondents stating in essence that the monies paid to Respondent Clarke and which was retained by him as full and final settlement of his brokerage commission were to be retained by Respondent Clarke as final payment of his commission in connection of the sale of the subject condominium. For all of these reasons, I shall recommend that the complaint filed herein be dismissed in its entirety.

Recommendation Based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as found above, it is hereby recommended that the complaints filed herein be dismissed in their entirety. Recommended this 23rd day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (2) 120.57475.25
# 6
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs. O. B. LINKOUS AND O. B. LINKOUS REALTY, INC., 80-002235 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-002235 Latest Update: Dec. 17, 1982

Findings Of Fact In the fall of 1973, Mr. and Mrs. Delmar D. Carter purchased the Buccaneer Motel and Woodside Apartments [the motel] from C.E.K., Inc., whom respondents represented in the sale. Respondents agreed to accept less from C.E.K., Inc., as their commission on the sale, that they might have otherwise, because the Carters agreed to give respondents the exclusive right to resell the motel for a period of five years. Two years after they purchased the motel, the Carters asked O.B. Linkous to try to sell the motel, but the Carters sell held the motel when the resale agreement expired in late 1978. One of the obligations assumed by the Carters in exchange for the motel was secured by a mortgage that C.E.K., Inc., had executed in favor of O.B. Linkous Realty, Inc., on December 14, 1972. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. This assumed obligation required the Carters to make certain monthly payments to the corporate respondent including a payment of $862.19 on January 1, 1979. Under the mortgage agreement, the entire principal (originally $88,247.93) would become due if a "default continue for a space of 30 days." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. On January 25, 1979, Mr. Carter delivered to Mr. Linkous a check in the amount of $862.19, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, as payment of the amount due on January 1, 1979. When he handed the check to respondent Linkous, Mr. Carter told him that the funds in the account on which the check was drawn were insufficient for the drawee to pay the check, but that he would deposit sufficient funds on the following day. Respondent Linkous answered that he saw no problem since he intended to deposit the check in his own account in another bank and assumed it would be at least a day before the check was presented to the drawee. On the following day, Mr. Carter deposited $865.96 in the account on which the check was drawn. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. On January 31, 1979, the balance in the account was $1,000.32. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3. Instead of depositing the check, respondent Linkous took the check, on the same day he received it, to the Flagship First National Bank of Ormond Beach, on which it was drawn, and persuaded a teller there to stamp it so as to indicate that it had been dishonored because sufficient funds were not on deposit. On February 7, 1979, a mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed against the Carters and C.E.K., Inc., (as holder of a junior mortgage), in which respondents' attorney alleged that the Carters had "defaulted under the note and mortgage by failing to pay the payment due January 1, 1979, and all subsequent payments." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. The Carters retained counsel who filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was alleged, inter alia, that Linkous "deliberately with premeditated design, deceived and tricked [the Carters]." Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2. After these pleadings had been filed, the Carters agreed to respondents' counsel's suggestion that they grant the corporate respondent the exclusive right to sell the motel for another five-year period in exchange for an end to the litigation, and executed an agreement to that effect. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 6. The parties stipulated that both respondents hold real estate licenses issued by petitioner.

Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That petitioner suspend respondents' licenses for a period of five years. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of June, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: S. Ralph Fetner, Jr., Esquire 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Howard Hadley, Esquire 827 Deltona Boulevard Deltona, Florida 32725

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
# 7
ROBERT O. FIGUEREDO vs. FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION, 77-002289 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-002289 Latest Update: Mar. 22, 1978

The Issue Whether petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman, pursuant to Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, should be approved.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner field applications for registration as a real estate salesman with respondent on October 10, 1977. Question 16 of the application reads as follows: 16. Have you, in this state, operated, attempted to operate, or held yourself out as being entitled to operate, as a real estate salesman or broker, within one year next prior to the filing of this application without then being the holder of a valid current registration certificate authorizing you to do so? The petitioner answered "no" to Question 16. On December 8, 1977, respondent Florida Real Estate Commission issued an order denying the application based on its determination that the applicant had operated, attempted to operate or held himself out as a real estate broker or salesman within the one year period prior to filing his application. Petitioner thereafter requested a hearing in the matter. (Exhibit 1) Petitioner is the president of Marketing Institute Corporation of the Americas, Ltd. of San Jose, Costa Rica. (MICA) The firm operates as a real estate sales organization under the laws of Costa Rica, and is owned by Insco S.A., a Costa Rican holding company. (Testmony of McIntire, Figueredo) In 1975, petitioner became associated with William W. Landa, president of Costa del Sol, a condominium project in Miami, Florida. His function was to produce sales of condominium units as a result of sales efforts in Latin America. Part of the informal arrangement was the petitioner occupied a rental villa at the condominium project. His success in producing sales was limited and, as a result, the association was terminated sometime in 1976. In a letter to Lands, dated January 21, 1977, petitioner sought an accounting of expenses incurred in the operation and stated that he had produced three purchasers for which commissions were payable at the rate of "10% for foreign sales and 5% on domestic sales." Although no explanation of the terms "foreign sales" and "domestic sales" was presented, Landa testified at the hearing that petitioner did not sell in Florida for Costa del Sol. (Testimony of Landa, Figueredo, Exhibits 2-3) On December 1. 1976, the receiver in bankruptcy of the estates of Grandlich Development Corporation and Fisher Development Corporation, Fred Stanton Smith, president of the Keyes Company, Miami, Florida, Wrote petitioner and offered to pay his firm a 10% commission on "all sales closed by you of all Commodore Club Condominiums sold to your prospects." The commission was to be payable to MICA through its agent in the United States, Transcontinental Properties, Inc. of Miami, Florida, a corporate broker, The Commodore Club is a condominium project located at Key Biscayn, Florida. Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. was the registered broker for the sales of the condominiums and kept sales agents on the premises. Smith instructed Hemisphere to cooperate with foreign brokers in the sales of the properties. Petitioner proceeded under this arrangement to obtain and refer prospective foreign purchasers to Transcontinental who arranged to show the condominium units to the clients and consummate any resulting sales. Although petitioner had desk space in the Transcontinental office from September, 1976, to August, 1977, he was not supposed to show properties to clients or be involve in any real estate sales functions. In September, 1976, the president of Transcontinental placed a telephone call to respondent's legal office at Winter Park, Florida and ascertained that commissions could be paid to a foreign broker. However, he was informed by the Commission representative that it was a "gray" area and, although the foreign representative could serve as an interpreter for foreign clients during transactions in the United States, he could not perform any of the sales functions himself in Florida. Sales were made in this manner and commission checks were paid to petitioner's firm during the period January - September, 1977. (Testimony of Smith, McIntire, Figueredo, Exhibits 4, 5, 12, 13, 15) On July 1, 1976, Alexander Sandru purchased a condominium at the Commordore Club through the Keyes Company as broker. He was a friend of petitioner's from Caracas, Venezuela, and the latter had recommended his purchase of the condominium. However, petitioner was not in the United States at the time Sandru viewed the property and purchased it. Petitioner claimed a commission on the sale and it was paid to his firm through Transcontinental's predecessor company. A dispute arose over the payment of the commission because a saleswoman of Hemisphere Equity Investors, Inc. had shown the property to Sandru and assumed that she would earn the commission on any resulting sale. (Testimony of Lundberg, Nelson, Murragy, Exhibits 8-11) On several occasions in 1976 and 1977, petitioner accompanied Latin American individuals to the Commodore Club where a representative of Hemisphere showed them various condominium units. During this time, petitioner would inquire concerning maintenance charges and the like and transmit such information to the individuals in Spanish. Several of these persons were connected with petitioner's foreign firm and were not prospective purchasers. (Testimony of Lundberg, Figueredo, Exhibit 7) On January 30, 1977, Insco S.A. entered into a purchase agreement for a Commodore Club condominium unit. Petitioner signed the agreement on behalf of his firm MICA as broker for the transaction. However, the deal was never consummated. (Testimony of Figeredo, Exhibit 14)

Recommendation That Petitioner's application for registration as a real estate salesman under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes, be denied. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of March, 1978. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: John Huskins, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard J. Mandell, Esquire 748 Seybold Building Miami, Florida 33132

Florida Laws (1) 475.01
# 9

Can't find what you're looking for?

Post a free question on our public forum.
Ask a Question
Search for lawyers by practice areas.
Find a Lawyer