The Issue This case is presented as rules challenges to certain matters allegedly undertaken by the Respondent and is brought in accordance with the authority set forth in Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. Petitioner asserts that there exist two rules within the meaning of Subsection 120.52(14), Florida Statutes, which have not been duly promulgated in keeping with the terms and conditions of Section 120.53, Florida Statutes. The items which are challenged by this Petition are: The Respondent's Contract Management System Manual (HRSR-0-75-1). The execution document involved in the award of contract No. 1979 DA-1, entitled "Design and Delivery of Drug Abuse Training Support Program", which was awarded to the Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Inc.
Findings Of Fact In support of its case the Petitioner presented one item of evidence. This item was received as Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1. The exhibit is a memorandum letter from Robert A. Furlough, Acting Mental Health Program Staff Director, addressed to Abe Lavine and it is entitled "Procedure in the Selection of the Most Appropriate Service Provided for Design Delivery of Training". Notwithstanding the title of the letter, it is in fact a summarization of the steps taken by the Respondent in the award of the "Design and Delivery of Training" element of the "State Training Support Program". In the course of the letter it discusses the fact that the Contract Management System Manual (HSRS-0-75-1) was utilized; however, that manual was not appended to the correspondence and was not offered in the course of the hearing. Likewise, the document of execution of the award of Contract No. 1979 DA-1, for the "Design and Delivery Training" element of the "State Training Support Program", if such a document exists, was not offered as evidence in the hearing sub judice.
Findings Of Fact Alexander G. Toth graduated from medical school in 1943 and migrated to Miami in 1948. He took his three-year residency in general surgery at the V. A. Hospital in Miami starting in 1951 and thereafter practiced general surgery until 1976 when he had a serious accident. This accident plus additional health problems caused him to give up surgery and he has practiced family medicine since 1976. His office hours have been limited from 9 until 12 each week day since 1976. Approximately 10 patients per day were seen by Respondent during the period involved in these charges. At all times here relevant Respondent was licensed by Petitioner as a physician. Richard Hatcher was a patient of Respondent in 1975 at which time he complained of headaches and low back pain. Respondent prescribed Percodan, Doriden, Dilaudid and Placidyl during a one-year period Hatcher was a regular patient. At this time Hatcher had a suit pending to recover damages for injuries received in an automobile collision. Hatcher did not see Respondent with any regularity again until 1978. Respondent's patient records of Hatcher (Exhibit 5) show he treated Hatcher on 11-20-78 on complaint of can't sleep, low back pain and spasm of lower back, by prescribing 100 Valium and 100 Percodan. Exhibit 6, which is a copy of prescriptions written by Respondent for Hatcher, shows the following prescriptions were written for Hatcher on dates indicated: 6/2/78 - 30 Valium 10 mg; 8/8/78 - 50 Seconal and 30 Fastin 30 mg; 10/11/78 60 Tuinal 3 grs, 60 Fastin 30 mg, 50 Valium 10 mg and 100 Percodan; and 11/20/78 - Valium 10 mg, 30 Fastin 30 mg and 100 Percodan. Exhibit 5 shows in 1975 Hatcher was 6 feet and 180 pounds. The entry dated 12/18/78 opposite Fastin is (Wt 205). During the period 12/18/78 to 2/27/79 Respondent prescribed for Hatcher on numerous prescriptions the following: 300 Percodan, 250 Valium, 230 Tuinal 3 gr, 60 Fastin, 60 Demerol 100 mg, one 30 cc vial Demerol 100 mg per cc, and 30 syringes (Exhibit 6) . Exhibit 5 contains an entry dated 3/2/79 "(Wants Demerol) Refused - refer to JMH", and a final entry (3-19) Deceased." Hatcher voiced the same or similar complaints of pain on each visit to Respondent. Richard Hatcher was found dead in his apartment on or about 21 March 1979 some 24 to 36 hours after he died. Cause of death was acute intravenous narcotism. The syringe with which the fatal narcotic was injected was still in his arm when his body was found. Due to the rapid clearing of many drugs from the blood the autopsy failed to reveal which of the opiate drugs caused Hatcher's death. About one week later Mrs. Hatcher, the mother of Richard, received from her ex-husband and father of Richard a page from a notebook found in Richard's apartment after his death signed by Richard which indicates some concern by Hatcher that he might overdose on drugs given him by Dr. Toth, the Respondent (Exhibit 12). Richard Hatcher became seriously involved with drugs in 1967 when he was 21 years old. By 1975 his mother noted a personality change where he would quickly go from normal to extremely agitated. In the fall of 1978 Hatcher committed himself to Village South, a drug rehabilitation program in Dade County, for some 4 or 5 months. After release from Village South Hatcher continued to take drugs. To his mother's knowledge he overdosed several times before his death. Three times she found him unconscious on the floor of her apartment and on numerous other occasions he was "spaced out". Respondent testified that Hatcher showed no indication he had abused or misused the medications Respondent prescribed. If so, it is evident that Respondent did not closely observe Hatcher or do more than hear his litany of pain. On the other hand, Exhibit 5 shows that some 2-1/2 weeks before Hatcher's death Respondent refused to prescribe the Demerol wanted by Hatcher. Unless Respondent recognized the seriousness of Hatcher's addiction it is not conceivable that he would suddenly refuse drugs so freely prescribed in the past. Michael Kavney was a patient of Respondent from June 1979 until his death from an overdose of Placidyl on 14 or 15 January 1980. On June 11 1979 Kavney complained of pain in his shoulder and Respondent prescribed 50 Tylenol. Kavney was 6 feet tall, weighed 189 pounds, and told Respondent he wanted to lose weight. Respondent on June 11, 1979 also prescribed 50 Fastin. On 8-16-79 Respondent, at Kavney's request, called in a prescription for 50 Valium. On 9/7/79 he called in a prescription for 50 Tylenol. Both of these prescriptions resulted from a phone call to Respondent. On October 29, 1979 Kavney visited Respondent, told him the shoulder pain persists and he would like some more weight reducers. By this time Kavney's weight was down to 185 pounds from 189 four months earlier. Respondent prescribed 50 Tylenol, 50 Valium (Exhibit 4) and 30 Fastin (Exhibit 3). By script dated 11/21/79 Respondent prescribed 50 Fastin for Kavney and by script dated 11/26/79 he prescribed 50 Tylenol (Exhibit 4). No record of these is contained in Exhibit 3. By entry on Exhibit 3 dated December 17, 1979 Respondent recorded "pain left shoulder, using heat at home, can't take codeine, Percodan 50". The Tylenol, which had been prescribed on four previous occasions, contains 1 grain of codeine per tablet. On January 14, 1980 Kavney visited Respondent, told him of disturbed sleep patterns, that he had taken Placidyl on prior occasions with good results and Respondent prescribed 60 Placidyl (750). Kavney was found dead in his automobile with an empty bottle with Placidyl label on the floor. An autopsy done on January 15, 1980 shows Kavney died from an overdose of Placidyl. Terry McGarey grew up in Miami and played in bands with Kavney as early as high school days. He had also known Hatcher since 1963. McGarey first visited Respondent in 1970 with an arm injury. He next saw Respondent near the end of 1976 and he complained of headache and leg pains from an earlier motorcycle accident. McGarey received a prescription for Percodan. McGarey, who appeared as a witness, testified that he had visited Respondent every three or four weeks in 1976 complaining of headache and during these visits he also received Placidyl, Demerol, Parest and Valium. These visits continued in 1977 with the same frequency and results. Respondent's patient records for Terrance McGarey (Exhibit 1) commence 3/28/78. The first entry is not dated but states "cc severe headaches - nausea - at JMH March `78. Neuological dept. - treated for organic brain syndrome - at JMH 1976 migraine - no allergies - only relief Demerol. Rx demerol 100 mg #5 fiorinal tabs." Thereafter Exhibit 1 shows entries 7-31-78, 8-7-78, 8-28, 9-1, 9-6, 9-11, 9-27, 10-9, 10-20, 10-29, 10-31, 11-16, 11-22, 12-18, 12-22, 12-29, 1-3, 1-8, 3-21 and 4-19-79. Most of these entries resulted from office visits but some entries recorded prescriptions as a result of phone calls. During this period prescriptions were issued to McGarey for Percodan, Emperin, Doriden Parest, Tuinal, Demerol, Placidyl, Dalmane, Darvon, Seconal and Valium (Exhibit 2) On May 7, 1979 McGarey called the Cardella Pharmacy saying he was Dr. Toth, gave the correct DEA number and authorized the delivery of 18 Placidyl 50 mg to patient Jerry McGaret. The pharmacist called the doctor's office, which was closed, and then issued the drugs to McGarey. A subsequent try was unsuccessful when the pharmacist was told by Respondent's office that this man was no longer a patient of Respondent. Respondent testified that he treated McGarey for migraine headaches, insomnia, nervousness, and low back pain. He found no evidence of abnormal conditions in his examination of McGarey. Through mid-October Respondent had no indication McGarey was in a methadone program or addicted and the drugs were continued with each visit or phone call. On December 29 Respondent learned from McGarey that he had been admitted to JMH for seizures and the resident recommended Seconal. On this basis Respondent prescribed Seconal but did not learn the cause of the seizures. On January 8, 1979 McGarey's mother called Respondent to advise that her son was a drug abuser and had been on a methadone program for 18 months. Following this entry is the notation "No more Rx's - back to JMH". Respondent's next entry on Exhibit 1 is "Called records at JMH patient admitted 2-9-79 - overdosed - discharged 2-14 Signed out - mother took him home." Although Respondent testified it never entered his mind that McGarey might be a drug abuser he also testified that the symptoms of narcotic addiction are agitation, nervousness, slurred speech and poor equilibrium. On the witness stand McGarey exhibited traits of nervousness and agitation. He appeared hyperactive rather than calm and sedate. His movements were jerky rather than fluid and he did not give the impression of a normally relaxed person under tension because he was testifying. On 11 January 1980 Kirk Kratz, a 29-year-old male, visited Respondent's office as a patient. He had a cast on his right upper arm and stated it was fractured some two weeks earlier. Also he had received a gunshot wound in the abdomen before Christmas and a laparotomy had been performed. He complained of pain in the right arm. He was given a prescription for 100 Percodan for pain and 60 Tuinal 3 gr for sleep. Kratz returned 12 February with same complaints and was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan, 60 Tuinal and 30 Valium. On 2/29 Kraft appeared without the cast, told Respondent the police had broken the cast, held him in jail for 3 days and confiscated his medication. He was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan and 60 Tuinal. On 4/8/80 Kratz still complained of "pain in the shoulder and arm and can't sleep." Prescriptions for 100 Percodan, 60 Tuinal and 100 Valium were given him. Finally on 6/13, with complaint of pain in hand and shoulder, Kratz was given prescriptions for 100 Percodan and 30 Doriden (Exhibit 9). Hatcher and McGarey were drug addicts before and during the time they were being treated by Respondent. At one time or another both of them had been enrolled in the methadone program at Jackson Memorial Hospital and/or other withdrawal programs for addicts. In addition to getting drugs from Respondent, they were also obtaining drug prescriptions from other doctors. Also from the quantity of drugs prescribed for Kavney and Kratz it is evident that both of these individuals were also addicts. During the period between 1 January 1980 and 14 June 1980 Respondent, with an active practice of some 700 patients prescribed approximately 28,000 Percodan and 2,000 Percocet tablets to various patients. Exhibit 16 shows a breakdown of the 130 patients treated by Respondent during this period. While Exhibit 16 shows Kirk Kratz received 100 Percodan only on 2/29/80, Exhibit 8 indicates he received 500 Percodan between 1 January and 14 June 1980. Assuming all other entries on Exhibit 16 to be accurate, a spot check shows the following patients were given Percodan or Percocet during the period 1 January - 14 June in the following quantities: Steven Arnold - 300; Cathy Blauk - 450; Bill Davis - 500; Kirk Decker - 300; George Fernandez - 300; Sidney Ford - 600; Ron Jangie - 300; Jerome Johnson - 300; Patty La Fortuna - 310; Vincent La Fortuna - 200; William Leonard - 350; Mary Leslie - 300; Gus Melquezo - 400; Michael Pravioski - 225; Debbie Saey - 250; Robert Sandifer - 400; James Setters - 300; Alvin Terrell - 300; Mike Thill - 300; Mark Wolfson - 200; Joe Worth - 300; and Harvey Zemaster - 200. Exhibit 16 also shows that most of these prescriptions were written for quantities of 100. It also lists almost 18,000 Percodan issued to 130 patients during this period, or an average of 140 per patient. Percodan, Tuinal, Parest, Demerol and Seconal are Class II drugs. One hundred Percodan taken in a one-month period will cause addiction in the taker. After 48 hours taking Percodan every 4 to 6 hours the patient will have withdrawal symptoms. Although Placidyl, Valium, Doriden, Empirin and Dalmane are not Class II drugs, they are dangerous and therefore controlled. Fifteen Placidyls taken at one time can be fatal. Many of the drugs prescribed by Respondent, when taken in combination, create a synergistic effect which makes the combination greater than the sum of its parts. Similarly a synergistic effect is created when some of these drugs are taken in conjunction with alcohol. Fastin is used for weight control. Neither Hatcher nor Kavney at 6 feet and 180 - 185 pounds should have been a candidate for weight loss. Further, prescriptions for Fastin and Seconal (for sleep) at the same time are incompatible as one is an upper, the other a downer. Tuinal in combination with Valium will increase depression. When Fastin is added, a pharmacological jungle can result. Respondent acknowledged that he relied more on the statements of his patients than upon an examination to determine when to prescribe medications. If the patient said he hurt, Respondent would prescribe a pain killer. A two- week-old fracture properly set and in a cast should cause little pain. If pain persists two weeks after casting something is wrong that will not likely heal itself. Therefore, painkillers to mask the symptoms are contraindicated. Similarly, a persistent pain in the shoulder is likely to be caused by inflammation and an anti-flammatory agent is indicated. Neither Tylenol nor Percodan are anti-inflammatory agents. Dr. John V. Handwerker, M.D. was accepted as an expert in family practice medicine. After reviewing Respondent's records of Hatcher, Kavney, Kratz and McGarey he expressed the strong opinion that the complaints of the patients did not justify the narcotics prescribed; that much larger quantities of each drug were prescribed at one time than was medically indicated or prudent; that drugs were prescribed in dangerous combinations due to the synergistic effect if taken together, plus some of these drugs such as Fastin and Valium are mutually exclusive; that issuing a prescription to take these drugs "as needed" was improper and dangerous; and that narcotics were frequently prescribed for alleged ailments for which more effective non-narcotic drugs were available. This witness was particularly critical of the prescription for liquid Demerol, as this should be prescribed only when the patient can't take the drug orally. After reviewing Exhibit 7 Dr. Handwerker expressed the opinion that prescribing 28,000 Percodan tablets during a 5-1/2 month period could only be justified with a large practice limited to trauma patients and that the records and prescription schedules show a practice harmful to the public. This opinion was based partially on Dr. Handwerker's practice in which, during the same period, he saw 2,081 patients and wrote 73 prescriptions for 1,996 Percodan tablets. Exhibit 7 contains 291 prescriptions issued by Respondent during this period, and recovered by Petitioner's investigator from pharmacies in the vicinity of Respondent's office. These coupled with Respondent's patient records show some 28,000 Percodan and 2000 Percocet tablets were prescribed. Valium is the most commonly prescribed drug in the United States and one of the most abused drugs. If a patient is emotionally stable 60 Valium is too many to prescribe for a patient at one time. If a patient is emotionally disturbed there is even greater reason for not prescribing 60 Valium. Dr. Roderick Palmer, M.D., testified as an expert in clinical pharmacology. He opined that prescribing 100 Percodan for a patient at one time was not appropriate because if the pain results from a traumatic injury, such injury will normally cease being painful in 4 or 5 days, and 100 Percodan is enough to commit suicide or become addicted. Dr. Palmer described Percodan and Placidyl as widely abused drugs. Sixty Placidyl in one prescription is too many because of suicide potential. Further, if one Placidyl is taken every day for 60 days the patient would probably become addicted. Taking more than one Placidyl per day could impair coordination enough to result in an industrial or automobile accident or other injury. With respect to Exhibit 7, Dr. Palmer cited instructions for Percodan or Percocet that the physician should not prescribe enough to result in addiction (not more than 30) nor prescribe enough for patient to commit suicide. It is necessary for patients to return to the physician before the patient can become addicted to the drugs prescribed. In this way the doctor will not lose control over the patient which could result in the patient becoming addicted. With respect to the 28,000 Percodan prescribed in a 5-1/2 months period Dr. Palmer viewed that quantity as more than he would prescribe in a lifetime. Dr. Murray Sims, M.D., is a Board certified surgeon who testified on behalf of Respondent. He found the prescriptions issued to Hatcher, Kavney, McGarey and Kratz to be proper for the complaints of the patients. Sims has known Respondent for many years, and has worked, studied, and taken examinations with Respondent. Dr. Sims prescribes Percodan in quantities of 100 and even 200. He does not believe 100 Percodan taken in a 30-day period is addictive. He has one 93-year old patient to whom he mails prescriptions for 100 Percodan per month (40 to 60 days) because, as she told him, "It makes my day start off right." (Tr. Vol. II, p. 102). When asked if Percodan and Tuinal taken together would have a synergistic effect Dr. Sims said no (Tr. Vol. II, p. 67) but on p. 119 he testified "I guess it would, you get a relief of both, yes. Don't hold me too much about pharmacy." Dr. Sims practice is 99 percent devoted to surgery patients and if he has a patient with a non-surgical related disorder he usually refers the patient to another doctor. This witness's testimony regarding the various drugs prescribed by Respondent and the appropriateness thereof was not deemed as credible as was the testimony of Drs. Hardwerker and Palmer. This was so because the latter had more expertise in this area of medicine and demonstrated greater credibility on the witness stand.
The Issue The issues presented for resolution in the two consolidated cases are whether Rule 10E-16.004(27), Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and whether Petitioner violated that rule on a specified occasion and is subject to fine or other penalty.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Associated Counselling and Education, Inc., doing business as Substance Abuse Family Education (SAFE), is a Florida corporation doing business in Orange County, Florida. SAFE provides substance abuse treatment to adolescents, mostly within the ages of twelve (12) to eighteen (18) years, with a few young adults who have turned nineteen while in treatment. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) is the state agency with statutory authority to license and regulate certain treatment programs, including SAFE. At all times material to this proceeding HRS has licensed SAFE to provide substance abuse treatment services in a category titled "non-residential day and night treatment with a host home component." SAFE is not licensed as a secure facility or an addictions receiving facility. SAFE uses a program similar to the Alcoholic Anonymous twelve-step program as a tool for rehabilitating drug abusing juveniles. The program includes five phases through which the clients progress at varying rates. The "first phase" describes clients who are new to the program. As clients progress they enter into stages of increasing responsibility and freedom, until they are able to graduate and return to the everyday world. The program requires that the youths' parents or legal guardians admit them into treatment, even when children are referred by a court, by HRS or another source. The program requires rigorous participation by the parents and any siblings of the client. SAFE's contract for treatment includes a voluntary withdrawal provision which requires that the client request withdrawal through a "chain of command." The purpose of the deliberate, several-step process is to avoid withdrawal on an impulsive or transitory whim of the client. SAFE's rules, including the withdrawal provision, are explained at the beginning of treatment and are reviewed daily with the clients. Clients who are just starting in the program, "first phasers," spend their days at the program and are placed at night with host parents, generally parents with experience in the program through their own children's participation. Staff and host parents are trained in crisis intervention and aggression control techniques through an HRS-sanctioned training program. The techniques are progressive; they range from verbal intervention, to putting an arm around a client's shoulder, to physically forcing a client to the floor when the client has threatened to injure himself or others. SAFE contends that when a client attempts to leave treatment without going through the withdrawal process and without involving the parents or guardians in the process, the client is in serious danger of injuring himself or others immediately following departure from the program. SAFE uses physical intervention as a last resort to prevent clients from leaving the program without going through the "chain of command." At night, however, such intervention is used by host parents only to restrain dangerously aggressive behavior. SAFE instructs its host parents to not physically stop a child from leaving the host home. S. B. was a "first phaser" in SAFE's program in August 1993. During dinner one evening he had been staring or glaring at other clients and acting in a provoking and disruptive manner. After dinner, during an organized "rap" session, several clients were called on to confront S. B.'s behavior. He reacted by throwing a chair, across several rows of clients, at the client who was confronting him. Then he bolted, or attempted to bolt, from the room through the exit door. He was restrained by staff, was calmed, and he returned to his seat. Very shortly after he returned to his seat S. B. began staring or glaring at a client by the exit door. He jumped up and ran for the door. Again, he was physically restrained as he kicked, fought and yelled with anger. Staffperson Pamela Mardis was one of the persons who participated in the restraint of S. B. on August 27, 1993. She considered the client to be in harm's way if he were permitted to leave the program without the assurance of proper safeguard for his well-being and safety. The January 12, 1994 amended notice of violation provided by HRS to Loretta Parrish, SAFE's owner and executive director, states, in pertinent part: As an amended complaint, the following incidents have been found to be in violation of 10E-16, F.A.C., requirements and are therefore subject to administrative fines: * * * August 27, 1993, 5:20 p.m., (report written August 27, 1993, 6:45 p.m.) in which a client was restrained in an effort to keep the client from leaving treatment, your agency will be fined $100 for non-compliance with 10E-16.004(27)(a), F.A.C., requirements. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 6) HRS interprets its rule to prohibit restraint when the perceived danger to the client is in leaving and getting back on drugs. SAFE contends that to let one client leave voluntarily without going through the withdrawal procedures would mean that all of the clients, adolescents with poor decision- making skills, would walk out. There is a program in Palm Beach County, Florida, purportedly similar to SAFE, called Growing Together, Inc. On January 22, 1994, HRS and Growing Together, Inc., entered into a stipulated Final Declaratory Judgement in case no. CL93-9599-AO, in the Circuit Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, which provided, in pertinent part: In the absence of a Court Order restricting the rights of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may act upon the request of a parent or legal guardian in accepting a minor client for substance abuse treatment regardless of the minor's objections. In the absence of a Court Order limiting the authority of a parent or legal guardian to control decisions affecting the health and welfare of a minor, Growing Together, Inc., may reasonably restrict minor clients from terminating their participation in treatment contrary to the express direction of a parent or legal guardian. So long as the minor's rights to challenge the reasonableness of restrictions imposed at the express direction of a parent or legal guardian are protected -- that is, so long as the minor is informed of his or her rights and is provided a practical means by which to exercise those rights -- Growing Together, Inc., may continue to act in loco parenti in declining to release a minor from treatment where such release is against the will of a parent or legal guardian and no court order has been issued to direct otherwise. The State of Florida , Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services is hereby prohibited from taking any action contrary to the legal principles enunciated herein and is expressly prohibited from enforcing any interpretation of F.S. Section 397.601 which interpretation is contrary to the findings of this Judgement. (Petitioner's exhibit no. 7) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Sections 120.56 and 120.57, Florida Statutes. The two cases consolidated above present two separate issues which must be addressed in separate orders, as one issue (the validity of Rule 10E- 16.004(27), Florida Administrative Code) is determined by the Hearing Officer, and the other issue (whether SAFE violated the rule) is determined by the agency upon a recommended order by the Hearing Officer. Notwithstanding the parties' earnest desire to obtain a resolution of the issue of when a program like SAFE can use physical restraint to prevent withdrawal, the Hearing Officer has no authority to issue a "declaratory statement." That function, addressed in Section 120.565, Florida Statutes, is reserved to the agency. Rule 10E-16.004(6)(a), [Florida Administrative Code], provides that "[t]he department shall impose a penalty of no more than $100 per day against a licensed program that commits a [significant violation pertaining to the health and safety of the clients.] ..." [emphasis added] Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides: (27) Aggression Control Techniques. Programs which use verbal, psychological and physical intervention methods for managing client behavior shall be required to implement the procedures established under HRS Regulation Number 205-1 regarding the use of Aggression Control Techniques (ACT), or other techniques, as approved by the department. (a) Justification and Documentation of Use. In the event that physical intervention is used to restrict a client's movement, clinical justification shall be documented in the client record, and a complete, detailed report of the incident shall be maintained as part of the program's administrative records and reported to the department's district administrator. Physical intervention techniques shall be employed by trained adult staff to prevent a client from injuring himself or others, or to prevent serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. HRS contends that SAFE violated Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code, when the program restrained its minor client, S. B., from attempting to bolt without going through the "chain of command" described in SAFE's voluntary withdrawal procedures. HRS has the burden of proving the alleged violation. Balino v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 348 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) HRS does not claim that the techniques used on S. B. were by other than trained adult staff or that the required reports were not made to the agency and properly maintained by the program. Rather, HRS claims that a program such as SAFE cannot detain a child against his or her will. The rule cited by HRS simply does not include that prohibition. It states in the affirmative two circumstances in which a program shall use appropriate physical intervention: to prevent injury to the client or others, or to prevent serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. SAVE contends that permitting a child to leave at will, without following established withdrawal procedures would cause a serious disruption of the therapeutic environment. SAFE presented some competent credible testimony by its director to support its contention. HRS presented no evidence on that subject. HRS, moreover, has failed to justify its policy determination and interpretation of the rule in this case. It argues, for example, that parents do have a right to admit their children to a secure facility and to obtain a court order or alternative involuntary assessment. SAFE is not classified as a secure facility. The procedures and statutes referenced in HRS' proposed recommended order, however, were not in effect at the time of the incident at issue. Chapter 397, Florida Statutes, was substantially revised in 1993 and the revisions became effective October 1, 1993, after the incident at issue. See, Chapter 93-39, Section 51, Laws of Florida. The arguments made by HRS were specifically rejected by the court in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Straight, Inc., 497 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986), a case decided prior to the 1993 amendments and therefore more relevant to the instant case. The determination that HRS has failed to meet its burden of proof in this case does not resolve for the parties their more global issue of whether a non-secure program such as SAFE can detain a child involuntarily placed by his or her parents or guardian. That issue is not resolved in Straight, supra, decided under a different statute; or by HRS' rule Chapter 10E-16.004, Florida Administrative Code, in its current form. Nor, contrary to SAFE's assertions, is the issue resolved in the stipulated judgement entered in the Palm Beach case referenced in paragraph 14, above, affecting a program which is not described in any competent evidence in this record. The conclusion in this case is properly limited to the facts and circumstances presented, and to consideration of a rule and statute in existence at the time of the incident at issue. The conclusion is merely that HRS failed to meet its burden of proving that by detaining S. B. on August 27, 1993, SAFE violated Rule 10E-16.004(27)(a), Florida Administrative Code.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter its final order dismissing the January 12, 1994 amended complaint. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Newnum, Esquire TURNBULL, ABNER, DANIELS and ROOKS 147 West Lyman Avenue, Suite 100 Winter Park, Florida 32790-0100 James A. Sawyer, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-827 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600 Sandy Coulter, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1600
The Issue Is Petitioner entitled to an exemption from disqualification, to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled, having been disqualified from direct contact with those persons by virtue of an offense related to drug abuse prevention and control, Chapter 893, Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact In State of Florida v. Victor Days, in the Circuit Court of the 11th Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida, Case No. 93-33378, Petitioner entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of cocaine possession. This case was in relation to a criminal law offense prohibited by Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. Adjudication was withheld. Petitioner received a one year probation based upon the order of the court entered October 22, 1993. Following the entry of his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine, Petitioner went through a drug screening to be evaluated concerning response to his use of drugs. The result of that screening was a recommendation that Petitioner receive out-patient treatment for his use of cocaine. Petitioner did not participate in an out-patient program. Eventually he enrolled in an in-patient program to address his drug abuse. Although Petitioner offered his plea to the offense of possession of cocaine and accepted the disposition, at the hearing in the present case Petitioner contended that he had not committed the offense for which he stood accused and entered his plea. But the plea entered contemplates a lack of agreement with the truth of the charges. Petitioner also complained in the administrative hearing that he had not received adequate advice from his attorney in the criminal law case. Petitioner does concede that he had a problem with the abuse of crack cocaine that existed before and beyond his arrest for the charge of possession of cocaine. Additionally, Petitioner admits that during this time he abused alcohol. Petitioner describes that he did not "drop" the cocaine that he was arrested for, and that charging him for that offense was an "injustice." Petitioner describes the circumstances of his arrest as a "wake-up call," concerning the fact that he was involved with crack cocaine, if not on the occasion of his arrest, at other times. Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine as being associated with binges in which he would have $100 and spend it on the crack cocaine. He can recall at least eight occasions in which he would "binge" on crack cocaine. In his testimony at the administrative hearing, Petitioner describes his use of crack cocaine in that period of time as constituting an addiction. Petitioner acknowledges that in the period 1993 through 1994, he suffered from addiction, to the extent that he had a co- dependency for crack cocaine and alcohol. In the years 1992 through 1994, Petitioner had worked for Jackson Memorial Hospital in Dade County, Florida, in the Environmental Services Department. This employment did not include direct contact with patients. Following the disposition of Circuit Court Case No. 93- 33378, roughly a year later, on November 15, 1994, Petitioner entered a residential program for drug abusers, referred to as Faith Farm Ministries in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Specifically, it was a program to benefit adults with drug abuse problems. The program was administered by Fort Lauderdale Rescue Tabernacle, Inc., Alpha Ministry. The program was designed to help the participants deal with their drug dependency and to reorder their lives for the better. Petitioner successfully completed the program as evidenced by a certificate issued to the Petitioner on May 1, 1995. For approximately eight months beyond his graduation from the drug abuse program, Petitioner served as a peer counselor for other adults enrolled in the program. During his probation, Petitioner's probation officer referred Petitioner to the court for having violated probation. Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation. When Petitioner was not found in violation of his probation, Petitioner had already attended the residential drug treatment program. 1l. Following the completion of his drug abuse program, Petitioner worked at a K-Mart in Miramar, Florida, for approximately six months in 1995, as a salesperson. Later Petitioner took a position with Chemical Addictions Recovery Effort, Inc. (Chemical Additions Recovery), in Panama City, Florida, as a Human Service worker, with direct contact with minors who are 13 to 17 years old. More specifically, those youngsters are part of a program referred to as Starting Over Straight (S.O.S.), within the umbrella of Chemical Addictions Recovery. In this position, Petitioner assisted the juveniles who had drug-related problems. This position was held for approximately three months. Petitioner then took a position with a program within the Chemical Addictions Recovery, referred to as Detox. That program, in which he had direct contact with the clients, was in association with adults and children suffering with problems related to alcohol and drugs. Petitioner held that position for approximately three months. During Petitioner's affiliation with Chemical Addictions Recovery, Petitioner was required to undergo a background check, based upon his holding a position of trust and responsibility, as an employee with direct contact with minor clients. When the screening was completed, it revealed Petitioner's criminal law case associated with the possession of cocaine. This disqualified the Petitioner from continuing to have direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. Petitioner has an interest in continuing employment involving direct contact with unmarried minors, such as the children who were participants in the S.O.S. For this reason Petitioner has pursued his request for exemption from disqualification. At the time of the hearing Petitioner was employed as a floor-care worker with Bay Genesis Eldercare in Panama City, Florida. He had held that position for approximately three months. On the date of hearing Petitioner was 36 years old. Petitioner believes that his life has changed following participation in the residential drug treatment program. Petitioner in his day-to day life works to tell people that drugs and alcohol are a waste of time. That was the motivation Petitioner had for working as a Human Service worker at Chemical Addictions Recovery. Petitioner does not sense any difficulty in dealing with children. He believes that children look up to him. At present Petitioner does not use alcohol or drugs. Petitioner attends church. Mary Cruel, Petitioner's great-aunt, is a supervisor at S.O.S. She describes that program as a residential program for children who have a problem with substance abuse. Ms. Cruel is familiar with the Detox program associated with Chemical Addictions Recovery. That program, as Ms. Cruel describes it, is a crisis intervention program for adult women and some children. Ms. Cruel recalls that Petitioner had a problem with drugs and alcohol, as part of overall life problems. In response, Ms. Cruel helped to place the Petitioner in the Faith Farm Ministries program. As Ms. Cruel describes it, Petitioner's participation in the Faith Farm Ministries program was voluntary. Participation in that program was felt to be the better choice, in that it had a spiritual emphasis. Ms. Cruel communicated with the Petitioner while he was participating in the drug rehabilitation program. She observed that the Petitioner was passionate about getting well, and that he quit blaming others for his difficulties. Now Ms. Cruel sees the Petitioner about three times a week. Ms. Cruel observes that her husband is close to the Petitioner. Ms. Cruel's husband does not abuse drugs. Ms. Cruel has observed the Petitioner trying to encourage other persons, who have problems with drugs to get into treatment and in conversation with others, Petitioner refers to his life experience. Ms. Cruel notes that Petitioner wants to work in a substance abuse program. Ms. Cruel is aware that Petitioner earns more money at his present employment than he did in the position that he was dismissed from with Chemical Addictions Recovery. Finally, Ms. Cruel observes that Petitioner lives a more regular life than he did before dealing with his addictions, and that Petitioner stays clean and sober one day at a time without being seen to have regressed. Rosemary G. Balkcom, R.N., C.D., a nursing services supervisor at Chemical Addictions Recovery, in correspondence, notes that Petitioner in working in the Detox program related well with clientele and that his overall attitude toward the persons participating in the program was one of genuine concern and empathy. Further, Ms. Balkcom notes in her remarks that Petitioner enjoys being able to assist and provide guidance for the clientele in the program. Finally, Ms. Balkcom notes that if Petitioner were allowed to continue to work in the program, and gained required education and training, Petitioner would present a positive role model for others. Amy Shackleford, Petitioner's co-worker, notes in correspondence that Petitioner has a genuine care for juvenile residents, and that Petitioner is active, motivated, honest, and dependable. Ms. Shackleford notes that young residents with low self-esteem have become actively involved with Petitioner. Ms. Shackleford notes that Petitioner is a perfect role model, and a positive influence in helping young people grow into productive citizens.
Recommendation Upon consideration the of the facts found and conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered exempting Petitioner from disqualification to work in a position of special trust or responsibility that would allow direct contact with unmarried minor clients or clients who are developmentally disabled. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of August, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of August, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Perry, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Suite 100A 2639 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2949 Victor Renaldo Days 1003 McKenzie Avenue Panama City, Florida 32401 Gregory D. Venz, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard A. Doran, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on his race and/or disability by terminating his employment in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent manufactures rubber hoses for the automotive industry. Petitioner is a black male who began working for Respondent on February 17, 1999. Petitioner's job as a molder required him to work with his hands and arms pinning rubber hoses onto metal pins and removing the hoses from the pins after they cooled down. The job was dangerous and physically stressful to Petitioner's hands and wrists. After working for Respondent for approximately three months, Petitioner suffered a job-related injury. Respondent sent Petitioner to a physician who diagnosed Petitioner as having sprained hand and wrist muscles. The physician prescribed anti-inflammatory medicine for Petitioner and recommended that he return to work on light duty. For the next several months, Petitioner worked as a molder in an area of Respondent's plant that caused less physical stress on the muscles and ligaments in Petitioner's hands and wrists. Petitioner had no problems working in that area. In time, Respondent began to experience a decrease in the number and type of orders that it received from its customers. The change in demand for Respondent's products resulted in a reorganization of the production line, a smaller number of available positions, and in some cases, layoffs of employees. Eventually, Respondent moved Petitioner's work station back to his original position which was physically more stressful. After a couple of months, Petitioner suffered another work-related injury. Respondent told Petitioner that he would have to continue working as assigned because there was no other work or lighter duty available. Petitioner continued to work in the more physically stressful area of Respondent's plant. On one occasion, Respondent took Petitioner to the hospital because he was experiencing pain. Petitioner did not go back to work until he saw a physician who specialized in treating Petitioner's type of injury. Petitioner eventually was diagnosed as having bi- lateral carpel tunnel syndrome. The doctor recommended that Petitioner work on light duty until he could have surgery. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's needs by allowing him to work on light duty pending the proposed surgery. Respondent has a substance abuse policy to maintain a work place that is free from the use of illegal drugs and the use of alcohol. The policy provides for assistance for employees who develop an addiction to drugs or alcohol and who voluntarily seek assistance before the company has knowledge of the problem. If an employee tests positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while on the job, the employee is subject to immediate termination. Respondent's substance abuse policy provides for drug and alcohol screening under the following circumstances: after any injury that requires outside medical attention; after any incident that results in damage to other associates, company property, or a pattern of personal injuries; upon observance of abnormal or erratic behavior while at work or a significant deterioration in work performance; upon reasonable suspicion due to observable phenomena, direct observation of use, or a report of use by a reliable and credible source; and (e) pursuant to random drug screening. Petitioner never tested positive for illegal drugs or alcohol use while he was working for Respondent. He never even went to work under the influence of illegal drugs or alcohol. However, on August 22, 2000, Petitioner voluntarily advised Respondent that that he had a substance abuse problem and that he desired to participate in the assistance referral program. On August 23, 2000, Petitioner met with Respondent's human resource manager and occupational nurse. The nurse reviewed the company's substance abuse policy and assistance referral program with Petitioner. Additionally. the nurse advised Petitioner as follows: (a) he would have to enroll in a treatment program; (b) he would have to provide Respondent with weekly letters from the treatment program, furnishing information about Petitioner's progress in the program; and (c) he would be subject to random drug screens for two years. The human resource manager advised Petitioner that he would be discharged if he failed to comply with and successfully complete the treatment program. Petitioner indicated that he understood Respondent's requirements for participation in the assistance referral program. Petitioner elected to enroll in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program sponsored by Marion Citrus Mental Health. Petitioner missed his first appointment at the treatment center because he lacked transportation. Petitioner eventually began attending the treatment program three nights a week. He continued to work light duty at Respondent's plant during the day. Petitioner did not furnish Respondent with documentation showing that he had enrolled in the substance abuse treatment program. Instead, Petitioner advised Respondent's occupational nurse that he had signed a release at Marion Citrus Mental Health so that she could call his mental health counselor to verify his attendance in the program. Meanwhile, Respondent continued to reorganize and downsize its operations. When there were more employees restricted to light duty than light duty positions available, Respondent assisted the employees in filing workers' compensation claims and allowed them to stay at home on medical leave for up to 12 weeks. In time, Respondent could no longer accommodate Petitioner's physical injury with a light duty position. Petitioner filed a workers' compensation claim and began staying at home on medical leave on September 11, 2000. On September 11, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse called Petitioner's mental health counselor at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse learned that Petitioner had kept an appointment at the mental health facility on September 7, 2000. The nurse also learned that Petitioner had not signed a release of information form that would allow the counselor to share any other information about Petitioner's treatment program. On September 12, 2000, Respondent's occupational nurse sent Petitioner a letter. The purpose of the letter was to remind Petitioner that he was required to furnish Respondent with a written statement from the substance abuse treatment facility each week. According to the letter, the written statement was supposed to include Petitioner's treatment plan schedule. The letter advised Petitioner that to remain employed, he would have to keep Respondent fully informed about his progress in and completion of the treatment program. On September 14, 2000, Petitioner called Respondent's occupational nurse to advise her that he could not keep his appointment at Marion Citrus Mental Health that week. Petitioner advised the nurse that he was taking medication that made him dizzy and that he had transportation problems, which made it difficult for him to attend the treatment program. On September 15, Petitioner went to Respondent's plant to see the occupational nurse. Because he claimed that he had not received the letter dated September 12, 2000, the nurse read the letter to him and gave him a copy of it. Once again the nurse explained Respondent's assistance referral program to Petitioner, advising him that Respondent would not tolerate future missed appointments at Marion Citrus Mental Health. The nurse also gave Petitioner a rapid drug screen, the result of which was negative. On November 15, 2000, Respondent sent Petitioner another letter regarding his failure to furnish Respondent with evidence of his attendance at and completion of a treatment program. The letter advised Petitioner that he had to furnish the information on or before November 27, 2000, or risk having his employment terminated. Petitioner received Respondent's November 15, 2000, letter but did not furnish Respondent with the requested information. Petitioner did not call Respondent to explain his failure to do so. In a letter dated November 27, 2000, Respondent advised Petitioner that he was discharged. Petitioner furnished Respondent with a letter dated December 4, 2000, from Marion Citrus Mental Health. The letter states that Petitioner had been enrolled in substance abuse outpatient counseling beginning August 31, 2000, and that he was progressing well. There is no evidence that Respondent applied its substance abuse policy to non-minority employees differently than it did to Petitioner or other minority employees. Additionally, there is no evidence that Respondent treated non-minority employees who had workers' compensation claims differently than it treated Petitioner or other minority employees who were home on medical leave due to a workers' compensation injury. In fact, Petitioner admitted during the hearing that he had no proof that Respondent discriminated against him based on his race. During the relevant time period, Respondent had approximately 52 employees (half black and half white) that suffered a workers' compensation injury. Employees with workers' compensation injuries were allowed to remain on family medical leave for 12 weeks. Employees who returned to work within the 12-week period were guaranteed a job. Subsequent to the 12-week period, employees with workers' compensation injuries were not officially terminated unless they were unable to return to work after 12 months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of October, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of October, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ray Mayo 708 Southwest Second Street Ocala, Florida 34471 Kade Spencer Dayco Products, Inc. 3100 Southeast Maricamp Road Ocala, Florida 34471 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Background Petitioner was founded by Mr. Art Barker in 1970 and has been operated since that time as a private, non-profit entity. Petitioner receives no funds from any unit of government and is a valuable asset in the field of drug abuse treatment and prevention. Petitioner enjoys a good reputation in the community it serves and has demonstrated its ability to help people with substance abuse problems. Approximately 7,000 people have gone through Petitioner's drug abuse program with a success rate in excess of 90 percent. Petitioner was an innovator in the development of the type of drug abuse programs administered by it. The drug abuse program administered by Petitioner has been emulated by approximately 12 other programs in the state. There are not enough programs of this type to satisfy the needs of individuals in the state. Respondent first began licensing drug abuse programs in February, 1972. Petitioner has been continuously licensed by Respondent as a drug abuse program. Petitioner is authorized under License Number 10A-38 to provide "day care with host component." The licensed address for Petitioner is 919 East Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33301. Petitioner's license must be renewed annually. Applicable administrative rules require licensees to operate drug abuse programs under the supervision of a "qualified supervisor." Prior to September, 1986, a qualified supervisor was defined as an individual who, by "training or experience" was responsible for providing clinical guidance to counselors. 3/ In September, 1986, the ability of an individual to qualify as a qualified supervisor based solely upon his or her work experience was deleted. Since September, 1986, an individual who wished to satisfy the requirements of a qualified supervisor was required to either satisfy minimum educational requirements or become certified by the Certification Board of Addiction Professionals of Florida, or by a substantially equivalent certification process ("certified addiction professionals" or "CAP designation"). Petitioner demonstrated its good faith effort to comply with Respondent's rules. Respondent's licensing agent advised Petitioner in 1987 that Petitioner would be in compliance with the new requirements for qualified supervisors as long as staff personnel placed their full name and title next to the comments on the client's records. That procedure was followed by staff personnel during the license years for 1987-1988 and 1988-1989. Petitioner's license was renewed during those years with no question from Respondent concerning the credentials of Petitioner's qualified supervisors. During the same license years, Petitioner's personnel were led to believe by Respondent's licensing agent and reasonably did believe that they were in full compliance with Respondent's rules. Petitioner relocated in 1987 and purchased a building rather than leasing one. The decision to purchase the building at the new location was made, in part, in reliance upon Respondent's representation and Petitioner's belief that Petitioner was in compliance with applicable rules regarding qualified supervisors. Respondent refused to issue a regular annual license to Petitioner for the 1989-1990 license year for the sole reason that Petitioner did not have a qualified supervisor. 4/ Respondent specifically determined that neither Mr. Art Barker nor Ms. Lybbi Kienzle satisfy the educational or certification requirements for qualified supervisors. 5/ It is uncontroverted that Mr. Art Barker and Ms. Lybbi Kienzle are each competent to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor. Respondent determined that each individual is competent to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor and so stipulated in the joint prehearing stipulation filed in this proceeding. Respondent did not follow its own rule in rejecting Petitioner's request for a deviation. Respondent's current written policy was adopted as a rule after Petitioner's request for a deviation but prior to the formal hearing. Under Respondent's current rule, each district office must make a recommendation concerning each request for deviation made to the district office. The request for deviation and the district office recommendation is then considered by the licensure rules committee. The licensure rules committee then recommends action to appropriate department personnel who may either accept or reject the committee's recommendation. The approval of any request for deviation automatically ends at the time of the expiration date of the regular license. At the time of Petitioner's request for deviation, Respondent was in the process of developing its current written policy. Deviation requests and district office recommendations were considered at the time by an ad hoc committee of anywhere from three to seven people, depending upon who was available. The occurrence of such a meeting, the number of people, and the identity of the committee members was determined by "catch-as- you-can." A licensure rules committee was not officially formed until some time after Petitioner's request for deviation. Petitioner's request for deviation and the recommendation of the district office was not considered by any committee. The district office recommended that Petitioner's request for a deviation be granted. Approval of the request for deviation was recommended by the district office subject to the conditions that the deviation be limited to one year, that Petitioner submit a new request for deviation prior to its annual licensing date, and that the competency of Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle to perform the duties of qualified supervisors be documented by their respective resumes. Documentation in the form of resumes was not a significant concern to Respondent and was merely ministerial. The recommendation for approval of the request for deviation was made by employees of the Respondent who have personal knowledge of the experience and competency of Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle. It is uncontroverted that Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle are competent to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor. The district office, however, did recommend that either Mr. Barker or someone on his staff pursue CAP designation. The recommendation of the district office was overruled by Dr. Iver Groves, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health. The request for deviation was rejected on the grounds that Mr. Barker's honorary degree did not satisfy the educational requirements for a qualified supervisor. Dr. Groves determined that deviation from the educational requirements for a qualified supervisor cannot be granted under any circumstances. Dr. Groves suggested that Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle comply with the requirements for CAP designation or formal education. Dr. Groves has no personal knowledge of the experience and competency of either Mr. Barker or Ms. Kienzle to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor. Dr. Groves first became involved in this proceeding when a draft of a letter embodying the recommendation of the district office was presented to Dr. Groves for his signature. Dr. Groves spent an ". . . hour [or] maybe two hours . . ." considering Petitioner's request for deviation. Dr. Groves never saw the recommendation of the district office, was unaware that anyone in the district office recommended approval of the deviation, and did not consider the recommendation of the district office in making his determination to reject Petitioner's request for deviation. Dr. Groves never compared the requirements for a deviation in the applicable administrative rule to Petitioner's request for deviation. Dr. Groves rejected Petitioner's request for deviation based upon his concern over the establishment of a precedent for other programs in the state. Dr. Groves primary concern was whether it was appropriate to waive a ". . . fundamental standard in the rule that would have ramifications for the practice of the treatment of addiction across the State of Florida." It is uncontroverted, however, that there are no other programs in the state that are comparable to that administered by Petitioner. The experience and competency of Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor satisfies the purposes of the educational requirements for qualified supervisors. As Dr. Groves stated during his testimony at the formal hearing, the purpose of imposing educational requirements on qualified supervisors is to give Respondent ". . . some assurance of the capability and competence of people within the program . . ." and to insure that ". . . somebody associated with that program . . . has been through a certain organized set of experiences and has been judged to be qualified." Transcript at 111. Grounds For Deviation Neither Mr. Barker nor Ms. Kienzle satisfy either the educational or certification requirements for qualified supervisors. Neither individual has the requisite education and neither has been certified by the Certification Board of Addiction Professionals of Florida, or by a substantially equivalent certification process. The honorary degree received by Mr. Barker from Fort Lauderdale University does not satisfy the educational requirements for a qualified supervisor. Mr. Barker was awarded "The Honorary Degree of Doctor of Social Science" in June, 1972, by Fort Lauderdale University. Fort Lauderdale University was accredited at the time the honorary degree was awarded. The citation attached to the honorary degree states in relevant part that the degree was awarded to: . . . the outstanding drug rehabilitation expert in the United States [who] saved 1,500 young men and women from a life in prison or mental hospital or a premature death from a drug overdose. . . . The ninety per cent success rate of The Seed is a tribute to your genius. Neither Mr. Barker nor Ms. Kienzle satisfy the educational requirements for becoming certified by the Certification Board of Addiction Professionals of Florida, or by a substantially equivalent certification process. Applicants for CAP designation must hold a minimum of an Associates Arts degree from a college or university. The degree requirement became effective on January 1, 1991, and it was impossible for either Mr. Barker or Ms. Kienzle to satisfy the educational requirements prior to the formal hearing. Requiring Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle to satisfy the educational requirements for a qualified supervisor would interfere with the efficient operation of Petitioner. The time and energy needed to obtain the academic credits would impose an unnecessary hardship on each of them and detract from the time and energy they could devote to the drug abuse program administered by Petitioner. Requiring Petitioner to hire a certified addiction professional would interfere with Petitioner's efficient operation. Petitioner has a positive net worth and can pay for such services. In recent years, however, Petitioner has experienced operating deficits. The amount of funds received as donations and pledges has been less than annual operating expenses. Expenses incurred by Petitioner to hire one or more additional personnel who have obtained the CAP designation would increase Petitioner's operating deficit and further erode Petitioner's remaining net worth. Supervision of either Mr. Barker or Ms. Kienzle by a certified addiction professional would be superfluous and would interfere with Petitioner's efficient operation. Neither Mr. Barker nor Ms. Kienzle need to be supervised by one or more individuals who have obtained the CAP designation in order to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor. It is uncontroverted that Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle are competent to perform such duties. Deviation from the educational requirements for qualified supervisors for Mr. Barker and Ms. Kienzle will not jeopardize the health and safety of clients in the program administered by Petitioner, will not abridge the rights of those clients, and will not diminish the level of quality of client care. Mr. Barker is competent to provide clinical guidance to counselors, approve and reassess treatment plans, supervise psychosocial assessment services, and supervise treatment services for Petitioner. Mr. Barker has focused his time continuously and exclusively on running the drug abuse program for Petitioner. Ms. Kienzle graduated from Petitioner's drug abuse program in 1971 and has been employed continuously and exclusively by Petitioner as a counselor and supervisor. A master's degree in a social or behavioral science does not assure competency to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor in a drug abuse program. Respondent's rule does not require the field of academic study to be related to the duties that must be performed by a qualified supervisor. As Dr. Groves stated in his testimony during the formal hearing, the requirement for a master's degree in a social or behavioral science is satisfied by a master's degree in history or English. For the same reason, the requirement of an Associate Arts degree for a CAP designation does not assure competency to perform the duties of a qualified supervisor for a drug abuse program.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner should be granted a regular license for one year and the requested deviation. The deviation should automatically end at the time of the expiration date of the regular license or at such time as Petitioner's regular license is revoked, suspended, or otherwise terminated. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 23rd day of October 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October 1991.
