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BERTHA MANCIL AND THOMAS H. MANCIL vs. EASTERN MARKETING SERVICE, INC., 78-002432 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002432 Latest Update: Apr. 26, 1979

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners and the Respondent had a business relationship under which the Respondent purchased watermelons from the Petitioners during the 1978 harvest season. Watermelons are at times sold on a "cash basis", which means that a buyer purchases the melons at the field for a set price per pound. At other times watermelons are sold on a "handle basis" or a "brokerage basis". Under these arrangements a buyer picks up a load of melons, sells it at the best obtainable price, and a portion of the sale price goes to the producer and a portion to the buyer. Prior to the 1978 harvest season, the Petitioners had had some unhappy experiences selling watermelons on a "handle" or "brokerage" basis. They decided to sell melons during the 1978 season only on a cash basis. The Respondent purchased several loads from the Petitioners during 1978 on a cash basis. A dispute arose as to four loads of melons which the Respondent purchased from the Petitioners late in the 1978 harvest season. The Petitioners understood that the transactions would continue to be on a cash basis. The Respondent, who was represented by W.B. Stevens in the transactions, appears to have had the honest belief that the transactions would be on a brokerage basis. Mr. Stevens did not, however, reduce the brokerage arrangement to writing, and he did not adequately advise the Petitioners that the terms of the transactions would be different from previous transactions that year. The four transactions were as follows: On May 30, 1978, the Respondent purchased 2,000 Grey watermelons which weighed 44,650 pounds at a quoted price of 4.75 cents per pound. On June 2, 1978, the Respondent purchased 1,330 Jubilee watermelons which weighed 45,470 pounds at 5.25 cents per pound. On June 5, 1978, the Respondent purchased 1,560 Grey watermelons which weighed 40,080 pounds at a quoted price of 4.50 cents per pound, and 1,550 Jubilee watermelons which weighed 44,100 pounds at a quoted price of 5.00 cents per pound. The total amount the Respondent owed the Petitioners for these four loads was $8,516.66. The Respondent issued the Petitioners a check for the loads in the amount of $5,453.72. The Petitioners are thus owed an additional $3,062.94. The Respondent offered several affidavits into evidence. These were identified for the record as Respondent's Exhibits 1-5, but they were rejected. Even if the affidavits had been admissible, they would not serve to alter the findings of fact set out herein. The affidavits identified as Respondent's Exhibits 1, 3 and 4 relate to the quality of the watermelons. Since it has been found that the melons were sold on a cash basis, the Respondent took ownership of the melons when they were loaded onto the Respondent's trucks. The quality of the melons would not, therefore, affect the amount the Respondent owed the Petitioners. If the Respondent were going to reject the melons, it should have done so when they were loaded onto the trucks. The affidavit which was identified as Respondent's Exhibit 2 relates to a truck shortage that existed in Florida at the time that the Petitioners' melons were harvested. While this affidavit may tend to support the Respondent's contention that it intended these loads to be sold on a brokerage basis, it does not alter the fact that the Respondent did not adequately communicate this understanding to the Petitioners. The affidavit which was marked as Respondent's Exhibit 5 is unsigned. Furthermore, it relates only that Mr. Stevens believed that the transactions would be handled on a brokerage basis. The affidavits are hearsay and are not cumulative of other evidence in this case. They are therefore inadmissible. Even if the affidavits were admissible, however, they would have no relevance to the issues. The Respondent is licensed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as an agricultural commodity dealer. The Respondent has a $20,000 bond on file with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that the Petitioners are entitled to $3,062.94 in additional compensation for agricultural commodities which they sold to the Respondent, and requiring the Respondent to pay this sum to the Petitioners. RECOMMENDED this 7th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 904/488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. W. B. Stevens President Eastern Marketing Services, Inc. P.O. Box 2156 Bartow, Florida 33830 Mr. Thomas H. Mancil P.O. Box 303 Clewiston, Florida 33840 L. Earl Peterson, Chief Bureau of License & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Robert A. Chastain General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.20604.21
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PEGGY J. THORNTON vs AFFILIATED OF FLORIDA, INC., 93-000321 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 21, 1993 Number: 93-000321 Latest Update: Mar. 14, 1994

The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of sex discrimination in employment.

Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the meaning of the relevant statute. Respondent is a wholesale food cooperative, which pools the wholesale purchasing power of numerous independent grocers. Respondent purchases goods from manufacturers and then sells them to the grocers, which are members of Respondent. The grocers offer the goods for sale at retail. Respondent also operates as a wholly owned subsidiary an insurance agency, which sells insurance to members and nonmembers. Although independent from the wholesale food operation, the insurance operation is housed in the same Tampa office building/warehouse complex as is the wholesale food operation. On June 19, 1991, Respondent hired Petitioner to work in the wholesale food operation. She was hired as an executive secretary or assistant to Gary Rinehart, who is the Vice President of the wholesale food operation. Petitioner had applied to work in the insurance operation, but was offered only the job in wholesale food. From the start, Petitioner told Mr. Rinehart that she wanted to move into insurance at the first opportunity. Mr. Rinehart had no objections as long as he was not left short- handed. Petitioner's primary responsibilities in wholesale food was to support the salespersons who travelled in the field assisting member-grocers with purchasing and displaying products. When the salespersons needed assistance while they were on the road, they would call Petitioner, who, from the Tampa office, would coordinate the efforts to solve a member's problems or get information or product to a member. Petitioner's ready availability was an important element of her job performance. Petitioner's immediate predecessor had quit after she had married another employee of Respondent. However, the evidence fails to establish that Respondent maintained a policy of requiring female employees who married another employee to leave upon their marriage. In any event, nothing surrounding the circumstances of the departure of Petitioner's predecessor suggests that her termination had anything to do with dating, which presumably preceded the marriage for some period of time. Mr. Rinehart discouraged dating among employees. When he first announced to his group that he had hired Petitioner, someone--presumably a travelling salesman--asked if she were married. Mr. Rinehart responded by telling his group that he did not like his employees to date each other. When Petitioner first began work, she did an excellent job, although she quickly developed a problem leaving work early and arriving late. She also failed to take a shorthand class that Mr. Rinehart had asked her to take, as Respondent's expense, since she joined Respondent. By the end of 1991, Petitioner evidently felt underchallenged by her assignment and had lost her enthusiasm for working in the wholesale food operation. Mr. Rinehart was receiving numerous complaints about Petitioner not being at her desk when needed, being on personal calls during working hours, and not relaying messages. She was also not doing her clerical tasks, like typing, accurately. Mr. Rinehart spoke with Petitioner about her work- related problems, but no improvement was seen until, in mid- December, 1991, Petitioner secured Mr. Rinehart's permission to seek a transfer into the insurance operation. Before the transfer was made, Petitioner had assisted in the preparation for an insurance seminar in Orlando sponsored by Respondent in late 1991 and had also begun attending the Monday morning meetings of the insurance sales staff. By mid-January, 1992, Petitioner had discussed with Harry Britton the possibility of her transfer into insurance. Mr. Britton is the general agent for Respondent's insurance agency and also serves as the Director of Human Relations. In February, 1992, Mr. Britton informed Petitioner that she could transfer into insurance if it was acceptable to Mr. Rinehart. Mr. Rinehart agreed, as long as Petitioner trained her replacement. She did and, at an undisclosed point in the month, transferred to the insurance operation. Petitioner's timing was unfortunate, assuming that she would have preferred her prior secretarial job to none at all. When Petitioner joined Respondent, it was still struggling to recover from the loss of the business of Kroger, which, when it withdrew from Florida, had accounted for over half of Respondent's gross sales. Respondent's performance had been poor for sometime, and it had already sold buildings, equipment, and leases in order to cut its expenses. Before taxes, on a consolidated basis, Respondent had the following earnings/(losses) for fiscal years ending 1987 through 1992, respectively: $482,000, $289,000, ($1,275,000), ($1,909,795), ($398,489), and ($1,503,543). The insurance operations accounted for the following earnings/(losses) for fiscal years ending 1988 through 1992, respectively: ($18,417), ($8207), $18,180, and $1810. In early 1992, Respondent confronted the facts that it had lost over $2.5 million over the past five years, was in the process of losing $1.5 million--the largest loss in Respondent's history--in 1992, and had already sold various assets. Additionally, it was entering the slow spring wholesaling season. Respondent's top management decided to make a reduction in force. The decision to make layoffs was made and communicated to Messrs. Rinehart and Britton around February 10-13, 1992. The decision had been discussed for about two months previously. The record does not disclose exactly when Petitioner transferred to insurance, but it appears to have been in early February, 1992. On February 22, 1992, Mr. Britton informed Petitioner that she would be laid off. Seven other employees were laid off at the same time, including others in the insurance operation. Layoffs were generally based on seniority with Respondent or in a particular department, and the layoff of Petitioner was consistent with this policy. Mr. Rinehart laid off four persons in his department. Although all of them hadmore experience than did Petitioner, her replacement as executive secretary, who had less experience with Respondent than did Petitioner, was not laid off. Unlike others laid off, Petitioner was given an indefinite period of time to look for work while remaining on Respondent's payroll and as much time off the job as she needed while she looked for work outside the office. Mr. Britton gave Petitioner special treatment because he wanted her to remain parttime. He offered her a parttime job in insurance at the meeting at which he informed her she was being laid off and again several times over the ensuing months. She refused each offer of parttime employment. After some difficulty, Mr. Britton eventually filled Petitioner's former position with a parttime person. On March 13, 1992, Petitioner announced that she did not want to remain employed by Respondent any longer, even under the special circumstances outlined above. She quit and Respondent paid her through March 20, 1992. Since the last quarter of 1991, Petitioner had been dating another employee of Respondent. This situation was known to Messrs. Rinehart and Britton. Although Mr. Rinehart was not reluctant to discourage employees from dating, there is no indication in the record that he took any action against Petitioner for dating an employee. The man whom Petitioner dated has also dated other employees of Respondent, evidently without adverse consequences to himself or the other employees, and remains employed with Respondent. More importantly, Mr. Britton, who laid off Petitioner, did not share Mr. Rinehart's concerns about dating among employees. Petitioner asked Mr. Britton at least twice if he had any problems with her dating an employee, and he replied that he did not. The record does not indicate that he took any action against Petitioner for dating an employee. Respondent had a legitimate, nonpretextual reason for laying off Petitioner--or, more precisely, converting Petitioner's position from fulltime to parttime. The reason was economics. Additionally, Petitioner had been a marginal employee in the wholesale food operation, so it is hard to interpret her untimely transfer to insurance as part of a conspiracy to rid Respondent of her for reasons of gender. If Respondent were discriminatorily focusing on the female employee of a male- female dating duo, it is not apparent from the record how Respondent would have addressed its "problem" by retaining Petitioner in parttime employment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. ENTERED on December 20, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 20, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-321 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1, 4, 6, 8: rejected as subordinate. 2-3, 5, 7, 10: rejected as recitation of testimony and subordinate. (additional evidence): stricken as outside the record. (first): adopted. 9 (second): rejected as legal argument. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-3, 13-15, 17-18, 20-26, 30-39: adopted or adopted in substance. 4: rejected as legal argument and recitation of testimony. 5-7, 9, 11-12, 16 (except for fact that Petitioner approached Messrs. Rinehart and Britton): rejected as subordinate. 8: rejected as repetitious and recitation of testimony. 10, 27-29: rejected as recitation of testimony. 19: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 40-43: rejected as irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Peggy J. Thornton, pro se 6802 North Branch Avenue Tampa, Florida 33604 W. Reynolds Allen Kevin O'Toole Hogg Allen 324 South Hyde Park Avenue, Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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JIMMIE MOTT AND D. W. NEELY vs. ANTHONY AND JOSEPH PELLEGRINO, 78-002023 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-002023 Latest Update: Mar. 21, 1979

Findings Of Fact The Petitioners and the Respondents had a contractual agreement, whereby the Respondents agreed to purchase watermelons from the Petitioners during the 1978 harvest season. The Petitioners were to be compensated for their watermelons by the pound as the melons crossed the scales during loading of the melons onto trucks. The actual price fluctuated based upon the market conditions. The Respondents' employees were responsible for picking and loading the melons. Pete Potenza was in charge of the loading operation for the Respondents. Mr. Potenza advised the Respondents that the price for the watermelons would be two and one-half cents per pound for the medium watermelons and three cents per pound for large ones. At the agreed price, the Petitioners would have been entitled to compensation of $1,197.75 for one load of watermelons, and $1,083.50 for another load. The Respondents compensated them $958.20 and $866.80 for the respective loads. The price paid by the Respondents was less than had been agreed upon. The Petitioners are entitled to $217.50 additional compensation for the first load, and $239.55 additional compensation for the second load. The Petitioners are entitled to total additional compensation in the amount of $457.05. There was no dispute as to the quality of the Petitioners' melons. The Respondents picked several loads of melons from the Petitioners subsequent to those which were disputed. Mr. Potenza advised the Petitioners that they would receive additional compensation, but they have not. The Respondents are licensed with the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services as an agricultural commodity dealer. The Respondents have filed a $20,000.00 bond with the Department.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final order be entered by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services finding that the Petitioners are entitled to $457.05 in additional compensation for agricultural goods which they sold to the Respondents and requiring the Respondents to pay this sum to the Petitioners. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of February, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Robert A. Chastain, Esq. General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32304 William F. York, Esq. GILMAN, MCLAUGHLIN & HANRAHAN Ten Post Office Square Boston, MA 02109 J. Victor Africano, Esq. P. O. Box 1450 Live Oak, FL 32060 Joseph Pellegrino, President A. Pellegrino & Sons, Inc. 24 New England Produce Center Chelsea, MA 02150 E. G. Musleh, Esq. P. O. Box 924 Ocala, FL 32670

Florida Laws (3) 120.57604.20604.21
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LEAH RAULERSON vs DIXIE GROWERS, INC., AND U. S. FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-005753 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Plant City, Florida Sep. 25, 1992 Number: 92-005753 Latest Update: Aug. 16, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., is indebted to Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, for agriculture produce purchased and not paid for in the amount of $3,722.49.

Findings Of Fact Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following relevant factual findings. During times material, Petitioner, Leah Raulerson, was an agricultural producer within the meaning of Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes and concentrated primarily in the production of peppers. During times material, Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., was an agricultural dealer within the meaning of Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, and wholesaler and purchased peppers from Petitioner during May and June, 1992. Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, issued a surety bond to Respondent Dixie during times material. During late May and June, 1992, Petitioner sold various types of pepper including hungarian wax, finger hots, long hots, bell pepper, fancy cubanelle and jalopeno to Respondent Dixie. During times material, Petitioner inquired of one of Respondent Dixie's owners, Charles Lawton, what the wholesale market was bringing for the type of peppers that she produced and desired to sell. Respondent Dixie advised that the average wholesale price was $8.00 per box. Petitioner told Respondent Dixie, that she could sell her peppers for that price but if the market deteriorated to the point where the price was $4.00 or less per box that she should be advised whereupon she would cease picking the peppers as her labor and other related costs would be below her breakeven point of $4.00 per box. Respondent Dixie, advised Petitioner that he (Charles Lawton) would let her know if the market declined. The agreement was struck and Petitioner was advised by Respondent Dixie to "bring the peppers on." Based on their agreement, Petitioner continued picking the peppers. Petitioner delivered to Respondent Dixie, a load of the various types of peppers that she produced and expected to be compensated at the rate of an average of $8.00 per box for her produce. Petitioner was not paid for the peppers at that time nor was she told that she should not bring any more peppers to Respondent's warehouse. Approximately two weeks from the date of delivery, Petitioner was paid an average of $1.03 per box by Respondent Dixie. Petitioner provided copies of the wholesale market reports for the types of peppers that she produced and sold to Respondent, Dixie, during May and June, 1992. The reports reflect an average wholesale price of $8.00 per box. Petitioner is owed by Respondent Dixie, the sum of $3,722.49 for nonpayment of produce (peppers) that she delivered to Respondent Dixie during May and June, 1992. Respondent Dixie, has countered that Petitioner's produce was bad and that the market had declined to the point whereupon they (Dixie Growers) were only able to obtain approximately $1.03 per box for the produce that Petitioner sold to Respondent Dixie. However, Respondent Dixie, failed to present any credible evidence which would establish that either Petitioner's produce was bad or that they were only able to obtain $1.03 as contended. No evidence was presented that the market declined or situation was anything different from the prices Petitioner was quoted and as reflected by the prices shown in the wholesale market reports. It is more probable than not that Respondent Dixie received the amounts reflected in the wholesale market reports for the produce that it purchased from Petitioner during May and June, 1992.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Agriculture, Bureau of License and Bond, issue a Final Order requiring that Respondent, Dixie Growers, Inc., pay to Petitioner the sum of $3,722.49 as claimed for agricultural produce purchased from Petitioner. In the event that Respondent Dixie fails to pay Petitioner, within 30 days of the date of the Department's Final Order, the sum of $3,722.49, that Respondent, U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company, as surety, remit to the Department that sum which should then be timely remitted to Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Terry Lawton P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Company Legal Department P. O. Box 1138 Baltimore, Maryland 21203-0000 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture The Capitol - PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Dixie Growers, Inc. P. O. Box 1686 Plant City, Florida 33564 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol - PL 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0350

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68604.15604.21604.34
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ROBERT J. WALSH AND COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES, 86-001422 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-001422 Latest Update: Jul. 14, 1986

Findings Of Fact Robert J. Walsh and Company, Inc. has been in the business of selling agricultural products since 1962. It is a "dealer in agricultural products" as defined in s. 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (1985). It is not a "producer" as defined in s. 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985). Walsh's modus operandi which it has used for many years is to have its salesmen call on landscapers, nurseries and other customers for trees, plants and other agricultural products to determine their needs. These salesmen have the prices of products and their availability from producers and the salesmen take orders from these purchasers. This order is sent to the producer who delivers the product to the purchaser and sends Walsh a copy of the delivery ticket. Walsh bills the customer for the product delivered and the producer bills Walsh for the consumer-cost of the product less a 20-25 percent discount from which Walsh derives its profit from the sale. The producer relies solely on Walsh for payment for the product it produces and delivers to the customer. Walsh has no authority to sell the product at a price other than that set by the producer. In any event, the producer bills Walsh for the product delivered at the producer's established price less the discount it gives Walsh for acting as intermediary in the sale. If products are damaged in transit, the producer's driver will make any necessary adjustment with the customer or return the damaged plant for replacement by the producer. Walsh does not represent the grower if such a situation develops. Similarly, if the product is rejected by the purchaser for not meeting quality standards, that issue is resolved between the grower and the customer without input from Walsh. Whatever agreement is reached between the grower and the customer is reflected on the invoice signed by the customer and forwarded to Walsh who has the responsibility of collecting from the customer. The grower bills Walsh for the cost of the product less Walsh's commission. The sales forming the bases for the complaints filed by Walsh with Respondent involve sales to Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, Dean Pent and J & W Landscape. On January 31, 1985, Walsh sold Pent three laurel oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service for a total price of $467.46 including sales tax (Ex. 2). On March 27, 1985, Walsh sold various trees and plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $403.98 (Ex. 3). On April 22, 1985, Walsh sold two live oaks grown by Stewart Tree Service to Pent Landscape Company for a total price of $336.00 (Ex. 4). On July 3, 1985, Walsh sold various plants grown by Goochland Nurseries to J & W Landscape for a total price of $564.96 (Ex. 5). On all of these sales the producers billed Walsh for the product and were paid by Walsh. Walsh billed the customers who did not pay and Walsh filed the complaints (Ex. 8, 9 and 10), denied by Respondent on grounds Walsh was not an agent or representative of the producers. In 1976, Petitioner filed a complaint against the bond of the Ernest Corporation, a licensed dealer in agricultural products and received $5,589.20 from Respondent who recovered from the bonding company. In the complaint Walsh alleged that it was agent for Southeast Growers, Inc., selling their nursery stock throughout Florida. Respondent's witnesses could not recall what additional evidence they saw to conclude that Walsh was, in fact, an agent for the producer. However, these witnesses all testified that had they then believed Walsh was solely responsible to the producer for payment for the products sold they would not have concluded Walsh was the agent or representative of the producer. The bond on which Petitioner is attempting to recover provides that if the principal "shall faithfully and truly account for and make payment to producers, their agents or representatives, as required by Sections 604.15 - 604.30, Florida Statutes, that this obligation to be void, otherwise to remain in full force and effect." (Ex. 11 and 12)

Conclusions The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the parties to, and the subject matter of these proceedings. Section 604.21, Florida Statutes (1985) provides in pertinent part: Any person claiming himself to be damaged by any breach of the conditions of a bond or certificate of deposit, assignment or agreement given by a licensed dealer in agricultural products as herein before provided may enter complaints thereof against the dealer and against the surety, if any, to the department, which complaint shall be a written statement of the facts constituting the complaint. Section 604.15(1) , Florida Statutes (1985) provides: "Dealers in agricultural products" means any person, whether itinerant or domiciled within this state, engaged within this state in the business of purchasing, receiving, or soliciting agricultural products from the producer or his agent or representative for resale or processing for sale; acting as an agent for such producer in the sale of agricultural products for the account of the producer on a net return basis; or acting as a negotiating broker between the producer or his agent or representative and the buyer. (emphasis supplied) One of the complexities of this case which leads to some confusion is the fact that both Pent and Walsh were dealers in agricultural products as above defined. Walsh fits into the category of a person claiming himself to be damaged by a breach of any condition of the bond of Pent. However, he has the burden of showing that he is a person covered by the bond. According to the terms of the bond, coverage is provided only for "producers, their agents or representatives." Walsh is clearly not a producer in this case but claims coverage as an agent or representative. In construing "agent" or "representative" the legislative intent should be considered. The purpose of these provisions of the statute requiring licensing and bonding of dealers in agricultural products, as expressed in Section 604.151, Florida Statutes, is to protect producers from economic harm. Economic harm sustained by an agent or representative is imputed back to the principals, which in this case are the producers. An agency may be defined as a contract either expressed or implied upon a consideration, or a gratuitous undertaking, by which one of the parties confides to the other the management of some business to be transacted in the former's name or on his account, and by which the latter assumes to do the business and render an account of it. 2 Fl. Jur. 2d "Agency," Section 1. Here, Walsh was selling agricultural products on its own account, which products it was purchasing from the producers. The producer sold its product to Walsh and delivered it to the address Walsh indicated. The customer receipted for the product and the producer billed Walsh for the total cost, including transportation, to the ultimate buyer, less the 20-25 percent commission Walsh received. Walsh paid the producer and billed the customer. Whether or not Walsh collected from the customer had no bearing on the debt Walsh owed the producer for the product. It could be said that the producer was the agent for Walsh in delivering the product to the user. Even though Walsh never had actual possession of the product the sale to Walsh was complete when the producer delivered the product to the user. The entire transaction clearly is a buy-and-sell operation by Walsh and not Walsh acting as an agent for the producer. The fact that Walsh sells the producer's product does not make Walsh the agent or representative of the producer, when the producer holds only Walsh responsible to pay for the product. Nor was Walsh a representative of the producers. Representative is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977 Ed.) as: "standing or acting for another esp. through delegated authority." Walsh had no delegation of authority to act for the producer. Walsh had no authority to modify the price, settle disputes, or any other function normally performed by a representative. The above interpretation of those having standing to file a complaint against a dealer in agricultural products is the same interpretation of the applicable statutory provisions that is made by Respondent. As stated in Natelson v. Dept. of Insurance, 454 So.2d 31 (Fl 1st DCA 1984): Agencies are afforded a wide discretion in the interpretation of a statute which it [sic] administers and will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. The reviewing court will defer to any interpretation within the range of possible interpretations. (citations omitted). This interpretation limiting recovery on an agricultural bond to producers and their agents or representatives is certainly within the range of possible interpretations, especially considering the purpose of these statutory provisions to be the protection of the economic well being of the producer. From the foregoing, it is concluded that Robert J. Walsh & Company, Inc. was not the agent or representative of Goochland Nurseries and Stewart Tree Service and does not have standing to file a complaint against Dean Pent, d/b/a Pent Landscape Company, and Paul Pent, d/b/a Paul Pent Landscape Company, and their surety, Transamerica Insurance Company.

Recommendation It is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the petition as contained in Petitioner's letter dated March 24, 1986. ENTERED this 14th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert Chastain, Esquire General Counsel Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Thomas M. Egan, Esquire Phillip Kuhn, Esquire Post Office Box 7323 Winter Haven, Florida 33883 Ronnie H. Weaver, Esquire Mayo Building, Room 513 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Joe W. Right Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (5) 589.20604.15604.151604.21604.30
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GUESLIN VINCENT vs U-HAUL CO. OF SOUTHERN ALABAMA,, 04-004570 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Dec. 21, 2004 Number: 04-004570 Latest Update: Jul. 21, 2005

The Issue Whether the Respondent engaged in a discriminatory employment practice contrary to Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, by paying the Petitioner less that other similarly situated employees and by discharging the Petitioner based upon the Petitioner's race, national origin age and disability?

Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a black male of Haitian extraction. His date of birth as given in his personnel records (Exhibit 7) is June 16, 1977. The Respondent is an employer within the statutory definition that engages in the rental of trailers, trucks, and moving supplies and sales and installation of equipment used in towing trailers. The Petitioner did not present any evidence regarding disability or age. The Petitioner was initially employed by the Respondent in 2002 as a customer service representative making $6.50/hour. Several month later, he received a raise to $7.00/hour, and before the end of the year, he received another raise to $7.50/hour. In the first half of 2003, the Petitioner was moved to the position of Assistant Moving Center Manager and his salary increased to $8.50/hour. In the fall, he received a raise to $9.25/hour and was given another raise to $11.50/hour before year's end. Testimony was received from Arthur Williams, who was the store manager and familiar with the operations of the company, although at the time of Petitioner's termination, he was new to the position and "in training." The pay for personnel employed by the Respondent is established nationwide and is based upon cost of living factors for an area. The wages paid to the Petitioner were slightly above the average for an area like Tallahassee, and reflected the Petitioner's hard work. His pay was in line with others doing similar work. The Petitioner alleged Clint Barrineau was paid more than he was paid. The evidence indicted that Barrineau had held in his career with the company, every position in its stores, including area manager. Barrineau had left the company for personal reasons, and upon his return in July 2003, was hired at $9.00/hour. Subsequently, he was promoted to the position of Hitch Professional at $11.50/hour. Notwithstanding Barrineau's prior experience, generally, it take less time for a person to be promoted as a hitch professional than as an assistant moving center manager reflecting hitch-related sales as an income center in the business. Both Barrineau and the Petitioner were making the same salary when the Petitioner was terminated. The Petitioner testified that he was denied promotion to store manager on two occasions. The Petitioner did not establish his qualifications for this position; however, evidence was received that the first person employed in that position was Henry Barnes a white male, and the second was Arthur Williams, a black male. Williams was brought in from outside the company; however, he had significant experience in retail sales management. The Petitioner's primary claim related to his discharge. The evidence presented indicated that on May 4, 2004, the Petitioner closed the store as the general manager on duty. As the manager on duty, it was his job to prepare the daily receipts for deposit in the bank, and retain a fixed amount for business operations on the next day. The Petitioner did this, and the bank deposit was made. On the following day, Arthur Williams, the store manager, arrived with Chuck Newell, the Field Relief Manager, who was helping to train Williams. The two men opened the store, which was duly locked, and Williams disarmed the alarm system. Williams opened the store safe, and counted the money. There was supposed to be $1000 kept in the safe for store operations. The count revealed only $800. Williams and Newell recounted and then search the safe and cash registers to ensure it had not been left in one of these places; however, the money was not present. Having assured themselves by checking and rechecking that the money was not present, they proceeded to open the store for business with the money on hand, and then check with the bank. They physically drove to the bank and checked the nightly deposit, which was correct, the deposit receipt having tallied with the money deposited. Williams and Newell returned to the store and called the alarm system center. This center is operated by U-Haul, and each authorized employee has his or her own code for disarming the alarm upon entering the store. If the code is not entered, or if the premise is broken into, the alarm goes off. The alarm center reported that there were no entries into the building after it was locked the previous night until Williams opened it o that morning. There was no evidence of the building being burgled. When the Petitioner reported to work on May 5, 2004, Williams confronted him about the missing money. The Petitioner did not have an explanation. As the manager closing the store, the Petitioner was solely and personally responsible for the deposit and for securing the money left on the premises. Although personnel were permitted to make up cash drawer shortages, the money in question was "store" money, and the amount involved was more significant that typical cash drawer shortages. Having determined that there was in fact a cash shortage and that the Petitioner was the person responsible for the accountability and security of the funds, Williams made the determination to discharge the Petitioner. Williams, although in training, was the sole individual responsible for the decision to discharge the Petitioner. As mentioned above, Williams is a black male. Williams testified further regarding other persons whom he had discharged. Ms. B. Heaulskamp was discharged for refusal to work her assigned schedule. Mr. Zak White, a white male, was discharged for a shortage in his cash drawer. Heaulskamp was provided a letter of termination; however, this was Williams' first termination, and he was advised it was company policy not to provide termination paperwork. He did not provide the Petitioner or White with such paperwork. Williams hired the Petitioner's replacement, William Westry, who was a black male. Williams has hired two Haitians since the Petitioner's termination, both of whom were still employed at the store.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That Florida Commission on Human Relations enter its final order dismissing the Petitioner's claims. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Gueslin Vincent Post Office Box 20123 Tallahassee, Florida 32316 Jeremy P. Hertz, Esquire For & Harrison LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1300 Orlando, Florida 32801-3379 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

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SCOTT TUCKER AND PHILLIP WATSON vs EDDIE D. GRIFFIN, D/B/A QUALITY BROKERAGE AND UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY, 92-007490 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Trenton, Florida Dec. 23, 1992 Number: 92-007490 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1993

The Issue Whether or not Petitioners (complainants) are entitled to recover $5,640.19 or any part thereof against Respondent dealer and Respondent surety company.

Findings Of Fact Petitioners are growers of watermelons and qualify as "producers" under Section 604.15(5) F.S. Respondent Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage is a broker-shipper of watermelons and qualifies as a "dealer" under Section 604.15(1) F.S. Respondent United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is surety for Respondent Griffin d/b/a Quality. Petitioners' claims against the dealer and his bond are listed in the Amended Complaint in the following amounts and categories: 6-18-92 Inv. #657 45,580 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $2,279.00 Advance - 700.00 NWPB* - 9.12 $1,569.88 6-19-92 Inv. #668 2,490 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 124.50 (paid for 42,860 lbs. short 2,490 lbs.) NWPB* - .50 124.00 6-20-92 Inv. #695 6,818 lbs. Crimson melons @ .05 lb. $ 340.90 (paid for 39,062 lbs. short 6,818 lbs.) NWPB* 1.36 339.54 6-20-92 Inv. @ #702 .05 39,880 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $1,994.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 7.98 Pmt. - 90.00 1,186.02 6-21-92 Inv. @ #706 .05 44,740 lbs. Sangria melons lb. $2,237.00 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 8.95 1,518.05 6-22-93 Inv. @ #716 .04 11,280 lbs. Crimson melons lb. NWPB* - 2.32 460.88 6-22-92 Inv. @ #709 .04 46,740 lbs. Crimson melons lb. $1,869.60 Advance - 700.00 Packing Straw - 10.00 NWPB* - 9.35 1,150.25 Deducted for #706 - 441.82 441.82 PAID 708.43 Total Claimed $5,640.19 *NWPB = National Watermelon Promotion Board Fee Petitioners and Respondent dealer have had an oral business relationship for four to five years. Both parties agree that their oral agreement initially called for a federal inspection to be done on each load if the load were refused in whole or in part by the ultimate recipient. Respondent Griffin contended that over the years there had been further oral agreements to "work out" or "ride out" small discrepancies or partial refusals of loads without resorting to federal inspections, the cost of which inspections could eliminate the entire profit on single loads. Petitioners denied that such an amended oral agreement was ever reached and further maintained that the amounts of the loads at issue herein could not be considered "small" by any interpretation. Respondent submitted no evidence as to what the relative terms, "large" and "small," mean in the industry. Consequently, it appears that there was never a meeting of the minds of the parties on the alleged oral contract amendments relied upon by Respondent. Respondent testified that in past years, prior to 1992, he had interpreted the term "ride it out" to mean that he would simply accept the hearsay statements of ultimate recipients that named poundages of melons were bad and he would let the ultimate recipients pay for only the melons they said were good. Respondent would thereafter absorb any losses himself, not passing on the loss by deducting any amount from the full amount he would normally pay to the growers within ten days. However, 1992 was such a bad year for melons that the Respondent dealer chose not to absorb the greater losses and passed them on to the growers by way of deductions on "settlement sheets." In 1992 Respondent sent Petitioners the settlement sheets with the deductions explained thereon with the net payments as much as thirty days after the ultimate sales. Upon the foregoing evidence, it appears that Respondent had established a course of business whereby Petitioners could reasonably have expected him to absorb any losses occasioned by Respondent's reliance on hearsay statements of the ultimate recipients concerning poor quality melons unless Respondent chose not to test the questionable melons with a federal inspection. Petitioners obtained Exhibit P-5 for load 657 at Respondent dealer's place of business, but were not certain it applied to the load Mr. Tucker claimed he delivered to Respondent on 6-18-92 because Mr. Tucker did not know his load number that day. The exhibit represents the weight ticket Petitioners believe applies to the load which Mr. Tucker claimed to have delivered to Respondent dealer on 6-18-92. However, the exhibit bears two other names, "Jones and Smith," not Petitioners' respective names of Tucker or Watson. It has "WACC" handwritten across it, which Mr. Tucker claimed signified the name of his watermelon field. The number "657" also has been handwritten across it. There is no evidence of who wrote any of this on the exhibit. Respondent denied that load 657 was received from Mr. Tucker. The exhibit shows a printed gross weight of 78,900 lbs., tare weight of 32,860 lbs. and net weight of 66,800 lbs. Net weights are supposed to signify the poundage of melons delivered to the dealer. Nothing on the exhibit matches Mr. Tucker's journal entry (Petitioners' Exhibit 3) of delivering 45,580 lbs. of watermelons to Respondent dealer on 6- 18-92. Mr. Tucker testified that he was never paid for his delivery. Respondent denied there was such a delivery and testified that he paid Jones and Smith for load 657. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $1,569.88 on Invoice 657. Petitioners' Exhibit P-4 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records that Petitioners contend apply to load 668. The first page has "45,350/6-19-92/Scott Tucker WACC" handwritten across it. None of the four poundages imprinted thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 668, and subtracting amounts testified to also does not conform these figures to Petitioners' claim on load 668. The second page weight ticket shows a date of 6-18-92 and a weight of 34,260 lbs. It also does not match Petitioner's claim that they were owed for 45,350 lbs. but were paid for only 42,860 lbs., being paid 2,490 lbs. short. Exhibit P-8 is the 668 invoice/settlement sheet which Respondent provided to Petitioners and shows invoice 668 with date of 6-19-92, tare and pay weight of 42,860 lbs. at $.05/lb. for $2,143.00 less $8.57 melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB, see supra) for $2,134.43, less a $700.00 advance and $10.00 for packing straw for a total due Petitioners of $1,424.43 which Respondent has already paid. Petitioners have established no entitlement to their claim of $124.00 on Invoice 668. Petitioners Exhibit P-6 represents two weight tickets secured from Respondent dealer's records. The first page has "45,880 lbs./6-20-92/Scott Tucker Crimson WACC 695" handwritten across it. None of the printed gross, tare, or net weights thereon match any of the amounts claimed by Petitioners for invoice 695. The second page shows the date 6-20-92 and a printed net weight of 32,000 lbs. Respondent dealer provided Petitioners with Exhibit P-7, invoice/settlement sheet 695 dated 6-20-92 showing tare and pay weights of 39,062 lbs. priced at $.05/lb. totalling $1,953.10, less melon adv. assoc. (a/k/a NWPB) fee of $7.81, for $1,945.29, less $700.00 advanced, less $10.00 for packing straw for a total of $1,235.29. The foregoing do not support Petitioner Tucker's claim based on his journal entry (P-3) that he was entitled to be paid for 45,880 lbs. he claims he delivered that day instead of for 39,062 pounds (short by 6,818 pounds) with balance owing to him of $339.54. Respondent has paid what was owed on invoice 695. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 9 shows that Petitioner Tucker delivered 39,880 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-20-92 and Petitioner Watson received back from Respondent dealer an invoice/settlement sheet 702 showing 39,880 pounds @ $.05/lb. equalling $1,994.00 and that although $1,994.00 was owed Petitioners, Respondent thereafter subtracted for $800.00 worth of returned melons, a $700.00 advance, $7.98 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), and $10.00 for packing straw, and that a balance was paid to Petitioners of only $90.00. This is arithmetically illogical. The subtractions total $1,517.98. Therefore, if all of Respondent's subtractions were legitimate, the total balance due Petitioners would have been $476.02. If the right to deduct for the $800.00 in returned melons were not substantiated by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners would be due $1,276.02. Since all parties acknowledge that $90.00 was already paid by Respondent dealer, then Petitioners are due $1,186.02 if Respondent did not substantiate the right to deduct the $800.00. Load 702 was "graded out," i.e. accepted as satisfactory, by a representative of Respondent dealer or a subsequent holder in interest when the melons were delivered by Petitioners to Respondent dealer. That fact creates the presumption that the melons were received in satisfactory condition by the Respondent dealer. Nothing persuasive has been put forth by the Respondent dealer to show that the situation concerning the melons' quality had changed by the time the load arrived at its final destination. Respondent got no federal inspection on this load and relied on hearsay statements by persons who did not testify as to some melons being inferior. In light of the standard arrangement of the parties over the whole course of their business dealings (see Findings of Fact 5-7 supra), Petitioners have proven entitlement to the amount claimed on load 702 of $1,186.02. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite 10 shows Petitioners Tucker and Watson delivered 44,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-21-92. At $.05/lb., Petitioners were owed $2,237.00, less melon adv. association fee (a/k/a NWPB) of $8.95, $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for straw. Those deductions are not at issue. Therefore, Petitioners would be owed $1,518.05, the amount claimed, from Respondent. However, the invoice also notes that Respondent made a $268.18 deduction for melons returned. Respondent's Composite Exhibit 1 purports to be a BB&W Farms Loading Sheet and Federal Inspection Sheet. Respondent offered this exhibit to show that only $68.18 was realized by him on load 706 which he attributed to Petitioner Watson. However, the federal inspector did not testify as to the results of the inspection, the inspection sheet itself is illegible as to "estimated total," the "estimated total" has been written in by another hand as "$62.60," and there was no explanation on the Composite Exhibit or in testimony as to how Respondent dealer came up with $200.00 in "return lumping charges" as also indicated on Exhibit R-1. Accordingly, Petitioners have established that with regard to load/invoice 706, they delivered watermelons worth $2,237.00 to Respondent dealer and Respondent dealer did not affirmatively establish that any melons were bad, despite the federal inspection sheet introduced in evidence. Petitioners have proven entitlement to their claim on invoice 706 for $1,518.05. However, Petitioners conceded that Respondent actually paid them $441.82 on invoice/settlement sheet 706. Therefore, they are only entitled to recoup a total of $1,076.23 on their claim for Invoice 706. In the course of formal hearing, Respondent dealer admitted that, with regard to load invoice 716, (Tucker) he did owe Petitioners $460.88 for 275 watermelons, and that it had not been paid purely due to clerical error. By oral agreement at formal hearing, Petitioners' Composite Exhibit 12 (Invoice and Weight Tickets 709, Watson) shows Petitioner Watson delivered 46,740 lbs. of melons to Respondent dealer on 6-22-92 and at $.04 lb., Petitioners were owed $1,869.60, less appropriate deductions. Petitioners conceded that Respondent dealer appropriately deducted $9.35 for melon adv. association (a/k/a NWPB), $700.00 for an advance, and $10.00 for packing straw, bringing the amount they were owed to $1,150.25. Petitioners and Respondent are in agreement the Respondent paid only $708.43 of the $1,150.25 owed on invoice/settlement sheet 709 because Respondent dealer also deducted from the amount owed on invoice 709 the $441.82 he had previously paid out on Invoice 706. See, Finding of Fact 13, supra. Since Petitioners have established that they were owed $1,518.05 on invoice 706 but were paid only $441.82 thereon, it appears that Petitioners should be paid $1,076.23 on Invoice 706 and realize nothing on Invoice 709.

Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Agriculture enter a final order awarding Petitioners $1,186.02 on invoice 702, $1,076.23 on invoice 706, and $460.88 on invoice 716 for a total of $2,723.13, dismissing all other claimed amounts, and binding Respondents to pay the full amount of $2,723.13, which in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company's case shall be only to the extent of its bond. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of June, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Scott Tucker and Phillip Watson Route 2 Box 280 Trenton, FL 32693 Eddie D. Griffin d/b/a Quality Brokerage Post Office Box 889 Immokalee, FL 33934 William J. Moore USF&G Post Office Box 31143 Tampa, FL 33631 United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company Post Office Box 1138 Baltimore, MD 21203 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Department of Agriculture Division of Marketing, Bureau of Licensure and Bond Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Bob Crawford Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68604.15604.20604.21604.34
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MARK R. BENSON, D/B/A B. I. SUB SHOP, ETC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 89-002437 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002437 Latest Update: Aug. 15, 1989

The Issue Whether Respondent's tax assessment against Petitioner should be sustained.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Mark Benson, was the owner of both B.I. Sub Shop and B.I. Auto Parts which were small business enterprises in Miami, Florida. B.I. Sub Shop was in the business of selling retail food, while B.I. Auto Parts sold retail automobile parts. Neither business is currently in operation. In December 1986, sales and use tax collections by the enterprises had not been received by Respondent. When Petitioner was notified in December 1986 by Respondent that he had not submitted the required sales tax collections, he contacted Respondent. An audit by Respondent ensued in the first quarter of 1987 resulting in the issuance of a Notice of Assessment against B.I. Auto Parts totalling $9,237.42 and a Notice of Assessment against B.I. Sub Shop totalling $1,421.33. To record sales for B.I. Auto Parts, Petitioner kept copies of sequentially numbered invoices of his sales, some of which were missing at the time of the audit, and of vendor receipts. For B.I. Sub Shop, Petitioner calculated sales by subtracting the amount of money in the cash drawer at the beginning of the day from the amount remaining at the end of the day. The amount was then entered in a daily log. Invoices of vendor sales were also maintained. Petitioner admitted that the records he kept did not meet acceptable business standards but contended that his records were adequate for his needs. Finding that the bookkeeping practices of both of Petitioner's enterprises were inadequate, Respondent made an estimate of the sales and use taxes owed. During the audit, Respondent requested certain records, including bank statements and certain income tax returns from Petitioner. Petitioner was given a date certain in which to provide the records but failed to timely comply with the request. To calculate the estimate for B.I. Auto Parts, Respondent calculated a gross taxable sales amount by adding an additional taxable sales amount to the gross sales amount noted on the invoices. The additional taxable sales amount was found by a calculation of an average monthly sales figure determined from the deposits noted on the available bank statement (10 months). The average monthly sales figure was then applied to the number of months covered in the estimate yielding an estimated gross sales amount. The gross sales taken from the invoices was subtracted from the estimated gross sales amount, resulting in additional taxable sales. To calculate the estimate for B.I. Sub Shop, Respondent took a sample (4 months) of the invoices of vendor sales. An average of the invoices was taken to obtain estimated purchases per month. The gross was calculated. Then, a 20% spoilage factor was deducted from the gross purchase and a 250% markup factor was applied, yielding an estimated gross sales. Certain other appropriate credits were given. In view of the inadequacy of Petitioner's records, Respondent's methodology to assess the monies owed was reasonable, and Petitioner has failed to demonstrate any error in such assessment.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order sustaining the subject assessments. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of August 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark Benson, B.I. Sub Shop and B.I. Auto Parts, 8250 N.W. 58th Street Miami, Florida 33166 Linda G. Miklowitz, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Katie D. Tucker, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 William D. Moore, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 203 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100

Florida Laws (2) 212.12421.33
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SKINNERS WHOLESALE NURSERY, INC. vs GREENBLADES OF CENTRAL FLORIDA, INC. AND WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 05-003083 (2005)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Jacksonville, Florida Aug. 24, 2005 Number: 05-003083 Latest Update: Apr. 13, 2006

The Issue The issue is whether Respondent, Greenblades of Central Florida, Inc., and its surety, Western Surety Company, are liable for funds due to Petitioner from the sale of agricultural products.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. Petitioner operates a nursery supply company that produces trees, plants, and other landscaping supplies at a location in Bunnell, Florida. Respondent is a dealer in agricultural products as defined by Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. At the time of the transactions in question, Respondent was a licensed dealer in agricultural products supported by a surety bond provided by Western Surety Company. This matter arose over a Producer Complaint filed by Petitioner on June 24, 2005, in which it alleged that Respondent owed $20,512.97, based upon five invoices for nursery goods delivered to various job sites where Respondent was providing landscaping services. The five invoices set forth in the original Producer Complaint are as follows: Date of Sale Invoice # Amount Dec. 28, 2004 64679 $2,884.72 Jan. 11, 2005 64828 3,878.75 Jan. 11, 2005 64829 1,926.00 Feb. 1, 2005 65229 2,086.50 Feb. 3, 2005 65127 9,737.00 Petitioner later amended its Complaint to withdraw its claims under Invoice Nos. 65229 and 65127, as untimely filed, resulting in an amended amount due of $8,689.47. Respondent filed a Response to the Producer Complaint on August 15, 2005, admitting the amounts due under Invoice Nos. 64679 and 64828, totaling $6,763.47, and denying the amount claimed in Invoice No. 64829, $1,926.00, as never having been filled, resulting in Respondent's using another vendor to fill the order. Respondent admitted the amounts due under Invoice Nos. 64679 and 64828; therefore, no further discussion is necessary for those items, except to note that Delivery Receipt No. 17751, relating to Invoice No. 64828 contains the note "Reject 1 Live Oak." Therefore, the amount of Invoice No. 64828 must be reduced by $214.00 ($200 for the tree and 7 percent Florida Sales Tax). With respect to Invoice No. 64829, however, Petitioner produced at hearing only an unsigned invoice without either a sales order or a receipt for delivery of goods, as was its custom concerning deliveries of nursery goods. Accordingly, Petitioner provided no proof that the order under Invoice No. 64829 was actually delivered to Respondent. Respondent and its surety, Western Surety Company, currently owe Petitioner $2,884.72 under Invoice No. 64679, and $3,664.75 under Invoice No. 64828, for a total amount owed of $6,549.47.

Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order requiring Respondent, Greenblades of Central Florida, Inc., or its surety, Respondent, Western Surety Company, to pay Petitioner $6,549.47 for unpaid invoices. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2006. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher E. Green, Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Division of Marketing 407 South Calhoun Street, Mail Station 38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Joseph Robbins, Jr. Greenblades of Central Florida, Inc. 11025 Southeast Highway 42 Summerfield, Florida 34491 Tom Snyder Western Surety Company Post Office Box 5077 Sioux Falls, South Dakota 57117-5077 Donald M. DuMond Skinner Nurseries, Inc. 2970 Hartley Road, Suite 302 Jacksonville, Florida 32257 Tom Robinson Skinner Nurseries, Inc. 13000 State Road 11 Bunnell, Florida 32110 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 407 South Calhoun Street, Suite 520 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800

Florida Laws (6) 120.569604.15604.17604.20604.21604.34
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BUD SOD, LLC vs FYV, INC., D/B/A MIAMI TROPICAL NURSERY, INC., AND FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, AS SURETY, 09-001278 (2009)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Myers, Florida Mar. 13, 2009 Number: 09-001278 Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2010

The Issue Whether Respondent, FYV, Inc., d/b/a Miami Tropical Nursery, Inc. (Respondent or Buyer), owes Petitioner, Bud Sod, LLC (Petitioner or Seller), the sum of $7,168.09 for pallets of sod sold to the Buyer by the Seller.

Findings Of Fact At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner and Respondent were involved in the purchase and sale of an agricultural product grown and delivered in Florida. Under the terms of their on-going business relationship, Petitioner supplied Respondent with sod. There is no disagreement that Petitioner produced and sold the sod to Respondent. In fact, the parties had numerous dealings that covered many tickets noting deliveries and invoices noting the monies owed. Prior to July 7, 2010, the parties met without their attorneys to try and agree upon an amount owed by Respondent. At that time, they went through the volumes of paperwork related to the claim and reached a mutually-acceptable decision. Petitioner maintains that Respondent owes $17,168.09 as a compromised sum for the sod sold by Petitioner to Respondent. Of that amount, Petitioner acknowledges that Respondent remitted $10,000 to the Seller. Accordingly, Petitioner asserts that the sum of $7,168.09 is owed and unpaid for the sod purchased by Respondent. Respondent presented no evidence to refute this amount.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving Petitioner's complaint against Respondent in the amount of $7,168.09. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of August, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of August, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Christopher E. Green, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Office of Citrus License and Bond Mayo Building, M-38 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Kathy Alves Fidelity & Deposit Company of Maryland Post Office Box 968036 Schaumberg, Illinois 60196 Steven J. Polhemus, Esquire Post Office Box 2188 LaBelle, Florida 33975 Yolanda More FYV, Inc., d/b/a Miami Tropical Nursery, Inc. 104475 Overseas Highway Key Largo, Florida 33037 Richard D. Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Suite 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Honorable Charles H. Bronson Commissioner of Agriculture Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.60591.17604.15604.151604.21
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