Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Teresa Jean Watson, at all times material to this proceeding was licensed as an ordinary life agent, a disability insurance agent and a general lines insurance agent. She was the only general lines agent licensed to sell insurance at the T. J. Watson Insurance Agency, Inc. and all insurance sold by that firm at times pertinent hereto was sold and issued under authority of her license. During times material to this proceeding, Teresa Jean Watson sold insurance coverage under authority of her general lines license either as direct agent for various insurance companies for whom she was general agent or, on behalf of MacNeill and Son, Inc. (MacNeill), her managing agency, which represented various insurance companies for whom the Respondent wrote coverage. Between February 1st and February 15, 1982, a homeowner's insurance policy was sold to Tony and Martha Williams by the Respondent's agency under the authority of the Respondent's general lines insurance agent's license. That homeowner's policy required a premium of $211.00. The policyholder, Tony Williams, wrote two checks to the T. J. Watson Agency dated January 22, 1982 and February 12, 1982. Those two checks totalled $174.00. The checks were cashed by the Respondent's agency on January 26, 1982 and on February 6, 1982. The Independent Fire Insurance Company issued the policy to Tony and Martha Williams and on August 4, 1982 a representative of the Independent Fire Insurance Company wrote the Respondent to advise her that she owed that company a balance of $179.35, as of May 1982. Petitioner asserts that the $179.35 represents the amount of Tony Williams' premium owed to the insurer, less the Respondent's commission, which if added together would equal the $211.00 premium on the Williams' policy. Although it was established that $179.35 was owed by the Respondent to the Independent Fire Insurance Company, and never paid, it was not established that it represented the premium due specifically for the Williams' policy as was charged in count 1 of the Administrative Complaint. For instance, the checks paid by the Williamses to the Watson Agency total $174.00 and therefore there is a discrepancy between the total of those checks and the $179.35 amount Independent Fire Insurance company was owed by the Respondent. This fact coupled with the fact that the dates on the checks from the Williamses (January and February) substantially predate the May 1982 billing date to Respondent from Independent Fire, renders it unproven that the checks written to the Watson Agency which Respondent negotiated and retained the benefit of, related to the amount of unremitted premium owed by Respondent to the Independent Fire Insurance Company. In short, it was established that $174.00 was paid the Respondent and her agency by the Williamses. But, it was not established that the premium paid by the Williamses became misappropriated fiduciary funds converted by the Respondent to her own use and benefit. It was merely established that as of May 1982 the Respondent owed the Independent Fire Insurance Company $179.35 as a past-due account It was not established that the Williamses ever suffered a lapse of insurance coverage or were otherwise harmed by the Respondent's failure to pay Independent Fire the $179.35. Indeed, the $179.35 figure was not proven to be more than a mere debt owed by Respondent to Independent Fire Insurance Company. The figure was not shown to have been related to any particular policy. The Respondent and her insurance agency in the regular course of business wrote insurance coverage for companies represented by MacNeill and Son, Inc., the Respondent's managing agency. The regular business practice between the Respondent and MacNeill was for the Respondent to write coverage on behalf of insurers represented by MacNeill and to remit on a regular open account" basis insurance premiums due MacNeill on behalf of its insurance company principals on a monthly basis. The Respondent became delinquent in submitting premiums to MacNeill and Son in November 1981. After unsuccessful efforts to collect the delinquent premium funds from the Respondent, MacNeill and Son, Inc. suspended T. J. Watson Insurance Agency and the Respondent from writing further coverage for companies they represented in January 1982. The Respondent purportedly sold her agency to one Thomas Zinnbauer in December 1981, but had already fallen into a pattern of failing to remit insurance premiums over to MacNeill before that time. In any event, the purported sale to Thomas Zinnbauer was a subterfuge to avoid collection of delinquent premiums inasmuch as the Respondent held herself out, in correspondence with MacNeill, (See Petitioner's Exhibit 4) to be the president of the agency at least as late as April 1982 and, at that time and thereafter, the agency continued to sell insurance under the aegis of the Respondent's license. After the Respondent made up the delinquency in premium remissions to the MacNeill Agency that agency restored her underwriting authority in January 1982. Shortly thereafter however, the Respondent and the T. J. Watson Agency again became delinquent in remitting insurance premiums to the MacNeill Agency and followed a quite consistent pattern of failing to forward these fiduciary funds to MacNeill for some months. Ultimately the Respondent and her agency failed to forward more than $6500.00 in premium payment funds to MacNeill and Son, Inc. as was required in the regular course of business. MacNeill and Son, Inc. made repeated futile attempts to secure the misappropriated premium payments from the Respondent and her agency. MacNeill made several accountings of the amount of the acknowledged debt to the Respondent. The Respondent communicated with MacNeill concerning the delinquent premium payments and acknowledged the fact of the debt, but sought to reach an amicable arrangement for a repayment schedule. Re- payment was never made, however, and ultimately the Petitioner agency was informed of the deficiencies and prosecution resulted. The Respondent knew that the premiums had been collected by herself and her agency and had not been forwarded to those entitled to them. She knew of and actively participated in the improper withholding of the premium payments. This withholding and diversion of premium payments from the agency and companies entitled to them was a continuing pattern of conduct and Respondent failed to take action to halt the misappropriation of the premium payments. Further, it is established by the testimony of Matthew Brewer, who investigated the delinquent premium accounts for MacNeill, that Ms. Watson failed to advise MacNeill of the purported sale of her agency until November of 1982, almost a year after it is supposed to have occurred and then only in response to Brewer's investigation. When confronted by Mr. Brewer concerning the ownership of her agency Ms. Watson refused to tell him to whom she had sold the agency. When Mr. Brewer learned that Thomas Zinnbauer had apparently bought the agency from the Respondent Mr. Brewer conferred with him and he refused to release the agency records unless Ms. Watson gave her permission. This fact, together with the fact that Ms. Watson held herself out as president of the agency some four months after she had purportedly sold the agency to Zinnbauer, establishes that Respondent, by representing to Brewer and other personnel of MacNeill and Sons, Inc. that she had sold her agency, was attempting to evade liability for failure to forward the fiduciary premium funds obtained under the authority of her agent's license. As a result of the failure to forward the above- mentioned premium payments some of the insureds who had paid those premiums suffered lapses in coverage and cancellations of policies because MacNeill and Company and the insurers they represented believed that no premiums had ever been paid. Ultimately, MacNeill and Company learned that the premiums had been paid by the policyholders, but not remitted by the Respondent and her agency and undertook steps to reinstate coverage, but those policyholders in some instances had substantial periods of time when their coverage was lapsed due to the Respondent's failure to remit the premium funds to the managing agency and the insurance companies involved. MacNeill and Company ultimately reimbursed the appropriate insurers and insureds at its own expense, incurring substantial financial detriment as a result of the Respondent's failure to have premium payments obtained under her licensed authority properly forwarded. Had the insureds who had their policies cancelled suffered losses for which claims could have been filed during the period of the lapses of coverage, they could have encountered substantial financial difficulty.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore recommended that the General Lines Insurance Agent's license of Respondent Teresa Jean Watson be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 27th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX RULING OF PETITIONER'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Accepted. Accepted, although the amount represented by the two subject checks totalled $174.00 instead of $175.00. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial credible evidence adduced. Rejected inasmuch as it was not established that the amount of $179.35 owed the Independent Fire Insurance Company represented the premium on the Williamses' insurance policy. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, although the last sentence in that Proposed Finding constitutes, in reality, mere argument of counsel. Accepted. Rejected as not comporting with the competent, substantial credible testimony and evidence actually before the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. RULINGS ON RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT: Respondent submitted a post-hearing document entitled "Proposed Findings of Fact." There are few actual Proposed Facts in that one-and-a-half page pleading which is interlaced throughout with argument of counsel. However, to the extent the six paragraphs of that document contain Proposed Findings of Fact they are ruled on as follows: This Proposed Finding is rejected, but for reasons delineated in the above Conclusions of Law, Count 1 has been recommended to be dismissed anyway. This Finding is accepted but is immaterial and irrelevant to, and not necessary to, the Findings of Fact reached herein and the Conclusions of Law based thereon. Paragraph Number 3 does not really constitute a Proposed Finding of Fact or even multiple Proposed Findings of Fact in the same paragraph. In reality, it constitutes argument of Respondent's counsel concerning admissibility of certain documents into evidence which have already been ruled to be admissible by the Hearing Officer during the course of the hearing. To the extent that the last two sentences in the third paragraph of the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact are proposed findings of fact, they are accepted, but are immaterial, irrelevant and unnecessary to the findings of fact made herein and the conclusions predicated thereon and recommendation made herein. Rejected as not being in accordance with the competent, substantial credible testimony and evidence adduced. Rejected as constituting mere argument of counsel and not being in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence adduced. Rejected as not in accordance with the competent, substantial, credible evidence presented as to Count 2. In reality, counsel obviously intended to refer to the two checks referenced in Count 1 of the complaint which has been recommended to be dismissed anyway. COPIES FURNISHED: Dennis Silverman, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mark A. Steinberg, Esquire Post Office Box 2366 Ft. Myers, Florida 33902 Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner and Treasurer The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this consolidated proceeding concern whether the Petitioner, Abraham Maida's applications to represent certain life insurance companies should be denied based upon his alleged unlawful failure to forward premium funds from insureds to the insurers during the applicable regular course of business. Also at issue are the charges in the Administrative Complaint in the related penal proceeding which concerns the same factual conduct involving the Respondent's alleged failure to forward premiums to the insurers involved in the policy contracts at issue.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Abraham George Maida, is licensed in Florida as a life insurance agent, a life and health insurance agent and a dental health care contract salesman. The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with licensing life, health and other types of insurance agents, with regulating their licensure and practice and with enforcing the licensure and practice standards embodied in the statutes cited hereinbelow. Abraham Maida engaged in the business of selling insurance coverage to various employees of the City of Jacksonville. The premium payments for this coverage were collected by payroll deduction from the employees, and lump sum premium checks were remitted over to the Petitioner/Respondent, Mr. Maida, by the appropriate personnel of the City of Jacksonville. Mr. Maida, in turn, was required by his contractual arrangements with the underwriting insurance companies involved and by the Florida Insurance Code, Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, with timely remitting those premium funds over to the insurers who underwrote the risk for the employees in question. Mr. Maida failed to timely remit the premium funds which he collected from the City of Jacksonville to the relevant insurers for the months of February, March and April of 1990, in the case of policy contracts written on behalf of Loyal American Life Insurance Company. Additionally, Mr. Maida failed to timely remit the premium funds received from the City of Jacksonville, after it received them by payroll deduction from its employees, for the months of March, April and May of 1990, with regard to the premium funds due in contracts involving the ITT Life Insurance Company, in accordance with his contract with that company. Mr. Maida failed to timely remit the insurance premiums of James E. Daniels to the ITT Life Insurance Company, as well. The Petitioner/Respondent's contracts with these insurance companies required him to remit premium funds which he received from insureds, within thirty (30) days of receipt, to the insurance company underwriting the risk involved. This the Petitioner/Respondent failed to do for the companies involved in the above Findings of Fact and for those months of 1990 delineated above. In the case of most of the delinquent premium funds due these companies, Mr. Maida authorized them to debit his commission and/or renewal accounts with those companies, which were monies due and owing to him from the companies, in order to make up the premiums which he had not remitted over to the companies involved at that point. That procedure did not defray all of the delinquent premium amounts, however. in the case of ITT Life Insurance Company and the monies owed that company by Mr. Maida, it was established that $10,554.21 of delinquent premium amounts were owing to that company and not timely paid by Mr. Maida. Although he paid the portion of that figure representing the March premium funds due the company for March of 1990, he did not directly pay the premium funds due for April and May of 1990 but, rather, suffered the company to charge those delinquencies, for those months, to his agent's commission account. This procedure still left $4,877.54 unpaid, as of the time of hearing. It was established by witness, Steven Heinicke of that company, that Mr. Maida is their most consistently delinquent agent, in terms of timely remission of premium funds due the company for insurance business which Mr. Maida has written. It has also been established however, that Mr. Maida made a practice of always paying premium funds due the companies for which he wrote insurance in the precise amounts owing, regardless of whether the billing statements to him from those companies had inadvertently understated the amounts which they were due. It was also established that his failure to timely remit the insurance premium funds in question was not due to any intent to defraud those companies of the funds involved or to permanently convert the funds to his own use. Rather, it was established that Mr. Maida's difficulty in timely payment of the premium funds was due to misappropriation of the funds because of financial problems which he was suffering at tee times in question, due at least in part to federal income tax difficulties he was experiencing. There has been no shoring in this record that Mr. Maida is not a competent insurance agent in terms of his abilities and qualifications to fairly and effectively obtain and contract for insurance business with insureds on behalf of the insurance companies he represents. There was no showing that he lacks reasonably adequate knowledge and technical competence to engage in the transactions authorized by the licenses or permits which he presently holds or which he seeks in the licensure application involved in this proceeding.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be found guilty of the violations found to have been proven in the above Conclusions of Law portion of this Recommended Order and that his licenses and eligibility for licensure with the insurers for which license application was made be suspended for a period of three (3) months. DONE and ENTERED this 5th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 90-6670 Respondent/Department's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-7. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Gallagher, State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil, Esq. General Counsel Department of Insurance and Treasurer The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300 Norman J. Abood, Esq. Willis F. Melvin, Jr., Esq. 1015 Blackstone Building Alan J. Leifer, Esq. Jacksonville, FL 32202 Department of Insurance and Treasurer 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner became employed by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Weights, on November 5, 1982. Upon being accepted for employment Petitioner completed and submitted to proper authorities the forms necessary to be covered by the State's group health insurance program and authorized the appropriate deductions from his salary to cover the premiums. On several occasions, he and his wife inquired through the Department of Transportation regarding their failure to receive an insurance card. Each time they were told the insurance card would be forthcoming and only administrative delays in processing the application were causing the delay. During this time no deductions were being taken from Petitioner's pay. In June, 1983 Petitioner incurred two doctor bills for his wife and son (Exhibit 1) in the total amount of $50, of which he paid $10 with the remainder forwarded to Blue Cross and Blue Shield who administers the state's health insurance plan. Blue Cross and Blue Shield had no record of Petitioner's insurance and the claim was denied. Petitioner paid the additional $40 charges. Although evidence was not submitted to show why Petitioner's application was not properly processed or what finally got this application back on track, the proper steps were finally taken and Petitioner was credited with having been covered with health insurance in accordance with his application from December 1982 and billed for premiums due from that date. This resulted in the assessment by the state of $436.14 for back premiums. Since he was not on the Blue Cross register in June 1983, Petitioner contests the assessment as a condition to remaining a participating member in the state health insurance program.
The Issue Whether Respondent, an insurance agent licensed in Florida, violated specified Florida Statutes and agency rules in the sale of an annuity to two senior citizens, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, and, if so, the penalty that should be imposed against Respondent's license.
Findings Of Fact The Parties At all times relevant, Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as an annuity, health, and life insurance agent in Florida. Petitioner is the state agency charged with licensing and regulating insurance agents and taking disciplinary action for violations of the laws and rules it administers. Background Annuities This case arises from Respondent's sale of an Allianz Life Insurance of North America equity indexed annuity ("Allianz annuity") to Robert and Frances Wexler in June 2004. An annuity is a contractual arrangement under which an insurance company, in exchange for a premium, agrees to pay the owner a specified income for a period of time. Annuities generally are classified as "fixed" or "variable." Under a fixed annuity, the benefit is paid according to a predetermined interest rate. Under a variable annuity, the premium is invested on the owner's behalf, and the amount of the benefit, when paid, reflects the performance of that investment. Fixed annuities can be either "immediate" or "deferred." Under an immediate fixed annuity, the insurer begins paying the benefit upon purchase of the annuity. Under a deferred annuity, the premium is allowed to grow over time until the contract "matures" or is "annuitized" and the insurer begins paying the benefit. The Allianz annuity that Respondent sold to the Wexlers is a fixed deferred annuity. The Allianz annuity at issue also is an equity index annuity. This means that the insurer pays a benefit to the insured based on a premium that earns interest at a rate determined by the performance of a designated market index. The premium is not invested in the market for the owner's account; rather, the interest rate rises or falls in relation to the index's performance, within predetermined limits. Equity index annuities typically are long-term investments. Owners of equity index annuities have limited access to the funds invested and accumulating in their accounts, although some equity index annuities, such as the Allianz annuity at issue in this case, permit yearly penalty-free withdrawals at set percentages. The accrued interest generally is not taxed until the funds are withdrawn or the benefit is paid under annuity. The purchaser may incur substantial surrender charges for canceling the contract and withdrawing his or her funds before a specified date. Some equity index annuities identify a date——often many years in the future——on which the insurer will "annuitize" the contract if the purchaser has not already opted to do so. This date is sometimes called the "maturity date." The benefit payable under the annuity is determined based on the account's value as of the maturity date, and the payments to the owner of the annuity begin at that time. The Wexlers Robert Wexler was born in 1930. He was 73 years old in 2004, when Respondent sold him the Allianz annuity at issue in this case. His wife, Frances Wexler, was born in 1932, and she was 71 years old at the time. Both Wexlers finished high school and took some college courses. They married after Mr. Wexler joined the Air Force. While in the Air Force, Mr. Wexler studied electronics, which ultimately led to his career in that field in the private sector. He worked for IBM, Univac, and General Electric before retiring in 1994. Mrs. Wexler worked for a small family-owned printing firm for over 26 years, and retired in 1997. The Wexlers raised three children, and they lived in the same home in Pennsylvania for 40 years. While living in Pennsylvania, the Wexlers saved money by using Mrs. Wexler's salary to pay their living expenses and saving most of Mr. Wexler's earnings in a retirement account. They never bought annuities, but did trade stocks, which resulted in financial loss. For many years, the Wexlers visited Florida as "snowbirds" and eventually purchased a condominium in a gated community in Deerfield Beach, Florida. In 1998, the Wexlers sold their home in Pennsylvania, liquidated the stocks they owned, and bought a larger condominium in the same gated community. They moved permanently to Florida in 1998, with approximately $500,000 in liquid assets. The 2002 Aviva Annuity Respondent met the Wexlers in 2002, when he worked for the Cornerstone Financial Group ("Cornerstone"). Cornerstone had mailed out cards to persons 65 years old and older and the Wexlers sent in a reply card with boxes checked indicating interest in learning about Cornerstone's products. Based on that contact, Respondent arranged an in-home appointment with the Wexlers. At that time, the Wexlers informed Respondent that they had three financial investment goals: safety of their invested principal; long-term growth of their investment; and at some point years in the future, having a fixed income stream for the rest of their lives. The Wexlers consider themselves "conservative" financial investors, and they live off of their monthly social security and retirement pension checks. Being able to take money out of an annuity to cover routine living expenses was not a high priority for the Wexlers. They were more interested in leaving their investment alone and allowing it to grow, and they communicated this information to Respondent. Based on this information, Respondent sold the Wexlers an Aviva3/ equity index annuity. The Wexlers paid a $60,000.00 premium. The annuity was issued on June 11, 2002, and had a maturity date of June 11, 2031. The policy allowed partial withdrawal beginning immediately, without charge, of up to ten percent of the value of the account on the prior certificate anniversary date. If the insured withdrew more than that amount, a withdrawal charge was assessed, with the amount4/ of the withdrawal charge decreasing over a ten-year period, so that starting in year 11, there was no withdrawal charge. Pursuant to this withdrawal charge schedule, if the Wexlers withdrew all of their money from the policy——in effect, "surrendering" the policy——before the ten-year withdrawal charge period had expired, they would be assessed charges according to the withdrawal charge schedule. Under such circumstances, withdrawal charges are referred to as "surrender charges." The Aviva policy allocated the premium to three investment strategies. Specifically, 50% was allocated to the Annual Equity Index Strategy ("AEIS"), which is the Standard & Poors (S&P) 500 index excluding dividend income. The AES investment strategy had a minimum guaranteed interest rate of zero percent. The remaining 50% of the premium was invested equally in the Investment Grade Bond Index Strategy (IGBIS") and the Guaranteed One-Year Strategy ("GOS"). The IGBIS strategy was tied to the Lehman Brothers Aggregate Index, and, at the time, had a minimum guaranteed interest rate of two percent per year. The GOS investment strategy had a four percent per year current interest rate and a two percent minimum guaranteed interest rate per year. No evidence was presented about how the Aviva policy would have performed to date had the Wexlers not surrendered the policy. The 2004 Allianz Annuity In June 2004, Respondent paid the Wexlers another visit. At that time, Respondent was with Global Financial Group and was marketing different products. Respondent met with the Wexlers to discuss an Allianz annuity that, in his view, had "better" features than the Aviva annuity he sold them two years earlier. The evidence establishes that Respondent spent at least an hour or more reviewing the Allianz annuity with the Wexlers. In Mr. Wexler's own words, Respondent spent time "explain[ing] it, patiently talking about it." Mr. Wexler nonetheless claimed5/ at hearing that Respondent did not provide a comparison of the Alliance and Aviva policies. Respondent testified that he did provide such a comparison, and the undersigned finds his testimony more persuasive. Mr. Wexler testified that Respondent told them that surrendering their Aviva annuity and moving their funds into the Allianz annuity would cause them to incur a substantial surrender charge,6/ but that they would recoup the charge through a bonus provided by the Allianz annuity. Respondent credibly testified that he told the Wexlers that the bonus would be available if they annuitized the policy. Mr. Wexler did not recall Respondent discussing the specifics of annuitizing the Allianz policy with him, and Respondent confirmed that he did not extensively discuss annuitization with the Wexlers. This was because Mr. Wexler told Respondent that they had liquid assets and were not interested in immediately generating an income stream from the annuity, but instead were interested in leaving their investment alone to grow over time. Using information provided by Mr. Wexler, Respondent filled out paperwork, consisting of the Application for Annuity and Authorization to Transfer Funds, required for the Wexlers to surrender their Aviva annuity and purchase the Allianz annuity. According to Mr. Wexler, Respondent selected the type of product (here, the 10% Bonus PowerDex Elite Annuity) on the Application for Annuity form, and also selected the percentage of funds to be allocated into specific investment strategies on a Supplemental Application form. Respondent testified that he always fills out the forms for his clients, and he credibly testified that he reviewed the selected strategies with the Wexlers. Mr. Wexler executed the "Agreements and Signatures" section of the Application for Annuity.7/ This section states in pertinent part: It is agreed that: (1) All statements and answers given above are true and complete to the best of my knowledge; . . . (5) I understand that I may return my policy within the free look period (shown of the first page of my policy) if I am dissatisfied for any reason; and (6) I believe this annuity is suitable for my financial goals. Respondent provided the Wexlers with a copy of a Statement of Understanding regarding the Allianz annuity. This document explained the key aspects of the annuity in substantial detail. Mr. Wexler executed the Statement of Understanding, confirming that he received a copy of that document, and that he reviewed and understood key aspects of the annuity. The document states in pertinent part: I received a copy of this Statement of Understanding. The agent has answered my questions. I have also reviewed the 10% Bonus PowerDex Elite Annuity consumer brochure. I understand that any values shown, other than the Guaranteed Minimum Values, are not guarantees, promises, or warranties. I understand that I may return my policy within the free look period (shown on the first page of the policy) if I am dissatisfied for any reason. The Wexlers paid a premium of $58,125.01 for the Allianz annuity, and invested an additional $8000.00, for a total investment of $66,125.01. As a result of surrendering the Aviva policy to purchase the Allianz annuity, they incurred a surrender charge of $5,726.89. The Allianz annuity, Policy No. 70097189, was issued on July 16, 2004. Once the Allianz annuity was issued, Respondent delivered it to the Wexlers and reviewed it with them. Respondent again informed the Wexlers of the 20-day free look period during which they could return the annuity and obtain a full refund of the premium. Mr. Wexler did not read the annuity and "stashed it away." The Allianz annuity had been approved by Petitioner for sale to investors, including senior investors, when Respondent sold the annuity to the Wexlers in 2004. Respondent credibly testified that Mr. Wexler did not tell him that he had purchased annuities from other agents, and Mr. Wexler could not clearly recall8/ whether he had provided Respondent information regarding his other annuities purchases. Respondent earned a commission of $6,281.92 on the sale of the Allianz annuity to the Wexlers. Comparison of the Aviva and Allianz Annuities The parties agree that annuities are intended to be long-term investments. Beyond that, there is substantial disagreement regarding whether the Allianz annuity was, in reality, a "better" investment than the Aviva annuity for the Wexlers. Respondent maintained that the Allianz policy had several advantages over the Aviva policy. Petitioner asserts that the Allianz annuity either had some substantial disadvantages, or, at best, did not offer any significant advantages over the Aviva policy. Respondent testified that a key reason for introducing the Allianz policy to the Wexlers was that it had a higher index-tied earnings cap than the Aviva policy, so it could earn more than the Aviva policy. Petitioner asserts, and a review of the policies confirms, that the Aviva policy had a higher cap rate——specifically, 15% for the first year with a 10% minimum guaranteed index cap rate thereafter for the Aviva policy, as compared to 12% for the first year, with a guaranteed five percent minimum thereafter for the Allianz policy. Thus, the Aviva policy provides greater potential for index-tied earnings than the Allianz policy. The evidence shows that Respondent provided the Wexlers inaccurate information on this policy term. Respondent maintained that the Allianz annuity had a 100% participation rate, as compared to only a 60% participation rate for the Aviva policy, so that under the Allianz policy, the Wexlers would keep 100% of any gains due to increases in the S&P Index, whereas under the Aviva policy, they would keep only 60% of those gains. Petitioner disputes that the Aviva policy contained a limit on participation rate. A review of the policies shows that they both state a 100% participation rate in the selected investment indices; however, under the Aviva policy, there is a "certificate charge" that is deducted when calculating the owner's index earnings. Whether this deduction is expressed as a "lower participation rate" or considered a "fee," the fact remains that under the Aviva policy, the owner got to keep less money from his or her index investment. Accordingly, it is determined that Respondent accurately informed the Wexlers on this point. Respondent claimed, and apparently communicated to the Wexlers, that there was no risk in the Allianz investment, because gains resulting from the investment allocation indices were locked in so the Wexlers would never lose their invested principal or any gains they realized on the investment indices. Petitioner, on the other hand, asserted that the Allianz policy embodied substantial risk because negative index adjustments were deducted from the policy's current value. Although Petitioner is correct regarding the policy's current value, Respondent is correct regarding the effect of negative index performance on the annuity's high water value. The policy's annuitization value is the greater of these two values, so the high water value is likely more important for investors like the Wexlers, who wish to leave their investment alone rather than annuitize in the short term. Although the Wexlers' investment value under the Allianz annuity may have declined in years 2008 and 2009 due to poor S&P Index performance (which also would have affected the value of the Aviva policy, had the Wexlers still owned it), the annuitization value of the policy was not negatively affected by the poor performance of that index. In light of Respondent's understanding of the Wexlers' investment goals, his representations on this point were reasonable and not materially inaccurate. The Allianz policy provided a ten percent bonus for money invested for the first five years, and the bonus was accessible if either the policyholder annuitized the policy or as a death benefit to the policy's beneficiary. By contrast, the Aviva policy offered no bonuses after the first year. Petitioner characterizes the Allianz bonus as an "ephemeral" feature because of the limits on its availability. However, the credible evidence establishes that Respondent informed the Wexlers about these limitations, and that they were aware of them when they purchased the annuity. Under the Aviva policy, the Wexlers could annuitize at any time before the policy's maturity date. Under the Allianz policy they could only annuitize after five years, could not withdraw more than 5% of the account value of the annuity on an annual basis, and could not withdraw more than 25% of the account value over the life of the annuity. Notwithstanding, the credible evidence establishes that Respondent told the Wexlers about the annuitization limits of the Allianz policy, and they were aware of these limitations when they purchased the policy. Both policies imposed surrender charges for withdrawal of funds before the maturity date. Under the Aviva policy, withdrawal charges applied during the first ten years; under the Allianz policy, surrender charges could be incurred for the lifetime of the policy pursuant to a formula and terms established in the policy. This information is clearly stated in the policy's contract summary, and Respondent credibly testified that he fully reviewed the annuity with the Wexlers before he sold it to them, and again when he delivered it to them after issuance. Both annuities had death benefit features. The Allianz annuity provided that if the owner died, the accumulation value9/ would be paid to the beneficiary over a five-year period. The Aviva annuity provided that if the annuitant was less than 75 years old on the contract date, the death benefit would be the greater of the account value or the guaranteed account value.10/ On balance, the policies' death benefits features were similar, and there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent touted the Allianz annuity as having a superior death benefit to induce the Wexlers to purchase the annuity. The Allianz annuity featured a nursing home benefit that allowed withdrawal of the policy's full annuitization value over a five-year period if the insured was admitted to a nursing home for 30 or more days. However, the Wexlers already had insurance coverage providing assisted living benefits. Respondent acknowledged that the Allianz policy nursing home benefit was of relatively little value to the Wexlers. The evidence is insufficient to prove that Respondent represented this feature as a substantial advantage in inducing the Wexlers to purchase the Allianz annuity. Ultimate Findings of Fact Regarding Alleged Statutory and Rule Violations For the reasons explained in detail below, the undersigned determines, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Petitioner did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(5), (7), (9), or (13); 626.9541(1)(a)1, (1)(e)1, or (1)(l); or 626.621(6); or rules 69B-215.210 or 69B-215.230.11 Alleged Violations of Section 627.611 Section 626.611 sets forth violations for which suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license is mandatory. Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating sections 626.611(5), (7), (9), and (13). These offenses require a finding that the licensee had intent to commit the act constituting the offense. See Beckett v. Dep't of Fin. Servs., 982 So. 2d 94, 99 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); see also Bowling v. Dep't of Ins., 394 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Here, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly show intent on Respondent's part with respect to any of the alleged violations of section 627.611. Although Respondent provided inaccurate information to the Wexlers on a material term——the comparative index earnings caps, which affect how much the Wexlers could earn through the policies' investment strategies——the evidence does not establish that Respondent intentionally misinformed the Wexlers on this policy term. To that point, Respondent accurately represented all other material terms of the Allianz policy to the Wexlers. The undersigned finds this probative in determining that Respondent's misstatement was made unintentionally, rather than willfully or knowingly. See Munch v. Dep't of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., 592 So. 2d 1136, 1143-44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008)(to find an offense of "misrepresentation," an intentional act must be proven). Section 626.611(5) makes the willful misrepresentation of any insurance policy or annuity contract or the willful deception with regard to any such policy or contract a ground for suspending or revoking an agent's license. Petitioner did not prove that Respondent willfully misrepresented any aspect of the Allianz or Aviva policies to the Wexlers or willfully deceived them regarding the policies. Respondent credibly testified that he reviewed the key terms of the Allianz policy with the Wexlers, and there is no persuasive evidence in the record to the contrary. Although Respondent did inaccurately represent the Allianz policy as having greater index-tied earnings potential than the Aviva policy, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent willfully misrepresented this information to the Wexlers, or willfully deceived them, to induce them to purchase the policy. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(5). Section 626.611(7) makes the demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance a ground for suspending or revoking an agent's license. Again, a finding of intent on the licensee's part is required to find a violation of this subsection. The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intended to provide incorrect, misleading, deceptive, or fraudulent information to the Wexlers to induce them to purchase the Allianz policy. As such, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, a demonstrated lack of fitness or untrustworthiness on Respondent's part to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of section 626.611(7). Section 626.611(9) makes fraudulent or dishonest practices in conducting business under an insurance agent license grounds for suspension or revocation of the license. As previously discussed, although Respondent provided incorrect information to the Wexlers regarding the comparative investment strategy caps for the Allianz and Aviva annuities, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent intended to do so. Accordingly, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(9) by engaging in fraudulent or dishonest practices in the sale of the Allianz policy to the Wexlers. Section 626.611(13) provides that willful failure to comply with, or willful violation of, Petitioner's orders or rules, or any willful violation of any provision of the Florida Insurance Code constitutes a basis for suspending or revoking an insurance agent license. Again, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent willfully violated its rules or orders, or willfully violated the Florida Insurance Code, in connection with the sale of the Allianz annuity to the Wexlers. Although Respondent did provide incorrect information on a key term——the comparative investment strategy caps, which affected the annuities' comparative earnings potential——the persuasive evidence in the record does not support a finding that Respondent willfully did so. Thus, Petitioner failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated section 626.611(13). Alleged Violations of Section 626.9541 Section 626.9541 is entitled "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices defined." This statute defines the types of acts that constitute unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the insurance industry, but it does not independently authorize disciplinary action. Werner v. Dep't of Ins., 689 So. 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Petitioner has charged Respondent with engaging in acts set forth in section 626.9541(1)(a)1., specifically, that he knowingly made, issued, circulated, or caused to be made, issued, or circulated, any estimate, illustration, circular, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents provides that making any estimate, statement, sales presentation, omission, or comparison which misrepresents the benefits, advantages, conditions, or terms of any insurance policy. As discussed above, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent knowingly engaged in any of these acts. Thus, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts as provided in section 626.9541(1)(a)1. Petitioner also charged Respondent with engaging in acts defined in section 626.9541(1)(e)1. This section requires, as a predicate for the imposition of discipline, a finding that the licensee knowingly made false material statements through a variety of actions described in that provision. Again, the evidence does not establish that Respondent knowingly engaged in any of these acts. Accordingly, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts as provided in section 626.9541(1)(e)1. Petitioner has charged Respondent with "twisting," which is defined in section 626.9541(1)(l) as knowingly making any misleading representation or incomplete or fraudulent comparisons or fraudulent material omissions of or with respect to any insurance policies for the purposes of inducing, or tending to induce, any person to surrender, terminate, or convert any insurance policy or to take out a policy of insurance in another insurer. Again, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent knowingly committed any of the acts described in this statute. Thus, Petitioner did not prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in twisting under section 626.9541(1)(1), Florida Statutes. Alleged Violation of Section 626.621 Section 626.621 sets forth violations for which suspension or revocation of an insurance agent's license is discretionary.12/ Petitioner has charged Respondent with violating section 626.621(6) by engaging in unfair methods of competition or in unfair or deceptive acts or practices, as prohibited by part IX of chapter 626, or having otherwise shown himself to be a source of injury or loss to the public or detrimental to the public interest. For the reasons previously discussed, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent engaged in any actions that could be considered unfair methods of competition or deceptive acts or practices under chapter 626, part IX. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent engaged in acts under section 626.621(6) that justify the suspension or revocation of his insurance agent's license. Alleged Violations of Agency Rules Petitioner charged Respondent with violating rule 69B- 215.210. This rule provides that the business of life insurance13/ is a public trust in which all agents of all companies have an obligation to work together in serving the best interests of the insuring public, by understanding and observing the laws governing life insurance by letter and in spirit by presenting accurately and completely every fact essential to a client's decision, and by being fair in all relations with colleagues and competitors and always placing the policyholder's interests first. The rule implements section 626.797, entitled "code of ethics," which directs Petitioner to adopt a code of ethics to "govern the conduct of life agents in their relations with the public, other agents, and the insurers," and to establish standards of conduct to avoid the commission of acts that would constitute grounds for suspension or revocation under sections 626.611, 626.621, and unfair trade practices and unfair methods of competition under chapter 626, part IX. The rule must be interpreted and applied consistent with the law it is implementing. As previously discussed, the violations of sections 626.611, 626.621, and 626.9541 with which Respondent was charged all require that he have intent to commit the act constituting the violation. The persuasive evidence does not establish that Respondent had the requisite intent necessary to find a violation of rule 69B-215.210.14/ Petitioner also charged Respondent with violating rule 69B-215.230. Rule 69B-215.230(1) makes unethical the misrepresentation of the terms of any policy issued or to be issued or the benefits or advantages promised by that policy. This rule implements sections 626.797 and 626.9541(1)(a) and (b), violations of which require a showing or willful or knowing misrepresentation. Further, "misrepresentation" requires that an intentional act be proven for a violation to be found. See Walker v. Dep't. of Bus. and Prof'l Reg., 705 So. 2d 652, 654 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). As previously discussed, the evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that Respondent knowingly or willfully provided incorrect information or misstatements to the Wexlers regarding the Allianz policy. Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that Respondent violated Rule 69B-230.210(1).15/
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services dismiss the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of June, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CATHY M. SELLERS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 2012.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondents offered and sold securities in Florida, in violation of the registration requirements of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes; offered and sold securities in Florida while Respondents were unregistered, in violation of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; or committed fraud in the offer, sale, or purchase of securities in Florida, in violation of Section 517.301(1)(a), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is the penalty to be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent James A. Torchia (Respondent) held a valid life and health insurance license. Respondent was the president and owner of Respondent Empire Insurance, Inc. (Empire Insurance), a now-dissolved Florida corporation. Empire Insurance was in the insurance business, and Respondent was its sole registered insurance agent. At no material time has Respondent or Empire Insurance held any license or registration to engage in the sale or offer for sale of securities in Florida. At no material time were the investments described below sold and offered for sale by Respondent or Empire Insurance registered as securities in Florida. These cases involve viaticated life insurance policies. A life insurance policy is viaticated when the policy owner, also known as the viator, enters into a viatical settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the viator sells the policy and death benefits to the purchaser for an amount less than the death benefit--the closer the viator is perceived to be to death, the greater the discount from the face amount of the death benefit. The viatical industry emerged to provide dying insureds, prior to death, a means by which to sell their life insurance policies to obtain cash to enjoy during their remaining lives. As this industry matured, brokers and dealers, respectively, arranged for the sale of, and bought and resold, life insurance policies of dying insureds. Prior to the death of the viator, these viaticated life insurance policies, or interests in such policies, may be sold and resold several times. In these cases, viators sold their life insurance policies to Financial Federated Title & Trust, Inc. (FinFed). Having raised money from investors, American Benefit Services (ABS) then paid FinFed, which assigned viaticated policies, or interests in the policies, to various trusts. The trusts held the legal title to the policies, and the trust beneficiaries, who are the investors from whom ABS had obtained the funds to pay FinFed, held equitable title to the policies. Sometimes in these cases, a broker or dealer, such as William Page and Associates, intervened between the viator and FinFed. At some point, though, ABS obtained money from investors to acquire policies, but did not pay the money to FinFed to purchase viaticated life insurance policies. The FinFed and ABS investment program eventually became a Ponzi scheme, in which investor payouts were derived largely, if not exclusively, from the investments of other investors. ABS typically acquired funds through the promotional efforts of insurance agents, such as Respondent and Empire Insurance. Using literature provided by ABS, these agents often sold these investments to insurance clients. As was typical, Respondent and Empire Insurance advertised the types of claims described below by publishing large display ads that ran in Florida newspapers. Among the ABS literature is a Participation Disclosure (Disclosure), which describes the investment. The Disclosure addresses the investor as a "Participant" and the investment as a "Participation." The Disclosure contains a Participation Agreement (Agreement), which provides that the parties agree to the Disclosure and states whether the investor has chosen the Growth Plan or Income Plan, which are described below; a Disbursement Letter of Instruction, which is described below; and a Letter of Instruction to Trust, which is described below. The agent obtains the investor's signature to all three of these documents when the investor delivers his check, payable to the escrow agent, to purchase the investment. The Disclosure states that the investments offer a “High Return”: “Guaranteed Return on Participation 42% at Maturity.” The Disclosure adds that the investments are “Low Risk”: “Secured by a Guaranteed Insurance Industry Receivable”; “Secured by $300,000 State Insurance Guarantee Fund”; “Short Term Participation (Maturity Expectation 36 Months)”; “Principal Liquid After One Year With No Surrender Charge”; “State Regulated Participation”; “All Transactions By Independent Trust & Escrow Agents”; and “If policy fails to mature at 36 months, participant may elect full return of principal plus 15% simple interest.” The Disclosure describes two alternative investments: the Growth Plan and Income Plan. For the Growth Plan, the Disclosure states: “At maturity, Participant receives principal plus 42%, creating maximum growth of funds.” For the Income Plan, the Disclosure states: “If income is desired, participation can be structured with monthly income plans.” Different rates of return for the Growth and Income plans are set forth below. For investors choosing the Income Plan, ABS applied only 70 percent of the investment to the purchase of viaticated life insurance policies. ABS reserved the remaining 30 percent as the source of money to "repay" the investor the income that he was due to receive under the Income Plan, which, as noted below, paid a total yield of 29.6 percent over three years. The Disclosure states that ABS places all investor funds in attorneys’ trust accounts, pursuant to arrangements with two “bonded and insured” “financial escrow agents.” At another point in the document, the Disclosure states that the investor funds are deposited “directly” with a “financial escrow agent,” pursuant to the participant’s Disbursement Letter of Instruction. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction identifies a Florida attorney as the “financial escrow agent,” who receives the investor’s funds and disburses them, “to the order of [FinFed) or to the source of the [viaticated insurance] benefits and/or its designees.” This disbursement takes place only after the attorney receives “[a] copy of the irrevocable, absolute assignment, executed in favor of Participant and recorded with the trust account as indicated on the assignment of [viaticated insurance] benefits, and setting out the ownership percentage of said [viaticated insurance] benefits”; a “medical overview” of the insured indicative of not more than 36 months’ life expectancy; confirmation that the policy is in full force and effect and has been in force beyond the period during which the insurer may contest coverage; and a copy of the shipping airbill confirming that the assignment was sent to the investor. The Disclosure states that the investor will direct a trust company to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. When the life insurance policy matures on the death of the viator, the insurer pays the death benefits to the trust company, which pays these proceeds to the investor, in accordance with his interest in the trust. Accordingly, the Letter of Instruction to Trust directs FinFed, as the trust company, to establish a trust, or a fractional interest in a trust, in the name of the investor. The Letter of Instruction to Trust provides that the viaticated insurance benefits obtained with the investor's investment shall be assigned to this trust, and, at maturity, FinFed shall pay the investor a specified sum upon the death of the viator and the trustee's receipt of the death benefit from the insurer. The Disclosure provides that, at anytime from 12 to 36 months after the execution of the Disclosure, the investor has the option to request ABS to return his investment, without interest. At 36 months, if the viator has not yet died, the investor has the right to receive the return of his investment, plus 15 percent (five percent annually). The Disclosure states that ABS will pay all costs and fees to maintain the policy and that all policies are based on a life expectancy for the viator of no more than 36 months. Also, the Disclosure assures that ABS will invest only in policies that are issued by insurers that are rated "A" or better by A.M. Best "at the time that the Participant's deposit is confirmed." The Disclosure mentions that the trust company will name the investor as an irrevocable assignee of the policy benefits. The irrevocable assignment of policy benefits mentioned in the Disclosure and the Disbursement Letter of Instruction is an anomaly because it does not conform to the documentary scheme described above. After the investor pays the escrow agent and executes the documents described above, FinFed executes the “Irrevocable Absolute Assignment of Viaticated Insurance Benefits.” This assignment is from the trustee, as grantor, to the investor, as grantee, and applies to a specified percentage of a specific life insurance policy, whose death benefit is disclosed on the assignment. The assignment includes the "right to receive any viaticated insurance benefit payable under the Trusts [sic] guaranteed receivables of assigned viaticated insurance benefits from the noted insurance company; [and the] right to assign any and all rights received under this Trust irrevocable absolute assignment." On its face, the assignment assigns the trust corpus-- i.e., the insurance policy or an interest in an insurance policy--to the trust beneficiary. Doing so would dissolve the trust and defeat the purpose of the other documents, which provide for the trust to hold the policy and, upon the death of the viator, to pay the policy proceeds in accordance with the interests of the trust beneficiaries. The assignment bears an ornate border and the corporate seal of FinFed. Probably, FinFed intended the assignment to impress the investors with the "reality" of their investment, as the decorated intangible of an "irrevocable" interest in an actual insurance policy may seem more impressive than the unadorned intangible of a beneficial interest in a trust that holds an insurance policy. Or possibly, the FinFed/ABS principals and professionals elected not to invest much time or effort in the details of the transactional documentation of a Ponzi scheme. What was true then is truer now. Obviously, in those cases in which no policy existed, the investor paid his money before any policy had been selected for him. However, this appears to have been the process contemplated by the ABS literature, even in those cases in which a policy did exist. The Disbursement Letter of Instruction and correspondence from Respondent, Empire Insurance, or Empire Financial Consultant to ABS reveal that FinFed did not assign a policy, or part of a policy, to an investor until after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In some cases, Respondent or Empire Insurance requested ABS to obtain for an investor a policy whose insured had special characteristics or a investment plan with a maturity shorter than 36 months. FinFed and ABS undertook other tasks after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents. In addition to matching a viator with an investor, based on the investor's expressed investment objectives, FinFed paid the premiums on the viaticated policies until the viator died and checked on the health of the viator. Also, if the viator did not die within three years and the investor elected to obtain a return of his investment, plus 15 percent, ABS, as a broker, resold the investor's investment to generate the 15 percent return that had been guaranteed to the investor. Similarly, ABS would sell the investment of investors who wanted their money back prior to three years. The escrow agent also assumed an important duty--in retrospect, the most important duty--after the investor paid for his investment and signed the closing documents; the escrow agent was to verify the existence of the viaticated policy. Respondent and Empire Insurance sold beneficial interests in trusts holding viaticated life insurance policies in 50 separate transactions. These investors invested a total of $1.5 million, nearly all of which has been lost. Respondent and Empire Insurance earned commissions of about $120,000 on these sales. Petitioner proved that Respondent and Empire Insurance made the following sales. Net worths appear for those investors for whom Respondent recorded net worths; for most, he just wrote "sufficient" on the form. Unless otherwise indicated, the yield was 42 percent for the Growth Plan. In all cases, investors paid money for their investments. In all cases, FinFed and ABS assigned parts of policies to the trusts, even of investors investing relatively large amounts. On March 21, 1998, Phillip A. Allan, a Florida resident, paid $69,247.53 for the Growth Plan. On March 26, 1998, Monica Bracone, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $900,000, paid $8000 for the Growth Plan. On April 2, 1998, Alan G. and Judy LeFort, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on June 8, 1998, the LeForts paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In the second transaction, the yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement notes a 36-month life expectancy of the viator. The different yields based on life expectancies are set forth below, but, as noted above, the standard yield was 42 percent, and, as noted below, this was based on a 36-month life expectancy, so Respondent miscalculated the investment return or misdocumented the investment on the LeForts' second transaction. On April 29, 1998, Doron and Barbara Sterling, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on August 14, 1998, the Sterlings paid $100,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield for the second transaction is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement notes that the Sterlings were seeking a viator with a life expectancy of only 30 months. When transmitting the closing documents for the second Sterling transaction, Respondent, writing ABS on Empire Insurance letterhead, stated in part: This guy has already invested with us (15,000) [sic]. He gave me this application but wants a 30 month term. Since he has invested, he did some research and has asked that he be put on a low T-cell count and the viator to be an IV drug user. I know it is another favor but this guy is a close friend and has the potential to put at least another 500,000 [sic]. If you can not [sic] do it, then I understand. You have done a lot for me and I always try to bring in good quality business. If this inventory is not available, the client has requested that we return the funds . . . In a third transaction, on February 24, 1999, the Sterlings paid $71,973 for the Growth Plan. The yield is only 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects the typical 36-month life expectancy for the viator. Although the investors would not have received this document, Respondent completed an ABS form entitled, "New Business Transmittal," and checked the box, "Life Expectancy 2 years or less (28%). The other boxes are: "Life Expectancy 2 1/2 years or less (35%)" and "Life Expectancy 3 years or less (42%)." On May 4, 1998, Hector Alvero and Idelma Guillen, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $6000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on October 29, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a third transaction, on November 30, 1998, Ms. Guillen paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. For this investment, Ms. Guillen requested an "IV drug user," according to Respondent in a letter dated December 1, 1998, on Empire Financial Consultants letterhead. This is the first use of the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants, not Empire Insurance, and all letters after that date are on the letterhead of Empire Financial Consultants. In a fourth transaction, on January 29, 1999, Ms. Guillen paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On April 23, 1998, Bonnie P. Jensen, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $120,000, paid $65,884.14 for the Growth Plan. Her yield was 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 20, 1998, Michael J. Mosack, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $70,600 for the Income Plan. He was to receive monthly distributions of $580.10 for three years. The total yield, including monthly distributions, is $20,883.48, which is about 29.6 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On May 27, 1998, Lewis and Fernande G. Iachance, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On June 3, 1998, Sidney Yospe, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $1,500,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, and the Participation Agreement reflects a 30-month life expectancy. On June 12, 1998, Bernard Aptheker, with a reported net worth of $100,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 10, 1998, Irene M. and Herman Kutschenreuter, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $200,000, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 9, 1998, Daniel and Mary Spinosa, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 5, 1998, Pauline J. and Anthony Torchia, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000 and the parents of Respondent, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. On June 29, 1998, Christopher D. Bailey, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $500,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction on the same day, Mr. Bailey paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. Petitioner submitted documents concerning a purported purchase by Lauren W. Kramer on July 21, 1998, but they were marked "VOID" and do not appear to be valid. On July 22, 1998, Laura M. and Kenneth D. Braun, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $150,000, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan, as Respondent completed the Participation Agreement. However, the agreement calls for them to receive $205.42 monthly for 36 months and receive a total yield, including monthly payments, of 29.6 percent, so it appears that the Brauns bought the Income Plan. In a second transaction, also on July 22, 1998, the Brauns paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Roy R. Worrall, a Florida resident, paid $100,000 for the Income Plan. The Participation Agreement provides that he will receive monthly payments of $821.66 and a total yield of 29.6 percent. On July 16, 1998, Earl and Rosemary Gilmore, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $250,000, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on February 12, 1999, the Gilmores paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 28 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of two years or less. On July 14, 1998, David M. Bobrow, a Florida resident with a reported net worth of $700,000 on one form and $70,000 on another form, paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. In a second transaction, on the same day, Mr. Bobrow paid $15,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 27, 1998, Cecilia and Harold Lopatin, Florida residents with a reported net worth of $300,000, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On July 30, 1998, Ada R. Davis, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Income Plan. Her total yield, including monthly payments of $246.50 for three years, is 29.6 percent. In a second transaction, on the same day, Ms. Davis paid $30,000 for the Income Plan on the same terms as the first purchase. On July 27, 1998, Joseph F. and Adelaide A. O'Keefe, Florida residents with a net worth of $300,000, paid $12,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 5, 1998, Thurley E. Margeson, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 19, 1998, Stephanie Segaria, a Florida resident, paid $20,000 for the Growth Plan. On August 26, 1998, Roy and Glenda Raines, Florida residents, paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy. The New Business Transmittal to ABS notes a life expectancy of 30 months or less. In a second transaction, on the same day, the Raineses paid $5000 for the Growth Plan. The yield is 35 percent, but the Participation Agreement reflects a 36-month life expectancy, although, again, the New Business Transmittal notes the life expectancy of 30 months or less. On November 24, 1998, Dan W. Lipford, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan in two transactions. In a third transaction, on January 13, 1999, Mr. Lipford paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 1, 1998, Mary E. Friebes, a Florida resident, paid $30,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 4, 1998, Allan Hidalgo, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 17, 1998, Paul E. and Rose E. Frechette, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including monthly payments of $205.41 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 26, 1998, Theodore and Tillie F. Friedman, Florida residents, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 19, 1999, Robert S. and Karen M. Devos, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. On January 20, 1999, Arthur Hecker, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $410.83 for 36 months, is 29.6 percent. On February 11, 1999, Michael Galotola, a Florida resident, paid $25,000 for the Growth Plan. In a second transaction, on the same day, Michael and Anna Galotola paid $12,500 for the Growth Plan. On November 3, 1998, Lee Chamberlain, a Florida resident, paid $50,000 for the Growth Plan. On December 23, 1998, Herbert L. Pasqual, a Florida resident, paid $200,000 for the Income Plan. The yield, including a monthly payment of $1643.33 for three years, is 29.6 percent. On December 1, 1998, Charles R. and Maryann Schuyler, Florida residents, paid $10,000 for the Growth Plan. Respondent and Empire Insurance were never aware of the fraud being perpetrated by FinFed and ABS at anytime during the 38 transactions mentioned above. Respondent attempted to verify with third parties the existence of the viaticated insurance policies. When ABS presented its program to 30-40 potential agents, including Respondent, ABS presented these persons an opinion letter from ABS's attorney, stating that the investment was not a security, under Florida law. Respondent also contacted Petitioner's predecessor agency and asked if these transactions involving viaticated life insurance policies constituted the sale of securities. An agency employee informed Respondent that these transactions did not constitute the sale of securities.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order: Finding James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., not guilty of violating Section 517.301(1), Florida Statutes; Finding James A. Torchia guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes; Finding Empire Insurance, Inc., guilty of 38 violations of Section 517.07(1), Florida Statutes, and 38 violations of Section 517.12(1), Florida Statutes, except for transactions closed on or after December 1, 1998; Directing James A. Torchia and Empire Insurance, Inc., to cease and desist from further violations of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $120,000 against James A. Torchia. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Fred H. Wilsen Senior Attorney Office of Financial Institutions and Securities Regulation South Tower, Suite S-225 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1799 Barry S. Mittelberg Mittelberg & Nicosia, P.A. 8100 North University Drive, Suite 102 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33321
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Emory Daniel Jones, was not involved or engaged in the insurance business prior to August, 1977. (Tr. 177.) In approximately August of 1977, United Sun Life Insurance Company (USL) hired Respondent as an agent. (Tr. 176, 177.) Respondent passed the insurance test administered by the State of Florida in August, 1977, and was scheduled for a seminar given by USL. (Tr. 178.) In late August, 1977, Respondent attended a three-day seminar established by USL for all its new agents. (Tr. 178.) At this seminar, USL taught the agents about a policy known as T.O.P. This was the only policy taught to the agents even though USL had other policies available. (Tr. 128.) The T.O.P. contract is a life insurance policy. This policy has two primary benefits. (Tr. 230, 231.) The first is the death benefit provided by all life insurance policies. Under the death benefit provision, the owner of the T.O.P. pays a premium to USL. When the insured dies, USL will pay the death benefit (money) to the beneficiary listed on the policy. (Tr. 128, 251.) The second major benefit provided by the T.O.P. is the life benefit feature. (Tr. 251.) The T.O.P. is an insurance policy which provides for the payment of dividends to the owner of the policy. The T.O.P contract states that the owner will share in the divisible surplus earnings of USL as determined by the Board of Directors. (Tr. 120; contract page 5, Exhibit #3.) The dividends were to be paid after the second year. (Tr. 129, 130.) The owner would participate in the divisible surplus earnings of USL through the payment of a dividend. (Tr. 129, 188.) As long as the T.O.P. was in effect, the owner would receive these dividends. USL developed a presentation to be given by the agents to prospective customers. This presentation was taught in the training session by USL. (Tr. 183, 249, 260, 270.) The agents were to memorize the presentation and were not to vary from the wording when they were attempting to sell the T.O.P. to prospective customers. (Tr. 185, 249.) The presentation taught by USL stressed the life benefit feature of the T.O.P. contract. (Tr. 251, 271.) The death benefit was only minimally covered because of the relatively high cost for the life insurance portion of the contract. This presentation further explained several features which made the T.O.P. contract life benefit provisions attractive to future customers: The T.O.P. contract owner was to participate in the divisible surplus earnings of USL. The only other persons that would also participate in the divisible earned surplus were the shareholders. (Tr. 196.) The T.O.P. contract was to be sold only to a limited number of people. After an undisclosed number of T.O.P. contracts were sold, the T.O.P. contract was to be taken off the market. (Tr. 234, 261, 276.) USL was not going to sell or issue any other policies which would participate in the divisible earned surplus of USL. (Tr. 234, 255, 261, 276.) USL would grow (increase its divisible earned surplus) by selling policies other than the T.O.P. contract. The more policies that were sold, the greater the divisible surplus earnings that would be available to the T.O.P. contract owners for dividends. (Tr. 196, 276.) Since the T.O.P. owners were limited and no other participating policies were to be issued, the T.O.P. owners would share in any increases in the divisible surplus earnings of USL. The greater the number of policies sold, the greater the dividends. The T.O.P. owners were then solicited to help the agents sell insurance policies of USL to their friends. This help would reduce the cost of advertising and increase the sales of insurance. The lower expenses and greater volume would mean more divisible surplus earnings in USL and greater dividends available to the T.O.P. owners. (Tr. 201.) To illustrate these points, USL taught the agents to draw circles representing other insurance policy owners. Lines were then drawn from these circles to the T.O.P. owner's circle. The lines between the circles represented the premiums paid on the other policies, which would increase divisible surplus earnings that would increase the dividends of the T.O.P. owners. (Tr. 196, 232, 263, 270.) USL taught the agents to illustrate the features of the life benefit by dollar signs. As the agent would talk about the other policies increasing the dividends to the T.O.P. owners, he was to increase the size of the dollar sign. (Tr. 233.) The whole emphasis of this presentation was on the participating feature. Another feature emphasized in the USL presentation was that the T.O.P. owner would participate in the divisible surplus earnings of USL as long as he was alive. Therefore, the agents were to stress that the T.O.P. owner should be a younger person in the family. If that person lived 70 years, then USL would pay dividends for 69 of those 70 years. This feature of the policy was stressed in the memorized presentation. (Tr. 204, 205, 232, 233, 252, 264, 270.) In late August of 1977, Respondent attended the training session and memorized the presentation. (Tr. 181, 184, 185.) At the end of the training session, USL reviewed the Respondent's presentation and found nothing wrong. (Tr. 187.) In late August of 1977, Respondent went into the field to sell the T.O.P. contract to potential customers. (Tr. 187.) Count I On September 7, 1977, Respondent met with Louis Charles Morrison and made the USL presentation on the T.O.P. policy to Morrison. Respondent made the presentation in the way he had been taught. Morrison was aware that he was purchasing an insurance policy. He was led to believe through USL's sales presentation as given by Respondent that the participating feature of the T.O.P. policy made this policy a good investment. Morrison concluded it was not a good investment because the dividends were not as great as he had anticipated they would be. Respondent's representations to Morrison with regard to the T.O.P. policy were not false. Count II On September 12, 1977, Respondent met with Fred Menk and gave to him the USL presentation on the T.O.P. policy. Respondent gave the presentation as he had been taught. Menk was aware that he was purchasing insurance. (Tr. 51.) Respondent made no representation about future dividends. (Tr. 59.) The interest rate was represented to increase as USL grew, which it did. (Tr. 59.) Menk was dissatisfied and felt the policy was misrepresented because he did not get the rate of return he had anticipated. (Tr. 59.) According to Menk, Respondent's representations made with regard to interest rate increases were accurate, and Respondent made no representations regarding future dividends. Count III Respondent met with Paul Loudin in September of 1978, and gave him the USL presentation on the T.O.P. policy as Respondent had been taught. Loudin was aware he was purchasing insurance. (Tr. 21, 26, 27, 31.) His interest was in life insurance and retirement compensation. (Tr. 36.) In part, Loudin's dissatisfaction was the belief he had lost his money because he did not receive a dividend on his first year's premium. The policy reflects that no dividends are payable in the first year. (Respondent's Exhibit #7.) A copy of the policy was provided to Loudin by Respondent. (Tr. 45.) Loudin also anticipated a dividend of 12 to 18 percent on his premiums based upon Respondent's general comments. However, he did not remember the exact conversation with Respondent. (Tr. 31, 32, 38, 39.) Loudin received a letter from USL which reflects a dividend history based upon an 18-year-old insured with an annual premium of $1,000 as follows: End of 2nd year $100.35 End of 3rd year 130.66 End of 4th year 162.86 The rate of return in the fourth year would be 11.6 percent on the fourth year's premium. The representations made to Loudin by Respondent were substantially true, or the relevant information was made available to Loudin by the Respondent. Count IV On November 30, 1977, Respondent met with Gayle Mason and gave the USL presentation on the T.O.P. policy as he had been taught. Mason knew she was purchasing insurance. (Tr. 107.) Respondent represented that the number of participants in the T.O.P. policy would be limited. (Tr. 108.) The current rate of return was taken by Respondent to be 11 percent, and it was represented that the return could be more. (Tr. 109.) Dividends were to be paid from surplus earnings. (Tr. 114.) Mason called the Better Business Bureau and the State Insurance Commissioner's office, and she was aware that USL was an insurance company and she was engaged in an insurance transaction. (Tr. 115.) Respondent represented that as USL grew, the dividends would increase. (Tr. 118.) Mason received a dividend in the second year in accordance with the policy. The representations made to Mason by Respondent were true or thought by Respondent to be true.
Recommendation Having found the Respondent, Emory Daniel Jones, not guilty of violating any of the statutes or rules as alleged, it is recommended that the Administrative Complaint against Respondent be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of January, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: David A. Yon, Esquire Department of Insurance 413-B Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Paul H. Bowen, Esquire 600 Courtland Street, Suite 600 Post Office Box 7838 Orlando, Florida 32854 The Honorable William Gunter State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is recommended that the Respondent, the Department of Administration, enter a final order denying coverage for the orthodontia recommended for Sandra Walsh. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of March, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of March, 1988.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioners’ Interim Rate Request (IRR) for an increase should be granted.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency of state government responsible for the implementation and administration of the Medicaid Program in the State of Florida. AHCA is authorized to audit Medicaid Cost Reports submitted by Medicaid Providers participating in the Medicaid Program. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud are licensed nursing homes in Florida that participate in the Medicaid Program as institutional Medicaid Providers. On May 23, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville entered into a settlement agreement with the representative of the estate of one of its former residents, D. P. The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that Avante at Jacksonville would pay $350,000.00 as settlement for all claims. Avante at Jacksonville paid the personal representative the sum of $350,000.00. By letter dated July 16, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville requested an IRR effective August 1, 2007, pursuant to the Plan Section IV J.2., for additional costs incurred from self-insured losses as a result of paying the $350,000.00 to settle the lawsuit. Avante at Jacksonville submitted supporting documentation, including a copy of the settlement agreement, and indicated, among other things, that the costs exceeded $5,000.00 and that the increase in cost was projected at $2.77/day, exceeding one percent of the current Medicaid per diem rate. At all times pertinent hereto, the policy held by Avante at Jacksonville was a commercial general and professional liability insurance policy. The policy had $10,000.00 per occurrence and $50,627.00 general aggregate liability limits. The policy was a typical insurance policy representative of what other facilities in the nursing home industry purchased in Florida. The policy limits were typical limits in the nursing home industry in Florida. By letter dated July 18, 2007, AHCA denied the IRR on the basis that the IRR failed to satisfy the requirements of Section IV J. of the Plan, necessary and proper for granting the request. Avante at Jacksonville contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. Subsequently, Avante at Jacksonville became concerned that, perhaps, the incorrect provision of the Plan had been cited in its IRR. As a result, a second IRR was submitted for the same costs. By letter dated October 22, 2007, Avante at Jacksonville made a second request for an IRR, this time pursuant to the Plan Section IV J.3., for the same additional costs incurred from the self-insured losses as a result of paying the $350,000.00 settlement. The same supporting documentation was included. Avante at Jacksonville was of the opinion that the Plan Section IV J.3. specifically dealt with the costs of general and professional liability insurance. By letter dated October 30, 2007, AHCA denied the second request for an IRR, indicating that the first request was denied based on “all sub-sections of Section IV J of the Plan”; that the second request failed to satisfy the requirements of the Plan Section IV J.3. and all sections and sub-sections of the Plan “necessary and proper for granting [the] request.” Avante at Jacksonville contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. On October 19, 2007, Avante at St. Cloud entered a settlement agreement with the personal representative of the estate of one of its former residents, G. M. The settlement agreement provided, among other things, that Avante at St. Cloud would pay $90,000.00 as settlement for all claims. Avante at St. Cloud paid the personal representative the sum of $90,000.00. By letter dated December 10, 2007, Avante at St. Cloud requested an IRR effective November 1, 2007, pursuant to the Plan Section IV J, for additional costs incurred as a result of paying the $90,000.00 to settle the lawsuit. Avante at St. Cloud submitted supporting documentation, including a copy of the settlement agreement, and indicated, among other things, that the increase in cost was projected at $2.02/day, exceeding one percent of the current Medicaid per diem rate. At all times pertinent hereto, the policy held by Avante at St. Cloud was a commercial general and professional liability insurance policy. The policy had $10,000.00 per occurrence and $50,000.00 general aggregate liability limits. The policy was a typical insurance policy representative of what other facilities in the nursing home industry purchased in Florida. The policy limits were typical limits in the nursing home industry in Florida. By letter dated December 12, 2007, AHCA denied the IRR on the basis that the IRR failed to satisfy the requirements of “Section IV J of the Plan necessary and proper for granting [the] request.” Avante at St. Cloud contested the denial and timely requested a hearing. Insurance Policies and the Nursing Home Industry in Florida Typically, nursing homes in Florida carry low limit general and professional liability insurance policies. The premiums of the policies exceed the policy limits. For example, the premium for a policy of Avante at Jacksonville to cover the $350,000.00 settlement would have been approximately $425,000.00 and for a policy of Avante at St. Cloud to cover the $90,000.00 settlement would have been approximately $200,000.00. Also, the policies have a funded reserve feature wherein, if the reserve is depleted through the payment of a claim, the nursing home is required to recapitalize the reserve or purchase a new policy. That is, if a policy paid a settlement up to the policy limits, the nursing home would have to recapitalize the policy for the amount of the claim paid under the policy and would have to fund the loss, which is the amount in excess of the policy limits, out-of-pocket. Florida’s Medicaid Reimbursement Plan for Nursing Homes The applicable version of the Plan is Version XXXI. AHCA has incorporated the Plan in Florida Administrative Code Rule 59G-6.010. AHCA uses the Plan in conjunction with the Provider Reimbursement Manual (CMS-PUB.15-1)3 to calculate reimbursement rates of nursing homes and long-term care facilities. The calculation of reimbursement rates uses a cost- based, prospective methodology, using the prior year’s costs to establish the current period per diem rates. Inflation factors, target ceilings, and limitations are applied to reach a per patient, per day per diem rate that is specific to each nursing home. Reimbursement rates for nursing homes and long-term care facilities are typically set semi-annually, effective on January 1 and July 1 of each year. The most recent Medicaid cost report is used to calculate a facility’s reimbursement rate and consists of various components, including operating costs, the direct patient care costs, the indirect patient care costs, and property costs. The Plan allows for the immediate inclusion of costs in the per diem rate to Medicaid Providers under very limited circumstances through the IRR process. The interim rate’s purpose is to compensate for the shortfalls of a prospective reimbursement system and to allow a Medicaid Provider to increase its rate for sudden, unforeseen, dramatic costs beyond the Provider’s control that are of an on-going nature. Importantly, the interim rate change adjusts the Medicaid Provider’s individual target rate ceiling to allow those costs to flow ultimately through to the per diem paid, which increases the amount of the Provider’s overall reimbursement. In order for a cost to qualify under an interim rate request, the cost must be an allowable cost and meet the criteria of Section IV J of the Plan. The Plan provides in pertinent part: IV. Standards * * * J. The following provisions apply to interim changes in component reimbursement rates, other than through the routine semi- annual rate setting process. * * * Interim rate changes reflecting increased costs occurring as a result of patient or operating changes shall be considered only if such changes were made to comply with existing State or Federal rules, laws, or standards, and if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause a change of 1 percent or more in the provider’s current total per diem rate. If new State or Federal laws, rules, regulations, licensure and certification requirements, or new interpretations of existing laws, rules, regulations, or licensure and certification requirements require providers to make changes that result in increased or decreased patient care, operating, or capital costs, requests for component interim rates shall be considered for each provider based on the budget submitted by the provider. All providers’ budgets submitted shall be reviewed by the Agency [AHCA] and shall be the basis for establishing reasonable cost parameters. In cases where new State or Federal requirements are imposed that affect all providers, appropriate adjustments shall be made to the class ceilings to account for changes in costs caused by the new requirements effective as of the date of the new requirements or implementation of the new requirements, whichever is later. Interim rate adjustments shall be granted to reflect increases in the cost of general or professional liability insurance for nursing homes if the change in cost to the provider is at least $5000 and would cause change of 1 percent or more in the provider’s current total per diem. CMS-PUB.15-1 provides in pertinent part: 2160. Losses Arising From Other Than Sale of Assets A. General.—A provider participating in the Medicare program is expected to follow sound and prudent management practices, including the maintenance of an adequate insurance program to protect itself against likely losses, particularly losses so great that the provider’s financial stability would be threatened. Where a provider chooses not to maintain adequate insurance protection against such losses, through the purchase of insurance, the maintenance of a self- insurance program described in §2161B, or other alternative programs described in §2162, it cannot expect the Medicare program to indemnify it for its failure to do so. Where a provider chooses not to file a claim for losses covered by insurance, the costs incurred by the provider as a result of such losses may not be included in allowable costs. * * * 2160.2 Liability Losses.—Liability damages paid by the provider, either imposed by law or assumed by contract, which should reasonably have been covered by liability insurance, are not allowable. Insurance against a provider’s liability for such payments to others would include, for example, automobile liability insurance; professional liability (malpractice, negligence, etc.); owners, landlord and tenants liability; and workers’ compensation. Any settlement negotiated by the provider or award resulting from a court or jury decision of damages paid by the provider in excess of the limits of the provider’s policy, as well as the reasonable cost of any legal assistance connected with the settlement or award are includable in allowable costs, provided the provider submits evidence to the satisfaction of the intermediary that the insurance coverage carried by the provider at the time of the loss reflected the decision of prudent management. Also, the reasonable cost of insurance protection, as well as any losses incurred because of the application of the customary deductible feature of the policy, are includable in allowable costs. As to whether a cost is allowable, the authority to which AHCA would look is first to the Plan, then to CMS-PUB.15- 1, and then to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). As to reimbursement issues, AHCA would look to the same sources in the same order for the answer. The insurance liability limit levels maintained by Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud reflect sound and prudent management practices. Claims that resulted in the settlements of Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud, i.e., wrongful death and/or negligence, are the type of claims covered under the general and professional liability policies carried by Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud both had a general and professional liability insurance policy in full force and effect at the time the wrongful death and/or negligence claims were made that resulted in the settlement agreements. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud filed a claim with their insurance carrier, even though they could have, for the liability losses incurred as a result of the settlements. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud both chose not to file a claim with their respective insurance carrier for the liability losses incurred as a result of the settlements. AHCA did not look beyond the Plan in making its determination that neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud should be granted an IRR. Wesley Hagler, AHCA’s Regulatory Analyst Supervisor, testified as an expert in Medicaid cost reimbursement. He testified that settlement agreements are a one time cost and are not considered on-going operating costs for purposes of Section IV J.2. of the Plan. Mr. Hagler’s testimony is found to be credible. Mr. Hagler testified that settlement agreements and defense costs are not considered general and professional liability insurance for purposes of Section IV J.3. of the Plan. To the contrary, Stanley William Swindling, Jr., an expert in health care accounting and Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement, testified that general and professional liability insurance costs include premiums, settlements, losses, co-insurance, deductibles, and defense costs. Mr. Swindling’s testimony is found to be more credible than Mr. Hagler’s testimony, and, therefore, a finding of fact is made that general and professional liability insurance costs include premiums, settlements, losses, co-insurance, deductibles, and defense costs.4 Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud submitted any documentation with their IRRs to indicate a specific law, statute, or rule, either state or federal, with which they were required to comply, resulted in an increase in costs. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud experienced an increase in the premiums for the general and professional liability insurance policies. Neither Avante at Jacksonville nor Avante at St. Cloud submitted documentation with its IRRs to indicate that the premiums of its general and professional liability insurance increased. Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud could only meet the $5,000.00 threshold and the one percent increase in total per diem under the Plan, Sections IV J.2. or J.3. by basing its calculations on the settlement costs. Looking to the Plan in conjunction with CMS-PUB.15-1 to determine reimbursement costs, CMS-PUB.15-1 at Section 2160A provides generally that, when a provider chooses not to file a claim for losses covered by insurance, the costs incurred by the provider, as a result of such losses, are not allowable costs; however, Section 2160.2 specifically includes settlement dollars in excess of the limits of the policy as allowable costs, provided the evidence submitted by the provider to the intermediary (AHCA) shows to the satisfaction of the intermediary that the insurance coverage at the time of the loss reflected the decision of prudent management. The policy coverage for Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud set the policy limits for each facility at $10,000.00 for each occurrence. Applying the specific section addressing settlement negotiations, the loss covered by insurance would have been $10,000.00 for each facility and the losses in excess of the policy limits--$340,000.00 for Avante at Jacksonville and $80,000.00 for Avante at St. Cloud—would have been allowable costs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying the interim rate requests for an increase for Avante at Jacksonville and Avante at St. Cloud. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of September 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of September, 2008. 1/ The corrected case-style.
