The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Charge of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), and, if so, what relief should Petitioner be granted.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a construction company. Petitioner is a black male who was employed by Respondent for almost six years as an electrical helper until his termination on February 2, 2015. The incident giving rise to Petitioner’s termination occurred on February 2, 2015, in Port Everglades, Florida. On that date, Petitioner was working on a project as an electrical helper. Petitioner and another employee in the area of the work reportedly violated Respondent’s “Lock out/Tag out” (“LOTO”) safety policy. LOTO is required to cutoff electrical power whenever construction, modification, testing, start-up, servicing, or maintenance is being performed on equipment or systems in which the unexpected energization, start-up, or release of stored energy, could cause injury to people or damage equipment. Any employee of Respondent whose job requires him or her to operate or use a machine or equipment on which construction, modification, testing, start-up, servicing, or maintenance is being performed under a LOTO, or whose job requires him or her to work in an area in which such activities are being performed, must comply with LOTO. Petitioner and another employee reportedly failed to comply with LOTO in an area in which they were working on February 2, 2015. Respondent considers the failure of an employee to comply with LOTO to be a terminable offense. Both Petitioner and another employee in the area were discharged by Respondent on February 2, 2015, for failing to comply with the LOTO policy. The persuasive and credible evidence adduced at hearing demonstrates that Petitioner was terminated for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons having nothing to do with his race, color, or national origin. Petitioner’s charge of discrimination is based on speculation and conjecture, and Petitioner failed to prove that Respondent’s reasons for his firing are a mere pretext for intentional race, color, or national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of December, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 2016.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Milos, illegally terminated Petitioner based on her race (Black), in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2018).
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of material and relevant fact: Petitioner is a Black female who worked for Milos as a line cook. Respondent is a Greek restaurant located in Miami, Florida. On January 12, 2016, Respondent hired Petitioner for a line cook position. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by Arsan. Arsan supervises all back-of-the-house staff and was Petitioner's supervisor throughout her entire 20-month period of employment. On May 30, 2016, approximately four and a half months after Petitioner's hire at Milos, Arsan gave Petitioner a raise in pay because he felt that she was performing well. Many of the employees Arsan supervises at Milos are Black. PETITIONER'S PERFORMANCE ISSUES AT MILOS On September 23, 2016, Petitioner was suspended for insubordination and violating company policies and procedures. Resp. Ex. 7 and 8. More specifically, Arsan was notified by the sous chef that there had been an argument between Petitioner and a coworker. Arsan attempted to investigate the dispute and found Petitioner to be very emotional and aggressive during the investigation. She was asked to leave but refused. Eventually, she left the premises. This incident came on the heels of another similar incident involving a verbal argument with a coworker, which occurred on September 17, 2016. Subsequently, on April 28, 2017, Petitioner was involved in another workplace argument with an employee named Rosa Salazar ("Salazar"). Resp. Ex. 10. The manager on duty intervened and attempted to resolve the dispute and calm the parties down. After he did so, Petitioner left work without permission and left early the following day as well. On June 27, 2017, a third employee named Ishay (a.k.a., Ayse Akbulut) complained that she could not work with Petitioner at their assigned station because Petitioner was "being rude and territorial." Resp. Ex. 11. Arsan spoke to Petitioner and resolved the matter between the two employees. However, he documented the incident as other employees had previously complained about Petitioner creating a hostile working environment. On June 30, 2017, Petitioner reportedly was involved in yet another workplace incident with Sonya Cabret ("Cabret"). Cabret complained that Petitioner made racially charged and demeaning comments to her based on Cabret's Haitian national origin. More specifically, Cabret complained that Petitioner called her an "ignorant Haitian," a "f ing Haitian," and stated that Cabret does not know how to speak English and that Cabret could not find a job anywhere else. Two months prior, Salazar had also complained that Petitioner made derogatory remarks to her based on Salazar's Latin ethnicity. Resp. Ex. 12 and 13. Salazar recounted that Petitioner had called her a "f ing Latino." Arsan disciplined Petitioner by counseling her and sending her home for the day. Each of the above incidents occurred prior to Hurricane Irma in September 2017. The undersigned finds that these incidents, and their related warnings and discipline, are relevant to the ultimate decision to discharge Petitioner and have some bearing on the propriety and necessity for termination. PETITIONER'S FAILURE TO RETURN TO WORK AFTER HURRICANE IRMA At some point in time on Wednesday, September 6, 2017, Arsan informed all employees that Milos would be closed at the end of the work day due to the approaching landfall of Hurricane Irma. Petitioner had been scheduled to report to work on September 6, 2017, at 10:00 a.m., but she did not do so. At 12:40 p.m. on September 6, 2017, Petitioner texted Arsan that she could not report to work because she was evacuating to Georgia due to Hurricane Irma. However, she hoped to return to work the following Tuesday (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 14. After the hurricane had passed, on September 10, 2017, Arsan sent a group text message to all back-of-the-house staff alerting them that the restaurant was "closed for Monday" (September 11, 2017) and "we will be probably open for Tuesday" (September 12, 2017). Resp. Ex. 15. Petitioner received this text message. Petitioner never informed Arsan that she would not be back from Georgia by September 12, 2017, as she mentioned in her text message on September 6, 2017. Believing Petitioner would be back in Miami on September 12, 2017, Arsan scheduled Petitioner to work Wednesday, September 13, 2017. Resp. Ex. 16. On September 13, 2017, Petitioner did not call in or report for work. That same day, Arsan called Petitioner to find out why she did not report to work. Petitioner did not answer or return Arsan's call. On September 14, 2017, Petitioner again failed to call in or report for work. Arsan again attempted to reach Petitioner by telephone, but she did not answer. Arsan then sent Petitioner a text message notifying her that she was scheduled to be at work. Petitioner responded to Arsan's text messages on September 14, 2017, and the following discussion ensued: Arsan: "Denise you are scheduled to work today[.]" Petitioner: "Nobody called me and told me anything I cannot get out until Tuesday or Wednesday I'll [sic] area was hit bad and the bus is [sic] down here start running Wednesday[.]" Arsan: "Denise everybody is at work except you. How the bus starting [sic] on wednesday, [sic] half of staff is using the bus and they are here, The buses working [sic] fine." Petitioner: "When you come to my family I don't care about no job [sic] that's not my life we had an emergency down here we don't have any lights some of the buses is not running my house got water in it I am coming from Georgia so I might not be back until Thursday I have a lot of stuff to take care of in my house[.]" Arsan: "Please help let [sic] me understand your situation are you in Miami? or Georgia? Petitioner: I will be in Miami tonight I still have a lot of stuff to do at my. . . . Resp. Ex. 14. Arsan and Petitioner did not have any further communications after this text message exchange. Further, Petitioner did not initiate or attempt to send any more text messages to Arsan after the September 14, 2017, exchange. Petitioner did not report for work scheduled on September 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, or 20. Petitioner testified that she did not report to work from September 13, 2017, to September 20, 2017, because she was attending to damage to her home caused by the hurricane. Based on Petitioner's text message that she does not "care about no job [sic]," Arsan, after consulting with Milos' outside contracted human resource company, removed Petitioner from the schedule for the week of Monday, September 18, 2017, to Sunday, September 24, 2017. On September 21, 2017, Petitioner showed up at Milos to work. Arsan believed Petitioner had abandoned her job and did not expect her to report to work again. After she arrived, Arsan directed Petitioner to speak to Faundez, Milos' outside human resource representative at Eleva Solutions. Contrary to what Petitioner told Arsan (i.e., that she missed work because she was attending to damage in her home from the hurricane), Petitioner gave Faundez three different reasons for her failure to call in or show up for work the preceding week: she did not know that she was supposed to be at work; there was no bus transportation; and (c) Petitioner had to be evacuated. Faundez concluded that Petitioner's reasons for failing to appear for work were inconsistent and conflicted with each other. She also did not believe that Petitioner had provided a definitive or plausible answer explaining why she had not returned to work. After consultation, Faundez and Arsan decided together to terminate Petitioner's employment. Arsan was not the sole decision-maker with respect to Petitioner's termination. Prior to her termination and despite having received Respondent's antidiscrimination policy and complaint procedures, Petitioner never complained that Arsan was discriminating against her because of her race. During the course of the hearing, Petitioner was unable to identify any employee(s) outside of her protected class who engaged in the same conduct and were not terminated from employment. Specifically, on cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that she was unable to identify a single non-Black employee who failed to show up for work following the hurricane and who was not terminated from employment. The evidence Petitioner offered to support her race discrimination claim was vague, unpersuasive, and included only conclusory and general allegations by her that Arsan "was a racist" and is a "nasty human being." There were no emails, texts, documents, or other direct evidence from Petitioner or Arsan supporting her claim that she was fired by Milos because of her race. Likewise, Petitioner called no witnesses to offer any compelling facts or circumstances to support her claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice and find in Respondent's favor. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of October, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 2018.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner, a member of a protected class, was terminated from his employment with the Respondent in the Hospitality Department at the Grand Floridian Hotel on or about March 18, 1993 on the basis of his national origin (Hispanic-Dominican Republic), in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is an employer under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. The Petitioner was employed by the Respondent at its Grand Floridian Hotel as a valet/greeter/bellman in the Hospitality Department during the relevant period of time, including March of 1993. The Petitioner is of Hispanic origin from the Dominican Republic and is a member of a protected class. In approximately October of 1988, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent at the Contemporary Hotel as a valet/greeter. In April of 1989, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for not logging in a piece of luggage. The Petitioner did not grieve the April 1988 written reprimand. In May of 1989, the Petitioner transferred to the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel, where he was a valet/greeter/bellman. In February of 1990, the Petitioner received an oral reprimand for three separate incidents of improperly logging luggage. 9. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the February, 1990 oral reprimand. In August of 1990, the Petitioner again received an oral reprimand, this time for mixing up luggage while loading it into vehicles. The luggage had to be mailed to each rightful owner at the Respondent's expense and caused an inconvenience to the guests. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the August 1990 oral reprimand. In December of 1991, the Petitioner mishandled luggage by failing to tag all of a guest's bags. In May of 1992, the Respondent's management discussed with the Petitioner his failure to tag a piece of luggage. In July of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for failing to log in a guest's luggage. The Petitioner's verbal reprimand in July of 1992 was the result of a direct complaint by a guest, who was required to search for a piece of his own luggage in the Hotel's storage room. The Petitioner could not recall if he grieved the July 1992 verbal reprimand. In September of 1992, the Petitioner received a verbal reprimand for approaching a guest to discuss splitting a tip with a bellman, an impermissible practice. The Petitioner was not suspended for this incident. In December of 1992, the Petitioner received a written reprimand for failing to follow proper procedures regarding a guest's luggage on two separate occasions. The Petitioner did not grieve the December 1992 written reprimand. The Respondent decided not to consider the two incidents in December of the Petitioner's luggage-mishandling as separate incidents for progressive discipline purposes, even though such action was permissible under the collective bargaining agreement. The Respondent's decision not to consider the two December 1992 incidents separately for progressive discipline purposes was based upon the Petitioner's length of service and his good performance in other areas. The Petitioner had a good attitude, had good people skills, and had received good guest comments during the course of his employment. In December of 1992, the Petitioner understood that he was in the progressive discipline process. In January of 1993, the Respondent met with the Petitioner and offered to remove him from the responsibility of handling luggage by putting him in a non-tipped, dispatcher position. Also, in January of 1993, the Respondent and the Petitioner's union representative were working together to preserve the Petitioner's job. The Petitioner was reminded by his union representative about his previous reprimands and that one more incident would cause his termination. The Petitioner was told by his union representative that the purpose of moving him to a dispatcher position was to get him away from the luggage-handling area. The Petitioner was told that if he remained free of similar reprimands for one year, he could return to the tipped position of valet/greeter with no loss of seniority. After initially refusing the dispatcher position, the Petitioner accepted. The Petitioner was given the shift that he requested when he was transferred to the dispatcher position. In February of 1993 while on duty as a dispatcher, the Petitioner received a three-day suspension, without pay, for using poor judgment. He interrupted a valet while the valet was servicing a guest. The Petitioner did not grieve the February 1993 suspension. The Petitioner's action as a dispatcher of interrupting a valet was grounds for the valet to grieve such actions to the union. The suspension in February of 1993 for the Petitioner's poor judgment as a dispatcher was not the basis for his termination. The Petitioner requested a reclassification back to valet/greeter/bellman position. The Petitioner understood that one more incident of any kind would result in his immediate termination. The Petitioner requested the change from dispatcher back to valet/greeter/bellman for personal financial reasons; and his union representative also advised him that if one more incident of any kind occurred, he would be terminated. On March 16, 1993, the Petitioner mishandled luggage. The Petitioner did not properly log in a guest's luggage (a garment bag). 35. The Petitioner was terminated on March 18, 1993 for poor job performance. The progressive discipline which the Petitioner received was consistent with the union contract. The contract provides that an employee can be terminated for the next offense following a single written reprimand. The Petitioner had the opportunity to grieve all of the reprimands he received, and his union representative was aware of the actions taken in connection with the Petitioner's employment. The Petitioner grieved his termination, and that grievance was denied. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence of any similarly-situated employee who was not terminated for mishandling luggage on as many occasions as he had. The Petitioner failed to provide evidence regarding any discrimination against other Hispanic employees, other than his own belief, speculation or conjecture. The Petitioner understood that the Respondent's management was closely checking into everyone's performance. Management asked all of the employees at the Grand Floridian Hotel to help the Hotel earn a five-star rating. The Petitioner was never part of the Respondent's management and did not attend manager meetings. During the course of his employment, the Petitioner was chosen to train other employees because he knew the proper procedures for his valet/bellman/greeter position. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for handling luggage received from guests. The Petitioner knew the proper procedures for logging in and handling bags. The Petitioner received copies of the Respondent's policies and procedures for a valet/bellman, including luggage handling. The Petitioner did not report many of the alleged discriminatory actions of his co-workers to management. The Petitioner conceded that on those occasions when he did make reports to management, these alleged actions stopped. The Petitioner received the overtime and schedules which he requested because of his seniority. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Orlando, Florida, work site has increased from 1993 to 1996. The number of minorities employed at the Respondent's Grand Floridian Hotel has either remained the same or increased from 1992 to 1995. In January of 1993, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department was 14, of which 11 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. In February of 1996, the number of minorities in the Grand Floridian Hotel's Hospitality Department (including valets, bellmen, greeters and dispatchers) was 16, of which 12 were Hispanic; and there were four Hispanics in the valet/greeter classification. The Petitioner failed to produce any evidence of an overall plan by the Respondent's management to eliminate minorities, including Hispanics, from employment at the company. The Respondent allows employees to review their employment records at any time upon request. The Petitioner presented only his own beliefs, speculation or conjecture as a basis for his claims of national origin discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order which denies the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3990 The following constitute my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. The Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact. Proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1-20, 22-31, 33-39, 41-61. Rejected as irrelevant, immaterial or as comment on the evidence: paragraphs 21, 32, 40. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Jorge V. Jimenez 2716 FDC Grove Road Davenport, Florida 33837 Myrna L. Galligano, Esquire Garwood, McKenna & McKenna, P.A. 731 North Garland Avenue Orlando, Florida 32801 Dana C. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue as to DOAH Case Number 94-0966 Whether disciplinary action should be taken against Respondent's license to practice as hearing aid specialist based on a violation of Sections 484.056(1)(g), Florida Statutes (1991) by allegedly selling old, stolen hearing aids as new hearing aids as alleged in the Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, and has been at all times material hereto, a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida, having been issued license number AS 0002321. Respondent is a licensed hearing aid specialist and has been so licensed for approximately seven years. During the seven-year period as a licensed hearing aid specialist, Respondent has fitted over 2,500 hearing aid devices. Prior to the instant complaint, Respondent had no disciplinary actions against him relating to customer service. as to DOAH Case Number 94-0966 Ms. Ola Martin is seventy-two (72) years old and has a hearing problem. In 1993, Ms. Nancy Martin retained the services of Bob Horine at Hearing World, Inc., in Maitland, Florida, for purposes of purchasing a hearing aid for her mother, Ms. Ola Martin. On January 6, 1993, Ola Martin came in the offices of Hearing World, Inc., and was examined by Bob Horine, the owner. Horine did the audio testing on Ola Martin by mechanically checking her hearing and fitting her for hearing aids. The only persons in the office at that time were Respondent, Ola Martin, Horine, and Mrs. Martin's daughter, Nancy Martin, who had accompanied her mother to Hearing World, Inc. During the time that Horine was selling and fitting Ola Martin with her hearing aids, Respondent was in and out of the examination room. Respondent was introduced to Martin at that time. Respondent did not participate in the examination or taking of impressions of Ola Martin's ears for the hearing devices. The person responsible for fitting and selling the hearing aids to Ola Martin was Bob Horine. The contract for sale and delivery of the hearing aids to Ola Martin was made between Horine and Ola Martin. Ola Martin stated that she was returning to Kentucky in two days and asked if she could have rush service. Horine agreed and advised her to pick up her hearing aids the following day, January 7, 1993. Ola Martin paid $1,295.00 to Horine on the same day that he tested her hearing for hearing aids. Horine asked Respondent for assistance in obtaining rush service. Respondent agreed that he would take the paperwork to the SonoTone Laboratory in Casselberry. They agreed to expedite the manufacture of the hearing aids for Ola Martin. Ola Martin arrived the following day with her daughter to retrieve her hearing aids. She was informed that neither Horine, nor Dan Culley, Hearing Aid Specialist, were available for the fitting, and the fitting would be done by Respondent. After agreeing to perform the final fitting for Martin, Respondent retrieved her file and found hearing aid devices inside. The file contained two devices, one for each ear. Respondent took Martin back to the examination area and examined her ears to make sure that they were free of wax. Respondent then took the hearing aids, installed the batteries, and placed the aids into Martin's ears, asking her how they felt. Respondent then showed Martin how to work the hearing devices. Respondent then gave Martin a 25-word discrimination test from a distance of ten feet. During the fitting, Martin conveyed to Respondent that the hearing aids seemed a little too large. Respondent then took them to another room where he buffed the hearing aids with a drill in order to help them fit properly. When placed back in the ears of Martin, they seemed to fit properly. Respondent instructed Martin to leave the hearing aids in place for one hour on the first day, and then gradually to increase the wearing time until she was comfortably wearing the hearing aids at all times except at night. At no time did Martin communicate her dissatisfaction with the fit or sound of her hearing aids to Respondent. Martin was in a hurry to conclude her business with Respondent, as she was worried that her daughter was going to be angry with her for taking so long. The serial numbers on the hearing aid devices delivered to Martin are too small to be viewed by the naked eye and require magnification to be seen. Respondent did not check the invoice numbers against the numbers on the devices delivered to Martin. At Hearing World, hearing aids were checked in through the receptionist, who would prepare the hearing aid devices for delivery. The receptionist was responsible for checking the serial numbers against those listed on the invoice. Respondent assumed when he found the two hearing aids in Martin's file, that they were the hearing aids which had been manufactured by SonoTone for her. Respondent made a visual inspection of the hearing aids and did not check the serial numbers from the manufacturer against those on the hearing aid devices. Neither a visual inspection, nor from any communication from Martin, caused Respondent to believe that the hearing aids which he inserted at that time were not those manufactured for Martin. Respondent received no negative communication from Martin after the fitting of her hearing aids. Approximately two to three days after Respondent fitted Martin's hearing aid devices, he was informed by the receptionist that two hearing aid devices had arrived from SonoTone for Martin. Respondent then realized that the hearing aids which were in Ola Martin's possession were not manufactured for her. When Respondent informed Horine of the error, Horine told Respondent that he had used Respondent's models in testing, and had "stuck" [sic] them in her file by mistake. Horine told Respondent that he would take care of the matter and straighten out the erroneous delivery. The standard operating procedure employed at Hearing World, Inc. in fitting a client with hearing aids was as follows: Hearing aids would be ordered. The hearing aids would then be manufactured by SonoTone in Longwood and sent to Hearing World, Inc. The hearing aids would first come to the secretary at Hearing World, Inc. The secretary would then take the hearing aids out, inspect them, insert batteries, and test their functioning. The secretary would record the serial numbers on the invoice and check those with the serial numbers on the hearing devices and place the hearing devices in the client's file. The person fitting the hearing aids would then pick up the file. It was not negligent, incompetent or misconduct for Respondent to have picked up Ola Martin's file, and finding two hearing aids therein, place them in the client's ears with a visual check only. After making the slight adjustment for size and with no complaints from the client as to audio or fitting problems, Respondent would not have had cause to double check the manufacturer's number on the hearing aids with the manufacturer's number on the invoice. Although the hearing aids helped Ola Martin's hearing, upon her return to Lexington, Kentucky, she complained that they seemed too loud even when she turned them down as low as they would go. Martin went to the Miracle Ear office in Lexington to have her hearing aids examined, and was examined by James McFadden, a hearing aid specialist for 29 years. Martin complained to McFadden that her hearing aids did not fit properly and that the sound was not clear. Upon examining Ola Martin's device, McFadden observed that they did not fit properly. McFadden attempted to adjust the hearing aids to Martin's satisfaction, but was not able to do so. McFadden obtained the serial number from the hearing device and spoke to a Miracle Ear representative in Minneapolis. He was informed that the hearing aid devices were registered to a woman in the Miami area and were fitted to that woman in March, 1991. McFadden then retested Martin and made new impressions of her ears for another Miracle Ear hearing device. The hearing aids brought to McFadden by Martin were originally made for Isabella Miller and were sold through Jean Marohn, a Miracle Ear franchisee based in Fort Myers, Florida. The shipping date was March 27, 1991. Miracle Ear instructed Martin to return the hearing aids to the original seller, Horine, for a complete refund. Based upon her conversation with McFadden, Martin returned the hearing aids to her daughter in order to obtain a refund from Hearing World, Inc., in Orlando. Ola Martin's daughter contacted Hearing World and was reimbursed by Horine for the full amount paid for hearing aids. Subsequently, Ola Martin filed a complaint with the Florida Department of Business and Professional Regulation against Horine, but not as to Respondent. Dahlburg is the manufacturer of Miracle Ear. During the manufacturing process, a serial number is placed on the hearing instrument which is unique for that particular hearing instrument. It is registered to the single individual for whom the instrument is made. Upon construction of the hearing instrument, it is shipped to the franchisee for placement in the consumer's ear. A franchisee outside the Minneapolis area could not obtain a hearing device from Dahlberg within a 24-hour period. Miracle Ear replaced Martin's hearing aids with new Miracle Ear hearing instruments at no cost to her. Jean Burton Marohn is a licensed hearing aid specialist in the State of Florida and owner of a Miracle Ear franchise located in Ft. Myers, Florida. In the early 1990's, Respondent was employed by Marohn as a manager at the store in Miami that covered South Dade and Monroe Counties. Respondent was employed in that capacity until approximately September 1992, when the store closed and he lost his home and personal belongs to Hurricane Andrew. The hearing aids in possession of Ola Martin were, in fact, sold by the Miami store to Isabella Miller. The hearing aids originally constructed for Isabella Miller were returned by her to Marohn's office in Miami. Miller alleged she was dissatisfied with the product, and could not afford the payments. Although Marohn attempted to rectify the problem with the hearing aid devices, Miller refused to reclaim possession of the hearing aids. They remained in Marohn's Miami location because the manufacturer's return period had expired. At the time of the impending Hurricane Andrew, Marohn requested that Respondent remove from the store what items he could: typewriters, telephones, copy machines, fax machines, and audiometers because of the potential for looting after the storm passed through. Respondent did so and informed Marohn that, in addition to the above items, he also removed stock and merchandise from the store. None of the items removed by Respondent, including the hearing aid devices, were returned to Marohn after the hurricane. In March of 1993, Marohn received a telephone call from an attorney calling on behalf of Respondent informing her that Respondent wanted to return the items removed from her store in exchange for commissions that she owed him. Marohn informed Respondent's attorney that she had replaced the equipment that Respondent had removed and she refused to accept the return of her property. Marohn tendered a casualty loss to her insurance company, including items that Respondent removed with knowledge, including the hearing aids. At the time that Respondent discontinued employment with Marohn, he was due a minimum of $3,000.00 in commissions. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, Marohn provided Respondent with a number of hearing aid devices which were given to him and which he employed as display or demonstrative models. The hearing aids returned to Marohn by Miller at Miracle Ear were given to Respondent for demonstrative purposes. Respondent kept approximately 12 pair of canal hearing instruments, including Miller's, of different sizes and frequencies in his display case, which he called Pandora's Box. He took this display case with him when he moved to Central Florida. After Hurricane Andrew occurred, Respondent left Marohn's employment and moved to Central Florida. He also took with him certain items that he had removed from the store. Subsequent to Respondent's departure, a dispute arose between him and Jean Marohn over commissions that were due from his employment with her. Respondent contacted an attorney who attempted to reach a settlement with Marohn as to the items held in Respondent's possession and commissions owed to him by Marohn. Respondent is currently in litigation with Marohn over the commissions due. Upon departing the Miami area, Respondent began employment with Hearing World, Inc. on Woodcock Road, Orlando, Florida. Respondent was employed at Hearing World, Inc. by Bob Horine and Tony Andreozzi. Bob Horine was president and manager of the Hearing World facility. The only compensation received by Respondent was 30 percent of the sale of hearing aids sold by him. Whenever Respondent completed the final fitting for a customer for hearing aids sold by Horine, Respondent would not receive any compensation. as to DOAH Case Number 94-0967 On June 21, 1993, the Petitioner conducted an inspection at Respondent's place of employment in Maitland, known as Hearing World, Inc. The inspection revealed several violations of Florida law, as follows: The testing room facilities and files were missing waiver forms. A failure to have hearing aid models, supplies and services available on the premises. A failure to post prices. A failure to provide calibration certifi- cates for audiometers in use in the facility. At the time of the inspection at Hearing World, Respondent introduced himself to Petitioner's inspectors as a vice president of that company. At the time of the inspection, Respondent was employed at Hearing World located on Woodcock Road in Orlando, Florida as a sales representative. Under his compensation agreement, he was to be paid for 30 percent of his sales. The owners of the company, Hearing World, Inc., located at Woodcock Road, Orlando, Florida, were Bob Horine and Tony Andreozzi. Respondent had no ownership interest in Hearing World, and was neither stockholder, officer, director nor minority shareholder in the company. Respondent received no compensation from the sales of hearing devices sold by other owners, managers, or employees of Hearing World, Inc. The only agreement between Respondent Horine as to the position of vice president was contingent upon Respondent's buyout of Horine's interest in Hearing World, Inc. A transaction which never came to fruition. Respondent expended no personal funds in renovating the office; purchasing signs, equipment, advertising or office overhead. The occupational license for Hearing World, Inc., posted on the premises, did not contain Respondent's name. Although Horine's Hearing Aid specialist license had been either suspended or revoked, Respondent had no knowledge of that fact until after the June, 1993 inspection. Respondent at no time agreed or intended to be the licensed person on the premises responsible for the business and training of other employees. At the time of the June, 1993, inspection, Hearing World had been at that location approximately 30 days. At the time of the June, 1993, inspection, there was an audiometric testing room on the premises under construction. An individual, named John Harris, was overseeing the work on the telecoustics and was in the process of doing the final calibration on the audiometric testing room at the time of the inspection. It was completed within a few days thereafter. At the time of the June 1993 inspection, Hearing World carried its services outside the office location and provided in-home service. At the time of the inspection, Respondent was not conducting any testing in the office. He was practicing in-home service. At the time of the inspection, hearing aid models, supplies and services were on the premises but were in the possession of the respective sales representatives. They stored them in their individual display cases (Pandora's Box). A majority of all supplies were located in the employees' Pandora Boxes, since Hearing World, Inc. was predominantly a field operation. The bags were utilized by the employees when they left the office to make field calls. The employees would bring their equipment to the office premises. When called into the field, they would take their equipment with them, which included hearing aid models and supplies. Hearing aid prices were posted in the administrative office at Hearing World, Inc., where the clients would come to pay their bills. On June 21, 1993, Respondents wife, Barbara Segretario, was employed as an administrator on the premises at Hearing World, Inc. Barbara Segretario was responsible for handling all the paperwork, accepting money, paying bills, and making financial arrangements for the purchase of hearing aids or to pay for repairs. All clients who came into the office to pay a bill, make financial arrangements, purchase a hearing aid, or pay for a repair would come into her office at Hearing World, Inc. There was a price list for hearing aids posted in Barbara Segretario's office in front of her desk, next to the window to her left, said price was posted on June 21, 1993, at the time of the inspection. Every transaction at Hearing World, Inc. included a visit by the client to the administrative offices for financial arrangements where hearing aid prices were conspicuously posted. Hearing World employed a service representative on June 21, 1993. When the inspection occurred, the representative was off the premises. The service representative's service equipment, as well as hearing aid models and supplies, were kept with him so that they were present when he was on the premises. He left with them when he went into the field to do an in- home service on behalf of Hearing World, Inc. Generally, these services were not conducted on premises, but were carried into clients' homes. All of the sales personnel at Hearing World, Inc. had their own hearing aid models which were kept with them in a display case, which they had in their possession while on premises and carried with them into the field for in-home services. There were two audiometers in use on the premises at the time of the June 1993 inspection; however, Horine and Respondent could not provide a certificate of calibration for those instruments to the inspector. Respondent did not provide the certification to the Petitioner for the audiometer that he employed at the time of the inspection. There were other audiometers on the premises that were not in use and were not certified at the time of the June 1993 inspection. A copy of the certifications of the two audiometers being used on the premises on June 21, 1993 were mailed to Petitioner after being requested by the Inspector. As of the date of this hearing, Petitioner had not received the certifications that were mailed pertaining to the two audiometers employed on the premises at the time of the inspection.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint as to DOAH Case No. 94-0966. It is further RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Counts I, II, III and V of the Administrative Complaint as to DOAH Case No. 94-0967, finding Respondent guilty of violating Count IV of the Complaint and imposing an administrative fine of $100.00 for said offense. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2 (in part), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 (in part), 9 (in part), 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31 (in part), 32 (in part), 34, 36, 37, 38 (in part), 39 (in part), 40 (in part), 42, 46, 47, 48 (in part). Rejected as not proven by clear and convincing evidence: paragraphs 2 (in part), 8 (in part), 9 (in part), 12, 31 (in part), 32 (in part), 33, 38 (in part), 39 (in part), 40 (in part), 41, 48 (in part). Rejected as subsumed, irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 5, 15, 16, 20, 27, 29, 35, 43, 44, 45. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact for Case No. 94-0966 Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (in part), 12, 13, 14, 15 (in part), 16, 17, 18 (in part), 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 33 (in part), 34, 35, 36 (in part), 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 (in part) 50 (in part), 51 (in part), 52 (in part), 57, 58, 61, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70 (in part), 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81 (in part), 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 108 (in part), 109, 110, 111. Rejected as against the evidence: paragraph 11 (in part), 15 (in part), 18 (in part) 51 (in part), 52 (in part). Rejected as subsumed, irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 22, 27, 31, 32, 33 (in part), 36 (in part), 37, 49 (in part), 50 (in part), 53, 54, 55, 56, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 70 (in part), 72, 81 (in part), 104, 105, 106, 107, 108 (in part), 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact for Case No. 94-0967 Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1, 2, 4 (in part), 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47 (in part), 48 (in part), 49, 50, 51 (in part), 53. Rejected as subsumed or irrelevant or immaterial: paragraphs 3, 31, 37, 38. Rejeted as not proven by clear and convencing evidence: paragraphs 4 (in part), 7, 8, 9, 46, 47 (in part), 48 (in part), 51 (in part), 52. COPIES FURNISHED: Susan E. Lindgard, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 William J. Sheaffer, Esquire 609 East Central Boulevard Orlando, Florida 32801 Susan Foster Executive Director Hearing Aid Specialists Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Norma J. Nolan, was discriminated against by Respondent, K.D.P., Inc. d/b/a Western Sizzlin Steak House, in violation of the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, on the basis of handicap, constituting an unlawful employment practice. Whether Petitioner has established a basis for, or entitlement to, an award of damages if, in fact, the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: K. D. P., Inc., operated a restaurant known as Western Sizzlin Steak House in Bradenton, Florida, which business was established prior to the alleged incident of July 1990. This business has continued in operation to the current time under the same management and with many of the same employees, although the restaurant has subsequently become known as Cattle Company Cafe. The Respondent, K. D. P., Inc., d/b/a Western Sizzlin Steak House, now known as Cattle Company Cafe (KDP), owned by Jack Parrish, has been managed by Kevin Wreford for approximately twelve years. Parrish relies on Wreford for the day-to-day operation of the business, hiring and firing decisions, and supervisory responsibility. The Petitioner was employed from December 1989 through February 1990 by Upjohn Health Care on a part-time basis as a respite worker. While she was physically able to do that job, Petitioner chose to leave that employment as it had little work available for her with that agency and Petitioner wished to work at a location closer to her home. Petitioner applied for employment with KDP by way of written application on August 2, 1990. Petitioner's employment application did not indicate any physical handicap, disability or limitation. Wreford interviewed Petitioner for the position of part-time cashier in early 1991. During the interview, Wreford discussed with the Petitioner the duties of the position for which she had applied. Those duties included taking payment from customers at the cashier's stand, overseeing the salad and sundae bar, checking the women's restroom, cleaning glass in the area of cashier's stand and watching for walkouts (walkouts being customers who walk out without paying for their meals). Petitioner advised Wreford that she was capable of performing these duties but was concerned about her lack of experience in working with cash and making change. Wreford hired Petitioner as a temporary, part-time cashier, and Petitioner began work in that capacity for Respondent on February 3, 1991. Petitioner continued in the employment of the Respondent in the capacity of part-time cashier through July 17, 1991. At the time Petitioner was hired by Respondent on February 3, 1991 there was a large wooden bar stool located behind the counter where the cashier took payments for meals. All cashiers working for the Respondent, including Petitioner, were allowed to sit on this stool at times when they were not waiting on customers (cashiers were required to stand while waiting on customers) or performing other assigned duties as set out in Finding of Fact 6. Sometime around July 1, 1991, Wreford discussed with the cashiers, including Petitioner, his concerns about the cashiers not performing their other assigned duties when they were not waiting on customers. Performing other assigned duties required the cashiers to be away from the cashier's area. At this time, Petitioner made Wreford aware of her knee problem and advised him that she may have difficulty standing for long periods of time. There had been no mention of this problem previously nor had Petitioner experienced any problem with her knee previously. Likewise, Petitioner did not experience any problems with her knee in carrying out her assigned duties during the next two weeks. In fact, both Wreford and Parrish were pleased with Petitioner's performance during this period. On or about July 12, 1991, Parrish's wife who had become involved in the management of the restaurant advised Parrish that the stool needed to be removed from the cashier area because: (a) the stool was showing its wear and tear and was aesthetically unpleasing; (b) the stool was taking up too much room resulting in the cashiers not being able to perform their duties properly, particularly looking for walkouts and; (c) to prevent a certain cashier (not Petitioner) from abusing the privilege of the stool by sitting on the stool for extended periods of time and not performing her other assigned duties. On or about July 12, 1991, Parrish removed the stool from the caahier's area and placed it in his office where it remains today because the stool has a sentimental value in that Parrish used the stool in his first restaurant. On or about July 13, 1991, when Petitioner arrived for work and noticed the stool had been removed she met with Parrish and Wreford and advised them that she could not work without the stool because of her knee. Parrish and Wreford offered to accommodate her problem by allowing Petitioner to sit at a table adjacent to the cashier area when she was not waiting on customers or performing her other assigned duties. Petitioner advised Parrish and Wreford that she could not work under those conditions but that she would stay on until a replacement was found. Parrish and Wreford accepted Petitioner's resignation but encouraged Petitioner to continue her employment until she could determine if the accommodation would be satisfactory. Petitioner continued to work for Respondent until July 17, 1991, and was able to function without any problems with her knee under the accommodations provided by Respondent. However, after Petitioner resigned she never asked to be reinstated even though she was able to function under the accommodations provided by Respondent. Although Petitioner alleged that she had a physical disability/handicap because of problems she had related to an alleged right knee replacement done some years earlier, there was no medical evidence or other documentation establishing any physical handicap or restrictions/limitations in her ability to work. There were other cashiers employed by Respondent who had conditions similar to Petitioner's conditions who were able to function with the same accommodation offered Petitioner. One of those was the person hired by Respondent to take Petitioner's position. Petitioner collected unemployment compensation after leaving Respondent's employment, as well as other forms of assistance, such as food stamps and housing assistance. Additionally, after leaving Respondent's employment Petitioner developed "female problems" and is not seeking employment even though she attended computer school. There was no evidence as to the amount of damages suffered by Petitioner. There is insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that Petitioner was discriminated against on the basis of a handicap by Respondent or that any unlawful employment practice occurred. There is competent substantial evidence in the record to establish facts to show that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory business reasons for the action taken by Respondent in removing the stool and providing other accommodations for the cashiers, including Petitioner. There was insufficient evidence to establish facts to show that the Respondent's articulated reasons for its action were pretextual.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Petitioner, Norma J. Nolan, was not discharged due to her handicap in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes, and that the Petition For Relief be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of June, 1993, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-3903 The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 13 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony rather than presented as a finding of fact. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. Proposed Findings of Fact 1 through 32 have been adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order, except where they may be subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, irrelevant, immaterial or a restatement of testimony rather than presented as a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Norma J. Nolan, Pro Se 1109 Harvard Avenue Bradenton, Florida 34207 Donna L. Derfoot, Esquire Post Office Box 3979 Sarasota, Florida 34230 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahasse, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Melvin Blum ("Mr. Blum"), was employed by the Respondent National Enquirer, Inc. ("National Enquirer"), 2/ from 1962 until his voluntary resignation in June 1980. The National Enquirer publishes a weekly tabloid newspaper in Palm Beach County, Florida. Since joining the National Enquirer, Iain Calder ("Mr. Calder") has held various positions as an employee and officer of the publication and its affiliated companies. Mr. Calder first joined the Enquirer in 1964 as London Bureau Chief. In 1967, he came to the United States as articles editor, a position he held until the early 1970's. In due course, he was promoted to senior articles editor, executive editor, editorial director, and then editor in 1975. In 1976, Mr. Calder became President of the National Enquirer. After the death of the owner, Mr. Pope, in 1988, Mr. Calder became Chairman of the company in order to sell the publication. After new owners acquired the publication, Mr. Calder became editor-in-chief of the publication and executive vice- president of the parent company. In December 1995, Mr. Calder stepped down as editor-in-chief and president and assumed the position of editor emeritus. Mr. Calder has known Mr. Blum for close to 30 years. Mr. Calder was familiar with Mr. Blum's work. When Mr. Calder was editorial director and then editor, Mr. Blum indirectly reported to him through his department head. Additionally, Mr. Calder would occasionally sit in as managing editor to learn the business of layouts. During those occasions, he would directly supervise Mr. Blum. While not close friends, Mr. Calder and Mr. Blum occasionally socialized outside of work. In Mr. Calder's view, while Mr. Blum was talented in using photographs, he had problems with headlines and with writing. Malcolm Hayes ("Mr. Hayes") first joined the National Enquirer in 1973. On his first stint at the publication, he held the positions of deskman, assistant editor, associate editor, and then managing editor. Mr. Hayes left the National Enquirer in 1986. Upon his return in 1989, he served in the position of assistant managing editor and then assumed his current position of managing editor upon the death of the prior managing editor, Nat Chrzan. Mr. Hayes first met Mr. Blum when he joined the National Enquirer in 1973. They worked together for seven years. While working together, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's work. It was Mr. Hayes' general impression that while Mr. Blum was efficient, thorough, and had good layout skills, he had problems with words and headlines. Mr. Blum has had a hearing impairment since he was 17 years old. During the 18 years Mr. Blum worked at the National Enquirer, he wore a hearing aid. Both Mr. Calder and Mr. Hayes knew Mr. Blum wore a hearing aid while he worked at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Calder nor Mr. Hayes felt it was an impediment to his work. It was never considered a negative factor. Mr. Calder believed he communicated well with Mr. Blum while he worked at the publication. Mr. Calder did not view it as limiting Mr. Blum's ability to perform his job in any way. In July of 1990, Mr. Blum wrote to Mr. Calder inquiring about the possibility of returning to work at the National Enquirer. Mr. Calder wrote a cordial letter in reply indicating that there were no openings for the position of a deskman. Additional letters were exchanged between Mr. Blum and Mr. Calder. In a February 1, 1991, letter, Mr. Calder wrote to Mr. Blum informing him there were still no available positions on the "desk." He further indicated that should a position become available, it would be the decision of the Managing Editor whether to rehire him. While Mr. Calder had the authority to hire and always retained veto power, it was his philosophy and policy not to mandate that his department heads hire a particular individual. Upon the resignation of a key member of Mr. Hayes' staff, Mr. Hayes attempted to fill a position on the "desk" with an individual who had in addition to "desk" experience, desktop publishing skills and management potential. The paper was moving into computers and was looking for someone with those skills. Additionally, Mr. Hayes' deputy at the time indicated that he did not want to serve in that role and fill-in for Mr. Hayes in his absence. As the term is used at the National Enquirer, a deskman is an individual who is a layout editor and writes headlines, writes captions, edits copy, and basically puts the pages together. Two members of Mr. Hayes' staff recommended William Condie ("Mr. Condie") for the position. Both individuals had worked with Mr. Condie when they were employed by the New York Post. Mr. Condie was at the Post at the time he was recruited. The National Enquirer had previously been very successful in recruiting newspaper people from the New York Post. Mr. Condie met both the experience requirements and the skill requirements that the National Enquirer was seeking. Mr. Condie had been involved in "desk work" for thirty years. He had served in various "desk" capacities at the London Daily Express, New York Daily News, and New York Post. Mr. Condie had a lot of experience in laying out pages. He was also a very good headline writer with good word skills. In addition to his extensive desk experience, Condie had worked with computers both at the New York Daily News and the New York Post. He also had a personal computer at home and was somewhat of a computer buff. Mr. Condie's background also reflected management experience. Prior to coming to the National Enquirer, Mr. Condie held the position of Night Managing Editor at the New York Post; the Post was considered one of the premier tabloids in the country. Mr. Condie was responsible for supervising all aspects of production of the newspaper after the first edition. He had performed in other management positions as well. Mr. Calder had known Mr. Condie for more than 30 years. Mr. Calder had an opportunity to work with Mr. Condie when Mr. Condie had previously worked at the National Enquirer. At one point in time early in their careers, Mr. Calder had reported to Mr. Condie. Based on his experience and skills, Mr. Condie was invited to the National Enquirer for a try-out in May 1991. At the end of the trial period, Mr. Condie was offered a position. The decision to hire Mr. Condie was made on or before June 5, 1991. Mr. Hayes made the decision to hire Mr. Condie which was approved by Mr. Calder. Mr. Condie began his full-time employment at the National Enquirer on July 8, 1991. The National Enquirer hired Mr. Condie on the basis of his qualifications. Since Mr. Condie was hired, no other positions on the "desk" became available at the National Enquirer. Neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder viewed the hiring process as a competition between Mr. Condie and Mr. Blum. Had Mr. Condie never been a candidate, Mr. Blum would not have been selected for the position. Mr. Blum lacked the qualifications that the National Enquirer was looking for in a candidate. Both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder were familiar with Mr. Blum's abilities and limitations. Mr. Hayes had worked with Mr. Blum for seven years. During that time, Mr. Hayes had an opportunity to observe Mr. Blum's professional work. While he felt Blum was efficient and thorough and had good layout skills, he felt Mr. Blum had problems with words and headlines. The nature of the publication had also changed since Mr. Blum had worked at the National Enquirer. Mr. Blum also did not have the management experience that Mr. Hayes was looking for in a candidate. During his entire time at the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum was never in a management position. Since leaving the National Enquirer, Mr. Blum's only managerial experience was at Senior Power, a free newspaper he started with another individual. While Mr. Blum was responsible for all business decisions, editorial decisions, and finances at Senior Power, it was a naive business concept and a financial failure. Given their personal experience with Mr. Blum, both Mr. Hayes and Mr. Calder felt that his personality was not conducive to supervising people. Additionally, Mr. Blum had no desktop computer experience at a major tabloid. Given their familiarity with Mr. Blum's experience and skills, neither Mr. Hayes nor Mr. Calder considered Mr. Blum a viable candidate for the position for which Mr. Condie was hired. Mr. Blum has no written evidence that the National Enquirer discriminated against him on the basis of his hearing. Mr. Blum knows of no statements made by Mr. Hayes, Mr. Calder, or anyone else evidencing discrimination against him on the basis of his hearing. In fact, Mr. Blum believes he was not rehired because of a grudge. Mr. Blum's hearing impairment played no role in the National Enquirer's decision not to rehire him. Mr. Blum filed his Charge of Discrimination on March 26, 1992.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued in this case dismissing the Petition For Relief and denying all relief sought by the Petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of September, 1996, at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of September, 1996.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Linda Mishko, suffers a severe hearing impairment. In December, 1985, Petitioner contacted the Respondent to apply for a temporary position of employment. Petitioner was asked to take a transcription test which she passed without any mistakes. This is not necessarily inconsistent with her handicap, however, since medical evidence indicates she is able to hear higher frequency voices, (women), more easily than lower frequency voices (men). The transcription test dictation was by a woman and she was able to satisfactorily understand what was being said. However, she has difficulty hearing lower men's voices. After the test was graded, Petitioner was asked if she would take a transcribing job. She indicated she preferred not to and instead, was referred to Grumman Aerospace, (Grumman), in Stuart where she was employed to do strictly word processing. Petitioner reported to Grumman on January 3, 1986. The documentation relating to her assignment reveals that the assignment was clearly noted to be for one month. Petitioner worked at Grumman from January 3, through May 5, 1986 and all performance ratings rendered on her during that time indicated that she was an excellent worker. She was told by Grumman personnel, and Respondent's office manager confirms this, that had they been able to do so, they would have hired her on a permanent basis. However, funding did not permit it and in May, 1987, Petitioner was released when the job for which she had been hired as a temporary employee was completed. Petitioner is convinced that she was discharged because of her handicap and contends that she was told this by her supervisor at Grumman. There is no evidence to support this contention, however. A witness who Petitioner contends would have testified to it refused to appear even though Petitioner was granted a recess during the hearing to call her again. According to Petitioner, the witness was afraid for her job, but there is no evidence that this was the case. After being released by Grumman, Petitioner was shortly thereafter called by Ms. Malodobry to take a temporary job at an attorney's office. Initially, Ms. Mishko declined to accept the job because she was afraid she would not be able to understand a man's voice in dictation. After thinking about it for a while, however, she decided she needed the work and agreed to attempt the job. Immediately upon reporting to the attorney's office, she advised him of her handicap but agreed to try to satisfy him. After 10 minutes or so of finding it difficult to understand his voice on the transcription tape, she left the job and did not return. Petitioner admits that Respondent, Manpower Temporary Services, has not discriminated against her in any way. She contends that the discrimination against her was committed by Grumman which, she believes, discharged her because of her handicap, and that Manpower is involved in a conspiracy with Grumman to cover it up. She contends that the favorable written comments on the Grumman records of her employment are lies, Ms. Malodobry is lying, and in fact anyone who doesn't support her theory of discrimination and conspiracy is lying. Petitioner admits she has no evidence of conspiracy, however, and that she filed her complaint based on her "feeling". There is no evidence that Manpower in any way discriminated against her or is in any way participating with Grumman to cover up the latter's supposed discrimination against her. In fact, there was no discrimination by Grumman. Ms. Mishko was terminated at the end of the period for which she was hired and her departure had no relationship whatever to her handicap.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief filed by Linda Mishko be dismissed with prejudice. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of September, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Linda Mishko 47 Southeast Erie Terrace Stuart, Florida 33497 Roy T. Mildner Esquire GOLDMAN, BRUNING & ANGELOS, P.A. 10020 South Federal Highway Port St. Lucie, Florida 33452 Donald A. Griffin Executive Director Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1925
The Issue : The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether Petitioner has a disability, whether she was discriminated against based upon the disability, whether there was a reasonably requested accommodation which was refused by the Respondent employer, and whether it maintained a hostile working environment.
Findings Of Fact This cause arose upon the filing of a Charge of Discrimination and ultimately a Petition for Relief by the above-named Petitioner against the Respondent, Principal Senior Living Group, d/b/a Benton Village (Benton Village or Respondent). The Petitioner was an employee at the Respondent's assisted living and memory care facility, located in Panama City, Florida. That facility employs approximately 28 to 30 employees and had 53 residents as of the time of hearing. The Respondent has an equal employment opportunity policy in place which precludes discrimination on the basis of any protected status including handicap or disability as to any employees, customers, vendors, or applicants for jobs. The Petitioner signed a document indicating that she had received a copy of that policy when she began employment on or about January 29, 2007. The Respondent, enforces the policy against discrimination and harassment and encourages employees to bring any such discrimination or harassment issues to the Respondent's attention so that it can take necessary steps to correct the situation. The Petitioner received a handbook at the beginning of her employment period that outlined the Respondent's benefits, practices, and policies. The Equal Opportunity Policy is restated in that handbook. On page 18 of the handbook under the title "Discourtesy or Disrespect," the Respondent stated a rule as follows: We expect all employees to be courteous, polite and friendly to our residents, vendors, and to their fellow employees. No one should use profanity or show disrespect to a resident or co-worker, or engage in any activity that could harm the company's reputation. The Petitioner began working for the Respondent in early February 2007 as a personal care assistant (PCA). Her general job description included assisting residents with personal care and activities of daily living and performing daily housekeeping tasks. Mr. Alan Williams is the Respondent's executive director. His duties involve resident care staffing including evaluation for promotion and administering discipline and managing the facility's budget. Mr. Williams was responsible for evaluating the Petitioner's job duties and performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Tiffany Sims who was the Resident Services Director while the Petitioner was employed at the Respondent's facility. The Petitioner is hearing-impaired and wears a hearing aid that allows her to hear within a normal range and follow normal conversations. She does have difficulty hearing when people speak in a low voice and at times has to request them to speak louder. The Petitioner acknowledged that her hearing aid allowed her to perform her job without any special treatment. Moreover, she was able to attend training course, which involved listening to a lecturer in a classroom, and did not request or need any special accommodation to understand the lecturer. When the Petitioner was hired by the Respondent, she did not tell anyone she had a disability that prevented her from performing the job duties in her job description. She received the same training as the other employees and did not request or receive accommodations for her alleged hearing impairment during the training process. She acknowledged that she did not request special treatment because she did not need special treatment. During her testimony at hearing she admitted that she had never requested an accommodation of her employer. During less that three months of employment she was disciplined once by Ms. Sims and on two separate occasions by Mr. Williams. The Petitioner admits receiving corrective action admonishments from Ms. Sims on or about February 8, 2007. The corrective action document informed the Petitioner that there had been several resident complaints regarding the Petitioner's resident care and the care with meal assistance. The corrective action also embodied an instruction to the Petitioner that within 30 days she should show significant improvement with care of residents, with no resident complaints or she could be subject to termination. Mr. Williams disciplined the Petitioner on February 26, 2007. He was notified on that occasion by Supervisor Sandy Simon and his Assistant Director Renee Rhodes, that the Petitioner had been observed watching television by herself in the Alzheimer's ward. Mr. Williams went to an office where he could view a security monitor and personally observed the Petitioner watching television by herself. Mr. Williams accordingly executed a corrective action form or memorandum to the Petitioner, which the Petitioner admits receiving. Mr. Williams administered discipline to the Petitioner on a second occasion on Tuesday, April 3, 2007. Mr. Williams had learned that the Petitioner had been involved in an altercation with a resident that involved raising her voice, yelling and engaging in disruptive behavior. Mr. Williams informed the Petitioner that this was unacceptable behavior and reflected badly on the Respondent. The Petitioner admitted the occurrence to Mr. Williams when he questioned her. There is a dispute over whether the Petitioner quit or was terminated as a result of this discussion. Mr. Williams established that, under the duly-adopted policy, arguing with a resident can be a terminable offense. Mr. Williams' testimony is deemed credible and is accepted. It was thus established that the Petitioner became angry and informed Mr. Williams that she was quitting her employment during the course of this discussion. One other incident occurred with Mr. Williams when he terminated an employee because the employee had yelled or cursed at a coworker. The employee who was terminated did not have any sort of disability of which Mr. Williams was aware. Mr. Williams' undisputed testimony shows that the Petitioner's hearing impairment did not play any role in the decision to discipline for the television incident, nor in the decision to speak to her about the altercation with the resident or with any other employment decision he made with regard to the Petitioner. The Petitioner admitted that Mr. Williams never made any negative comments to her about her hearing or hearing impairment. The Petitioner contended that some co-workers made fun of her hearing impairment during the course of her employment. The Petitioner acknowledged, however, that she never complained of this to the Human Resources manager or to Mr. Williams, even though she had received a copy of the company's policies against harassment and discrimination.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the subject petition in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of May, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Demetrice Worthy Post Office Box 121 Panama City, Florida 32401 Scott E. Wood, Esquire 990 Hammond Drive, Suite 910 Atlanta, Georgia 30328 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Marlowe D. Robinson ("Petitioner"), was unlawfully discriminated against by Respondent, Broward County School District ("BCSD"), his employer, based on his disability and in retaliation for complaining about discrimination, in violation of chapter 760 of the Florida Statutes, the Florida Civil Rights Act; and, if so, what is the appropriate remedy.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner worked for BCSD for approximately 20 years prior to the termination of his employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner is a disabled veteran. At the time of his termination, Petitioner was employed as the Head Facility Serviceperson at BCSD's office in the Katherine C. Wright Building ("KCW"). On February 5, 2016, Richard Volpi began working at KCW as the Manager of Administrative Support and as Petitioner's immediate supervisor. During Mr. Volpi's third day on the job, Petitioner told him that he was not happy that Mr. Volpi was at KCW and that KCW was "his house." He also told Mr. Volpi that he did not work because he "delegated to his crew." On February 18, 2016, Petitioner filed two internal labor grievances. In the first, he asked to have his job title changed to "Building Operations Supervisor." In the second grievance, Petitioner alleged that Mr. Volpi and Jeff Moquin, Chief of Staff, created a hostile and unclean work environment. Mr. Volpi processed the grievances by having a meeting with Petitioner on February 25, 2016. Finding no basis for the grievances in the collective bargaining agreement, Mr. Volpi denied them. On October 10, 2016, Mr. Volpi met with Petitioner to discuss a significant pattern of Petitioner coming in late, failing to notify BCSD when arriving late, staying after his scheduled shift to make up time without authorization, failing to call in as required for sick days, and failing to have pre- authorization for using accumulated leave. After the meeting, Mr. Volpi issued a written "Meeting Summary," which included counseling, based on Petitioner having come in late 24 days since August 1, 2016, and only notifying Mr. Volpi's assistant of the tardiness on three of those 24 days. The "Meeting Summary" was not considered discipline and stated, "If for any reason you need to change your shift hours to assist you in getting to work on time, please let me know." On October 19, 2016, Petitioner filed his third internal labor grievance after Mr. Volpi became his supervisor. The third labor grievance made numerous allegations against Mr. Volpi, including, but not limited to, sexual harassment, unspecified Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") violations, and retaliation for filing prior grievances. On October 26, 2016, Petitioner submitted a request for intermittent leave pursuant to FMLA. The next day, Petitioner was notified that his FMLA leave request was incomplete, and was therefore denied. Petitioner was later granted intermittent FMLA leave with the agreement that he was to provide advance notification of his anticipated absences. On November 9, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 16, 2016, for a pre- disciplinary conference to discuss Petitioner's failure to adhere to the directive of October 10, 2016, to notify Mr. Volpi if he was going to be late, out for the day, or working outside his scheduled hours. The letter specified that Petitioner was late October 11, 13, and 17, 2016, without notifying Mr. Volpi, and that Petitioner was late and worked past his regular scheduled hours on October 21, 25, and November 7, 2016. The letter also specified that Petitioner "called out" (took time off) without notifying Mr. Volpi on October 31 and November 1, 2, 3, 4, and 8, 2016. In response, Petitioner filed a fourth grievance against Mr. Volpi alleging retaliation, bullying, and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") and various policies of BCSD. On November 16, 2016, Mr. Volpi memorialized in writing that Petitioner failed to show up for the November 16, 2016, pre-disciplinary meeting. On November 21, 2016, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on November 30, 2016, for a pre-disciplinary meeting to replace the original meeting scheduled for November 16, 2016. Petitioner was not disciplined for not showing up to the November 16, 2016, meeting. The meeting on November 30, 2016, went forward as scheduled and Petitioner was issued a verbal reprimand on December 5, 2016, his first discipline from Mr. Volpi, for Petitioner's ignoring the prior directive to contact his supervisor if he was going to be late, absent, or wanted to work beyond his scheduled shift. He was again reminded that he had to make such notifications and have permission in advance of working hours other than his regular shift. On January 12, 2017, Petitioner was granted a reasonable accommodation pursuant to the ADA. The accommodation granted permitted Petitioner to report to work within one hour of his scheduled work time and leave within one hour of his scheduled end time ("flex time"). Additionally, Petitioner was required to notify his supervisor in advance of using flex time. Mr. Volpi assisted Petitioner in the accommodation process. Mr. Volpi provided Petitioner the accommodation paperwork and advocated for Petitioner to be granted an accommodation. On January 26, 2017, Petitioner again came in late without providing Mr. Volpi advance notice of intent to use his flex time. On January 27, 2017, Mr. Volpi sent an email to Petitioner reminding Petitioner that he was required to notify him if he is going to be late. This was not considered discipline. On March 21, 2017, Petitioner was notified in writing that he was to appear at Mr. Volpi's office on March 27, 2017, for a pre-disciplinary meeting regarding ongoing excessive tardiness and failure to adhere to his work schedule. On March 23, 2017, Petitioner filed his fifth internal labor grievance, again alleging harassment (among other claims) against Mr. Volpi. On March 28, 2017, Petitioner filed his sixth internal labor grievance, again making harassment allegations against Mr. Volpi. On April 6, 2017, Petitioner was issued a Written Reprimand by Mr. Volpi for his nine days of tardiness in February and March and his failure to notify Mr. Volpi in advance. On April 7, 2017, Petitioner appealed the Written Reprimand. Petitioner also filed his seventh and eighth internal labor grievances alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and retaliation. Petitioner filed his Charge with the FCHR on April 13, 2017. Mr. Volpi conducted a first-step grievance hearing on April 27, 2017, and as a result of the discussion with Petitioner, who agreed to notify Mr. Volpi in advance of his inability to arrive at work as scheduled, the April 6, 2017, Written Reprimand was reduced to a verbal warning. The FCHR dismissed Petitioner's Charge with a No Reasonable Cause Determination on October 10, 2017. Between January 1 and February 15, 2018, Petitioner came to work late 14 days without providing prior notice, was absent without leave two days, and worked overtime one day without prior authorization. As a result, BCSD issued a three- day suspension on February 21, 2018. On February 22, 2018, Mr. Volpi met again with Petitioner to go over the expectations and provided a reminder memo not to work unauthorized hours without prior approval. On March 13, 2018, Mr. Volpi asked BCSD to issue a ten-day suspension to Petitioner for his ongoing failure to report to work at assigned times, unauthorized overtime, and absences without leave. In response, Petitioner filed yet another labor grievance. BCSD approved the ten-day suspension on April 10, 2018. Despite the ADA accommodation, increasing discipline, multiple counseling meetings and reminders, Petitioner continued his pattern of tardiness, unauthorized overtime, and absences. Accordingly, BCSD terminated Petitioner's employment on May 8, 2018. Petitioner's discipline and ultimate termination were not performance based, but rather, related solely to ongoing attendance issues.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing FCHR Petition 201700954. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S MARY LI CREASY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2018.
Findings Of Fact Based on all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: This case involves a claim by petitioner, William C. Eagle (petitioner or Eagle), that in February 1994 he was denied employment as a delivery helper by respondent, S. R. Perrott, Inc., on account of a real or perceived handicap. According to the complaint, at the time the alleged discriminatory practice occurred, petitioner was suffering from a "soft tissue injury" from a "work related accident with his former employer." Because the evidence shows that in February 1994 petitioner did not enjoy in some measure the full and normal use of his physical facilities, he was a handicapped person, at least temporarily, within the meaning of the law. A preliminary investigation by the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) found no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice had occurred. Respondent is a beer distributor in Ormond Beach, Florida. Whether respondent employs "fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year" so as to be subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, is not of record. In February 1994, petitioner learned of an opening for a delivery helper at respondent's plant. The position required that the employee unload beer kegs weighing 167 pounds from a delivery truck onto a dolly and then push the dolly into the business establishment. At that point, the employee would have to bend over and lift the keg off of the dolly to a waist-high position and place it in the desired location. Empty kegs would then be loaded onto the dolly and taken back to the truck and loaded. Since a truck would typically make up to 30 to 40 stops per day, the helper was required to engage in repetitious bending, twisting and lifting of heavy objects. After filing an application with respondent, petitioner was interviewed by respondent's general manager, Gary Connors, on February 23, 1994. During the interview, petitioner failed to disclose that he had suffered a back injury on a previous job, he was receiving worker's compensation benefits, he was then being treated by a doctor, and because of the injury, he was, at least arguably and temporarily, a handicapped individual. Without these undisclosed facts, Connors believed Eagle was qualified for the job and told him to report to work the next morning as a delivery helper. Like every other applicant, however, Eagle was also told that the job was contingent on his successfully passing a pre- employment physical examination. On the same morning that petitioner began work, or February 24, 1994, Connors contacted the office of Dr. James W. Bennett, a local chiropractic physician who conducted employment physicals for respondent, to set up an appointment for Eagle. During his telephone conversation with Dr. Bennett, Connors learned that Eagle was being treated by Dr. Bennett for a back injury suffered on his previous job, and that he had been examined by Dr. Bennett on February 14, 1994, or ten days earlier. Dr. Bennett accordingly saw no need to re-examine Eagle, and he advised Connors that Eagle could aggravate "an existing, active injury," and that he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Based on this information, Connors immediately spoke with the plant manager, Richard Shaffer, and instructed him to recall Eagle from his route and terminate his employment. In making this employment decision, Connors was not motivated by discriminatory animus, but rather he made the decision solely because of Eagle's inability to pass a pre-employment physical examination, a prerequisite for employment for all job applicants. Indeed, at that time, while Connors knew that Eagle had a pre-existing back injury through conversations with Dr. Bennett, he neither knew, or had reason to believe, that the injury constituted a handicap under the law. Shaffer recalled Eagle from his route and discharged him around noon on February 24, 1994. Since Shaffer did not know the reason for the termination, he told Eagle to check back in a few days and he would find out the specific reason for his discharge. A few days later, Eagle returned and met with Connors who told him that he was discharged because he could not pass the pre-employment physical examination. Several months later, Eagle filed his charge of discrimination. At hearing, Eagle denied that he was handicapped and asserted that as of February 1994 he "felt fine" physically. Indeed, he described in some detail the type of heavy manual labor he had performed with another employer up to the time he applied for the position. He also contended that the injury was minor and would not interfere with a delivery helper's tasks. But testimony from Dr. Bennett established that as of February 24, 1994, Eagle had "a current, precarious injury," namely, moderate chronic lumbar sprain strain, that work restrictions with his former employer had been recommended, and that Eagle was "highly likely" to worsen that injury should he engage in the job activities required of a delivery helper. This testimony was not credibly contradicted. Although Eagle was later discharged from Dr. Bennett's care on April 1, 1994, Eagle could not pass the pre-employment physical examination on February 24, 1994, when the employment decision was made, and thus he did not qualify for the job. Eagle further suggested at hearing that, assuming he was handicapped, respondent failed to take reasonable steps to accommodate his disability. But Eagle made no request for accommodation either at the time he sought the position or after he learned the reason for his termination. Even if Eagle had requested accommodation, respondent had no positions in the business that did not require some heavy lifting except for a secretarial slot, for which Eagle was not qualified. Moreover, respondent's general manager did not know, or even believe, that Eagle was handicapped and thus may have required accommodation. Then, too, in order to accommodate Eagle, respondent would have had to make fundamental alterations in its work program or even create a new job. Eagle did not rebut this showing at hearing, and he failed to respond with any evidence regarding his individual capabilities and suggestions for possible accommodations by respondent within the restrictions imposed by Dr. Bennett. There is no evidence regarding the compensation Eagle would have received as a delivery helper. The record also fails to establish his compensation since that time, and thus there is no basis on which to make a finding as to lost wages. Whether petitioner seeks reinstatement as a delivery helper is also not of record.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the petition for relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 95-1788 Petitioner: Petitioner filed an "order" with nine unnumbered paragraphs containing a mixture of proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5 and 8. 6-8. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. 9. Rejected as being contrary to the evidence or a conclusion of law. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the more credible evidence, cumulative, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: P. Daniel Williams, Esquire P. O. Box 1007 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 Winston K. Borkowski, Esquire P. O. Box 1725 Ormond Beach, Florida 32175 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
