The Issue Petitioner protests the method by which Respondent Department of Transportation (DOT) advertised RFP-DOT-99/00-3002 and RFP-DOT-99/00-3003 and the specifications contained in the RFP's SCOPE OF SERVICES, Sections 1.7.2, 2.0-A, 14.0-A, 14.0-B, and 14.0-C.
Findings Of Fact The subject Requests for Proposal (RFPs) are RFP-DOT- 99/00-3002 and RFP-DOT-99/00-3003, commonly referred-to as the 2000 RFPs. These RFPs seek suppliers of security guards for rest areas and welcome centers maintained by DOT in its District III. That District currently is administered by "east" and "west" segments of Interstate Highway 10, with "east" corresponding to RFP 3003 and "west" corresponding to RFP 3002. NYCO is a supplier of security guard services for industrial, health care, general, and retail establishments in Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi. Ken Chandler is Administrator and Operational Manager for NYCO. Since 1994, NYCO has bid on DOT RFPs for the same project and has provided security guard services for District III. Generally speaking, security guards are non-skilled persons who work at or near minimum wage. Higher standards for its security guards imposed by prior DOT contracts requiring law enforcement training and certification have resulted in NYCO paying off-duty law enforcement officers at a considerably higher rate of pay to work at DOT's facilities. The 2000 RFPs constitute "contractual services contracts" governed by Chapter 287, Florida Statutes. They also are "standard scope of services contracts," which means they are developed on a statewide basis with District input. NYCO's first contract with DOT was awarded July 1, 1994, for two years. The second was awarded July 1, 1996, for two years. For the first contract, specifications were mailed to Mr. Chandler three months in advance of the bid submittal date. For the second contract, NYCO, as the incumbent contract holder, was notified that specifications were ready for pick-up. NYCO had to submit a written request for the RFP package. The 1999 RFP was advertised on the Florida Communities Network (FCN) and, according to Richard Norris, DOT District III Contract Administrator, RFP packages also were sent to all proposers for the prior contract because he had promised to do so when that set of bids had all been rejected. Apparently, no such promise was made for the 2000 RFPs. (TR-103). FCN is a website maintained by the Florida Department of Management Services for the purpose of advertising public contracts. During the course of NYCO's most recent contract, NYCO employee Joe Huff regularly checked with DOT personnel to ensure that the security which NYCO was already providing was going along well. Both Mr. Chandler and Mr. Huff assumed NYCO would be alerted during these conversations as to when it could request the specifications for the next round of contracts, the 2000 RFPs. DOT employee Lloyd Tharpe submitted technical aspects of the 2000 RFPs to Richard Norris on or about December 23, 1999. Mr. Huff testified that he made contact with DOT personnel, including Mark Thomas, Tom Williams, Charlie Ward, Rufus Baron, and Milton Blake, on February 7, February 14, February 15, February 21, and February 29, 2000. While Mr. Huff maintained that on nearly every occasion he asked if the DOT employee to whom he was speaking knew when the new RFP specifications would be ready, his testimony on the precise contents of these conversations is a little vague. He based his recollection on notes in his day planner which merely listed the name of a city, and he then assumed that he spoke with whomever he usually contacted in that city. He could not recall the exact content of these conversations. None of the foregoing DOT employees corroborated that they had been asked about the 2000 RFP specifications by Mr. Huff. It was not established that any of Mr. Huff's contacts were with DOT's procurement office, which Mr. Huff knew advertises the RFPs. DOT District Maintenance Engineer Mark Thomas stated that he only became aware on or about February 29, 2000, that the 2000 RFP was being advertised. Mr. Huff was told on February 29, 2000, by Mark Thomas that the 2000 RFPs were "on the street" and that the mandatory pre-bid conference would be held March 2, 2000. NYCO attended the mandatory pre-bid conference for the 2000 RFPs on March 2, 2000. On March 3, 2000, NYCO timely filed its Notice of Intent to Protest the specifications of the 2000 RFPs. The deadline for submitting proposals in response to the 2000 RFPs was March 9, 2000. NYCO submitted a bid proposal timely, but found it difficult to prepare in such a short time frame. On March 13, 2000, NYCO timely filed its Formal Written Protest of certain specifications of the 2000 RFPs. The specifications challenged in this case were developed by the Department's State Maintenance Office. They read as follows: 1.7.2 Qualifications of Key Personnel Those individuals (as identified in Section 12 of Exhibit "A" Scope of Services) who will be directly involved in the project should have demonstrated experience in the areas delineated in the scope of work. Individuals whose qualifications are presented will be committed to the project for its duration unless otherwise excepted by the Department's Contract Manager. Where State of Florida registration, certification, or license is deemed appropriate, as identified in Exhibit "A" Scope of Services, a copy of the registration, certificate, or license shall be included in the proposal package. 2.0-A Services to be Provided by Contractor A. Provide uniformed, armed Security Officers licensed pursuant to F.S. 493, to provide security services. 14.0 Eligibility Criteria All Security Officers and Contract Supervisors employed by the Contractor under this Contract are required to meet the following requirements. Training Requirements: Must be a graduate of a certified United States federal, state, county, or local law enforcement agency training program, a correctional officer training program, a military police training program, or an equivalent training program, which presented the individual with the appropriate certificate or diploma stating eligibility for employment as a Law Enforcement or Correctional Officer. Law Enforcement Officer and Correctional Officer shall be defined in Sections 943.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. The Contractor is encouraged to seek services of security guards licensed pursuant to Chapter 493, F.S., who are former members of the armed forces of the United States and have been affected by military downsizing or base closures, and shall be further encouraged to contact community colleges or other educational institutions which provide training for security guards for candidates meeting these qualifications. Licensing Requirements: Contract Supervisors and Security Officers, while on duty, must possess upon their person and present to Department personnel upon request the following: State of Florida Class "D" License (security guard license). State of Florida Class "G" License (license authorizing individual to bear a firearm). State of Florida Driver's License or other State Driver's License which permits the individual to operate a vehicle in the State of Florida. No Security Officer will be permitted to work under this contract using an Acknowledgement Card from the Department of State. A Security Officer or Contract Supervisor employed as a Law Enforcement Officer or Correctional Officer must have documentation showing proof of current employment and approval from his/her employing agency or department to carry a firearm during off-duty hours in his/her capacity as Security Officer and Contract Supervisor. The manner of advertising the 2000 RFPs also was challenged. For the 2000 RFPs, DOT did not advertise in newspapers or the Florida Administrative Law Weekly and did not mail specifications to incumbent contractors or to a list of potential bidders. DOT only advertised the 2000 RFPs via FCN from approximately February 1, 2000 to March 6, 2000. According to Richard Norris, the Department is required by statute to advertise projects on FCN. He cited neither statute nor rule to support his conclusion. He stated that there are many other or additional ways DOT may advertise a project and that advertisement by FCN is only the minimum requirement. He was not aware of any current statutory or rule requirement that DOT directly notify potential bidders for this type of RFP. However, he stated that if he were approached directly by a potential bidder, he would tell that potential bidder about the RFP over the phone. To develop scope of services contracts such as the 2000 RFPs, Alan Reese, the Department's State Contracts and Agreements Manager, directs the gathering of information from the Department's Districts or other sources, develops a draft, receives input from each District as to the draft, and the draft is reviewed throughout the Department, including its legal office, until finally the State Maintenance Engineer signs-off on it. In this instance, the bid specifications were intended to create a uniform and consistent statewide system that was understandable to the bidders. Lloyd Tharpe and his staff were responsible for mailing out the RFP packages as they were requested by potential bidders after the first advertisement approximately February 1, 2000. No active intent or effort by DOT staff to obscure NYCO's opportunity to bid was proven. The 2000 RFPs require that to be a security guard of DOT facilities, one must be qualified to be hired as a law enforcement officer or correctional officer as defined in Subsections 943.10(1) and (2), Florida Statutes. (RFP Section 14.0-A). The training qualifications to be hired as a law enforcement officer under Chapter 943 are higher than those imposed by a Class "D" security guard license from the Department of State pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes. The 2000 RFP specifications also require that to be a security guard of DOT facilities one must have a Class "D" or Class "G" (if a gun is carried) license from the Department of State, pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes (RFP Section 4.0-B.1 and 2). DOT interprets the foregoing RFP requirements to mean that even currently employed Florida law enforcement officers and correctional officers must also be licensed by the Florida Department of State as Class "D" or Class "G" security officers. DOT is aware of an exemption in Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, permitting law enforcement officers to act as security guards without obtaining a Class "D" license from the Department. As far as the 2000 RFPs are concerned, the exemption may not be exercised. A 1996 DOT Inspector General's internal audit report identified individuals with questionable backgrounds working for security firms which had already contracted with DOT. The report concluded that the background checks that the then- existing contracts required the contract security firms to perform had been unsatisfactory. The report recommended that the security firms do more extensive background checks on their employees. DOT did not want anybody guarding tourists, especially women and children tourists, who had not gone through a thorough background check. DOT apparently felt it could not rely on the security firms to do background checks on their employee-guards. DOT determined that it did not have authority or ability to do its own background checks, so it decided to rely on the Department of State, which did have authority and ability to do background checks. Mark Thomas understood that once an application for a Class "D" or "G" license has been received by the Secretary of State, an FDLE criminal background check is conducted by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE), and an acknowledgment card is sent by the Department of State to the applicant which states that the applicant may perform security guard services while carrying the card. However, Mr. Thomas ultimately admitted that he did not know anything at all about Department of State background checks. His "understanding" was not corroborated by Ms. Constance Crawford. Constance Crawford is the Bureau Chief for the Bureau of Licensing, Department of State. She handles the administrative responsibilities associated with the review of security guard applications pursuant to Chapter 493, and Sections 790.06 and 849.094, Florida Statutes. According to her, the Department of State will issue Class "D" and Class "G" security guard licenses to law enforcement officers. Ms. Crawford provided no information about the Department of State's security guard background checks. In developing the 2000 RFPs, DOT decided not to accept Department of State acknowledgement cards because DOT staff believed that acknowledgment cards were issued by the Department of State to applicants before a national background check (also called an NCIC check) was completed through the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). No DOT witness had knowledge of how Department of State, FDLE, or FBI background checks are performed. Mr. Chandler testified that NYCO's problem with the RFPs' requirement for law enforcement officers to have Class "D" and/or Class "G" licenses before they are employed at DOT's interstate facilities was due to the time it takes to get Class "D" and "G" licenses issued by the Department of State, which can be anywhere from a few weeks to several months, and because it is very difficult for NYCO to retain potential employees for that long before they are placed on the jobsite. He testified that NYCO would have no problem if the employees could be certified in three days. Mr. Chandler testified that the letters of authorization required by DOT in specification 14.0-C differed from the language employed in Chapter 493, Florida Statutes, and that many law enforcement agencies had refused to sign the form letter provided by DOT because those law enforcement agencies interpreted the letters to make the law enforcement agencies liable for anything done by the law enforcement officer, on or off-duty. DOT's approved form letter reads: Dear Sirs: is an employee of this Department and has the approval of this Department to carry a fire arm during off- duty hours in his/her capacity as a Security Officer and/or Contract Supervisor at the Florida Department of Transportation Rest Areas/Welcome Centers within the Third District. Sincerely, Name Title
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation which rejects all bids and provides that the specifications be redrafted in accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 2000.
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in an unlawful employment practice with regard to Petitioner because of Petitioner's asserted disability.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the hearing, Ms. Hays was 36 years of age and was unemployed. During times pertinent she lived in Chattahoochee, Florida. The Hospital in Chattahoochee, Florida, is a large residential mental health facility operated under the auspices of the Department. The Hospital also administratively supports employees of the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. The Hospital is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), and thus subject to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Ms. Hays, prior to her employment with the Hospital, worked for various employers in clerical and secretarial positions. She began working at the Hospital in 2000. She was employed in a temporary position in Unit 25 as a Clerk Typist Specialist. After two weeks on the job, she was moved to Unit 14 and worked as a Human Service Worker I. This was also a temporary position. In this latter position, she took care of elderly residents. She bathed them, fed them, and otherwise helped them with their daily needs. She also escorted them to off-campus appointments. She received a "Review and Performance Planning" document signed by her on June 19, 2000, which indicated that she was performing in a satisfactory manner. She was hired in a full-time position as a Human Service Worker I in August 2000 in Unit 31/32. In this position her duties included assisting nurses in the medical unit of the Hospital. A "Review and Performance Planning" document signed by Ms. Hays on January 30, 2001, stated that she achieved standards and included some complimentary remarks. In July 2001, she was moved to Unit 29 as a Human Service Worker I. Unit 29 is also known as the Mentally Retarded Defendant Program (MRDP) or MRDP 29. She received a "Review and Performance Planning" document that she signed on March 29, 2002. She received an overall evaluation of "3.81." A performance rating of "4" means that she consistently met and often exceeded expectations. A "5" is the highest rating one can obtain at the Hospital. Her next rating for the period March 2002 until July 2002, resulted in a grade of "4." During the period July 20, 2002, until March 1, 2003, she did not receive a rating because she was not working at the Hospital during the evaluation period. Nevertheless, Annette Bates, Ms. Hays' supervisor, noted that she was a good worker and an asset to MRDP 29. Ms. Hays was injured on November 27, 2001, while exiting the "big blue bus." She slipped on wet steps, and her lower back and neck impacted the steps. A physician, Dr. K. W. Richardson of Chattahoochee, reported that the injury sustained was a broken tail bone. He noted this in a "First Report of Injury or Illness" dated November 28, 2001. Ultimately the diagnosis was changed to two bulging disks. Pain medication was prescribed, but she never required surgery. Wages paid to her, by the Hospital, $751.63 bi-weekly, terminated on December 4, 2001. Subsequently, she was paid workers' compensation benefits. She was informed she could work, but could not lift more than ten pounds and could not have contact with patients. She was authorized to work only at a desk job. Ms. Hays returned to work at the Hospital on January 18, 2002. She was placed on light duty and assigned to the Medical Records Section at MRDP. She filed documents and did other tasks as assigned. Her supervisor was a Ms. Lawrence. On July 18, 2002, her light-duty status expired and because the Hospital could not accommodate her restrictions, she was sent home and provided workers' compensation benefits. She continued to receive workers' compensation benefits until December 2004, when she reached maximum medical improvement. In December 2004, she was contacted by Tracy Wallace and as a result, Ms. Hays met with Margaret Forehand. Ms. Forehand, at that time, was the Hospital's Workers' Compensation Coordinator. She told Ms. Hays that a position was available in MRDP, Unit 29, and invited her to apply for it. Ms. Hays completed a State of Florida Employment Application. She was thereafter employed as a "clerk typist specialist - F/C" at a salary rate of $754.24, which was, on a bi-weekly basis, $39.70 less than she was receiving before her injury. (The designation F/C means forensic corrections.) Ms. Hays' Letter of Acceptance, dated December 7, 2004, and accepted by Ms. Hays on December 7, 2004, informed her that her position was probationary for 12 months. The letter was written on Department stationery, but was signed by David English, Program Operations Administrator, who worked for the Agency for People with Disabilities. He has the ultimate hiring authority for the employees of MRDP. Although termed a "demotion," the lower pay was actually the result of Hospital policy that was applied to all employees who returned from an absence subsequent to being placed on workers' compensation. This job was not preceded by an interview. The person who became her supervisor, Shellie Owens, was not involved in Ms. Hays' hiring process. Ms. Hays' ultimate employer was the Department. Ms. Hays' duties as a "clerk typist specialist- F/C" included filing, typing, and answering and referring calls. She filed ward charts, "thinned charts," and ensured that ward charts and central files were maintained in accordance with Hospital policies, among other tasks. Her duties were set forth in a "Career Service System Position Description." Her section was denoted "MRDP." She was physically able to perform these duties without an accommodation. Her daily work was not in the least affected by any injury or disability. The evidence indicates that both Ms. Hays and Ms. Owens' ultimate employer was the Agency for Persons with Disabilities. Ms. Owens was aware that Ms. Hays had been on workers' compensation for a time. Ms. Owens knew that Ms. Hays could not lift more than ten pounds and was aware that the job did not require lifting more than ten pounds. No evidence was adduced indicating that Ms. Owens perceived Ms. Hays as disabled. Because entries are frequently entered in patients' ward charts, they would grow quite large if not managed. It is necessary for some of the information to permanently remain in ward charts, but a substantial portion may be stored elsewhere. The portions of the charts that are not required to remain in the ward are permanently stored in the Medical Records Office. The process of removing designated matter from the ward charts is called "thinning." Thinning was an important part of Ms. Hays' job. She had to "thin" in accordance with a schedule. Some documents would be left in ward charts for three months, some would be kept if they were only the most recent of a type, and some were kept as long as needed. Some were permanent and, therefore, never removed. It was important also, as part of the process, that Ms. Hays ensure that documents in ward charts were arranged in the proper order. For the rating period December 7, 2004, until March 1, 2005, Ms. Owens evaluated Ms. Hays as a "3." In the written portion of the evaluation, Ms. Owens noted that Ms. Hays had a pleasant personality and was willing to assist others. Ms. Owens' job title is Health Information Specialist Supervisor. In addition to Ms. Hays, during times pertinent, Ms. Owens supervised from three to four other people. On April 19, 2005, approximately six weeks after receiving her evaluation, Ms. Hays was counseled by Ms. Owens. Ms. Owens told her she needed to improve in some areas and that her desk was not tidy. She provided Ms. Hays with a schedule of daily assignments designed to help Ms. Hays improve. Ms. Owens memorialized her discussion with Ms. Hays in a memorandum dated April 19, 2005. In the memorandum, she noted that Ms. Hays had been provided with the MRDP Worksite Orientation Requirement Worksheet on February 25, 2005, and that Ms. Hays understood her duties and acknowledged that by signing it. The memorandum recited that Ms. Hays' work was backed up and that her desk had food and drink on it that could have been spilled on documents which were on the desk. The memorandum also reminded Ms. Hays that she was a probationary employee. Ms. Owens also gave Ms. Hays a "daily schedule" that had an effective date of April 25, 2005. Ms. Hays and Ms. Owens both signed it. The "daily schedule" informed Ms. Hays exactly what she was to do every day of the week. In Ms. Hays' opinion, she followed "every word" of the schedule, and Ms. Owens did not indicate that there was any problem with her work immediately subsequent to the implementation of the "daily schedule." Ms. Owens conducted an audit of the charts maintained by Ms. Hays on May 20, 2005, and reduced the results to writing. The information developed in the audit caused Ms. Owens to conclude that Ms. Hays' work was not improving. Ms. Owens believes that medical records are extremely important and keeping them in good order is a necessity. Her audit found that Ms. Hays was not keeping them in good order. She found her work to be unacceptable. She discussed the matter with Les Smith, the Residential Services Director of Forensic Corrections. He was her immediate supervisor. Ms. Owens then talked to Amy Bryant the Hospital's Employee Relations Counselor with regard to procedures to be followed in terminating an employee. She wanted to comply with procedures. Ultimately a meeting occurred attended by Ms. Owens, Les Smith, David English, and an attorney for the hospital, Amy Tillman. During this process, the decision to offer Ms. Hays the opportunity to resign in lieu of being fired, was finalized. On May 24, 2005, Ms. Hays was ordered by Ms. Owens to report to Mr. Smith's office. Mr. Smith is Ms. Owens' supervisor. When she arrived, she was given the choice of resigning or being fired. If she had not resigned, she would have been fired immediately. Ms. Hays was surprised when she was informed of this choice. She resigned in a handwritten letter dated May 24, 2005. This was her last day of work at the Hospital. As a probationary employee, she had no right to appeal what amounted to a discharge. Bernice King worked at the Hospital with Ms. Hays. She was a Human Service Worker II in MRDP 29. She had an opportunity to observe Ms. Hays' work. Ms. King used the charts maintained by Ms. Hays, and she found them to be in good order. Danielle Rene Shaw worked at the Hospital with Ms. Hays. She was a Human Service Worker II in MRDP 29. She had an opportunity to observe Ms. Hays' work. Ms. Shaw used the charts maintained by Ms. Hays, and she found them to be in good order. She thought Ms. Hays was a hard worker. Mark Flodin, M.D., worked as a physician in MRDP 29 when Ms. Hays was working there, and he had an opportunity to observe her performance. He noted that she was a hard worker and had a professional attitude. He said she maintained the ward charts in an orderly fashion. He was surprised when she was terminated. Ms. Hays' position was filled by Ms. Ryan Smith, who came to the Hospital from another state agency. She was paid at the rate of $828.17 bi-weekly. Ms. Hays applied for over a hundred jobs with the State of Florida using the state's website, MyFlorida.com. She also sought employment with 15 private employees. She was interviewed twice, but received no job offers. She was never offered an interview at the Hospital. She received unemployment compensation for about six months after she left the Hospital. Subsequent to her departure from the Hospital, and her inability to secure other employment, she had to have her depression medicine, Zoloft, increased, but she still feels depressed and worthless. She is also taking Chlonzpam, an anti- anxiety drug, and Wellbutrin. Ms. Hays' mother works at the Hospital, as a licensed practical nurse, and her husband was once employed there also. Her father is retired from employment at the Hospital, and her grandmother and grandfather worked there.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss the Petition of Alicia Hays. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carolyn Dudley, Assistant Staff Director Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 101F Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sharon L. Ray, Esquire Agency for Persons with Disabilities 3700 Williams Drive Marianna, Florida 32446 Erika E. Bush, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, P.A. 310 East Bradford Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The question presented here concerns the entitlement of the Petitioner, Theodore D. Walker to be approved to serve as Chief of Security, Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, in the face of the Director, Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering's disapproval of that request.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner in this cause, Theodore D. Walker, has made application to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., in its fronton known as Palm Beach Jai Alai, Palm Beach County, Florida, for the seasons 1980-81. This request has been denied by the Respondent in the person of the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering. The justification for this denial is premised upon the alleged conflict of interest between the employment responsibilities of the Petitioner in his part- time employment as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton and his primary duty responsibilities as Lead Investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County, Florida, which is the State Attorney's office with jurisdiction over the County in which the Palm Beach Jai Alai is located. As authority for his denial, the Director has referred to Rule Subsections, 7E-3.03(11) and (12), Florida Administrative Code. 1/ The Petitioner has held seasonal employment as a security officer with the Fronton, Inc. in its West Palm Beach facility from 1965 until the Director's denial of approval which occurred on August 26, 1988. Beginning in 1972, Petitioner had been approved as Chief of Security at the aforementioned fronton. Walker has worked as an investigator in the State Attorney's office, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, continuously beginning in 1973, and at the time he was hired in his primary employment as investigator, he held the secondary employment as Chief of Security with the Palm Beach Fronton. The Honorable David Bludworth, State Attorney, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, knew of Mr. Walker's secondary employment as Chief of Security for the fronton when Walker was hired. Over the years, Walker has been promoted from the position of investigator to the position of Lead investigator. Presently his duties for the State Attorney's office involve assisting the attorneys in that office in the preparation of their cases for trial; original investigations that do not have their origins with other law enforcement agencies, in particular "white collar" crime, including public officials and law enforcement personnel and the primary responsibility to head up the "organized" crime unit of that State Attorney's office. In connection with his duties, the Petitioner is granted arrest powers and carries a weapon. As a full-time employee of the State, Walker is paid by the State of Florida. His salary is approximately $23,888 per year in contrast to his salary as a Chief of Security which has been in the amount of $14,888 for tax year, constituted of two meetings (seasons) at the fronton. (Pending the outcome of these matters, the Respondent's secondary employment with the Palm Beach Fronton, is that of floor supervisor at an undisclosed amount of compensation.) Walker's responsibilities as Chief of Security for the fronton include the hiring and supervising of security officers; the security of the physical plant at the fronton, to include the ejection of unruly patrons with the assistance of local law enforcement; initial contact with individuals over betting disputes which are ultimately referred to the Respondent; initial investigation of irregularities involving the computer system utilized by the fronton in running its facility; supervision of watchmen; initial investigation of matters involving betting on credit; investigation of shortages of money involving employees of the Fronton end prohibiting prostitutes and "book makers" from plying their trades on the fronton premises. In connection with his duties as Chief of Security, the Petitioner has no special expertise in the field of computers. When the Director of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering disapproved the Respondent's request to serve as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., he contended and continues to hold that belief, that the Petitioner's dual employment as Investigator for the State Attorney's office and as Chief of Security for the fronton, would serve to undermine public confidence in the integrity of the sport of jai alai and, therefore, was not in the best interest of the pari-mutuel industry. Consequently there was ample cause to reject Walker's request, according to the Director. In elaborating on his position, the Director expressed the opinion that law enforcement type officials should not be allowed to hold secondary employment in a fronton in a capacity as security official within the same geographical area in which the individual applicant has law enforcement responsibilities. To that end, six to eight other individuals, excluding the Petitioner, have also been disapproved as security officials at pari-mutuel wagering establishments, following the Walker disapproval. Gary Rutledge, Director of the Division of Pari- Mutuel Wagering in stating the reasons for denying Walker's request, goes on to say that the Chief of Security is a primary person responsible for detecting violations of law at the fronton and Rutledge has a concern that those matters might not be investigated by the Chief of Security or that the appearance might be created that the matters might not be investigated. Moreover, the Director worries about the potential flow of information from the State Attorney's office to the fronton, in particular, when there is, in his mind, the aura of "organized crime" which surrounds the pari- mutuel wagering industry. In response to concerns referred to above, neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent has shown any acts of impropriety on the part of Walker in serving in the capacity as Investigator for the State Attorney's office or in his part-time employment as Chief of Security for the Fronton, Inc., or do they have any reason to suspect that Walker is less than a man of utmost integrity in his profession and in his private life. There was, however, one instance in 1978, in which a fire occurred at the Palm Beach Fronton and State Attorney Bludworth made the judgment not to allow Walker to serve as State Attorney Investigator on that case, in which arson was suspected. This decision on Bludworth's part was made to protect against the appearance that might be created that as investigator to the prosecutor, some special knowledge and advantage could possibly be afforded to Walker in his role as Chief of Security for the fronton. Although Walker was above reproach in this matter, the State Attorney lost the advantage of his services as investigator in a circumstance wherein other law enforcement officials felt that it would have been extremely helpful to have Walker serving in his primary duty as State Attorney Investigator in attempting to solve the arson case. This instance points up the viability of the Director's argument on the issue of public confidence in the industry, in particular, in avoiding the appearance of fraud or dishonesty in that industry, and it is no less valid in the face of Walker's insistence that he would step down in future cases such as the 1978 incident and the State Attorney's indication that he would give serious consideration to the role that Walker would play in investigations involving incidences at the fronton in West Palm Beach. As stated before, criminal acts have occurred at the fronton and it is a reasonable expectation those events shall take place in the future. Alleged conflict of interest is the only ground upon which the Petitioner has been denied his request to act as Chief of Security at the Palm Beach Fronton. There has been some suggestion concerning a rumor that the Director had denied the application based upon a lack of good moral character on the part of the Petitioner and the ensuing effect that this has had on the community, and in particular, the black community in Palm Beach County of which the Petitioner is a member; however, Director Rutledge has never offered lack of good moral character as a reason for denying the permit application, and his decision to deny Walker's application was not racially motivated.
The Issue Whether Petitioners violated provisions of Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Order of Probable Cause filed August 23, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Chapters 97 through 106, Florida Statutes, comprise the Florida Election Code (Code). Pursuant to the Code, the Commission is empowered specifically to enforce the provisions of Chapters 104 and 106, Florida Statutes. Mary McCarty was elected to the City Commission of Delray Beach, Florida in 1987. She was elected to the Palm Beach County Commission in 1990. She has been returned to that office in each subsequent election and she is currently a member of the Palm Beach County Commission. In November of 2002, she was elected to her fourth term as Chairman of the Palm Beach County Republican Executive Committee. The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary was an unincorporated entity. It was a de facto committee, which, for reasons addressed herein, did not ever become a "political committee" as defined in Section 106.011(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. McCarty has run for public office six times and was successful on each occasion. Prior to each election she received from the Florida Secretary of State a handbook addressing campaign financing. She is familiar with the statutes and rules with regard to financing an individual campaign. Sometime before the Thanksgiving Holiday in 2000, Ms. McCarty received a telephone call from Roger Stone of Washington, D.C. Ms. McCarty knew Mr. Stone, who at various times had been a campaign operative for Senator Arlen Specter, had been involved in opposing the sugar tax amendment in Florida, and had been a consultant to Donald Trump, during his short-lived presidential campaign. Ms. McCarty was aware that Mr. Stone and Craig Snyder were principals of IKON Public Affairs, a business entity with offices in Washington, D.C., and Miami Beach, Florida. Roger Stone informed Ms. McCarty that he was forming a committee to raise funds for the purpose of taking action against the Florida Supreme Court. Mr. Stone stated that he had formed The Committee and that he wished for her to be the chairperson. She did not initially commit to undertake this responsibility. A few days after the conversation with Mr. Stone, Ms. McCarty received a facsimile draft of a fundraising letter that The Committee proposed to post. The facsimile was sent by Roger Stone from Washington. She made some suggested changes and returned it to the address in Washington from whence it came. Subsequently, she had a telephone conversation with Lora Lynn Jones of Unique Graphics and Design in Alexandria, Virginia. Ms. Jones was in the business of making mass mailings. Ms. McCarty told Ms. Jones that her name could be used on the fundraising letter although Ms. McCarty did not sign the fundraising letter. Nevertheless, the document was mailed to a large number of people and it bore the printed name, "Mary McCarty, Palm Beach County Commissioner." The first time Ms. McCarty saw The Committee's finished product it was in the form of a "Telepost, high priority communication." She first saw the "Telepost" when it arrived in her mailbox in early December 2000. The wording of the letter was different from the draft Ms. McCarty had seen earlier. Unlike the draft, it targeted specific justices on the Florida Supreme Court. It cannot be determined from the evidence the date the December "Telepost" was posted, but it was posted before Ms. McCarty determined that she had become Chairperson of The Committee. The "Telepost," dated December 2000, solicited funds so that The Committee could, ". . . send a clear message to the Florida Supreme Court that we will not tolerate their efforts to highjack the Presidential election for Al Gore." Later in December 2000, Mr. Stone called Ms. McCarthy and told her that she should be the chairman of The Committee. She agreed. Ms. McCarty signed a "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," which was dated December 19, 2000. This is a form provided by the Division of Elections, which, if properly completed and filed, officially establishes a political committee. She also signed a form entitled "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee." Mr. Stone, or his operatives, provided these forms to Ms. McCarty. She signed them and mailed them to Mr. Stone's address in Washington, D.C., which was the headquarters of the IKON Public Affairs Group. The "Statement of Organization of Political Committee," dated December 19, 2000, was received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. It listed Amber McWhorter as Treasurer. Inez Williams, who works in the document section of the Division of Elections, processed the form. When Ms. Williams received it, she recognized that the form was incomplete because on the face of it the reader could not determine if the committee was an "issue" committee, or a "candidate" committee. Ms. Williams noted that the mailing address on the form dated December 19, 2000, was "c/o VisionMedia," 1680 Michigan Avenue, Suite 900, Miami Beach, Florida. Ms. Williams found a telephone number for that business and dialed it, on December 27, 2000. No one answered so she left a message on VisionMedia's answering machine. In addition to the telephone call, Ms. Williams prepared a letter with the address of, "Mary McCarty, Chairperson, The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary, 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, Miami Beach, Florida." This letter was dated December 27, 2000, and was signed by Connie A. Evans, Chief, Bureau of Election Records. This is the address found on the "Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for Political Committee," which had also been received by the Division of Elections on December 26, 2000. The letter signed by Ms. Evans on December 27, 2001, informed Ms. McCarty that items 3 and 7 needed to be "rephrased." It further informed Ms. McCarty, that upon receipt of the requested information the committee would be included on the "active" list. The message recorded on The Committee answering machine on December 27, 2001, generated a response from a person who identified himself as Mr. Snyder, on January 2, 2002. Mr. Snyder engaged in a telephone conversation with Ms. Williams. Ms. Williams explained to Mr. Snyder that items 3, 5, 7, and 8, would have to be completed properly as a condition of The Committee's being recognized. A letter dated January 4, 2001, bearing the letterhead of "The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary," and signed by Amber Allman McWhorter, was faxed to the Division of Elections on January 4, 2001, and received that date. This letter referenced the telephone call between Ms. Williams and Craig Snyder, who was further identified as The Committee's attorney. The letter stated that a corrected Statement of Organization of Political Committee, and a designation of treasurer, would be forwarded to the Division of Elections within the next 72 hours. On January 8, 2001, a filing was received by the Division of Elections that was deemed by the Division to be complete. Subsequently, in a letter dated January 10, 2001, and signed by Connie Evans, informed Ms. McCarty and The Committee that the Statement of Organization and the Appointment of Campaign Treasurer and Designation of Campaign Depository for The Committee complied with the Division of Elections' requirements. The Committee was provided with Identification No. 34261. Posted with the letter was a copy of the "2000 Handbook for Committees," which is published by the Division of Elections. The letter and the handbook were sent to The Committee operation in Miami, not Ms. McCarty, and no one in the Miami Beach operation ever forwarded it to her. Connie Evans, Bureau Chief of Election Records, the entity that supervises the filing of the forms mentioned above, believes that due to a court ruling in Florida Right to Life v. Mortham, Case No. 98-770-Civ-Orl-19A, the language in Section 106.011, Florida Statutes, which defines a "political committee," has been found to be unconstitutional. She believes that a political committee is not required to register with the Division of Elections but that if a committee does register, it must abide by the statutes regulating political committees. Ms. Evans has informed numerous entities of this interpretation of the law in letters. The efficacy of that case, and Ms. Evans' interpretation of it, will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law, below. Ms. McCarty signed a "Campaign Treasurer's Report Summary"(CTR-Q1) which was filed with the Division of Elections on April 10, 2001. This addressed the period January 1, 2001 until March 31, 2001. Under the certification section of the CTR-Q1 are the words, "It is a first degree misdemeanor for any person to falsify a public record (ss. 839.13, F.S.)." Immediately above her signature are the words, "I certify that I have examined this report and it is true, correct, and complete." The box found immediately above and to the right of her signature, was checked to signify that Ms. McCarty was the chairperson of The Committee. According to Ms. Evans, The Division of Elections regulates several kinds of committees. There are "issues" committees, "candidate" committees," "party executive" committees, and "committees of continuing existence." Depending on the nature of the committee, different rules apply. The Committee was a "candidate" committee so the contribution regulations of a political candidate applied to the committee. That meant that the maximum contribution per person was $500. The CTR-Q1 indicated in the "Itemized Contributions Section" that seven people contributed $1,000 and one person contributed $2,000. Walter Hunter, Neda Korich, Arthur Allen, William Shutze, Caroline Ireland, Henry Allen, and Honore Wansler, contributed $1,000, each. Robert Morgan contributed $2,000. The amounts in excess of $500 were eventually returned to the $1,000 contributors, except that in the case of Henry Allen, the refund was made to Allen Investment corporation. The sum of $1,500 was returned to Robert Morgan, the $2,000 contributor, but the CTR-Q1 listed only a $500 repayment. Therefore, the CTR-Q1 in its expenditures section was incorrect with regard to Mr. Morgan. The CTR-Q1 also listed in the "Itemized Contributions Section" the receipt, on January 2, 2001, of $150,000 for "LOA/INK extension of credit for direct mail services." These words may be interpreted to mean that a loan in the form of an "in kind" service had been provided. This was reported under the name of Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The Committee had a bank account at CityBank of Miami, Florida. The sole authorized signatory on the account was Diane Thorne. The Account No. was 3200015694. There was no entry in the bank account of the receipt of $150,000. This indicates that the item was not processed through the bank and it would not have been processed through the bank if it were really an "in kind" contribution. Because the beginning balance was zero on February 8, 2001, it is concluded that the inception date of Account No. 3200015694 was February 8, 2001. Lora Lynn Jones, is the principal of Unique Graphics and Design, which is located in Suite 253, at an address in Alexandria, Virginia, which is not further identified in the evidence of record. Ms. Jones prepared and posted the fundraising letter of December 2000, at the direction of Mr. Stone. Ms. Jones talked on the telephone with Ms. McCarty prior to mailing the fundraising letter and determined that the language in the letter was agreeable to Ms. McCarty. At the direction of Mr. Stone, Ms. Jones requested payment and received payment for her work, but from whom she cannot remember, except that she is sure that Creative Marketing did not pay it. The money for this production was paid in advance by wire transfer. There is no evidence in the record that this was paid from the account of The Committee. In fact, because the payment was made sometime in early December 2000, it could not have been paid from the account because it had not been opened. Ms. Jones is aware of an entity by the name of Creative Marketing Company and she believes it may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. It is found by clear and convincing evidence that the fundraising letter was not paid for by Creative Marketing, 2760 Eisenhower Avenue, Suite 250, Alexandria, Virginia. The bank records of The Committee reflect a $50,000 expenditure made to Unique Graphics and Design, paid with a check dated May 9, 2001. This represents a payment for something other than the fundraising letter dated December 2000. The $50,000 item was reported as an expenditure on the CTR-Q1 that was reported to have been made on March 12, 2001. It was reported as having been made to Creative Marketing as payee. The only check in the amount of $50,000, reflected in The Committee checking account for the period February 8, 2001, to June 30, 2001, was payable to Unique Graphics and Design and was dated May 9, 2001. Therefore, it is found that the CTR-Q1 is incorrect when it was reported as having been made on March 12, 2001, to Creative Marketing. Ms. Jones believes there is a company by the name of Creative Marketing Company, which she believes may be located in Northern Virginia, but she is not involved with it. Contributions remitted in response to the fundraising letter were forwarded to one of Mr. Stone's two addresses. Because the address of 1348 Washington Avenue, Suite 177, in Miami Beach, Florida, is the address listed on the fundraising letter, it is likely that contributions in response to the fundraising letter went to Mr. Stone's Miami Beach operation. In any event, it is found as a fact that Ms. McCarty did not personally receive or have any contact with any of the contributions remitted to The Committee. The people handling the receipt of funds and the deposits were Roger Stone and people paid by his organization, including Diane Thorne, the secretary; Amber McWhorter, the treasurer; and Craig Snyder. Just as Ms. McCarty was not involved in the receipt of income to The Committee, she was also not involved in the disbursement of funds. The CTR-Q1 was completed by The Committee's staff in either Miami Beach or Washington, D.C., but Ms. McCarty had no input into its preparation. When Ms. McCarty signed the CTR-Q1 she was without knowledge as to whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. It is further found that she made no effort to ascertain whether the report was truthful, correct, or complete. She believed it to be true and correct because she trusted Mr. Stone's operatives to accurately prepare the report. Ms. McCarty, excepting the current litigation, has never been the subject of a Commission action. Ms. McCarty has an income of approximately $80,000. She owns a residence jointly with her husband which is valued at approximately $300,000 and which is subject to a mortgage of approximately $200,000. She owns a vacation home in Maine jointly with her husband that is valued at approximately $25,000. She and her husband own three automobiles. She owns stocks, annuities, mutual funds or certificates of deposit of an indeterminate value.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing the Orders of Probable Cause entered in the case of both Mary McCarty and The Committee to Take Back Our Judiciary. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Kendall Coffey, Esquire Coffey & Wright, LLP 2665 South Bayshore Drive Grand Bay Plaza, Penthouse 2B Miami, Florida 33133 J. Reeve Bright, Esquire Bright & Chimera 135 Southeast 5th Avenue, Suite 2 Delray Beach, Florida 33483-5256 Mark Herron, Esquire Messer, Caparello & Self, P.A. Post Office Box 1876 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1876 Eric M. Lipman, Esquire Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Barbara M. Linthicum, Executive Director Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Patsy Ruching, Clerk Florida Elections Commission 107 West Gaines Street Collins Building, Suite 224 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050
Findings Of Fact On or about January 16, 1981, the Petitioner began regular employment with the Probation and Parole Services, Region IV, office of the Department of Corrections. He was hired as a "Probation and Parole Officer (Trainee)." On or about June 15, 1981, the Department advised Petitioner that he had been dismissed from his position with the Department. The dismissal was effective June 18, 1981. At that time, Petitioner had not yet attained permanent status in the Florida Career Service System. He was serving a probationary period. In the notice of dismissal, it was provided, as follows: This action is taken after careful consideration and discussion with your immediate supervisor concerning the following: The falsification of your employment application when applying for employment in the Miami Circuit Office of Probation and Parole Services. Your actions were in violation of Chapter 22A-4.03(2) of the rules of the Department of Administration of the Career Service System. This action is in accordance with the State of Florida Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System Chapter 22A-7.10(7)(H). Since you have been terminated during your trainee status, Chapter 22A- 7.03(4), Florida Personnel Rules and Regulations would apply. Petitioner thereafter filed his "Petition for Section 120.57(1) Formal Administrative Hearing" with the Department of Corrections. In his employment application, Petitioner stated that he had never been convicted of a felony or first degree misdemeanor. On January 10, 1971, Petitioner was convicted of municipal ordinance violations in the city of Pueblo, Colorado. The violations were misdemeanors. Petitioner was fined $50 for "disturbance," and $75 for "assault and battery." He paid the fine and served one-half day in the city jail. The Department contends that on account of these convictions, Petitioner's statement in his employment application was false.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered by the Department of Corrections dismissing the petition for formal administrative hearing filed by Heriberto Roman Conti. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of March, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of March, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Sisinio Ortiz Valentin, Esquire Puerto Rico Legal Services Corp. Box 727 Guaynabo, Puerto Rico 00657 Louis A. Vargas, Esquire Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Louie L. Wainwright Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the Florida Human Relations Commission (Commission) created by Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and is an agency within the meaning of Section 20.03(11), Florida Statutes (1993). The Commission consists of twelve (12) members appointed by the Governor. The Commission is charged with the administration of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992. Petitioner is Parrish Management, Inc. Petitioner is an "employer" within the meaning of Section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes, and, in accordance with stipulation of the parties, has standing to bring this proceeding. Evidence in this record of Petitioner's involvement as a participating party in another administrative proceeding convened pursuant to provisions of Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, as the result of a determination of reasonable cause, further serves to underscore Petitioner's qualification as a substantially affected party for purposes of this proceeding. Respondent enacted Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, ostensibly pursuant to authority contained in Subsections 760.06(6) and (12), Florida Statutes. Those statutory provisions read as follows: Powers of the commission.--Within the limitations provided by law, the commission shall have the following powers: * * * (6) To issue subpoenas for, administer oaths or affirmations to and compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses or to issue subpoenas for and compel the production of books, papers, records, documents and other evidence pertaining to any investigation or hearing convened pursuant to the powers of the commission. In conducting an investigation, the commission and its inves- tigators shall have access at all reasonable times to premises, records, documents, and other evidence or possible sources of evidence and may examine, record, and copy such materials and take and record the testimony or statements of such persons as are reasonably necessary for the furtherance of the investigation. The authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths may be delegated by the commission, for investigations or hearings, to a commissioner or the executive director. In the case of a refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, the commission may make application to any circuit court in this state, which shall have jurisdiction to order the witness to appear before the commission to give testimony and to produce evidence concerning the matter in question. Failure to obey the court's order may be punished by the court as contempt. If the court enters an order holding a person in contempt or compelling the person to comply with the commission's order or subpoena, the court shall order the person to pay the commission reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, accrued by the commission in obtaining the order from the court. * * * (12) To adopt, promulgate, amend, and rescind rules to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 and govern the proceedings of the commission in accordance with chapter 120. (emphasis supplied.) Rule 60Y-2.004(2)(e) and Rule 60Y-5.004, Florida Administrative Code, read as follows: 60Y-2.004 General Description of Organization and Functions of Commission Staff. (2) The Executive Director is the chief administrative officer of the Commission and is responsible for implementing policy of the Commission. The Executive Director is appointed by the Commission and may be removed by the Commission for cause. The Executive Director has the following duties: make determinations as provided by Rule 60Y-5.004; * * * 60Y-5.004 Executive Director's Investigatory Determination; Notice. Upon completion of an investigation, if a complaint has not been settled or withdrawn, the Office of Employment Investigations shall report the investigation, with recommendation, to the Office of General Counsel. The Office of General Counsel shall review the report and shall make a recommendation to the Executive Director as to whether there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred. If the recommendation is based upon lack of jurisdiction over the respondent or subject matter of the complaint or upon untimely filing of the complaint, the Executive Director may dismiss the complaint pursuant to Subsection 60Y- 5.006(3) or (11), provided that the investigation does not reveal any disputed issues of material fact. The Executive Director shall issue a determination on the foregoing bases of lack of jurisdiction or untimeliness where disputed issues of material fact appear to exist. After a determination has been made by the Executive Director, the Clerk shall serve a Notice of Determination, with copies of the determination, upon the complainant and the respondent. A Notice of Determination of Reasonable Cause shall include an invitation to participate in conciliation. A Notice of Determination of No Reasonable Cause, No Jurisdiction or Untimeliness shall advise the complainant of the right to file a Petition for Relief, pursuant to Rule 60Y-5.008, within 30 days of service of the notice. A form, Petition for Relief, hereby incorporated by reference, in blank, shall be provided to the complainant at the time of service of the notice. A Notice of Determination shall further advise the parties of the right to request redetermination, pursuant to Rule 6OY-5.007, within 20 days of service of the notice. If the complainant requests redetermination, the 30-day period for filing a Petition for Relief shall be tolled until service of a Notice of Redetermination. After service of a Notice of Determination, the parties named in the determination may inspect the records and documents, in the custody of the Commission, which pertain to the determination. The Executive Director may direct that a particular record, document or portion thereof be withheld from inspection by a party only when necessary for the protection of a witness or third party, or for the preservation of a trade secret. Helpful to an understanding of the legal authority of the Commission and consideration of whether the subject rules are an appropriate result of legislatively delegated authority, is Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, which provides that: In the event that the Commission determines that there is reasonable cause to believe that a discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, the aggrieved person may either: Bring a civil action against the person named in the complaint in any court of competent jurisdiction; or Request an administrative hearing under s. 120.57. The election by the aggrieved person of filing civil action or requesting an administrative hearing under this subsection is the exclusive procedure available to the aggrieved person pursuant to this act. (emphasis supplied.) Further, Section 760.11(3), Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that, "Within 180 days of the filing of the complaint, the Commission shall determine if there is reasonable cause to believe that discriminatory practice has occurred in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992." (emphasis supplied.) As noted, Section 760.11(4), Florida Statues, provides two separate avenues of relief, one administrative and one judicial. Additionally, as set forth in Section 760.11(5), Florida Statutes, the judicial remedy permits the recovery of back pay, and allows damages for mental anguish, loss of dignity, any other intangible injuries, and punitive damages. The Commission's determination of reasonable cause pursuant to Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, is a condition or restriction upon the exercise by a complainant of a substantive right, i.e. the right to judicial remedy. Accordingly, provisions of Section 760.11(4), Florida Statutes, which authorize the Commission's determination constitute a substantive, as opposed to a procedural, law. In those instances of the Commission's determination of no reasonable cause, Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes, provides: If the Commission determines that there is not reasonable cause to believe that a violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 has occurred, the commission shall dismiss the complaint. The aggrieved person may request an administrative hearing under s.120.57, but any such request must be made within 35 days of the date of determination of reasonable cause any such hearing shall be heard by a hearing officer and not by the commission or a commissioner. If the aggrieved person does not request an administrative hearing within the 35 days, the claim will be barred. . . . As established by evidence presented at the final hearing, members of the Commission meet formally on a quarterly basis throughout the year to consider policy issues but have no formal knowledge or involvement in any pending case prior to presentment of recommended orders rendered by Hearing Officers of the Division of Administrative Hearings. As established through official recognition of provisions of Section 760.11, Florida Statutes, the Commission is an adjudicative body with the quasi- judicial authority to determine the substantive rights of the parties, award back pay, prohibit specified discriminatory employment practices and provide affirmative relief from the effects of those practices.
The Issue The questions posed by this dispute involve the assertion by Petitioner that she is entitled to be credited with retirement benefits as an employee who is certified as "high hazard" for the period July 1, 1965, through November 30, 1970. See Section 122.34, Florida Statutes. Further, Petitioner claims entitlement to credit while employed in an alleged capacity as "special risk" member of the Florida Retirement System for the period December 1, 1970, through March 31, 1980. See Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Respondent does not believe Petitioner is entitled to recognition in the "high hazard" and "special risk" categories for the referenced periods. Thus, the need for the formal Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing.
Findings Of Fact On July 1, 1965, Petitioner, Judy Wyllie, whose name at that time was Judy L. Benton, made application for employment with the Volusia County, Florida, Sheriff's Office. On that date, Petitioner was 18 years of age, having been born on May 3, 1947. Petitioner has also been referred to as Judy L. Weir. The specific position being applied for on July 1, 1965, was related to secretarial work. She was hired on July 1, 1965, as a civil clerk in the sheriff's office, not as a law enforcement officer. On December 15, 1969, the Petitioner resigned her position with the sheriff's office. She returned in January 1970 and has continued her employment. Upon her resignation she was refunded the amount paid into her retirement account and has yet to repay the reimbursed amount into the Florida Retirement System and cannot claim credit for service from July 1, 1965, until the date of resignation on December 15, 1969. Between 1969 and 1912, Petitioner was assigned the position of Clerk IV, a designation within the personnel system of Volusia County, Florida. That system establishes job positions and specifications for the Volusia County Sheriff's Office at present and at relevant times contemplated by this inquiry beginning in 1971. The Clerk IV position involved the supervision of clerical work done-within the Civil Division of the sheriff's office by clerks who maintain records and reports. Petitioner answered public questions and maintained a payroll. Budget matters, including purchasing, were a part of her responsibility. She maintained liaison between the courts and attorneys of Volusia County in civil court matters. The Civil Division of the sheriff's office included a position known as Civil Deputy. This position of Civil Deputy was a recognized position within the Volusia County Personnel System. Those employees who were Civil Deputies worked in public safety, serving civil court papers to people who were expected to appear in court as defendants or witnesses. In pursuing their duties related to civil law, these employees would serve writs of possession, writs of replevin, writs of attachment and writs of execution. Petitioner, in her position as Clerk IV, supervised the Civil Deputies. On March 13, 1970, Petitioner was designated the rank of Lieutenant within the Volusia County Sheriff's Office. This designation was made by Sheriff Edwin Howland Duff II. It was not a designation which had been accepted by the Volusia County Personnel System. In effect, this designation of Lieutenant was an in-house arrangement by which Sheriff Duff attempted to promote the acceptance of Petitioner's supervisory decisions and her authority to carry out her functions within the Civil Section of the sheriff's office. This arrangement ceased in 1977. Over time the sheriff sought to have Petitioner's position upgraded, and on November 11, 1975, Petitioner was promoted to the position of Civi1 Court Records Supervisor. This is a designation by the Volusia County Personnel System, and the position is described as being one involving technical, clerical and supervisory work of some complexity involving the coordination and supervision of civil court records within the sheriff's office. This designation gave illustrations of the duties, to include review, control and writing of refund checks to attorneys and the general public related to overpayment of fees, etc. It involved maintaining liaison between the Civil Division of the sheriff's office and the courts and attorneys within the county. It also involved assistance in the preparation of the budget for that division. The position specifications further describe the involvement with certain writs such as replevin and habeas corpus. In her new position, Petitioner continued to be the supervisor of the Civil Deputies. During the pendency of Petitioner's service within the Civil Division of the sheriff's office, in the capacity described, and while other personnel known as Civil Deputies were performing their function, there was another personnel position within Volusia County which was known as Deputy Sheriff. The Deputy Sheriff position involved work of a general public safety nature with the primary emphasis being related to protection of life and property and the routine enforcement of laws and regulations. Among the duties of those persons serving as Deputy Sheriffs was the patrolling of parks, building, installations and property in areas where the deputies were on foot or operating out of police vehicles. The task of these law enforcement officers was to preserve law and order and to prevent damage to property via fire, theft or vandalism. They were to respond to calls and complaints involving automobile accidents, domestic disturbances and misdemeanors or felonies. They were entitled to serve writs, warrants, summons and civil papers. In addition to enforcing traffic laws and regulations, the deputies were to conduct preliminary investigations involving crime or accident, to obtain witnesses and evidence and to make arrests and transport or escort prisoners to and from confinement areas. They were also to testify in court related to arrests that had been made. While employed with the Civil Division of the sheriff's office in Volusia County, Petitioner was required to participate in a study involving the examination of the duties of Civil Court Records Supervisor. This study took place in 1978. In this study there are identified duties which are synonymous with the job description for Civil Court Records Supervisor as previously described. The study also sets forth that ten per cent of the job function involved keeping up with civil laws by reading statute books, sheriff's manuals and sheriffs association literature; attending civil seminars a couple of times a year for schooling; and by assisting in difficult levies where inventorying was required or involving sheriff's sales and taking up money and writing receipts. Nowhere does this study, the official description of her employment as Clerk IV or Civil Court Records Supervisor, suggest that any significant amount of time was devoted to duties which are traditionally related to law enforcement, as described in Chapter 121 and 122, Florida Statutes, Chapter 22-B, Florida Administrative code, and the description of law enforcement activities related to Deputy Sheriffs within the Volusia County Personnel System. Effective April 1, 1980, Petitioner was serving and continues to serve as a supervisor of a new position within the Volusia County Personnel System known as Judicial Support Officer. The individuals who serve in that capacity had been recognized as "special risk'' members of the Florida Retirement System, as envisioned by Section 121.515, Florida Statutes, commencing April 1, l980. Those persons are required to be certified in compliance with Section 943.1395, Florida Statutes, pertaining to police minimum standards of the Florida Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission for police officers, in that it is necessary for those persons in the position of Judicial Support Officer to obtain certification within the year of appointment to that position. The Judicial Support Officers function as bailiffs for the circuit court; guard prisoners on the way to and from courtrooms; call defendants, plaintiffs and witnesses before the judge; escort prisoners who have been convicted to the court cashier and verify payments of fines before prisoners are released; transport prisoners from one destination to another to guard against escape; return prisoners by the extradition process from other states, serve warrants, subpoenas or other court documents as required; and perform other related duties. The duties of the Judicial Support Officer contemplate involvement with criminal law matters as well as civil law proceedings. These functions are akin to those activities set out in Section 121.0515, Florida Statutes, pertaining to criteria for recognition as special risk's members within the Florida Retirement System. It is for this reason that the Judicial Support Officers and the Petitioner, as supervisor to those persons who serve as Judicial Support Officers, were recognized by Respondent as "special risk" members of the retirement system effective April 1, 1980. With the advent of the Judicial Support Officer position in the Volusia County Civil Service, the Civil Deputy positions were phased out. By application made to the State of Florida, Florida Retirement System, Petitioner sought recognition and credit for service as a "high hazard" employee as contemplated by Section 122.34, Florida Statutes, in the period July 1, 1965, through November 30, 1970. Additionally, she has sought recognition and credit as a "special risk" member of the retirement system for the period December 1, 1970, through March 31, 1980, as contemplated by Chapter 121, Florida Statutes. Various documents have been submitted in support of her claim to entitlement to an accelerated accumulation of retirement credits gained by persons who are recognized in the "high hazard" and "special risk" categories. Those documents were examined and commented on by officials within the Respondent agency, and the State Retirement Director, A. J. McMullian III, concluded that the request for recognition should not be granted and made known this position in correspondence of June 28, 1985, directed to the Petitioner. This intent to deny a claim for credits in the subject categories led the Petitioner to request a hearing pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. This request for hearing was made, on July 11, 1985. It was followed by the formal petition seeking relief and recognition of the credit for service in the disputed categories. The formal petition is dated September 5, 1985. Following the referral of this action to the Division of Administrative Hearings, a formal Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes hearing was held on the dates reflected in this recommended order. In advancing her claims for further credit in the "special risk" category and in an attempt to be recognized in the "high hazard" category, Petitioner points out the fact that she has been provided a badge from the sheriff's office, a badge holder, uniforms and other accouterments which law enforcement officers display. She occasionally wears a uniform which indicates affiliation with the sheriff's office of Volusia County. She has a pistol and has participated in proficiency training for the use of that pistol. Petitioner has satisfied the requirements of Chapter 943, Florida Statutes, pertaining to the recognition by the police standards certifying agency. This recognition was pursuant to "grandfathering" at the request of former Sheriff Rodney B. Thursby, who was the sheriff in Volusia County from January 1, 1957, up to January 1, 1969. As a member of the sheriff's office, Petitioner has been bonded. Petitioner, during the course of her employment with the Civil Division of the sheriff's office, has had occasion to act as a matron of female prisoners, has transported prisoners in her custody, has made arrests, and has been involved with the transportation of incompetent persons and since 1969 has been involved with field work in which she has assisted in carrying out writs or orders of court involving arrest, execution and replevin. In her duties, she has detained individuals in a detention facility. Typically, this activity occurs when females or children are involved or families are to be evicted from their residence. In carrying out her function related to civil proceedings, it could be expected that in some instances people would react violently and at times must be taken into custody. Examples of Petitioner's civil arrests were presented in the hearing. This arrest function and other functions described in the preceding paragraph are rare and certainly can not be described as routine. In performing these duties, Petitioner has carried her badge and gun. Although Petitioner seeks recognition for service under the "high hazard" category, the Volusia County Sheriff's Office has never submitted her name for certification as a person who performed duties according to rule, order or established custom as a full-time criminal law enforcement officer, nor has this certification been made by anyone within the general government of Volusia County. For the period December 1, 1970, to October 1, 1978, Petitioner's employer has not sought recognition of her service as a "special risk.' member of the retirement system. Finally, there has been no demonstration of any payment of additional funds into the State and County Retirement System to defray the expense of membership in the "high hazard" category. During the period of time that remains in dispute, July 1, 1965, through March 31, 1980, as stated, Petitioner was seldom involved in arresting persons either in her individual capacity or in assisting or supervising others. Petitioner, in that time frame, cannot be considered to have as her primary and duties and responsibilities the apprehension of law violators or suspected law violators, either in the sense of the job specifications pertaining to her clerical and supervisory functions within the Civil Division of the sheriff's office or actual day to day activities in those roles. Nor can it be found that her primary duties or responsibilities were that of maintaining physical custody of prisoners within a prison or any other form of detention facility or accompanying prisoners in transport of those prisoners or other persons held in custody. Petitioner's occasional acquaintanceship with law enforcement duties is similar to persons who are recognized under Section 122.34, Florida Statutes, as "high hazard" and Section 121.0515, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 22-B, Florida Administrative Code, pertaining to "special risk." Nonetheless, Petitioner's primary duties have never related to those traditional law enforcement practices of pursuit, apprehension or arrest of law violators or suspected law violators. Her primary obligation is that of administrative support involving accounting, purchasing, legal and personnel matters. Her law enforcement function is incidental as would be incumbent upon all sworn officers. This role as law enforcement officer in the time frame was not an essential part of her job. The Civil Deputies whom the Petitioner supervised, in furtherance of the job description, wore uniforms and related to civil matters, made arrests of persons who did not pay child support and transported those individuals to jail. The Civil Deputies also detained persons who were in their custody and transported prisoners and mental incompetents to receiving facilities. The Civil Deputies were involved with the civil process service, not criminal process service. The Civil Deputies bore firearms during the relevant period. Typically, the Civil Deputies would make one or two arrests per month, and on occasion as many as three or four arrests. As described by the Civil Deputies who testified in the course of the hearing, very little time was spent by the Petitioner in supervising arrest functions in the field by Civil Deputies. The traditional law enforcement functions of the Civil Deputies in the relevant period before April 1, 1980, were incidental to their job position. In trying to make a retrospective examination of the entitlement of the Petitioner or others in similar circumstance who have sought recognition as "special risk" members who are employed in law enforcement, for the period December 1, 1970, to October 1, 1978, Respondent has a policy of referring to the then-existing provision of Rule 22B-1.05, Florida Administrative Code, and its amendments made in that time period. This choice is made in an effort to have available the same criteria that were utilized in assessing those applicants for "special risk" membership while the rules were operative, to insure equal treatment of the applicants, such as Petitioner, who make application following the repeal of those intervening rule provisions. This policy choice is administratively sound and affords due process.
The Issue The issues are as follows: (a) whether this case should be dismissed due to Petitioner's failure to file a timely Petition for Relief as required by Rule 60Y-5.008, Florida Administrative Code; and if not, (b) whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner based on her handicap by creating a hostile work environment, failing to accommodate her disability, and causing Petitioner's constructive discharge contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white female. She applied for a cashier's job at Respondent's store in Defuniak Springs, Florida, on March 30, 2000. Petitioner's job application indicated that she was available to work on any shift and any day of the week, including days, evenings, nights, Saturdays, and Sundays. As a general rule, Respondent hires people that are available to work on an as needed basis. However, there is no persuasive evidence that Respondent always refuses to hire people who are not available to work at all times. On April 13, 2000, Petitioner began working for Respondent as a part-time cashier. She only worked a few days before she suffered two heart attacks on the same day, neither of which occurred while she was at work. Her medical records indicate that she began having heart problems in 1996 and that a stent was implanted in an artery of her heart on April 21, 2000. On April 23, 2000, Petitioner requested a medical leave of absence, expecting to return to work on or about June 1, 2000. Respondent granted this request. On May 1, 2000, Petitioner's doctor certified that Petitioner had a diagnosis of "S/P Inferior Wall Myocardial Infarction." The doctor stated that Petitioner could return to work and resume normal activity pending a follow-up evaluation on May 30, 2000. On June 13, 2000, Petitioner's doctor certified that Petitioner could anticipate returning to work on July 17, 2000. Petitioner was scheduled to repeat a heart catheterization on July 14, 2000. Medical records indicate that Petitioner underwent a stent-implant in an artery of her heart at that time. On July 21, 2000, Petitioner tendered her resignation because she did not expect to return to work. Respondent accepted Petitioner's resignation, indicating on the exit interview form that she was eligible for rehire. The exit interview form also indicates that Petitioner had qualified for supplemental security income (SSI) benefits due to her heart condition. Petitioner recovered from the surgery and applied for re-employment with Respondent on September 9, 2000. Petitioner sought a full-time position, indicating on her second employment application that she was available to work at any time. She specifically requested as many hours as Respondent could give her. Petitioner confirmed her availability to work with no job restrictions during her job interview. On October 26, 2000, Petitioner completed a Form 8850, Pre-screening Notice and Certification Request for the Work Opportunity and Welfare-to-Work Credits. On this form Petitioner certified that she had advised Respondent of her receipt of SSI benefits for any month ending within the last 60 days. Respondent rehired Petitioner to work as a peak-time (part-time) cashier beginning on October 30, 2000. Petitioner accepted the position even though she knew that working as a cashier involved a lot of stress and would require her to lift items as heavy as 50 pounds. Shortly after being re-hired, Petitioner actively sought more work hours in addition to her regular schedule. Respondent accommodated Petitioner's request by letting her work on the floor as a stock clerk, as well as a cashier. Approximately two weeks after returning to work, Petitioner required hospitalization again due to a heart attack. She was discharged from the hospital on November 27, 2000. Petitioner's doctor instructed her to rest and limit her activity, including walking, heavy exercise, and/or lifting more than five pounds, resuming normal activity on the second day as "tolerated." On December 2, 2000, Petitioner was admitted to the emergency room again after work. Petitioner's doctor recommended that Petitioner not return to work until she was evaluated again on December 11, 2000. Petitioner's doctor released her to return to work on December 12, 2000. Respondent's employees and management were aware of Petitioner's heart condition but they were not aware that Petitioner had a disability requiring accommodation. The doctor's release-to-work contained no medical restrictions. During December 2000, Petitioner worked as a cashier and on the customer service desk receiving items returned by customers. The latter job occasionally required Petitioner to handle heavy items. On January 9, 2001, Respondent gave Petitioner a performance appraisal. The appraisal indicated that Petitioner worked well with others, assisted in raising funds for charity, and participated in associate functions. Respondent's performance standards include "below," "meets," or "exceeds" expectations. Petitioner's performance appraisal indicates that she "met" performance expectations in all areas except one area of productivity. She received a "below" expectations rank as to the number of items she scanned per hour. Based on the overall appraisal, Petitioner received a pay raise commensurate with the "meets" expectation criteria. On February 6, 2001, Petitioner's doctor excused her from work for a week due to illness. The doctor indicated that Petitioner could return to work on February 9, 2001, if she was feeling well. Otherwise, Petitioner would need another medical evaluation before she returned to work. On February 12, 2001, Petitioner's doctor excused her from work until February 14, 2001. Petitioner's medical records indicate that Petitioner had bronchitis, asthma, and flu-like symptoms. Around the middle of February 2001, Petitioner requested that she be scheduled to work the night shift only two nights per week. Respondent's associate schedules, which were computer-generated weeks in advance of the scheduled work, show that Respondent granted her request. Petitioner was scheduled to work after 6:00 p.m. as follows: (a) two times from February 24, 2001, to March 2, 2001; (b) one time from March 3, 2001, to March 9, 2001; (c) one time from March 10, 2001, to March 16, 2001; and (d) two times from March 17, 2001, to March 23, 2001. Respondent posts daily or weekly schedules to make corrections to the computer-generated schedules. Two such undated handwritten schedules indicate that Petitioner was scheduled to work a day shift on two days. Petitioner actually worked after 6:00 p.m. as follows: one time from February 10, 2001, to February 23, 2001; one time from February 24, 2001, to March 9, 2001; and no times from March 10, 2001, to March 23, 2001. On or about February 20, 2001, Petitioner told her supervisor that she planned to resign on March 1, 2001. In a subsequent handwritten note dated February 27, 2001, Petitioner advised Respondent that she intended to quit work on March 23, 2001. The note states that she was leaving due to illness but wanted to return when she was well. On or about March 8, 2001, a customer in an express checkout lane, limited to 20 items, made a written complaint to Petitioner's supervisor that Petitioner had been rude. Specifically, the customer alleged that Petitioner had expressed her objections to the customer having more than 20 items when the customer had exactly 20 items. The customer claimed that Petitioner's comments were embarrassing. Petitioner's supervisor gave Petitioner a verbal coaching. The supervisor reminded Petitioner of Respondent's policy that the customer was always right. During the hearing, Petitioner stated that she agreed with this policy. Under protest, Petitioner complied with the supervisor's request for Petitioner to write an apology to the customer. The written apology stated that Petitioner was sorry if she hurt the customer's feelings and asked the customer to please go to Petitioner's checkout line again. The supervisor also wrote an apology to the customer. On March 12, 2001, Petitioner underwent a medical examination at Doctors Medical Center of Walton County due to chest pains radiating into her right arm. The medical history taken at that time indicates that Petitioner's medical history included two heart attacks and five stents in her heart arteries. Petitioner's doctor wrote an excuse for Petitioner missing work on March 13, 2001. The note states that Petitioner could return to work on the following Monday, March 19, 2001. On March 21, 2001, Petitioner had an altercation with a customer service manager. The incident occurred because Petitioner and another cashier were scheduled for breaks about the same time. The manager allowed the other cashier to go on break before Petitioner because the co-worker's line was empty and Petitioner had customers in her line. Raising her voice, Petitioner protested that she was due a break before her co-worker. The manager told Petitioner to stop harassing him. Petitioner subsequently complained to her supervisor. Petitioner admitted during the hearing that she got "sassy" with the customer service manager on March 21, 2001. The morning after the altercation with the customer service manager, Petitioner told her co-workers that she intended to have the store manager fired because she was having him investigated. As a result of her comments, Petitioner was invited to the rear office where she spoke to the regional personnel manager on the phone. During that conversation, the personnel manager told Petitioner she could call him at home if she felt more comfortable doing so. The personnel manager excused Petitioner from work for the next two days with pay through March 23, 2001, the effective date of her resignation. Petitioner's final exit interview is dated March 22, 2001. On the exit interview form, Petitioner indicated that she quit her job because she did not like the way the store manager ran the store and due to her health. Petitioner indicated that the termination was voluntary due to her health. After Petitioner signed the exit interview form and left the store, Respondent's staff had further conversation with the regional personnel manager and completed a section on the form reserved for the employer. This section indicates that Petitioner had a bad attitude and, if she had not resigned, Respondent would have terminated Petitioner. Competent evidence shows that Petitioner did have a bad attitude after being rehired. She always took the position that she was right and did not want to communicate with certain managers. Petitioner understood that she could only work for six months without losing her SSI benefits. Her resignation on March 23, 2001, occurred just prior to the end of the six-month period. Due to her health problems, Petitioner has not worked since she resigned her job with Respondent. She has not looked for work and does not intend to do so because she continues to receive SSI. During the hearing, Petitioner discussed several incidents in support of her allegations of discrimination based on her disability. However, Petitioner admitted that her memory was bad and that she could not recall the specific dates involved. On several occasions, Petitioner complained to Respondent's district manager about the way the store manager ran the store. For example, Petitioner complained that someone was selling Avon products in a fitting room. The district manager determined that there was no merit to this allegation. On another occasion, Petitioner complained to Respondent's district manager that the store manager had made an inappropriate religious comment to Petitioner. Upon subsequent investigation, the district manager determined that the store manager had made one such comment to another employee but not to Petitioner. The store manager was advised to refrain from making such comments in the future. Petitioner testified that if an employee was not a member of the store manager's "holy roller" church, the employee was nothing in the opinion of the store manager. Petitioner's testimony that she was treated differently from other employees because she would not "suck up" to the store manager and because she was not a member of his clique is not persuasive. Petitioner told the district manager that she did not like the way the store manager criticized employees in the office. However, Respondent's policy is to provide praise in public and constructive criticism in private. Respondent has a policy to send employees flowers when they are hospitalized. Petitioner complained to Respondent's district manager that the store did not send her flowers when she was in the hospital. According to Petitioner, the store manager told her at some point in time that she was going to die and where she was going to be buried if she did not quit her job. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the store manager did not make this statement. Petitioner presented testimony that Respondent's managers called her a whiner. Petitioner also presented testimony that the assistant store manager stated that she would not baby-sit dummies (retarded people). The most persuasive evidence indicates that Respondent's managers never made these comments. To the contrary, Respondent does not have a policy against hiring people with disabilities. In fact, at the time of the hearing, Respondent had another disabled person working at the store in Defuniak Springs, Florida. Sometime after Respondent rehired Petitioner in October 2000, she began to experience chest pains while she was working as a cashier. Petitioner's co-workers were aware of Petitioner's problem but there is no competent evidence that Respondent's managers were aware of her specific symptoms. In fact, none of Respondent's managers who testified at the hearing could remember Petitioner complaining of chest pains while she was working as a cashier. When Petitioner requested permission to leave work due to illness, she was told to wait for relief, then to close her register and go to the office to check out. The process took about 20 minutes. At the time in question, Petitioner drove herself to the doctor's office. She did not request anyone to drive her and no one offered to do so. After being examined by her doctor, Petitioner 's doctor recommended that she travel to the hospital by ambulance. Petitioner refused this recommendation and elected to call a friend to take her to the hospital in Defuniak Springs, Florida. Eventually, Petitioner was placed in intensive care and transferred to a hospital in Pensacola, Florida, where she underwent the replacement of a stent due to its collapse. There were times when Petitioner was not allowed to leave her register before a break to take her medication; however, she was allowed to have water at her register so that she could take her medication at her workstation. On the one occasion that Petitioner could not locate her nitroglycerine prescription, she was told to finish with a customer before going to the store's pharmacy to obtain a new prescription. During the hearing, Petitioner testified that she was not allowed to operate machinery while taking some of her prescribed drugs. Therefore, Petitioner did not take those medications when she went to work. There is no evidence that Respondent was aware that Petitioner was not taking prescribed medications in order to work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is
The Issue This matter was referred by the Public Employees Relations Commission to the Division of Administrative Hearings for hearing to determine: Whether the Respondent, Seminole County, is a Public Employer within the meaning of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. Whether the Petitioner, Union, is an employee organization within the meaning of Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. Whether there has been a sufficient showing of interest has required for the filing of a representation election petition under Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. Whether the employer organization is a properly registered organization with the Public Employees Relations Commission. What is the appropriate unit of public employees within the Public Employer? PRE-HEARING MATTERS Prior to the commencement of the hearing, Respondent filed the following motions with the Hearing Officer who made the indicated disposition of the motion: Motion for Discovery; denied on the basis of prior PERC rulings. Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction to Local PERC; denied because the local ordinance had not been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission. Motion for Oral Argument on Motion to Transfer Jurisdiction; denied, see Petitioner's Motion to Amend, below. Motion to Dismiss Based on Employer Not Having Denied Recognition; denied. Motion to Dismiss or Limit Hearing on the Basis that Local PERC Ordinate Controls; denied. Motion to Dismiss on the Basis of Inappropriateness of Units Sought; denied. Motion to Quash Hearing on Basis that Acting Chairman Lacked Authority to Notice Hearing; denied. Motion to Dismiss on Basis of Lack of Due Process and Lack of Authority; denied. The Petitioner moved orally in response to the suggestion that paragraph 11 of the Petition indicated concurrence in local PERC authority to amend paragraph 11 to "no". Motion was granted by the Hearing Officer. After having presented its motions the Respondent thereafter filed its Answer, asserting therein certain affirmative defenses. Succinctly stated the position of the Respondent was that the county had defined the appropriate units within the Public Employer by local ordinances as professional, supervisory and blue collar, and that the unit sought by the Petitioner did not conform to the units the County had defined by ordinance. The Petitioner sought all employees of the Road and Arthopod Divisions of Seminole County excluding officers, clericals, supervisory and guard employees.
Findings Of Fact The Hearing Officer directed the Employer to go forward and present its evidence in support of its definition of the units. The Employer sought to call Pat Hill and Jack McLean, both previously subpoenaed by the Employer. Neither of the individuals were present in the hearing room. The Hearing Officer, noting that the time had not expired to oppose the subpoenas but that no opposition had been filed, allowed the Employer to proffer the testimony these witnesses would have given if present. The Hearing Officer notes that subsequently these subpoenas were quashed. Therefore, the proffered testimony will not be considered by the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer would, in light of the fact that the Commission's file was not present at the hearing, direct the Commission's attention to the proffer as it relates to the Commission's file for resolution of any matters appropriately raised. The Employer then called Carl Crosslin who was present but whose subpoena had been timely opposed by his Counsel. The subpoena having been issued by the Acting Chairman, the Hearing Officer deferred to the Acting Chairman for his ruling on the subpoena in question. The Hearing Officer allowed the Employer to proffer the testimony which would have been presented by Carl Crosslin and Commissioner Paul Parker. Thereafter, the Employer moved for a continuance which motion was denied by the Hearing Officer. The Employer then made a demand for presentation of the authorization cards, which were not present at the hearing. The Employer then sought to introduce the affidavit of Chris Haughee which was rejected by the Hearing Officer. The Employer then filed its motion for Determination of Managerial and Confidential Employees. This motion is preserved for consideration by the Commission. It is appropriate to note at this point that upon the conclusion of the taking of testimony the Petitioner amended its petition to seek a unit composed of non-exempt employees of the Road Construction and Maintenance Division, the Heavy Equipment and Vehicle Maintenance Division, and Arthopod Division of the Public Works Department of the County of Seminole, or in the alternative, all non-exempt employees of the Public Works Division and as a final alternative, a unit of all blue collar workers of the Public Employer who are in construction, maintenance and trades, but excludes clerical, secretarial and similar positions. The parties also stipulated to the managerial status of division directors within the Administrative Services Department and their secretaries. However, in light of the fact that not all division directors within the employ of the Public Employer were not included within the stipulation, and further, because the Employer has filed a motion for Determination of Managerial and Confidential Status and because the stipulation between the parties would not be binding upon others who might have an interest, the facts relating to the duties and functions of division directors and similar positions are set forth so that the Public Employees Relations Commission may resolve the status of these employees as it relates to the motion filed by the Public Employer. The general organization of the Public Employer is indicated on Exhibit 6. The Board of County Commissioners, as the elected representatives of the citizens of Seminole County, head the Public Employer. An executive assistant manages the office and staff of the Board of County Commissioners and functions as general coordinator for the other department heads of the county government. Each of the several departments of government is headed by a department head. Each department head is directly responsible for the management of his department to the Board of County Commissioners. Although the executive assistant, as a coordinator, would have some coordinating function with the department heads, the department heads are the first level of management below the Board of County Commissioners. The department heads prepare the budgets for their department, manage and direct their personal staffs and their division heads, make policy within their department, and participate in the resolution of grievances. They have the authority to hire and fire all employees making less than $10,000 per year and they participate in evaluations of all employees. Department heads have the ability to effectively recommend the employment and discharge of division heads and employees making more than $10,000 per year. All of the department heads meet on Mondays to discuss their joint duties and coordinate their activities. The division heads or directors have the authority to effectively recommend hiring and firing of personnel. The division heads assign work and determine the manner in which work shall be done by their subordinates. The division heads have the authority to discipline their personnel or effectively recommend disciplinary measures dependent upon the action taken. Division directors prepare and submit budget data to the department heads upon which the departmental budget is based. The division heads constitute the second level of supervision or management in county employment. Among their other functions they make determinations regarding the manner in which programs will be accomplished and participate in the resolution of grievances. In all but the smallest divisions and in all of the departments, the department heads and division directors have secretaries assigned to them to handle their personal correspondence, In the larger divisions and in the majority of the departments there are additional clerical personnel assigned to handle general typing and filing and to maintain fiscal records. The parties with regard to the RC petition in question have stipulated that the secretaries to the department heads and division directors should be excluded as confidential. There are divisions within the county government whose function is primarily administrative and whose employees perform administrative duties. These divisions or activities would include the Personnel Division, Microfilm Division, Division of Manpower Planning, Purchasing Division, Office of Management and Evaluation, Veterans' Service Officer, Division of Social Services and Seminole County Industrial Development Authority. In the aforelisted activities, all of the personnel are involved in totally administrative functions. In addition to these totally administrative divisions or activities, there are additional divisions in which there are mixed administrative and other functions. The administrative employees of these divisions would include Switchboard Operators and the Mail Clerk in Support Services Division; the Biologists in Operations Division of the Department of Environmental Services; the Operator Inspector, Pollution Control Technician, Account Clerk in the Division of Environmental Control of the Department of Environmental Services; Cashiers within the Division of Motor Vehicles of the Department of Public Safety; the Deputy Civil Defense Director in the Division of Civil Defense, Department of Public Safety; Permit Clerks and a Secretary II of the Building Division of the Department of County Development; two Secretaries and a Site Planner within the Office of the Land Development Administrator, Division of Land Development, Department of County Development; a Secretary, two Draftsmen, two Planners, Drafting Technician II, Planner (current plans), Senior Planner, Principal Planner and County Planner within the Planning Division of the Department of County Development. The following personnel hold positions within the county government below that of division director and perform functions which are not clerical or administrative in nature. These remaining personnel will be discussed by division. Within the Building Maintenance Division there is a Supervisor of Custodial Services, Supervisor of Courthouse Custodians, and Building Custodian Supervisor, all of whom report to the Director of Building Maintenance. The Supervisor of Courthouse Custodians directly supervises the fifteen custodians assigned to the Seminole County Courthouse. The Supervisor of Custodial Services supervises the custodians assigned to the maintenance of the other county buildings. The Building Custodian Supervisor supervises the electrical, carpentry, plumbing and air conditioning foremen under whose direction maintenance workers perform such maintenance as is required upon the various county buildings. These three supervisors have the authority to effectively recommend hiring, firing and disciplinary action and assign specific work to those employees under their direction. These supervisors constitute the first level of direct supervision over the county employees for although there are trades foremen designated they function as lead workers. Within the Support Services Division there are three Night Watchmen who are responsible for security of the County Courthouse and one Senior Night Watchman who assigns the work shifts of the Watchman. The testimony would indicate that the Senior Night Watchman functions in the role of a lead worker. It should be noted that this Division does not have a division director but is under the control of the acting executive assistant. Within the Division of Human Services is the Office of Animal Control which is headed by the Animal Control Officer. The Animal Control Officer is responsible for the operation of the County Pound and the supervision of the work of the four Animal Control Officers. He is assisted in his functions by the Animal Control Supervisor who is specifically charged with maintenance of the County Pound. The Animal Control Officer has authority to recommend hiring, firing and discipline of these employees who he evaluates. Within the Operations Division of the Department of Environmental Services there is a Chief Operator and three Operator Trainees who are responsible for the operation and maintenance of the county's water and sewage treatment facilities. The Operator Trainees are under the direct supervision of the Chief Operator whose responsibility is to train then to operate the system and to assign their duties. The Operator Trainees perform maintenance, read meters, and perform such other duties as the Chief Operator assigns necessary to the operation of these facilities. Within the Office of the Director of Public Safety and under the Director's control is Fire Prevention and Arson Investigator, a Training Officer, and two Mechanics. The Investigator and the Training Officer are trained firefighters. The two Mechanics are physically located at Station 14 and are responsible for the maintenance of the County Fire Department's Vehicles. The Fire Department is divided into three shifts or platoons. Each shift or platoon being supervised by a Sector Fire Coordinator. The Sector Fire Coordinator prepares the budget for his shift, establishes field operating procedures, and directs fire fighting, and has access to the personnel files of the employees. Also within the Department of Public Safety is the Communications Division which at present relates primarily to the Fire Department but which will in the future also encompass the 911 telephone number. The Communications' personnel are under the supervision of the Communications supervisor. The Communications' personnel are generally not firefighters, but receive emergency calls and dispatch equipment. Within the Motor Vehicle Inspection Division of the Department of Public Safety there are three Inspection Stations located within the county. The Motor Vehicles Inspection function is under the supervision of the Motor Vehicles Inspection Supervisor who acts as a division director and effectively recommends hiring and firing and discipline of employees and who helps prepare the budget for the Motor Vehicles Inspection activities. He is also responsible for work assignments and development of work procedures. Each Inspection Station is under the direction of a Chief Inspector who is responsible for assigning work at each station and responsible for the function thereof. There are four Motor Vehicle Inspectors at each Inspection Station and one Cashier. Within the Division of Parks and Recreation of the Department of County Development there is a Parks Coordinator/Designer who can effectively recommend hiring and firing and disciplinary action of personnel within the Division. The Parks Coordinator/Designer is also responsible for the direct or specific supervision of work. He functions as an assistant division director. The Parks Supervisor is also able to effectively recommend hiring, firing and disciplinary action. The Parks Supervisor provides direct supervision of the five Maintenance Workers, the Equipment Operator II, and three Trades Workers assigned to the Parks and Recreation Division. In addition to the positions enumerated above there are an additional twenty-nine CETA Workers assigned to Parks and Recreation primarily in the grades of Maintenance Worker and Equipment Operator. Within the Building Division of the Department of County Development the construction inspection function within the county is the responsibility of the Building Official who functions as the division director of the Building Division. He is assisted in his duties by the Plans Examiner who functions as the Deputy Building Official. Both employees have the authority to effectively recommend the hiring, firing and discipline of their subordinate employees. The actual inspection of construction is carried out by one of ten inspectors. There are three Chief Building Inspectors; one assigned to general construction, one to electrical, and one to plumbing, There are six Inspectors who work under the three Chief Inspectors and one Trailer or Mobile Home Inspector who reports directly to the Building Official. Within the Land Development Division of the Department of County Development is the Zoning Department. The Land Development Administrator functions as the division director. He is assisted in his Duties by the Zoning Administrator who acts as the Assistant Division Director. Both employees have the authority to effectively recommend hiring, firing and disciplinary actions. There are three Inspectors assigned to the Land Development Division. One inspects for compliance with the County Tree Ordinance, one inspects with regard to commitments made to the county by developers and the third inspects for violations of the county zoning code. The Engineering Division of the Department of Public Works is responsible for three basic functions: Traffic engineering, design and survey, and survey and inspection. The Traffic Engineer is responsible for the traffic engineering activity and supervises the other employees directly. Signs are prepared in the County Sign Shop which is under the supervision of the Sign Shop Foreman. An Electrician is also assigned to this activity together with an Electronics Technician. They are responsible for the installation and maintenance of traffic signals. A Radio Technician is also assigned to the Traffic Engineer activity. The Radio Technician is responsible for the repair of all county radios. The Design and Survey activity consists of a Design Engineer and a Design Technician who design and draft plans for county construction projects. The Assistant County Engineer heads up the survey and inspection type activity for the Engineering Division. He is responsible for the county's two survey crews which are made up of a Party Chief and three to four crew members. The Assistant County Engineer is responsible for directing the work functions and activities of his subordinates and has the authority to effectively recommend hiring, firing and discipline. The Assistant Road Superintendent is in charge of the Road Construction and Maintenance Division of the Department of Public Works. He is assisted in the performance of his duties by two foremen and three to four crew leaders. The Road Maintenance function contains three supervisors, two of which supervise a foreman and two crew leaders and the third supervisor who supervises a crew leader. Under each crew leader there are from four to six maintenance workers or equipment operators. The Assistant Road Superintendent and the three supervisors in maintenance all function in assigning work to crews and individuals and supervising the work activity. In addition, the Assistant Road Superintendent acts as the assistant to the Road Superintendent who functions as the division director. Both men would have authority to effectively recommend hiring, firing, and disciplinary action together with the three supervisors, The Division of Heavy Equipment Maintenance is under the supervision of the Shop Foreman who functions as a division director, He is assisted by the Parts Manager who acts as the assistant division director. The position of Chief Mechanic is currently vacant and the duties are being performed by the Assistant Chief Mechanic. The primary function of the Parts Manager is the purchasing and stockage of spare parts. The Shop Foreman, Parts Manager and Assistant Chief Mechanic all have the authority to effectively hire, fire and recommend discipline. These three individuals would also provide evaluations of the mechanics, mechanic helpers and equipment servicemen assigned to the Heavy Equipment Maintenance Division. The Arthropod Division of Seminole County is responsible for refuse disposal. The division director is the Refuse Superintendent. Working under him are the Refuse Supervisor and a Landfill Foreman. The Landfill Foreman is responsible for supervision of the actual landfill operations and directly is responsible for three Equipment Operator III's and an Equipment Operator IV. The Landfill Foreman is also responsible for supervision of truck drivers while they are at the landfill area. The Landfill Foreman, Refuse Supervisor and Refuse Superintendent (division director) all have the authority to effectively recommend hiring, firing and discipline and to make work assignments and to evaluate performance. There were approximately twenty-eight employees within the Arthropod Division at the time of hearing. With regard to the employees of the county generally the testimony indicates that all employees of the county are entitled to the same vacation, retirement, and insurance benefits and that their salaries are established within the framework of the pay classification plan. The Petitioner has argued that each division is a totally independent unit, therefore, a unit composed of employees of the Arthropod and Road Construction and Maintenance Divisions of the Department of Public Works would be appropriate. The Employer has urged that the employees of the county be divided into three units: (1) all professional employees (2) all supervisory employees and (3) all employees not contained in the first two units. The Employer's proposal would appear to lump all the clerical employees, all custodial and maintenance employees, and certain highly skilled or specially trained employees in the same unit. The record does not support the Petitioner's contention that the divisions of Seminole County government are independent. The record clearly indicates that divisions are subordinate to the departments of which they are a part. The record further indicates that even departments are not totally independent or autonomous since the department heads are responsible to the County Commission which in turn establishes the salaries and other benefits of employment for all employees of the county. The record clearly indicates that a unit limited to the Arthropod and Road Divisions or even to the Public Works Department would not encompass many employees with essentially the same job functions and in some instances the same job titles and pay classifications. There are maintenance workers, equipment operators and certain custodial personnel and mechanics located in other divisions of county government. The position of the Employer fails to recognize the disparity of interest between the employees which would be "left over" and compose the third unit it has proposed. The record indicates that there are essentially three types of employees below the grade or position of division director as follows: (1) Clerical, (2) Maintenance/Custodial, and (3) Highly skilled. A large portion of the total number of county employees would fall into the clerical category to include secretaries, clerk typists, filing clerks, and fiscal assistants. The maintenance/custodial category would appear to be the next largest grouping of employees and would include custodial and maintenance workers, vehicle operators, watchmen, and mechanics. The highly or specially skilled category would include various planners, biologists, draftsmen, personnel specialists, zoning and building inspectors, and the highest level of skilled trades workers and sanitariums. Based upon the foregoing categorization of county employees, the unit composed of maintenance/custodial employees would encompass all of the job titles and job classifications sought by the Petitioner within the Department of Public Works and consolidate a substantial portion of the total number of county employees who share similar duties and work environments. A unit composed of this category would be almost identical to the last alternative unit sought by Petitioner. At the same time it would prevent fractionalization within county government and better meet the criteria stated in Section 447.009(4), Florida Statutes. This report is respectfully submitted this 11th day of April, 1976. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas J. Pilacek, Esquire Bowels & Pilacek 131 Hark Lake Street Orlando, Florida 32803 David Richeson, Esquire Alley, Alley & Blue 205 Brush Avenue Tampa, Florida Henry Swann, Esquire Alley, Alley & Blue 205 Brush Avenue Tampa, Florida Chairman Public Employees Relations Commission Suite 300, 2003 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
Findings Of Fact On July 7, 1978, Petitioner, Amelia M. Park (Park), was hired as District VI Legal Counsel of Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (Department). The position was included in the Florida Career Service System, and Park obtained permanent status in the position in January 1979. The Legislature exempted the position from the Career Service System and made it a Senior Management Service position on November 12, 1981. On the morning of November 9, 1984, Park was in Bradenton to attend a hearing for the Department in Manatee County Court. She had scheduled a meeting with Bill Presmeyer at the Manatee Health Department, but the meeting was cancelled at the last minute. Because Park had pre-approved annual leave for the afternoon, she went to her vacation home located in Holmes Beach on Anna Maria Island. Late in the morning, Park received a telephone call from her secretary, Muriel Pages, who informed Park that Assistant District Legal Counsel, Dennis Palso, who had been on the job only one week, and District Program Manager, Stephanie Watson Judd, wanted to talk to her. Park knew or should have known that the matter to be discussed was considered important by the Department staff or they would not have telephoned her at her home. Judd told Park that the Department had received a court order committing a juvenile to the Department but that they were not sure what the Department properly should do in response to the Order. Palso, who only had been on the job for one week, pointed out internal inconsistencies in the Order. The Order found the juvenile both incompetent to stand trial and not guilty by reason of insanity. The Order also cited the rules of criminal procedure instead of the rules of juvenile procedure. At the request of Carl Neill, the Department's District Administrator, Park's immediate supervisor, Judd and Palso relayed this information to Park and sought her advice on several questions: (1) whether the Order was legal; (2) whether the juvenile could be placed in a mental health facility based on the Order alone without bringing a Baker Act proceeding; and (3) whether and how the Department should take the child into custody. Park responded that the Order was sufficient for the Department to take the juvenile into custody and place him in a mental health facility. Notwithstanding the questions Park was being asked, she assumed that the juvenile was in custody because she would not have expected the judge to release such a juvenile into the community. Park told Palso that he or she would be able to clear up the internal inconsistencies and problems in the Order the following week by filing a motion in court. Park recommended that the Department's staff telephone "central admissions" in Tallahassee since Park believed that office of the Department had experience with similar orders and would know how to proceed. After talking to Park, Judd telephoned Sam Ashdown in Tallahassee to discuss the case and receive advice on how to proceed. In the course of their discussion, Judd read the Order to Ashdown over the telephone and, to her surprise, Ashdown took the position that the Order was illegal and that the Department could not act upon it. Judd informed Ashdown that Park, as District VI's legal counsel, had given the District VI staff a contrary opinion and suggested that Ashdown talk directly with Park, giving him the telephone number at Park's vacation house. Later in the afternoon of November 9, Judd telephoned Park again to inform her about Judd's conversation with Ashdown and to prepare her to receive a telephone call from Ashdown. Park became angry at Judd for having given Ashdown her telephone number. She denied ever having given a legal opinion that the Order was legal, but told Judd that there was nothing that could be done about it by the end of Friday afternoon. Park told Judd to call Ashdown back and tell him not to telephone Park about the matter. In the face of Park's tirade, Judd informed Carl Neill of what Park had said and telephoned Ashdown to relay Park's message and tell him not to call Park. Neill became very concerned about the manner in which Park handled the matter earlier in the afternoon of November 9, 1984. Although Park was a knowledgeable lawyer and able advocate for the Department, she had a history of difficulty working, relating, and communicating with certain members of the Department's District VI staff. This history included several occasions in which Park's personal relationships with Department staff deteriorated to the point of affecting Park's ability to work with or even talk to staff. Neill suspected that a recent deterioration in the personal relationship between Judd and Park may have been partially responsible for the manner in which Park handled the juvenile matter on November 9. Park's work relationship with each of the two assistant attorneys working under her before Palso had deteriorated to the point that Park could communicate with them only in writing and not very well. Park's personality and deficient interpersonal skills was at least partially responsible for those problems in District VI's legal office. Park also had a deserved reputation among District VI's staff for being unpredictable. For no apparent reason, Park would sometimes be unreasonably irritable and rude. For example: Park has chastised Joseph Tagliarini in front of other staff for operational (not legal) difficulties in dealing with the local Sheriff's Office. This rebuff was hostile and angry, inappropriate and unwarranted. On another occasion, Park refused to dis- cuss a personnel matter with Allen Mundy and William Stanley, became rude and directed them to leave her office. Personnel officer, David Stoops, had asked Mundy and Stanley to discuss the matter with Park. At a training session she was giving on child support enforcement, Park became angered by questions being asked by one of the partici- pants, became progressively more hostile and angry, and ended up yelling at the employee from the podium in the middle of the training session. James Freyfogel, one of Park's own wit- nesses, was unfairly accused by Park with having concealed information material to a real estate transaction entered into by the Depart- ment. Because of Park's conduct, Freyfogel tried to avoid any contact with her for about a year and a half. Another of Park's witnesses, Judy Wichter- man, testified that Park was "a nasty person" and that she and other counselors avoided con- tact with Park whenever possible. Park was not even aware of the effect of her personality on Freyfogel and Wichterman. The strained work relationships described in paragraph 9 above (and others) do not typify all of Park's relationships with members of the staff of the Department's District VI. Park had many good days and many positive working relationships. However, Neill was aware that Park's personality had caused several problems in work relationships at District VI and that it was not a matter of one or two isolated incidents. At least part of the blame for these problems rests with Park's personality. Problems caused by Park's personality were not limited to lower staff members whom Park intimidated. For example: Neill also was aware that Park had unknow- ingly offended Larry Overton, then Deputy As- sistant Secretary For Operations for the De- partment in Tallahassee. Overton related to Neill that Park had become hysterical during a meeting he had with her concerning problems with a nursing home in District VI. In the fall of 1984, Park insisted on be- ginning a letter to a private attorney with whom she was dealing on behalf of the Depart- ment by stating that she was "outraged" at some of the attorney's tactics and conduct. Neill had specifically requested that Park, as representative of a State agency, not express "outrage." Neill told Park that he thought this form of expression was inappropriate, and he directed that the letter be reworded. Despite Neill's direct request, Park sent the letter as originally written with the justifi- cation that she was indeed "outraged." Park also angered two judges before whom she appeared as attorney for the Department, a Judge Pope and a Judge Calhoun. In compliance with Neill's suggestion and request, Park wrote a letter of apology to Judge Pope. When Park returned to work after the weekend and Monday holiday on Tuesday, November 13, 1984, Neill asked her into his office to discuss the events of November 9. During the discussion, Neill referred to the events of November 9 as an emergency, and Park attempted without success to learn from Neill why it was an emergency. Neill explained his position that it is unacceptable for senior managers on leave to refuse to permit HRS staff to contact them to discuss matters staff believes need to be discussed. Neill stated that senior managers must be available in such circumstances. Park became very angry and upset at having been accused of less than satisfactory performance. She lost her temper in front of Neill. She stated that she was incensed that Judd had given her home telephone number to Ashdown and stated that, in the future, she would avoid this situation by not leaving a telephone number where she could be reached. Park then stormed out of Neill's office. As a result of all of the events referred to in these Findings of Fact, including Neill's meeting with Park on November 13, 1984, Neill's confidence and trust in Park was shaken. Neill did not believe he could continue to function with Park as his legal counsel. Neill did not think he could count on Park to make herself available to Neill and his staff when needed. Neill also believed he could retain competent legal counsel who would be able to get along better with a larger part of Neill's staff so that Neill's staff could function more smoothly and effectively as a whole. Neill telephoned HRS supervisors in Tallahassee for advice and was told that he had authority to terminate Park in his discretion. After spending the rest of the day and evening of November 13 making up his mind, Neill decided to terminate Park as his legal counsel. On November 14, 1984, Neill again met with Park and informed her that he intended to make a change in the position of legal counsel and asked for Park's assistance in making the transition smooth. Park interpreted Neill's comment as a request for Park's resignation, and Park responded that she could not agree to resign without giving the matter further thought and discussing it with her husband, Park's counsel in this case. Because of Park's work schedule she requested until Monday, November 19, 1984, to give Neill an answer, and Neill agreed. On November 19, 1984, Park and her husband met with Neill as scheduled at 8:30 in the morning. Neill handed Mr. Park a letter informing Park of Neill's intent to terminate Park's employment effective November 27, 1984. Mr. Park asked if the meeting was a pre-termination conference. Neill stated that he did not believe a pre-termination conference was required for senior management but that he was willing to treat the meeting as a pre-termination conference and would consider anything Mr. or Mrs. Park had to say about the matter. Mr. Park suggested to Neill that Neill was exposing himself to possible personal liability by terminating Mrs. Park but had nothing else to say about the matter. The Parks stated that they had all they needed and left Neill's office. Towards the end of the final hearing, Park stipulated that she was not dismissed for political reasons.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, enter a Final Order consistent with the previous exercise of its discretion to terminate Petitioner, Amelia M. Park, from her Senior Management Service position. RECOMMENDED this 15th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 1985. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 84-4443 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted. See Finding 1. Rejected as unnecessary, irrelevant and subordinate. As reflected in the Conclusions Of Law, the ultimate issues of fact are narrower than Petitioner perceives. Unless the subordinate facts in proposed Finding 2 persuade the finder of fact that the alleged legitimate reasons for termination of Petitioner's employment were mere fabrications, they are unnecessary and irrelevant. In any event, they are subordinate. Covered by Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 12. Covered by Finding 14. Covered by Finding 15. See Paragraph 1 above. See Paragraph 1 above. Also covered in part by Findings 9 and 10. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. Also covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. See Paragraph 9 above. Also covered in part by Finding 8. Covered by Findings 2 through 4. See Paragraph 8 above. Also covered in part by Findings 2 through 6. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings Of Fact Covered by Finding 1. Rejected in part as being subordinate. Also covered in part by Finding 11(a). Covered by Finding 9(a).* Covered by Finding 9(b). Covered by Finding 9(c). Rejected in part as subordinate or cumulative. Covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 6 above. See Paragraph 6 above. Covered by Finding 11(b). Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 9. Covered by Finding 8. Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 8. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. See Paragraph 12 above. Also covered in part by Finding 7. Rejected in part as subordinate. Covered in part by Finding 11(c). Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, and argumentative. Covered in part by Findings 8 thorough 11. See Paragraph 20 above. Covered by Finding 9(d). Rejected in part as subordinate and cumulative. Covered in part by Finding 9. See Paragraph 23 above. Covered by Finding 9(e). Rejected as subordinate, unnecessary, and argumentative. Rejected in part as subordinate, cumulative, unnecessary, and argumentative. Covered in part by Finding 10. Covered by Findings 7 through 10. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. 30-35 Covered b Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 12. Rejected in part because Rule SM-1.09, Florida Administrative Code, is a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. Rejected in part because there was no evidence of HRS Regulation 60-49. In part covered by the Findings 2 through 6. Covered by Finding 14. Covered by Finding 15. Covered by Finding 15. Rejected as subordinate and unnecessary. Covered by Finding 16. *It should be noted that parts of this proposed finding of fact and many others have been rejected to the extent that they contain excessive argument. COPIES FURNISHED: William M. Park, Esquire Building 501, Suite A 8001 N. Dale Mabry Tampa, Florida 33614 Jay Adams, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
