Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.
Findings Of Fact Application No. 76-00451 seeks a consumptive water use permit for an existing use involving 14 withdrawal points. The application seeks a total average annual withdrawal of 20.2584 million gallons per day and a maximum daily withdrawal of 45.8539 million gallons per day. The water will be used for citrus processing. The Southwest Florida Water Management District's staff recommends issuance of the permit with the following conditions: That the applicant shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller-driven type on all withdrawal points covered by this permit. That the applicant shall record the pumpage from the above-referenced meters on a weekly basis and submit a record of that pumpage to the district quarterly, beginning on January 15, 1977. That the permit shall expire on December 31, 1980.
Recommendation It is hereby Recommended that a consumptive use permit in the amounts and from the points set forth in the application be granted subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 2 above. ENTERED this 13th day of October, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Lykes Pasco Packing Company Post Office Box 97 Dade City, Florida
Findings Of Fact On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for a variance to replace an existing four foot fence extending to the seawall on his property at 643 Harbor Island, Lot 12 Island Estates, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned RS-6. Petitioner had already replaced his previous fencing prior to the filing of this application with wooden fencing which extends on the north and south side of his property through the setback to the seawall. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered Petitioner's application at its meeting on May 12, 1988, and based upon the Petitioner's explanation that the variance was sought simply to replace an existing fence that had termite damage, the Board approved his application on a 3 to 2 vote. The variance approval was conditioned upon the Petitioner obtaining a building permit within one month of the approval. Petitioner failed to obtain the required building permit, and no excuse was offered for this failure. Therefore, he had to reapply for the variance. On or about July 21, 1988, Petitioner filed his variance reapplication. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered this reapplication on August 25, 1988, at which time Petitioner again stated that he was simply replacing an existing fence. Due to a tie vote, consideration of the reapplication was continued to the Board's meeting of September 8, 1988. At the meeting on September 8, he explained for the first time that while the fencing on the south side of his property was simply the replacement of a previous fence which had extended to the seawall, the fencing on the north side was not. The previous fence on the north side of his property had stopped prior to the fifteen foot setback. With this clarification, the Board approved his variance reapplication for the south side of his property, but denied the variance for the north side. Petitioner has timely appealed the denial of his variance reapplication as it relates to the north side of his property. Petitioner testified at hearing that prior to the construction of his current wooden fence, he had a wood fence all the way to the seawall on the south side of his property. Since he had to replace that fencing due to termite damage, he took the opportunity to also replace and extend the wooden fencing on the northern side of his property through the setback. This action was not based on any hardship, but simply because he and his family felt it would look better if he had the same fencing on both sides of his property. It is clear and undisputed that Petitioner constructed a new fence on the north side of his property through the setback without obtaining a variance or permit. He did this simply for aesthetic reasons, and not due to any hardship. He failed to disclose this in his applications, or when the Board met on May 12 and August 25, 1988 to consider this matter.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law it is recommended that the permit requested be issued in accordance with the recommendations and special provisions set forth in the staff report (attached thereto). Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 1975, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of November, 1975. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas C. Garwood, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802 John Wheeler, Esquire Post Office Box V West Palm Beach, Florida
The Issue The issue in this appeal is whether the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board denying Petitioner's application for variances for certain signage on his property is supported by the evidence in the record, or whether it departs from the essential requirements of law. See Section 137.014(f)(3), City of Clearwater Land Development Code.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the owner of certain property located at 1923-1943 U.S. Highway 19 North, Clearwater, Florida (Section 05-29-16, M&B 23.05). This property is zoned CC (Commercial Center), and is the site of a strip shopping mall. On or about March 23, 1989, Petitioner applied for three variances for the subject property, as follows: 243 square feet to permit a total of 411 square feet of property identification signage; 13.5 feet in height to permit a 33.5 foot high pole sign; permission for a roof mounted sign. The Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for variances on April 13, 1989, and Petitioner timely filed this appeal of the Board's decision. Under the provisions of the City of Clearwater Land Development Code applicable to the Petitioner's property, only 168 square feet of property identification signage and pole signs not to exceed 20 feet in height would be allowed without a variance, and roof signs of any kind are prohibited unless a variance has been granted. Several months prior to Petitioner's filing for these variances, a roof sign was erected on the building located on the subject property. This roof sign consists of individual letters spelling "Harbor Square", which is the name of this shopping mall. The letters are from 3 feet, to 4 feet 9 inches in height, and span a distance of 34 feet 9 inches in width. The roof sign replaced a property identification sign at the right of way which previously carried the name of the shopping center, but the space on the pole sign previously used to identify the mall was not eliminated. That space is now used to identify a uniform business in the mall. Petitioner is seeking these after the fact variances to authorize the roof sign which has already been erected, and to approve the height of an existing pole sign. An enforcement action initiated by the City is pending this variance determination. Tenants in the Harbor Square mall testified that the change in signage has made the mall more visible and accessible, and several of their customers have commented that their businesses are now easier to find. The tenants feel that this change in signage will benefit their businesses financially. The Development Code Adjustment Board has previously granted variances from the signage limitations imposed by the Code, but the evidence produced at hearing indicates that none of these variances were granted after the fact. The two variances which were approved for roof signs were based upon a finding of conditions unique to the property which created a hardship for the applicant. In both instances, the Board found that the applicant had not created his own hardship, but that it arose from the size or positioning of the property involved in each application. In this case, nothing unique about the property can be found. The applicant has caused his own problems by allowing a sign to be erected without first obtaining a permit or variance. The Petitioner urges that it was the responsibility of his sign contractor to obtain all necessary permits or variances, and that the contractor did not inform him that a variance was necessary before he erected the sign. However, neither the sign contractor nor the Petitioner himself was present to testify, and therefore, there can be no finding with regard to his credibility, or with regard to whatever arrangement he had with the contractor. In any event, as the property owner seeking a variance, Petitioner has failed to establish any basis for a finding of a hardship or circumstance unique to his property, other than the fact that he allowed this sign to be erected without obtaining the necessary approvals from the City.
The Issue The issues are whether David Boston should be issued an environmental resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization allowing him to construct 96 linear feet of rip rap revetment; construct a private dock of less than 1,000 square feet; and place 3,500 square feet of fill in non-jurisdictional areas; and whether he qualifies for a general permit to place a fill pad in isolated wetlands adjacent to the St. Johns River, a Class III waterbody.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this permitting dispute between neighbors, Petitioner, Vincent R. D'Antoni, Jr., contends generally that Respondent, David Boston (Boston), will cause flooding to Petitioner's property by reason of placing too much fill on an isolated wetland, which lies in the center of Boston's property. The filling is in conjunction with Boston's efforts to construct a single-family residence and private dock on his property, purchased in June 1998, which lies adjacent to the St. Johns River, a Class III waterbody, in Duval County, Florida. In preliminary decisions made on November 5, 1998, and January 21, 1999, Respondent, Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), "acknowledge[d] receipt" of Boston's intent to use a noticed general permit "to fill less than 4,000 square feet of an isolated wetland to facilitate construction of a single family home" on his lot (Case No. 99-2861), and gave notice of its intent to issue Boston an environmental resource permit and sovereign submerged lands authorization allowing him to construct a rip rap revetment and a dock and to place 3,500 square feet of fill in mainly non-jurisdictional areas (Case No. 99-1916). Although a number of objections were raised by Petitioner in his original filings, as clarified at the final hearing, Petitioner now contends that Boston placed excessive fill on his lot, including an isolated wetland, and that the fill has resulted in flooding, saturated soil, or standing water on Petitioner's property. He also contends that the location of Boston's proposed dock will affect the ability to use his own dock. Because no evidence was presented on the docking issue, and through admissions Petitioner acknowledged that there will be no adverse environmental impacts, no consideration will be given to those objections. Finally, Petitioner does not object to the placement of the rip rap revetment on the shoreline. Accordingly, the request for an environmental resource permit and consent to use sovereign submerged lands in Case No. 99-1916 should be approved. The property in issue lies just south of the Jacksonville University Country Club and a few blocks west of University Boulevard North on Wayland Street, which fronts the eastern side of the St. Johns River in a tract of land known as University Park. Except for the Boston lot, all other waterfront lots are now developed. When facing the river from Wayland Street, Petitioner's lot lies to the right of Boston's lot, while another lot owned by Robert Henderson (Henderson) lies to the left of Boston's lot. The lots are up to 500 feet deep; Boston's lot is around 96 feet wide, while Petitioner's lot has a similar width but narrows to only 20 feet or so near the river. At the river end of the D'Antoni, Boston, and Henderson lots is an area of contiguous wetlands. Until 1995, DEP regulated those wetland areas and this prevented D'Antoni and Henderson from placing any fill in those areas. Under DEP's current wetland delineation rule, however, such areas are non- jurisdictional, and any placement of fill at the river end is outside the purview of DEP's jurisdiction. Before Boston's lot was cleared and filled, it was about a foot lower in elevation than the D'Antoni lot; this was true even though Petitioner has never changed the natural grade of his property since it was purchased and developed. Therefore, water tended to flow naturally from an upland area north or east of the D'Antoni lot, through the D'Antoni lot to Boston's lot, and then through the lower part of the Henderson lot populated by "very mature cypress trees," and eventually into the St. Johns River. According to a 1977 aerial photograph, the Boston lot contained what appears to be a tidal connection from an uplands area through the wetlands on his property to the river. However, construction on property adjacent to the Henderson lot sometime after 1977 severed this connection, and a tidal connection (direct hydrologic connection) to the river no longer exists. Under Rule 62-341.475(1)(f), Florida Administrative Code, "a single family residence" is exempt from the Environmental Resource Program permitting and a general permit will be granted "as long as it is not part of a larger plan of common development," and "the total area of dredging or filling in isolated wetlands for the residence and associated residential improvement shall not exceed 4000 square feet." Since there is no longer a direct hydrologic connection between the wetlands on Boston's property and the St. Johns River, the wetlands are isolated within the meaning of this rule. Availing himself of the foregoing provision, on October 19, 1998, Boston gave notice to DEP "of [his] intent to use a noticed general permit to fill less than 4,000 square feet of an isolated wetland" on his property. He also provided certain drawings and other information (prepared by his surveyor) to show that he qualified for the permit. DEP does not "issue" a noticed general permit; rather, it only determines whether the applicant qualifies for a permit and then "acknowledges" this fact. Accordingly, on November 5, 1998, DEP "acknowledge[d] receipt" of Boston's notice. Although DEP encourages the user of such a permit to notify affected or adjoining property owners, there was no legal requirement that Boston do so, and he proceeded to clear the lot and then fill a part of the wetland area with two or three feet of dirt without giving notice to Petitioner or Henderson, his two neighbors. The filling raised the elevation of the Boston property at least two feet above the D'Antoni and Henderson lots and impeded the prior natural flow of water. At the same time, Boston constructed a three to four-foot timber wall (consisting of railroad ties) on the Henderson property line to retain the fill and a similar two-foot wall on Petitioner's line. These changes had the effect of impounding the water which had previously flowed naturally in a north-south direction through the wetlands from the D'Antoni lot to the Boston lot to the Henderson lot. It also generated runoff from the Boston lot to the D'Antoni lot, which had not previously occurred. When Petitioner observed the adjacent lot being cleared and filled, and the resulting erosion of fill onto his property, pooling of water, and damage to his chain link fence after a heavy rain in January 1999, he filed a complaint with DEP. An inspection was made by DEP, and Boston was told to stop work until corrective changes were made to ensure that such flooding would not occur. After a series of changes were made which satisfied DEP's concerns, the stop work order was lifted. Boston also signed a consent order and paid a $100.00 fine. However, pending the outcome of these cases, no further construction work has occurred. Petitioner has contended that Boston has placed more than 7,200 square feet of fill on his property in violation of the rule, which limits the amount of fill to less than 4,000 square feet. While this amount of filling has in fact occurred, approximately 3,500 square feet of fill was placed in non- jurisdictional areas between the shoreline and the isolated wetlands, and the rule only requires that Boston limit his fill to less than 4,000 square feet on the isolated wetland. Thus, contrary to a suggestion by Petitioner's engineer, the jurisdictional and non-jurisdictional filling are not totaled together to determine whether the threshold within the rule has been exceeded. Through photographs received in evidence and testimony by Petitioner and his wife, it was established that flooding or standing water has occurred on Petitioner's property during heavy rainfalls since the filling occurred, even as recently as January 2000. The evidence further shows that Petitioner's chain link fence has been damaged through the weight of the fill pressing against the fence. In addition, Petitioner has suffered the loss of "a couple of trees" because of "mucky" and "oversaturated" soil caused by excessive water. Also, a dog house on a raised platform in the back yard which was previously dry now "stays in water." These affected areas lie immediately adjacent to the filled area of the isolated wetland on Boston's property. Finally, there is an erosion problem beyond the isolated wetland consisting of sand and silt flowing from Boston's lot onto Petitioner's lot during heavy rainfalls. Despite these problems, Petitioner does not object to the development of the lot; he only asks that Boston do so in a manner which prevents these conditions from recurring in the future. Petitioner's engineering expert, Ronnie D. Perron (Perron), a professional engineer who visited the site in August 1999, ran a computer model (Interconnected Channel and Pond Routing, Version 2.11) showing runoff both before and after the fill was placed on Boston's lot. He concluded that "there was over one and a half feet of flooding in that wetlands due to filling Mr. Boston's lot" during a "mean annual storm event," which assumes five inches of rain during a 24-hour period. Even when he used more conservative estimates, Perron still arrived at water accumulations ranging from 0.6 feet to 1.5 feet. This excessive runoff is caused by the retaining wall and fill, which "blocks off" the water and causes it to "spread out in [Petitioner's] whole back yard." In response to Perron's model, a DEP professional engineer, David P. Apple (Apple), ran another computer model (PONDS, Version 2.25) received in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit No. 14. That model shows that during a three-year, one- hour storm event, the small depressed area on Boston's property (including the isolated wetland) had sufficient storage capacity to absorb up to six inches of runoff from off-site areas and not overflow back onto Petitioner's property. This size of storm event (which produces two and one-half inches of rain in an hour) is typically used by the Department in calculations for single- family residential property when the impervious area site is less than fifty percent. In this case, Apple didn't "feel that the impervious area out there was greater than [fifty] percent." Therefore, Apple concluded that the storm event used by Perron was too large, and that the smaller event used in his model was more appropriate. He also concluded that the Boston property could retain all water in a normal storm event without discharging any stormwater onto the D'Antoni lot. He did not, however, address the issue of the fill and retaining wall on the Boston lot impounding the water on his neighbor's lot. In developing the input perameters for his model, Apple assumed that water falling at the front (Wayward Street) side of the D'Antoni property drained to the front roadway; in fact, much of that water drains to the rear of the lot into the wetland area. A similar incorrect assumption was made regarding runoff on the Boston lot. If modifications were made to account for the proper drainage patterns, the Apple model would show larger amounts of water staging on the Boston property during rainfall events, which would increase the possibility of runoff onto the D'Antoni lot. Apple questioned the accuracy of the Perron model given the fact that Perron had used a larger storm event than he (Apple) believed was appropriate. However, even if Perron had used a three-year, one-hour storm event on his computer model, as advocated by Apple, he established that it would have resulted in flood staging on Petitioner's property between 0.97 and 1.64 feet during a smaller storm event. DEP proposed no solutions to the water problems on the D'Antoni lot, presumably because it concluded that the rule was satisfied; that by filling the Boston lot, it was no longer the "stormwater pond for the neighborhood runoff"; and that DEP had no other regulatory authority to solve this peculiar situation. The record shows clearly, however, that if no changes are made, water will continue to back up on Petitioner's property by virtue of the higher elevation on the Boston lot, and the possibility of runoff from Boston's lot exists during certain storm events. Neither condition existed before the fill was added. To correct the foregoing conditions, Perron proposes two corrective measures. First, Boston should install a yard drain (underground culvert) beginning in the wetlands area of his property and outfalling to the cypress trees on the adjacent Henderson lot. Besides providing an outfall for the excess water, this would also help recharge the mature cypress trees on the Henderson lot. Second, D'Antoni should install a series of "yard drains" using high-density polyethylene pipes to convey the standing water on his lot directly into the St. Johns River. The expert opined that neither activity would require a permit from DEP. These modifications are reasonable and appropriate and should be used by the factioning parties. Accordingly, the installation of a yard drain should be a condition for Boston to use his noticed general permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a final order granting the application for a permit and consent in Case No. 99-1916 and confirming that David Boston qualifies for use of a noticed general permit in Case No. 99-2861 provided, however, that such use be conditioned on Boston constructing an underground culvert with a yard drain from the wetland area on his lot to the St. Johns River. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Vincent R. D'Antoni, Jr. 3824 Wayland Street Jacksonville, Florida 32277 David Boston 2262 Orchard Street Jacksonville, Florida 32209 Francine M. Ffolkes, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) to grant the application of the Appellant, the City of Clearwater for dock length, width and setback variances to allow the reconstruction of the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida. (The pier was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993.)
Findings Of Fact On or about September 1, 1993, the City of Clearwater applied to the City of Clearwater Development Code Adjustment Board (the Board) for dock length, width and setback variances to reconstruct the public pier facility located at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater, Florida, where it terminates at the waterfront in an "aquatic lands/coastal zoning district." The pier was 91.5 feet in length and 40 feet in width; it was set back 12.5 feet from the extension of the adjacent property lines. It was destroyed by the "No Name Storm of the Century" on March 12-13, 1993. Since the site has 65 feet of waterfront, reconstructing it to its previous dimensions requires variances of: (1) 59 feet in dock length (over the 32.5 feet allowed by the City of Clearwater Development Code); (2) 17.25 feet in dock width (over the 22.75 feet allowed by the Code); and (3) 7.5 feet reduction in setback from the extended adjacent property lines (below the 20 feet required by the Code.) Before its destruction, the public pier at the west end of Magnolia Drive in Clearwater had been in existence for many years. (The original version was built in approximately 1915.) The evidence is that the community at large desires to reconstruct the pier to its former dimensions. The old pier has historic and sentimental significance. It also serves as a recreational facility for residents without private access to a dock on the waterfront. Especially in the last several years before its destruction, public use of the old pier brought with it problems of misuse, loitering, litter, noise, trespassing, and crime. The police did not have the resources to prevent these problems. Criminal activity in the area seems to have decreased since the destruction of the old pier. As a result, the property owners closest to the pier do not want the public pier reconstructed at all, and certainly do not want it reconstructed to its former dimensions. They oppose the variance application. The conditions imposed by the Board (no deviation from the proposed materials and building plan, the erection of signs as to closing times to be enforced by the police, proper lighting, and the installation of an electronic safety system, including a gate, to be monitored by the police) will help alleviate many of the concerns of the neighboring property owners but are not guaranteed to eliminate them in their entirety. The water is shallow in the vicinity of the site, and a dock of a certain length is necessary for the dock to be used for boats of any appreciable size and draft. However, this condition is not unique to the particular site in question, but is uniformly applicable all along the City waterfront, and there was no evidence as to the length of dock required for adequate water depth for use by boats. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variances will not be materially detrimental or injurious to other property or improvements in the neighborhood in which the property is located. There is no competent, substantial evidence in the record from which it could be found that the granting of the variance will not impair the value of surrounding property.
Findings Of Fact Application for consumptive use permit No. 75-00225 is a request for an existing use to be withdrawn from the Floridan Aquifer from two different wells. These two wells are located in the Hillsborough Basin and in Polk County. The property contiguous to the wells encompasses approximately 80.9 acres. The water is to be used for citrus processing and disposed of off site. The permit seeks, for average daily withdrawal, 2.98 million gallons per day for one well and 1.566 million gallons per day for the other well for a total average daily withdrawal of 3.864 million gallons per day. For maximum daily withdrawal the permit seeks 4.096 million gallons per day for one well and 2.792 million gallons per day for the other well for a total maximum daily withdrawal of 6.888 million gallons per day. The amount of water sought to be consumptively used by this application greatly exceeds the water crop of the subject lands owned by applicant. Mr. John C. Jennings and Mr. William Sunderland, owners of property adjacent to the Kraft property, appeared in their own behalf and stated that they felt that their wells were being hurt because of the large quantities of water pumped by Kraft. They did not attempt to offer expert testimony nor did they claim to be hydrologists. They did note that each had substantial problems with their wells running out of water.
Recommendation It does not appear that the district has had a reasonable opportunity to examine the objections and comments of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland with regard to the effect of the applied for consumptive use on their property. These objections were apparently raised for the first time at the hearing. As noted in paragraph 6, if the wells of Messers. Jennings and Sunderland are substantially affected in an adverse manner by applicant's use of such large quantities of water, such a use would not seem to be a reasonable, beneficial use as is required for permit unless further conditions were placed upon the permit. Therefore, it is recommended that the Southwest Florida Water Management District staff further investigate the effect of the applied for consumptive use on the wells located on the property of John C. Jennings and William Sunderland prior to the Board taking formal action on this application. ENTERED this 26th day of May, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Staff Attorney Southwest Florida Water Management District P. 0. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Douglas T. Moring, Esquire Kraftco Corporation Kraftco Court Glenview, Illinois 60025
The Issue The issue in this case was to have been whether the evidence sustains the decision of the City of Clearwater Planning and Zoning Board to deny the application of the Appellant for a conditional use permit to sell alcoholic beverages for consumption at the Gallery Restaurant on Sand Key if a outside deck is added to the facility. However, a threshold issue is whether an appointed hearing officer has jurisdiction to decide the case.
Findings Of Fact The Appellant's desire to expand its Gallery Restaurant by adding an outside deck necessitated the filing of an application for a conditional use permit. The application was filed in August, 1994. The matter was presented to the Planning and Zoning Board (the Board) for decision at its meetings on October 18, November 1, and December 13, 1994, but was continued each time. Finally, at its meeting on February 14, 1995, the Board considered and voted to deny the application. On February 23, 1995, a Notice of Appeal was filed with the City Clerk for the City of Clearwater.
Findings Of Fact This application is a request for a consumptive water use permit for six wells at the following locations: LATITUDE LONGITUDE 28 degrees 20' 50" 82 degrees 41' 36" (hereinafter referred to as Garden Terrace No.1) 28 degrees 20' 50" 82 degrees 41' 35" (hereinafter referred to as Garden Terrace No.2) 28 degrees 20' 55" 82 degrees 39' 11" (hereinafter referred to as Parkwood Acres No.1) 28 degrees 21' 20" 82 degrees 39' 11" (hereinafter referred to as Parkwood Acres No.2) 28 degrees 21' 49" 82 degrees 38' 56" (hereinafter referred to as New Well No.1) 28 degrees 21' 50" 82 degrees 38' 56" (hereinafter referred to as New Well No.2) Although included in the application, it appears from the record of this proceeding that Garden Terrace No. 1 is to be abandoned by applicant upon completion of its new facilities and therefore is not intended for inclusion in any consumptive water use permit issued pursuant hereto. Further, it appears from the records that the applicant intends to use Garden Terrace No. 2 as an emergency standby supply well only and therefore its average daily withdrawal as reflected on the application is not intended to be included in a consumptive water use permit issued pursuant hereto. Therefore, with those amendments the application seeks, from a total of five wells, a maximum daily withdrawal of 1,501,000 gallons and an average daily withdrawal of 650,000 gallons. The use of this water is for public water supply and appears to be a reasonable, beneficial use consistent with the public interest and not interfering with any legal use of water existing at the time of the application. Further, according to testimony of the staff of the Southwest Florida Water Management District it does not appear that any of the matters set forth in Subsection 16J-2.11(2), (3) or (4), F.S., exist so as to require the denial of this permit. The staff recommendation is that this permit be granted for a maximum daily withdrawal of 1.50 million gallons per day and an average daily withdrawal of .650 million gallons per day. The staff recommendations are subject to the following conditions: That all individual connections to the system be metered. That the permittee shall install totalizing flow meters of the propeller driven type on all withdrawal points covered by this permit with the exception of those wells which are currently gaged together using a single meter. That the permittee shall submit to the District a record of his pumpage for each meter. Said pumpage shall be read on a monthly basis and submitted quarterly to the District by April 15, July 15, October 15, and January 15, for each preceding calendar quarter. That the permittee have water samples from all wells permitted analyzed for chloride on a monthly basis and results submitted to the District by April 15, July 15, October 15 and January 15 for each preceding calendar quarter. That to promote good water management and avoid salt water intrusion that the water be withdrawn at an average of .217 million gallons per day from each of the three following wells: Parkwood Acres Well No. 1, Parkwood Acres Well No. 2, and New Well No. 1. New Well No. 2 shall be operated only to meet peak demand. That Garden Terrace Well No. 2 be used only as an emergency standby well. The applicant entered no objections to the conditions set forth above nor were there any objections from members of the public to the issuance of this consumptive water use permit.
Recommendation It is hereby RECOMMENDED that a consumptive use permit be issued for the five subject wells for the withdrawal of 1.30 mgd maximum daily withdrawal and .65 mgd, average daily withdrawal subject to the conditions set forth in paragraph 4 above. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHRIS H. BENTLEY, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Jay T. Ahern, Esquire Southwest Florida Water Management District P.O. Box 457 Brooksville, Florida 33512 Delmar Water Corporation 731 West Main Street New Port Richey, Florida 33552
