The Issue Has Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. (Fancy Farms) made proper accounting to Petitioner Wayne Sullivan in accordance with Section 604.22(1), Florida Statutes, for agriculture products delivered to Fancy Farms from November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994, by Wayne Sullivan to be handled by Fancy Farms as agent for Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis as defined in Section 604.15(4), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Wayne Sullivan was in the business of growing and selling "agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(3), Florida Statutes, and was a "producer" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Fancy Farms was licensed as a "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes, as evidenced by license number 8453 issued by the Department, supported by bond number 57 92 20 in the amount of $75,000, written by Gulf Insurance Company with an inception date of September 1, 1994, and an expiration date of August 31, 1995. From November 8, 1994, through December 10, 1994 Wayne Sullivan delivered certain quantities of an agricultural product (zucchini) to Fancy Farms. It is the accounting for these zucchini (zukes) that is in dispute. It was stipulated by the parties that Fancy Farms was acting as agent in the sale of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms for the account of Wayne Sullivan on a net return basis. There is no dispute as the quantity or size of the zukes delivered by Wayne Sullivan to Fancy Farms during the above period of time. Furthermore, there is no dispute as to the charges made by Fancy Farms for handling the zukes, including but not limited to the commission charged by Fancy Farms. The agreed upon commission was ten per cent (10 percent) of the price received by Fancy Farms from its customers. There is no evidence that Fancy Farms found any problem with the quality of the zukes delivered to Fancy Farms by Wayne Sullivan during the above period of time. Upon delivering the zukes to Fancy Farms, Sullivan was given a prenumbered delivery receipt ticket (delivery ticket) showing Wayne Sullivan as Grower number 116 and containing the following additional information: (a) date and time of delivery; (b) produce number, i.e., 37 indicating fancy zukes and 38 indicating medium zukes; (c) description of the produce, i.e., zukes, fancy; (d) a lot number containing number of delivery ticket, grower number and produce number, i.e. 2074-116-37 and; (e) the number of units of zukes received by Fancy Farm. The accounting for the zukes from the following delivery receipt ticket numbers is being contested in this proceeding: (a) 2127 dated November 8, 1994, lot nos. 2127-116-37 and 2127-116-38; (b) 22145 dated November 10, 1994, lot nos. 2145-116-37 and 2145-116-38; (c) 2181 dated November 15, 1994, lot nos. 2181-116-37 and 2181-116-38; (d) 2242 dated November 29, 1994, lot nos. 2242- 116-37 and 2242-116-38; (e) 2254 dated December 1, 1994, lot nos. 2254-116-37 and 2254-116-38; (f) 2289 dated December 7, 1994, lot nos. 2289-116-37 and 2289- 116-38 and; (g) 2313 dated December 10, 1994, lot nos. 2313-116-37 and 2313-116- 38. Once Fancy Farms found a customer for the zukes, Fancy Farms prepared a prenumbered billing invoice. Additionally, a bill of lading and load sheet was prepared and attached to the invoice. The bill of lading and load sheet would have the same number as the invoice. Basically, the invoice and bill of lading contained the customer's name and address, produce number, description of produce, number of units ordered, number of units shipped and the price per unit. The load sheet contains the customer's name, produce number, description of produce, units ordered, units shipped and the lot number for the units that made up the shipment. On numerous occasions Fancy Farms made adjustments to the selling price after the price had been quoted and accepted but before the invoice was prepared. Fancy Farms did not make any written notations in its records showing the adjustments to the price or the reasons for the adjustments to the price. Salvatore Toscano testified, and I find his testimony to be credible, that this usually occurred when there was a decrease in the market price after Fancy Farms made the original quote. Therefore, in order to keep the customer, Fancy Farms made an adjustment to the price. Sullivan was never made aware of these price adjustments. In accounting for the zukes delivered by Sullivan, Fancy Farms prepared a Grower Statement which included the delivery ticket number, the date of delivery, the lot number, grower number, produce number, description of the produce, quantity (number of units), price per unit and total due. Payment for the zukes was made to Wayne Sullivan from these statements by Fancy Farms. Sometimes payment may be for only one delivery ticket while at other times payment would be for several delivery tickets for different dates. A portion of Petitioner's composite exhibit 1 is the Florida Vegetable Report (Market Report), Volume XIV, Nos. 19, 21, 23, 31, 33, 37 and 40, dated October 28, 31, 1994, November 8, 10, 15, 29, 1994, and December 7, 12, 1994, respectively. The Market Report is a federal-state publication which reports the demand (moderate), market (steady), volume (units) sold and prices paid per unit for numerous vegetables, including zucchini, on a daily basis. The prices quoted for zucchini is for 1/2 and 5/9th bushel cartons and includes palletizing. The average cost for palletizing in the industry is 65 per carton. Fancy Farms receives and sells zukes in one-half (1/2) bushel cartons. Fancy Farms does not palletize the cartons for handling at its warehouse or for shipment. On November 8, 10, 15, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 130 units of fancy zukes and a combined total 206 units of medium zukes represented by delivery receipt ticket nos. 2127, 2145 and 218l, for a combined total of fancy and medium zukes of 336 units for which Fancy Farms paid Sullivan the sum of $1,171.00 as evidenced by the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994. Forty eight units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2127-116-37 was billed out by Fancy Farms to P. H. Lucks, Inc. for $5.00 per unit. Without an explanation, Fancy Farms reduced the price to $2.50 per unit. However, Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.00 per unit for the 48 units of fancy zukes. Five units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2145-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Thirty two units of fancy zukes represented by lot no. 2181-116-37 were not accounted for by invoice. Nineteen units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2242-116-38 were not accounted for by invoice. Where there is no invoice the price quoted in the Market Report is used to calculate the amount due Sullivan. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated November 25, 1994, is: Lot No. 2127-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 48 units (Invoice 3814) = $ 240.00 Lot No. 2127-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 45 units (Market Report) = $ 157.50 $3.50 per unit x 35 units (Invoice 3783) = $ 122.50 Lot No. 2145-116-37: $5.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 3818) = $ 60.00 $5.00 per unit x 38 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 190.00 Lot No. 2145-116-38: $3.00 per unit x 13 units (Invoice 3820) = $ 39.00 $3.00 per unit x 22 units (Invoice 3822) = $ 66.00 $3.00 per unit x 5 units (Market Report) = $ 15.00 Lot No. 2l81-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 32 units (Market Report) = $ 256.00 Lot No. 2181-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 86 units (Invoice 3778) = $ 301.00 Total owed to Sullivan = $1,447.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $1,171.00 Ten per cent commission = 144.70 Net due Sullivan = 131.30 On November 29, 1994, Sullivan delivered 53 units of fancy zukes and 69 units of medium zukes as represented by delivery ticket no. 2242 for a combined total of 112 units for which Sullivan was paid $472.00 by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994. The prices of $3.25 and $3.00 as indicated by invoice nos. 3941 and 3947, respectively are not indicative of the market for fancy zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $8.00 per unit for fancy zukes. Likewise, the price of $3.00 per unit for medium zukes as indicated by invoice no. 3927 is not indicative of the market for medium zukes as established by the Market Report for December 1, 1994. The Market Report established an average price of $6.00 per unit for medium zukes. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 7, 1994, is: Lot no. 2242-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 53 units (Market Report) = $ 424.00 Lot no. 2242-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 69 units (Market Report) = $ 414.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 838.00 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 472.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 83.80 Net due Sullivan = $ 282.20 On December 1, 7, 1994, Sullivan delivered a combined total of 51 units of fancy zukes and a combined total of 87 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 138 units of fancy and medium zukes represented by delivery ticket nos. 2254 and 2289 and was paid $516.00 for these zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by the Grower Statement dated December 15, 1994. There was no invoice for lot nos. 2254-116-37 or 2254-116-38. The Market Report established a market price of $8.00 and $6.00 per unit for fancy and medium zukes, respectively. The amount due Sullivan from the Growers Statement dated December 15, 1994, is: Lot No. 2254-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 39 units (Market Report) = $ 312.00 Lot No. 2254-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 20 units (Market Report) = $ 120.00 Lot No. 2289-116-37: $6.00 per unit x 12 units (Invoice 4049) = $ 72.00 Lot No. 2289-116-38: $3.50 per unit x 67 units (Invoice 3946) = $ 234.50 Total owed Sullivan = $ 738.50 Less: Amount paid Sullivan = $ 516.00 Ten Percent Commission = $ 73.85 Net due Sullivan = $ 148.65 On December 10, 1994, Sullivan delivered 27 units of fancy zukes and 18 units of medium zukes for a combined total of 45 units as represented by delivery ticket no. 2313 and was paid $211.50 for those zukes by Fancy Farms as represented by Growers Statement dated December 23, 1994. The 18 units of medium zukes represented by lot no. 2313-116-38 are not covered by an invoice. The Market Report established a unit price of $6.00 for the fancy zukes. Invoice no. 4075 billed the fancy zukes at zero without any explanation. Fancy Farms paid Sullivan $5.50 per unit for the fancy zukes. The Market Report established a per unit price of $8.00 for the fancy zukes which is more in line with the market than is the $5.50 per unit paid by Fancy Farms. The amount due Sullivan from the Grower Statement dated December 23, 1994, is: Lot No. 2313-116-38: $6.00 per unit x 18 units (Market Report) = $ 108.00 Lot No. 2313-116-37: $8.00 per unit x 27 units (Market Report) = $ 216.00 Total owed Sullivan = $ 324.00 Less: Ten percent commission = $ 32.40 Amount received by Sullivan = $ 211.50 Net due Sullivan = $ 80.10 The net amount owed to Sullivan by Fancy Farms: From Grower Statements dated: November 25, 1994 $ 131.30 December 7, 1994 $ 282.20 December 15, 1994 $ 148.65 December 23, 1994 $ 80.10 Total owed to Sullivan $ 642.25
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Respondent Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. be ordered to pay Petitioner Wayne Sullivan the sum of $642.25. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3015A The parties elected not to file any proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Wayne Sullivan 49 Myrtle Bush Lane Venus, Florida 33960 James A. Crocker Qualified Representative Fancy Farms Sales, Inc. 1305 W. Dr. M. L. King, Jr., Blvd. Plant City, Florida 33564-9006 Gulf Insurance Company Legal Department 4600 Fuller Drive Irving, Texas 75038-6506
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are true, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the agency charged with regulating the pari-mutuel wagering industry in Florida, including persons licensed under Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. At all times material to this case, the Respondent was licensed as a cardroom employee occupational license number 1395921-1181, issued by the Petitioner. On May 20, 1998, the Respondent was working as a teller in the cardroom at Tampa Jai-Alai. The evidence establishes that on May 20, 1998, the Respondent provided wagering tickets to a patron of the facility without obtaining cash or a cash voucher in exchange for the tickets.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a Final Order revoking the cardroom employee license number 1395921-1181 of Bobbie J. Manning. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan C. Felker-Little, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Bobbie J. Manning 3007 Spillers Avenue Tampa, Florida 33619 Deborah R. Miller, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether proposed rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g) are invalid exercises of legislative delegated authority pursuant to Subsection 120.52(8), Florida Statutes (2004),2 and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to an award of costs and attorney's fees pursuant to Subsection 120.595(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Calder is a Florida corporation and a pari-mutuel permitholder permitted and licensed by the Department pursuant to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes. Calder seeks to challenge proposed amendments to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.021. Specifically, Calder challenges Subsection (5)(f), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 32, August 6, 2004, and Subsection (5)(g), as noticed in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 30, Number 21, May 21, 2004.3 The challenged amendments shall be referred to as the "Proposed Rules." The Proposed Rules provide: For tickets cashed more than 30 days after the purchase of the ticket, the ticket may not be cashed at any type of patron- operated machine or terminal. The totalisator system must be configured to instruct patrons on how to cash the ticket. The totalisator system must have the ability to identify such tickets and indicate to a teller that the ticket falls within this category. Calder is a licensed and permitted pari-mutuel facility which sells tickets and uses totalisator machines, and the Proposed Rules would govern the operation of such facility. The Proposed Rules have the effect of directly regulating the operation of Calder's pari-mutuel facility, and, as such, Calder is substantially affected by the Proposed Rules. The parties have stipulated that Calder "may properly challenge both Proposed Rules 61D-7.021(5)(f) and 61D-7.021(5)(g)." A pari-mutuel ticket evidences participation in a pari-mutuel pool. A winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket belongs to the purchaser and may be claimed by the purchaser for a period of one year after the date the pari-mutuel ticket was issued. An "outs" or "outs ticket" is a winning or refundable pari-mutuel ticket which is not redeemed. If a ticket remains unclaimed, uncashed, or abandoned after one year from the date of issuance, such uncashed ticket escheats to the state unless the ticket was for a live race held by a thoroughbred permitholder such as Calder, in which case the funds are retained by the permitholder conducting the race. A totalisator machine is "the computer system used to accumulate wagers, record sales, calculate payoffs, and display wagering data on a display device that is located at a pari- mutuel facility." § 550.002(36), Fla. Stat. The Department was prompted to begin the rulemaking process for the Proposed Rules by two major cases involving fraud, one Florida case and one national case. The Florida case involved two totalisator employees named Dubinsky and Thompson, who allegedly accessed outs ticket information in the totalisator's central computer system, counterfeited outs tickets based on the information, and cashed the tickets at self-service machines at two pari-mutuel wagering facilities. The fraudulent conduct involved approximately $13,000. In the Florida case the fraudulent tickets were cashed several months after the tickets were said to have been issued. The fraud came to light when the ticketholder who held the true ticket attempted to cash the ticket, but could not because the fraudulent ticket had been cashed. The national case also involved a totalisator employee who cashed fraudulent outs tickets. In the national case, the fraudulent tickets were cashed less than 30 days after the date the tickets were purportedly issued. The purpose of the Proposed Rules is to deter the cashing of fraudulent tickets. The Department received comments from AmTote International, a totalisator company, at the rule workshop held during the rulemaking process and received written comments submitted by AmTote International after the workshop, indicating that the majority of tickets are cashed within six to nine days after the date of issuance. The older a ticket gets the less likely it becomes that the ticket will be cashed, and the less likely that it becomes that the cashing of a fraudulent ticket would be revealed by the true owner attempting to cash the ticket. Staff of the Department felt that by requiring that outs tickets older than 30 days be cashed by a live person, a thief would be deterred because he would be dealing with a person rather than a machine. The only thing that the self- service machine requires to redeem a ticket is a bar code, so it would be possible to submit a ticket containing nothing but the bar code and receive a voucher which could be submitted to a teller for money.4 If the fraudulent ticket looks different in anyway from a valid ticket, a teller may be able to spot the difference and question the transaction. Calder argues that the way to deter the fraud which has occurred is to stop totalisator employees from being able to print fraudulent tickets. However, the Department is also concerned about computer hackers potentially getting into the computer system which contains the outs tickets numbers and copying the bar code which could be submitted to a self-service machine. By regulating the method of cashing outs tickets, the Department is attempting to deter fraud by totalisator employees and others who may be able to access outs tickets information which could be used in producing counterfeit tickets. During the rule making process, the Department held a workshop, received written comments from the public, and held a hearing to receive comments from the public after the Proposed Rules were first noticed. The Department considered the comments it received and modified the Proposed Rules as noticed in the Notice of Change published on August 6, 2004, to accommodate some of the comments. Calder did not submit a good faith, written proposal for a lower cost regulatory alternative within 21 days after the notice of the Proposed Rules was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on May 21, 2004, or after the Notice of Change was published.
The Issue The issue for disposition is whether Barry Amos d/b/a Cloud Nine Travel violated section 559.927, F.S., by operating as a seller of travel without being registered, and if so, what remedial action is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant to the issues here, Barry Amos operated a business at 4312-101 Plaza Gate Lane, Jacksonville, Florida. In the latter months of 1993, Mr. Amos was interested in starting up a travel agency. He requested information from the department and was sent a registration packet with forms and a copy of the statute and rules. On December 29, 1993, Mr. Amos wrote to the department requesting an exemption from registration based on his understanding that he was entitled to such. His letter references a telephone conversation with "Melissa" at the department and states: "She informed me that since I would not be handling ticket stock or actual payments that I would not be required to register or post the surety bond with your department." (Petitioner's composite exhibit #1) Mr. Amos did not receive his exemption; instead the department sent another letter on February 10, 1994 reiterating that the law required registration unless he provided proof that he was exempt. Joseph Nicolosi is an investigator with the department's Division of Consumer Services. On July 19, 1994 he conducted what he calls an "on-site inspection" of Mr. Amos' business. He had the information on the business but did not have a proper phone number. He looked in the yellow pages and found a listing for "Cloud 9 Travel" with a telephone number. The individual who answered Mr. Nicolosi's telephone call identified himself as Barry Amos. Mr. Nicolosi asked about coming to the office to look at brochures and to plan a trip from Jacksonville to Colorado. Mr. Amos told him that his wife would meet him someplace or send him the brochures. Mr. Amos also said that he would have to figure out the cost of the trip and call him back and that payment would be made by Mr. Nicolosi to him for the trip; he, Mr. Amos, would make the arrangements. After the telephone call was terminated, Mr. Nicolosi called Mr. Amos back a few minutes later and asked if he would accept a check as payment. Mr. Amos replied that it would be better to use a credit card but he agreed that he would accept a check. Mr. Amos concedes that when he was in business as Cloud 9, he accepted personal or cashier's checks from the public for ticket purchases. He did not accept payment from the public for what he called "services", like a commission. The checks he accepted for ticket purchases were made out to Cloud 9 Travel and were used to purchase tickets for the clients. Commissions were paid to Cloud 9 from the ticket sellers. Barry Amos ceased operation as Cloud 9 Travel in January, 1995. He never registered as a seller of travel.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter its final order finding that Respondent, Barry Amos d/b/a Cloud 9 Travel, violated section 559.927, F.S., imposing an administrative fine of $250.00, requiring that Respondent continue to cease and desist until properly registered as a seller of travel and denying such registration until the administrative fine is paid. DONE and ORDERED this 19th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY W. CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Jo Englander, Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Mr. Barry Amos 4312-101 Plaza Gate Lane Jacksonville, Florida 32217
The Issue Whether American Airlines committed the unlawful employment practices alleged in the employment discrimination charges filed by Petitioners and, if so, what relief should Petitioners be granted by the Florida Commission on Human Relations.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made to supplement and clarify the extensive factual stipulations set forth in the parties' February 23, 2006, Corrected Joint Prehearing Stipulation2: Petitioners are both Hispanic. Hispanics represent a substantial portion of the workforce in American's maintenance department at Miami International Airport (MIA). Among these Hispanic employees in the maintenance department are those who occupy supervisory positions. American’s Vice-President for Maintenance, Danny Martinez, is Hispanic. As aviation maintenance technicians for American, Petitioners' job duties, as set forth in the written job description for the position, were as follows: In addition to the work specified for the Junior Aviation Maintenance Technician, an Aviation Maintenance Technician's responsibility also includes the following: troubleshooting, individually or with Crew Chief, management or professional direction, disassembly, checking and cleaning, repairing, replacing, testing, adjusting, assembling, installing, servicing, fabricating, taxing or towing airplanes and/or run-up engines, de-icing aircraft, required to maintain the airworthiness of aircraft and all their components while in service or while undergoing overhaul and/or modification. Certifies for quality of own workmanship, including signing mechanical flight releases for all work done on field work. In those work positions where stock chasers are not utilized and/or available at the time may chase own parts. May have other Mechanic personnel assigned to assist him/her in completing an assignment. Works according to FAA and Company regulations and procedures and instructions from Crew Chief or supervisor. Completes forms connected with work assignments according to established procedures and communicates with other Company personnel as required in a manner designated by the Company. Performs the following duties as assigned: cleaning of aircraft windshields; connection/removing ground power and ground start units; pushing out/towing of aircraft and related guideman functions, fueling/defueling, de-icing of aircraft. At all times material to the instant cases, Petitioners were members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the Transport Workers Union of America (TWU) and covered by a collective bargaining agreement between American and the TWU (TWU Contract), which contained the following provisions, among others: ARTICLE 28- NO DISCRIMINATION, AND RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS AND COMPLIANCE The Company and the Union agree to make it a matter of record in this Agreement that in accordance with the established policy of the Company and the Union, the provisions of this Agreement will apply equally to all employees regardless of sex, color, race, creed, age, religious preferences, status as a veteran or military reservist, disability, or national origin. The Union recognizes that the Company will have sole jurisdiction of the management and operation of its business, the direction of its working force, the right to maintain discipline and efficiency in its hangars, stations, shops, or other places of employment, and the right of the Company to hire, discipline, and discharge employees for just cause, subject to the provisions of this Agreement. It is agreed that the rights of management not enumerated in this Article will not be deemed to exclude other preexisting rights of management not enumerated which do not conflict with other provisions of the Agreement. * * * Copies of the Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) Program will be available to all employees upon request. Any changes to the PPC Program will be provided and explained to the TWU prior to implementation. ARTICLE 29- REPRESENTATION * * * The Union does not question the right of the Company supervisors to manage and supervise the work force and make reasonable inquiries of employees, individually or collectively, in the normal course of work. In meetings for the purpose of investigation of any matter which may eventuate in the application of discipline or dismissal, or when written statements may be required, or of sufficient importance for the Company to have witnesses present, or to necessitate the presence of more than the Company supervisor, or during reasonable cause or post accident drug/alcohol testing as provided in Article 29(h), the Company will inform the employee of his right to have Union representation present. If the employee refuses representation, the supervisor's record will reflect this refusal. At the start of a meeting under the provisions of Article 29(f), the Company will, except in rare and unusual circumstances, indicate the reason that causes the meeting and then provide an opportunity for the employee and his Union representative to confer for a reasonable period of time. Following that period, the 29(f) meeting will be reconvened and continue until concluded by the supervisor. Before written notification of discipline or dismissal is given, an employee will be afforded the opportunity to discuss the matter with his supervisor. If he desires, he will have a Union representative in the discussion. . . . * * * ARTICLE 30- DISMISSAL An employee who has passed his probationary period will not be dismissed from the service of the Company without written notification of that action. The notification will include the reason or reasons for his dismissal. Appeal from dismissal will be made, in writing, by the employee within seven (7) calendar days after receiving the notification and will be addressed to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days following his receipt of the appeal, unless mutually agreed otherwise. A copy of the written decision will be provided to the Union. * * * If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the dismissal and decision will be appealed in accordance with Article 30(c), provided, however, the appeal must be submitted within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of the decision rendered by the Chief Operating Officer. An appeal from the decision of the Chief Operating Officer will be submitted to the appropriate Area Board of Adjustment in accordance with Article 32. . . . * * * ARTICLE 31- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE An employee who believes that he has been unjustly dealt with, or that any provision of this Agreement has not been properly applied or interpreted, or against whom the Company has issued written disciplinary action, may submit his grievance in person or through his representatives within seven (7) calendar days. The grievance will be presented to his immediate supervisor, who will evaluate the grievance or complaint and render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than seven (7) calendar days following his receipt of the grievance. . . . If the written decision of the immediate supervisor is not satisfactory to the employee whose grievance is being considered, it may be appealed within ten (10) calendar to the Chief Operating Officer, with a copy to the appropriate Human Resources Office. The Chief Operating Officer will fully investigate the matter and will render a written decision as soon as possible, but not later than twelve (12) calendar days, unless mutually agreed otherwise, following his receipt of the appeal. . . . If the decision of the Chief Operating Officer is not satisfactory to the employee, the grievance and the decision may be appealed to the System Board of Adjustment, as provided for in Article 32. * * * ARTICLE 32- BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT * * * Area Board of Adjustment, Discipline and Dismissal Cases * * * (2) Each Area Board will be composed on one member appointed by the Company, one member appointed by the Union, and a neutral referee acting as Chairman. . . . * * * Procedures Generally Applicable to the Boards * * * Employees and the Company may be represented at Board hearing by such person or persons as they may choose and designate. Evidence may be presented either orally or in writing, or both. The advocates will exchange all documents they may enter and the names of witnesses they may call in their direct case not later than ten (10) calendar days prior to the date set for hearing. Nothing in this paragraph will require either advocate to present the documents or the witnesses provided above during the course of the hearing. The advocates will not be restricted from entering documents or calling witnesses that become known subsequent to the ten (10) ten calendar day exchange, provided a minimum of forty-eight (48) hours notice is provided to the other party and a copies are submitted to the other party prior to the presentation of the direct case. The party receiving the late document or witness has the option to postpone the hearing in light of the new document or witness. Upon the request of either party to the dispute, or of two (2) Board members, the neutral referee will summon witnesses to testify at Board hearing. The Company will cooperate to ensure that all witnesses summoned by the board will appear in a timely fashion. Reasonable requests by the Union for employee witnesses will be honored. The requests for witnesses will normally not be greater than the number, which can be spared without interference with the service of the Company. Disputes arising from this provision will be immediately referred to the Director of the Air Transport Division and the Vice President-Employee Relations, or their respective designees, for resolution. A majority of all members of a Board will be sufficient to make a finding or a decision with respect to any dispute properly before it, and such finding or decision will be final and binding upon the parties to such dispute. . . . * * * ARTICLE 36- MEAL PERIODS Meal periods will be thirty minutes, except when a longer period is agreed upon between the parties. Meal periods will be scheduled to begin not earlier than three (3) hours after commencement of work that day and not later than five hours after commencement of work that day. The commencement of work is from the start of the employee's regular shift. If an employee is not scheduled for a meal period within the foregoing time span, the meal period will be provided immediately before or after it. In the event that a meal period has not been provided in accordance with the foregoing, the employee is then free, if he so desires, to take his meal period. At all times material to the instant cases, American had Rules of Conduct for its employees that (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) were applicable to TWU- represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners. These Rules of Conduct provided, in pertinent part, as follows: As an American Airlines employee, you can expect a safe and productive workplace that ensures your ability to succeed and grow with your job. The rules listed below represent the guidelines and principles that all employees work by at American. Attendance * * * During your tour of duty, remain in the area necessary for the efficient performance of your work. Remain at work until your tour of duty ends unless you are authorized to leave early. * * * 17. Work carefully. Observe posted or published regulations. * * * Personal Conduct * * * 34. Dishonesty of any kind in relations with the company, such as theft or pilferage of company property, the property of other employees or property of others entrusted to the company, or misrepresentation in obtaining employee benefits or privileges, will be grounds for dismissal and where the facts warrant, prosecution to the fullest extent of the law. Employees charged with a criminal offense, on or off duty, may immediately be withheld from service. Any action constituting a criminal offense, whether committed on duty or off duty, will be grounds for dismissal. (Revision of this rule, April 10, 1984) * * * Violations of any of the American Airlines Rules of Conduct (listed above) . . . could be grounds for immediate termination depending of the severity of the incident or offense and the employee's record. . . . At all times material to the instant cases, American had a Peak Performance Through Commitment Policy (PPC Policy) to deal with employee performance and disciplinary problems. The policy, which (as permitted by Article 28(b) of the TWU Contract) was applicable to TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, provided, in pertinent part, as follows: Peak Performance Through Commitment (PPC) is a program that fosters ongoing communication between managers and employees. It encourages managers . . . to regularly recognize outstanding performance and to work together with employees to address and correct performance issues fairly. For the few employees whose performance does not respond to regular coaching and counseling, the following steps advise them that continued performance problems have serious consequences, ultimately leading to termination: -First Advisory for employees with problem performance or conduct who do not respond to coaching or counseling. -Second Advisory for employees whose performance fails to respond to initial corrective steps. -Career Decision Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct warrants termination. They are given a paid Career Decision Day away from work to consider their future and continued employment with American Airlines. -Final Advisory for employees whose problem performance or conduct requires termination, or those who have failed to honor the Letter of Commitment signed after their Career Decision Day. Please note that steps can sometimes be skipped, in instances where the nature of the conduct is very serious. It is your responsibility as an employee to know the company's rules of conduct and performance standards for your job, and to consistently meet or exceed those standards. In the event that your performance does not measure up to the company's expectations, your manager will work with you to identify the problem and outline steps to correct it. * * * SERIOUS INCIDENTS OR OFFENSES Some violations of our guiding principles and rules of conduct will result in immediate termination. For example, insubordination, violating our alcohol and drug policy, abusing travel privileges, aircraft damage, violations of the work environment policy, and job actions could be grounds for immediate termination, depending on the severity of the incident and the employee's record. Hate-related conduct and dishonesty will always result in termination. In cases when immediate termination may be appropriate but additional information is needed, the employee may be withheld from service while an investigation is conducted. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioners' regular shifts were eight and a half hours, including an unpaid, thirty minute "meal period" (to which TWU-represented bargaining unit members were entitled under Article 36 of the TWU Contract). Although they were paid to perform eight hours of work during their eight and a half hour shifts, TWU-represented bargaining unit members, including Petitioners, were, in practice, allowed to take up to an hour for their meals, without penalty. TWU-represented bargaining unit members "clocked in" at the beginning of their shift and "clocked out" at the end of their shift. They were expected to remain "on the clock" during their "meal periods" (which, as noted above, were to be no longer than one hour). During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Castellanos was assigned to perform a "routine 'A' [safety] check" on a Boeing 757 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" approximately four hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Castellanos was two hours and 15 minutes into his shift. During his eight and a half hour shift which began on July 30, 2004, Petitioner Pena was assigned to perform "PS checks" on two Boeing 737 aircraft, an assignment it should have taken a "well qualified [aviation maintenance technician] working quickly but carefully" at least six hours to complete. At the time he left MIA that evening to go to the Quench nightclub, Mr. Pena was three hours and 45 minutes into his shift. Walter Philbrick, an investigator in American's corporate security department, covertly followed Petitioners when they left MIA that evening and kept them under surveillance until their return almost four hours later. Petitioners did not clock out until following the end of their shifts on July 31, 2004. In so doing, they effectively claimed full pay for the shifts, notwithstanding that, during the shifts, they had been off the worksite, engaged in non-work- related activity, for well in excess of the one hour they were allowed for "meal periods." Mr. Philbrick prepared and submitted a report detailing what he had observed as to Petitioners' movements and conduct during the time that they had been under his surveillance. Mike Smith is American's maintenance department station manager at MIA. He is "responsible for the entire [American] maintenance operation in Miami." Mr. Smith assigned his subordinate, Anthony DeGrazia, a day shift production manager at MIA, the task of looking into, and taking the appropriate action on behalf of management in response to, the matters described in Mr. Philbrick's report. Neither Mr. Smith nor Mr. DeGrazia is Hispanic. Mr. DeGrazia met separately with both Mr. Pena and Mr. Castellanos. The meetings were held in accordance with the provisions of Article 29(f) of the TWU Contract. Before conducting the meetings, Mr. DeGrazia had reviewed Mr. Philbrick's report. Mr. Castellanos stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was trying to complete his assignment as fast as possible because he wanted to have an alcoholic beverage; that evening, he was "away from work" for approximately four hours, which he knew was wrong; and he and Mr. Pena had engaged in similar activity on perhaps six or seven previous occasions. Mr. Pena stated, among other things, the following in his meeting with Mr. DeGrazia: on the evening in question, he was "off the field" for three to four hours, which he knew was not "okay"; this was something he had done "sometimes" in the past; and American was a "great company" to work for. Based on his review of Mr. Philbrick's report and the information he had obtained from Petitioners, Mr. DeGrazia concluded that Petitioners had committed "time clock fraud" in violation of Rule 34 of American's Rules of Conduct and that they therefore, in accordance with American's policy that "dishonesty will always result in termination" (as expressed in the PPC Policy), should be terminated. Before taking such action, Mr. DeGrazia consulted with Mr. Smith and "someone" from American's human resources department, who both "concurred" with Mr. DeGrazia that termination was the appropriate action to take against Petitioners. On August 12, 2004, Mr. DeGrazia issued Final Advisories terminating Petitioners' employment. The Final Advisory given to Mr. Castellanos read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2230-0700. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete an A-check on a 757 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when asked how it was possible for you to complete your assignment in such a short amount of time you stated that you were, "trying to complete the job as fast as I can because I was getting the urge of getting a drink." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, 17, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * The Final Advisory given to Mr. Pena read, in pertinent part, as follows: On Friday, July 30, 2004, your scheduled tour of duty was 2100-0530. During your scheduled shift you were assigned to complete two PS-checks on 737 aircraft. At approximately 0045, Corporate Security observed you leaving the premises and going into a nightclub in Coconut Grove. While there, you were observed at the bar drinking from a plastic cup. You were observed leaving the nightclub at 0315 and driving towards the airport. By your own account, you returned to the airport approximately 0400. During a company investigation, you admitted to leaving the premises, during your scheduled tour of duty and going to a restaurant/bar. Further, you admitted to consuming alcoholic beverages. Additionally, when you[] were asked if it is acceptable to go to lunch for 3-4 hours you stated, "no, according to Company Rules, it's not OK." Based on the above information I have concluded that your actions fall far short of that which may be reasonably expected of our employees and are a direct violation of American Airlines' Rules of Conduct, Rules 3, 4, and 34 . . . . In view of the above rule violations your employment with American Airlines is hereby terminated effective today, August 12, 2004. * * * That Petitioners were Hispanic played no role whatsoever in Mr. DeGrazia's decision to terminate them. Mr. DeGrazia terminated Petitioners because, and only because, he believed that they had engaged in dishonesty by committing "time clock fraud." Mr. DeGrazia has never encountered another situation, in his capacity as a production manager for American, where an aviation maintenance technician over whom he had disciplinary authority engaged in conduct comparable to the conduct for which he terminated Petitioners. No one has ever reported to him, nor has he ever observed, any aviation maintenance technician other than Petitioners taking "meal periods" that were longer than an hour while remaining "on the clock." Petitioners both grieved their terminations pursuant to Article 31 of the TWU Contract. Neither of them advanced any allegations of anti-Hispanic discrimination in his grievance. Petitioners' grievances were ultimately denied on September 9, 2004, by William Cade, American's managing director for maintenance. Petitioners appealed the denial of their grievances to the American and TWU Area Board of Adjustment for Miami, Florida (Board), in accordance with Article 32 of the TWU Contract, which provided for "final and binding" arbitration of disputes arising under the contract. A consolidated evidentiary hearing was held before the Board on April 28, 2005. At the hearing, Petitioners were represented by counsel. Through counsel, they called and cross- examined witnesses, submitted documentary evidence, and presented argument. Neither of them testified. The Board issued a decision on June 27, 2005, denying Petitioners' grievances. The TWU Board member dissented. The Discussion and Opinion portion of the decision read, in pertinent part, as follows: There is no dispute that the rule violations by grievants['] actions on July 30, 2004 constituted time card fraud and violation of rules relating to remaining at work. This was not some minor taking of time, such as overstaying lunch for a shortened period. It was a well-planned event. They had with them a change of clothes - in effect "party clothes" apropos to a late night-early morning South Florida nightclub. They had even done this several times before. Once at this nightclub they actually drank very little. Grievant Pena had two drinks and grievant Castellanos appeared to have just one. In fact, when he was later tested after his return to work almost five hours later, the result was negative for drugs and alcohol. Clearly, they failed to remain at work for their tours of duty in violation of Rules 3 and 4. These rules, however, do not by themselves call for immediate discharge nor do any of the Company documents relating to rules, such as its PPC, refer to them as serious violations that would incur discharge. The seriousness here concerns the grievants' badging out after their eight-hour tour and being paid for eight hours, almost five of which they did not work. There is no question that this is time card fraud and as such it involves dishonesty that is covered by Rule 34's "dishonesty of any kind." Numerous arbitrators for the parties have found such conduct to be violative of Rule 34 and have concluded that stealing time from the Company is dishonesty that requires immediate dismissal. * * * [T]he grievants engaged in this misconduct on multiple occasions that involved more than half of their shift being spent at a nightclub. And they knew it was wrong as they readily admitted when finally caught. Mitigation based on the grievants' EAP involvement is insufficient to overcome and reduce in any fashion their core responsibility to be honest employees and abide by all Company rules and regulations. The Company made this clear enough in its current Drug and Alcohol policy, and, as seen, other Boards have found it reasonable, as does this Board. To all of this the Union argues that there are other mitigating factors - seniority, disparate treatment, failure to consider employment records and a common practice permitting employees to extend lunch breaks. As to the latter, there is no evidence that any employee has been allowed to stay away from work for almost five hours with the knowledge or consent of management at any level. There is some evidence of employees overstaying the break by 30 minutes, of employees going for food for the crew and arriving back late and even some two-hour absences. None of this is comparable to the grievants' conduct. Nor is the evidence concerning supervisor Delgadillo enough to warrant the finding of a practice. She was not Pena's supervisor. She called grievant Castellanos' cell, but that alone does not mean that she knew he was off several hours at that point socializing and drinking in Coconut Grove on July 30 or at other times. She may have gone out with them while she was a mechanic, but the evidence does not show that she went for these long journeys to drink and socialize at a night club. Most importantly, the grievants never claimed a practice existed but instead readily admitted at the 29(f)s that their conduct was wrong and they violated Company rules. As to the disparate treatment incidents, although the dishonesty issue appears similar, different treatment only becomes disparate when the employees being compared also have factual situations and records that are similar. The comparators here did not leave work on more than one occasion, or on any occasion, for four hours or more to drink and socialize in a nightclub. Thus, Mora's 45-minute late punch-in resulted from his retrieving his drivers' license; he then immediately informed management of what he did. He did not have to be put under security surveillance for this type of conduct occurring in the past. Although his 30-minute extended lunch was part of the practice referred to above, it hardly qualifies as like conduct when compared to the grievants' activities. The claim by Vizcaino that he was sick when he used his Company travel privilege is the type of violation referred to the Travel Abuse Committee under a rule penalizing employees by suspending their travel privileges. The facts of that incident and the reasoning of this committee are not known to make any clear and relevant comparison. Even if accepted as a valid comparison, it is only one employee incident that by itself is insufficient to show that management disparately treated these grievants. Nor is their any proof that Rule 34 was involved in either of these situations. Manager DeGrazia disclosed that he did not consider the grievants' prior record or their seniority. He explained that the seriousness of their conduct was sufficient for his decision. The Board fully recognizes that the grievants cooperated during the investigation, had no prior discipline, and had seniority from 1989 and 1996. Each of these factors is significant in assessing the suitability of the penalties. But it is well established by the parties and even in arbitration cases involving outside parties, that in light of the gravity of time card fraud, these factors need not be evaluated. The Chairman notes nonetheless, that seniority and work records cannot be entirely ignored. But here, the grievants' propensity in the past to engage in this same outlandish conduct, and to do so undetected, significantly minimized, for mitigation purposes, much of their good record and seniority. Petitioners subsequently filed employment discrimination charges with the FCHR, alleging for the first time that their terminations were products of anti-Hispanic discrimination. There has been no persuasive showing made, in support in these allegations, that the decision to terminate them was motivated by anything other than legitimate business considerations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding the American not guilty of the unlawful employment practices alleged by Petitioners and dismissing their employment discrimination charges. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2006.
The Issue The issues are whether, pursuant to section 559.929(3), Florida Statutes (2019), Petitioner has been injured by the fraud, misrepresentation, breach of contract, financial failure, or any other violation of chapter 559, part XI, by Respondent Travbuzz, Inc. (Respondent), for prearranged travel services and, if so, the extent to which Respondent is indebted to Petitioner on account of the injury.
Findings Of Fact Respondent provides prearranged travel services for individuals or groups. Having relocated from New Jersey to Miami, Florida, evidently in 2018, Respondent has been registered at all material times with the Department as a "seller of travel" within the meaning of the Act and holds registration number ST-41461. With Respondent as the principal, the Surety issued a Sellers of Travel Surety Bond bearing bond number 10076529 in the amount of $25,000, effective from June 22, 2018, until duly cancelled (Bond). On November 12, 2019, Petitioner, a resident of San Diego, California, purchased from Respondent one ticket for himself and one ticket for his daughter on the Palace on Wheels: A Week in Wonderland Tour (POWAWIWT) with a departure date of April 1, 2020. Earnestly described by Respondent's principal as a "cruise ship on wheels," the POWAWIWT provides one week's transportation, accommodations, and meals for travelers seeking to visit several of India's cultural and historical landmarks without the inconvenience of changing hotels, finding restaurants, arranging intercity transportation, or, it seems, obtaining refunds for trips that never take place. The purchase price for two POWAWIWT tickets was $8600.40. Additionally, Petitioner purchased from Respondent a guided side trip at one location for $75. At the time of the purchase of the two POWAWIWT tickets, Respondent charged Petitioner's credit card for the required downpayment of $1911.20 for both tickets. By personal check dated January 6, 2020, Petitioner timely paid the balance due for both tickets of $6689.20. By personal check dated February 19, 2020, Petitioner paid the $75 charge for the side trip. The credit card issuer duly debited Petitioner's account and credited Respondent's account for the charged amount, and Respondent obtained the funds represented by both checks. Petitioner later disputed the credit card charges, and the credit card company debited the $1911.20 amount in dispute from Respondent's account. Although Petitioner claimed that his account had not been credited for this amount, as of the evening prior to the hearing, Respondent's credit for these charges had not been restored, so the $1911.20 still seems to be in the possession of the credit card issuer. Despite availing himself of the remedy available under the Act, Petitioner has not authorized the credit card issuer to restore to Respondent's account the credit for the $1911.20. This case is a byproduct of the emerging Covid-19 pandemic, which, as discussed below, caused RTDC to cancel Petitioner's April 1 POWAWIWT. According to Respondent, RTDC has refused to refund Petitioner's payment of $8600.40 gross or about $8000 after deducting Respondent's 7% commission.1 Although Respondent's principal deflects the blame to RTDC for its no-refund policy and to Petitioner for supposedly waffling on the relief that he sought for the cancelled trip, Respondent quietly has declined to refund its commission of approximately $600, as well as the additional $75 payment, although the failure to refund the $75 may be explained by Petitioner's failure to address this negligible amount until he prepared the Prehearing Statement in this case. 1 Respondent's principal testified that Respondent discounted the price of the April 1 POWAWIWT by reducing its standard 17% commission, which would approximate $1460, to 7%, for a 10% discount, or about $860, leaving a net commission of about $600. Respondent's factual defenses to Petitioner's refund claim include the several defenses set forth above and a new defense asserted for the first time at the hearing: Petitioner cancelled his POWAWIWT before RTDC cancelled his POWAWIWT, so Petitioner was never entitled to a refund under the terms of the Contract. This defense oddly finds more support in Petitioner's allegation that he demanded a refund before RTDC cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT than in Respondent's allegation that Petitioner did not demand a refund until the March 13 email, in which he reported that RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT.2 Regardless, this new defense is no more supported by the facts than Respondent's previously stated defenses. Respondent's who-cancelled-first defense is based on emails and telephone calls. Petitioner's emails portray his consistent efforts to obtain a refund for the trip, but only after RTDC had cancelled the April 1 POWAWIWT. The lone email of Respondent's principal serves to reveal Respondent's inability to respond meaningfully to Petitioner's efforts to protect his travel purchase and raises the possibility of bad faith on the part of Respondent's principal. On March 9, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the March POWAWIWTs, but not the April 1 POWAWIWT. This email does not seek to cancel the April 1 POWAWIWT, but expresses concern that RTDC will cancel the trip. On March 13, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a Times of India news article that reported that RTDC had cancelled the remaining POWAWIWTs through April. This email complains that RTDC had not 2 This oddity is unsurprising given the patter of each witness's testimony. Respondent's principal peppered his testimony with false apologies while, in a reassuring tone, he gently deferred and deflected blame and patiently, but mistakenly, insisted that the Contract did not require him to refund monies paid for a train trip that never took place. Petitioner frenetically rebutted each factual defense while somehow missing the salient points that he had paid for a POWAWIWT that never took place, Respondent refused to refund Petitioner's payment, and the Contract calls for a refund. Although a retired appellate attorney for the state of California, Petitioner seems to have grounded his early demands for a refund on natural law, because he appears not to have discovered one of the crucial contractual provisions, as discussed below, until he prepared the Prehearing Statement responded to Petitioner's requests for information, requests advice as to his available options, and asks for some assurance that Petitioner would not lose his payments of $8600 for the train tour plus an unspecified amount "for post trip activities" that are also unspecified. On March 15, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal a news article in The Hindu that reported that another operator of train tours in India was paying refunds for cancelled trips and all tourist visas into India had been cancelled through April 15. This email implores Respondent to do the right thing and immediately refund the money paid for the cancelled trip. A few hours later, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal an India West news article that reported that India was now in a complete lockdown and the Indian government had cancelled all nondiplomatic visas. This email asks Respondent's principal to keep Petitioner informed on what RTDC was going to do and expresses hope that RTDC issues refunds. On March 19, Respondent's principal emailed Petitioner that "we are reaching some agreement with our ground operator for the train and this is what is being finalized." The statement clearly discloses no agreement, but, at best, an expectation of an agreement. The email describes the expected agreement to allow Petitioner to take a POWAWIWT during the following season from September 2020 through April 2021, but requires Petitioner to select travel dates within six days and pay whatever fare is in effect at the time of the trip. Respondent's principal never explained why Petitioner had only six days to accept an "offer" that RTDC had not yet authorized its agent to make, might not authorize within the six-day deadline, and might not ever authorize. Respondent's demand for a near-immediate acceptance of a nonexistent offer of a trip at market price was unreasonable and suggests that Respondent's principal was merely trying to induce Petitioner to make an offer in the form of an acceptance, so the principal might have greater bargaining leverage with RTDC. On March 23, Petitioner emailed Respondent's principal, noting a series of unanswered emails and phone calls from Petitioner to the principal since the receipt of the March 19 "offer." Asking for clarification of the terms of the "offer," Petitioner's email concedes that it appears that Petitioner's money is lost and asks merely that Respondent show him the courtesy of calling him, confirming his fear, and providing a full explanation of what happened. Later that day, an employee of Respondent emailed Petitioner and informed him that the principal was suffering from a respiratory disorder and was unable to talk, so that future communications needed to be by email. Petitioner received no more emails from Respondent's principal, who, having returned to the United States after taking a POWAWIWT in early March, was later diagnosed with Covid. The telephone calls are undocumented. The credibility of Respondent's principal started to leave the tracks with the March 19 email of an illusory "offer" with an immediate deadline for acceptance. A month later, in responding to the disputed credit card charge, the credibility of Respondent's principal derailed completely, as he attempted to resecure the $1911.20 credit with material misrepresentations of what had taken place in an email dated April 21 to the credit card issuer. The email claims that Petitioner never cancelled the trip, so he was a "no-show"--a Kafkaesque claim that implies a duty to report for a trip that, undisclosed in the email, the sponsor had cancelled over two weeks prior to departure. The email states that, at the beginning of March, Petitioner called and said he did not feel comfortable taking the trip, but the trains were still running and "'Cancel for Fear'" was not an allowable reason for waiving a cancellation fee--perhaps true, but irrelevant. The email encloses a copy of the principal's March 19 email, states that Petitioner did not accept this "offer," and concludes that "[s]ince [Petitioner] did not cancel or inform us of the decision for travel before the travel date, the charge is valid as per the terms and conditions." The email cites a provision of the Contract addressing no-shows and, despite the absence of any mention of RTDC's cancellation of the trip due to the pandemic, adds a seemingly obscure reference to another provision of the Contract addressing acts of God, medical epidemics, quarantines, or other causes beyond Respondent's control for the cancellation of a trip. Notably, the email omits mention of the provisions of the Contract, described below, clearly calling for a refund. On balance, it is impossible to credit the testimony of Respondent's principal that, in telephone calls, Petitioner cancelled the trip before RTDC cancelled the trip or, more generally, that Petitioner could not settle on an acceptable remedy, and his indecisiveness prevented Respondent's principal from negotiating a settlement with RTDC--an assertion that, even if proved, would be irrelevant. Notwithstanding resolute attempts by Respondent's principal to misdirect attention from these unavoidable facts, Petitioner has paid for a train tour that never took place, RTDC cancelled the tour, and Petitioner never cancelled his tickets. The question is therefore whether, in its Contract, Respondent successfully transferred the risk of loss to Petitioner for a trip cancelled by the tour sponsor due to the pandemic. Analysis of this issue necessitates consideration of several provisions of the Contract that, despite its prolixity, is initially remarkable for two omissions: Respondent's Seller of Travel registration number3 and the name of RTDC as the sponsor of the POWAWIWT. Respondent claims that Petitioner caused his injury by declining to purchase travel insurance. The cover page of the Contract contains a section 3 Section 559.928(5) requires a seller of travel to include in each consumer contract the following: "[Name of seller of travel] is registered with the State of Florida as a Seller of Travel. Registration No. [X]." Even absent any mention of a statute, this disclosure provides a consumer with some means to learn of the somewhat obscure Act, the seller's statutory responsibilities, and the relief that may be available to a consumer for a seller's failure to discharge these responsibilities. Petitioner testified only that he somehow learned of the Act, but never said how. The record does not permit a finding that the omission of the statutory disclosure was purposeful, so as to conceal from the consumer the existence of the Act, or was a product of guileless ineptitude. called "Travel Insurance." This section provides an opportunity to purchase travel insurance from an entity "recommended by [Respondent]." The options are to check a box to purchase from Respondent's recommended entity or to check a box that states the traveler undertakes to obtain travel insurance independently, but this provision adds that, if travel insurance is not obtained, the consumer "absolve[s Respondent, t]he tour operator and the travel agent of all possible liabilities which may arise due to my failure to obtain adequate insurance coverage." Respondent offered no proof that its recommended travel insurance or other available travel insurance would pay for the cancellation of the April 1 POWAWIWT due to the pandemic, so Petitioner's choice not to purchase travel insurance is irrelevant. Additionally, the clear provisions of the Contract, discussed below, requiring a refund for a trip cancelled by the sponsor rebut Respondent's labored effort to apply the travel insurance provision to shift to the customer the risk of loss posed by a cancellation of the trip by the sponsor--a risk that might be better addressed by Respondent's purchase of commercial business interruption insurance. Respondent claims that the trip was cancelled by RTDC too close to the departure date to entitle Petitioner to any refund. The Contract contains a section called "Cancellation Fees." This section provides for increasing cancellation fees based on the proximity of the cancellation to the trip departure date. The Contract provides a 10% cancellation fee "if cancelled" more than 90 days prior to departure, 20% cancellation fee "if cancelled" between 89 and 35 days prior to departure, and 100% cancellation fee "if cancelled" within 34 days prior to departure. The Contract fails to specify if this provision applies to cancellations at the instance of the consumer or the trip sponsor, but the graduated fee reflects the greater value of a trip cancelled well in advance of the trip departure date, so that the trip can be resold. Obviously, a trip cancelled by a sponsor cannot be resold, so the cancellation fee provision applies only to a cancellation by a customer and does not shield Respondent from liability in this case. Lastly, Respondent relies on a section of the Contract called "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability." Provisions in this section warn that Respondent acts as an agent for a trip sponsor, such as the railroad, from which Respondent purchases the travel services. Although Respondent makes every effort to select the best providers of travel services, Respondent does not control their operations and thus CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR ANY PERSONAL INJURY, PROPERTY DAMAGE OR OTHER CLAIM which may occur as a result of any and/or all of the following: the wrongful, negligent or arbitrary acts or omissions on the part of the independent supplier, agent, its employees or others who are not under the direct control or supervision of [Respondent]; [or] * * * (3) loss, injury or damage to person, property or otherwise, resulting directly or indirectly from any Acts of God, dangers incident to … medical epidemics, quarantines, … delays or cancellations or alterations in itinerary due to schedule changes, or from any causes beyond [Respondent's] control. … In case of overbooking, [Respondent] will only be liable for refund [sic] the charged amount to the guest. [Respondent] shall in no event be responsible or liable for any direct, indirect, consequential, incidental, special or punitive damages arising from your interaction with any retailer/vendor, and [Respondent] expressly disclaims any responsibility or liability for any resulting loss or damage. The "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" provisions are general disclaimers of liability for various forms of damages arising out of the acts and omissions of third parties or forces outside the control of Respondent, such as the pandemic. These provisions represent a prudent attempt to avoid liability for damages, such as the lost opportunity to visit a gravely ill relative who has since died, that may amount to many multiples of the price paid for a trip. Complementing these general provisions limiting Respondent's liability, other provisions limit Respondent's liability to the payment of a refund of the purchase price of a trip cancelled by the sponsor. The section immediately following the "Responsibility--Limitation of Liability" section is the "Reservation of Rights" section, which provides: "The company [i.e., Respondent] reserves the right to cancel any tour without notice before the tour and refund the money in full and is not responsible for any direct or indirect damages to the guest due to such action." As noted above, the Contract omits any mention of Respondent's principal, so as to Respondent in the place of its undisclosed principal; thus, a provision referring to a cancellation of the tour by Respondent includes a cancellation of the tour by Respondent's principal. As cited by Petitioner in the Prehearing Statement, the other relevant provision is in the "Prices, Rates & Fares" section and states that, if a customer cancels, any refund to which the customer is entitled, under the above-cited cancellation fee provisions, will be dependent on then-current exchange rates, but "[i]n the event that a tour is canceled through no action of the Client, the Client will receive a full refund of US$."4 This provision entitles a consumer to: 1) a refund and 2) a refund in U.S. dollars, presumably unadjusted for currency fluctuations since the payment. At the hearing, Respondent's principal tried to construe the "US$" provision as a reference to the currency to which a consumer is entitled to be paid when a consumer cancels a trip under conditions in which the customer is entitled to a refund, but this construction ignores that the cited clause applies to 4 An identical "US$" provision is found at the end of the section called "A Note About Cancellation for All Tours/Reservations." cancellations occurring through no action of the consumer and imposes on Respondent the obligation to make a "full refund" in such cases.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order directing Respondent to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 within 30 days of the date of the order and, absent timely payment, directing the Surety to pay Petitioner the sum of $6689.20 from the Bond. 7 Perhaps the recommended and final orders in this case will persuade the credit card issuer to issue the credit for the $1911.20 to Petitioner, who is entitled to this disputed sum. But, if Respondent regains possession of this disputed sum and refuses to refund it to Petitioner, the Department may wish to consider suspending or revoking Respondent's certificate or referring the matter to the Miami-Dade County State Attorney's Office. See the preceding footnote. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Gil Gonzalez 8444 Mono Lake Drive San Diego, California 92119 (eServed) Benjamin C. Patton, Esquire McRae & Metcalf, P.A. 2612 Centennial Place Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire H. Richard Bisbee, P.A. 1882 Capital Circle Northeast, Suite 206 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) W. Alan Parkinson, Bureau Chief Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Rhodes Building, R-3 2005 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6500 Tom A. Steckler, Director Division of Consumer Services Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services Mayo Building, Room 520 407 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The threshold issue in this case is whether Petitioner knowingly and voluntarily waived all claims, including claims for employment discrimination, against Respondent, his former employer. If he did not, then the question is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his alleged disability when it terminated his employment.
Findings Of Fact A. Background Facts Petitioner Waldemar Casanova ("Casanova") is a high school graduate who has completed four years of college level courses in the field of business administration. As of the final hearing, he had worked in the airline industry for more than 30 years. In 1987, Casanova began working for Respondent Worldwide Flight Services ("Worldwide"), a ground handling services organization that specializes in, among other things, providing customized cargo, ramp, passenger, and technical services to various passenger and cargo airlines. Casanova was stationed in New York City for about 12 years, providing services to Worldwide's client, American Airlines, at the John Kennedy and LaGuardia Airports. In 1999, Casanova transferred to Florida, where he continued to work in furtherance of a contract between Worldwide and American Airlines to provide passenger services at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. Casanova initially was assigned to work as a Ramp Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing passenger baggage services. Thereafter, in the spring of 2002, Casanova was assigned to work as a Cabin Services Supervisor, in which position he was responsible for overseeing the cleaning and servicing of aircraft.1 Facts Relating to Casanova's Hernia Surgery In June 2002, Casanova underwent hernia surgery. He took a leave of absence from work to recover. A couple of months later, Casanova's doctor certified that Casanova could return to "light" work duties on September 3, 2002. The doctor's certificate specified that, upon his return to work, Casanova should not lift more than 10 pounds. To accommodate this restriction, when Casanova returned to work in September 2002, Worldwide reassigned him, temporarily, to its administrative office, where Casanova was responsible for reviewing attendance records. Cancellation of the Contract Between American Airlines and Worldwide and the Consequences Thereof On Casanova's Employment with Worldwide. Effective September 15, 2002, American Airlines canceled its ramp-handling/cabin services contract with Worldwide at the Fort Lauderdale Airport. As a result, Worldwide laid off approximately 33 employees in September and October 2002, including Casanova and five or six other supervisors who, like Casanova, were employed in connection with the American Airlines contract. By letter dated September 18, 2002, Worldwide informed Casanova that he was being laid off. In that letter, Worldwide offered Casanova a lump sum severance payment equaling 13 weeks of pay at his base salary in exchange for, and subject to, Casanova's execution of a Severance Agreement and General Release ("Agreement"). The Agreement was enclosed with the September 18, 2002 letter. The release contained in the Agreement provided, in pertinent part: I agree . . . to release Worldwide . . . from any and all claims for relief of any kind, whether known to me or unknown, which in any way arise out of or relate to my employment or the termination of my employment at Worldwide Flight Services, concerning events occurring at any time up to the date of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, any and all claims of discrimination of any kind. This settlement and waiver includes all such claims, whether under any applicable federal law, including but not limited to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Americans with Disabilities Act, Equal Pay Act and Employee Retirement Income Security Act, Older Worker Benefit Protection Act, or under any applicable state or local laws I further agree not to file a claim or suit of any kind against Worldwide Flight Services et al. . . . I further agree not to bring, continue, or maintain any legal proceedings of any nature whatsoever against Worldwide Flight Services et al. before any court, administrative agency, arbitrator or any other tribunal or forum by reason of any such claims, demands, liabilities and/or causes of action, arising out of, relating to or resulting from my employment or termination from employment . . . . In the September 18, 2002, letter, Worldwide also advised Casanova that the decision whether to accept the terms and conditions of the Agreement was completely voluntary, that he should consult with an attorney of his choice before signing the Agreement, and that he could take up to 45 days to consider the Agreement. In addition, Worldwide advised Casanova that, if he had any questions concerning his separation package, he could consult either with Alvin Brown, a human resources representative at Worldwide's corporate headquarters, or Barry Simpson, then General Manager at Worldwide's Fort Lauderdale station. Casanova signed and dated the Agreement on October 2, 2002.2 He then returned the instrument to Worldwide, where Barry Simpson executed the Agreement on the company's behalf, also on October 2. By the terms of the Agreement, Casanova was afforded a period of up to seven days after execution of the Agreement to revoke the acceptance of its terms. At no time during the seven-day revocation period did Casanova notify Worldwide that he wanted to revoke his acceptance of the Agreement. After the expiration of the seven-day revocation period, and in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, Casanova received a lump sum payment of $8,091.20 by check dated October 26, 2002, which sum constituted 13 weeks of severance at Casanova's base salary.3 Since his receipt of this payment, Casanova has neither tendered back nor attempted to tender back the severance payment to Worldwide. At hearing, Casanova admitted that he had understood fully the language and effect of the Agreement, including the release of all claims, and that he knowingly and voluntarily had accepted the terms of the Agreement as well as the benefits provided to him thereunder.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order dismissing with prejudice Casanova's Petition for Relief because, for valuable consideration, Casanova knowingly and voluntarily released Worldwide of and from any claims arising out of his employment with Worldwide. Alternatively, the final order should declare that Worldwide is not liable to Casanova because (a) he is not a handicapped individual and (b) even if he were a handicapped individual, Worldwide has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for Casanova's discharge, which Casanova failed to prove was a pretext for discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2005.
Findings Of Fact On November 24, 1976, petitioner purchased an airplane (the Corsair) in Florida from R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., for which he paid eighty thousand dollars ($80,000.00). Sales tax has never been paid on account of this transaction. Before the purchase, petitioner asked George W. Sullivan, an airplane mechanic and test pilot, to evaluate the Corsair as an investment for resale. After petitioner acquired the Corsair, he caused three new cylinders to be installed and had the carburetor, the magneto and the propeller overhauled. Within three or four months of petitioner's acquisition, several prospective purchasers had inspected the Corsair. In the spring of 1977, petitioner began displaying the Corsair. At various times, petitioner engaged other pilots to ferry the Corsair to aircraft shows at Cherry Point, North Carolina, Greenville- Spartanburg, South Carolina, and elsewhere. At the time of the hearing, the Corsair had been flown approximately 43 hours since petitioner had acquired it, ten to twelve hours of which petitioner flew himself, in the course of displaying the Corsair and checking out repairs. Petitioner has traded in airplanes for the last several years and has been recognized as a dealer in aircraft by the Internal Revenue Service. Petitioner, who moved to Florida from California, applied to respondent for a dealer's certificate promptly upon learning that he was required to do so. On November 24, 1976, however, petitioner was not registered as an aircraft dealer with respondent. After an unsuccessful attempt to register effective retroactively to July 1, 1972, petitioner registered as a dealer with respondent, effective October 1, 1977. According to respondent's records, R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., was not registered as a dealer with respondent on November 24, 1976, and has not registered since. Petitioner obtained an address for R. D. Whittington Aircraft Sales, Inc., from respondent and, on or about, December 20, 1977, sent by certified mail a blanket resale and exemption certificate to the address respondent had furnished. A return receipt indicated that the certificate was delivered as addressed. In the past, respondent has treated sales to dealers as exempt from sales tax where the purchaser furnished the seller a resale and exemption certificate at the time of the sale and even when the certificate has been furnished afterwards, where the purchaser was registered as a dealer with respondent at the time of the transaction. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stuckey's of Eastman, Georgia v. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which is attached as an appendix to the recommended order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent's proposed assessment be upheld. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of August, 1978 in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 904/488-9675
