Findings Of Fact Respondent is currently licensed, and as of the date of the Administrative Charges and Complaint, held license No. HB-0008511 as a mortgage broker and was president and principal broker of Bay Area Financial Services, Inc. He has held such license since November 1979. He sold the business in April 1980 and has reapplied within six months for an individual license. The application was received on May 16, 1980. Pursuant to Rule 3D-40.03(3), Florida Administrative Code, Respondent is treated as a current licensee, and as an applicant. From October 25, 1977, until June 12, 1979, Respondent was employed as vice-president and principal mortgage broker by United Companies Mortgage and Investment of St. Petersburg, Inc., hereinafter UCMI, a mortgage brokerage firm. United Companies Financial Corporation, hereinafter UCFC, is a Louisiana corporation, authorized to do business in Florida. The company engages in the business as a mortgage lender. On August 31, 1978, UCMI by and through its broker, Respondent, made a loan to "James G. Anderson" and "Lorraine Anderson, his wife," and accepted a note in the amount of $14,500.00 made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," together with a first mortgage also made by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as security for the repayment of the loan. The first mortgage purported to encumber Lot 25, Oak Harbor Subdivision, according to the plat thereof as recorded in Plat Book 5, page 94, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. On August 31, 1978, UCMI, for value, assigned the note and mortgage to UCFC. The Respondent has no objection as to the authenticity and genuineness of Exhibit 11, a copy of a contract for sale of real estate which, on its fact, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as purchasers of certain real property from the seller, Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry. The document reflects that the purchase price be $18,500.00, payable $100.00 in cash as a deposit, $900.00 cash within twenty-four hours, $4,500.00 additional deposit at time of closing, and $13,000.00 mortgage balance. (Exhibit 2). Anderson acknowledged his signature on this document but has no recollection of signing it. On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Customers, required by federal law, was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife Lorraine," setting forth the disclosure requirements of Regulation Z. The lender is reflected as UCFC and the broker as UCMI of St. Petersburg. Respondent Hughes executed such document as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." On August 31, 1978, a promissory note was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" promising to pay UCMI the sum of $14,500.00. (Exhibit 3). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Consummation of Loan Secured by Real Property, was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 4). On August 31, 1978, a document entitled Notice to Customer Required by Federal Law was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," as the borrowers. (Exhibit 5). On August 31, 1978, a document regarding the loan transaction was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson," acknowledging receipt of the "Good Faith Estimates," and certain other materials. (Exhibit 6). On August 31, 1978, a Notice to Purchaser-Mortgagor was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine Anderson" acknowledging receipt of such notice. (Exhibit 7). On August 31, 1978, an Owner's Affidavit was executed by "James G. Anderson and his wife, Lorraine." (Exhibit 8). On August 28, 1978, a loan application was executed by "James G. Anderson" for the $14,500.00 to be secured by a first mortgage. Respondent personally handled the application as indicated on the application itself. (Exhibit 1). On August 31, 1978, check No. 15-39091 was executed by Respondent Hughes, as authorized representative of United Companies, Inc., as payor, to James G. Anderson and Title Consultants, as payees, in the amount of $11,014.58. The check was endorsed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson." (Exhibit 10). On August 31, 1978, a Warranty Deed was executed by Linda Carol Querry, a/k/a L. C. Querry, as seller of certain real property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent Hughes executed the document as a witness to Linda Querry's signature and execution. The property described in the Warranty Deed is the identical property mortgaged by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson" to secure the loan from UCMI and UCFC. (Exhibit 13). On August 31, 1978, a Mortgage Deed was executed by "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife," as mortgagors, to UCMI of St. Petersburg, as mortgagee, as security for the repayment of the loan. Respondent Hughes executed the Mortgage Deed as a witness to the signatures of "Mr. and Mrs. Anderson." (Exhibit 9). On August 31, 1978, UCMI, by and through its principal broker and vice president, Respondent Hughes, assigned the Anderson mortgage and note to UCFC. The applicable Florida law governing this matter is Chapter 494, Florida Statutes (1977), and as amended in the 1978 Supplement, and Chapter 3D- 40, administrative rules regulating mortgage brokerage, Florida Administrative Code. In August 1978, James G. Anderson, who worked in the Sanitation Department of the City of St. Petersburg, also worked part-time repainting houses purchased for resale by Vic Vogel, a speculator. While so employed, Anderson had seen Respondent a few times in the company of Vogel, but had never formally met Respondent. Vogel offered to sell one of these houses to Anderson on terms that would require no down payment by Anderson, who would thereafter make monthly payments similar to the rental payments he was then making. Further, there would be no "red tape" and Anderson would be buying a home rather than renting one. Anderson trusted Vogel, who assured Anderson he would take care of all the details. The house Anderson agreed to buy was on 11th Street and 20th Avenue South in St. Petersburg and was one of the houses Anderson had worked on in his part-time job with Vogel. In the contract to purchase signed by Anderson (Exhibit 11) the block for the legal description of the property is blank. The various other spaces on the form now showing the purchase price, down payment, etc., were blank when signed by Anderson. For several years prior to 1977 Anderson had been living with Lorraine Walker but never held her out as his wife. The signature "Lorraine Anderson" on all exhibits except Exhibit 14, the quitclaim deed from Anderson to United Companies Financial Corporation, were signed by someone other than Lorraine Walker. At the instigation of his attorney, Anderson and Lorraine Walker signed Exhibit 14 to clear up foreclosure proceedings that had been instituted against Anderson. The closing of the sale of property to Anderson took place at the offices of United Companies at 300 S. Duncan Street, Clearwater, Florida on 31 August 1978. Anderson was picked up by Vogel and driven to the closing. Accompanying Vogel was Mike Robertson, an associate of Vogel; Linda Querry, Vogel's girl friend, who signed the deed conveying the property to Anderson; and an unidentified black woman. While awaiting Respondent's arrival for the closing, Vogel took the group to lunch. At the closing, Anderson signed numerous documents and other people, including the black woman who obviously signed "Lorraine Anderson," also signed these documents as witnesses and/or notary. Anderson does not recall having seen Verona Krnjaich, who notarized his signature on the documents he signed at the closing and Ms. Krnjaich does not recall a closing at which Anderson was present. However, she testified that her normal practice is to notarize only documents notarized in her presence, and that she follows this practice at all closings. On the other hand, she has good recall of faces seen at closings but does not believe she ever saw Anderson before this hearing. Anderson testified that he trusted Vogel and signed whatever documents Vogel asked him to sign; that all the documents bearing his signature were blank when he signed them; that he did not know the black woman in the room at the closing or that when she signed these documents she did so in the name of Lorraine Anderson; that the closing took place on the second or third floor of a building just off U.S. 19 between Clearwater and St. Petersburg; that he doesn't know the address of this building but could return to it, and in fact, a few months prior to this hearing, took one of Petitioner's agents to the building where the closing took place; that he received no copy of any document signed by him at the closing; that he thought he was buying a house from Vogel; and that he expected Vogel to notify him after the closing when he could move in and how much he would pay each month. Vogel did not again contact Anderson and apparently has left the area. A few months prior to this hearing Anderson accompanied one of Petitioner's agents to show the agent where the closing occurred. The building to which the agent was taken by Anderson is two-storied and occupied by Ellis National Bank. In August 1978 there was no other occupant of this building and the second floor was unfinished but contained restrooms and some offices occupied by bank employees. Anderson made no cash payment before, at, or after the closing on this house; nor did he ever move into it. The legal description on the deed conveying the property to Anderson is for property located at 626-27th Avenue South, St. Petersburg, Florida, and not for the house at 11th Street and 20th Avenue South which Anderson thought he was buying. After Anderson became delinquent on his mortgage payments Respondent went to Anderson's home one Sunday afternoon demanding payment of the delinquent monthly payments owed by Anderson. The latter told Respondent he hadn't bought any house from the lender, owed no money, and wasn't going to pay. Respondent shortly thereafter turned the case over to the United Companies' attorney, who instituted foreclosure proceedings. When served with these papers Anderson took them to his lawyer. After some of the facts surrounding this transaction became apparent, the assignee of the mortgagee accepted a quitclaim deed to the mortgaged property from Anderson. Lorraine Walker accompanied Anderson to the lawyer's office and signed the quitclaim deed "Lorraine Anderson" (Exhibit 14). The deed signed by L. C. Querry conveying Lot 25 to Anderson (Exhibit 13) conveyed the property to "James G. Anderson and Lorraine Anderson, his wife." Respondent had known Vic Vogel for five or six years prior to August 1977 and had been involved in ten or twelve transactions in which Vogel had picked up distressed property, refurbished it and sold it. Anderson had few debts and readily qualified for the mortgage loan without considering the income of Lorraine or his income from his part-time work. He understood he was buying the house without any down payment, and, in fact, Anderson paid nothing down when he signed the contract and he produced no cash at the closing. The only disbursement made at closing was by the mortgagee, whose check for $11,014.58 (Exhibit 10) was payable to Title Consultants and Anderson. The latter endorsed this check and presumably Title Consultants disbursed to the seller. Closing statements for the buyer and seller were not in the files of UCMI or Title Consultants, nor was a contract to purchase in which the description of the property to be bought was shown. Respondent's witness testified that she reviewed all documents prior to a closing; that she recalls the Anderson transaction; doesn't recall who prepared those documents but believes she typed them; that documents were never signed in blank and the blanks subsequently completed; that she did the credit check on Anderson; and that all documents used in the closing were completed in full before the closing at which they were signed by Anderson and the person signing as Lorraine Anderson. A check with the credit bureau should have disclosed Anderson's marital status as not married and this witness was unable to explain the failure to pick this up when Exhibit 1, the loan application, was verified with the credit bureau. Respondent testified that he recalled the Anderson transaction on 31 August 1978 but later in his testimony stated he did not recall this specific transaction. He believes he followed his usual procedure and explained the various documents to Anderson before the latter signed them. Prior to 1978 he had closed many transactions for UCMI without a contract to purchase having been executed. The loan application is mailed to the main office of United Companies in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and telephonic approval is given by Baton Rouge. Accordingly, it was not unusual for Anderson's loan application to be prepared 28 August 1978, the original mailed to Baton Rouge and approval received in time to close the transaction on 31 August 1978. The contract upon which this house was conveyed, and the closing statements of buyer or seller, were not presented at this hearing. Witnesses testified these documents were missing from the files in which they would be expected to keep. Regardless of this, it is uncontradicted that Anderson made no payment at closing and, if any payment was made prior to closing, any such payment would have been accounted for by the escrow agent. It is also evident that no such accounting was made. By signing a note and mortgage for $14,500.00 Anderson purported to purchase a house for slightly more than $11,000.00, which is the amount of the check endorsed by Anderson at closing and which sum presumably went to the seller. Some $3,000.00 was retained by the lender as prepaid finance charges ($1,567.67) and brokerage fee ($1,545.45). (Exhibit 2.) Accordingly, the mortgage of $14,500 represented approximately 130% of the amount paid for this house. This fact was known, or should have been known, to Respondent, who presumably was representing his principal, UCMI, the lender at this closing. Respondent was paid a fixed salary by UCMI and did not receive additional compensation for each transaction he closed. UCMI suffered a financial loss on the repossession of the house from Anderson and filed suit against Industrial Valley Title Insurance Company (Exhibit 15).
Recommendation From the foregoing it is concluded that Respondent was guilty of concealing material facts from UCMI involving the transaction with Anderson at which UCMI was mortgagee, and that, as a result, UCMI suffered injury. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that Robert E. Hughes' license as a mortgage broker be suspended for a period of six (6) months. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of October 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: Franklyn J. Wollett, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George W. Greer, Esquire 302 South Garden Avenue Clearwater, Florida 33516 K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of October 1980.
Findings Of Fact On July 6, 1981, the Applicant submitted to the Department of Banking and Finance (Department) an application pursuant to Section 658.19, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980), for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting a general banking business to be located at 1000 Massey Boulevard, unincorporated Palm City, Martin County, Florida. Notice of receipt of the application was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on December 11, 1981. Protests and requests for hearing were filed by American Bank of Martin County (American), Central Savings and Loan Association (Central), Florida National Bank of Martin County (Florida National), and First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart (First National) on or before December 30, 1981. On September 27, 1982, Florida National withdrew its protest. Publication of the Notice of Hearing in this cause appeared in The Stuart News on October 1, 1982. A hearing was held in this cause on October 19 through 20, 1982, in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. The pronosed bank will occupy 3,300 square feet of an existing single- story structure located at the west end of the Villa Plaza Shopping Center fronting on Massey Boulevard, also known as Martin Downs Building. The proposed bank will have visibility and access to Massey Boulevard and also to First Street along the rear (south side) of the Villa Plaza Shopping Center, through use of the ingress and egress facilities of the shopping center. (View by Hearing Officer) The site has facilities for three drive-in lanes. The plan of the proposed bank will include a teller line, lobby area, private offices, teller work area, coupon booth area, vault, restrooms and an employee lounge. Adequate parking facilities already exist and there is room for expansion. (T. 48-50; View by Hearing Officer) The facility is adequate to handle the projected business of the bank for a reasonable period of time and is of such a nature to warrant customer confidence in the security, stability and permanence of the bank. The Applicant intends to lease the facilities from R&S Equities, a Florida partnership whose partners are John C. Robinson and Woodrow J. Smoak. The lease terms include a five year term with annual rent of $36,000 payable in monthly installments of $3,000. The lease also provides for renewal options every five years for a maximum of thirty (30) years with specified annual rental payments to be used during each of the five year terms. Applicant anticipates an investment of $174,500 in fixed assets, including $49,500 for leasehold improvements and $125,000 for furniture, fixtures and bank machinery. Temporary quarters for the bank are not anticipated as the existing structure is ready and the planned improvements can be completed quickly. Applicant has no plans to purchase or lease any land, buildings, improvements to be made thereon, or equipment, furniture, or fixtures to be installed therein, from a director, officer or stockholder who owns 5 percent or more of the capital stock of the Applicant or any controlled company of any officer, director or stockholder. The Applicant's primary service area incorporates portions of the City of Stuart, unincorporated Martin County and a portion of unincorporated Martin County known as Palm City. The PSA is a "bedroom community" with shopping, recreational and public school facilities. Included within the PSA are U.S. Census Enumeration Districts 11, 12, 32, 33, 61, 65, 66, 67 and a portion of 10. The PSA's northern, eastern, southern and western boundaries are the St. Lucie County/Martin County Line (along with the St. Lucie River and Frazier Creek), Colorado Avenue (State Road 76), Indian Street, extended to Florida's Turnpike, and Florida's Turnpike respectively, and are located 2.4 road miles, 0.9 miles, 1.8 miles and 2.5 miles respectively from the proposed site. The south fork of the St. Lucie River runs north and south through the eastern protion of the PSA. The Palm City Bridge, a modern fixed span bridge, crosses the river and connects the larger portion of the PSA west of the river with the eastern portion and the City of Stuart. The bridge's western end is approximately 0.2 miles from the Applicant's proposed site. The delineation of the boundaries of the PSA took into consideration the locations of the offices of existing financial institutions, along with the other economic and demographic factors. The ability of PSA residents to reach the proposed site in a convenient and timely manner was likewise a factor considered in delineating the boundaries of the PSA. The northern boundary of the PSA, consisting primarily of the St. Lucie County/Martin County Line, presents a logical and political northern boundary. The eastern boundary, Colorado Avenue, is a major north/south thoroughfare chosen primarily because of its proximity to existing financial institutions. The southern boundary, Indian Street, extended to the Florida Turnpike and the western boundary, the Florida Turnpike, were chosen because they are areas beyond which population concentrations are limited. Also, Florida's Turnpike is a significant man-made barrier. There are no other significant natural or man-made barriers which would restrict the flow of traffic within the PSA. The PSA's major north/south arteries are 18th Avenue, Mapp Road, Palm City Avenue and Colorado Avenue. The PSA's primary east/west arteries are Highway 714, Massey Boulevard, a/k/a Martin Downs Boulevard and Murphy Road. The 1970-1980 population trends for the City of Stuart, Martin County, the State of Florida, and the Applicant's designated PSA were considered. This data was provided by the Applicant and the Department from census data and from data published by the University of Florida's Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR). The PSA population grew from 3,300 in 1970 to 6,350 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 9.2 percent. The City of Stuart grew from 4,820 in 1970 to 9,467 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 9.6 percent. The population of Martin County went from 28,035 in 1970 to 64,014 in 1980 for an average annual increase of 12.8 percent. Over the same ten year period, Florida's population increased an average of 4.4 percent annually from 6,791,418 to 9,746,324. The BEBR projected 1983 Martin County population at 70,600 by its low projection, at 74,600 by its medium projection and at 75,300 by its high projection. For Florida's 1983 population, the BEBR estimated 10,352,200 as its low projection, 10,595,100 as its medium projection and 10,757,200 as its high projection. The average annual 1980-1983 population growth rate projections for Martin County are 3.43 percent, 5.20 percent and 5.88 percent as calculated from the low, medium and high 1983 projections respectively. For Florida, tide average annual 1980-1983 population growth rate projections are 2.07 percent, 2.90 percent and 3.46 percent as calculated for the low, medium and high projections respectively. See "Data Source Packet" of Department's Official File (DSP). One hundred percent of the County's 1970-1980 population growth resulted from immigration, a proportion above the state's 91.97 percent. (DPS) Over the 1970-1979 period, the Martin County population aged somewhat, with the population proportion below age 15 having decreased from 23.8 percent to 18.6 percent; the population proportion within the working age group (15 to 64) increased from 54.9 percent to 56.3 percent; and the population aged 65 years and above increased from 21.3 percent to 25.1 percent. Florida population during the same period decreased from 25.8 percent to 20.4 percent for the group below age 15; increased from 59.6 percent to 61.9 percent in the working age group and increased from 14.6 percent to 17.7 percent for those 65 and over. (DPS) In April, 1980, the Martin County population was older than the Florida population. Martin County's population under age 15 was 16.4 percent; with 59.1 percent in the working age group; and 24.5 percent over age 65. In April, 1980, 19.3 percent of Florida's population was below age 15; 63.4 percent were in the working age group; and 17.3 percent were aged 65 or over. With a higher percentage of people over age 15, there is a relatively higher number of people in Martin County of an age to utilize banking services than exists on the average statewide. The rate of growth in the number of households in Martin County exceeded the rate of growth in the State of Florida during the 1970-1980 period. The BEBR estimated the number of Martin County households in 1980 at 25,863, having reflected at 155.5 percent increase above the 1970 level of 10,122 households. The number of state households increased 63.8 percent during the same period from 2,284,786 to 3,841,356. County and state average household sizes declined 11.8 percent and 12.1 percent, respectively, over the 1970-1980 period with the Martin County average household size having declined from 2.72 to 2.40 persons, and the state average declined from 2.90 to 2.55 persons. Statewide unemployment rates have significantly exceeded those of Martin County for all periods since 1974. During 1975, Florida's 10.7 percent unemployed rate exceeded Martin County's 8.7 percent rate. In 1976, Florida's 9 percent unemployment rate exceeded the 7.7 percent rate in Martin County. Florida's 8.2 percent unemployment rate exceeded the Martin County 6.9 percent rate in 1977. In 1978, Florida's unemployment rate was 6.6 percent which was also well above the 5.5 percent rate in Martin County. In 1979, the margin was even larger with Florida's unemployment rate at 6 percent and Martin County's unemployment rate at 4.8 percent. The margin continued to grow in 1980 with the Florida unemployment rate still at 6 percent but the Martin County unemployment rate having dropped to 4.4 percent. In 1981, Florida and Martin County's unemployment rates were 6.8 percent and 5.6 percent respectively. In 1981, the Florida unemployment rate remained well above the unemployment rate in Martin County. (T. 181) Between 1979 and 1981, average household effective buying income (HEBI) in Martin County grew from $16,339 to $20,119. In 1979, Florida HEBI was $18,613 and in 1981, was $21,301. The increase between 1979 and 1981 was much more significant in Martin County than in the State of Florida overall. HEBI increased 23.1 percent or $3,780 in Martin County while increasing only 14.4 percent or $2,688 in Florida between 1979 and 1981. Net income figures show an even more significant increase in Martin County. Between 1979 and 1981, net income in Martin County increased 73.3 percent from $336,574,000 to $583,448,00. During the same period, net income in Florida increased by only 34.2 percent from $63,889,652,000 to $85,768,756,000. Per capita personal income data (PPI) formulated for the state and county by the United States Department of Commerce, and reprinted by the University of Florida, was in evidence and considered. This data appears in the following table: YEAR 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 Martin Co. 3861 4258 4773 5246 5363 Florida 3693 4007 4461 4988 5341 YEAR 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Martin Co. 5834 6437 7215 8094 9178 Florida 5634 6094 6733 7591 8521 PPI level in Martin County exceeded Florida PPI levels throughout the 1970-1979 period. Between 1975 and 1979, PPI in Martin County increased by $3,344 or 57.3 percent while per capita income in the State of Florida increased by only $2,887 or 51.2 percent. In addition, PPI in Martin County in 1979 exceeded the statewide figure by 7.7 percent. The Applicant submitted data on estimated retail sales in Martin County and Florida for 1975 through 1981. At the time the application was filed, the latest available figures were for 1979. Between 1979 and 1981, estimated retail sales increased 32.3 percent in Martin County while the State of Florida increased by only 28 percent. Five operating commercial bank offices are located in or within one mile of the PSA. Florida National operates a branch office 0.8 miles northeast of the proposed opened 0.2 miles west of the proposed site. The two branches are the only bank offices in the PSA. The following three bank offices are located within one mile of the PSA: Florida National's main office, operating 2.7 miles northeast of the proposed site; First National's main office, operating 2.1 miles northeast of the proposed site; and First National's branch office, operating 1.8 miles northeast of the proposed site. These five bank offices are operated by only two bank institutions, neither of which is a state chartered institution nor has its main office in the PSA. Florida National, the only bank operating in the PSA, withdrew its protest to this application. Seven savings and loan association (association) facilities were cited as operating in or within one mile of the PSA. These seven association facilities include two main offices in operation and five association branch offices. Two offices operate within the PSA: Harbor Federal Savings and Loan Association (formerly First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Ft. Pierce) operates a branch office 0.9 miles northeast of the proposed site. First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Martin County operates a branch office 0.9 miles northeast of the pronosed site.. The following facilities are within one mile of the PSA: Citizens Federal Savings and Loan Association operates a branch office 2.2 miles northeast of the proposed site; Community Federal Savings and Loan Association operates a branch office 2.7 miles northeast of the proposed site; First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Martin County has its home office 2.2 miles northeast of the proposed site; Home Federal Savings and Loan Association has a branch office 2.1 miles northeast of the proposed site; and the recently opened main office of Central Savings and Loan Association is one mile northeast of the proposed site. A period's inflation is most commonly estimated by the period's corresponding change in the consumer price index, which is the only method of record in this proceeding. Each month, changes in the consumer price index from the previous month and for the previous 12 months are published by the United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. For the year ending September 30, 1981, the rate of inflation was 11.0 percent. For the year ending December 31, 1981, the rate of inflation was 8.9 percent. For the year ending March 31, 1982, the rate of inflation was 6.8 percent. (DSP) Only one bank office (a branch office) was in operation within the PSA in March, 1982. During the year ending March 31, 1982, the Florida National Bank of Martin County branch office within the PSA increased its total deposits from $12,638,000 to $16,307,000 or an increase of 29 percent, a rate more than four times that of the 6.8 percent rate of inflation that existed during the year ending March, 1982. Data is also available for the bank offices operating within one mile of the PSA. The main office of First National increased its total deposits during the period of March, 1981, to March, 1982, from $149,296,000 to $153,845,000 for a yearly increase of 3.0 percent. The branch office of First National close to the PSA increased deposits during the same period from $3,144,000 to $3,587,000 or an increase of 14.1 percent. The Florida National main office had a decrease in deposits from $89,806,000 to $3,587,000 or a loss of 2.0 percent during the year ending March 31, 1982. Total Martin County deposits for the period increased from $402,666,000 to $423,762,000 or a 5.2 percent increase. During the period from March 31, 1981, to March 31, 1982, bank deposits within the State of Florida increased from $41,478,327,000 to $43,933,129,000 or an increase of approximately 5.9 percent. In summation, the rate of growth in deposits within the PSA exceeded the rate of growth in deposits in Martin County and the rate of deposit growth was bore than four times greater than the rate of inflation for the same period. For the period between September 30, 1980, and September 30, 1981, the savings and loan association offices operating in the PSA showed increases in the volume of savings accounts as follows: Harbor Federal increased from $12,287,000 to $14,997,000 or a yearly increase of 22.1 percent; First Federal of Martin County (opened in March, 1980) increased from $2,194,000 to $6,033,000 or a total increase of 175.0 percent in one year. Thus, the increase in the two savings and loan offices in the PSA showed a combined one year gain of $6,549,000 or 45.2 percent. In Martin County as a whole, savings increased from September 30, 1980, to September 30, 1981, from $352,735,000 to $381,625,000 or a yearly increase of 8.2 percent. In the State of Florida as a whole, savings during the same period went from $42,560,303,000 to $45,332,969,000 or a yearly increase of only 6.5 percent. In summary, association deposits at offices in the PSA increased at a rate far in excess of those in Martin County as a whole, and in the State of Florida. In addition, the 45.2 percent increase of association deposits in the PSA during the reporting period was more than four times the 11 percent rate of inflation for the year ending September 30, 1981. The Applicant proposes to offer the full range of banking service offered by full-service commercial banks. No deficiencies in the proposed services were established by any Protestant. However, it should also be noted that there are, at present, only two branches of one multi-bank holding company (Florida National) located within the PSA. No other bank is presently represented in the PSA. No bank is headquartered in the PSA, nor is there a facility of a state chartered bank in the PSA. Also, only Florida National Bank and one other banking organization maintain bank offices in or within one mile of the PSA. Consequently, alternative or competitive choices are limited in the PSA and within one mile of its boundaries at the present time. Applicant projected total deposits of $5,000,000, $9,000,000 and $13,000,000 at the end of the proposed banks' first three years of operation respectively. It also projected a $22,381 net operating loss during the proposed bank's first operating year, and pre-tax net operating income levels of $257,715 and $466,208 during the bank's second and third operating years respectively. These deposit and increase projections were formulated under the assumption that the proposed bank would have: $2,750,000 in total time and savings deposits and $2,250,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the first operating year; $5,400,000 in total time and savings deposits and $3,600,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the second operating year; and $8,450,000 in total time and savings deposits and $4,550,000 in total demand deposits at the end of the third operating year. Applicant's projections are conservative, were unrefuted by the Protestants and are likely achievable. The Applicant's testimony and evidence established that there are nine active residential subdivisions in the PSA totaling 6,576 units of which 416 or 6.3 percent were cited as completed. Home prices range from between $65,500 and $580,000. Five areas are planned for single family units accounting for 95 percent of the total units planned. Prices for the single family units range between $75,000 and $580,000, while prices for condominium units range between $65,500 and $87,900. The single family subdivisions are Canoe Creek, Martin Downs, Mid-Rivers, Pipers Landing and Westgate. Utilities are being installed for 70 new lots in the PSA and there are 15 new rental units recently opened and under construction. Extensive testimony was presented about the Martin Downs project located within the PSA. Martin Downs is a 2,400 acre planned residential development which will contain 5,500 residential units. It will also contain two golf courses, racquet club, resort center, retail shopping center, office park, industrial park, government service center, schools, yacht club, parks and a utility plant. Road improvements have already been made in and around Martin Downs. Further, during 1983, major improvements will be made to Martin Downs Boulevard, the major east/west artery through the PSA. These improvements include widening that portion of Martin Downs Boulevard that runs past the proposed site of the Applicant bank. (T. 23-26) Martin Downs will be built in phases with a final population of 12,000 to 13,000 people. (T. 23) The builders of Martin Downs already have approximately $20 million invested in the project. The Crane Creek area of Martin Downs is one of the most exclusive residential sections in the PSA. (View by Hearing Officer) It consists of 346 lots of which approximately 300 are sold and approximately 150 lots are occupied or have homes under construction. The lots sell for $35,000 to $60,000. Homes sell from around $150,000 to $400,000. Crane Creek also contains a championship golf course, clubhouse and racquet club with thirteen tennis courts. (T. 15) Four condominium projects are presently under construction: Country Meadows, Mapletree Villas, The Crossings, and The Townhomes at Poppleton Creek. Prices range between $49,900 and $87,900. These four projects have 306 total units planned of which 60 were completed in October, 1982, and another 72 under construction. Residents living in all of the single family subdivisions cited and at Mapletree Villas and the Crossings must, as a practical matter, pass the Applicant's proposed site on their way to and from the City of Stuart. In addition to the developments cited, there are a large number of existing residences within the PSA. Many of these are located west of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River and these residents must also pass the Applicant's proposed site when going to and from Stuart. (View by Hearing Officer) Commercial activity in the PSA is primarily centered along Massey Boulevard and Mapo Road in close proximity to the subject site. Downtown Stuart lies approximately 2.5 miles northeast of the proposed site. As of May, 1981, 35 businesses were established within one-half mile of the proposed site. In addition, the Monterey Plaza, a large, modern shopping center within one mile of the proposed site, contained 44 businesses in August, 1981. There are 43 businesses within one-half mile of the site. Manufacturing is limited in Martin County. However, the county's largest manufacturer, Grumman Aerospace Corporation, is located at Witham Field, approximately 2.7 miles east of the proposed site. In addition, there are two areas established for industrial development in the PSA itself. One is a planned industrial park to be located in Martin Downs. The other is a ten acre industrial park known as Heritage Square, located at Palm City School Road and State Road 714, approximately 1.7 miles southwest of the proposed site. There are approximately three acres currently developed in the park which opened in 1978. At the time the application was filed, it had 12 tenants, 11 of which are small manufacturing firms. The proposed bank will be capitalized with a total of $1,500,000. The capital will be divided into common capital of $1,000,000, surplus of $300,000, and undivided profits of $200,000. The bank will issue 100,000 shares of stock, with a par value of $10 and a selling price of $15 plus $.50 per share assessed for the Organizational Expense Fund. All 100,000 shares have been subscribed to. The proposed directors have personally subscribed to 30,000 shares as follows: Herbert-Biggs, 5,000 shares; Stephen Frasier, 5,000 shares; Richard Jemison, 5,000 shares; Charles Pope, 5,000 shares; Donald Ricci, 5,000 shares; and Roy Talmo, 5,000 shares. The proposed Board of Directors is composed of six members with diverse business backgrounds, some of whom have had prior banking experience. Herbert Biggs is an 11 year Florida resident living in Jupiter, Florida. Mr. Biggs has a B.S. degree from Mississippi State University and a J.D. from the University of Mississippi. After a short period as a professional basketball player, Mr. Biggs came to Martin County to practice law. He has since left the practice of law to pursue a career as a general contractor and developer. He is currently the president of Suncastle Homes, Inc., a construction and development corporation. Mr. Biggs holds professional licenses as a realtor, general contractor and attorney. Mr. Biggs is a U.S. citizen. Mr. Biggs has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Stephen Frasier is a 12 year resident of Martin County. He holds a B.S. degree from Florida State University and J.D. from the University of Florida. Mr. Frasier served in the Navy as a Flight Officer and is presently a Lieutenant in the Naval Reserve. He served as the Assistant City and County Attorney in Martin County and is presently engaged in the private practice of law in Martin County as a partner in the firm of Frasier and Bateman, P.A. Mr. Frasier is a member of the Civitan Club, the Masonic Temple, the Elks Club, Martin County Bar Association, on the Board of Directors of the Visiting Nurses Association, Florida Bar, on the Board of Directors for the Paradise Ranch for Boys, and is the Chairman of the Board for the Sailfish District of the Boy Scouts of America. (T. 122) Mr. Frasier is a U.S. citizen. (T. 121) Mr. Frasier has a reputation evidencing honesty demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. (T. 80, 113; Exs. 1, 5) Richard Jemison has been a Florida resident since 1939, and presently lives in Stuart, Florida. (T. 102; Ex. 1) He has a B.S. degree in Civil Engineering from the University of Florida. (T. 103) Mr. Jemison was in the printing business in St. Petersburg, Florida, for 13 years and is now the president of Seabridge Associates, Inc. (T. 104) He holds licenses as a real estate broker, mortgage broker, and contractor. (T. 103) Mr. Jemison is a member of the Palm City Chamber of Commerce, Stuart Chamber of Commerce and Kiwanis Club. Mr. Jemison has substantial banking experience in that he served on the Board of Directors of the First State Charter Bank in St. Petersburg from 1968 through 1974. (T. 106; Ex. 1) He is a U.S. Citizen. (T. 102) Mr. Jemison has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. (T. 83, 115-116; Exs. 1, 4) Charles Pope has lived in Florida since 1951 and presently lives within the PSA of the proposed bank. He received a B.S. degree from the University of Florida and has completed all of the course work for an M.B.A at the Florida Institute of Technology. Mr. Pope has direct banking experience from his past employment with First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart, Atlantic Bank Corporation, and First American Bank and Trust Company (formerly First American Bank of Palm Beach) Mr. Pope is the president of Charles Pope & Associates, Inc., an investment banking firm. He holds a mortgage brokers license from the State of Florida, is a Certified Commercial Lender and a Certified Review Appraiser. He is a member of the American Bankers Association, American Institute of Banking and the Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Pope is a citizen of the United States. He has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Donald Ricci has lived in Florida since 1975, and in Martin County for the past five years. After being honorably discharged from the U.S. Air Force, Mr. Ricci was a part owner and general manager of an automobile dealership. Mr. Ricci became interested in the real estate business and worked as the Marketing Director for First Southern Holding Company, the developers of Martin Downs. As Marketing Director, he was in charge of sales and marketing for Martin Downs. Mr. Ricci is a 50 percent partner and manager of Seabridge Associates, Inc., a real estate development firm whose offices are located in the PSA and close to the proposed site of the Applicant bank. Mr. Ricci is a licensed real estate broker and a member of the Palm City Chamber of Commerce and the Stuart/Martin County Chamber of Commerce. Mr. Ricci is a U.S. citizen. He has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and has an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. Roy W. Talmo has lived in Palm Beach County, Florida, since 1964. He received a B.B.A. and M.B.A from the University of Minnesota. Mr. Talmo has extensive direct banking experience, having been employed as a banker since 1959. Mr. Talmo has been employed by the Continental Bank in Chicago and the First National Bank of St. Petersburg, and is the past Chairman of the Board of Miami National Bank. Mr. Talmo is presently Chairman of the Board of First National Bank and Trust Company in Palm Beach, and has directed its growth from an $11 million bank to its present size of just under $500 million. Mr. Talmo also serves as a Director of First American Bank of Broward County, First City Bank of Dade County, and First State Bank of Broward County. He is a member of the Palm Beach Junior College Foundation, the Palm Beach Festival, and the Tourist Development Committee for Palm Beach County. Mr. Talmo is a U.S. citizen. The Applicant adduced evidence which was not refuted, and which established that Mr. Talmo has a reputation evidencing honesty and integrity and an employment and business history demonstrating his responsibility in financial affairs. As of the date of the final hearing, the Applicant had not selected a President or Chief Executive Officer, nor a Cashier or Operations Officer. The Applicant has selected the name First American Bank of Martin County. There are no Florida financial institutions with a name so similar as to cause confusion with the proposed name. Parenthetically, it should be noted that a cogent discussion and resolution of the issue of "name confusion" is extant in First Bank of Hollywood Beach and Office of the Comptroller vs. American Bank of Hollywood, DOAH Case No. 80-1581, opinion filed May 13, 1981. The Applicant has proven that public convenience and advantage will be served by the approval of the application. The Applicant has proven that local conditions indicate a reasonable promise of successful operation for the new bank. DONE and ENTERED this 4th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Gary Williams, Esquire Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Noel Bobko, Esquire Post Office Drawer 2315 Stuart, Florida 33495 James L. S. Bowdish, Esquire Post Office Drawer 24 Stuart, Florida 33494 Walter W. Wood, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE DIVISION OF BANKING IN RE: Application of First Administrative Proceeding American Bank of No. 83-5-DOB Martin County DOAH No. 82-034 / FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND FINAL ORDER Pursuant to Notice, an Administrative Hearing was held before P. Michael Ruff, Hearing Officer, with the Division of Administrative Hearings on October 19 and 20, 1982, in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. The purpose of the hearing was to receive evidence concerning the application of First American Bank of Martin County for authority to open a new bank in Stuart, Martin County, Florida. At the hearing, the parties were represented by counsel: For Applicant, C. Gary Williams, Esquire First American Bank Michael J. Glazer, Esquire of Martin County: Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 For Protestant, Noel Bobko, Esquire American Bank of Post Office Drawer 2315 Martin County: Stuart, Florida 33495 For Protestant, James L. S. Bowdish, Esquire First National Bank & Post Office Drawer 24 Trust Co. of Stuart: Stuart, Florida 33494 For the Department of Walter W. Wood, Esquire Banking and Finance: Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Having fully considered the facts and information contained in the record relating to the application of First American Bank of Martin County for authority to organize a corporation for the purpose of conducting banking business in Stuart, Florida, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, as Head of the Department of Banking and Finance, hereby renders the following FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND FINAL ORDER in the above-styled case.
Conclusions The statutory criteria set forth in Chapter 658, Florida Statutes, which were in effect at the time the application was filed, are the standards which govern this application. Chapter 3C-10, Florida Administrative Code, which was in effect at the time the application was filed, contains the rules under which this application was considered. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051, Florida Administrative Code, when an application for authority to organize and operate a new state bank is filed, it is the applicant's responsibility to prove that the statutory criteria warranting the grant of authority are met. The Department shall conduct an investigation pursuant to Section 658.20, Florida Statutes, which was done in this case, and then approve or deny the application in its discretion. This discretion is neither absolute nor unqualified, but is instead conditioned by a consideration of the criteria listed in Section 658.21, Florida Statutes, wherein it is provided that: The Department shall approve the application if it finds that: Public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the establishment of the proposed state bank or trust company. In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this subsection, the department shall consider all materially relevant factors, including: The location and services offered by existing banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices in the community. The general economic and demographic characteristics of the area. Local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed state bank or trust company and those banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices already established in the primary service area. In determining whether an applicant meets the requirements of this subsection, the department shall consider all materially relevant factors, including: Current economic conditions and the growth potential of the area in which the proposed state bank or trust company intends to locate. The growth rate, size, financial strength, and operating characteristics of banks, trust companies, trust departments, and trust service offices in the service area of the proposed bank. The proposed capital structure is in such amount as the department shall deem adequate, but in no case shall the paid-in capital stock be less than $800,000. In addition to the capital required, every state bank or trust company hereafter organized shall establish: A paid-in surplus equal in amount to not less than 20 percent of its paid-in capital; and A fund to be designated as undivided profits equal in amount to not less than five percent of its paid-in capital. The proposed officers have sufficient banking or trust company experience, ability, and standing, and the proposed directors have sufficient business experience, ability and standing, to indicate reasonable promise of successful operation. The name of the proposed state bank or trust company is not so similar as to cause confusion with the name of an existing financial institution. Provision has been made for suitable quarters at the location in the application. If, in the opinion of the Department, any one of the six foregoing criteria has not been met, and cannot be remedied by the Applicant, it cannot approve the application. An Applicant can, however, take corrective action in most circumstances, to meet the criteria set forth in Sections 658.21(3)(4)(5) or (6), Florida Statutes, if any one of these is found to be lacking. For example, if all other statutory criteria are met, the Applicant may increase capital, or make certain changes in the board of directors, or change the name or alter the provisions for suitable banking house quarters, because these factors are, at least to some degree, within its control. It is the Department's policy to allow applicants to make certain changes to meet these criteria if all other criteria are met; to do otherwise would be to subject applicants to unnecessary red tape. However, it is the Department's position that there is little, if anything, that an applicant can do to alter its ability to meet the criteria set forth in Sections 658.21(1) and (2), Florida Statutes, since the applicants cannot easily change the economic and demographic characteristics of an area. Therefore, if either one or both of these criteria are not met, the Department cannot approve the application. For the purposes of applications for authority to organize and operate a bank, Section 658.12(19), Florida Statutes, defines the primary service area (PSA) as: " . . . the smallest geographical area from which a bank draws, or a proposed bank expects to draw, approximately 75 percent of its deposits; the term also means the smallest geographic area from which a trust company or the trust department of a bank or association draws, or a proposed trust company or a proposed trust department of a bank or association expects to draw, approximately 75 percent of the assets value of its fiduciary accounts." The Applicant's PSA which incorporates portions of the City of Stuart, unincorporated Martin County and a portion of unincorporated Martin County known as Palm City appears to have boundaries delineated around a natural market area. The designated boundaries do not unrealistically exclude competing financial institutions or include areas of concentrated population. The Department concludes that a market exists for the Applicant in the PSA and that the Applicant may reasonably expect approximately 75 percent of its business to arise from the PSA. Consequently, the Department deems that the PSA has been realistically delineated and that the criteria set forth in Section 658.12(19), Florida Statutes, for a realistically delineated PSA has been met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that public convenience and advantage will be promoted by the proposed bank's establishment. Therefore, the criterion in Section 658.21(1), Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(a)(1), Florida Administrative Code, the location and services offered by existing financial institutions in the service area are indicative of the competitive climate of the market. The traffic patterns in the area, as well as the area's general economic and demographic characteristics shall also be considered. Because it is recognized that the establishment of a new bank or trust company anywhere would promote convenience and advantage for at least a few people, substantial convenience and advantage for a significant number of people must be shown; otherwise, a new bank could be justified for every street corner in the state. Clearly such a result was not the legislative intent in regulating entry into the banking industry, nor is it in the public interest. Based upon the facts in the record, the Department has determined that the establishment of the proposed new bank will substantially increase convenience to a significant number of residents and workers of the PSA. The location of the proposed site at a shopping center 0.2 miles from the only bridge from the eastern end of the PSA to the western end makes it convenient to residents, shoppers and commuters. The Department, therefore, concludes that the criteria of public convenience and advantage is met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed bank and those already established in the area. Therefore, the criterion in Section 658.21(2) Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Section 658.21(2)(a) and (b) , Florida Statutes, and Rule 3C-10.051(3)(b) , Florida Administrative Code, current economic conditions and, to a lesser extent, the growth potential of the area in which the new bank or trust company proposes to locate are important considerations in determining its probable success. Essential to the concept of banking opportunity is that there does and will exist a significant volume of business for which the bank or trust company can realistically compete. The growth rate, size, financial strength, and operating characteristics of financial institutions in the primary service area are also important indicators of economic conditions and potential business. It is noted that the statutory standard requires that: " . . . local conditions indicate reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed state bank or trust company and those banks . . . already established in the primary service area . . ." Banking involves a public trust. Unlike private enterprise generally, banks operate on the public's capital and therefore, the Legislature has vested in the Comptroller the responsibility of protecting the public interest. Furthermore, the failure of a bank, as opposed to private enterprise generally, may have an unsettling effect on the overall economic welfare of the community, and that is why the Florida Legislature and the United States Congress have imposed stringent requirements for the industry. This Department is responsible for enforcing this legislative standard. Public interest is best served by having a banking system whereby competition is encouraged, where appropriate, yet at the same time, ensuring that the financial resources of the residents of the community are stable and safe. That was the obvious intent of the Legislature in regulating entry into the banking industry. The facts in the record show a significant and growing number of residential developments that are not centrally served by any main office, commercial bank, and no state-chartered banks at present. Thus, a significant number of PSA businesses and residents, especially on the western side of the PSA from the St. Lucie River, can be expected to patronize the proposed bank, insuring that there is a reasonable promise of successful operation. The facts in the record show that the rate of growth in deposits within the PSA exceeded the rate of growth in deposits in Martin County and the rate of deposit growth was more than four times greater than the rate of inflation for the same period. Based upon the above, the Department concludes that local conditions do indicate a reasonable promise of successful operation for the proposed bank and for those financial institutions already established in the area. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the proposed capital structure of the proposed new bank is adequate. Therefore, the criteria of Section 658.21(3) Florida Statutes, is met. Capital should be adequate to enable the new bank or trust company to provide necessary services . . ., including loans of sufficient size, to meet the needs of prospective customers. Capital should be sufficient to purchase, build, or lease a suitable permanent facility complete with equipment. Generally, the initial capital for a new nonmember bank should not be less than $1.0 million in non-metropolitan areas and $1.5 million in metropolitan areas. The capital referred to in the Findings of Fact shall be allocated among capital stock, paid-in surplus, and undivided profits in the ratios set forth in Subsection (3) of Section 658.21, Florida Statutes. The proposed capital accounts of $1.5 million are allocated according to the statutory ratios. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the criteria of Section 658.21(4), Florida Statutes, are met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the organizers, proposed directors, and officers shall have reputations evidencing honesty and integrity. They shall have employment and business histories demonstrating their responsibility In financial affairs. At least one member of a proposed board of directors, other than the chief executive officer, shall have direct banking or trust company experience. In addition, the organizers, proposed directors and officers shall meet the requirements of Section 658.33, Florida Statutes. Officers shall have demonstrated abilities and experience commensurate with the position for which proposed. Members of the initial management group, which includes directors and officers shall require prior approval of the department. Changes of directors or chief executive officer during the first year of operation shall also require prior approval of the department. While it is not necessary that the names of the proposed officers be submitted with an application to organize a new state bank, the chief executive officer and operations officer must be named and approved at least sixty (60) days prior to the bank's opening. The Department concludes that the proposed directors have, as a group, good character, sufficient financial standing and business histories demonstrating ability and experience commensurate with the positions for which they are proposed and at least one proposed director (other than the chief executive officer) has direct banking experience. It should be noted that interlocking directorships involving existing financial institutions competitively near the proposed site of a new institution are discouraged. Such interlocking directorships could possibly restrict competition and create fiduciary problems. The Department concludes that there is no interlock problem in this instance. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that the name of the proposed new bank, First American Bank of Martin County, would not cause confusion with the name of a Florida financial institution. Therefore, the criterion of Section 658.21(5), Florida Statutes, is met. It is the opinion and conclusion of the Department that provisions has been made for suitable banking house quarters in the application's specified area. Therefore, the criterion of Section 658.21(6), Florida Statutes, is met. As set forth in Rule 3C-10.051(3)(f), Florida Administrative Code, permission to open in temporary quarters may be granted, for good cause shown. Under the rules of the Department, the permanent structure of a new bank should contain a minimum of 2,500 square feet, unless the Applicant satisfactorily shows that smaller quarters are justified due to the performance of certain auxiliary services off-premises. In addition, it shall meet the Federal Bank Protection Act requirements and be of sufficient size to handle the projected business for a reasonable period of time. The banking house . . . facility shall be of a nature to warrant customer confidence in the institution's security, stability and permanence. Other pertinent factors include availability to adequate parking, adequate drive-in facility if such is contemplated, and possibilities for expansion. Temporary quarters are not contemplated and Applicant's permanent quarters meet the above standards. Rule 3C-10.051(5), Florida Administrative Code, relating to insider transactions requires that: Any financial arrangement or transaction involving, directly or indirectly, the organizers, directors, officers and shareholders owning 5 percent or more of the stock, or their relatives, their associates or interests must he fair and reasonable, fully disclosed, and comparable to similar arrangements which could have been made with unrelated parties. Whenever any transaction between the proposed bank or trust company and an insider involves the purchase of real property, appraisals of land and improvement thereon shall be made by an independent qualified appraiser, and be dated no earlier than 6 months from the filing date of the application. The Department has determined that there is no insider transaction involving the leasing of the proposed bank's office space. Therefore, the criterion in Rule 3C-10.051(5) Florida Administrative Code, is met. RULING ON PROTESTANTS' EXCEPTIONS Section 120.57(1)(b)12, Florida Statutes, provides as follows: " . . . The agency shall allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions to the report." The Department's procedural Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code, Post-Evidentiary Procedures, follows the wording of the statute and provides that "the Department shall allow each party 10 days from the date of the hearing officer's report in which to submit written exceptions thereto pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(h) 12, Florida Statutes." The Department interprets that the word "submit" means that the Department must receive the exceptions by the 10th day in the same manner as when documents are required to be filed by a date certain. See Sonny's Italian Restaurant v. State of Florida, 414 So.2d 1156 at 1157. In Sonny's Italian Restaurant v. State, the Third District Court of Appeal in a per curiam decision affirmed a final agency order upon a holding that: "Any error resulting from the entry of the Final Order on July 2, 1981, prior to receipt of Appellant's exceptions to the recommended order, is not material in light of the fact that the exceptions, dated July 6, 1981, were not filed within the requisite 10-day period of Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, when measured from either the date the recommended order was entered (June 19), or the date submitted to the agency and parties (June 23)." The wording in Section 120.57(1)(b)8, Florida Statutes, concerning the time for filing of exceptions is identical to that of Section (1)(b)12 concerning the filing of exceptions for applications for a license or merger pursuant to Title XXXVIII. The Report of the Hearing Officer, C. Michael Ruff, in this case was done and entered on April 4, 1983, with a cover letter dated April 5, 1983, and was received by the Department on April 6, 1983. A copy of Protestant American Bank of Martin County's exceptions was received by the Department on April 21, 1983. A copy of Protestant First National Bank and Trust Company of Stuart's exceptions were received by the Department on April 19, 1983. The Department deems that all exceptions were untimely filed since the last day to file exceptions with the Department was April 15, 1983. Nevertheless, it has been determined that the exceptions that were untimely received would not have had any effect on the final outcome of this matter.
The Issue The issue for determination at the final hearing was whether the Respondent violated the real estate licensing law, as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to account and deliver a deposit; failing to maintain a deposit in a real estate brokerage escrow account or some other proper depository until disbursement thereof was properly authorized; and/or being guilty of fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, and/or breach of trust in a business transaction.
Findings Of Fact Based on my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence received and the entire record compiled herein, I hereby make the following findings of fact: Respondent is now, and was at all times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0360741. The last license issued was as a broker, c/o Consolidated American Realty Services, Inc., in Tampa, Florida. From June 6, 1983, through June 25, 1984, Respondent was licensed and operating as a real estate broker under the trade name, "Benjamin Realty," in Tampa, Florida. For sometime prior to June 2, 1984, Eileen Cumbie attempted to sell a lot owned by her located at 1102 26th Avenue, Tampa, Florida. On June 2, 1984, the Respondent contacted Ms. Cumbie and informed her that he had a client interested in purchasing the property. Ms. Cumbie informed the Respondent that as long as she netted a certain amount, she would be willing to sell the property. Ms. Cumbie allowed the Respondent to put together a contract for the sale of the lot. In connection therewith, the Respondent prepared a sales contract with Danilo Castellanos, as purchaser, and Eileen W. Cumbie, as seller, for the purchase and sale of the property. Pursuant to the purchase and sales agreement, the Respondent received in trust from Mr. Castellanos a $500 earnest money deposit via check dated June 2, 1984. On June 5, 1984, the Respondent deposited the check into his real estate brokerage account maintained at the Central Bank of Tampa, 2307 W. Rennedy Boulevard, Tampa, Florida. Mr. Castellanos entered into the contract for the benefit of his son and daughter-in-law who resided in New Jersey but were planning to relocate to the Tampa area. Mr. Castellanos' daughter-in-law went to look at the lot on June 10, 1984 and decided that she did not like the area in which it was located. The closing of the transaction was set for June 15, 1984. On approximately June 13, 1984, Mr. Castellanos' daughter- in-law informed the Respondent that they were no longer interested in purchasing the property. Ms. Cumbie was out of town during the time of the scheduled closing, but had prepared and signed all of the paperwork in advance. When she returned after June 15, 1984, she called Respondent to find out how the closing went. The Respondent informed her that the buyers failed to go through with the transaction. The contract provided in part as follows: ". . . If the buyer fails to perform this contract within the time specified herein, time being of the essence of this agreement, the deposit made by the buyer shall be disposed of in the following manner: To the Broker an amount equal to his earned commission, but not to exceed 1/2 of the deposit which shall discharge the sellers obligation to him for that service; remainder to the seller to be credited to him against his damages accrued by reason of the breach of contract. " After the transaction failed to close, Ms. Cumbie requested that Respondent give a portion of the deposit to her. The Respondent told Ms. Cumbie that he would give her the entire deposit because she had paid for the survey and a few other items to facilitate the closing of the transaction. Over the next several months, the Respondent, on several occasions, promised to deliver a check to Ms. Cumbie. However, the Respondent never delivered any such check to Ms. Cumbie. Because the Respondent failed to provide Ms. Cumbie with a share of the earnest money deposit, she initiated a civil action in the County Court of Hillsborough County. On October 15, 1985, Ms. Cumbie was awarded a final judgment in the amount of $250 against Respondent for her share of the forfeited earnest money deposit. As of the date of the final hearing, the Respondent had not satisfied the judgment and Ms. Cumbie had not received any proceeds from the forfeited earnest money deposit. Shortly after the transaction failed to close, the purchasers requested that the Respondent return the earnest money deposit to them. However, the Respondent informed them that they were not entitled to the return of the earnest money deposit. The earnest money deposit was never returned to the purchasers. On July 31, 1984, the balance in Respondent's escrow account was $568.83. However, on September 1, 1984, the balance in the Petitioner's escrow account fell to S18.83. From October 31, 1984 to January 1, 1986, the balance in the Petitioner's escrow account remained $3.83.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that the registration of Fortunato Benjamin- Pabon as a real estate broker be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 18th day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur R. Shell, Jr., Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Fortunato Benjamin-Pabon 2729 N. Ridgewood Avenue, #1 Tampa, Florida 33602 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the state of Florida, in particular Section 20.30, Florida Statutes; Chapters 120, 455 and 475, Florida Statutes and the rules promulgated in accordance with those statutes. Respondent is now and was at all times associated with this administrative complaint a licensed real estate broker in the state of Florida having been issued license number 0251002 under the authority of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent's last license was issued as a real estate broker with the firm of Eastern Marketing, Inc. which is located at 17841 U.S. Highway 441, 3 Mount Dora, Florida 32757. RESPONDENT'S ROLE At the time of the hearing, Respondent had been involved in the real estate profession for approximately 18 years. This real estate practice has been exclusively in the state of Florida. In addition to being a real estate broker, Respondent is licensed as a general contractor in Florida and as a mortgage broker in the state. His general contractor's license is a certified license. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was a real estate broker with Collins and Associates, Inc., a real estate brokerage firm. He also had affiliation with Collins Builders, Inc., a licensed general contracting firm. He was a one half owner in Tallahassee Properties, a Florida general partnership in which the other ownership was held by W. Ronnie Collins, Respondent's brother. All of these firms did business in Florida and particular as these firms are involved with the issues in dispute, they did business in Tallahassee, Florida. At times relevant to this inquiry, Respondent was involved in a sales promotion program which has been referred to as a trade-in program. In essence, this program was designed to allow persons who had purchased residences from a firm or through affiliated Collins companies to turn over the initial residence to Tallahassee Properties in exchange for a new home bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with the builder using the real estate services of Collins and Associates, Inc. to sell the new home. The house that was being traded was deeded to Respondent or one of the companies with which he was affiliated. In this case, the company with which Respondent was affiliated with which had property deeded to it was Ralco, Inc. Those persons who were trading one home for another had been solicited by Collins and Associates, Inc. as a realtor in an advertising program. No realtor was involved in making commissions associated with the closing that took place between the sellers who were trading in a home and Tallahassee Properties, Respondent and Ralco, Inc. with whom he was affiliated. This arrangement was designed to stimulate sales of the new home being purchased. The traded homes typically had mortgages. Tallahassee Properties not only took possession of the traded or exchanged homes but was responsible for the activities associated with the closing of the transaction, to include assumption and payment of mortgages associated with the exchanged property. As grantee on the deeds in the traded homes Respondent and Ralco, Inc. were also responsible for assumption and payments. As Respondent identified in his testimony, he and his brother W. Ronnie Collins; Collins and Associates, Inc.; Collins Builders, Inc. and Tallahassee Properties were anticipated as being the individuals to apply for the assumption of loans with the lending agencies who held the mortgages on the traded property. W. Ronnie Collins was also one of the names in the overall scheme in which the traded-in property could be placed as grantee. Approximately 80 homes were traded over a period of 6 or 7 years. The properties in dispute in this case were among them. Respondent had authorized Tallahassee Properties and in particular his brother W. Ronnie Collins as managing partner of that partnership, to place the properties in Respondent's name, W. Ronnie Collins' name or any of several companies affiliated with Respondent in furtherance of identifying a grantee that the mortgage holder would allow to assume the mortgage. Respondent's expectation was that Tallahassee Properties and the title company involved in the closing of the transaction associated with the traded property would facilitate the assumption arrangement with the mortgage holder. The title company used in the cases that are at issue here was Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. In the closings for the traded homes, which are at issue in this case, the evidence presented at hearing which may be relied upon for fact finding did not reveal what attempts were made to have the mortgage holders for the traded homes ultimately accept the substitution of Respondent, his brother or one of the companies with which he was affiliated as parties responsible for the existing mortgages on the traded properties. The reason which Respondent gave for allowing his brother, W. Ronnie Collins to act in his behalf in Tallahassee Properties was that he felt that it was impossible for him to involve himself in that business and its day to day process and at the same time be active in Collins and Associates, Inc. and Collins Builders, Inc. Therefore, he allowed W. Ronnie Collins to act for him in the business of Tallahassee Properties. This explanation has not been disputed and being tenable is credited as true. In accepting deeds related to the traded property, as will be described in the individual instances that follow, Respondent recognized that he had obligated himself to take the responsibility for assumption of and payment of the mortgage. Respondent has no direct knowledge of whether any of the trade-in transactions were followed up by gaining permission from the mortgage holder to allow someone other than the original mortgagor to become responsible for the mortgage payments. The contracts for obtaining the traded-in homes were executed by Tallahassee Properties. Nonetheless, as described, Respondent was given a deed to some of the properties purchased, to include properties in dispute here. Respondent never orally or in writing advised the sellers of the traded property that the routine mortgage payments associated with the traded property and the overall mortgage obligation would no longer be the responsibility of those sellers. In one of the cases which is at issue here involving the trade-in property of John M. and Jeanne B. Miller, Respondent stated that he received their traded property as grantee on the deed. In fact Ralco, Inc. was grantee. When asked about whether he had assumed the obligation for the mortgage that existed on that home, Respondent replied that he had assumed the loan. When asked if he explained the fact to that assumption to the Millers, he pointed out that he had never talked to the individuals. When asked if he had directed anyone in any of his companies or his real estate company in particular to explain the details of the transaction, Respondent pointed out that Collins and Associates, Inc. as realtor, and as a licensed broker had trained each associate to explain all of the rules and procedures associated with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, FHA, VA and HUD loans and that Respondent as the broker of those associates would expect that the associates would explain everything to the Millers. Whether the Millers were informed about such matters by Collins and Associates, Inc. employees was not proven. The traded in properties were rented, repaired and sold or kept in inventory by Tallahassee Properties. After purchase of the traded-in properties, Respondent's expectations as a partner in Tallahassee Properties was that the partnership would take possession of the properties and manage them and make payments on existing mortgages associated with any of those properties. Respondent believes that until the latter part of 1985 when he and some of his operations were involved in a Chapter 11 Federal Bankruptcy declaration, payments on the existing mortgages for traded properties were being made, in that had it not been so that he would have been notified. The record offers no proof that can be relied upon to satisfactorily corroborate or rebut this assumption on his part. The Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was not caused by problems associated with the traded properties. Ralco, Inc. was not involved in the bankruptcy. Some of the traded properties in question were owned by Ralco as grantee. Although Ralco was not involved in the bankruptcy, it was unable to make payments because of the bankruptcy in that the houses in question had a negative cash flow and Respondent was unable to take funds from the bankruptcy court and place them with Ralco, Inc. to make the payments on mortgages that existed on the traded properties. Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. were not involved in the closings of the traded property. Their involvement was with the new house being purchased following the trade. The closing associated with the new house under purchase was a separate closing and Collins and Associates, Inc. received a real estate commission for its participation. None of the exact details of the solicitation process by Collins and Associates, Inc. in which homeowners were encouraged to trade existing residences on other homes built by Collins Builders, Inc. were made known, so that it might be understood whether Collins and Associates, Inc. promised to make the attempt to have the lender accept a substitute for the original mortgagor on the mortgage indebtedness, to include the possibility of the outright release of the original mortgages from the debt obligation. Therefore, that solicitation process has no part to play in examining the issue of Respondent's conduct associated with the closings of the traded homes. In the latter part of 1985, following the filing of the petition under Chapter 11, Bankruptcy Laws, Respondent and Duval First Corporation with which he was affiliated were granted an order of relief on December 23, 1985 in Case Nos. 85-07179B and 85-07178C, respectively in the United States District Court, Northern District of Florida, Tallahassee Division. As part of the disposition in front of the bankruptcy court, the bankrupt estates and Real Estate Financing, Inc. agreed that the bankruptcy estates would surrender certain properties and the automatic stay in all expressed injunctions associated with those properties were lifted. The bankruptcy court held that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. 506, Real Estate Financing, Inc. would not be entitled to an unsecured claim against the bankrupt estates for debts secured by the lien on those properties. Those properties had been encumbered by a first mortgage in favor for Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Court found that the value of those properties was equal to or exceeded the debts secured by the mortgage lien of Real Estate Financing, Inc. as of the date of the Order for Relief. In that Order for Relief, Real Estate Financing, Inc. was allowed a secured claim for the full extent of the debt due as of the date of the Order for Relief plus interest accrued up to the extent of the value of each property and up to the date of November 18, 1986. The bankruptcy court did not hold that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was entitled to any unsecured claim for any pre-petition debt that was secured by the lien on its mortgages. Among the properties affected by this action were those properties of David Walsh, Troy Brewer, Sam Hinson, Harold C. Miller, Peter Hartman, and John Miller, all of whom are listed as individuals whose transactions with Respondent are found in the Administrative Complaint and about which Respondent is said to have violated the aforementioned disciplinary provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. By this arrangement in bankruptcy court, Respondent hoped to avoid the circumstance by which the mortgage was foreclosed leaving a deficiency against the original mortgagor/homeowner of the traded-in property which would in turn lead to some claim against the bankruptcy estates for the amount of the deficiency. Nonetheless, Real Estate Financing, Inc. proceeded to foreclose on its mortgages as subsequently discussed in commenting on the individual counts to the Administrative Complaint pertaining to individual homeowners. While the bankrupt estates would have preferred to deed back the property in lieu of foreclosure, it accepted the foreclosures given the protections to the bankrupt estates that have been identified in this discussion. It should also be mentioned that two of the accounts in the Administrative Complaint pertaining to Eric Larsen and Robert Aubin, to be discussed, were not part of this arrangement in the bankruptcy court associated with Real Estate Financing, Inc. At the closings on the traded homes in question some explanations about the mortgage assumptions were made by persons who may have been representing Tallahassee Properties or other Collins affiliates, but these persons are not clearly identified in the record as to their actual position with those organizations and how Respondent was accountable for their remarks. Those remarks will be discussed in the assessment of the individual counts that follow. Respondent, following the petition for bankruptcy in his own name and that of companies with which he was associated, wrote to advise homeowners who had traded in their homes about his perception of the homeowners' status following that bankruptcy. These letters were written on February 18, 1986 on stationary of the Respondent and were signed by him. In this correspondence, which is the same format in all instances, he would make reference to the date upon which the transaction closed at which time the homeowner deeded over the traded property to Respondent or a company with which he was affiliated. He described the existence of the prior mortgage to Real Estate Financing, Inc. with a loan number and the existence of the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause and, according to the letter, that the loan was not paid off at the time of the closing and the assertion that the lender would not allow the assumption of that loan by Respondent or one of his companies. Again this record is silent on the subject of what attitude the lender held about this, or even the matter of whether an attempt was made to have the lender accept a new obligor. He described how the lender was not considering Respondent or his company as purchaser but that the original mortgagor was being considered. This was taken to mean that Respondent was trying to express that the lender was looking to the original mortgagor as a responsible entity on the mortgage. The letter described how Respondent or one of his companies had been renting and making payments since the time of closing until December 23, 1985 when declaration of the Petition in bankruptcy went forward. It described how the Respondent and his companies were unable to continue funding payments related to the mortgages on the traded property which was in the name of the homeowners who had traded the property. The letter went on to describe how the payments would be brought current until February 28, 1986. The letter is interpreted to suggest that beyond that point, the property would either be deeded back to the original owner or the lender would foreclose. The letter expressed a preference by Respondent that because, interpreting the letter again, there was no cash flow that he preferred to see the property deeded back to the original owner. The name Bobbie May was given as a contact person and a telephone number provided for the homeowners to call regarding the return of the property back to the original homeowner. The letter goes on to describe an apology from Respondent to the homeowners. Movaline Hill who was a property manager for Tallahassee Properties traded in homes, to include the homes in discussion in the Administrative Complaint, offered her testimony at hearing. The principal business of Tallahassee Properties as established in her testimony was to rent homes. Ms. Hill advertised the property for rent, collected the rent, made payments on existing mortgages on the homes, and took care of maintenance matters. Tallahassee Properties took the rent and put the payments in escrow. One of the homes that Ms. Hill was involved with had belonged to David Walsh. It was a traded home and she had discussed with Walsh getting payment cards or coupons for the mortgage that existed on the traded home. The mortgage company had sent these cards or coupons to Walsh and Hill desired to have them so that the payments on the mortgage could be made. In this connection, Hill wrote Walsh a letter. A copy of that letter may be found as Petitioner's Exhibit 20. It indicates enclosure of a recorded deed on the traded property of Mr. Walsh showing Respondent as having the title in his name. It further states that Mr. Walsh should sign and mail a pre-prepared letter to Real Estate Financing, Inc. telling that lender to change the mailing address and requesting new payment cards. The letter describes that Real Estate Financing, Inc. did not know that the title was no longer in Mr. Walsh's name and that the lender would not transfer the mortgage to anyone and asks Walsh not to send the copy of the deed to the Respondent to the lender. Emphasis is placed in this correspondence on not sending that information to the lender. Ms. Hill was not instructed by anyone to write the letter. The reason why Ms. Hill said that she put an indication in the letter that the transfer of the mortgage could not be done was based upon her assertion that she had been told this by the lender. What connection Respondent had with the letter, if any, was not established. The cards that she received from Mr. Walsh on coupons for payments would have his name struck over and Respondent's name placed on it and Hill would send the check to the mortgage company for payment of the mortgage. With Real Estate Financing, Inc., Ms. Hill was sending one or two checks per month that dealt with 15 or 20 mortgages. There would be a lump sum payment with account numbers and backup materials sent with the check. The backup materials would include the payment cards or coupons. During Ms. Hill's tenure with the Tallahassee Properties, she says that she kept the mortgage payments current. No evidence was presented to the contrary which is competent. From this it is found that mortgage payments were kept current for a period of time which is not specifically shown. She received no contact from the mortgage companies on the topic of any assumption packages for these loans being assumed. She did receive some coupon books with the Respondent's name affixed. Those latter circumstances were not shown to be associated with any of the traded properties that are at issue in this case. Charles O. Middleton testified at the hearing. He had worked in 1981, 1982 and up to September, 1983, with Capitol Abstract and Title, Inc. which served as a closing agent on traded properties that were picked up by Tallahassee Properties. His recollection of the events is that, as closing agent for the title company, he worked from a contract which identified the terms of the transaction. His recollection is that the transactions associated with a trade property and the new home being purchased after trade was handled together. This is in contrast to the understanding of those homeowners whose traded properties are the subject of this Administrative Complaint and Respondent. The explanation by those homeowners and Respondent that two separate closings were held, one for the traded property and one for the newly purchased property is accepted as factually correct. Middleton recalls that explanations were given by him as closing agent concerning the nature of the transaction to include the matters of the paragraph 17 "due on sale" clause. He describes this arrangement as involving an affidavit or hold harmless agreement that had to be signed. This included the initialing of the paragraphs within that agreement by the buyer and the seller. Again, none of the homeowners who sold traded property that is described in the Administrative Complaint recalls such explanations and documents and their recollection is deemed more creditable and is accepted in lieu of the comments by Mr. Middleton. Likewise, the document for purposes of explanation which was offered as Respondent's Exhibit 8 containing disclaimers about the paragraph 17, "due on sale" clause, while admitted, offers no insight into the nature of what the homeowners were told in the cases that are at issue here because it isn't the same form that Middleton recalls using in the transactions he participated in as closing agent and hasn't been shown to be a form used in any of the cases here. Middleton explained that in the transactions he was involved in, the homeowners were provided a copy of every document to be utilized in the closing and that the original documents had their pages turned while the copies for the homeowners were being examined at the same time. A brief explanation would be given about each document and the homeowners were asked if they wished to take some time to read the documents and to ask any questions. Middleton as closing agent would offer to answer questions or put them in touch with the lender and let the lender answer questions. In Middleton's estimation, it was the closing agent's responsibility to make sure that necessary documents were presented to the lenders in the assumption of the mortgage for the traded in property. Respondent had not instructed Middleton in any of the closings on the topic of what to do with closing documents that were used at the time of transaction. Middleton said that he was unable to produce any of the documents of explanation concerning the closings which he participated in for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. because he has no access to those files. Middleton identified the fact that in a circumstance in which a home had a mortgage and an assumption was called for, an assumption packet would be customarily ordered at the time of the request for assistance in the closing, which he refers to as an order. Middleton identifies the fact that he is only vaguely familiar with the transactions that are at issue in this Administrative Complaint. He thinks he may have closed some of them but he has no specific recollection about that. As a consequence, he has no worthwhile knowledge of how many of those transactions had assumption packages completed. COUNT I Samuel Hinson, Jr. owned property in Arbor Hills which he had bought from Collins Builders, Inc. on June 30, 1982. This house was taken in trade for a house on Starmount. This Starmount home was also purchased from Collins Builders, Inc. and Collins and Associates, Inc. served as the real estate firm for the purchase of the new home as agent for the seller. Andrew Jackson Federal Savings financed the new purchase. The traded in home was sold to Tallahassee Properties with Capital Abstract and Title, Inc., serving as closing agent according to documents presented at hearing. Mr. Middleton did not appear for Capital Abstract at that closing. In the purchaser's closing statement, W. Ronnie Collins is shown as the representative for Tallahassee Properties. Two warranty deeds were made from Hinson in selling his Arbor Hill property. In deeding his Arbor Hill property on May 20, 1983, one of those went to the Respondent and the other to Tallahassee Properties. In both warranty deeds, the grantee promised to assume and pay an existing mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. The existing mortgage on the Arbor Hills property had the paragraph 17 clause which absent certain exceptions allowed Real Estate Financing, Inc. at its option to declare all sums secured by the mortgage to be immediately due and payable, if the property was sold or transferred without prior written consent from the lender. None of the exceptions pertained to this transaction between Hinson and either Respondent or Tallahassee Properties. The paragraph 17 clause also stated that the mortgage holder was considered to have waived its option to accelerate if prior to the sale or transfer, the mortgage holder reached agreement with the purchaser in writing that the credit of the purchaser was satisfactory to the mortgage holder, thus allowing the purchaser to become responsible for the mortgage. In that instance, interest payable on the sum secured by the mortgage would be at the rate requested by the mortgage holder. The mortgagor, Hinson, would be released from all obligations under the mortgage note if the purchaser was substituted on prior written approval. Hinson went into the transactions involving the sale of his Arbor Hill house and the purchase of the Starmount house with the impression that he had to sell the Arbor Hill house in order to purchase the Starmount house. This was his surmise. Money realized in the sale of the Arbor Hill house was used as a down payment for the Starmount home. Petitioner believed that he had an arrangement to purchase the Starmount home with Ralph Collins. In reality, he was purchasing the home from Collins Builders, Inc. with Collins and Associates, Inc. being the seller's broker. In Mr. Hinson's mind, Respondent and Collins Brothers, Inc. and the then Collins real estate firm through Century 21 were all the same. Going into the transaction, Hinson was not familiar with Tallahassee Properties and its business purpose. Respondent was at both closings, the closing to sell the Arbor Hill house and the closing to purchase the Starmount home. No one discussed the matter of the assumption of the mortgage associated with the Arbor Hills house during the course of the closing of that home. Hinson got the impression from events that Respondent had bought his Arbor Hills house and that everything was being paid off. This impression was not based upon anything Respondent said to him. Hinson, after the closings, requested his insurance company to write to First Alabama concerning the cancellation of his homeowners policy on Arbor Hills. His understanding was that the insurance company sent a letter to do this and that First Alabama sent back a letter saying that they needed certain information. That latter correspondence was then taken to the Respondent. Respondent, under those circumstances, stated to Hinson that it was a mistake and that he would handle it, but that it would take some time to get some of the paper work done. Respondent did not comment to Mr. Hinson on that occasion that he had not assumed the mortgage for the Arbor Hill property nor did he indicate that none of the companies with which he was affiliated had assumed the mortgage. Respondent made no comment whatsoever about assumption of the mortgage in this conversation shown by facts presented at hearing. Hinson then got a new payment book from First Alabama, which he received a couple of days after the insurance letter. This was taken to Respondent and Respondent said that he would take care of it, that it was just a mistake. Again, what was meant by this remark was not developed at hearing. Hinson got one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent that has been referred to previously. Having received this correspondence, Hinson complained to the Tallahassee Board of Realtors. Out of the process of his complaint, Hinson met with Keith Kinderman, Respondent's counsel and the Respondent together with Eric Hoffman, counsel to Hinson. Respondent told Hinson he would help get information and that his counsel, Mr. Kinderman would help in getting some form of restitution and help clear Hinson's name and seek relief from the Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. who had closed the Arbor Hill home. In attempting to obtain a Visa credit card and a Sears credit card, Hinson has been denied that credit. The reason given for the denial is the circumstance associated with the Arbor Hills home and non-payment of the mortgage. The exact circumstance of the Arbor Hills property, concerning who holds it now was not proven at hearing by evidence that can be relied upon for fact finding. COUNT II David P. Walsh and Leila DeJarnette Walsh, his wife bought a home in Huntington Woods from Collins Builders, Inc. on December 23, 1981. This home was financed through Real Estate Financing, Inc. and carried a mortgage from that lender. The mortgage included a paragraph 17 whose language was the same as the Hinson home financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. The Walshes traded in the Huntington Woods property for a home on Faversham Drive which was financed by Citizens and Southern Mortgage Company. Separate closings were conducted. One was for the sale of the Huntington Woods property with Respondent receiving a warranty deed for that property which property was to be taken over by Tallahassee Properties. The second closing was associated with the sale of the Faversham Drive property from Collins Builders, Inc. to the Walshes. In executing the warranty deed in favor of Respondent as grantee pertaining to the Huntington Woods property, a condition of the warranty deed was an agreement by the grantee to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. and pay Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. through some person other than Middleton was the closing agent at the transaction involving the sale of the Huntington Woods property, according to documents at the hearing. Both that sale and the purchase of the Faversham Drive property took place on March 30, 1983. The Walshes signed a document reference the escrow account held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. on its Huntington Woods property. There is no indication whether this was or was not signed by Tallahassee Properties or the Respondent and sent to the Real Estate Financing, Inc. pertaining to funds in the escrow account and insurance coverage being transferred from the Walshes to Tallahassee Properties or Respondent as contemplated by the form. The separate closing associated with the Faversham Drive property was done through Tallahassee Title Company. Respondent was at the closing associated with the homes. Mr. Walsh is not in a position to pay for mortgages on two homes. Mr. Walsh's understanding of the trade in of his Huntington Woods home for the Faversham Drive home was to the effect that he could buy a new home from the transaction and that he would no longer be liable for the traded home, that all paperwork would be taken care of. Some salesman involved in these transactions made these remarks to Mr. Walsh; however, he doesn't know who that person was. Consequently, it is not possible to attribute responsibility for those remarks to Respondent. Subsequent to the closings, the Walshes received correspondence purportedly from First Alabama having to do with Real Estate Financing, Inc.'s mortgage held on the Huntington Woods' property. This correspondence of April 4, 1983, by its terms, reminds the Walshes that the mortgage holder has received notification of cancellation of the homeowner's policy and that the Walshes were to provide insurance coverage at all times. What the real circumstances of the homeowners policy was is not proven by competent evidence. In connection with the transactions, Mr. Walsh describes that he felt that he was dealing with a reputable real estate broker and that they had his best interest in mind. He was not represented by counsel at the closings. Mr. Walsh received one of the February 18, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. Mr. Walsh hired a lawyer to try to address the situation of the Huntington Woods property without success in the endeavor. To his knowledge the Huntington Woods property has been foreclosed on. No proof which is competent has been presented in the hearing to describe the exact nature of the developments with the property. Nonetheless, Mr. Walsh has had problems receiving credit twice since that time. Before the situation with the property he had never had credit problems. Mr. Walsh was proceeding in these transactions on the basis on the belief that Tallahassee Properties and the Respondent were the same entities. COUNT III Troy A. Brewer and Tina J. Brewer, his wife purchased a home from Collins Builders, Inc. in Huntington Woods on December 30, 1981. This home was financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. A mortgage was given by the Brewers in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. and it included a paragraph 17 assumption clause as described in the Hinson mortgage financed by that lender. On March 25, 1983, the Brewers traded their Huntington Woods property for a home on Faringdon Drive. The seller of the Faringdon Drive property was Collins Builders, Inc. In these transactions, the Huntington Woods property was deeded to Respondent with the provisor in the warranty deed that Respondent would assume and agree to pay for the mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. Mr. Brewer is not in a position to meet mortgage payments associated with two mortgages; one on the Huntington Woods property and one on the Faringdon Drive property. Therefore, he would not knowingly obligate himself to assume mortgages associated with both of those properties. In the transactions associated with the traded property and new home purchased, Mr. Brewer proceeded on the basis that the first home was being taken over by the Respondent and that the mortgage would be paid off after a month or so as a means for him to purchase the second home. What led him to believe this is not clear. Mr. Brewer's recollection is that he was told that everything would be taken care of and he would not have to worry about anything and there wouldn't be any problems about the house being traded and that he could stay in the home that he was selling until the new home had been built and that once built, all transactions would be taken care of. Both the traded property and the property being purchased were financed by Real Estate Financing, Inc. He was not represented by an attorney in these matters. Some undisclosed realtor had told Mr. Brewer he could have an attorney but that he really didn't need one. As shown in the testimony of Mr. Brewer given at hearing, he had spoken to Respondent at closing. He also had conversations with Jackie Collins whom he believed to be a representative of Respondent. Jackie Collins was understood by Mr. Brewer to be a realtor. Again, the exact nature of the affiliation of Jackie Collins to the Respondent or his companies was not established in this hearing. Mr. Brewer did state that at the closing he was told by Respondent that there would be no problems. The nature of that remark was not further developed under interrogation of the witness. Nor was the matter of Mr. Brewer's comment to the effect that he had questioned the fact that his first mortgage on the Huntington Woods home was not assumable and had made that question known at the closing, other than to state that in response "they" had assured him everything would be taken care of and he wouldn't have to worry about it. This was associated with some remarks to the effect that Mr. Brewer should not worry that "we" would take it all in and that "they" would transfer everything over and take it out of the Brewers' name, again not pursued as to who "they" and "we" were and whether Respondent was a "they" or "we" or was in attendance when a "they" or "we" made the comments if he was not a "they" or "we." On this subject, Mr. Brewer was of the understanding that the transfer of the mortgage from Mr. Brewer to Respondent had in fact been tentatively approved by Real Estate Financing, Inc. but this was not proven by competent proof either. Mr. Brewer received one of the February 8, 1986 letters from Respondent as previously described. He in turn composed a letter of complaint concerning the transactions associated with the traded property. The complaint is dated March 31, 1986 and is addressed "To whom it may concern". As a result of the non-payment of the Huntington Woods property, Mr. Brewer received a letter purportedly from First Alabama for Real Estate Financing, Inc. dated February 13, 1986 that indicated that payment for the mortgage in the Brewer property had not been paid in January and February, 1986 and under paragraph 18 of the mortgage, Mr. Brewer was being notified of the failure to make payments and the possibility of the pursuit of these delinquent payments through legal means. Whether the assertions in this unauthenticated hearsay document are true was not proven by competent evidence. Beyond that date, in an action in which Respondent and the Brewers were named as defendants, Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. obtained a Summary Final Judgment of foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property on June 1, 1988. This points out that the Brewers were not released from the mortgage obligation as envisioned by paragraph 17. It does not address what attempts were made by Respondent or his companies to gain their release. As a result of the foreclosure, Mr. Brewer has had problems with his credit. Notwithstanding the foreclosure on the Huntington Woods property, there has been no deficiency judgment entered against Mr. Brewer, to his knowledge. COUNT V On November 30, 1983, Collins Company of Pensacola, Inc. conveyed property at Eldorado Drive in Pensacola, Florida to Harold C. Miller, Jr., a Collins employee. That property was subject to a mortgage from Real Estate Financing, Inc. which included a paragraph 17 as included in the facts pertaining to the Hinson transaction involving that lender. This house was purchased because of a transfer of Mr. Miller to Pensacola as a condition of his employment with the Collins Company. The Collins Company of Pensacola was responsible for paying the mortgages during that time frame. In conversation with Respondent, it was determined that Miller would buy the house and the Respondent would buy it back and in the interim, Mr. Miller would live rent free. On May 23, 1985, a quit claim deed was executed by Mr. Miller in favor of the Respondent returning possession of the Pensacola home. Because Respondent had told Mr. Miller that Respondent would make payments on this home, Mr. Miller did not make any payments. Mr. Miller speaks of a contract that was in writing and was involved in the closing on the Pensacola home when it was purchased and that there was a promise to assume the mortgage held by Real Estate Finance, Inc. This comment is made in a deposition of Mr. Miller which was entered as Exhibit 71 by the Petitioner. Whether this refers to an assumption by the Respondent or someone else is not clear. As pointed out by the deposition testimony, more importantly, this contract was not produced then and is not available now for consideration in the deliberation of this case. Mr. Miller bought another house from Collins Construction in Leon County which is at Foxcroft. At the time of the deposition it was occupied by Susan, Mr. Miller's wife. Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued the Respondent and Harold C. Miller, Jr. and Susan F. Miller, his wife, in a foreclosure associated with the Pensacola property and received a Final Judgement for foreclosure on May 11, 1988. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. By the circumstances, Mr. Miller was persuaded that the Respondent would take care of the mortgage on the Pensacola home until it was paid off. What the payment history was on the mortgage prior to foreclosure has not been established in this record. In terms of any promises from Respondent about further obligations on the mortgage on the Pensacola home, Mr. Miller describes that Respondent never told him that he was relieved of that obligation or that he wasn't. Mr. Miller did not question the Respondent about this because he trusted him. COUNT VI On September 25, 1981, Collins Builders, Inc. sold a home to Peter A. Hartmann at Grantham Lane in Tallahassee, Florida. Mr. Hartmann borrowed money from Real Estate Financing, Inc. to purchase that home secured by a mortgage that included paragraph 17 the language of which is the same as in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. That property was subsequently deeded to Respondent on March 25, 1983. In the deed Respondent as grantee promises to assume and pay the Real Estate Financing, Inc. mortgage on the property. The Hartmann property upon which Real Estate Financing, Inc. held a mortgage was foreclosed upon in a suit by Federal National Mortgage Association by and through its agent Real Estate Financing, Inc. against Respondent and in Peter A. Hartmann. Action was taken by order of court on May 3, 1988 and the property sold on May 27, 1988 as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Second Judicial Court in and for Leon County, Florida. This points out that Mr. Hartmann was not released form the mortgage obligation. There is a potential for a deficiency judgement against Mr. Hartmann following that sale. The details of the Hartmann transaction were not presented at hearing through his testimony or anyone else. COUNT VII On April 22, 1982, Collins Builders, Inc., sold John A. Miller and Jeanne B. Miller, his wife, a home in Lakewood Estates. That home was secured by a mortgage in favor of Real Estate Financing, Inc. It contained a paragraph 17 which had the language set out in the Hinson transaction with Real Estate Financing, Inc. which has been described. The home at Lakewood Estates was traded for a home in Huntington Woods II. Those transactions took place on March 2, 1984, and on that date the Millers executed a deed to Ralco, Inc., one of Respondent's companies. The warranty deed contained language to the effect that Ralco, Inc. promised to pay on the mortgage held by Real Estate Financing, Inc. Bobbie G. May signed the contract for sales and purchase as representative of Ralco, Inc. The Huntington Woods II property that was bought by the Millers was bought from Collins Builders, Inc. with Bobbie G. May serving as representative for Collins Builders, Inc. in the contract for sale and purchase. The payments were not made as promised by Ralco, Inc. and Respondent sent the Millers one of the February 18, 1986 letters as previously described. Ultimately, Florida National Mortgage Association through Real Estate Financing, Inc. sued Ralco, Inc. and the Millers in foreclosure and obtained a summary Final Judgement of Foreclosure against those defendants. This points out that the Millers were not released from the mortgage obligation. This as with other foreclosures does not speak to attempts by Ralco, Inc. to be allowed to assume the mortgages in a novation. The property at Lakewood Estates which had been traded in was then sold June 28, 1988, as evidenced by a Certificate of Sale from the Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, in and for Leon County, Florida. That judgment against the Millers is shown on the credit report of John Henry Miller. Mrs. Miller understood that the mortgage payments on the traded home would be made until the property was sold by Ralco, Inc. Visits to the neighborhood where that traded home was found did not indicate any activities toward the sale by way of for sale signs. No one was living in the traded home at that time. The Millers were not represented by counsel during the course of the closings associated with the two homes. They were represented in the foreclosures suit. In reference to the credit circumstance of the Millers, in trying to buy a vehicle they had been denied credit once. They were eventually able to buy the vehicle. The Millers had been told when purchasing the initial home at Lakewood Estates that the reason for buying it would be the possibility of being able to trade for a larger home at some later date if needed. Again, it is not clear who made those statements to the Millers. On the day before the closing of the traded home, Mrs. Miller spoke with Sissie Collins whom she understood to be affiliated with Respondent or one of his companies. The record does not show what that affiliation would have been, if anything. In this conversation with Sissie Collins, Mrs. Miller pointed out to Ms. Collins that the loan with Real Estate Financing, Inc. was not assumable without qualifying. Moreover, Mrs. Miller believed that Respondent did not qualify for the loan and that it was not assumable unless he did. Sissie Collins stated that this was not a problem and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. or First Alabama allowed Respondent to assume a mortgage and make the payments until the property was sold and the mortgage was paid off and that Real Estate Financing, Inc. was fully aware of the circumstance. Whether this was true or not was not proven by competent evidence. What Respondent knew about these matters wasn't shown either. At the time of hearing, the Millers had not been called upon to pay any deficiencies associated with the foreclosure of their Lakewood Estates property. COUNT VIII Eric R. Larsen and Young Oak Larsen, his wife, purchased a home from a Collins Company in Huntington Woods Unit II. That house was eventually traded for a home in Cross Creek. The traded home was deeded to Respondent with the promise that Respondent would assume an existing mortgage on the Huntington Woods Unit II property which is owed to Andrew Jackson State Savings and Loan Association and make payments. The closing associated with the traded property took place on December 2, 1982. The new home was being purchased through the same lending institution as the traded home. The Larsens were not represented in the closings associated with the traded home and the purchased home. The closing of the traded home took place in offices of the Respondent's business. The second closing for the purchased home took place at the Andrew Jackson Federal Savings. When Mr. Larsen asked why the deed for his Huntington Woods II property was being made to the Respondent, he was told that it was to facilitate the assumption of the mortgage. By his remarks, Mr. Larsen is not clear on whether the Respondent attended the closing associated with the traded property. He does recall someone whose name is Chip who he thought was the real estate broker who worked with Respondent was at the closing. No further indication of who this man named Chip might be as to association with Respondent or his companies was shown in this record. The Larsens received a February 18, 1986 letter from Respondent as previously described, when the problems occurred about payments for the traded property, and at that time the mortgage was shown as being held by Colonial Mortgage Company. Mr. Larsen also received a letter on April 8, 1987, purportedly from Colonial Mortgage Company, which states that Mr. Larsen is not released from liability on the traded property and some comment about assumption packages having been sent on various dates and reminds Mr. Larsen that the loan could not be assumed without the prospective purchaser's credit having been approved. The letter describes other perceptions about the ability of the Respondent to take over responsibility for the mortgage on the traded property. All of the matters set out in this unauthenticated correspondence are hearsay and they cannot form the basis of fact-finding in terms of whether Respondent or his companies were ever allowed to assume the mortgage on the traded property. People who had a direct knowledge of the mortgage circumstance with Colonial Mortgage Company pertaining to this traded property as with other traded property on which a lender held mortgages and sent letters have not been presented to explain that circumstance by competent evidence. Likewise, the outcome of what has happened with the traded property in the Larsen transaction has not been proven by competent evidence. The explanation of the outcome with that property is hearsay which may not be used as a basis for fact finding. COUNT IX Robert R. and Patricia A. Aubin, husband and wife, traded property under the program which Respondent was affiliated with for taking in one residence and selling another. Mr. Aubin thought that this kind of transaction was common and that led to his telling his financing institution that the same builder was taking back the original home in order to build Mr. Aubin another house, thinking that this might simplify the transaction. In speaking to someone about the obligation to deal with the existing mortgage on the traded property, he identifies the person he was talking to as Ed Hines. Again, it is not clear what Mr. Hines' association was with the Respondent and his companies. The traded home was going to be given to Tallahassee Properties. Mr. Aubin was not certain of the arrangement Respondent had with his individual companies. Ultimately, there was a problem with the payments on the house that had been traded in. Respondent wrote the Aubins one of the February 18, 1986 letters reference the property at Huntington Woods Unit I. An arrangement was being made whereby Real Estate Financing, Inc. received $3,704.48 from Ralco, Inc. by a check of June 26, 1986. That check was issued after Ralco, Inc. conveyed the traded property back to the Aubins on June 17, 1986 and this resolved the problem for the Aubins.
Recommendation In consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of October, 1989, at Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER DOAH CASE NO. 89-3850 The following discussion is given concerning the proposed fact-finding offered by the parties. PETITIONER'S FACTS Paragraph 1 is utilized. Paragraph 2 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 3 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. 4-5. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are set out in the findings of fact. 6-10. Paragraphs 6-10 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 11 has not been proven. Paragraph 12 is correct in terms of Hinson's decision to convey the property; however, what Hinson was allowed to believe concerning the matter of assumption as it might show culpability on the part of the Respondent has not been proven. This matter set forth in paragraph 13 has not been proven. Paragraph 14 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 15 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 16 has not been proven as to any financial losses due to dishonest acts or false promises of the Respondent. Hinson was found to have been denied credit cards. The latter sentence in paragraph 16 is speculation and not fact. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 18 in the suggestion that the Respondent through his real estate office and salesmen made representations and promises to the Walshes was not proven in the sense that persons involved with the Walshes and the transaction to trade in the home were not sufficiently identified to understand how those persons were affiliated with the Respondent. Paragraph 19 is accepted as to the documents and promises by the Respondent. Again, what the association was of the other person identified as the salesman may have been is not clear in this transaction. Paragraph 20 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 21 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 22 is not proven in the first sentence. The second sentence is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 23 was not proven. Paragraph 24 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found except in its suggestion that the Walshes had been deceived in the sense of the idea of the mortgage not having been assumed or attempts made to have it assumed. Paragraph 26 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to facts found except as it identifies the nature of the salesperson and what the affiliation was with Collins and Associates insufficient proof was made to show the true nature of the position of the salesperson in Collins and Associates, Inc., if any, and what Respondent had in mind and any instructions to this person who was reportedly the salesperson. Paragraph 29 is subordinate to facts found as to promises in the document system responsibilities of Respondent. Otherwise it is not accepted. Paragraph 30 is subordinate to facts found except as to its suggestion that deceit has been proven relating to the Respondent's attempts to have the mortgage assumed. Paragraph 31 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 33 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found except as to the suggestion that this problem of the foreclosure dissolved the marriage. Paragraph 35 in its first sentence is contrary to the Impression of the facts. There was a discussion and a decision reached to buy the house, whether Respondent was acting as a real estate broker individually or as a builder developer is unclear. Whether he made his employee buy the house or directed him to is not accepted as a fact. Paragraph 36 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 37 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 38 was not proven on the issue of whether Respondent applied for an assumption. The Final Judgment of closure was proven. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found in a suggestion of an agreement to take over the Huntington Woods property. Reference to the allegations and the foreclosure petition are not necessary to the resolution of the dispute and do not constitute an explanation of how Respondent may have carried out his promise to take over responsibilities for the mortgage and the traded property which is the true issue. Likewise, paragraph 42 where it is acknowledged in that suit the agreement to assume the mortgage does not answer the issue of whether attempts were made to bring about that assumption. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 44 and its suggestion as to any intended action on the part of a mortgage insurer has not been proven by competent evidence. Paragraph 45 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 47 in the suggestion of activities by a salesperson of Collins and Associates has not been shown in terms of the affiliation with the Respondent's companies or with the Respondent in terms of the details of that affiliation sufficient to show that Respondent is culpable for any acts of his employees. Respondent through Ralco, Inc. had agreed to assume and pay for the existing mortgage on the traded property. Paragraph 48 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 49 is subordinate to facts found. Suggestion by counsel that Respondent's admission of 86 coincide with the fact finding in paragraph 50 is erroneous as is reference to page 11 in the transcript which speaks of the admissions. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found with the exception that the Respondent was not shown to have been deceitful in saying that the mortgage had not been allowed for assumption in that no competent proof was offered as to the attitude of the lender concerning the assumption. Paragraph 53 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 54 is correct in terms of the credit report on foreclosure, otherwise it is rejected as heresay. Paragraph 55 is inaccurate when it suggests that proof was made that Respondent did not take care of the assumption in the Larsen trade-in property. Paragraph 56 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 57 constitutes legal argument. RESPONDENT'S FACTS 1-7. Paragraphs 1-7 are subordinate to facts found. The first sentence of Paragraph 8 is contrary to facts found. The remaining sentences within paragraph 8 are subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 9 is subordinate to facts found. In paragraph 10, Charles Middleton was not shown to have been the closing agent for Capital Abstract and Title, Inc. in the transactions which are at issue here. In paragraph 11, Respondent was responsible for applying for the mortgage assumptions but the proof was not made that he did not do so or that he did. Paragraph 12 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 13 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 14 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 15 is hearsay and may not form the basis of the fact finding. Paragraph 16 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 17 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 18 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 19 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 20 is not accepted. Paragraph 21 is not accepted. Paragraph 22 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 23 is not relevant. Paragraph 24 is the reputation of the Respondent is only relevant if culpability has been shown. It has not been. 25. Paragraph 25 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 26 is not accepted in terms of what position Chip Miller held and what capacity he was acting in when involved in the Hinson transaction as employee of Collins and Associates, or Tallahassee Properties or exactly what capacity. Paragraph 27 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 28 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 29 is heresay and not accepted. Paragraph 30 is contrary to the impression of the credit circumstance of Mr. Hinson. Whatever the current credit report may say, Mr. Hinson's credit had been hurt. Paragraph 31 is true. Paragraph 32 is subordinate to the facts found except for deprivation of credit. Paragraph 33 is not necessary to the resolution of dispute. Paragraph 34 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 35 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 36 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 37 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 38 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 39 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 40 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 41 is subordinate to facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 42 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 43 is subordinate to facts found, except in its suggestion of what capacity Sissie Collins really served which is not established. Paragraph 44 is subordinate to facts found, except not proven that mortgage assumption tentatively approved. He did make representations as the mortgage grantee. Paragraph 46 is subordinate to the fact found. Paragraph 47 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 48 is contrary to facts found. There is no paragraph 49. Paragraph 50 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 51 is subordinate to the facts found, except as to credit. Paragraph 52 is subordinate to the facts found. 53.-55. Paragraphs 53-55 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 56 is contrary to facts found. Paragraph 57 is subordinate. Paragraph 58 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 59 is subordinate to the facts found. 60.-62 Paragraphs 60-62 are subordinate to the facts found. 63.-64. Paragraphs 63-64 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 65 is subordinate to facts found. Paragraph 66 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 67 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 68 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 69 is subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 70 is subordinate to the facts found. 71.-72. Paragraphs 71-72 are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 73 in the first sentence is subordinate to the facts found. The second sentence has to do with whether Andrew Jackson gave preliminary approval for the assumption of the mortgage on the traded property and is heresay not accepted. Paragraph 74 is not necessary to the resolution of the dispute. Paragraph 75 is subordinate to the facts found. 76.-77. Paragraphs 76 and 77 are accepted as true but are not needed. 78.-79. Paragraphs 78-79 are subordinate to the facts found. 80. In this instance and all that have discussed before, Respondent did make representations through the February 18, 1986 letters. 81-82. Paragraphs 81-82 are subordinate to facts found. 83. Paragraph 83 is subordinate to facts found. 84.-85. Paragraphs 84-85 are subordinate to facts found. Suggestion that the paragraph 86 relates back to initial paragraphs is acknowledged and accepted in the manner that has been described in the discussion at the paragraphs set forth in the proposed fact finding. Paragraph 87 is legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Darlene F. Keller, Executive Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 James H. Gillis, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate Legal Section 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32817 William M. Furlow, Esquire Katz, Kutter, Haigler, Alderman, Eaton, Davis, Marks, P.A. Post Office Box 1877 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1877 Keith Kinderman, Esquire 906 Thomasville Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On or about November 24, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed a sign advertising Coldwell Banker Realty apparently on the right-of-way of U.S. 19 in Pinellas County. At this location, the right-of-way of U.S. 19 extends 50 feet from the edge of the paved surface of U.S. 19. A measurement taken from the edge of the pavement to the sign showed the sign to be 38 feet from the edge of the pavement of U.S. 19, some 12 feet inside the right-of-way line.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of issuing checks from his escrow account without sufficient funds so as to constitute culpable negligence, breach of trust, misrepresentation, or concealment, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; failing to reconcile escrow accounts, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e) and (k), Florida Statutes, and Rule 61J2-14.012, Florida Administrative Code; employing an unlicensed person, in violation of Section 475.42(1)(c), Florida Statutes; failing to maintain business records, in violation of Section 475.5015, Florida Statutes; and violating a lawful order of the Florida Real Estate Commission by failing to pay a citation within the required time, in violation of Section 475.25(1)(e), Florida Statutes. If Respondent is guilty of any of these allegations, an additional issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent became a licensed real estate salesperson in 1987. The following year, he became a licensed real estate broker, and he has remained a broker continuously since that time. From September 30, 1996, through January 30, 2000, Respondent was the qualifying broker of Express Realty and Investments, Inc. (Express Realty). At no time relevant to this case was Novellete Faye Hanse a Florida-licensed real estate broker or real estate salesperson. At all relevant times, Ms. Hanse was the office manager of Express Realty. Respondent formed Express Realty in 1995. Respondent was the sole director and president. Ms. Hanse's son was an officer of Express Realty from the time of its formation. Respondent met Ms. Hanse in 1991. She informed Respondent that she was a licensed mortgage broker. Respondent and Ms. Hanse agreed in late 1991 to form a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation in a single office. However, when Hurricane Andrew struck in 1992, Respondent, who has been a licensed general contractor since 1978, engaged exclusively in construction until 1995. Respondent formed Express Realty to pursue the prior plan of a joint real estate/mortgage broker operation. The two businesses occupied an office building owned by Ms. Hanse, who did not charge Respondent's business any rent. The address was 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. Express Realty served as an escrow agent in a contract dated May 9, 1999, for the sale and purchase of real property located at 6360 Southwest 23rd Street in Miramar. In this capacity, Express Realty, held various funds in escrow for the closing. For the closing, Express Realty issued two checks payable to the closing agent, totaling $19,169.08, and drawn on its escrow account. The checks, which are dated July 15, 1999, and signed by Ms. Hanse, bear the name, "Express Realty & Investments, Inc. Escrow Account" and bear the address 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The bank failed to pay these checks due to insufficient funds. After receiving a complaint that Express Realty had failed to produce these escrow funds at the closing, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Respondent's escrow account. At the audit, which took place the day prior to the day scheduled, the investigator found Ms. Hanse, but not Respondent, at the Express Realty office. Despite repeated requests on and after the day of the office visit, the investigator could not obtain relevant records from Ms. Hanse or Respondent concerning the real estate transaction for which Express Realty had issued escrow checks with insufficient funds. On August 23, 1999, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued a citation to Respondent at 6306 Pembroke Road in Miramar. The citation was served on Respondent within one week of the date of issuance. The $100-citation was for the failure to give the required disclosure or notice in a real estate transaction. The citation gave Respondent 30 days to contest the citation or 60 days to pay the citation. After the deadline, the investigator contacted Respondent and asked him about the citation. Respondent stated that he had forgotten about it. When Respondent still failed to pay the citation, the investigator called again, and Respondent stated that he had mailed the money, but it had been returned due to a faulty address. Respondent paid the citation approximately four months after it had been served on him. Shortly after Respondent belatedly paid the citation, Petitioner received another complaint concerning a contract for the sale and purchase of real property located at 850 Southwest 9th Avenue in Hallandale. In this transaction, Ms. Hanse represented herself to be a licensed real estate broker, showed the property to prospects, and accepted $5000 in escrow on behalf of Express Realty. In July 2000, Petitioner's investigator conducted an audit of Express Realty's escrow account. Again, the investigator was unable to find any documents by which he could undertake an independent reconciliation of the account or otherwise document the role of Express Realty in the subject transaction. At the hearing, Respondent claimed that he was unaware that Ms. Hanse had been conducting real estate business without his authority in the name of Express Realty. Although he admitted that she was an employee of Express Realty, he disclaimed any knowledge that she had removed him from the escrow account and otherwise taken over the management of the real estate broker company. However, Respondent could not explain why, after his claimed discovery of these misdeeds in the summer of 1999, he did nothing to prevent Ms. Hanse from continuing to use Express Realty as the means by which to conduct unlicensed real estate activities, as she did a few months later. Under the circumstances, Petitioner proved that Respondent was at all times aware that Ms. Hanse was conducting unlicensed real estate activities through Express Realty.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the allegations contained in Counts I-IV and VI of the Amended Administrative Complaint, imposing a $5000 administrative fine, and suspending his license for three years; provided, however, if Respondent fails to pay the fine in full within 180 days of the final order, his license shall be revoked without further notice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack Hisey, Deputy Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Dean Saunders, Chairperson Florida Real Estate Commission Division of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Hardy L. Roberts, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Juana Carstarphen Watkins Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 Wayne Wagie 11900 North Bayshore Drive, Unit No. 5 Miami, Florida 33181
