The Issue The issues in this case are: Whether Petitioner, Warren M. Briggs ("Briggs"), should be issued a Wetland Resource Permit (WRP) for the construction of a single-family dwelling on a lot with jurisdictional wetlands in Santa Rosa County, Florida, as proposed in his application submission of 1998; and Whether the Department would permit the construction of a single-family dwelling on the subject lot under conditions and circumstances other than those set forth in Briggs' application.
Findings Of Fact Briggs is the owner of Lot 67, Block H, Paradise Bay Subdivision, located in southern Santa Rosa County ("Briggs lot"). Paradise Bay Subdivision was developed in approximately 1980, prior to the passage in 1984 of the Warren Henderson Wetland Protection Act. (Official Recognition of Section 403.918, Florida Statutes). The subdivision consists of modestly priced single- family homes that are attractive to young families because of the quality of nearby schools. The typical non-waterfront home in the subdivision is single story, approximately 2,000 square feet in area, and built on a concrete slab. The typical setback from the road to the front edge of a home is 75 feet. This fairly consistent setback from the road prevents the view from one home into the adjacent property owner’s back yard and, thereby, adversely affecting the neighbor’s property value. The undeveloped Briggs lot was purchased in 1981 for approximately $15,000 and remains undeveloped. Briggs bought the lot, along with three other lots in the subdivision, as investment property. The other three lots have been sold. One of the lots sold earlier by Briggs was a waterfront lot on East Bay located in jurisdictional wetlands. The entire lot was filled pursuant to a permit issued by the Department. The Briggs lot is 90 feet wide by 200 feet deep. It is located on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive. The lots on the north side of Paradise Bay Drive are waterfront lots on East Bay. To the rear (south) of the Briggs lot and other lots on the south side of Paradise Bay Drive, is a large swamp that eventually discharges into East Bay. The major connection between the Briggs lot and East Bay is through a culvert under Paradise Bay Drive. The Briggs’ lot consists of 2,914 square feet of uplands and 15,086 square feet of state jurisdictional wetland, with all of the uplands located in the northern half of the lot. Converted to acres, the Briggs lot consists of 0.067 acres of uplands and 0.347 acres of state jurisdictional wetland. Lot 66, immediately east of the Briggs lot, has been cleared and is about half tietie swamp with the remainder consisting of uplands and disturbed wetlands. Some fill has been placed on the lot. Lot 68, immediately west of the Briggs lot, is undeveloped and consists of all tietie wetlands. Lots 69, 70 and 71 of Block H of the subdivision are undeveloped and consist primarily of wetlands. The Department issued a permit on October 31, 1996, that allowed the owners of Lot 71 to fill 0.22 acres (9,570 square feet) of wetlands. The fill is allowed to a lot depth of 145 feet on the west side, and to a width of 73 feet of the total lot width of 90 feet. The fill area is bordered on the east and west by wetland areas not to be filled. The Department issued a permit on November 13, 1997, that allowed the owner of Lot 61 to fill 0.26 acres (11,310 square feet) of wetlands. Fill is allowed over the entire northern 125 feet of the 185 foot-deep lot. On April 28, 1998, Briggs applied to the Department for a permit to fill Lot 67. The Department, in its letter of August 7, 1998, and its permit denial of September 2, 1998, erroneously described the project as consisting of 0.47 acres of fill. The entire lot consists of only 0.41 acres, of which 0.067 acres is uplands, leaving a maximum area of fill of 0.343 acres. If Briggs’ residential lot is to be used, some impact to the wetlands on the lot is unavoidable. Alternatives discussed by Briggs and the Department, three of which are still available for Briggs to accept, included the following: One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill from the wetland area, with no off-site mitigation; Fill pad could be placed on property with the remainder of the wetlands on the site to remain in their natural state with no backyard, with no off-site mitigation required; One hundred feet of fill with a bulkhead separating the fill material from the wetland, with a small back yard, with no off-site mitigation required. Briggs did not accept any of the foregoing alternatives or proposed acceptable mitigation measures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the permit application, provided that the parties may reach subsequent agreement regarding proper mitigation in order to make the construction of a single-family dwelling possible on the Petitioner’s property in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Collette, Esquire Lucinda R. Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Jesse W. Rigby, Esquire Clark, Partington, Hart, Larry Bond and Stackhouse 125 West Romana Street, Suite 800 Post Office Box 13010 Pensacola, Florida 32591-3010 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard The Douglas Building, Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact The Intervenors filed an Application for Dredge and Fill Permit with the Department of Environmental Regulation. The Department entered a notice of its intent to issue a permit. Petitioner requested a formal administrative hearing. The Department forwarded the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings, where it was given Case No. 82-3155. A Recommended Order which includes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law has been entered in Case No. 82-3155. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set out in the Recommended Order are hereby incorporated into this Final Order and constitute a part of this Final Order. The Petitioner is an association of home owners within a residential development known as "Caloosa." Intervenors are seeking to develop an industrial park on land adjacent to the Caloosa development. Surface and ground waters from the proposed industrial park would drain toward Caloosa. Prior to the Department's entry of the notice of intent to issue a permit to Intervenors, the Department's personnel evaluated the application in free-form proceedings. An environmental specialist who works with the Department as a permit processor proposed to deny the application on account of the fact that Intervenors proposed to fill approximately 70 acres of wetlands, 24 of which were within the Department's permitting authority under Rule 17-4.28, Florida Administrative Code. The administrator of the Department's Dredge and Fill Permitting Section came to the conclusion that denial of the application could not be justified. He felt that the wetlands to be filled served only marginally to preserve water quality in the area. The Intervenors had proposed to artificially create wetland areas in order to compensate for the loss of filled wetland areas. The program administrator suggested to the permit processor that they negotiate to get the Intervenors to create additional artificial wetlands in order to mitigate against any possible adverse effect from the loss of natural wetland areas. These negotiations occurred, and the Intervenors agreed to increase artificially created wetland areas. The Department of Environmental Regulation does not have a rule which provides that its personnel can engage in negotiations respecting a permit application. Negotiations are, however, an inherent part of a permitting process. The Department does not have any written or unwritten policy whereby it accepts such mitigating factors as artificially created wetlands as justifying the filling of natural wetlands. It does not appear that the Department has any rule or nonrule policy concerning mitigation or trade-offs, and it does not appear that the Department has ever had such a rule or policy. The Department does not have a policy of accepting concessions, trade-offs, or mitigating factors so as to allow an applicant to violate the Department's water quality standards. Since there has been a permitting process, such factors as artificially created wetlands have been considered by the Department in determining whether an application meets the Department's criteria for issuance of a permit. The Department's policy is to consider whether an applicant has provided reasonable assurance that the short-term and long-term effects of proposed activities will not result in violations of water quality standards, as required under Rule 17- 4.28(3), Florida Administrative Code. If an applicant has proposed to construct artificial wetlands, the Department would logically consider it in making determinations about granting the permit. There is no evidence in the record of this proceeding from which it could be concluded that the Department has any unpromulgated "mitigation" policy which has the effect of a rule.
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted the relief requested in his petition challenging the Department of Environmental Protection's Consolidated Notice of Denial [of] Environmental Resource Permit and Consent of Use to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a collector and wholesaler of various "saltwater products," as defined in Chapter 370, Florida Statutes.1 He possess a saltwater products license (issued pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 46-42, Florida Administrative Code), with a restricted species and marine life endorsement, which allows him to engage in these activities. Petitioner collects and sells, among other things, what is referred to as "live sand," a calcium carbonate sediment used in public and home aquaria as a decorative detoxifying agent. "Live sand" is found on offshore water bottoms in the Florida Keys (where Petitioner engages in his collection activities) and other areas in Florida. "Live sand" consists primarily of the calcified (dead) remains of Halimeda plants. Halimeda plants (generally on a seasonal basis) produce plates, which they ultimately shed. These plates, through various physical and biological processes, are broken down over time into smaller and smaller granules. Halimeda plants are very productive (in terms of the number of plates they produce), but they are found only in certain (not all) offshore areas in the Florida Keys. While the granules that make up the "live sand" Petitioner collects and sells consist of dead plant matter, thousands of micro and macroorganisms (in a cubic foot area), representing numerous species, live amongst these granules and therefore are also removed from the water as a result of Petitioner's collection activities. The microorganisms living in "live sand" include nitrosomous bacteria. The presence of nitrosomous bacteria enables "live sand" to neutralize the ammonia waste products of fish in public and home aquaria. Among the macroorganisms living in "live sand" are mollusks, worms, arthropods, and echinoderms. These organisms are an important part of the diet of other species, including protected species such as the spiny lobster (Panulirus argus), which itself is part of the food supply for fish in the area. Petitioner collects "live sand" by diving underwater and using his hands to scoop up and place in buckets the top layers of the bottom ("live sand") substrate. Such collection activities have negative environmental consequences that are not insignificant. They adversely impact water quality in the waters in which they occur and in adjacent waters inasmuch as they increase turbidity and reduce biological diversity. Excavation of the top layer of bottom substrate exposes the siltier sediment below, which, when disturbed, reduces water clarity and therefore also the amount of sunlight that penetrates the water. Furthermore, this newly exposed substrate, because of its anaerobic nature, is unable to attract a significant benthic community comparable to that found in the "live sand" that previously covered it. In addition, because these collection activities result in the removal of organisms that are important components of the aquatic food chain and in loss of their habitats, these activities have an adverse effect on marine productivity and, resultantly, on fishing and recreational values. The "live sand" that is the subject of the instant controversy is located in Monroe County within the boundaries of the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary in state waters designated Class III, Outstanding Florida Waters (OFW).2 Petitioner first contacted the Department in writing regarding the removal of this "live sand" in May of 1997, when he sent the Department a letter which read, in pertinent part, as follows: REF: Collection of Sand for Use in Aquari[a] Pursuant to our recent telephone conversation, I respectfully request that I receive a letter of de minimis for the aforementioned activity. The sand is collected by hand using five gallon buckets. The collection occurs under water [at] a depth of approximately 20 feet. The sand occurs in an area devoid of marine grasses, plants and corals. No sand is taken from or near shorelines and no sedimentary resultant is produced. I intend to collect four five gallon buckets each of which contains 50 pounds of sand. This collection is to occur once a month. . . . By letter dated June 2, 1997, the Department acknowledged receipt of Petitioner's letter and requested that he provide "additional information" to enable the Department to determine whether it should grant him "an exemption from the need for an Environmental Resource Permit pursuant to Part IV, Chapter 373, Florida Statutes (F.S.), and an authorization to use state- owned submerged lands, pursuant to Chapters 253 and 258, F.S., to collect sand, by hand, from underwater." On August 28, 1997, Petitioner supplied the Department with an "addendum to [his] original request for consideration" in which he specified the location of his "proposed collection" of "live sand" as "Lat. N 24.31.29 - Lon. W 081.34.40. The Department deemed Petitioner's "addendum" insufficient to render his paperwork "complete." By letter dated September 23, 1997, the Department so advised Petitioner. Along with letter, the Department provided Petitioner with the following "revised request for additional information identifying the remaining items necessary to complete [his] application": Part I REVISED COMPLETENESS SUMMARY FOR SAND COLLECTION The proposed project will require an Environmental Resource Permit. The correct processing fee for this project is $500.00. Provide a $500 processing fee payable to the Department of Environmental Protection. In your letter received May 6, 1997, requesting a De Minimis exemption you state you intend to collect four (4), five (5) gallon buckets of sand each of which contains fifty (50) pounds of sand per month. A letter you submitted to the Department from the Army Corps of Engineers (dated May 9, 1997) states you will collect four (4) or five (5), five (5) gallon buckets three (3) times per month. Please indicate the quantity of sand you propose[] to collect per month. Part II CONSENT OF USE (Chapters 18-18, 18-20 and 18-21, Florida Administrative Code) For your information If the project develops to the point where proposed dredging will be recommended for authorization, payment for the removal of sovereign submerged land will be required at $3.25 per cubic yard, or a minimum payment of $50.00 prior to issuance of the authorization. Do not provide payment until requested by Department staff. [See 18- 21.011(3)(a), F.A.C.] Petitioner timely responded to the Department's "revised request for additional information" by letter dated October 10, 1997, to which he attached the requested "processing fee." In his letter, Petitioner advised the Department that it was his "intent to collect approximately 600 (six hundred) pounds of material each month." Following its receipt of Petitioner's letter and accompanying "processing fee," the Department sent letters to potentially affected parties advising them of Petitioner's "proposed [sand collection] activit[ies]" and soliciting their comments concerning these activities. The Florida Department of Community Affairs responded to the Department's request by indicating, in written correspondence it sent to the Department, that it had "no objection to the proposed project." The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) also provided written comments to the Department. It did so by letter dated November 21, 1997, which read as follows: The following are comments from the Florida Keys National Marine Sanctuary (FKNMS) concerning the application from Jeff Frankel to collect live sand, File No 44-0128760-001. These comments reflect the consensus of both NOAA and FDEP Sanctuary staff. The harvest of live sand is viewed by the Sanctuary as dredging. This activity is considered neither fishing nor traditional fishing activity. Therefore, "harvesting of live sand" is within the prohibition against dredging, or otherwise altering the seabed of the Sanctuary and does not fall within the exception for "traditional fishing activities" as Mr. Frankel asserts. As such this activity should not be conducted in the Sanctuary without a Federal or State permit. The Sanctuary is opposed to permitting this activity in Federal or State waters for the following reasons: As stated above, it is a dredging activity which is prohibited.3 The Sanctuary exists because of the unique and nationally significant resources found here. These resources exist due to the dynamic ecosystem of which sand, and the meiofaunal communities found therein, is a major component. The Sanctuary is opposed to unnecessary alteration of the ecosystem particularly when viable alternatives exist such as harvesting outside the FKNMS in Gulf waters and aquaculture. Sixty-five percent of the Sanctuary seabottom is State sovereign lands. Removal of the quantities of substrate for commercial purposes does not appear to be in the public interest. Pursuant to the intragency compact agreement between the State of Florida and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration dated May 19, 1997, NOAA will not permit a prohibited activity in federal waters in the Sanctuary that is not allowed in the State waters of the Sanctuary. We appreciate the opportunity to comment on this application. On January 8, 1998, the Department issued its Consolidated Notice of Denial [of] Environmental Resource Permit and Consent of Use to Use Sovereign Submerged Lands. In its Consolidated Notice, the Department gave the following reasons for its action: The Department hereby denies the permit for the following reason: The proposed project will directly impact water quality by removal of approximately 660 pounds of "live sand" from state-owned sovereign submerged land each month. The material collected consists of dead calcareous green algae (Halimeda spp.) and calcium carbonate grains. This substrate is important habitat for grazers and detritivores and it contains an extensive and diverse invertebrate community. . . . The project as proposed does not comply with the specific criteria within; Chapter 373, F.S., F.A.C. Rule 62-300, and Section 4.2 of the Basis of Review for Environmental Resource Permit Applications within the South Florida Water Management District. The above impacts are expected to adversely affect marine productivity, fisheries, wildlife habitat, and water quality. The applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the immediate and long-term impacts of the project will not result in the violation of water quality standards pursuant to F.A.C. Rule 62-312.150(3) and 62-312.070. Specific State Water Quality Standards in F.A.C. Rules 62-302.500, 62-302.510, 62- 302.560 and 62-4.242 that will be affected by the completion of the project include the following: Biological Integrity- . . . . This project will also result in the following matter which are not clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 373.414(1)(a), F.S.: adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered species, or their habitats; diminish the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity; adversely affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of the activity; the activity will be permanent in nature; adversely affect the functions and relative value of the habitat within the area of the proposed project. Therefore, the Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the project is clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 373.414(1)(a), F.S. The request for authorization to use sovereign submerged lands is denied because the Applicant has not met all applicable requirements for proprietary authorizations to use sovereign submerged lands, pursuant to Article X, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution, Chapter 253 F,S., associated Chapter 18-21, F.A.C., and the policies of the Board of Trustees. Specifically, operation of the activity is inconsistent with management policies, standards and criteria of F.A.C. Rule 18- 21.00401(2) and 18-21.004. The Applicant has not provided reasonable assurance that the activity will be clearly "in the public interest," will maintain essentially natural conditions, will not cause adverse impacts to fish and wildlife resources or public recreation or navigation, and will not interfere with the riparian rights of adjacent property owners. In addition, the project is inconsistent with the goals and objectives of the "Conceptual State Lands Management Plan," adopted by the Board of Trustees on March 17, 1981. The . . . activity is inconsistent with Section 18-21.00401(2), F.A.C., the authorization to use sovereign submerged lands cannot be approved, in accordance with Sections 18-21.00401 and 62-343.075, F.A.C., because the activity does not meet the conditions for issuance of a standard general of individual permit under Part IV of Chapter 373, F.S., as described above. The Consolidated Notice accurately describes the adverse impacts of the "project" which is subject of the instant case (Project). Petitioner has not proposed any measures to mitigate these adverse impacts. If the Department authorizes the Project, it is reasonable to anticipate that other collectors of "live sand" would seek the Department's approval to engage in similar activity in the area. If these other projects were also approved, there would be additional adverse environmental consequences. As the Consolidated Notice alleges, Petitioner has failed to provide reasonable assurance that the Project would not degrade the ambient water quality of the OFW in which the Project would be undertaken, nor has he provided reasonable assurance that the Project is clearly in the public interest.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department issue a final order denying Petitioners' application for an environmental resource permit and for a lease to use sovereign submerged lands. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of January, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of January, 1999.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Clifford O. Hunter, is the owner of real property located at Dekle Beach, Taylor County, Florida. Mr. Hunter's property is located at lot 53, Front Street, Dekle Beach, within section 22, township 7 south, range 7 east, Taylor County. Respondent, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida with responsibility for, among other things, dredge and fill permits involving Florida waters. Mr. Hunter lived in a home on his Dekle Beach property until a storm in March of 1993 destroyed the home. Mr. Hunter's Application for Permit. On or about June 2, 1993, Mr. Hunter applied for a wetland resource permit to rebuild his home, construct a bulkhead and fill 1750 square feet of salt marsh. The permit was designated No. 62-232123-2 by the Department. Mr. Hunter also sought approval for the construction of a dock. The dock, however, is exempt from the permitting requirements of Rule 17- 312.050(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code. On July 21, 1993, the Department issued a Notice of Permit Denial. The Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter. On August 13, 1993, Mr. Hunter filed a Request for Formal Administrative Hearing with the Department contesting the denial of his permit application. The Department's Jurisdiction Over the Proposed Project. The proposed project involves dredging and filling in the waters of the State of Florida. A wetland resource permit is, therefore, required. Wetland jurisdiction of the State of Florida extends to the eastern edge of an existing concrete slab on Mr. Hunter's property from a canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's northern boundary. The canal connects with the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico surrounding Dekle Beach, except for an area extending 500 feet outward from the town limits of Dekle Beach, is within the Big Bend Seagrasses Aquatic Preserve. The preserve is an Outstanding Florida Water (hereinafter referred to as an "OFW"). The evidence presented by the Department to support findings of fact 9, 10 and 11 was uncontroverted by Mr. Hunter. Impact on Water Quality Standards. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Mr. Hunter has provided reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not lower the existing ambient water quality of waters of the State of Florida. The evidence presented by the Department concerning adverse impacts of the proposed project on water quality standards was uncontroverted by Mr. Hunter. Approval of Mr. Hunter's proposed project would allow the placing of fill in an intertidal area and the elimination of the portion of the intertidal area filled. Intertidal areas help maintain water quality by acting as a filter for water bodies. Mr. Hunter has obtained a variance from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services which will allow him to place a septic tank on his property if the permit is granted. The septic tank will leach pollutants. Those pollutants will include nutrients, viruses and bacteria. Because the soil around the septic tank is very saturated, filtering of the pollutants will be low. Pollutants will, therefore, leach into the waters of the State of Florida and adversely impact water quality standards of the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property. Under such circumstances, Mr. Hunter has failed to demonstrate that the project will not lower existing ambient water quality of waters of the State of Florida. Public Interest Test. Mr. Hunter failed to present evidence to support a conclusion that the proposed project will not be adverse to the public interest. Rather, the unrebutted evidence presented by the Department supports a finding that Mr. Hunter's proposed project will not be in the public interest, especially when the cumulative impacts of the proposed project, discussed, infra, are considered. Possible adverse impacts to the public interest include the following: The septic tank which Mr. Hunter will place in the 1750 square feet of filled area will allow fecal coliform, viruses and pathogens to leach into the waters of the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property. Anyone who enters the canal could be infected from bacteria and viruses leaching from the septic tank. The conservation of fish and wildlife would also be adversely affected by the adverse impact on water quality and by the elimination of intertidal area. Recreational value of the canal would be reduced because of the adverse impact on water quality. The proposed project is for a permanent structure. Cumulative Impact. There are a number of applications for permits similar to the application filed by Mr. Hunter which have been filed by property owners of Dekle Beach whose homes were also destroyed by the March 1993 storm. If Mr. Hunter's permit application is granted, the Department will have to also grant most, if not all, of the other similar permit applications. Approximately 20 to 30 other applications involve similar requests which will allow the placement of fill and the installation of septic tanks. The resulting fill and use of septic tanks will have a significant cumulative adverse impact on the waters of the State of Florida. The cumulative impact from leaching effluent from the septic tanks on the waters of the State could be substantial. In addition to the impact on the canal adjacent to Mr. Hunter's property, there will a cumulative negative impact on the ambient water quality of approximately 20 septic tanks on the canals and on the OFW. Errors in the Department's Notice of Permit Denial. The Notice of Permit Denial issued by the Department contained the following errors: An incorrect description of Mr. Hunter's lot number and section number; An incorrect statement that the amount of Mr. Hunter's proposed fill would eliminate 3,200 square feet of marsh; An incorrect statement that Mr. Hunter proposed to fill his lot for a distance of 64 feet waterward. The errors contained in the Notice of Permit Denial did not form any basis for the Department's denial of Mr. Hunter's application. The errors were typographical/word-processing errors. Several notices were being prepared at the same time as the Notice of Permit Denial pertaining to Mr. Hunter. The incorrect information contained in Mr. Hunter's Notice of Permit Denial was information which applied to the other notices. Other than the errors set out in finding of fact 23, the Notice of Permit Denial was accurate. Among other things, it was properly addressed to Mr. Hunter, it contained the project number assigned by the Department to Mr. Hunter's proposed project and it accurately reflected the Department's decision to deny Mr. Hunter's permit application. Mr. Hunter responded to the Notice of Permit Denial by requesting a formal administrative hearing to contest the Department's denial of his application. On December 20, 1993, Mr. Hunter received a letter from the Department which corrected the errors contained in the Notice of Permit Denial. The corrections were also contained in a Notice of Correction filed in this case by the Department on December 20, 1993. The Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter within 90 days after his application was filed. The corrections to the Notice of Permit Denial was received by Mr. Hunter more than 90 days after his application was filed.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection enter a Final Order dismissing the petition in this case and denying the issuance of permit number 62-232123-2 to Clifford O. Hunter. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Mr. Hunter's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 3. Accepted in 2. Accepted in 4. Although Ernest Frey, Director of District Management, Northeast District Office of the Department, did ask Mr. Hunter whether he wanted to sell his property to the State, the evidence failed to prove why Mr. Frey asked this question, that Mr. Frey asked the question in his official capacity with the Department, or that Mr. Frey made the inquiry at the direction or on behalf of the Department or the State. More importantly, the evidence failed to prove that the Department denied the permit sought by Mr. Hunter because of any interest the State may have in purchasing Mr. Hunter's property. See 4. 6-8 No relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Accepted in 6, 23, 28 and 30. Not a proposed finding of fact. See 8. The "aerial photo, Petitioner's exhibit 6, does not show "No vegetation behind the slab, nearly to the Mean High Water Line . . . ." Respondent's exhibit 3 does, however, show vegetation as testified to by Department witnesses. 13-14 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not a proposed finding of fact. Generally correct. Mr. Hunter was not properly put on notice of "alternatives" by the Notice of Permit Denial, as corrected, issued by the Department. Summation: Mr. Hunter's Summation was considered argument and was considered in this case. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 3. Accepted in 2. Accepted in 1 and 4-5. Accepted 6-7. Accepted in 8. 6-9 Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 14. Accepted in 15. Accepted in 19. Accepted in 20. Accepted in 15. 17-18 Accepted in 15 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 15 and 20-21. Accepted in 10. Accepted in 22. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 22. Accepted in 12. Accepted in 15-16. Accepted in 17 and 21. 27-28 Accepted in 17. Accepted in 18. Accepted in 13. Accepted in 16. 32-33 The Notice of Permit Denial, as corrected, did not put Mr. Hunter on notice that the alternatives raised by the Department at the final hearing would be an issue in this case. Those alternatives should not, therefore, form any basis for the Department's final decision. Accepted in 24-25. Accepted in 23. Accepted in 25. Accepted in 24 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 26. COPIES FURNISHED: Clifford O. Hunter 1410 Ruby Street Live Oak, Florida 32060 Beth Gammie Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-9730 Virginia B. Wetherell, Secretary Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Kenneth Plante, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact On or about August 11, 1987 an application for conditional use approval to allow on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages (4COP) was filed on behalf of Joseph W. McGoldrick for property located at 2848 Gulf to Bay Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The property is zoned general commercial (CG) and multiple family residential (RM-12). A public hearing before the Planning and Zoning Board was held on September 1, 1987. The Planning and Zoning Board voted 5-1 to grant conditional use approval for this application. A timely appeal was taken by Petitioners on September 15, 1987. Petitioners are surrounding property owners whose property is located within five hundred feet of the subject property. With this application, McGoldrick seeks approval for on-premises consumption of alcoholic beverages since he intends to convert the use of the property to a nightclub. The parties stipulated that the property in question is within five hundred feet of several residences, including Petitioners'.
The Issue The issue on appeal is whether, pursuant to Clearwater Code of Ordinances Section 4-505, to sustain or reverse, with or without conditions, the decision of the Community Development Board on June 20, 2003, denying Cepcot Corporation's application to build a convenience store with two islands for pumping gas.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner The Cepcot Corporation (Cepcot) owns real property located at 657 Court Street in the downtown zoning district of the City of Clearwater (Property). On December 17, 2002, Cepcot filed a Flexible Development Application for a comprehensive infill redevelopment project (Application) on the Property. At the time of the proposal, the Property, which comprises 0.95 acres, was developed with a restaurant in a building that was the former Clearwater train station, a thrift store, and a park. The Application proposes the demolition of these improvements and their replacement with a 3200 square-foot convenience store and two gas pump islands. The Property fronts Chestnut Street to the south, East Avenue to the east, and Court Street to the north. The surrounding area is developed with office uses to the west and south, a privately owned utility plant to the north, and warehouse uses to the east. Upon the completion of the Memorial Causeway bridge, which is presently under construction, traffic to the beach will use Court Street and traffic from the beach will use Chestnut Street. In response to questions and suggestions from Respondent's staff, Cepcot revised the proposed site plan several times. The Application is presently complete. Respondent's Planning Department prepared a Staff Report, which finds that the proposed project does not meet certain requirements and recommends denial of the Application on several grounds. On June 17, 2003, Respondent's Community Development Board (CDB) considered the Application. CDB denied the Application and issued a development order explaining the reasons for denial as follows: The proposal is inconsistent with the adopted Community Development Code, the Comprehensive Plan, 1995 Clearwater Downtown Redevelopment Plan, and the Downtown Design Guidelines. The proposed automobile service station is not a permitted use within the downtown district. Approval of the proposed use may encourage other like uses and may be detrimental to downtown redevelopment. The proposal does not comply with the Flexible Development criteria as a comprehensive infill redevelopment project per Section 2-803. The proposal is not in compliance with the other standards in the Code including the general applicability criteria for Section 3-913. Most of the reasons cited for denial involve Respondent's Community Development Code (CDC), which is the land development regulations. The Property is in the Downtown District. CDC Section 2-901 states: "The intent and purpose of the Downtown District is to establish a mixed use downtown where citizens can work, live, and shop in a place which is the economic, governmental, entertainment and cultural focal point of a liveable city." CDC Section 2-902 sets forth the permitted uses within the Downtown District, and CDC Chart 2-100 lists permitted uses by zoning district. The proposed uses are not among the permitted uses for the Downtown District (or the Tourist District, to which portions of the record refer). CDC Section 2-903.C sets forth the following ten criteria to be applied in determining if the proposed use qualifies as a Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Project (CIRP) that may qualify an otherwise non-permitted use: The development or redevelopment of the parcel proposed for development is otherwise impractical without deviations from the use, intensity and development standards; The development of the parcel proposed for development as a Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Project will not reduce the fair market value of abutting properties; The uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are otherwise permitted in the City of Clearwater; The uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are compatible with adjacent land uses; Suitable sites for development or redevelopment of the uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are not otherwise available in the City of Clearwater; The development of the parcel proposed for development as an comprehensive infill redevelopment project will upgrade the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development; The design of the proposed comprehensive infill redevelopment project creates a form and function which enhances the community character of the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole; Flexibility in regard to lot width, required setbacks, height and off-street parking are justified by the benefits to community character and the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole; Adequate off-street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development; The design of all buildings complies with the Downtown District design guidelines in Division 5 of Article 3. CDC Section 3-913.A sets forth the General Applicability criteria. CDC Section 3-913.A.1 states: "The proposed development of the land will be in harmony with the scale, bulk, coverage, density, and character of adjacent properties in which it is located." CDC Section 3-913.A.5 states: The proposed development is consistent with the community character of the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development."
The Issue The issue is whether Florida Administrative Code Rules 40E-0.109(1)(a), 40E-1.511(1)(b), and 40E-1.5095 are invalid exercises of delegated legislative authority, pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On March 8, 2003, Respondent published in The Stuart/Port St. Lucie News, a daily newspaper published in Martin County, the following notice (Published Notice): The South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) Governing Board will consider, for approval, a Water Use Permit Renewal/Modification (Application 971224-8, Permit 40-00089-W) for the Martin County Utilities (Martin County Consolidated System), PO Box 9000, Stuart, FL 34995 at its March 13 2003 Governing Board Meeting. The Applicant has requested an annual allocation of 4,529 MG (17.41 MG on a maximum daily basis) with a permit duration of 5 years, for a Public Water Supply to service approximately 17,000 acres located in Martin County. The water will be withdrawn from the Surficial Aquifer System. A copy of the proposed agency action, a description of the project, and a staff analysis of the project, are available for inspection at the South Florida Water Management District, Environment Resource Regulation Department, 3301 Gun Club Road, West Palm Beach, FL 33406, or a copy may be obtained by contacting Ralph Peno at 561- 582-9605. Interested persons may comment upon the proposed agency action and are entitled to request an Administrative Hearing regarding the proposed agency action by writing the Governing Board of the South Florida Water Management District, PO Box 24680, West Palm Beach, FL 3316, but which comments or requests must be received within 21 days from the date of this publication. Publish March 8, 2002 (The only copy of the Published Notice is a facsimile copy that is illegible in certain places. Typographical errors therefore may appear in the version set forth above, but none of the possible discrepancies would affect the outcome of this case.) Petitioner and his wife own a single-family residence at 2039 Ginger Terrace, Jensen Beach, Florida. Petitioner lives in close proximity to certain lands that he claims have been adversely affected by overpumping of Martin County's wellfields. Petitioner enjoys various recreational activities on these lands. Unaware of the Published Notice on March 8, 2003, Petitioner filed his petition challenging the proposed permit to Martin County on September 25, 2003. This date was within 21 days of when Petitioner received actual notice of the proposed agency action and 21 days of the decision of Respondent's Governing Board to approve Martin County's application for a water use permit. The Governing Board did not approve and may not have considered the proposed agency action on March 13, 2003, as indicated in the Published Notice. The delay between the date on which the Published Notice announced that the Governing Board would take action on Martin County's application and the date on which the Governing Board took action was due to the time consumed by successful efforts of the Governing Board and Martin County to resolve a dispute that another party had raised with respect to the proposed permit. With the challenged provisions underlined, Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-0.109 provides: 40E-0.109 Point of Entry Into Proceedingsand Mediation. Point of entry into proceedings determining substantial interests are governed by Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., and this section. (1)(a) “Receipt of written notice of agency decision” as set forth in Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., means receipt of either written notice through mail or posting that the District has or intends to take final agency action, or publication of notice that the District has or intends to take final agency action. (b) If notice is published pursuant to this chapter, publication shall constitute constructive notice to all persons. Until notice is published, the point of entry to request a formal or informal administrative proceeding shall remain open unless actual notice is received. If the Board takes action which substantially differs from the notice of intended agency decision, the applicant or persons who may be substantially affected shall have an additional point of entry pursuant to Section 28-106.111, F.A.C., unless otherwise provided by law. The Board action is considered to substantially differ from the notice of intended agency decision when the potential impact on water resources has changed. Notwithstanding Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., intended agency decisions or agency decisions regarding consolidated applications for Environmental Resource Permits and Use of Sovereign Submerged Lands pursuant to Section 373.427, F.S., shall provide a 14 day point of entry to file petitions for administrative hearing under Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. Specific Authority 120.54(5), 373.044, 373.113 FS. Law Implemented 120.54(5), 120.569, 120.57, 120.60, 373.146, 373.413, 373.427 FS. History–New 7-2-98, Amended 6-12-00 Challenged in its entirety, Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-1.5095 provides: 40E-1.5095 Publication of Notice of Agency Decision or Intended Agency Decision. In cases where a project is determined to be of heightened public concern, or where there is the likelihood of a request for an administrative hearing, where the proposed activity is potentially harmful to the water resources of the District or contrary to the overall objectives of Chapter 373, F.S., as outlined in Section 373.016, F.S., or if objection(s) to the application has been received, the District shall publish, or require the permit applicant to publish notice of agency decision or intended agency decision in the Florida Administrative Weekly or newspapers of general circulation in the area affected by such decisions as required by Chapter 50, F.S., and shall post notice and mail copies of its notice to applicants and interested groups. Such publication may be used as evidence of constructive and sufficient notice. Specific Authority 120.54(5), 373.044, 373.113 FS. Law Implemented 120.54(5), 120.569, 120.57, 373.146, 373.413 FS. History–New 7-2-98, Amended 6-12-00. With the challenged provisions underlined, Florida Administrative Code Rule 40E-1.511 provides: 40E-1.511 Point of Entry Into Proceedings. Procedures regarding point of entry into proceedings determining substantial interests and mediation are set forth in the Uniform Rules of Procedure Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. The following exceptions are applied in combination with the applicable Uniform Rules of Procedure. (1)(a) “Receipt of written notice of agency decision” as set forth in Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., means receipt of either written notice through mail or posting that the District has or intends to take final agency action, or publication of notice that the District has or intends to take final agency action. (b) If notice is published pursuant to this chapter, publication shall constitute constructive notice to all persons. Until notice is published, the point of entry to request a formal or informal administrative proceeding shall remain open unless actual notice is received. If the Board takes action which substantially differs from the notice of intended agency decision, the applicant or persons who may be substantially affected shall have an additional point of entry pursuant to Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., unless otherwise provided by law. The Board action is considered to substantially differ from the notice of intended agency decision when the potential impact on water resources has changed. Notwithstanding the timeline in Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., intended agency decisions or agency decisions regarding consolidated applications for Environmental Resource Permits and Use of Sovereign Submerged Lands pursuant to Section 373.427, F.S., shall provide a 14 day point of entry to file petitions for administrative hearing. Specific Authority 120.54(5), 373.044, 373.113 FS. Law Implemented 120.54. On March 13, 1998, Respondent published in Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 24, Number 11, a copy of its petition to the Administration Commission for, among other things, an exception from the Uniform Rules of Procedure adopted by the Administration Commission. The petition states, in relevant part: The SFWMD seeks an exception from Rule 28-106.111(2), F.A.C., regarding notices of agency decision. This exception is sought to clarify that "written notice of agency decision," as used in Rule 28-106.111, includes the publication of notice and posting of notice, as well as actual written notice by mail. Chapter 373, F.S., provides the authority to require publication of notice in addition to actual or mailed written notice of an agency decision or intended agency decision. . . . Publication is required if desired by the applicant, or if the proposed project is potentially harmful to the water resources, of heightened public concern or contrary to the overall objectives of Chapter 373, F.S. Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C., provides for a petition requesting an administrative hearing to be filed within 21 days of receipt of "written notice" of an agency's decision. The phrase "written notice" is not defined in Rule 28-106.111, F.A.C. or elsewhere in the Uniform Rules, however, it could be narrowly interpreted as only allowing notice by mail or similar actual notice. Publication is an accepted legal procedure providing a clear point of entry for filing a petition. It has been recognized as a viable noticing procedure in administrative law forums. See, e.g., City of LaBelle v. Bio-Med Services, Inc., et al, 598 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Based on the above, this exception is necessary both to implement the authority under Chapter 373, F.S., and for the efficient operation of the SFWMD. By Final Order entered March 25, 1998, the Administration Commission granted Respondent an exception from Florida Administrative Code Chapter 28-106 for proposed Rule 40E-0.511, "on the basis of implementation of statute and the most efficient operation of the agency." During subsequent rulemaking, "Rule 40E-0.511" became the three rules that, in whole or in part, Petitioner is challenging in this case (Rules). By Order of Non-Compliance with Requisite Rules and Dismissing Petition with Leave to Amend dated October 29, 2003, Respondent found Petitioner had not timely filed his initial petition because it was not filed within 21 days of the publication of the Published Notice. The Order dismissed the petition with leave to file an amended petition within 21 days. Petitioner filed his First Amended Request for Administrative Hearing on November 17, 2003. Reserving all rights concerning the timeliness of the petition, Respondent, by Order dated January 7, 2004, transmitted the petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings, which designated the case as DOAH Case No. 04-0104. Pursuant to the procedures discussed during the March 22, 2004, telephone conference, Respondent and Martin County have requested a summary disposition of DOAH Case No. 04-0104, which would be granted if the Administrative Law Judge dismisses the challenge to the Rules and sustains the sufficiency of the Published Notice.
Findings Of Fact John Taylor, III, Petitioner, owns property located at 1200 South Missouri Avenue in the City of Clearwater which is zoned CC (commercial center). The subject property consists of a mall and movie theater. On or about April 17, 1986, Michael Johnson, on behalf of Petitioner, applied for a variance to allow two message signs on the subject property and also to allow total message signage of 256 square feet. Without a variance, the subject property can have only one message sign which cannot exceed 192 square feet. The property presently has one message sign and total message signage of 176 square feet located on its marquee. At a meeting of the Development Code Adjustment Board on May 8, 1986, Petitioner's variance application was denied. The parties stipulated that Fusco Corporation is the manager of the mall located on Petitioner's property and further that Fusco is the owner of all improvements on the property. Further, Cineplex-Odeon has leased the theater located on the subject property and has renovated and expanded it from two to five movie theaters. Finally, Michael Johnson was employed by Cineplex-Odeon to install the changeable message sign which is the subject of this variance. The second message sign which is sought by this variance would be located 350 feet from Missouri Avenue, which runs north and south in front of the subject property. Specifically, it will be located in the front wall of the theaters next to the ticket counter, and will be 16 feet long by 4.4 feet high. The sign would actually be a display case, 6 inches deep, with five individual poster display cases, which would be used to display coming attraction posters. Each display case would have a hinged glass door, through which the poster could be seen. Coming attraction posters are 2 feet long by 3.3 feet high. The 6 inch depth of the display case extends equally into, and protrudes out of, the front wall of the theater. Petitioner has not established that a hardship would exist if this variance is not approved. Coming attraction posters can be, and in fact are, displayed in the theater lobby. During the renovation of the theater, the front wall could have been removed and a window installed to allow viewing of the lobby posters from outside the theater. Finally, the existing sign on the property could be used to advertise coming attractions, as well as movies which are currently playing. The display case for which this variance is sought on behalf of Petitioner is a "changeable message sign," as that term is used in Section 134.011(a), Land Development Code, since it would be a graphic communication or device which would be primarily used to convey information or advertise and would also be prominently visible from outside the theater.
Findings Of Fact Ramchandra Jakhotia and Rashmi Jakhotia, his wife, acquired the King Cole Motel at 401 East Shore Drive, Clearwater, Florida in 1983 and have owned the property since that time. At the time of acquisition and for some time prior thereto the property included a commercial marina with 22 slips. In 1985 the City of Clearwater revised its Development Code effective October 13, 1985 and, incident thereto, effective July 7, 1988, enacted Section 114.05, Live-Aboard Vessels as Ordinance 4597, Clearwater City Code. That enactment provided, in part, that: Prohibited; exceptions: It shall be unlawful for any person to moor any live-aboard vessel at any location within or upon the navigable waters in the City for any period of time in excess of seventy-two (72) hours, except as follows: At a marina facility for which conditional use approval has been obtained, or a marina facility in existence as of October 13, 1985 for which conditional use approval would otherwise be required;... In January 1986 a survey was taken of all marinas within the City of Clearwater to determine the number of live aboard vessels coming within the purview of the revised Development Code. At this survey eight live aboard vessels were occupying berths at the King Cole Motel marina and this was the number determined to be grandfathered for which no conditional use approval would be required. In 1988 King Cole Motel applied for conditional authorization to utilize 14 additional berths for live aboard vessels. This conditional use was approved subject to the applicant installing a pump-out facility and meeting the parking requirements. Although the parking requirements for a commercial marina, i.e., 0.5 parking space per slip, is the same as the parking requirement at marinas for live aboard vessels, the latter generally place a greater demand on parking spaces than does non-live aboard vessels. To change the approved use from commercial marina without live aboards to live aboards is a change in the use and requires conditional use approval. Before conditional use approval can be granted the applicant must comply with all code requirements, such as required parking spaces, at the time of the change in use. At the time Appellant acquired the King Cole Motel the 22 commercial slips were grandfathered as an authorized use without any parking being provided. Accordingly, as a 22-slip commercial marina Appellant did not have to provide parking. When the eight slips used for live aboards were counted in 1986 they too were grandfathered in without the need for parking spaces. However, when Appellant applied in 1988 for authorization to use 14 other slips for live aboard vessels, the code required the applicant to provide seven parking spaces. To his credit Appellant obtained the use of seven parking spaces down the road from the marina but those spaces were not contiguous to Appellants' marina as required by the code. Therefore, Appellants' use of the additional slips for live aboards did not meet the parking requirement in his conditional use approval. In 1992 Appellant applied for a variance of the seven parking spaces required to allow the use of these additional slips by live aboard vessels. This hearing was held before the Development Code Adjustment Board on February 11, 1993 and it is from the denial of this variance that this appeal is taken. The Board denied the variance requested because the Appellant failed to demonstrate that the standards established by Section 45.24 Land Development Code were met. In these proceedings Appellant presented no additional evidence to support the variances requested than was submitted to the Board.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether to grant the appeal of Valentinos Koumoulidis from the Planning and Zoning Board's denial of his application for variances from the requirement of a minimum lot width of 150 feet at the setback line and from the requirement of a minimum of 20 percent clear space.
Findings Of Fact When the Appellant, Valentinos Koumoulidis, bought the subject property, the building was being used as a six-unit motel--three units on each of two floors. There were approximately 1600 square feet of space on each of the two floors. The property fronts at 606 Bayway Boulevard; the back of the property is waterfront. In 1991, the Appellant applied for and was granted a parking variance and variances to enable him to convert the first floor to retail use and convert the second floor to a residence. Apparently construction was delayed, and in October, 1992, the Appellant reapplied for the variances to enable him to convert the first floor to retail use and convert the second floor to a residence, while withdrawing the application for a parking variance. (He had decided to convert from straight- in/back-out parking to an off-street parking lot.) In 1994, the Appellant again applied for variances, this time to allow him to add approximately 300 square feet of commercial space to the back of the first floor and approximately 900 square feet of residential space to the back of the second floor. The Board denied those variance requests in October, 1994. Rather than appeal, the Appellant decide not to pursue the addition of commercial space to the back of the first floor and, on December 22, 1994, instead applied for variances to allow him just to add approximately 900 square feet of residential space to the back of the second floor. (Of the 900 square feet, approximately 550 would be enclosed, and approximately 350 would be open deck.) The evidence (primarily through the testimony of Noel Woods, one of the Appellant's neighbors) was that the residential property in the immediate vicinity is comparable, in terms of square footage of living space per dwelling unit, to the Appellant's current second floor--i.e., approximately 1600 to 1700 square feet. There was some evidence that residential properties across the intracoastal waterway from the Appellant's property are valued as high as a million dollars. But the evidence (again, the testimony of Noel Woods) also was that condominium units in the immediate vicinity are valued at approximately $175,000. There was no evidence that the use the Appellant is making of his property (retail on the first floor and residential on the second floor) is not a reasonable use.
