Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a final order correcting the annual leave account of Robert J. Braun by reducing his annual leave balance by 125 hours in accordance with its 1983 audit of the account. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of January, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1985.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Basil Glinton (Glinton), was employed full time by the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department) as a Public Assistance Specialist II. On September 14, 1984, as a result of a transfer, Glinton was scheduled to start work at the Department's Food Stamp Office, Unit 61, in Miami, Florida. At 9:15 a.m., September 14, 1984, a Friday, Glinton reported to Unit He requested and received his paycheck, and advised the acting supervisor that he had a doctor's appointment which would require his absence from the office for about one hour. Glinton did not return to the office that day. On Monday, September 17, 1984, Glinton reported to Unit 61 and worked from 8:12 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. On that date, the office supervisor, Raquel Tima, met with Glinton and spoke with him about his absence of September 14, 1984. Ms. Lima advised Glinton that she needed a doctor's statement to authorize that absence. No doctor's statement has been produced. Glinton failed to report for work the remainder of that workweek-- September 18-21, 1984. On September 21, 1984, Ms. Lima sent a warning letter, certified mail, to Glinton. The postal claim check reflects that Glinton was notified of the letter on September 24, 1984, September 29, 1984, and October 9, 1984, but failed to claim it. Glinton likewise failed to report for work the following week-- September 24-28, 1984. He did, however, appear at the office on Friday, September 28, 1984, to request his paycheck. On October 1, 1984, Glinton was personally delivered a letter dated September 28, 1984, which advised him that his absence from work since September 18, 1984 was unauthorized and that, pursuant to Rule 22A-7.10(2), F.A.C., he was deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service. The letter further advised Glinton of his right to petition the Department of administration for a review of the facts and whether they constitute abandonment. By letter dated October 4, 1984, Glinton timely petitioned the Department of Administration for review. In his letter, and at final hearing, Glinton claimed he was ill and under a doctor's care for the period of September 18-28, 1984, and that he had routinely called, or had someone else call, the office to advise them of his illness. While professing "illness" for a two-week period, Glinton failed to offer any evidence of the nature of his illness. He further failed to offer the testimony of his physician, or any other evidence supportive of his claim. While Glinton acknowledges familiarity with the Department's rule which requires that the supervisor be notified of absence due to illness, he made no attempt to contact his supervisor. The only time the office was notified of his absence was on September 19, 1984 when an unknown female telephoned and advised the switchboard operator, without explanation, that Glinton would not be coming to work on that date. Glinton's testimony that his absence from work during the period of September 18-28, 1984 was due to illness, and that he telephoned the office every day during his absence, is inherently improbable and unworthy of belief.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a Final Order that: Petitioner, Basil Glinton, abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service effective October 1, 1984. Dismisses the petition of Basil Glinton with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of May, 1985, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of May, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Dniel C. Brown, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Leonard Helfand, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Suite 1070, 410 N.W. 2nd Avenue Miami, Florida 33128 Robert L. McKinney, Esquire Suite 1107 Jackson Medical Tower 1500 N.W. 12th Avenue Miami, Florida 33125 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David H. Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1321 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner received a salary overpayment from Respondent for leave usage to which he was not entitled, as set forth in correspondence dated April 26, 2013; and, if so, whether Respondent is entitled to a repayment for the salary overpayment made to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bruce Deterding, was an employee of the Department of Health, having served as an executive director of a medical practice board, making him a Select Exempt Service (SES) employee. Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with the Department on December 19, 2012. The agreement required Petitioner to resign his position with the Department effective February 28, 2013, and included the following conditions: Petitioner's last day in the office would be December 18, 2012, one day preceding the signed settlement agreement; and Petitioner was required to utilize 384 hours of accrued annual leave beginning on December 19, 2012, and ending on February 27, 2013. Petitioner did not participate in the preparation of the settlement agreement, but agreed to its terms by his signature. The agreement was signed by the Division of Medical Quality Assurance Director Lucy C. Gee on behalf of the Department. From December 19, 2012, through February 28, 2013, Petitioner performed as obligated under the agreement. The Department paid Petitioner for the 384 hours of leave as required by the agreement. Petitioner relied on the Department's representations that he would be able to purchase his former military service time from the State Retirement System and retire with 30 years of state service on the resignation date set forth in the agreement. Petitioner demonstrated through a screen shot of his personnel records in the "PeopleFirst" system that he had an available balance of 428 hours of annual leave at the time he entered into the settlement agreement with the Department. The Department's employee verified through PeopleFirst that sufficient hours of leave were available prior to presenting the settlement agreement offering to pay 384 hours of leave to Petitioner. The Department notified Petitioner by a letter dated April 26, 2013, that he had received salary overpayments. Specifically, the letter stated that two payments in the amounts of $1,262.48 and $1,717.56, dated February 22, 2013, and March 8, 2013, respectively, had been erroneously made to him. Petitioner, as an SES employee, received 176 hours of annual leave on his leave accrual anniversary date of July 1 each year. In 2010, Petitioner received an annual leave accrual of 176 hours on June 18, 2010, and a second annual leave accrual on July 1, 2010. On April 26, 2013, Petitioner had a telephone conversation with Meshelle Bradford, one of the Department's payroll employees, concerning potential salary overpayments. During that conversation, Petitioner acknowledged he had received the two salary accruals totaling 352 hours on June 18 and July 1, 2010. Petitioner testified that he assumed he was the beneficiary of an "extraordinarily good hire date" which entitled him to receive leave on his former (from his previous state employment) and new leave accrual dates. The Department conducted a payroll and leave audit after the date of Petitioner's resignation and separation from the agency. The audit revealed that Petitioner had been overpaid for annual leave hours that he had accrued in 2010 by mistake. Petitioner had been paid for annual leave he used in February 2013, when he had exhausted all of his accrued leave. During the two-week pay period of February 1 through 14, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 58.5 hours of leave he did not have available, and for the two-week pay period of February 15 through 28, 2013, Petitioner received pay for 80 hours of leave he did not have available, resulting from the double accrual of leave in June and July 2010. The Department's position is that Petitioner should have been in leave without pay status for the 58.5 and 80 hours of leave for which he was paid in February 2013. The calculated overpayment for the unavailable leave is $2,980.04. The Department seeks reimbursement from Petitioner for that amount. Petitioner disputes that he owes any amount due to the fact he entered into a settlement agreement that delineated the payments to be made by the Department to him as a condition of his resignation. The Department's Agency Attendance and Leave Policy, in section VI.D.3, states: "It is the employee's responsibility to maintain an accurate accounting of their leave balances."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health requiring Petitioner to repay the overpayment of salary in the amount of $2,980.04. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Mark John Henderson, Esquire Department of Health 2585 Merchants Row, Room 110J Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Bruce Milton Deterding 4841 Old Bainbridge Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Althea Gaines, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 Jennifer A. Tschetter, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 John H. Armstrong, M.D., F.A.C.S. State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
The Issue The issue in this case involves a consideration of whether the Petitioner has abandoned his job position with the Respondent as described in Rule 22A- 7.010, Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact In the relevant time period which is associated with this case, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Revenue as an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville, Florida, office of the Northeast Region, Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax. He worked with the Respondent agency beginning April 1980 until his dismissal from the agency on December 17, 1986, based upon the theory that he had allegedly abandoned his job within the meaning of Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code. During his employment Petitioner operated out of his home, which was in Palm Coast, Florida. Douglas Drozd, an employee of the Respondent agency, was sent to the Jacksonville office of the Bureau of Field Appraisals, Division of Ad Valorem Tax to serve as a temporary Appraiser Supervisor for that office. This assignment occurred on October 6, 1986. On October 21, 1986, Albert Johnson, the former Appraiser Supervisor with the Jacksonville office, left that position. Following the departure of Johnson, Drozd became the permanent Appraiser Supervisor for the Jacksonville office. From October 6, 1986, through November 18, 1986, Drozd acted in the capacity as the immediate supervisor of the Petitioner. Beyond that date, Robert Worley, an Appraiser II in the Jacksonville office, took over the position of Appraiser Supervisor in the subject regional office. Worley served in the capacity of supervisor from November 19, 1986, until December 22, 1986, when he returned to his duties as Appraiser II. While Worley was serving as Appraiser Supervisor, Drozd took over the function of Property Appraiser, Duval County, Florida. On December 22, 1986, Drozd returned to his duties as Appraiser Supervisor for Respondent's Jacksonville office. On November 17, 1986, Petitioner asked the permission of his supervisor, Drozd, to take annual leave for days in December 1986. This request was not made in writing and was not responded to in writing. Although Rule 22A- 8.002(4), Florida Administrative Code, contemplates that leave shall be requested in writing, it gas the custom and practice of the Respondent agency for oral requests for annual leave to be made and approved orally. At the time of the conversation on November 17, 1986, between the Petitioner and Drozd concerning the request for annual leave, Drozd initially granted that request without any reservations or contingencies being applied to the permission given. Subsequently, on that same day, Drozd told Richards that he expected that all "field work" assigned to the Petitioner should be completed before leave was taken. This arrangement included work being done on vacant parcels of property as well as improved parcels. More particularly, "field work" includes: Completion of neighborhood analysis form Dr-549 Completion of structural elements form Dr-551 Measurements of all improvements Notes pertaining to subject property (condition of property, any unusual circumstances) Sketching and traversing (perimeter measurements for calculating square footage) Pictures Completion of factual change of physical characteristics forms. Worley was unaware on November 17, 1986, of the arrangement between Drozd and the Petitioner concerning conditions placed upon the permission for the Petitioner to take leave as set forth by Drozd. Petitioner's work assignment involved 180 parcels. Effective December 12, 1986, 27 parcels had "field work" which was incomplete, according to his flow chart of that date. Effective that date, Petitioner had turned in field folders for 88 of the 180 parcels. He kept 92 field folders for the remaining parcels. Thus, his supervisor was unable to verify whether Petitioner had completed his "field work" as summarized in his flow chart submitted on December 12, 1986. According to Petitioner's account set forth in his flow chart of December 12, 1986, which is part of Petitioner's Exhibit R submitted by the Respondent and admitted into evidence, the 27 parcels pertained to vacant land. Petitioner further conceded that other minor problems existed concerning the completeness of the "field work" pertaining to the improved parcels reported in his flow chart. Prior to Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office on December 12, 1986, Worley, who was then serving as the Appraiser Supervisor, did not have a detailed knowledge of the flow chart submitted by the Petitioner on that date. Worley had reviewed some of the Petitioner's files and noted shortcomings in the work; however, on balance, Worley took no issue with Petitioner's work progress. Worley acquiesced in the Petitioner's departure on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, as a prelude to the commencement of Petitioner's annual leave on December 15, 1986 This acquiescence was by a verbal expression to the effect that the Petitioner should have a nice holiday. By contrast, on December 12, 1986, Drozd became aware, upon examination of Petitioner's flow chart, that certain parcels had not been completed in terms of "field work." Drozd's observations about Petitioner's flow chart became significant when Worley and Drozd spoke to supervisors in Tallahassee, Florida, on the afternoon of December 12, 1986, in the person of Ben Faulk, Chief of the Bureau of Field Operations in the Respondent agency, and Eugene White, who was the Deputy Director of the Division of Ad Valorem Tax for that organization. In actuality, there were two conversations, and in the latter conversation Drozd participated in a discussion in which Faulk, White and Drozd determined that Petitioner should not be allowed to proceed with annual leave based upon his failure to comply with the contingency which Drozd had established on November 17, 1986, pertaining to Petitioner's wish to take annual leave, the contingency being completion of "field work." The latter conversation between Worley, Drozd, White and Faulk took place following Petitioner's departure from the Jacksonville office. At the time this conversation was held, Drozd was not a member of the Respondent agency. On the other hand, Faulk and White were appropriate officials within the Respondent agency with power to make determinations concerning the annual leave of a subordinate employee, in this instance, the Petitioner. Worley was also a proper source of policy in she management chain. It was decided that Worley should try to telephone the Petitioner and forestall the use of the annual leave by Petitioner. Emphasis is placed upon the fact that Faulk and White felt that this denial of Petitioner's annual leave based upon Petitioner's failure to meet a contingency concerning his "field work" was an appropriate disposition of the case. Around 6:00 p.m., Worley was able to reach Petitioner by telephone while Petitioner was at his daughter's home, preparing to leave for a trip to Washington, D.C. In placing the telephone call to Petitioner, Worley did not favor the revocation of leave opportunity. Nonetheless, he did revoke the leave while acting as supervisor for the Northeast Region, at the behest of Drozd and upon authority of Faulk and White. In the conversation with Petitioner on December 12, 1986, by telephone, Worley told Petitioner that his leave had been revoked and that Petitioner should report to his job assignment at 8:00 a.m. on Monday, December 15, 1986, or be considered on unauthorized leave. Further, it was explained to Petitioner that he would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he had not returned to work by 5:00 p.m. on Wednesday, December 17, 1986. These remarks by Worley were not equivocal, and Petitioner understood the significance of those instructions and the implications of his failure to attend his duties on the dates described. This understanding of the explanation of unauthorized leave and potential abandonment of his job position was held by the Petitioner at the point of the conversation at approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 12, 1986. Instead of reporting to work on December 15, 1986, at 8:00 a.m., Respondent absented himself from his job assignment on that date and on December 16 and 17, 1986. For those three consecutive days in which Respondent did not attend his job, his nonattendance was without authorization to take any form of leave and in the face of having been advised that he was in the posture of unauthorized leave. The days that Petitioner was missing from his job were work days. Petitioner's choice to go forward with his vacation plans and ignore the instruction of his supervisor concerning returning to his job position was made knowingly, with volition, with intent and showed willful disregard of a legitimate order of a superior. Petitioner had decided that since he had longstanding plans for taking annual leave in Washington, D.C., and given the fact that his wife was already there awaiting the arrival of the Petitioner and his daughter, he would go forward with his plan on the expectation that someone in his employment system would not allow a conclusion to be drawn that he had abandoned his job position. In furtherance of the assertion that the Petitioner would be considered to have abandoned his job position if he didn't return before the conclusion of the work day on December 17, 1986, a memorandum was sent to the Petitioner at his residence on December 15, 1986. A copy of that memorandum may be found as Respondent's Exhibit Q admitted into evidence. Petitioner did not become aware of this memorandum until returning from his vacation. When he returned, he signed for service of correspondence of December 18, 1986, which constituted the Respondent agency's notice of claimed abandonment and notice of rights to administrative hearing to contest that claim. A copy of that notification may be found as part of the Respondent's Exhibit M admitted into evidence, together with the return receipt signed by the Petitioner on December 29, 1986. A timely petition requesting consideration of the agency's claims of abandonment was filed by the Petitioner on January 5, 1987.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is indebted to the State of Florida in the amount of $897.01 arising out of his receipt of overtime pay while in an "excluded position" with the Department of State.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is currently an employee of the State of Florida, Department of State ("State"). He has been continuously employed by "State" from March 1991 to date. Petitioner has consistently received his regular salary, annual leave, sick leave, special holidays, and retirement contributions as part of his employment package as a state government employee. Petitioner was employed by the Division of Elections of "State" as an Administrative Assistant II until April 1, 1991, at which time, he was promoted to an Administrative Assistant III. Petitioner went from an "included position" to an "excluded position" upon his promotion on April 1, 1991. Employees filling "included positions" may receive overtime compensation. Employees filling "excluded positions" may only receive compensatory leave on an hour-for-hour basis for those hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. "Compensatory leave" may be withdrawn from an employee's leave accumulation amount and utilized in the same way as annual leave for the employee's rest and relaxation or other personal purposes. Prior to Petitioner's promotion, "State's" Division of Elections had never had an employee move from an Administrative II, included position, to an Administrative III, excluded position. Neither "State's" administrative personnel nor Petitioner had any prior knowledge that upon his promotion Petitioner would/was no longer entitled to be paid money for the overtime he worked in the new position. "State's" March 27, 1991 appointment letter to Petitioner advising him of his promotion did not advise him that the promotion had the effect of moving him from an included to an excluded position for purposes of overtime pay. The April 10, 1991 Report of Personnel Action regarding Petitioner's promotion incorrectly indicated that he had moved from an Administrative II, "excluded," to an Administrative III, "excluded" position. The Department of Management Services (Management Services) is solely responsible for the designation of whether an employee is in an included or excluded position as it relates to a Report of Personnel Action. That agency's personnel were unable to explain why the April 10, 1991 Report of Personnel Action was incorrect. Due to the erroneous Report of Personnel Action, neither "State" nor Petitioner were on actual notice that Petitioner had moved from an included to an excluded position for purposes of overtime pay and that he was no longer entitled to be paid money for the overtime he worked in the excluded promotional position of Administrative Assistant III. However, all concerned had constructive notice by prior documents and designations that the Administrative Assistant II position was an "included" position. No agency deliberately misled the Petitioner concerning his promotion, and there is no evidence that he would have refused the promotion had he known of the change of status from "included" to "excluded." Petitioner's "State" supervisor who had authorized his April 1, 1991 promotion was without actual knowledge at the time of Petitioner's promotion that Petitioner had moved from an included to an excluded position for purposes of receiving overtime pay and did not advise him of his ineligibility for overtime pay after his promotion. Petitioner was paid $897.01 in overtime payments for overtime worked during April through July 1991, while in an excluded position, despite not being entitled to overtime pay after May 31, 1991 for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. (The May 31, 1991 date was stipulated by the parties, see appendix.) Petitioner's "State" supervisor erroneously authorized the overtime payments Petitioner received while in his excluded promotional position. The Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance's (Banking and Finance's) payroll system that is designed to detect errors such as occurred here upon receipt of an employee's authorized request for pay did not detect this error because the system was not on-line during the four months Petitioner worked and submitted authorized requests for overtime pay in the excluded promotional position. The fact that Petitioner had received overtime pay while in an excluded position was neither discovered nor conveyed to him until six months after his April 1, 1991 promotion. Banking and Finance initiated an investigation concerning the overtime payments received by Petitioner while in an excluded position after receiving an anonymous complaint on October 28, 1991. In a March 10, 1993 letter, Banking and Finance asserted that the overtime payments Petitioner received while in an excluded position constituted a monetary debt to the State of Florida which Petitioner must repay in money. Petitioner spent the $897.01 to pay bills associated with the vacation he had taken prior to his promotion. Petitioner would have been able to repay the overpayment in cash had the error been discovered after the first or second erroneous monthly overtime payments, but he was not able to repay that large an amount in cash after the third request was submitted. Petitioner's request for authorization for overtime pay after his promotion was not submitted fraudulently or mendaciously, but was submitted because neither Petitioner nor anyone in his agency ("State") understood that he was not legally entitled to overtime pay. After determining that Petitioner had received overpayments, "State" took steps to recoup the overpayments. "State" sought to work with Petitioner to alleviate this problem for which its personnel felt partially responsible. In fact, "State" permitted him to utilize one of its agency attorneys for purposes of the instant formal proceeding. Petitioner and "State", without consulting Banking and Finance, entered into a negotiated agreement by which Petitioner would remit the $897.01 in overpayments in the form of 78 annual leave hours, and on December 31, 1991, 78 hours were deducted from Petitioner's accrued annual leave balance. In calculating the repayment of the deducted 78 annual leave hours from Petitioner's annual leave balance, "State" multiplied his rate of pay at that time, with the number of annual leave hours necessary to equal the amount of the overpayments, equaling $897.01. Neither Petitioner nor any agency received a cash payment from the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours. "State" merely deducted the hours from Petitioner's annual leave balance. "State" represented to Petitioner that the deduction of an amount of annual leave hours equivalent to the overpayments would satisfy his debt to the State of Florida. However, "State" neither requested nor received written permission from the Department of Banking and Finance to enter into an agreement by which "State" could accept a non-monetary "repayment" from Petitioner. Charlene Wilson, Personnel Services Specialist, Benefits Division of Administrative Services, Department of State, testified that accrued paid leave is a dollar-for-dollar payment since each hour of annual leave represents an hour of active employment and, therefore, are equal. William J. Schmitt, Chief, Bureau of Payrolls, Department of Banking and Finance, testified that an employee is paid for annual leave when authorized by an agency. However, these isolated pieces of evidence are not controlling. Further testimony was provided as to the historical application of the rules of the Department of Banking and Finance and the Department of Management Services. Robert W. Henley, Labor Specialist for Management Services, and William J. Schmitt each testified to the historical application and interpretation of their respective agency rules. Each testified that, as their agencies had interpreted and applied their own rules to date, employees who are continually employed by the State of Florida may not use annual leave to repay a debt in the manner Petitioner and the Department of State chose. Prior to the December 31, 1991 deduction of the annual leave hours, Petitioner had "banked" 109.097 annual leave hours. After the deduction of 78 hours to satisfy his agreement with "State," he had only 31.097 hours remaining. It took Petitioner 12 months to build his annual leave balance back to where it was prior to the December 31, 1991 deduction. During the 1991 year, but prior to the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours, Petitioner had taken a vacation to Innsbruck, Austria utilizing his annual leave accrued to that point in time and being paid his regular salary while he was on vacation. Petitioner did not take a vacation in 1992, the year following the deduction of the 78 annual leave hours, because of the lack of sufficient accrued annual leave hours left in his balance to take the length of vacation he wanted to take. In 1992 there were still low air-fare prices for trips abroad. In 1991, Petitioner utilized 80 annual leave hours while receiving regular pay. In 1992, Petitioner utilized 18.25 annual leave hours while receiving regular pay.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order providing as follows: That Petitioner is indebted for salary overpayments to the Department of Banking and Finance for the amount of $897.01; That Petitioner shall repay the aforesaid amount within one year from date of this order in payment amounts of not less than $100.00 each or the total remaining balance of the debt in any single payment and that failure of Petitioner to repay the full amount in the year provided shall result in the Department of Banking and Finance debiting his salary for the unpaid balance at the end of the year's grace period, and That once full payment is completed, the Department of Banking and Finance shall coordinate, to the degree possible, with all other agencies the restoration of 78 hours annual leave to Petitioner's annual leave account balance and the crediting of Petitioner with the appropriate compensatory leave hours earned after his promotional date. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of February, 1994, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of February, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER 93-1886 The following constitute specific rulings, pursuant to S120.59(2), F.S., upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF). Petitioner's PFOF: 1-5 Accepted in substance, but not adopted verbatim. 7-11 Accepted in substance, but not adopted verbatim. 6,12 Rejected as stated due to the legal words of art employed. See FOF 2 and 11 which more accurately conform to the record as a whole. 13-32 Not adopted verbatim. Accepted in substance except for unnecessary, subordinate or cumulative material. It is noted that PFOF 21 and 22 seem to be contradictory but were in fact stipulated as fact by the parties. Although a date of March 31 makes better sense, the hearing officer assumes that the parties' use of the May 31 date accounts for pre-earned payments of overtime delayed into a following pay period. This is not a dispositive issue and the parties' stipulation has been honored in FOF 13. 33-34 Rejected because these proposals are misleading as stated and are not dispositive. Covered in FOF 25-26. 35-36 Not adopted verbatim. Accepted in substance except for unnecessary, subordinate, or cumulative material. Rejected as stated because it contains words of art and represents a proposed conclusion of law. See Conclusions of Law. Covered only as necessary in FOF 21-23. Otherwise rejected as a proposed conclusion of law or as cumulative to the facts as found. 39-40 Rejected as conclusions of law or legal argument and as unnecessary and non-dispositive. See FOF 21-23 and Conclusions of Law. 41-49 The interspersed conclusions of law, including but not limited to the "payment" of leave hours, are rejected as such. The interspersed and footnoted legal arguments also are rejected. See FOF 28-30 Conclusions of Law. Otherwise, the proposals are accepted in substance but not adopted verbatim to avoid subordinate, cumulative and verbose material. 50 Accepted. Respondent's PFOF: 1-2 Accepted, but some unnecessary, subordinate and cumulative material has been excised. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas D. Sunshine, Esquire Department of State The Capitol, LL-10 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Scott C. Wright, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position with the Respondent and resigned from Career Service pursuant to the personnel rules of the Career Service System?
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was an employee of the Respondent for more than five years. At all times relevant hereto, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent. During the month of December, 1986, and the portion of January, 1987, prior to the date the Petitioner was removed from his position, the Petitioner was assigned to the Blountstown, Florida, road maintenance office. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Mr. Gustavev Goodwin. Mr. Goodwin was an HMT-3 with the Respondent and supervised a maintenance crew of three men, including the Petitioner. Mr. Goodwin was the Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Mr. Lloyd Blackburn, a Highway Maintenance Supervisor with the Respondent, was Mr. Goodwin's immediate supervisor. Mr. Blackburn supervises all crews operating out of the Blountstown office. The Petitioner and his crew worked a 10-hour day, 4 days a week. Mr. Goodwin prepares a weekly crew report on a daily basis. Mr. Goodwin records the hours a crew member worked or, if a crew member was not present, Mr. Goodwin notes the absence and the reason for the absence. Mr. Blackburn transfers the information recorded on the weekly crew reports to timesheets which are used for payroll purposes. If approval of a request for leave is required, employees are required to report to their crew supervisor or Mr. Blackburn. The Petitioner would have been required to obtain approval of leave from Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn, if prior approval had been required. In cases of sick leave, employees were expected to call by telephone on the day of the illness or injury and inform Mr. Blackburn. Mr. Blackburn was at the office each work day in the morning before the crews completed fueling their trucks and departed for the day. Mr. Blackburn was then out of the office during most of the remainder of the day. During the last week of December, 1986, Mr. Goodwin, the Petitioner and the other members of Mr. Goodwin's crew were "bull skating" (joking and talking). The Petitioner told Mr. Goodwin in response to some comment, probably pertaining to the work that would be done the first week of January, 1987, that "I won't be here next week anyway. I be in the hospital." Although Mr. Goodwin did not remember the Petitioner having made these comments, the Petitioner and one of the crew members, Mr. Arthur Jackson, both testified that the comments were made. Neither Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn told the Petitioner that he could be absent from work during the first week of January, 1987. The Petitioner was absent from work during the first week of January, 1987 -- January 5, 6, 7 and 8, 1987. Neither Mr. Goodwin nor Mr. Blackburn were contacted on January 5-8, 1987, by the Petitioner or anyone on behalf of the Petitioner, about the Petitioner's absence. Neither Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn told the Petitioner that his absence on January 5-8, 1937, was approved. The Petitioner had obtained approval of annual leave prior to the period at issue in this case. The Petitioner had planned to go to the hospital on January 5, 1987, because of problems he has had with his legs, and to remain in the hospital for the remainder of the week. Because of the problems with his legs and his automobile, the Petitioner did not go to the hospital or see a doctor on January 5, 1987. On January 8, 1987, the Petitioner had a friend drive him to Panama City, Florida, where he remained under the care of Dr. Ernest G. Haslam, M.D., in the hospital, until January 12, 1987. Although the Petitioner does not have a telephone at his residence, Mr. Goodwin or Mr. Blackburn could have been contacted by Petitioner's wife, who works at Hardees, or by a friend. The Petitioner acknowledged receipt on April 14, 1983, of the Florida Department of Transportation Employee Handbook and his responsibility to review the handbook in detail and to request clarification, if necessary. On page 43 of the handbook it is provided that "[a]fter an unauthorized leave of absence for three consecutive workdays, the Department will consider you to have abandoned your position and resigned from Career Service ..." On page 22 of the handbook it is provided that "[i]f a medical appointment is necessary during work hours, you should obtain `approval, in advance, to use your earned sick leave." By certified letter from Allen Potter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department, dated January 8, 1976, the Petitioner was informed that he was deemed to have abandoned his position with the Respondent and to have resigned from the Career Service because of his absence from work during the first week of January, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration rule that the Petitioner, Albert T. Smith, has not abandoned his position with the Respondent, the Department of Transportation, and has not resigned from the Career Service. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-0450 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s), if any, in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Paragraph numbers in the Recommended Order are referred to as "RD ." Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact The Petitioner has filed a letter dated April 10, 1987. The only proposed finding of fact contained in this letter concerns the question of whether the Petitioner told his supervisor, Mr. Goodwin, that he would not be at work during the period of time at issue in this case. The proposed finding of fact has been accepted in RD 10. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding RD Number of Acceptance of Fact Number or Reason for Rejection 1 RD 1-4 and 8. 2 RD 5-7 and 9. 3 RD 10-11. 4 RD 11 and 13. The evidence did not prove that the Petitioner had obtained prior approval for sick leave subsequent to the period of time involved in this case. The evidence only proved that the Petitioner had on other occasions received prior approval of annual leave. 5 RD 19-20. RD 16 and 18. The evidence does not prove that the Petitioner got into a car and drove to town. RD 21. The Petitioner was not, however, "absent from his position without authorized leave ..." COPIES FURNISHED: Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kay N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Hayden Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 ATTN: Eleanor F. Turner, MS 58 Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street, MS 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Mr. Albert T. Smith Route 1, Box 135, B 69A Blountstown, Florida 32424 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact From July 1946 until his retirement from the state career service system on June 30, 1983, Petitioner was an employee of the Department of Labor and Employment Security or its predecessor agencies (the Florida Industrial Commission, the Department of Commerce, and the War Manpower Commission), hereinafter collectively referred to as the Department. The Department, at the time of Petitioner's initial employment, established and administered its own leave policies. Subsequently, the Florida Merit System was expanded to cover all state agencies, including the Department, and uniform personnel policies and practices, including the accumulation of annual leave, were established. Effective July 1, 1957 the accumulation of annual leave for employees of the Department, as with employees of all state agencies, was limited to 240 hours. Initially, Merit System leave regulations provided that leave accumulated by employees of agencies with existing leave regulations, such as the Department, would be credited to their accounts as of July 1, 1957, but any accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours would become void after December 31, 1959. At the behest of the Department, the deadline within which excess accumulated leave had to be utilized was extended to December 31, 1961. Essentially employees were afforded four and one-half years within which to utilize their excess accumulated annual leave or forfeit it. Upon his retirement June 30, 1983, Petitioner was paid for, and had computed as part of his Average Final compensation; the annual leave he had accumulated up to a maximum of 240 hours in accordance with Rule 22A-8.10, F.A.C. That rule, or its predecessor, has contained the same 240-hour limitation since December 31, 1961. Petitioner asserts that he had accumulated leave in excess of 240 hours on December 31, 1961. While the evidence does establish Petitioner had excess leave on that date, there was no competent evidence presented from which his actual leave balance could be established. The actual amount of Petitioner's excess leave is not, however, significant since any annual leave he had in excess of 240 hours was void after December 31, 1961. Notwithstanding the voiding of his excess annual leave, Petitioner asserts that his entitlement to such leave still exists because of certain assurances he received from his supervisors. According to Petitioner, he was unable to utilize his excess leave between July 1, 1957 and December 31, 1961, because he was on "special assignments" for the Department which precluded his absence from work. Consequently, Petitioner says, `his supervisors "assured" him that they would see to it that he "got his excess leave." It is worthy of note that the supervisors who purportedly gave such assurances have been dead for over a decade, that there exists no corroborating evidence of Petitioner's assertions, and that at no time during the ensuing 23 years did Petitioner raise any issue concerning, or attempt to use, the leave which had been forfeited. It is further worthy of note that while purportedly assured he would "get his excess leave," Petitioner received no assurance he would be paid for it upon retirement. It is unnecessary to decide whether such assurances were in fact given. The evidence is clear that the supervisors in question had no authority, real or apparent, to bind the State by such assurances. Further, any reliance Petitioner may have placed on such assurances would not have been reasonable, since such assurances were contrary to existing regulations.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Hughlan Long, was employed by the Florida Industrial Commission from 1946 to 1952, during which time he was a member of the State and County Officer and Employee Retirement System (SCOERS). Petitioner was employed as a state attorney from 1953 to 1956. Again, during that time he was a member of SCOERS. During the period 1962 to 1964, Petitioner was a member of the Dade County Commission, at which time he was a member of SCOERS. On this occasion, as on each of the above occasions, the Petitioner obtained a refund of all contributions to SCOERS when he terminated his employment. In October of 1969, Petitioner became Public Defender for Dade County and was a member of SCOERS. From this position he was appointed a judge of industrial claims. He has stayed in that position since his appointment on December 28, 1970. Several days prior to his appointment as a judge of industrial claims, on December 1, 1970, Petitioner voluntarily transferred from SCOERS to the Florida Retirement System (FRS). Petitioner based his decision to transfer upon his reading of the statutes and the data available from the Division of Retirement upon the benefits available under the two systems. At the time he transferred to FRS, Petitioner was not eligible to purchase past service credit in SCOERS. Petitioner corresponded with Respondent and was advised he could receive two percent credit for his 10.18 years prior SCOERS service. The Division erroneously advised him that he would receive two percent credit for his past service, although at the time Petitioner was a member of FRS and only eligible for 1.6 percent credit for such service. Based upon the information provided to him, the Petitioner purchased his prior service credit of 10.18 years and paid the required interest, a total of $4,092.27. In 1975, the Division discovered its error and sent a letter to Petitioner. See Petitioner's Exhibit #11. This letter advised Petitioner that his purchase had been incorrectly computed based upon Chapter 122, Florida Statutes, because he did not have three years service prior to the time he transferred to FRS. The letter further stated, "therefore, after you completed the three continuous years you must claim prior service in this system (FRS)." This was the only reference or correction made by the Division to Petitioner until 1981. In 1981, Petitioner requested data on his retirement credit and was advised he would get 1.6 percent rather than two percent for his past service credit. No credible evidence was received that Petitioner was induced to purchase his past service by the erroneous information provided him. Petitioner filed a timely request for a hearing pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the Hearing Officer recommends that the decision of the Division of Retirement to deny the Petitioner two percent service credit be upheld. However, because Petitioner was misadvised he should receive the option of accepting the benefit as provided by law or receiving his purchase price back with interest of six percent per annum. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of February, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Jerold Feuer, Esquire 19 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130 Augustus D. Aikens, Esquire Division of Retirement Cedars Executive Center Nevin G. Smith, Secretary 2639 North Monroe Street Department of Administration Suite 207C - Box 81 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether the Petitioner received a salary overpayment from the Respondent for leave usage to which she was not entitled, as set forth in amended correspondence dated October 2, 2009, and, if so, the amount of any overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ms. Anderson was employed by the Department as a full- time Career Service employee until her separation on August 11, 2009. She had one year and four months' service with the State of Florida. As an employee of the Department, Ms. Anderson was paid biweekly. Based on her years of service, Ms. Anderson accrued four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave each biweekly pay period. Ms. Anderson used the People First System to complete her timesheets, request approval of leave, and review her leave balances. At issue is the amount of annual and sick leave used by Ms. Anderson during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009 and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson entered her time in the computerized People First timesheet as follows: February 6, 2009 8 hours' worked February 9, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 10, 2009 8 hours' sick leave February 11, 2009 3.25 hours' sick leave 4.75 hours' annual leave February 12, 2009 8 hours' personal holiday February 13, 2009 8 hours' annual leave February 16, 2009 7.25 hours' annual leave February 17, 2009 8 hours' worked February 18, 2009 8.75 hours' worked February 19, 2009 4 hours' sick leave 4 hours' annual leave The Pay Period Overview in the People First System for the pertinent time period reflected the following: Beginning balance 2/06/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Accrual 2/19/09: 4 hours' annual leave 4 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Used N/A : (24.00) hours' annual leave (23.25) hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday Ending Balance 2/19/09: 0 hours' annual leave 0 hours' sick leave 0 hours' personal holiday The Department's Policies and Procedures for Attendance and Leave provides in pertinent part: III. Standards and Procedures * * * Annual Leave Method of Earning Annual Leave * * * Bureau of Personnel 1. Annual leave earned during any period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period or, in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Annual Leave Employee 1. Use of annual leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited and shall only be used with the prior approval of the proper authority. * * * Sick Leave Method of Earning Sick Leave * * * Employee * * * 4. Sick leave earned during any pay period shall be credited to the employee on the last day of that pay period, or in the case of separation, on the last day the employee is on the payroll. * * * Use of Earned Sick Leave Employee 1. Use of sick leave shall not be authorized prior to the time it is earned and credited to the employee and shall only be used with the approval of the proper authority. The Department keeps an official record of an employee's leave balances and accruals for each pay period, and it conducts audits of an employee's leave upon separation. The Department performed an audit of Ms. Anderson's leave and created an Employee Leave Record setting out annual and sick leave earned and used by Ms. Anderson up to her date of separation in August 2009. The audit revealed that Ms. Anderson had 20 hours of annual leave and 19.25 of sick leave available as of January 6, 2009, and that she accrued 4 hours of annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave on February 19, 2009, which could be used beginning February 20, 2009. As shown on the People's First timesheet prepared by Ms. Anderson and set out above, Ms. Anderson used 24 hours of annual leave and 23.25 hours of sick leave during the pay period beginning February 6, 2009, and ending February 19, 2009. Ms. Anderson, therefore, used four hours of annual leave and four hours of sick leave to which she was not entitled during the pay period extending from February 6, 2009, to February 19, 2009, and she was paid for these hours in the salary warrant issued February 27, 2009. In calculating the amount of the salary overpayment to Ms. Anderson, the Department made allowance for the one hour's annual leave balance Ms. Anderson had when she separated from the Department. The Department, therefore, calculated the salary overpayment based on seven non-compensable hours, and the balance owed by Ms. Anderson to the Department for the salary overpayment is $66.65.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order requiring Lillian Anderson to remit to the Department of Juvenile Justice the amount of $66.65. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of February, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA M. HART Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of February, 2010. COPIES FURNISHED: Kimberly Sisko Ward, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Lillian Anderson 3617 Carambola Circle North Coconut, Florida 33066 Frank Peterman, Jr., Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Jennifer Parker, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Department of Legal Affairs (Department) is an agency of the State of Florida. Petitioner, Calvin L. Fox (Fox), was employed by the Department from April 24, 1978 to June 26, 1987, and consequently accrued nine years, two months and two days of creditable state service. Immediately prior to his employment with the Department, Fox had been employed by a county government. That employment, which commenced March 17, 1976, is creditable under the state retirement system but is not considered creditable state service for other termination benefits. Upon his resignation from the Department, Fox was paid $966.31 for accumulated sick leave based on the erroneous conclusion that March 17, 1976, as opposed to April 24, 1978, was the date he commenced creditable state service. 1/ Commencing in 1985, Fox was engaged in litigation against the Department arising from his employment with the State of Florida. While the record does not disclose the specifics of that litigation, it does establish that the parties resolved their dispute through the execution of a mutual release dated August 7, 1987, and a joint stipulation of voluntary dismissal with prejudice of a Federal court action on the same date. Pertinent to this case, the joint stipulation provided: In consideration for such mutual releases and voluntary dismissal with prejudice, the parties agree to provide the consideration agreed upon in the Mutual Release attached as Exhibit 1 as full settlement of all claims alleged or which could have been alleged in this cause of action. By accepting the terms of this stipulation and the mutual release which may pertain, the parties do not admit liability or wrongdoing in this action. The parties agree to mutual releases and the payment of consideration solely to accomplish the compromise and settlement of any and all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, or suits of any kind or nature whatsoever, including all attorney fees and costs, arising from Plaintiff's employment or non- employment, by the Defendants. All parties stipulate and agree that this document, with the attached release, represents the entire agreement between them, and that the terms contained herein may not be changed or altered without the express written consent of all parties. The mutual release provided: In consideration of Employee Fox's voluntary dismissal with prejudice and his voluntary resignation, the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, the State, for itself and its legal representatives and assigns, agrees to release, acquit, satisfy and forever discharge Employee Fox, his agents or servants and all heirs, legal representatives, successors or assigns, from all claims alleged or which could have been alleged in the above-styled actions and from all causes of action, claims or demands whatsoever in law or in equity as a result of any loss known or unknown at this time, or which may hereafter become known, develop or accrue, occasioned by or arising out of, directly or indirectly, any of the matters set forth or which could have been set forth in the above-referenced or any other litigation between the parties. * * * The undersigned have read the foregoing release and fully understand it and voluntarily accept it for the purpose of making a full and final compromise, adjustment and settlement of any and all claims based upon the allegations of the above-referenced litigation or any other litigation between the parties and for the express purpose of precluding forever any further or additional claims arising out of Employee Fox's employment or non-employment. In March 1988, the erroneous payment of accumulated sick leave to Fox was disclosed during a routine audit of the Department by the Auditor General. Fox has denied liability for the repayment of such monies predicated on the parties execution of the joint stipulation and mutual release discussed supra.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order which terminates any further efforts to collect the subject monies from Fox. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1989.
