The Issue 1. Whether the applications which are the subjects of DOAH Case Nos. 96-4970 and 96-4971 should be granted. 2a. Whether the respondents in DOAH Case No. 96-5525 committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued in that case. 2b. If so, what sanctions should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency, which, among other things issues motor vehicle retail installment seller (MVRIS) licenses. Jack Bowshier Buick-Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc. (Bowshier Buick) is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Florida. Bowshier Buick formerly operated an automobile dealership at 2445 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart, Florida, and held a MVRIS license issued by the Department. At all times material to the instant cases, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., in his capacity as owner/director/president, and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., in his capacity as general manager/director, exercised control over the policies and practices of Bowshier Buick. On or about October 25, 1995, the Department began an investigation into the business affairs of Bowshier Buick. The Department's investigation revealed, among other things, that Bowshier Buick engaged in the practice of reselling "trade-ins" without timely satisfying the existing liens on the vehicles. Such practice, which was the product of cash flow problems the dealership was experiencing, adversely affected the credit ratings of those who had "traded-in" these vehicles and prevented the ultimate purchasers of the vehicles from timely obtaining new certificates of title. In the "deal jackets" that the dealership created to place the paperwork relating to the transactions involving these "traded-in" vehicles, the Department's investigators found copies of checks which were made payable to those who held the liens on these "trade-in" vehicles. The investigators subsequently discovered, however, that these checks had not been timely sent to the lienholders, but instead had been placed in the desk drawer of the dealership's office manager, Christine Casale. On several occasions, when customers who had "traded-in" vehicles complained to the dealership that the liens on their vehicles had not been satisfied, they were told by Casale that the checks to satisfy the liens had been mailed to the lienholders, when in fact they had not been. Such misrepresentations were made in an effort to mislead and deceive these complaining customers. In making these fraudulent misrepresentations, Casale acted pursuant to instructions that had been given to her by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr. On November 3, 1995, the Department issued an Emergency Immediate Temporary Final Order to Cease and Desist and Suspension of [Bowshier Buick's] Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License (Emergency Order) in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195. Bowshier Buick, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., were named as respondents in the Emergency Order. The Department alleged in the Emergency Order that they had committed the following violations of the law for which they are subject to the penalties as set forth in Section 520.995, Florida Statutes: Violation of Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes, in that they have perpetrated fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, or gross negligence in retail installment transactions, regardless of reliance by or damage to the buyer. Violation of Section 520.995(1)(b), Florida Statutes, in that they have committed criminal conduct in the course of their Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sellers business. Violation of Section 520.995(3)(d), Florida Statutes, in that they have demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility. On November 13, 1995, an Administrative Complaint for Imposition of Sanctions was filed against Bowshier Buick, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr. Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., subsequently engaged in negotiations with William Chamberlain, the owner and president of WAFC Holdings, Inc. (WAFC) concerning the sale of the assets of Bowshier Buick to WAFC in return for, among other things, the assets of two Chamberlain-owned corporations, South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., d/b/a Palm Beach Motors, and Stuart Motors, Inc., d/b/a Stuart Motors, that were in the business of selling pre- owned motor vehicles in the West Palm Beach and Stuart areas, respectively. On December 5, 1995, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Chamberlain signed paperwork (Sale/Purchase Agreements) in which their corporations agreed to consummate such a transaction. On that same date, they also, on behalf of their corporations, executed Interim Management Agreements, pursuant to which WAFC took over the management of Bowshier Buick's dealership at 2445 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart and Bowshier Buick assumed responsibility for the management of Palm Beach Motors and Stuart Motors, effective December 5, 1995. Later that month, WPAS, Inc. (WPAS) and DAB, Inc. (DAB) were formed. At all times material to the instant case, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., has been the sole owner, president and director of WPAS, and, as such, has directed the operations of the corporation. At all times material to the instant case, WPAS maintained its principal place of business at 2815 Okeechobee Boulevard in West Palm Beach, the location of Palm Beach Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., was the general manager of Palm Beach Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., has been the sole owner, president and director of DAB, and, as such, has directed the operations of the corporation At all times material to the instant case, DAB has maintained its principal place of business at 2695 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart, the location of Stuart Motors. At all times material to the instant case, Todd Bowshier, has been the general manager of Stuart Motors. A Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195 (Stipulation) was executed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., on behalf of Bowshier Buick and on his own behalf, and by Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., on January 31, 1996, and by Thomas Stouffer, the Regional Director of the Department's Southeast Florida Regional Office, on behalf of the Department, on February 2, 1996. It provided as follows: The State of Florida, Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (hereinafter "Department"), and Respondents Jack Bowshier Buick-Pontiac-GMC Trucks, Inc. (hereinafter "Bowshier Buick"), Jack A. Bowshier (hereinafter "JA Bowshier"), and Jack D. Bowshier (hereinafter "JD Bowshier"), in consideration of the mutual promises herein contained and other good and valuable consideration hereby agree to enter into this Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order as follows: At all times material hereto Bowshier Buick has been a Florida corporation with its principal place of business located at 2445 SE Federal Highway, Stuart, FL 34994. On or about December 25, 1988 Bowshier Buick was issued a Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License by the Department, which remains active to date. At all times material hereto JA Bowshier has been a Director, owner and control person of Bowshier Buick. In these capacities JA Bowshier creates, controls, formulates, directs and personally participates in the acts, practices and affairs of Bowshier Buick. At all times material hereto JD Bowshier has been a Director and General Manager of Bowshier Buick. In these capacities JD Bowshier creates, controls, formulates, directs and personally participates in the acts, practices and affairs of Bowshier Buick. On or about October 25, 1995, the Department received information that it believed indicated that Bowshier Buick had accepted motor vehicles as "trade-ins" and resold these vehicles without first satisfying their existing liens. The Department was concerned that purchasers of these motor vehicles could not be issued Certificates of Title. As a result of this information, Department examiners/investigators, on three occasions, visited Bowshier Buick's principal office pursuant to Section 520.996, Florida Statutes. They concluded that Bowshier Buick was engaging in acts and/or practices constituting violations of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes. On November 3, 1995, the Department filed an Emergency Immediate Temporary Final Order to Cease and Desist and Suspension of Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller's License (hereinafter "Emergency Order") which was followed, on November 13, 1995, with an Administrative Complaint for Imposition of Sanctions and Notice of Rights (hereinafter "Complaint"). Respondents agree that they have been duly served with both the Emergency Order and Complaint and that the Department has jurisdiction over them and this case. The Department agrees that Respondents timely filed their Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Petition for Formal Proceedings in response to the Complaint. The Department herein makes the following findings of fact, upon which the penalties imposed are based, but which findings Respondents neither admit nor deny: There were approximately thirty trade-ins taken by Bowshier Buick for which the dealership had not satisfied existing liens. Some of these vehicles were resold without first satisfying their existing liens. Some customers who traded in their motor vehicles suffered adverse credit ratings because of the failure of Bowshier Buick to pay off the existing lienholders. Bowshier Buick was experiencing severe cash flow problems. For the month of September, Bowshier Buick incurred a monthly bank charge of $5,000 for dealership bank overdrafts. A total estimated amount of $125,000 in outstanding insufficient funds checks was evident as of November, 1995. Bowshier Buick did not remit premiums collected to the insurance company for credit life, accident & health insurance policies which had been purchased by Bowshier Buick customers. They had not forwarded said premiums for policies purchased by customers since January, 1995. Bowshier Buick records were misleading in that copies of checks made payable to lienholders and in the amount due to satisfy liens were contained within the files for months, when the checks were never delivered and/or funds were never disbursed to the payee. Respondents maintain that subsequent to the Department's filing of its Emergency Order, Bowshier Buick has cooperated with the Department to resolve the lien, title, and premium problems. In an effort to avoid litigation and costs associated therewith, the Department and Respondents now voluntarily agree to enter into this Stipulation for Settlement and Consent to Final Order (hereinafter "Stipulation") addressing the violations raised by the Emergency Order and the Complaint. The Respondents and the Department agree as follows: Respondents will bring and keep all books and records up to date and maintain them accurately and in compliance with the law. Respondents will maintain and keep current all forms required by the automobile dealer's manual, Department of Motor Vehicles and the Department, including the title log. Respondents will keep all title work and registrations current and in compliance with the law. Respondents will write any and all insurance policies and remit all premiums in compliance with the law, including but not limited to credit life, accident and health insurance. Respondents will dismiss with prejudice any and all actions pending in Circuit Court and the District Court of Appeal, not file any further actions in any court which in any fashion or respect arise or tend to arise out of the facts presented by the Emergency Order or the Complaint (see paragraph 6 herein) and, indemnify and hold the Department harmless if such further actions are filed. Respondents shall, within 30 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, reimburse any and all customers who made payment(s) on past due liens which they did not owe. Within 45 days, verifiable proof of reimbursement shall be provided to the Department. Respondent shall, within 90 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, assist any and all customers who have been affected by Respondents untimely payment of liens in repairing their credit. Their assistance shall include, but shall not be limited to, sending letters to lenders wherein Respondents assume all responsibility for the late lien payments. Within 105 days, verifiable proof of such assistance shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall, within 30 days from the date of execution of this stipulation, reimburse any and all customers due refunds on credit life, accident and health insurance. Within 45 days, verifiable proof of such assistance shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall, immediately upon execution of this stipulation, pay off any and all outstanding past due customer liens, as well as all liens that have been improperly levied upon customers. Upon repayment, verifiable proof thereof shall be provided to the Department. Respondents shall operate the dealership, at all times in compliance with the law. Respondents shall pay to the Department by cashiers check, within 30 days of the date of execution of this stipulation, $5,000, representing costs of the Department's examination/investigation in this case. Respondents agree to sell Bowshier Buick to WAFC Holdings, Inc., its agents, nominees or assigns. If the sale is cancelled or not consummated within 6 months from the date of the Final Order herein, for any reason: 1.) Respondents will immediately notify the Department, Diane Leeds, Esq., in writing via certified mail, return receipt requested, of that fact. 2.) Respondents' Departmental license(s) shall be placed upon and remain on probation for a period of three (3) years, commencing on the date the sale is cancelled or not consummated. For the duration of the probationary period, Respondents agree to: Provide the Department, on a monthly basis, prior to the 10th day of each month, a copy of the dealership "finance log" attached hereto and made a part hereof as Exhibit "A." Allow the Department to make unannounced visits to the dealership, as frequently as the Department deems necessary, to assure that Respondents are operating in compliance with the law. Prior to the termination of the probationary period the dealership shall have, in reserve, a minimum of three (3) weeks supply of operating capital, to be computed based upon the operating expenses of the dealership at that time, and provide verifiable proof thereof to the Department. The Final Order incorporating the terms of this stipulation constitutes final agency action by the Department for which the Department may seek enforcement pursuant to the provisions of Chapters 120 and 520, Florida Statutes, and Respondents knowingly and voluntarily agree to waive any right to: 1. A formal hearing; 2. To contest the finality of the Final Order; 3. To contest the validity of any term, condition, obligation or duty created hereby; 4. To separately stated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; and 5. To administrative or judicial review hereof. Respondents acknowledge, concur and stipulate that their failure to comply with any of the terms, obligations and conditions of this stipulation and the Final Order adopting it, shall result in their being deemed to be in violation of a written agreement and Final Order issued pursuant to the provisions of Chapters 120 and 520, Florida Statutes, and Respondents stipulate and agree to the issuance of an emergency suspension of their license(s) and a cease and desist order. Respondents waive all rights to prior notice and hearing before entry of such order. However, nothing herein limits Respondents' right to contest any finding or determination made by the Department concerning their alleged failure to comply with any of the terms and provisions of this stipulation or of the Final Order. Respondents waive and release the Department and its agents, representatives, and employees from any and all causes of action they may have including without limitations, any right to attorney fees arising out of this proceeding; libel; slander; violation of a constitutionally protected right; intentional tortious interference with advantageous contractual relationship and the like; arising prior to or out of the filing of the Complaint, Emergency Order, the execution of the stipulation and entry of the Final Order. The Department agrees to accept this release without acknowledging, and expressly denies, that any such causes of action may exist. Respondents further agree that nothing contained herein shall be construed to waive or restrict the Department's right to initiate any legal action based upon facts or information which come to the Department's attention subsequent to the execution of this stipulation and the Department further agrees that nothing contained herein shall be construed to waive or restrict the Respondents' rights to defend any subsequent legal action. The Department and Respondents each agree to bear their own costs and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with this proceeding and entry of the Final Order, except as stated in paragraph 11k. herein. The Department and Respondents represent that the officer(s) executing this stipulation are authorized to act on behalf of the corporations and agency for settlement purposes. The Department and Respondents acknowledge that they have read this stipulation and fully understand the rights, obligations, terms, conditions, duties, and responsibilities with respect to its contents. Execution of this stipulation by the Department shall not be construed as a final acceptance of its terms and conditions absent entry of a Final Order by the Comptroller adopting same, however, the existing Emergency Order shall be null and void immediately upon entry of the Final Order by the Comptroller. The undersigned parties hereby acknowledge and agree to the terms and conditions of the foregoing stipulation by written consent on the last date executed below, subject to final approval by the Comptroller. On February 16, 1996, a Final Order was issued in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195 adopting the parties' Stipulation and requiring the parties to comply with the Stipulation's terms and conditions. The purchases of the assets of Bowshier Buick, South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., and Stuart Motors, Inc., were finalized in March of 1996. On March 18, 1996, WPAS filed with the Department an Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License (WPAS's Application). In its Application, WPAS indicated that it was doing business as Palm Beach Motors at 2815 Okeechobee Boulevard in West Palm Beach. In response to Question 10 on the application form, which read as follows, WPAS answered "yes" and appended to its completed Application a copy of the Stipulation filed in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F- 11/95, and 4287b-F-1195: Has the applicant, any of the persons listed herein, or any person with power to direct the management or policies of the applicant had a license, registration, or the equivalent, to practice any profession or occupation revoked, suspended, or otherwise acted against? Yes No (If yes, list such persons, give details, and provide a copy of the allegations and documentation of the final disposition of the case.) WPAS's Application was signed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr. On April 8, 1996, DAB filed with the Department an Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License (DAB's Application). In its Application, which was signed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., DAB indicated that it was doing business as Stuart Motors at 2695 Southeast Federal Highway in Stuart. In response to Question 10 on the application form, DAB mistakenly answered "no." Neither a copy of the Stipulation filed in Administrative Proceeding Nos. 4287-F-11/95, 4287a-F-11/95, and 4287b-F-1195, nor a copy of the Final Order entered in these proceedings, was appended to DAB's completed Application. The Department granted DAB's Application and issued DAB a MVRIS license, effective April 11, 1996. On May 1, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., sent the following letter to the Department: I am voluntarily surrendering my license from the Department of Banking and Finance issued to DAB, Inc., D/B/A Stuart Motors to you today due to the fact that we have made an honest mistake in the application for the license. I apologize for this mistake. I am reapplying for the license for this corporation. I ask that you please reconsider your position. On that same day, May 1, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., on behalf of WPAS, and William Chamberlain, on behalf of South Florida Auto Exchange, Inc., executed an agreement (WPAS Use of License Agreement), which provided as follows: AGREEMENT made this 1st day of May, 1996 by and between SOUTH FLORIDA AUTO EXCHANGE, INC., DBA PALM BEACH MOTORS, INC., a Florida corporation ("PBM") AND WPAS, INC., a Florida corporation ("Operator"). WHEREAS, PBM and Operator, or Operator's affiliate, entered into an agreement for sale and purchase of assets dated December 5, 1995 (the "Asset Purchase Agreement") for the purchase and sale of certain assets of PBM located at 2815 Okeechobee Blvd., West Palm Beach, Florida (the "Dealership"); and WHEREAS, PBM and Operator closed on the sale and purchase on or about the 19th day of March, 1996; and WHEREAS, Operator has submitted an application (the "Application") to the State of Florida, Comptroller's Office, Department of Banking (the "Department") for a license to originate financing in connection with the sale of automobiles at the Dealership, which Application remains pending with the Department; and WHEREAS, Operator has not yet received a license from the Department pursuant to the Application; and WHEREAS, Operator has requested PBM to allow Operator to continue to use PBM's license (the "PBM License") from the Department at the Dealership pending the Department's action on Operator's Application; and WHEREAS, PBM, after obtaining the verbal approval of the Department, has agreed to allow Operator to utilize PBM['s] License at the Dealership on a temporary basis. NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of Ten dollars ($10.00) paid by Operator to PBM, as well as other good and valuable considerations, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged by PBM, the parties agree as follows: The foregoing recitals are true and correct and incorporated herein by reference. PBM hereby authorizes Operator to originate finance paper under the PBM license at the Dealership until the earlier of: PBM notice to Operator of the revocation of such authority, which notice may be given [by] PBM, in PBM's sole and absolute discretion, at any time upon three (3) days prior notice to Operator, upon the Department's disposition of Operator's application, whether such disposition is a granting of a license or the denial of a license, any demand by the Department that Operator cease the use of the PBM license, upon the infraction of any rule or regulation by Operator applicable to the PBM License. Operator agrees to utilize the PBM License only in strict compliance of all applicable rules and regulations, including, but not limited to the rules and regulations of the Department. Operator does hereby agree to indemnify and hold PBM harmless against any claim arising out of the Dealership or Operator's use of the PBM License. This Agreement contains the entire understanding of the parties and may not be changed or modified orally, but only by written instrument signed by the parties hereto. Any notice required or permitted to be given under this Agreement shall be in writing, delivered by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by a national overnight courier service, such as Federal Express, and mailed to the parties at the following address: PBM: c/o Stuart Buick Pontiac GMC 2445 S.E. Federal Highway Stuart, Florida 34994 Operator: 2815 Okeechobee Blvd. West Palm Beach, Florida 33409 This agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their successors and assigns. This Agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Florida. In the event litigation is instituted in connection with the enforcement of the terms of this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees, including attorneys fees and costs on appeal. The "PBM License" referenced in the WPAS Use of License Agreement had an "expiration date" of December 31, 1996. An agreement between DAB and Stuart Motors, Inc. (DAB Use of License Agreement) containing provisions substantially identical to those in the WPAS Use of License Agreement was executed by Jack A. Bowshier, Sr. (on behalf of DAB) and Chamberlain (on behalf of Stuart Motors, Inc.) also on May 1, 1996. The MVRIS license which was the subject of the DAB Use of License Agreement, like the "PBM License," had an expiration date of December 31, 1996. The WPAS and DAB Use of License Agreements were both drafted by Chamberlain's attorney, Michael Botos. Before drafting these agreements, Botos had spoken to Diane Leeds, an attorney with the Department. Botos erroneously believed that Leeds, acting on behalf of the Department, had given the "verbal approval" referenced in the agreements. On May 6, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., filed a corrected Application for Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Seller License on behalf of DAB (DAB's Second Application). Department investigators visited Palm Beach Motors on July 19, 1996. They discovered, from an examination of WPAS's records, that WPAS (acting through Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., the general manager of Palm Beach Motors) had been involved in retail installment transactions with retail buyers of its vehicles, notwithstanding that it did not have a license from the Department authorizing it to engage in such activity. Ten retail installment contracts (signed by Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., on behalf of WPAS) were found and reviewed. In four of these ten retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate in excess of 18 percent per annum. By letter mailed on July 19, 1996, the Department notified WPAS of its intention to deny WPAS's Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its notice, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, WPAS's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes. Department investigators visited Stuart Motors on July 22, 1996. They discovered, from an examination of DAB's records, that DAB (acting through Todd Bowshier, the general manager of Stuart Motors) had been involved in retail installment transactions with retail buyers of its vehicles, notwithstanding that it did not have a license from the Department authorizing it to engage in such activity. Ten retail installment contracts (signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB) were found and reviewed. In all of these ten retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of 19.95 percent per annum. On or about July 26, 1996, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., met with Department representatives, including Diane Leeds, to discuss the Department's proposed action. At the meeting, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., was told that "he could not finance without a license at that time under anybody's license." Nonetheless, following the meeting, WPAS (doing business as Palm Beach Motors) and DAB (doing business as Stuart Motors), relying on the legal advice of their attorney (and acting through their general managers), continued to operate as motor vehicle retail installment sellers without having MVRIS licenses of their own (as they had done since May of that year, following the execution of the WPAS and DAB Use of License Agreements). In addition, they continued to knowingly charge buyers simple interest rates in excess of 18 percent per annum. Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., was at all material times aware of these activities, which continued at Palm Beach Motors until approximately September or October of 1996, when the used car operation was sold,1 and continued at Stuart Motors until early 1997. By letter mailed on October 1, 1996, the Department notified DAB of its intention to deny DAB's Second Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its notice, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, DAB's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes. Department investigators returned to Stuart Motors on October 6, 1996, to examine DAB's records. Their examination revealed nine retail installment contracts that DAB had entered into since the investigators' July 22, 1996, visit. These contracts were signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB. In all but one of these retail installment transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of more than 18 percent per annum. In late January of 1997, personnel from the Office of the State Attorney, 19th Judicial Circuit, assisted by Department personnel, conducted a search (pursuant to a search warrant) of the records maintained by DAB at Stuart Motors. Sixty-four retail installment contracts (signed by Todd Bowshier on behalf of DAB) that DAB had entered into from August 10, 1996, to January 25, 1997, (including eight of the nine contracts that Department investigators had discovered during their October 6, 1996, visit to Stuart Motors) were seized. Thirty-seven of these 64 retail installment transactions took place from August 10, 1996, to October 16, 1996. In all but one of these 37 transactions, the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of more than 18 percent per annum. In all of the post-October 16, 1996, transactions (including eight which occurred after the expiration of the MVRIS license which was the subject of the DAB Use of License Agreement), the buyer was charged a simple interest rate of 17.99 percent. It was not until the Bowshiers received a copy of the following letter, dated February 13, 1997, the Office of the State Attorney, 19th Judicial Circuit, sent to the Department regarding the "Jack Bowshier investigation" that DAB stopped engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller: This letter is in response to your investigation of DAB, Inc. d/b/a Stuart Motors etc. As you are aware I have spent the last three weeks reviewing the events between your Department, which began on March 18, 1996, and the above named suspect. It is apparent from the outset of your investigation that Mr. Bowshier and associates have done everything in their power to continue operating a business and finance automobiles without the appropriate Retail Installment Sellers license. However, it is my opinion that I would have insurmountable proof problems in a criminal prosecution based on the events that have occurred to date. Mr. Bowshier maintains that he can continue writing installment loan contracts because the validity of the denial of his application continues to be the subject of litigation. Mr. Bowshier continues to suggest that this is his position at the advi[c]e of his attorney, Mr. Ronald LaFace. After speaking with Mr. LaFace regarding the above I can see why the suspect would reasonably rely on his attorney's advice. Even to me, Mr. LaFace continues to maintain the position that the denial of the licensure application is "nonfinal." While we know this position is irrelevant to both the Department of Banking and Finance, and the criminal prosecution, it still creates the appearance of a defense which would remove the "criminal intent" aspect of our case. I have an ethical obligation to only prosecute cases in which I believe, based on my training and experience, there is a reasonable chance for a conviction at trial. Because this case has become so diluted in "my attorney told me" and "my understanding was . . .," I cannot ethically go forward with a criminal prosecution and still meet my burden of proof at trial. However, I understand the frustration in wanting to go forward in a case of this nature. With that in mind this letter will serve two purposes. While my declination to prosecute this case up through the date of this letter is final, it is not absolute. This letter will be sent to both Mr. Bowshier (and associates) and Mr. Ronald LaFace. In doing so, it will serve a very particular purpose. It will inform the above (including Mr. LaFace), that I will not prosecute the criminal acts that Mr. Bowshier and associates have committed to date because of the above explained proof problems. However, I will prosecute from this date forward any and all financing that occur[s] by the suspect and his associates without a license. I should make it perfectly clear to Mr. Bowshier and his attorney that it does not matter what their position is regarding the "appeal" of the denial of license, they cannot finance automobiles. Mr. Bowshier and associates should also know that the advice of their attorney to continue writing contracts during the pendency of the licensure "appeal" is wrong. If the suspect and his associates continue to write contracts, it will constitute a criminal act despite the advice of his attorney. I will prosecute Mr. Bowshier and associates if he continues to write contracts without the appropriate licenses pr[e]scribe[d] by law. The "appeal" referenced in the letter was taken after the Department, by letter mailed October 1, 1996, advised DAB of its intention to deny DAB's Application for a Motor Vehicle Installment Seller License. In its letter, the Department advised that its proposed denial was based upon, among other things, DAB's engaging in the business of a motor vehicle retail installment seller without a license, in violation of Section 520.03(1), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding the Bowshiers guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; (2) directing the Bowshiers to cease and desist from committing such violations; (3) imposing jointly and severally upon WPAS, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Jack D. Bowshier, Jr., an administrative fine in the amount of $7,000.00; (4) imposing jointly and severally upon DAB, Jack A. Bowshier, Sr., and Todd Bowshier an administrative fine in the amount of $61,500.00; and (5) denying WPAS's and DAB's applications for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1998.
The Issue Whether Petitioner has standing under section 320.642, Florida Statutes, to file a petition with the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (Department) protesting the establishment of an additional dealership at a proposed location.
Findings Of Fact As defined in section 320.60(11)(a), Recovery Racing is an existing motor vehicle dealer, and is a party to a Maserati franchise agreement. Recovery Racing sells Maserati vehicles from a licensed franchise located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. As defined in section 320.60(8), Maserati is a licensee. Rick Case is the additional Maserati dealer that Maserati seeks to establish at 3500 Weston Road, Davie, Florida (proposed location). The Proposed Location is approximately 18 miles from Recovery Racing’s dealership located at 5750 North Federal Highway, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Recovery Racing is not within a radius of 12.5 miles of the proposed Rick Case location; accordingly, Recovery Racing is not claiming standing pursuant to section 320.642(3)(b)1. Recovery Racing relies on section 320.642(3)(b)2., to establish standing. Mr. Stockton, the expert presented by Recovery Racing, opined that Recovery Racing has standing to protest because it made more than 25 percent of its retail sales to persons with registered household addresses within a 12.5 mile radius of the proposed location. Mr. Stockton’s opinion is based on his assumption that “registered household address,” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2., means the address where the persons who use or drive the vehicle reside, regardless of the household addresses where the purchased vehicles are registered. Mr. Stockton explained that in making his calculation, he did not rely on vehicle registration data; rather, he relied on the dealership sales files for each sale, and information provided to him by Mr. Hayim, the general manager for Recovery Racing. Mr. Stockton’s opinion on standing was also based on his definition of “retail sales” as set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2. According to Mr. Stockton, sales to businesses are included as retail sales where the business is an “instrument” of the transaction, and the person using the car is a “beneficiary.” In contrast, he explained that a sale to a business is excluded as a retail sale when the business is the “beneficiary” of the transaction. Turning to the time periods referenced in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.004(9) sets forth the manner in which the 36-month period within which the 12-month period for standing is calculated. The period ends on the last day of the month preceding the month in which notice is published, running through the end of the month prior to the date of publication of the notice. Given the date of the notice in this case, which is May 12, 2014, the relevant period in the instant case ends on April 30, 2014, and begins 36 months before that date on May 1, 2011. In calculating the time periods detailed in section 320.642(3)(b)2., Mr. Stockton was unaware of the Florida Administrative Code rule addressing the calculation of the 12-month period within a 36-month period. Accordingly, he began and ended his calculations mid-month, on May 19, 2011. He explained that there were approximately 730 possible 12-month periods to review; each one starting on a different day, going forward 12 months. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the statutory time periods does not comply with the standards set forth in the Florida Administrative Code. In making a standing calculation, the automotive industry calculates the percentage using the following fraction: the denominator is the total number of retail sales, and the numerator reflects the number of retail sales that are within the geographic radius required by the statute (referred to as “the ring”). The records attached to Mr. Stockton’s reports, which are tabs 6 through 128 (although not consecutively numbered) in Exhibit 1, contain the documents that Mr. Stockton relied upon in making his standing calculation. Mr. Stockton calculated the fraction at least two different times; both calculations were presented to the undersigned. The first calculations were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 32 127 25.20% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 32 126 25.40% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 33 127 25.98% Mr. Stockton’s revised calculations, after receiving more information about some of the sales, were reported as follows: Date range Sales within ring Nationwide sales Percent within ring 5/19/2011-5/18/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/20/2011-5/19/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/21/2011-5/20/2012 34 127 26.77% 5/22/2011-5/21/2012 34 126 26.98% 5/23/2011-5/22/2012 35 127 27.56% Sixteen of the sales included in the “sales within ring” (using either of the two reports detailed above) are not supported by any vehicle registration data. Those 16 sales are, as enumerated by the tabs attached to Mr. Stockton’s report, the following: 18, 19, 24, 34, 37, 43, 51, 61, 68, 76, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119, and 122. Interestingly, for two of the sales, tab 37 and tab 43, Mr. Stockton knew that the cars were registered in New Hampshire and Orlando, Florida, respectively. He included them, however, in the sales within the ring because he had knowledge that the vehicles were being used by persons with household addresses within the ring. Mr. Stockton’s method of reviewing the “end user” of a vehicle sale is wholly dependent on documents that vary from sales file to sales file and on information given to him by the general manager of the dealership. This methodology is subjective and easily manipulated by an interested party. Mr. Stockton also included two sales, tabs 24 and 122, that were sold to non-retail buyers, who purchase the vehicle wholesale. He included both because he had acquired information that the “end users” of the vehicles were persons with household addresses within the ring. Maserati’s expert, Mr. Farhat, opined that Recovery Racing did not have standing to protest because Recovery Racing did not meet the 25 percent requirement of retail sales within the 12.5 mile radius, within the time period mandated by the statute. Mr. Farhat’s calculations were based on the assumption that the statutory term “registered household addresses” means the household addresses to which vehicles are registered with the Department. Given this assumption, he reviewed the vehicle registration data for each retail sale. Mr. Farhat obtained the data from two authoritative sources in the automotive industry: Experian and IHS. Both of these entities obtain their vehicle registration data from state departments of motor vehicles. Mr. Farhat defined the term “retail sale” as sales to individuals, and to businesses that purchase less than 10 vehicles in a year. He explained that this definition is used industry-wide. Mr. Farhat ultimately opined that Recovery Racing never got close to reaching the 25 percent requirement, in any of the potential rolling 12-month periods in the preceding 36- months. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “registered household addresses” is found credible, as it gives meaning to all of the language contained in the statute. Mr. Stockton’s definition is not supported by the statutory language, is unreliable, subject to manipulation, fails to give any meaning to the word “registered” as used in the statute, and inserts the term “end user” into the statute. Mr. Farhat’s testimony as to the definition of “retail sales” is also found credible, as it is an objective standard used by the automotive industry. Mr. Stockton’s definition of “retail sales” is suspect in that it requires investigation into whether a business is a “beneficiary” or an “instrument”—-again, information that is highly subjective and easily manipulated. The plain meaning of the words “registered household addresses,” as used in section 320.642(3)(b)2., is the household address to which a vehicle is registered with the Department. Given that 16 of the sales included in the ring by Mr. Stockton had no vehicle registration data, they cannot be included in the numerator. Two of those 16 sales were also not retail sales, as defined by the automotive industry. Recovery Racing failed to meet its burden of proving that it has standing to protest the proposed Rick Case dealership location, as it did not establish that 25 percent of its retail sales, sold during the defined statutory timeframe, were within the 12.5 mile radius set forth in section 320.642(3)(b)2.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order dismissing Recovery Racing’s protest of the proposed establishment of an additional dealer for lack of standing. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of December, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JESSICA E. VARN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of December, 2014. COPIES FURNISHED: Jennifer Clark, Agency Clerk Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A430 2900 Apalachee Parkway, MS 61 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) J. Andrew Bertron, Esquire Nelson, Mullins, Riley, and Scarborough, LLP Suite 202 3600 Maclay Boulevard, South Tallahassee, Florida 32312 (eServed) Robert E. Sickles, Esquire Hinshaw and Culbertson, LLP Suite 500 100 South Ashley Drive Tampa, Florida 33602 (eServed) Elias C. Schwartz, Esquire Schwartz and Englander, P.A. 1900 Glades Road, Suite 102 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 (eServed) Robert D. Cultice, Esquire Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Door, LLP 60 State Street Boston, Massachusetts 02109 (eServed) Richard N. Sox, Esquire Jason T. Allen, Esquire Bass Sox Mercer, P.A. 2822 Remington Green Circle Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Terry L. Rhodes, Executive Director Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room B-443 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed) Steve Hurm, General Counsel Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Room A-432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 (eServed)
The Issue Whether Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 is a invalid exercise of legislatively delegated authority in violation of Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an agency of the State of Florida. The Department adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C- 17.005, which became effective March 3, 1996. The Rule has not been amended since its initial adoption. JM Lexus and Lexus of Orlando are both licensed franchised motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida. Lexus of Orlando has filed a complaint in the Ninth Circuit Court, Orange County, Florida, alleging, that JM Lexus violated Rule 15C-7.005 in connection with the alleged sale for resale of new Lexus vehicles to non-Lexus dealerships. FADA and SFADA are trade associations whose members are licensed motor vehicle dealers in the State of Florida and are substantially affected by the rule. Florida Administrative Code Rule 15C-7.005 provides the following: 15C-7.005 Unauthorized Additional Motor Vehicle Dealerships - Unauthorized Supplemental Dealership Locations. An additional motor vehicle dealership, as contemplated by Sections 320.27(5) and 320.642, Florida Statutes, shall be deemed to be established when motor vehicles are regularly and repeatedly sold at a specific location in the State of Florida for retail purposes if the motor vehicle dealer transacting such sales: Is not located in this state, or Is not a licensed motor vehicle franchised for the specific line-make, or Is a licensed motor vehicle dealer franchised for such line-make, but such sales are transacted at a location other than that permitted by the license issued to the dealer by the Department. Such sales are not subject to this rule, however, when a motor vehicle dealer occasionally and temporarily (not to exceed seven days) sells motor vehicles from a location other than the motor vehicle dealer's licensed location provided such sales occur within the motor vehicle dealer's area of sales responsibility (except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed a licensee under this rule). For the purpose of this rule, a sale for retail purposes is the first sale of the motor vehicle to a retail customer for private use, or the first sale of the motor vehicle for commercial use, such as leasing, if such commercial motor vehicle is not resold for a period of at least ninety days. Furthermore, this rule shall apply regardless of whether the titles issued, either in this or another state, pursuant to such sales are designated as "new" or "used." An additional motor vehicle dealership established in this fashion is unlawful and in violation of Section 230.642, Florida Statutes. A licensed motor vehicle dealer of the same line-make, as the vehicle being sold in violation of this rule, may notify the Department of such violation. The notice shall include motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the identity of the selling dealer and initial retail purchaser of the motor vehicles involved. Within 30 days from receipt of a request from the Department containing motor vehicle identification numbers or other data sufficient to identify the motor vehicles involved, the licensee shall provide to the Department, to the extent such information is maintained by the licensee, copies of documents showing the dealer to whom each vehicle was originally delivered, any inter- dealer transfer and the initial retail purchaser as reported to the licensee. Upon a showing of good cause, the Department may grant the licensee additional time to provide the information requested under this paragraph. Examples of good cause include, but are not limited to, request for information on more than 100 vehicles, information on vehicle sales which accrued more than 2 years prior to the date of the request, and information which is no longer maintained in the licensee's current electronic data base. Within forty days of receipt of notice from the motor vehicle dealer, the Department shall make a determination of probable cause and if it determines that there is probable cause that a violation of this rule has occurred, the Department shall mail, by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the line-maker motor vehicle dealership or dealerships involved a letter containing substantially the following statement: Pursuant to Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C., the undersigned has received a notice that you have allegedly supplied a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis, which were sold at a location in the State of Florida, at which you are not franchised or licensed to sell motor vehicles. If these allegations are true, your conduct may violate Florida law including, but not limited to, the above-mentioned rule, Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. It may also cause you to be deemed a licensee, importer and/or distributor pursuant to Florida law and subject you to disciplinary action by the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, including fines and/or suspension of your Florida Dealer license, if applicable. The Division of Motor Vehicles is putting you on notice, if you are conducting such activity, that you cease and desist such activity immediately. If you fail to do so, this agency will take appropriate action. If the dealer supplying vehicles in violation of subsections (1) and (4) is not located in the State of Florida, the Department shall notify such dealer in writing that they may be operating as a distributor of motor vehicles without proper authorization in violation of Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, and may be violating Section 320.642, Florida Statutes. A motor vehicle dealer, whether located in Florida or not, which supplies a substantial number of vehicles on a regular and repeated basis which are sold in the manner set forth in subsection (1), shall be deemed to have established a supplemental location in violation of Section 320.27(5), Florida Statutes, and Rule 15C-7.005, F.A.C. Furthermore, a motor vehicle dealer which supplies vehicles in this manner shall be deemed to have conducted business within the State of Florida and acted as a "licensee," "importer" and "distributor" as contemplated by Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, and thus such activity shall constitute a violation of Sections 320.61 and 320.642, Florida Statutes. Furthermore, this paragraph neither imposes any liability on a licensee nor creates a cause of action by any person against the licensee, except a motor vehicle dealer who may be deemed to have acted as a licensee under this paragraph. Furthermore, no provision of this entire rule creates a private cause of action by any person against a licensee, other than a dealer who is deemed a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule, for civil damages; provided, however, if a licensee fails to comply with the requirements of paragraph (3)(a) of this rule, the Department may bring an action for injunctive relief to require a licensee to provide the information required. No other action can be brought against the licensee pursuant to this entire rule other than a dealer who is deemed to be a licensee pursuant to the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule. Any franchised motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, the provisions of subsection (4) of this rule by a motor vehicle dealer, or a motor vehicle dealer which pursuant to subsection (4) shall be deemed to have conducted business and acted as a licensee, importer, and distributor, has adversely affected or caused pecuniary loss to that franchised motor vehicle dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all remedies against such dealers, including, but not limited to the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under Sections 320.695 and 320.697, Florida Statutes. Rule 15C-7.005 identifies as specific authority Section 320.011, Florida Statutes. Section 320.011 states: The department shall administer and enforce the provisions of this chapter and has authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement them. The Rule lists as "Law Implemented" Sections 320.27 and Sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes. Sections 320.60 through 320.70, Florida Statutes, are commonly referred to as the Motor Dealers Act. Section 320.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, provides the following definitions for a motor vehicle dealer and a franchised motor vehicle dealer: (c) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person engaged in the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale at wholesale or retail, or who may service and repair motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Any person who buys, sells, or deals in three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period or who offers or displays for sale three or more motor vehicles in any 12-month period shall be prima facie presumed to be engaged in such business. The terms "selling" and "sale" include lease-purchase transactions. . . The transfer of a motor vehicle by a dealer not meeting these qualifications shall be titled as a used vehicle. The classifications of motor vehicle dealers are defined as follows: 1. "Franchised motor vehicle dealer" means any person who engages in the business of repairing, servicing, buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in s. 320.60(1). Subsection 320.27(2), Florida Statutes, requires motor vehicle dealers to be licensed. Subsection (5) of this same provision requires that "any person licensed hereunder shall obtain a supplemental license for each permanent additional place or places of business not contiguous to the premises for which the original license is issued." Section 320.27(9) authorizes the Department to discipline motor vehicle dealers for a variety of enumerated offenses. Among those enumerated offenses is the willful failure to comply with any administrative rule adopted by the department or the provisions of Section 320.131(8), Florida Statutes. § 320.27(9)(a)16., Fla. Stat. Section 320.60, Florida Statutes, provides definitions for terms used in Sections 320.61 through 320.70, Florida Statutes. Pertinent to this case are the following: "Agreement" or "franchise agreement" means a contract, franchise, new motor vehicle franchise, sales and service agreement, or dealer agreement or any other terminology used to describe the contractual relationship between a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or importer, and a motor vehicle dealer, pursuant to which the motor vehicle dealer is authorized to transact business pertaining to motor vehicles of a particular line-make. * * * (5) "Distributor" means a person, resident or nonresident, who, in whole or in part, sells or distributes motor vehicles to motor vehicle dealers or who maintains distributor representatives. * * * "Importer" means any person who imports vehicles from a foreign country into the United States or into this state for the purpose of sale or lease. "Licensee" means any person licensed or required to be licensed under s. 320.61. * * * (10) "Motor vehicle" means any new automobile, motorcycle, or truck, including all trucks, regardless of weight . . . the equitable or legal title to which has never been transferred by a manufacturer, distributor, importer, or dealer to an ultimate purchaser; (11)(a) "Motor vehicle dealer" means any person, firm, company, corporation, or other entity, who, Is licensed pursuant to s. 320.27 as a "franchised motor vehicle dealer" and, for commission, money, or other things of value, repairs or services motor vehicles or used motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as defined in subsection (1), or Who sells, exchanges, buys, leases or rents, or offers, or attempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of any interest in, motor vehicles, or Who is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling motor vehicles, whether or not such motor vehicles are owned by such person, firm, company, or corporation. * * * (14) "Line-make vehicles" are those motor vehicles which are offered for sale, lease, or distribution under a common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the manufacturer of same. Section 320.61, Florida Statutes, requires all manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers to be licensed. Section 320.63, Florida Statutes, describes the application process for obtaining licensure for manufacturers, factory branches, distributors or importers. The section authorizes the Department to require certain enumerated information as well as "any other pertinent matter commensurate with the safeguarding of the public interest which the department, by rule, prescribes." § 320.63(7), Fla. Stat. Section 320.64, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: 320.64 Denial, suspension, or revocation of license; grounds.--A license of a licensee under s. 320.61 may be denied, suspended, or revoked within the entire state or at any specific location or locations within the state at which the applicant or licensee engages or proposes to engage in business, upon proof that the section was violated with sufficient frequency to establish a pattern of wrongdoing, and a licensee or applicant shall be liable for claims and remedies provided in ss. 320.695 and 320.697 for any violation of any of the following provisions. A licensee is prohibited from committing the following acts: * * * (3) The applicant or licensee willfully has failed to comply with significant provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 or with any lawful rule or regulation adopted or promulgated by the department. * * * A motor vehicle dealer who can demonstrate that a violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the preceding provisions by an applicant or licensee will or can adversely and pecuniarily affect the complaining dealer, shall be entitled to pursue all of the remedies, procedures, and rights of recovery available under ss. 320.695 and 320.697. Section 320.642, Florida Statutes, provides the process for a licensee to establish additional motor vehicle dealerships or to relocate existing dealerships to a location where the same line-make vehicle is presently represented by a franchised motor vehicle dealer or dealers. Section 320.642, does not, by its terms, authorize rulemaking. Section 320.69, Florida Statutes, states in its entirety that "the department has the authority to adopt rules pursuant to ss. 120.536(1) and 120.54 to implement the provisions of this law." Section 320.695, Florida Statutes, which contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: In addition to the remedies provided in this chapter, and notwithstanding the existence of any adequate remedy at law, the department, or any motor vehicle dealer in the name of the department and state and for the use and benefit of the motor vehicle dealer, is authorized to make application to any circuit court of the state for the grant, upon a hearing and for cause shown, of a temporary or permanent injunction, or both, restraining any person from acting as a licensee under the terms of ss. 320.60-320.70 without being properly licensed hereunder, or from violating or continuing to violate any of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70, or from failing or refusing to comply with the requirements of this law or any rule or regulation adopted hereunder. Such injunction shall be issued without bond. A single act in violation of the provisions of ss. 320.60-320.70 shall be sufficient to authorize the issuance of an injunction. However, this statutory remedy shall not be applicable to any motor vehicle dealer after final determination by the department under s. 320.641(3). Section 320.697, Florida Statutes, which also contains no additional grant of rulemaking authority, provides: Civil damages.--Any person who has suffered pecuniary loss or who has been otherwise adversely affected because of a violation by a licensee of ss. 320.60-320.70, notwithstanding the existence of any other remedies under ss. 320.60-320.70, has a cause of action against the licensee for damages and may recover damages therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction in an amount equal to 3 times the pecuniary loss, together with costs and a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by the court. Upon a prima facie showing by the person bringing the action that such a violation by the licensee has occurred, the burden of proof shall then be upon the licensee to prove that such violation or unfair practice did not occur.
Conclusions _ This matter came before the Department for entry of a Final Order pursuant to an order closing the file at the Division of Administrative Hearings. The record reflects that the parties have settled their dispute and entered into a Settlement Stipulation. Having reviewed the stipulation and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, it is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: 1. Respondent shall pay a civil fine of $5,000.00. Payment shall be made in the form of a certified cashier’s check payable to The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles and delivered to the Division of Motor Vehicles, Bureau of Field Operations, Region IV Office, at 1354 South Woodland Boulevard, Deland, Florida, 32720. Payment shall be delivered as set out herein within thirty (30) days of the entry of this final order by the Division of Motor Vehicles approving this settlement. Jan 2? 2010 11:57 DHSMY LEGAL TLH Fax: 850-617-5112 Jan 2? 2010 11:56am 002/009 2. Respondent agreed to voluntarily surrender its motor vehicle dealer license within thirty (30) days of the entry of this final order by the Division of Motor Vehicles approving the settlement. 3. Respondent expressly and affirmatively agreed that if it fails to timely pay the fine or to surrender its license as set forth herein the Petitioner will revoke its license without prior notice. Respondent further expressly and affirmatively waives its ability to challenge or appeal such revocation by any means in any forum whatsoever. 4. Florida Luxury Coach, LLC, may file an application for a motor vehicle dealer license pursuant to section 320.27, Florida Statutes. If Florida Luxury Coach, LLC, does apply, the: following conditions will apply: (a) The Petitioner will not rely on the violations alleged in the administrative complaint in this matter to deny the application or otherwise hold such violations against Florida Luxury Coach, LLC. (b) _—_- Victoria L. Scott will be the sole manager/member of Florida Luxury Coach, LLC. (c) Lon Neuville may be employed by Florida Luxury Coach, LLC, solely in a sales capacity. : (d) Victoria L. Scott and Florida Luxury Coach, LLC, expressly and affirmatively agree that no motor vehicle dealer license will be issued to it until the civil fine agreed to herein is paid and until the Respondent surrenders its motor vehicle dealer license. (e) Florida Luxury Coach, LLC, must meet the normal qualifications imposed by statute and administrative rule for issuance of a motor vehicle dealer license. (63) Failure to abide by the conditions of this agreement will be grounds for denial. or revocation of a motor vehicle dealer license to Florida Luxury Coach, LLC and Victoria L. Scott. 5. Victoria L. Scott signed the agreement individually, as a member of the Respondent and as a member of Florida Luxury Coach, LLC. 6. Each party shall bear its own costs and attomey fees in this matter. DHSMV LEGAL TLH Fax: 850-617-5112 Jan 2? 2010 11:56am P003/009 7. The undersigned warrant that they entered into this agreement freely and voluntarily and are doing so under advice of legal counsel. They further warrant that they have the full authority of their respective parties to enter into the agreement and to bind the parties to its terms. 8. Each party will bear its own costs and attorney fees. It is further ORDERED that the Settlement Stipulation of Petitioner and Respondent is adopted and incorporated into this Final Order f the Department in accordance with its terms. DONE AND.ORDERED this 2b ay of January, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Copies furnished: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Senior Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kixkman Building, Rm. A-432 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0504 Peter N. Hill, Esquire Wolff, Hill, McFarlin & Herron, P.A. 1851 West Colonial Drive Orlando, Florida 32804 A A. FORD, Directo Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkanan Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Motor Vehicles this day of January, 2010. Jan 2? 2010 OHSMV LEGAL TLH Fax: 850-617-5112 J.D. Parish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 William Camper Hearing Officer Division of Motor Vehicles Julie Gentry Chief, Bureau of Field Operations Nalint Vinayak Dealer License Administrator Florida Administrative Law Reports Post Office Box 385 Gainesville, Florida 32602 11:5? Jan 27 2010 11:57am 004/009
The Issue Whether the Respondent knowingly sold rebuilt vehicles without disclosing in writing to the purchaser, customer, or transferee that the vehicles were previously titled as rebuilt vehicles.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles R. Kuhn, III, is and was at all times relevant to the allegations in the administrative complaint a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida. The Respondent did business in the name A-1 Auto and Truck Center and was located at 12180-1 Phillips Highway, Jacksonville. The Department is the state agency authorized by statutes to regulate licensed independent motor vehicle dealers and to maintain the titles of motor vehicles in the State of Florida. Pam A. Albritton testified about her experiences buying a vehicle from the Respondent. On August 22, 2003, as reflected by the date on the installment sales contract, Albritton purchased a 2000 Volkswagen (VW), VIN (Vehicle Identification Number) 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, for $8,281.80. The Respondent did not at any time provide Albritton with a written statement that the vehicle she purchased, VIN 3 VWSD 29 M1YM 197846, hereafter the Albritton vehicle or car, was a rebuilt vehicle and had been previously titled as a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Albritton that this vehicle was a rebuilt vehicle. Albritton did not see the certificate of title to the vehicle until after the sale of the vehicle. Albritton took the car to an authorized VW dealer in November of 2003 because it was not shifting gears properly. The dealer found that the vehicle had suffered extreme damage from an accident and needed extensive repairs to the engine control system and the airbag in order to make the car safe to drive. The dealer told Albritton what had been found and advised her not to drive the car until it had been repaired. Albritton confronted the Respondent about the problems with the vehicle, and the Respondent gave her a handwritten "warranty" dated November 20, 2003. Pursuant to this agreement, Albritton took the car to the Respondent to have the seatbelts fixed; however, the repairs did not actually make the belts safe because the seatbelt retractor mechanism would not lock. In December of 2003, the wheel bearings on Albritton's car broke, and she contacted the Respondent about getting the car fixed. She was informed that the Respondent was away for two weeks, and nothing could be done until he returned. Needing her car for transportation in her work, she paid $200 to have the wheel bearings repaired. Pursuant to a mediation agreement, Albritton agreed to settle her complaint against the Respondent on the basis that he would get her a comparable vehicle. The Respondent was supposed to contact Albritton within 30 days of the mediation but failed to do so. The records introduced at hearing show that Albritton's vehicle had been re-titled as a rebuilt vehicle. Such a title indicates that the vehicle in question had been written off as an insurance loss and the original title cancelled or destroyed. Thereafter, the vehicle was repaired, and the person making the repair obtained a new title, which when issued, showed that the vehicle was rebuilt. Aylwin S. Bridges testified regarding his purchase of a VW from the Respondent. On or about June 14, 2003, Aylwin S. Bridges, purchased a 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, from the Respondent for $11,555.00. Neither prior to nor at the time of the sale did the Respondent provide Bridges a written statement that the 2000 VW, VIN 3 VWTE 29 MXYM 135556, was a rebuilt vehicle. The Respondent did not tell Bridges that the car he was purchasing was rebuilt. The records introduced at hearing show that the Bridges' car had been re-titled as rebuilt. Bridges did not see a certificate of title to the vehicle prior to the sale of the vehicle. The Bridges' vehicle had extensive mechanical problems. For example, the engine control module had been spliced into the car and several codes had been deleted from it; the seat belts would not work; and the horn would not work. When Bridges sought to trade the vehicle, he found that the most he was offered for the car was only $2,500 because it was rebuilt. The Respondent testified in his own behalf. He did not deny having failed to disclose to Albritton and Bridges in writing prior to selling them their cars that the vehicles had previously been titled as rebuilt vehicles. The Respondent introduced a general disclaimer, Respondent's Exhibit 7, which was provided to Albritton and Bridges. This disclaimer states that the purchaser is buying a used car and that used cars may have any one or more of the listed problems. The Respondent testified that he knew the cars were rebuilt, but felt he had complied with the legal requirements of disclosure by providing the buyers with the aforementioned disclaimer. The specifics of the disclaimer are discussed in the Conclusions of Law for purposes of continuity, but are findings of fact.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order finding that the Respondent violated Section 319.14, Florida Statutes, on two occasions; fine Respondent $1,000 for each violation; and suspend the Respondent's license for six months for each violation, said suspensions to run consecutively, and that payment of the fine be a condition precedent to re-issuance of a license. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Patrick Kuhn, III A-1 Auto and Truck Center 12180-1 Philips Highway Jacksonville, Florida 32256 Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite A432 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Carl A. Ford, Director Division of Motor Vehicles Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, Suite B439 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399
The Issue The primary issues for determination are whether Respondent committed a myriad of violations of Section 320.27, Florida Statutes, which provides certain requirements applicable to motor vehicle dealers. The violations alleged to have been committed by Respondent are inclusive of failures to display a consumer sales window form, to keep certain records of purchases and sales, to keep proper records of temporary tags, and not possessing required proper proof of ownership of two vehicles. In the event that Respondent committed these violations, an additional issue is what administrative penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with regulating the business of buying, selling, or dealing in motor vehicles or offering or displaying motor vehicles for sale. Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed independent motor vehicle dealer in Florida, having been issued license number VI-13051. Petitioner issued the license based upon an application signed by Sudarshan Kuthiala, as President. Respondent's address of record is 5895 St. Augustine Road, Suite No. 8, Jacksonville, Florida 32207. Respondent's president is Sudarshan Kuthiala. On or about March 12, 2004, Petitioner's compliance examiner conducted an annual records inspection of Respondent's dealership. The purpose of that inspection was to determine whether the dealership was complying with statutory and rule requirements. Arrangements to conduct the inspection were made at least a week ahead of time. At the time of the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner found that Respondent did not have the "Buyer's Guide" required by federal law and known as a “consumer sales window form,” properly displayed on a vehicle, a 1995 Nissan, Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) 1N6SD16S25C386012, being offered for sale by Respondent. Also, during the March 12, 2004 inspection, the compliance examiner reviewed five purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent. The examiner discovered that records of two of the vehicles involved did not contain any documentation of the method or proof of purchase or the required odometer disclosure statement at time of acquisition. Another of the vehicles did not have the odometer disclosure statement upon its disposition. An examination during the March 12, 2004 inspection of Respondent's temporary tag log found that the log was incomplete. Respondent's temporary tag log did not include the name and address of the person to whom a temporary tag for a vehicle had been assigned. A follow-up inspection of Respondent's dealership was conducted on June 23, 2004. An appointment for that inspection was made at least one week ahead of time. In the course of that June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner discovered Respondent did not display the required "Buyer's Guide" or “consumer sales window form” required by federal law on a 1992 Mercury automobile with VIN 1MEPM6043NH616615, being offered by Respondent for sale. Further, Respondent's records did not contain the odometer disclosure statement of that vehicle when it was acquired. Additionally, Respondent did not have a title or other proof of ownership of the 1992 Mercury automobile. During the June 23, 2004 inspection, Petitioner's examiner also discovered that records of three purchases and sales of motor vehicles made by Respondent were deficient. Records for two of the vehicles did not have the method or proof of purchase or odometer disclosure statement upon acquisition. Records for one of the vehicles did not have the required odometer disclosure statement upon disposition of the vehicle. The June 23, 2004 inspection also revealed that Respondent's temporary tag log was incomplete. The log did not reveal the name and address of a person to whom a temporary tag was issued or the vehicle identification number of the vehicle for which the temporary tag was issued. Following both of the inspections recounted above, neither Sudarshan Kuthiala nor anyone else on behalf of Respondent offered to provide the missing records or account for them. In the course of attendance at training school for dealers, Sudarshan Kuthiala was informed of the required forms and the process for their preparation. Also, Respondent's records have been inspected in the past and recordkeeping requirements further explained to Kuthiala.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order revoking Respondent’s license. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Sudarshan K. Kuthiala 2961 Bernice Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32207 Fred O. Dickinson, III, Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicle Neil Kirkman Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500
The Issue Whether Respondent, Maserati North America, Inc.’s ("MNA"), proposed 2017 Commercial Policy Program ("2017 Program") is a modification of the franchise agreement between MNA and Petitioner, New Country Motor Cars of Palm Beach, LLC, d/b/a Maserati of Palm Beach ("Palm Beach"), or Petitioner Recovery Racing, LLC, d/b/a Maserati of Ft. Lauderdale ("Fort Lauderdale"); and, if so, whether it is fair and not prohibited by section 320.641(3), Florida Statutes (2016). Whether MNA’s proposed modifications to the Existing Franchise Agreements with Petitioners are fair and not prohibited under section 320.641(3).
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence presented, the Pre-hearing Stipulation of the parties and the record as a whole, the following relevant and material Findings of Fact are made2/:
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A final order be entered by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles: (1) DISMISSING Petitioners’ claims regarding MNA’s 2017 Commercial Policy Bonus Program; and (2) GRANTING, IN PART, AND DENYING, IN PART, Petitioners’ claims regarding modifications in the Proposed New Agreement, as set forth above. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of January, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of January, 2018.
The Issue Whether General Motors' decision not to renew its franchise agreement with Gallman Pontiac was "unfair" as the term is defined by Section 320.641(3), Florida statutes.
Findings Of Fact Background On or about October 28, 1988, (general Motors Corporation, Pontiac Division (General Motors) notified it franchisee, Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. (Gallman Pontiac), a licensed motor vehicle dealer in the State of Florida, of its election not to renew the franchise agreement, effective ninety days from the date of the delivery of the notice of its decision. Because the franchise agreement was scheduled to expire on November 20, 1988, Bill Gallman would have the option to void the nonrenewal due to General Motor's failure to notify the motor vehicle dealer ninety days in advance of the proposed nonrenewal. To avoid this result and to comply with the franchise agreement, General Motors informed the dealer in the same notification that the current agreement was being extended for the same ninety day period in which the dealer had been given notice of the proposed nonrenewal. General Motors' extension of the term of the franchise agreement was a unilateral proposed novation that was accepted by Gallman Pontiac when he relied upon the modification and continued to do business under the novation. Gallman Pontiac's acceptance of the novation is clearly demonstrated by the timing of the verified complaint in this proceeding, which was filed on January 12, 1989. The specific reason stated by General Motors for its decision not to renew its franchise agreement beyond the ninety-day period was that Gallman Pontiac failed to fulfill its minimum sales performance responsibilities pursuant to its contractual obligations as set forth in the Dealer Sales and Service Agreement. Gallman Pontiac subsequently filed a verified complaint, pursuant to Section 320.641, Florida Statutes, to contest the proposed nonrenewal of the franchise agreement. The complaint alleges that the proposed nonrenewal is unfair and that the grounds asserted for the nonrenewal were factually untrue and/or legally insufficient for the intended purpose. The Mathematical Formula for Sales Effectiveness The manufacturer's primary purpose for entering into a franchise agreement with a dealer is to have its automobiles sold. To determine whether a dealer is meeting its responsibilities in this regard, the franchise agreement contains a mathematical formula which is used to evaluate the sales performance of all dealers who sell Pontiacs. Pursuant to the formula, which is expressed in the agreement and tide annual sales performance evaluation form, a dealer's sales ratio and registration ratio must be calculated. A dealer's sales ratio is determined by dividing the dealer's actual unit sales of new motor vehicles, wherever registered, by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. A dealer's registration ratio is determined by dividing new motor vehicle unit registrations by industry new unit registrations in the Dealer's Area of Prime Responsibility. After these ratios are recorded, the dealer's sales and registration ratios are compared to zone and national registration ratio levels to determine sales and registration effectiveness. If the individual dealer's sales and registration performances reach a comparative level of 85 percent effectiveness to the zone and national levels, the dealer's performance is considered effective by General Motors. When the comparisons were made in this case, the dealer's sales effectiveness was 53.6 percent in 1987 and 68.5 percent in 1988. Registration effectiveness was 56.5 percent in 1987 and 74.1 percent in 1988. These levels of performance do not meet the minimum levels required by the franchise agreement. Other Considerations Under the Agreement In addition to the mathematical formula, the franchise agreement states that General Motors will consider other relevant factors in its sales evaluation, including the following factors: the trend over a reasonable period of time of dealer's sales performance; the manner in which dealer has conducted the sales operations, including advertising, sales promotion and treatment of customers; sales to fleet customers if they have affected registrations; the manner in which dealer has submitted orders for new motor vehicles to the Pontiac Division; the availability of new motor vehicles to dealer; and significant local conditions that may have directly affected dealer's performance. If the mathematical formulas regarding sales and registration effectiveness set forth in the franchise agreement were the sole measure used to determine Gallman Pontiac's sales performance through January 1989, it is clear that the dealer was not meeting its contractual obligations to General Motors in this area of responsibility. However, under the terms of the agreement, General Motors must look to other relevant factors that may have directly affected dealer's performance before a final determination can be made regarding an individual dealer's sales effectiveness. Contrary to the terms of the agreement, the annual evaluation forms show that Gallman Pontiac's performance was evaluated on retail sales only. The other relevant factors in the franchise agreement were not reviewed before the decision not to renew the franchise agreement was made. Other Relative Factors in the Agreement Which Should Have Been Considered in the Dealers Evaluation When the trend of the Gallman Pontiac's sales performance is reviewed, the evidence shows that Gallman Pontiac's sales performance over the life of the franchise agreement has improved relative to market growth by a small percentage (7.51%). This slight upward trend does not demonstrate an effective performance as the sales were below an acceptable standard before the increase in sales, and the improvement barely exceeded the local market growth. The time period over which the trend evaluation occurred is reasonable in this case because both parties agreed to a two-year term in the franchise agreement, which was subject to an overall evaluation prior to a renewal of the agreement. Although there was opinion testimony from a former sales manager from the dealership that Gaillman Pontiac did not order sufficient quantities and mix of vehicles, and imprudently focused the advertising towards the limited, younger group of buyers in Naples, this testimony was not found to be credible by the Hearing Officer. All of the other evidence presented by both sides regarding the manner in which the dealer conducted sales operations demonstrates that Gallman Pontiac met or exceeded his contractual obligations in this area of responsibility. Sales to fleet customers did not affect registrations in 1988. The dealer chose not to compete in the fleet market because the later resale of these vehicles interferes with the sale of new vehicles at this dealership. The manner in which the dealer submitted orders to the Pontiac Division was not criticized by General Motors. The dealer's procedures were continuously reviewed and evaluated through the Dealer Assistance Program. There was no showing that the dealer's ordering procedures directly affected its sales performance. The allocation procedures were applied to Gallman Pontiac in the same manner they were applied to other dealers. The evidence did not show that imprudent selections were made by the dealer in the ordering process, nor was it sufficiently established that manufacturer delays or the unavailability of certain products interfered with the dealer's sales in Naples. A significant local condition that may have directly affected the dealer's sales performance was the lack of receptivity in the Naples market area for linemakes in the class of automobiles offered by Pontiac. Actual sales performance data for all new car registrations in the area show that the Naples market prefers to purchase automobiles from the high group of automobiles such as Cadillac, Lincoln, BMW, Mercedes Benz, and Porsche. Pontiac does not have a linemake designed to compete in this market segment. Application of the Other Relevant Factors To The Decision Not To Renew Because the franchise agreement and the annual sales evaluation form have not made provisions for any adjustments to the original statistical formula based upon the additional considerations mentioned in paragraphs 9-13, these factors are to be considered independently from the initial mathematical calculation. The purpose of the review of these factors is to determine if the statistical analysis is a reliable indicator of the sales performance of the dealer who is being evaluated before General Motors makes its final decision regarding termination. There has been no showing that General Motors ever used the additional considerations for any other purpose in its course of dealings with other dealers in the past or that any other interpretation has been given to these factors. In this case, when the additional relevant factors are reviewed in addition to the ineffective sales and registration performance statistics, the mathematical formula continues to be a reliable indicator that the sales performance at the Gallman Pontiac dealership does not meet required standards. The additional considerations set forth in the franchise agreement which are relevant to this case, do not seriously undermine the fairness of the application of the initial mathematical calculation to the sales performance of Gallman Pontiac. While the local market's lack of receptivity directly affects Gallman Pontiac's performance, the statistical formula takes this into account to a large degree when a dealer is required to meet eighty-five percent of the zone or national average to demonstrate minimum performance. If yet another mathematical formula was created to give additional weight to this local condition beyond the provision in the minimum standards formula, the manufacturer could be harmed by a individual dealer's lack of market penetration efforts. Because it is difficult to determine the primary cause and effect of poor market penetration in a specific area, the statistical formula is generally fair to both sides in most situations. It does not unfairly accuse either the dealer or the manufacturer as being responsible for the lack of sales. One indicator of the fairness involved in the application of the formula as designed can be found in Mr. Anderson's comparative analysis of the Naples automobile market and the Sarasota market. Mr. Anderson is the expert in automobile marketing analysis presented by General Motors. This analysis refutes the opinion of Dr. Ostlund, the expert presented by Gallman Pontiac during the hearing regarding automobile marketing analysis. It is Dr. Ostlund's opinion that Naples is a unique market in which the usual statistical formula becomes unfair if it is applied to all registrations in the Dealer's Area of Responsibility. Based upon this analysis, Dr. Ostlund suggests that a weighted average be applied in the standard formula to all of the sales made by Gallman Pontiac during the franchise period. However, even if this were done, Gallman Pontiac's performance would have been 84.7 percent, which is still below the required standard of 85 percent. Contrary to Dr. Ostlund's analysis, the Naples-Sarasota comparison conducted by Mr. Anderson demonstrates that Pontiac can compete in a high income area with similar demographics to Naples within the same zone along the same Florida coast. Therefore, the usual statistical formula remains a reliable indicator of the sales effectiveness of a Pontiac dealer in Naples, Florida, and should be applied without any further weighting of averages in the statistical analysis required by the franchise agreement. Application of Additional Factors Relevant to the Decision Not to Renew Pursuant to Statute A nonrenewal of the franchise agreement is clearly permitted by the franchise agreement. The nonrenewal has been undertaken in good faith and good cause. The manufacturer has continuously encouraged the dealer to meet sales performance standards and has worked with Gallman Pontiac in an effort to achieve this goal within the time frame agreed to by the parties. Because franchise dealers are the major outlet the manufacturer has for the sale of new automobiles, it is essential that minimum levels of sales performance are achieved on a regular basis. Failure to meet the minimum sales performance over the term of this agreement by Gallman Pontiac is a material and substantial breach of the contract.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles enter a Final Order dismissing Gallman Pontiac's complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 28 day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28 day of June, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-0505 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #3. Reject all but last sentence. Conclusions of Law. Accept the last sentence. Rejected. Conclusion of Law. Accepted. Reject that the dealer code problem can be attri- buted to the conduct of the manufacturer. Insufficient proof. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Reject the weighted average basis. See HO #14 and #15.. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Speculative. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Attempt to shift evidentiary burden. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Rejected. See HO #15. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #15. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. Accept that additional factor's need to be considered. Rejected Dr. Ostlund's interpretation. See HO #9 through #15. Rejected. Improper summary. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. Accepted, except for the last sentence which is an opinion or closing argument as opposed to a finding of fact. Accepted. Rejected. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted, except for Nissan. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. See HO Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Closing argument as opposed to finding of fact. Rejected. Irrelevant and contrary to fact. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Rejected. Conclusionary. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. See HO #10. Rejected. See HO #17. Rejected. See HO #15 and #17. Rejected. See HO #17. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #17. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #8. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO 415. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. See HO #13. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #15. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #11. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Redundant. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #14. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Rejected. Unreliable conclusion. Accepted. See HO #17. Rejected. Irrelevant. Outside the reasons given for nonrenewal. See HO #8. Rejected. Same reason as given in above. Rejected. Same reason as 49 and 50. Also contrary to fact. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant to this hearing. Accepted. See HO #17. Accepted. See HO #15. Rejected. Redundant and argumentative. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Improper argument. Rejected. The use of "sales reported" was allowed by the Hearing Officer at hearing. Rejected. Irrelevant in these proceedings. Rejected. Irrelevant and unreliable speculation. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Dr. Ostlund was very credible. Mr. Anderson's analysis, based upon y~he Sarasota- Naples comparison, which tended to refute the testimony of Dr. Ostlund, was given greater weight by the Hearing Officer. COPIES FURNISHED: James D. Adams, Esquire Michael J. Alderman, Esquire Feaman, Adams, Harris, Department of Highway Fernandez & Deutch, P.A. Safety And Motor Vehicles Corporate Plaza, Fourth Floor Neil Kirkman Building 4700 N.W. Second Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Boca Raton, Florida 33431 S. William Fuller, Jr., Esq. Vasilis C. Katsafanas, Esquire Fuller Johnson & Farrell Rumberger, Kirk, Caldwell, Post Office Box 1739 Cabaniss, Burke & Wechsler Tallahassee, Florida 32302 11 East Pine Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Charles J. Brantley, Director Division of Motors Vehicles William J. Whalen, Esquire Department of Highway Office of General Counsel Safety and Motor Vehicles General Motors Corporation B439 Neil Kirkman Building New Center One Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 3031 West Grand Boulevard Detroit, Michigan 48232 Enoch J. Whitney, Esquire General Counsel S. Thomas Wienner, Esquire Departments of Highway Dykema Gossett Safety and Motor Vehicles 35th Floor Neil Kirklan Building 400 Renaissance Center Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0500 Detroit, Michigan 48243
