Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Florida Hospital, is a tertiary care hospital located in Orange County, Florida, and consisting of three different campuses, with a total of 1,075 licensed beds. It is the second busiest and biggest hospital in Florida. T2. 9,20. Florida Hospital submitted its original FY 1984 budget to the Hospital Cost Containment Board (HCCB) on October 31, 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit 5. The FY 1984 budget was revised at least once through informal negotiation with HCCB staff before it was considered by the HCCB, and these revisions were accepted by the staff of the HCCB. T1. 54, 104. These changes were not placed in evidence. The HCCB reviewed Petitioner's FY 1984 budget at its meeting on April 19, 1984. T1. 54; Petitioner's Exhibit 4. The budget was accepted and not selected for public hearing, and the HCCB found that Petitioner's hospital had one of the top three highest case mixes in the state. Petitioner's Exhibit 4. Petitioner's 1984 fiscal year ran from January 1, 1984 to December 31, 1984. T1. 52. Although the budget was not considered by the HCCB until April, 1984, the budget was effective for all of fiscal year 1984. T1. 54. By letter dated October 11, 1984, but received October 15, 1984, Florida Hospital submitted an amended FY 1984 budget to the Hospital Cost Containment Board. T1. 54; T2. 51; Petitioner's Exhibit 6. The amendment thus was submitted 289 days after the beginning of Petitioner's 1984 fiscal year, using the date of receipt as the date of submission, and 77 days from the end of the fiscal year. By letter dated February 11, 1985, the HCCB staff notified Florida Hospital that its amended 1984 budget would not be accepted because it was received less than 90 days before the end of Florida Hospital's 1984 fiscal year. T1. 54-55; Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Florida Hospital is not aware of any analysis made by the staff of the HCCB with respect to the merits of the proposed amendment. T1. 56. In the fall of 1984, the HCCB applied the 90 day policy to all hospitals which submitted proposed budget amendments. T1. 7, 13. The policy was initiated in late summer or early fall, 1984. T1. 6,7. The HCCB did not provide the Petitioner with any other reason for the proposed denial of its amendment. T1. 23. The HCCB has now abandoned its policy of refusing to accept budget amendments within the last 90 days of the fiscal year, and that issue is not present in this case because the HCCB does not rely upon it to deny the amendment proposed by the Petitioner. T1. 11, 27. Effective May 18, 1984, the Legislature substantially amended the Health Care Cost Containment Act of 1979, section 395.501, et seq., Fla. Stat. Chapter 84-35, Laws of Florida (1984). Historically, there was no practice or policy of the HCCB or its staff to either encourage or discourage amendment of budgets after submission to the HCCB, and although such amendments were not required by law, amendments were routinely allowed. T1. Under prior law, the HCCB had no regulatory authority over hospital budgets, and could not require a hospital to revise its budget or to abide by its budget. T1. 40. The HCCB only had the power to subject the hospital to a public hearing. Id. It often occurred that hospitals would revise a budget under the former law, after preliminary staff analysis and recommendation, and it is inferred that often such amendments were prompted by the possibility that the unrevised budget would trigger a public hearing. T1. 39. In fiscal year 1984, ninety-nine hospitals submitted amendments or other changes to their budgets after initial budget Submission to the HCCB. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Sixty-five of those amendments were accepted by the staff of the HCCB or the HCCB and became a part of the hospital's 1984 budget. Id. At least fifteen or twenty of the attempts to amend the FY 1984 budget set forth above were filed after the particular fiscal year had already begun. T1. 70. The majority of these fifteen or twenty were changes or amendments submitted prior to the time that the particular budget was submitted to the board of the HCCB. Id. In most eases, these fifteen or twenty amendments were accepted by the HCCB. T1. 71. Thus, it was common for the HCCB to accept amendments to the FY 1984 budget after the beginning of that fiscal year. There is no evidence, however, that any of these amendments accepted by the HCCB had the effect, under the amended 1984 law, of reducing the variance between a 1984 budget as originally filed and 1984 audited actual experience to diminish or entirely avoid the base year adjustment required by section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1985). On March 6, 1984, Kissimmee Memorial Hospital submitted an amendment to its FY 1984 budget after the beginning of that fiscal year. Its fiscal year was calendar year 1984. This amendment was accepted by the HCCB in April, 1984, and was effective retroactively and prospectively, for the entire fiscal year. T1. 71-77; Petitioner's exhibit 7, worksheets C-3, C-4 and X-4. Of the fifty FY 1984 files reviewed at the HCCB by Scott Miller, witness for the Petitioner, one contained an amendment to a budget which was accepted by the HCCB after the HCCB had approved the budget. T1. 77. That hospital was Central Florida Regional Hospital. Id. The fiscal year for Central Florida Regional Hospital was calendar year 1984. T1. 79. The HCCB accepted the budget during their June, 1984, meeting. T1. 79; Petitioner's Exhibit 8. Subsequently, by letter dated September 21, 1984, Central Florida Regional Hospital submitted a proposed amendment to its FY 1984 budget. T1. 79-80. The proposed amendment was received by the HCCB on September 24, 1984, and sought an amendment due to receipt of favorable prior year Medicare settlements. Petitioner's Exhibit 8, letter of September 21, 1984, and worksheets C-2 and X-4; T1. 81. This was 22 days before the HCCB received the amendment proposed by the Petitioner in this case, and was more than 90 days from the end of the 1984 fiscal year. Apparently the amendment proposed by Central Florida Regional Hospital was subjected to the same 90 day amendment policy as Petitioner's amendment, but since the amendment of Central Florida Regional Hospital was submitted with more than 90 days left in the fiscal year, the amendment was not precluded by application of that policy. T1. 7, 13. The amendment proposed by Central Florida Regional Hospital related to past and future periods, and was proposed to be effective for the entire fiscal year. T1. 136, 81. The amendment was concerned solely with actual experience, the receipt of a Medicare settlement, which was a single unusual revenue event. The HCCB accepted the amendment, T2. 69, and the amendment became effective for the entire 1984 fiscal year. T1. 80-81; T2.69. (Specifically, staff of the HCCB accepted the amendments, the amendments were entered into the HCCB computer, this was deemed to be acceptance by the HCCB itself, and the amendments were averaged on the computer for the entire 12 month period. T2. 67, 69-70.) The effect of the amendment was to increase net revenue per adjusted admission by about $180, and this increase was too small to have any impact upon the issue of whether Central Florida Regional Hospital would be subject to a base year adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1984). T1. 61-62. The policy described in finding of fact 8 above was never promulgated by the HCCB as a rule. T1. 9, 12. No general written notice was given to hospitals potentially affected by the policy. T1. 13. The first notice given to hospitals of the existence of the policy was when staff of the HCCB notified a particular hospital in response to proposed fiscal year 1984 budget amendments. Id. Florida Hospital first learned of the existence of the policy when its attempted budget amendment was rejected by the HCCB staff on February 11, 1985. T1. 54-55. The amendment proposed by the Petitioner to its FY 1984 budget included a reduction of about 21,000 patient days, and a reduction of about 1900 admissions from the original budget. T1. Additionally, the amendment sought to increase revenue amounts which resulted primarily from a change in case mix. Id. Finally, there were increases in expenses for malpractice insurance and data processing software. Id. Revenues respond quite directly to increases or decreases in case mix. T1. 68. Case mix is a mathematical expression of the intensity of services provided to the patient, T2. 16, which correlates to the degree of illness of the patient. Id. The average case mix is 1.0. T2. 17. In the summer and early fall of 1983, when the Petitioner prepared its original budget for 1984, case mix standards did not exist, T1. 61, and the 1984 budget was not based upon a case mix. Id. Case mix data for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 became available in January, 1984. T1. 135. Florida Hospital's case mix, and its revenues, increased in fiscal year 1984 primarily due to the introduction of the Medicare prospective payment system on October 1, 1983. T1. 59, 65, 96. Additionally, in the market served by Florida hospital there was increased activity from health maintenance organizations and preferred provider organizations. T1. 59. The Medicare prospective payment system was a major change in the reimbursement system. T1. 119. These changes in the health care market caused Florida Hospital to experience a decrease in length of stay and an increase in the intensity of services rendered to sicker patients. This occurred because the new Medicare System, as well as HMO's and PPO's, were intended to reduce hospital stays and treat less sick patients outside the hospital. T1. 59. The budget of Florida Hospital was initially prepared and submitted in October, 1983, with virtually no actual experience under the new Medicare prospective payment system. T1. 95-96. See also findings of fact 2 and 19, supra. Florida Hospital hired two consultants to assist it in trying to predict the impact of the new Medicare program. T1. 95. Florida Hospital receives many of its patients on referral from other hospitals which cannot provide services to such patients. T2. 18, 33-34. Thus, Florida Hospital is relied upon by the surrounding area to treat sicker patients. T2. 25. It is hard to predict trends in such referrals, and consequently, it is difficult to predict the impact of other market changes, such as the Medicare changes and the success of health maintenance organizations described above, since Florida Hospital must rely on referrals. Health maintenance organizations in the first year of operation in the surrounding community were able to substantially reduce days of care, and this success was not predictable by Florida Hospital when it formulated its FY 1984 budget. T2. 14- Additionally, the Orlando area in the last two years has experienced significant unpredictable increases in population, which added to the foreseeability problems of Florida Hospital. T2. 18-20. Over the several years preceding fiscal year 1984, Florida Hospital experienced a trend of increasing open heart surgical procedures. T1. 60. In 1984, Florida Hospital originally budgeted for a significant increase over 1983, to its maximum capacity using a 5 day week. Id. But the demand continued, and in 1984, Florida Hospital began doing open heart surgery on weekends. T1. 61. This decision, coupled with a decrease in length of stay per surgery, resulted in an increase in open heart surgeries greater than originally predicted in the 1984 budget. Id; T1. 110-111. Florida Hospital might have anticipated using weekends when it prepared its 1984 budget, but did not do so because weekend work is not a normal practice. T1. 112. In the fall of 1983, the national trend for open heart surgery was showing a decrease in such procedures. T1. 135-36. Additionally, Florida Hospital experienced a shift of less complicated surgeries, such as cataract surgeries, from inpatient to outpatient procedures, resulting in an overall increase in intensity of the remaining surgical procedures. T1. 62-63. The Hospital has no control over this choice, since it is made by physician and patient and is affected by reimbursement policies of insurance and governmental programs. Id. Florida Hospital monitors its budget on a monthly basis, but does not have specific criteria for evaluating the meaning of trends. T1. 86-87. A change of 5 percent would cause concern to Florida Hospital but other circumstances would be evaluated. T1. 87. In the first two months of the first quarter of FY 1984, Florida Hospital experienced a slight increase of admissions over budget estimates. T1. 85-88. In a letter to the HCCB dated March 23, 1984, Florida Hospital noted that the intensity of its case mix for Medicare patients had increased about 50 percent since 1979, and that the length of stay had dropped 0.2 days from 1983 to 1984. Intervenor's Exhibit I. At the time the letter was prepared, the Hospital had no way of knowing if the non-Medicare case mix was the same. T1. 109. The data further showed a trend away from psychiatric patient days, which produce less revenue per day, toward more intense forms of care, which produce more revenue per day. Id. The letter was sent to provide information requested by staff of the HCCB, and to explain changes to the budget as originally submitted. Id.; T1. 104. While March and April of 1984 showed some signs of a change from predictions in the budget, it was not until June, 1984, that Florida Hospital experienced a significant decline in patient days. T1. 97-98. Even then, it was determined that the June, 1984, experience was not a good trend indicator, but was an anomaly. Id. This was shown to be the case when June, 1984, was compared to June, 1985. Id. Moreover, these were only gross trends in patient days and admissions, and were not specific for case mix. T1. 99. In fact, Florida Hospital finished the fiscal year at about the gross revenue level it had predicted in its 1984 budget; the problem was an increase in intensity of case mix, with lower patient days generating higher revenue per adjusted admission. Id. In June, 1984, Florida Hospital received a Medicare settlement for two or three prior years. The settlement was $10 million, and the timing of the receipt of such settlements was not within the control of Florida Hospital. T1. 63, 93. Significant variances were first noticed by Florida Hospital in revenue per adjusted admission in July, 1984. T1. The variances were cumulative from April, 1984. T1. 100. The vice president for finance at Florida Hospital, Scott Miller, was first aware of the amendments to the Hospital Cost Containment law, chapter 84-35, Laws of Florida (1984), establishing a base year adjustment for fiscal year 1984 based upon actual experience in 1984, in June, 1984. T1. 100. Section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1984), requires comparison of the 1984 budget for net revenues per adjusted admission filed with the HCCB with the audited actual experience of each hospital for such revenues. The bulk of the work in preparation of the proposed amendment to its FY 1984 budget, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, was done in August, 1984, based upon data to June 30, 1984. T1. 92, 83. One of the reasons for submitting the amended budget was to diminish the base year adjustment described in finding of fact 30 above. T1. 100. Since the potential loss to Florida Hospital is over $10,000,000, it is likely that this was a major cause for the amendment. Additionally, the proposed amendment was submitted to more honestly reflect changes in the predicted budget. T1. 102. From a purely fiscal point of view, without consideration of regulatory consequences, there is an incentive to underestimate revenues and overestimate expenses. T2. 26-27. During the preparation of the proposed budget amendment, Florida Hospital did not consult the Florida Hospital Reporting System Manual, and did not talk with any employee of the HCCB for advice with respect to the proposed amendments. T1. 130. The proposed budget amendment submitted in October, 1984, dealt with the entire fiscal year 1984, and did not distinguish between portions of the year which already had been completed and the remainder of the fiscal year. T1. 131-132. As set forth in finding of fact 16, the basis of the proposed amendment was actual experience in fiscal year 1984, T1. 139-140, and contained revenues actually received that were substantially greater than originally predicated. With respect to future periods, the budget was a projection. Due to seasonal variances, unpredictable receipt of lump sum payments, and variations in changes in admissions for various types of cases, it is not practicable to prorate the budget of Florida Hospital, as proposed to be amended, in daily, monthly, or quarterly segments, T1. 133, and the proposed amended budget does not contain a method for such proration. A budget can be defined as a projection for a future time of expenditure and revenue, and it reflects anticipated goals. T1. 127, 131. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Florida Hospital has ever attempted to avoid a public hearing by underestimating revenue, and there is no evidence in the record to suggest that Florida Hospital's original FY 1984 budget contained intentional underestimations of revenue or intentional overestimations of reductions from gross revenue. As found in findings of fact 18 through 31, Florida Hospital's original FY 1984 budget was based upon the best information then available. It took six months to prepare, T. 127, and was reasonable at the time submitted. Florida Hospital submitted amendments to its budgets in FY 1982 and 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. In years prior to 1984, Florida Hospital had submitted amendments to budgets after the beginning of its fiscal year. T1. 134. Florida Hospital has claimed in previous years that it offers services not offered by other hospitals in its group. T2. 72-73. Through discussions with the staff of the HCCB, it was agreed between Florida Hospital and the staff of the HCCB that Florida Hospital could delete from its FY 1984 budget revenues and expenses associated with kidney transplant, employee housing, pathologist laboratory fees, sales of gasoline to employees, and a laundry. T2. 73-74. See Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 2 and 3. The effect of deletion of these items from the FY 1984 budget was to delete a predicted $3,231,000 in revenue. Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 1. When Florida Hospital filed its audited actual experience for 1984, the HCCB had a new staff analyst assigned to review the budget of Florida Hospital, and the new analyst concluded that the items described in finding of fact 40 should be included in the actual report initially, Petitioner's Exhibit 10, attachment 4, but that these items would be "pulled back out" for purposes of analysis later. T2. 75. However, Respondent's Exhibit 1 did not implement this agreement. Instead, the items described above were deleted from the FY 1984 budget but were included in the FY 1984 actual experience figures on this exhibit. Id. The total amount of revenue actually received for these items in FY 1984, which should be deleted from the FY 1984 actual experience of Florida Hospital pursuant to the understanding with staff of the HCCB, is $4,074,415. If this amount is not deleted, Florida Hospital's base year adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. is larger by nearly $3 million. T2. 76. Respondent's Exhibit 1 computes the FY 1984 net revenue per adjusted admission for Florida Hospital for the following: FY 1984 original budget; FY 1984 budget as proposed to be amended; FY 1984 budget if the proposed amendment is allowed for only the last 77 days of the fiscal year; and the 1984 actual experience. T2. 51-53. As discussed in finding of fact 41, the figure for 1984 actual experience does not delete the items discussed in that finding. Respondent's Exhibit 2 computes the adjustment to base year if the proposed amendment is not accepted, and if the items described above in findings of fact 40 and 41 are not deleted from actual experience. T2. 56-58. The amount of this adjustment would be $13,771,310 which is $344.52 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Respondent's Exhibit 2. Respondent's Exhibit 3 computes the adjustment to base year if the proposed amendment is accepted for the 77 days remaining in the fiscal year, and if the items described above in findings of fact 40 and 41 are not deleted from actual experience. T2. 59-60. The amount of this adjustment would be $10,476,400, which is $262.09 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Respondent's Exhibit 3. If the proposed amendment is not accepted, but the items described in findings of fact 40 and 41 are deleted from actual experience, the adjustment to base year would be $10,871,303, which is $271.97 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit 9. If the proposed amendment is accepted for the 77 days remaining in the fiscal year, and if the items described in findings of fact 40 and 41 are deleted from actual experience, the adjustment to base year would be $7,760,747, which is $190.15 per adjusted admission for FY 1986. Petitioner's Exhibit 9. If the proposed amendment is accepted by the HCCB to be effective for the entire FY 1984, the budgeted net revenue per adjusted admission for Florida Hospital is $4,008.70. Respondent's Exhibit 1. Assuming that the deductions from actual experience in 1984 are not made (see findings of fact 40 and 41), the net revenue per adjusted admission actually experienced by Florida Hospital in 1984 was $4,346.66. Id. Since the difference between these two figures is less than 10 percent above the budgeted amount, $4,008.70, the base year of Florida Hospital would not be adjusted pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat., if the proposed amendment were accepted for the entire fiscal year. This result would occur even though the deductions from revenue described above are not made.
Recommendation It is therefore recommended that the Hospital Cost Containment Board enter its Final Order approving the proposed amendment to the FY 1984 budget of Florida Hospital only for the last 77 days, and, as a result, calculating the adjustment pursuant to section 395.509(11), Fla. Stat. (1985), in the following amounts: subtraction of a total of $7,760,747 net revenues from FY 1986 budget, which is subtraction of $190.15 net revenues per adjusted admission for the FY 1986 budget. DONE and ENTERED this 7th day of February, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of February, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 85-0747H Rulings upon Proposed Findings of Fact. Pursuant to section 120.59(2), Fla. Stat., the following are specific rulings upon all proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties. The numbers herein correspond to the numbers of each proposed finding by party. Findings of fact in this recommended order are indicated by the abbreviation "FF". Findings of Fact Proposed by the PETITIONER, Florida Hospital. Adopted, FF 1. Adopted, FF 2. law. law. Adopted, FF 3. Adopted, FF 4. Adopted, FF 6. Adopted, FF 7. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 9. Rejected because the proposed finding is a question of Rejected because the proposed finding is a question of Adopted, FF 10. Adopted, FF 11. Adopted, FF 12. Rejected because of insufficiency of evidence that this categorical, all inclusive finding of fact can be mode. There is a marked distinction between amendments submitted by Hospitals before acceptance of the budget by the HCCB, and amendments submitted after the budget has been accepted by the HCCB. See FF 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. Further, of the ninety-nine instances of amendment, the Petitioner presented only one occasion when an amendment was accepted after the budget had been approved by the HCCB and was accepted for the entire fiscal year, some of which had already been executed. See FF 14. Through 19. Adopted, FF 13. 20. Through 28. Adopted, FF 14. Adopted, FF 8 and 14. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted to the extent found in FF 11 end 12, and the remainder rejected for lack of evidence. Adopted, FF 8. Rejected because irrelevant since the basis for the 90 day incipient policy is not at issue because the policy is not at issue. Adopted, FF 7 and 8. Adopted, FF 8. Adopted, FF 15. Adopted, FF 8. True, but irrelevant and therefore rejected. Rejected because not supported by the evidence. As found in FF 17 through 31, Florida Hospital was aware of the amended law, effective May 18, 1984, that subjected hospitals to a potential base year adjustment resulting from FY 1984 budget data, but as also found in those findings, Florida Hospital could not prepare its proposed amendment any sooner due to lack of data. The delay in filing the amendment, on this record, occurred due to lack of data, not lack of notice concerning the 90 day policy. Adopted, FF 39. Adopted in part, FF 39. However, the purpose of prior year amendments cannot be a portion of this finding of fact because there is insufficient evidence. Without evidence as to the nature of such prior year amendments, and given the reverse incentive in those years to understate revenues to avoid public hearing, it cannot be concluded that the motives for such amendments were to "present a fair document to the HCCB." Adopted, FF 8. and 48. Adopted, FF 16. and 49. through 51. Adopted, FF 17. 52. and 53. Adopted, FF 18. 54. and 55. Adopted, FF 19. 56. and 57. Adopted, FF 20. 58. and 59. Adopted, FF 21. 60. and 61. Adopted, FF 22. Adopted, FF 21. Rejected. It is unclear from the evidence whether volume of patient days and admissions "magnifies" the impact of changes in market conditions. It could be statistically true that a greater volume produces more reliable predictions due to a larger base pool of data, which averages out small anomalies in data. Adopted, FF 19. through 69. Adopted, FF 23. 70. and 71. Adopted, FF 24. Adopted, FF 38. Adopted, FF 29. Adopted, FF 31. Adopted, FF 28. and 77. Adopted to the extent modified in FF 38. To the extent not adopted in the modified language, it is rejected for lack of evidence. Adopted, FF 33. Since there were no other definitions given in the record, adoption of this finding as proposed would be misleading. T1. 127-128. Thus, it is rejected as phrased. Adopted, FF 37, except this is the same definition, not "another" definition. Rejected as phrased. There is not evidence in the record that the budget which is the subject of testimony at T1. 129 was prepared or used in any manner with respect to past time in the budget year. Adopted in the introduction, but not, strictly speaking, a finding of fact. Adopted, FF 42. and 86. Adopted, FF 43. and 87. Adopted, FF 44. 88. and 89. Adopted, FF 14. Adopted to the extent relevant in the introduction. Adopted, FF 40. Rejected as unnecessary and cumulative to FF 40. Adopted, FF 40. through 96. Adopted, FF 41. Adopted, FF 45. Adopted, FF 46. Findings of Fact Proposed by the RESPONDENT, HCCB. The first sentence is adopted, FF 9. The next two sentences are rejected as issues of law, not fact. The next sentence is adopted, FF 7 and 9. The last sentence, also a matter of law, is rejected because not fact. Adopted only to the extent in FF 8, and remainder is rejected as unnecessary and irrelevant since the policy is not used by the HCCB to deny amendment in this ease. Adopted, FF 5 and 7. Adopted, FF 8, except the last sentence, which is not relevant as discussed above. The first two sentences are adopted as modified in FF The next sentence is adopted in FF 16. The next sentence is adopted as modified in FF 26. The last sentence is adopted as modified in FF 27 and 29. The first sentence is adopted in FF 16, the second sentence is adopted in FF 19, the last two sentences are adopted in FF 23. The first sentence is adopted in FF 3. The last sentence is true, T2. 51, but not relevant. Adopted, FF 32 and 34. Adopted, FF 35. Adopted, FF 40. The first sentence is rejected for the reasons stated in FF 40 and 41. The second sentence is rejected as an issue of law, and also rejected because irrelevant: there does not appear to be any statute allowing or prohibiting the HCCB to "disregard" any portion of a budget. But as found in FF 10, there is apparently some discretion afforded the HCCB, discretion that is exercised frequently. Adopted, FF 14 and 8. Findings of Fact Proposed by the INTERVENOR, The Public Counsel. Adopted, FF 1. Adopted, FF 9. Adopted, FF 2. Adopted, FF 2, 3, and 4. Adopted as modified in FF 16. and 7. Adopted as modified in FF 16, but there is not enough evidence to show a "trend." Adopted, FF 3 and 4. Adopted, FF 7. Adopted, FF 16. Adopted, FF 31. Adopted, FF 19. Adopted, as modified in FF 27 and 29. Adopted, FF 30. Adopted, FF 30. Adopted, FF 32. The record contains no evidence that the subject matter of the proposed amendment is incorrect, or false, and thus the motive for such amendment is largely irrelevant. For this reason, this finding is rejected. Adopted, FF 34. Rejected because the record citation does not support the proposed finding. Rejected because misleading. The proposed amendment does not relate to a specific future time, but in fact relates to the remaining days of the fiscal year, since that was all that was left of the budget year when the amendment was filed. Adopted, FF 35. Adopted as modified, FF 35. Adopted as modified, FF 36. Adopted as modified, FF 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35. Adopted, FF 36. Adopted, FF 26 and 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35 and 36. Adopted as modified, FF 35 and 36. Adopted, FF 19 and 20, except the last sentence, which is cumulative and unnecessary. Rejected because irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and cumulative to FF 20. Adopted, FF 20. Rejected as irrelevant and cumulative to FF 20. Adopted, FF 19. Rejected as irrelevant. See FF 18 and 20. The record supports only one conclusion regarding the prospective payment system: no one knew what massive changes would occur in the market place prior to actual implementation of that system for a number of months. Awareness that PPS was on the way, without knowing what it would do, is irrelevant. Adopted as modified, FF 30. Rejected as irrelevant. See FF 15 through 31, which conclude that the Petitioner acted in a timely manner to prepare and submit its proposed amendment. Adopted, FF 37. Adopted, FF 38. Adopted, FF 10. Adopted, FF 3 and 10. Adopted, FF 12. Adopted as modified, FF 12. Adopted as modified, FF 12. Further, the point is irrelevant. Rejected because the proposed finding is an issue of law. Rejected because inextricably mixed with the issue of law contained in proposed finding 46. Rejected because inextricably mixed with the issue of law contained in proposed finding 46. COPIES FURNISHED: Curtis Ashley Billingsly, Esquire Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Building L, Suite 101 Tallahassee, Florida 32303 David Watkins, Esquire Oertel & Hoffman, P.A. 2700 Blairstone Road, Suite C Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Shreve, Public Counsel Office of Public Counsel 202 Blount Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 T. L. Trimble, Esquire 2400 Bedford Road Orlando, Florida 32803 James Bracher, Executive Director Hospital Cost Containment Board 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue The issues are (1) whether certain medical expenses incurred by petitioners' daughter should be covered under the state group health insurance program, and (2) whether the state is estopped from denying the claim based upon erroneous misrepresentations made by its agent.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Etta Aldridge, is a full-time employee of Sunland Training Center in Marianna, Florida and is a participant in the state group health insurance program (the plan). James Aldridge, her husband and also a petitioner in this cause, and Jerrilyn Aldridge, her daughter, are covered by the plan. On November 3, 1987, Jerrilyn, then around seventeen years of age, was severely injured in an automobile accident near her home in Greenwood, Florida. Among other things, she suffered a skull fracture, abrasions, crushed pelvis and hip, and punctured lungs and stomach. She was initially taken to a Marianna hospital for emergency treatment and then transferred to a Tallahassee hospital for longer-term care. While at the Tallahassee hospital, Jerrilyn was diagnosed by her neurologist as having a closed, diffuse brain injury and brain stem contusions. After Jerrilyn was treated in Tallahassee for two and one-half months, which included one month in the hospital and forty-five days at the hospital's extended care facility, her parents were advised that, due to her poor prognosis, they had a choice of putting her in a nursing facility or taking her to their home. Although Jerrilyn was still in a coma, petitioners decided to take her home and care for her in a bedroom which had been converted into a hospital room setting. After six or seven weeks at home, and contrary to earlier medical expectations, Jerrilyn opened her eyes, made noises and manifested some slight arm movement. Based upon these encouraging signs, petitioners sought further medical advice and were told that, given the foregoing signs of improvement, treatment in a facility that specialized in brain injury rehabilitation would improve their daughter's condition. Petitioners contacted the National Head Injury Foundation and were given a list of health care facilities in the state that provided rehabilitative services for brain injured patients. This list included Manatee Springs Nursing Center, Inc. d/b/a Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton (MRB), a facility licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility but which specialized in rehabilitating brain injured patients. MRB is the largest brain injury rehabilitation facility in the southeastern united States. Since the Aldridges did not have the financial resources to pay for any additional treatment for Jerrilyn, it was essential that they selected a facility that would be covered by the plan. After James Aldridge spoke with and received information from most of the facilities on the list, and conferred with Jerrilyn's neurologist, he eventually narrowed his choice to several facilities, including MRB, which impressed him because of its good reputation and specialty in head injury rehabilitation. To confirm whether coverage would be provided for further treatment, James Aldridge telephoned the customer service unit of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. (BCBS), the plan's administrator. He also contacted MRB and authorized it to make an inquiry with BCBS on his behalf. On March 28, 1989 Aldridge received favorable advice from a BCBS service representative concerning coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn at MRB. This advice was independently confirmed by MBR on the same date, and Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient at the facility effective March 31, 1988. Some three months later, and after some of the bills had been paid, BCBS advised MBR and petitioners that a "computer" error had been made and that the requested benefits applied only when rendered in a licensed hospital and not a skilled nursing facility. BCBS accordingly declined to pay the bills. That prompted petitioners to initiate this proceeding. The bills in question total over $225,000. The Insurance Plan The State has elected to provide a self-insured group health insurance program for its employees and their dependents. The legislature has designated respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Employees' Insurance (Division), as the responsible agency for the administration of the plan. To this end, the Division has entered into an agreement with BCBS to administer the plan. Among other things, BCBS provides verification of coverage and benefits, claims payment services, actuarial and printing services, and medical underwriting of late enrollee applications. Including dependents and retirees, there are almost 300,000 persons who are covered by the plan. Upon enrolling in the plan, all employees, including Etta Aldridge, were routinely given an insurance card with BCBS's telephone number and a brochure entitled "State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan Brochure" (brochure) containing a general description of the plan. The brochure warns the insured that the brochure is not a contract since it does not include all the provisions, definitions, benefits exclusions and limitations of the plan. It also contains advice that if the brochure does not answer an employee's question, he should telephone the Division's customer service section in Tallahassee. In actual practice, however, if an employee contacts the Division number, he is told to telephone BCBS's customer service unit in Jacksonville regarding any questions as to coverage and benefits, claims or other problems concerning the plan. The Division generally becomes involved only when an employee is unable to resolve a claims problem with BCBS. BCBS has established a service unit that deals exclusively with inquiries regarding coverage and benefits under the state group health plan. There are approximately twenty- eight service representatives in that unit. Each representative receives four weeks of training before being certified as a customer service representative. After being certified, a representative's primary responsibility is to respond to inquiries from state employees, health providers and physicians regarding verification of benefits and coverage under the state group policy. It should be noted that a distinction exists between verification of benefits and coverage. To verify coverage means to verify that a person has an active policy at the time services are rendered. To verify benefits means to confirm that a specific service is covered under the policy. In this case, there was an inquiry by the insured and provider regarding both benefits and coverage. In the event a representative is unsure as to the licensing status of a facility or provider, the representative has access to BCBS's master registry department which maintains the provider number and licensure status of every facility in the state. That registry identified MRB as a skilled nursing home. BCBS representatives have the authority to make decisions regarding benefits and coverage. It is only when an inquiry falls within a "grey area" that the final decision is referred from the unit to either the Legal or Medical Division of BCBS. The Division, with the assistance of BCBS, has prepared a seventy-five page benefit document (document) which governs all claims arising under the plan. However, the document is for BCBS in-house use only and is not given to state employees or providers. The document first became effective on May 1, 1978 and has been subsequently amended from time to time. When Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB, the document effective October 1, 1987 was controlling. The document was further amended effective July 1, 1988, which was three months after her admission to MRB. As is pertinent here, the July 1, 1988 amendments increased the deductibles and narrowed the definition of a "hospital". According to the state benefits administrator, the document is "the final word" on any dispute regarding coverage or claims. The BCBS service unit uses this document to verify coverage and benefits. Included in the document are numerous definitions that are used to resolve disputed claims. Relevant to this controversy is the definition of a hospital at the time Jerrilyn was admitted to MRB: "Hospital" means a licensed institution engaged in providing medical care and treatment to a patient as a result of illness or accident on an inpatient/outpatient basis at the patient's expense and which fully meets all the tests set forth in 1., 2., and below: It is a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, or the American Osteopathic Association or the Commission on the Accreditation of Rehabilitative Facilities; It maintains diagnostic and therapeutic facilities for surgical or medical diagnosis and treatment of patients under the supervision of a staff of fully licensed physicians; It continuously provides twenty-four (24) hour a day nursing service by or under the supervision of registered graduate nurses. It is undisputed that, while MRB may have provided many services comparable to those rendered by a licensed hospital and is considered to be an atypical nursing home, MRB is still licensed by the state as a skilled nursing facility. Thus, MRB cannot qualify as a hospital under the benefit document. Payment for services in a skilled nursing facility, such as MRB, are much more limited and restrictive than for a hospital. To qualify for payment of benefits in a skilled nursing facility, the insured must have been hospital confined for at least three consecutive days prior to the day of hospital discharge before being transferred, upon a physician's advice, to a skilled nursing facility. Once admitted to such a facility, the insured's room and board reimbursement is limited to a maximum of $76 per day. Further, payment of services and facilities is limited to sixty days of confinement per calendar year. In contrast, benefits for hospital care include, for example, unlimited days of coverage per calendar year and much higher reimbursement rates for room, board and other services. In this case, besides having been admitted to MRB directly from her home, and not a hospital, Jerrilyn had already used up forty- five of the sixty days of annual benefits at the extended care unit of a Tallahassee hospital. BCBS also has a fee schedule that is used in paying all covered claims. However, the schedule was not introduced into evidence. Estoppel Before he made a final decision as to where to send his daughter, James Aldridge spoke by telephone with several BCBS representatives, including Michelle Sahdala and Rhonda Hall, the unit supervisor and considered its most experienced representative. 1/ Aldridge made these telephone calls because he wanted to positively confirm which facilities would be covered by the plan. During one conversation, Sahdala advised Aldridge that the proposed treatment would not be covered in several facilities named by the National Head Injury Foundation, including New Medico Rehabilitation Center of Florida in Wauchula, Florida and Capital Rehabilitation Hospital in Tallahassee. Aldridge advised BCBS that he might want to place his daughter in MRB, but only if such treatment was covered under his wife's insurance plan. He heard nothing further from BCBS until a week later. Aldridge contacted MRB on March 21, 1988 and advised an MRB representative that he wished to place his daughter in the facility if his wife's insurance covered the treatment at MRB. He also gave MRB the BCBS unit supervisor's name (Rhonda Hall) and telephone number. To verify coverage and benefits, MRB's admission coordinator, Patricia Dear, telephoned Hall on March 22, 1988. Such an inquiry is routinely made by the provider on behalf of the insured and before the patient is admitted to the facility. This is to ascertain if the prospective patient is insured, and if so, to verify the amount of benefits. Dear identified herself and advised Hall that she was requesting benefits information on Jerrilyn Aldridge, an insured. She told Hall that MRB was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the nature of services that would be provided to Jerrilyn and her need to determine whether such services would be covered under the plan before Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient. When asked if she would need further information in hand concerning MRB before determining the amount of benefits, Hall responded affirmatively. Accordingly, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail a letter and brochure describing the facility's services. They were received by BCBS the next morning, or March 23. The letter included information concerning MRB, the fact that it was a skilled nursing facility and not a hospital, the type of services that MRB provided, a summary of the expected charges for treating Jerrilyn (from $600 to $850 per day), the average length of stay of a patient (3 to 9 months), and an offer to answer any additional questions that BCBS might have. When Dear heard nothing further from Hall within the next few days, she made a follow-up telephone call to Hall on March 28 to see if Hall had any questions and to verify benefits coverage. Hall acknowledged receiving the letter of March 22 with attachment. After Dear discussed each of the disciplines and types of services to be provided and their expected cost, including physician services, physical therapy, neuropsychology, central supply, pharmacy, laboratory services and a room and board charge of $351 per day, Hall advised Dear that the only policy exclusions on coverage would be occupational and speech/language therapy. She added that all charges would be subject to medical necessity, and ambulance costs to transport Jerrilyn to the facility would be covered. The two also discussed the fact that there were no time limitations under the policy and that almost $475,000 in lifetime coverage still remained. Hall represented that after the Aldridges satisfied their $1500 deductible on which BCBS paid only 80% of the bills, BCBS would thereafter pay 100% of all medically necessary charges. In making that representation, Hall did not disclose the fact that BCBS has a fee schedule and that all payments were subject to the limitations specified in that schedule. After verifying that Hall had cited all policy limitations, and consistent with her longtime experience in verifying benefits with other insurance carriers, Dear properly assumed that if the policy contained a provision which limited payment to something less than 100% of covered services, Hall would have said so. Dear asked Hall if there was any reason not to admit Jerrilyn and Hall replied "no." Dear also asked Hall if she (Hall) was in a position to verify benefits and Hall represented that she was. Dear then told Hall that Jerrilyn would be presented to the admissions committee the next day and, if clinically appropriate, she would be admitted. Dear ended the conversation by advising Hall that a letter confirming their understanding would be sent after Jerrilyn was admitted. After speaking with Hall, Dear had a clear understanding that coverage and benefits had been approved and, except for occupational and speech/language therapy, BCBS would pay 80% of all medically necessary charges until the Aldridge's $1,500 deductible was met, and then to pay 100% of all remaining medically necessary charges. 2/ After receiving the favorable advice, Dear telephoned Aldridge the same day and told him the results of her conversation with Hall. Within a few moments after speaking with Dear, Aldridge received a telephone call from an unidentified female BCBS representative who informed him that BCBS would pay for his daughter's treatment at MRB. Jerrilyn was accepted as a patient by MRB's admissions committee on March 28, 1988. Both the provider and the insured relied upon Hall's representations in admitting Jerrilyn to the facility. Had Jerrilyn not been covered by the plan, the committee would not have approved her admission. Also, if the Aldridges had known that the treatment at MRB was not covered, they would have sent their daughter to another facility covered by the plan. On April 4, 1988, and pursuant to her last telephone conversation with Hall, Dear sent Hall by overnight mail the following letter: This is to confirm the admission of Jerrilyn Aldridge on March 31, 1988, to the specialized head trauma rehabilitation program at Mediplex Rehab-Bradenton, Florida. The following benefits information has been verified by you and Patricia Dear, R. N., Admissions Coordinator on March 28, 1988. Effective date: 10/1/79 Benefits: After $1,500 - out of pocket/yr- 100% coverage Days available: Unlimited days Monies available: $474,533.79 Exclusions: Occupational Therapy, Speech- Language Therapy Limitations: Treatment subject to "Medical Necessity" If I do not hear from you, I will consider you to be in agreement with the above information. Please place this in the client's file. Thank you for your prompt attention to this matter. (Emphasis supplied) Although BCBS's records reflect that Dear's letter was received, Hall did not advise Dear that there were any problems concerning Jerrilyn's coverage and benefits under the plan or that Dear's understanding of the benefits to be paid was inaccurate or in error. Of some note is the fact that Hall is considered one of the most knowledgeable BCBS representatives on state health plan benefits and recognizes that her statements concerning benefits are relied upon by providers. Even though Hall was specifically advised both orally and in writing that MRB was licensed as a nursing home, and she had access to BCBS's master registry to confirm MRB's licensure status, she failed to discern that a nursing home was not a covered facility for the requested services within the meaning of the plan. Indeed, she later acknowledged by deposition that she knew that "the state does not pay for nursing homes" and that she had made a mistake by failing to properly "investigate" the matter more thoroughly. By failing to convey accurate advice to James Aldridge and MRB and to note that the proposed treatment would not be covered if rendered by a nursing home, Hall failed to use reasonable care and competence in responding to the inquiry. Three months after Jerrilyn's admission, James Aldridge received notice that BCBS had changed its position and now asserted it was not going to pay for Jerrilyn's rehabilitation and treatment at MRB. Proposed agency action confirming this decision was later issued by the Division on October 21, 1988. Miscellaneous All medical services received by Jerrilyn were medically necessary within the meaning of the benefit document. The necessity of Jerrilyn's placement in a rehabilitation facility was established by Dr. James D. Geissinger, her Tallahassee neurologist, who based it upon Jerrilyn's improvement after leaving the Tallahassee hospital and made her a candidate for brain rehabilitation. Doctor Geissinger also noted that, as a result of receiving treatment at MRB, Jerrilyn had made "remarkable" improvement and was able to partially regain her language function, use her left arm and hand, and improve her "activities of daily living." There are expectations that she will be able to walk again within a year. Further, based upon the testimony of an MRB staff physician, the services and treatment received by Jerrilyn at MRB were medically necessary to facilitate her neurologic and functional recovery. Given the nature of her injury and MRB's nursing staffing ratios, the required intensive medical rehabilitation and monitoring of Jerrilyn's medical and neurological condition was comparable to care in a hospital intensive care unit. These matters were not contradicted. On April 1, 1988, the Aldridges executed a standard financial agreement with MRB whereby they agreed to indemnify MRB for all charges which were not paid by BCBS. As is normally done, they also authorized MRB to directly bill BCBS for all charges incurred by Jerrilyn while being treated at the facility. Finally, the Aldridges authorized MRB to make inquiries on their behalf with BCBS to verify insurance coverage and benefits for Jerrilyn. MRB submitted to BCBS all bills for services and treatment given to Jerrilyn during her five or six month stay at the facility. A summary of the dates of service, charges, payments made by BCBS and balance due is contained in petitioners' exhibit 17. In all, there are thirty-eight outstanding bills totaling $227,139.27. The parties have stipulated that the bills in exhibit 17 represent services that were actually performed and supplies that were actually received by the patient. As noted in finding of fact 21, all such supplies and services were medically necessary. For the reasons given in the conclusions of law portion of this recommended order, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies, and petitioners are entitled to be reimbursed for all unpaid bills filed with BCBS in accordance with the representations of agent Hall. These include room and board charges (at the intensive care room rate), physician services, neuropsychology, physical therapy, central supply, pharmacy and laboratory charges as more fully described in petitioners' exhibit 17. Such reimbursement should be not be subject to the limitations prescribed in the fee schedule.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the amended petition of Etta and James Aldridge be GRANTED, and the Division order Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. to reimburse petitioners $227,139.27 as reflected in petitioners' exhibit 17. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 7th day of August 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August, 1989.
Conclusions Having reviewed the four Notices of Intent to Deny Application issued May 13-18, 2010, attached hereto and incorporated herein (Ex. 1, 2, 3, and 4), and all other matters of record, the Agency for Health Care Administration (“Agency”) has entered into a Settlement Agreement (Ex. 5) with the other party to these proceedings, and being otherwise well-advised in the premises, finds and concludes as follows: ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Petitioner shall remit to the Agency, within thirty (30) days of the entry of a Final Order adopting this agreement, an administrative fee in the sum of thirty thousand dollars ($30,000.00) to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. 3. Checks should be made payable to the “Agency for Health Care Administration.” The check, along with a reference to this case number, should be sent directly to: Filed January 10, 2012 1:47 PM Division of Administrative Hearings Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 4. Unpaid amounts pursuant to this Order will be subject to statutory interest and may be collected by all methods legally available. 5. Any requests for an administrative hearing are withdrawn. The parties shall bear their own costs and attorney’s fees. This matter is closed. DONE and ORDERED this [0 day of ~ Bettie: ; 20/2, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. — Ds we { izabeth Dudek, retary fey ir wacked 0. th€are Administration A PARTY WHO JS ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THIS FINAL ORDER IS ENTITLED TO JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED BY FILING ONE COPY OF A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITH THE AGENCY CLERK OF AHCA, AND A SECOND COPY, ALONG WITH FILING FEE AS PRESCRIBED BY LAW, WITH THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL IN THE APPELLATE DISTRICT WHERE THE AGENCY MAINTAINS ITS HEADQUARTERS OR WHERE A PARTY RESIDES. REVIEW OF PROCEEDINGS SHALL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FLORIDA APPELLATE RULES. THE NOTICE OF APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF RENDITION OF THE ORDER TO BE REVIEWED. Copies furnished to: Lance P. Cohen, Esquire Warren J. Bird, Asst. General Counsel Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Office of the General Counsel 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite # 102 Agency for Health Care Administration Jacksonville, Florida 32310 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 (U. S. Mail) Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Jan Mills Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3, MS #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Roger Bell Health Care Clinic Unit Manager Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, MS #53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Agency for Health Care Administration Office of Finance and Accounting Revenue Management Unit 2727 Mahan Drive, MS# 14 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (Interoffice Mail) Suzanne F. Hood Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (U.S. Mail) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of this Final Order was served on the oa above-named person(s) and entities by U.S. Mail, or the method designated, on this the 10 day of aaa » 2012" Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Building #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 (850) 412-3630 Certified Article Number , ?bbO 390) Y5778 8971 SEMDERS RECORD i", Certified Article Number (?160 3901 9846 7935 1337 SENDERS RECORD One Nofice $1149/1° CHARLIE CRIST FIORDAAGENCY FOR HEATH CARE ADMINS TRATION Better Health Care for ail Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8428 1680 Dunn Ave Case #: 2010004935 Ste 39 Jacksonville, FL 32218 F INTENT TO DENY APP TION It Is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 1680 DUNN AVE, STE 39, JACKSONVILLE, FL, 32218, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further Information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 15, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: A copy of the closing documents, stock or similar certificates signed and dated by both the buyer and seller is required, In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGH Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 ; Legal Intake Unit, Mall Stop 3. EXHIBIT 14 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 " Certified Article Number , 7260 3901 9648 57748 8995 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 12, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File Number: 8430 9826 San Jose Blvd Case #: 2010004881 Jacksonville, FL 32257 .. : NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 9826 San Jose Bivd, Jacksonville, FL, 32257, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated March 27, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 8, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Subpart 1.B, Name-of.Applicant: The name of the applicant must be the corporation or legal entity as it is registered with. the Division of Corporations, it must also match-the FEIN indicated in section 1.C. This subpart was submitted as a response to the omissions, but the. applicant's name indicated does not match the FEIN# listed in section 1.C. of the application. : As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhead, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. : In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). TION OF HT! Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing, In order to obtain a formal proceeding before -the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120,57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing-must conform to the - requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ; : : Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida,com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 EXHIBIT 2 Physicians Medical Centers -. . Inc Page 2 : May 12, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 Te thictee-Va thet [9 Number fd60 3901 9848 7495 a2, SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION CHARLIE CRIST THOMAS W. ARNOLD GOVERNOR Better Health Care for all Floridians SECRETARY May 13, 2010 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc File #8427 5960 Beach Blvd : Case #2010004956 Ste3 ; Jacksonville, FL 32207 NOTICE OF INTENT TQ DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 5960 Beach Bivd., Ste 3, Jacksonville, FL, 32207, be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes. You were notified by correspondence dated April 7, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty- one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency's correspondence. Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on Apri! 9, 2010. The outstanding issues remaining are: As this facility did a change of ownership, provide a copy of the closing documents signed and dated by both the buyer (new owner) and seller (previous owner). Acceptable documentation may include any one of the following: Copy of final sale/transfer documents showing date of final transfer and signatures of buyer(s) and seller(s), or a signed, written statement from an attorney, on letterhéad, that confirms sale/transfer completion and provides the date of final action. ; In addition, the Agency received information that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120.569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S., your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. EXHIBIT 3 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Page 2 May 13, 2010 SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS. Health Cae Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 RTE ecm 3901 94a 7935 yy74 SENDERS RECORD FLORIDA AGENCY TOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION oe ERNGS Better Health Care for all Floridians THOMAS W. ARNOLD May 18, 2010 CERTIFIED MAIL / RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED File Number: 8429 Physicians Medical Centers - Jax, Inc 2020 Kingsley Ave Case #: 2010005135 Suite A Orange Park, FL 32073 NOTICE OF INTENT TO DENY APPLICATION It is the decision of this Agency that the application for certificate of exemption from health care clinic licensure for Physicians Medical Centers - Jax Inc, located at 2020 Kingsley Avenue, Suite A, Orange Park, Florida, 32073 be DENIED. The specific basis for this determination is based on the fact that: Requested information was not complete or timely received by the Agency pursuant to Section 408.806(3)(b), Florida Statutes, You were notified by correspondence dated April 9, 2010 to provide further information addressing identified apparent errors or omissions within twenty-one days (21) from the receipt of the Agency’s correspondence, Our records indicate you received this correspondence by certified mail on April 12, 2010, The outstanding issues remaining are: Evidence of Ownership — Information received by the Agency states that Victoria Critzer is the owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax Inc. Provide the following documentation as evidence of ownership: * A copy of the final closing documents such as a bill of sale or stock purchase agreement. signed and dated by both the buyer and seller including the effective date sale or transfer. The closing documents should contain the signature of Gordon Garver DC, previous owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc and Joseph Thomas MD, new owner of Physicians Medical Center-Jax Inc. ¢ A copy of the cancelled and reissued stock certificates transferring shared to Joseph Thomas MD. ¢ Acopy of the lease agreement that includes the name(s) of the owner(s). e Acopy of the business tax receipt that includes the name of the corporation and owner. In addition, the Agency received information indicating that the facility does not meet exemption requirements as it is not wholly owned by a Florida licensed health care practitioner, pursuant to Section 400.9905(4)(g). EXHIBIT 2727 Mahan Drive,MS-53 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Visit AHCA online at http://ahca.myflorida.com . Physicians Medical Centers - Ja... .nc Page 2 May 18, 2010 EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS Pursuant to Section 120,569, F.S., you have the right to request an administrative hearing. In order to obtain a formal proceeding before the Division of Administrative Hearings under Section 120.57(1), F.S. your request for an administrative hearing must conform to the requirements in Section 28-106.201, Florida Administrative Code (F.A.C), and must state the material facts you dispute. ey SEE ATTACHED ELECTION AND EXPLANATION OF RIGHTS FORMS, For questions regarding this notice, please contact Ruby Schmigel, Health Services & Facilities Consultant with the Health Care Clinic Unit at (850) 412-4413. oger Bgl, Mandger Health Care Clinic Unit ce: Agency Clerk, Mail Stop 3 Legal Intake Unit, Mail Stop 3 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS PHYSICIANS MEDICAL CENTERS-JAX, INC., Petitioner, DOAH Case Nos. 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 vs. AHCA CASE Nos.: 2010004881, 2010004956 AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 2010004935 and 2010005135, ADMINISTRATION, Respondent. / SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT Respondent, State of Florida, Agency for Health Care Administration (hereinafter the “Agency”), through its undersigned representatives, and Petitioner, Physicians Medical Centers- Jax, Inc. (hereinafter “Petitioner”), pursuant to Section 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, each individually, a “party,” collectively as “parties,” hereby enter into this Settlement Agreement (“Agreement”) and agree as follows: WHEREAS, the Petitioner applied for four certificates of exemption from licensure pursuant to Section 400.9935(6), Florida Statutes and Chapter 59A-33, Florida Administrative Code; and WHEREAS, Victoria Critzer has applied for four initial health care clinic licenses, expressly intending to purchase the interest of Dr. Joseph Thomas in Petitioner upon issuance by the Agency of those licenses; and WHEREAS, the Agency has jurisdiction of the license and exemption applications described in the foregoing paragraphs, by virtue of being the regulatory and licensing authority over the said licenses and exemptions; and EXHIBIT 5 WHEREAS, the Agency served the Petitioner with four Notices of Intent to Deny Application on or about May 13, 2010, notifying the Petitioner of the Agency’s intent to deny the certificates of exemption for the reasons stated thereon, in Agency cases numbered 2010004881, 2010004956, 2010004935 and 2010005135; and WHEREAS, Petitioner timely requested a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, and in response to said request the matters were forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH), and were designated as cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10-3204 and 10-3205 in that tribunal; and subsequently the parties agreed to, and did abate those cases in DOAH, for the purpose of discussing settlement; and WHEREAS, the Agency alleges, and Petitioner denies, that during the period of processing of the aforementioned applications, Petitioner operated one or more unlicensed health care clinics in violation of Florida law as to which no formal administrative, civil or criminal action has thus far been brought; and WHEREAS, the parties have agreed that a fair, efficient, and cost effective resolution of this dispute would avoid the expenditure of substantial sums to litigate the dispute; and WHEREAS, the parties stipulate to the adequacy of consideration exchanged; and WHEREAS, the parties have negotiated in good faith and agreed that the best interest of all the parties will be served by a settlement of these proceedings; and NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises and recitals herein, the parties intending to be legally bound, agree as follows: 1. All recitals are true and correct and are expressly incorporated herein. 2. Both parties agree that the “whereas” clauses incorporated herein are binding findings of the parties. 3. Joseph Thomas, M.D. hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by him, he is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center-Jax, Inc. 4, Victoria Critzer hereby acknowledges, affirms and certifies that, at the time this agreement is executed by her, she is the sole owner of the Florida corporation Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 5. Upon full execution of this Agreement, Petitioner agrees to waive any and all proceedings and appeals to which it may be entitled including, but not limited to, an informal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(2), a formal proceeding under Subsection 120.57(1), appeals under Section 120.68, Florida Statutes; and declaratory and all writs of relief in any court or quasi-court (DOAH) of competent jurisdiction; and further agrees to waive compliance with the form of the Final Order (findings of fact and conclusions of law) to which it may be entitled. Provided, however, that no Agreement herein, shall be deemed a waiver by either party of its right to judicial enforcement of this Agreement. 6. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the parties agree to the following: a. Petitioner's four (4) applications for exemption from licensure are hereby withdrawn, and Petitioner expressly waives its right to challenge or appeal, or both, in DOAH or elsewhere, the denial by the Agency of the exemptions. b. The Agency will resume processing the four initial licensure applications submitted by Victoria Critzer as intended future 100% owner of Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc., now pending, and if the applications are complete and the applicant qualified under applicable law, the Agency will issue the licenses upon full payment by Petitioner of an agreed upon sum, as set forth below, to resolve the Agency's claim of unlicensed activity against Physicians Medical Center, Inc. Ms. Critzer agrees to use reasonable diligence to timely remedy any omissions from the applications cited by the Agency, to make the facilities available as required by law for all inspections required in connection with the licensure of the facilities, and to otherwise comply with all requirements of the application process, and all statutes and administrative rules thereunto appertaining, including background screening as may be applicable. c. The Agency agrees to use all reasonable diligence to process the initial license applications, and to issue the initial licenses as expeditiously as reasonably possible, provided that Ms. Critzer timely complies with all reasonable requests for additional information to which the Agency is entitled as a component of the application and licensure process, and provided that Victoria Critzer, and the applications she presented, are qualified for the licenses under all applicable statutes and administrative rules. d. Victoria Critzer will maintain the health care clinic license #HCC6732 currently held by Physicians Medical Center Inc. (PMC), for purposes of billing health care services provided solely at the licensed location, 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, Jacksonville, Florida. Whereas, Ms. Critzer, through counsel, has advised the Agency of a change of address for the license from 9826 San Jose Boulevard, to 9826 San Jose Boulevard, Suite B, PMC will submit a change of address application to the Agency together with the appropriate fee, within 10 days of execution of this agreement, and prior to resumption by the Agency of processing of the subject licensure applications. The license will be maintained 7. under a different federal employer identification number from any other licenses issued to Victoria Critzer or any entity in which she has a controlling interest. A separate health care clinic license must be obtained for any other location at which any health care services will be provided and third-party reimbursement sought for on behalf of Physicians Medical Centers Inc. e. Physicians Medical Centers, Inc. agrees to pay the sum of thirty thousand and no/100s dollars ($30,000.00) to the Agency, to resolve the Agency's allegations of unlicensed activity, in the interest of expediently resolving these matters and in recognition of the expense and uncertainty of litigation. The sum will be paid in lump sum at the time that the initial licenses referenced in paragraph b., above, are issued, or within 30 days following rendition of a Final Order by the Agency that incorporates this Agreement, whichever occurs first. f. Nothing in this Agreement shall prohibit the Agency from denying Petitioner’s application for licensure based upon any statutory and/or regulatory provision, including, but not limited to, the failure of Petitioner to satisfactorily complete a survey reflecting compliance with all statutory and rule provisions as required by law. By executing this Agreement, the Petitioner neither admits nor denies the allegations raised in the Notices of Intent to Deny referenced herein. 8. Upon full execution of this Agreement, the Agency shall enter a Final Order adopting and incorporating this Agreement in its entirety, and closing the above-styled case(s). The cases resident in DOAH, referenced above as DOAH cases numbered 10-3202, 10-3203, 10- 3204 and 10-3205, are currently closed by Order entered in that tribunal on October 7, 2010. The parties hereby further agree that those cases shall remain closed permanently, and each party hereby waives its right to seek to have any of those cases re-opened. 9. Each party shall bear its own costs and attorney’s fees. 10. This Agreement shall become effective on the date upon which it is fully executed by all the parties. 11. The Petitioner for itself and for its related or resulting organizations, its successors or transferees, attorneys, heirs, and executors or administrators, does hereby discharge the Agency and its agents, representatives, and attorneys of all claims, demands, actions, causes of action, suits, damages, losses, and expenses, of any and every nature whatsoever, arising out of or in any way related to this matter and the Agency’s actions, including, but not limited to, any claims that were or may be asserted in any federal or state court or administrative forum, including any claims arising out of this Agreement, by or on behalf of the Petitioner or related or resulting organizations. 12. This Agreement is binding upon all parties herein and those identified as a party, or a beneficiary, of the provisions of this Agreement, and each signatory acknowledges same and the adequacy of consideration therefor. 13. In the event that Petitioner is or was a Medicaid provider, this settlement does not prevent the Agency from seeking Medicaid overpayments or from imposing any sanctions pursuant to Rule 59G-9.070, Florida Administrative Code. This Agreement does not prohibit the Agency from taking action regarding Petitioner’s Medicaid provider status, conditions, requirements or contract. 14. The undersigned have read and understand this Agreement and have authority to bind their respective principals to it. Both parties have been represented by counsel in the negotiation and execution of this Agreement. The Petitioner fully understands that counsel for the Agency represents solely the Agency and Agency counsel has not provided legal advice to or influenced the Petitioner in its decision to enter into this Agreement. 15. This Agreement contains the entire understandings and Agreements of the parties. 16. | This Agreement supersedes any prior oral or written Agreements between the parties. This Agreement may not be amended except in writing. Any attempted assignment of this Agreement shall be void. 17. Venue for any action brought to interpret, challenge or enforce the terms of this Agreement or the Final Order entered pursuant hereto shall lie solely in the Circuit Court in Leon County, Florida. 18. ‘Ifa court of competent jurisdiction finds any part of this Agreement to be void, voidable, or unenforceable, then the remainder of the contract shall remain in full force and effect. 19. All parties agree that a facsimile signature suffices fe 20. The following representatives and beneficiaries hereby ae duly S. to enter into this Agreement. Molly McKéns eputy Secretary {_ panes P. Céhen, Esquire Health Quality ance Cohen & Thurston, P.A. Agency for Health Care Administration 1723 Blanding Boulevard, Suite 102 2727 Mahan Drive, Bldg #3 Jacksonville, Florida 32310 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Counsel to Petitioner DATED: (frolir DATED: 1-1 U~ aye William R. Roberts Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: /7 [(3l 4 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop #3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 DATED: Uf (5) WH Physicians Medical Centers-Jax, Inc. 9826 San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 patep: _})-14~!/ ~~ x. 1 _f- Victoria Critzer as president, sole director and 100% Owner Physicians Medical Center, Inc. 9826-B San Jose Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32257 DATED: _|1- (4-//
The Issue Whether Rule 64B8-9.009(6)(b)1.a., Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority pursuant to Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated Facts Section 458.331(1)(v), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Board to adopt rules establishing the standards of practice and care for particular physician practice settings. The Board is the agency that adopted Rule 64B8-9.009, Florida Administrative Code, regarding standards of care for office surgery. Petitioner, Victor Ortiz, is a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA), and is licensed by the Board of Nursing pursuant to Chapter 464, Florida Statutes. Mr. Ortiz is not a member of the Florida Association of Nurse Anesthetists or the Florida Nurses Association. Mr. Ortiz provides anesthesia care to patients in various settings under the supervision of physicians licensed pursuant to Chapters 458 and 459, Florida Statutes. Among other functions, Mr. Ortiz orders preanesthetic medications; administers regional, spinal, and general anesthesia under protocol and the supervision of a physician; provides life support functions; and monitors patient condition during surgery and in the recovery room. Prior to April 15, 2002, the effective date of Rule 64B8-9.009(6)(b)1.a., Florida Administrative Code (the Rule), Mr. Ortiz administered anesthesia under the supervision of operating physicians for all types of office surgeries, including surgical procedures classified by the Board of Medicine as "level III." Mr. Ortiz provided anesthesia services to patients in level III office surgeries under the supervision of M.D. or D.O. operating physicians four or five days per week on average. The Rule requires that if the anesthesia provider is a CRNA, there must be a licensed M.D. or D.O. anesthesiologist, other than the surgeon, to provide direct supervision of the administration and maintenance of the anesthesia in level III office surgeries. Since the adoption of the Rule, the physicians for whom Mr. Ortiz previously provided anesthesia services will no longer employ him for level III office surgeries because they believe that it is unnecessary and cost-prohibitive to pay Mr. Ortiz to provide the actual anesthesia services and an anesthesiologist to directly supervise him. Consequently, Mr. Ortiz' revenues have been reduced and his office practice has been substantially and adversely affected.
The Issue Whether Florida Hospital Medical Center is entitled to reimbursement in the amount preliminarily determined by the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, in a reimbursement dispute regarding bills submitted by Florida Hospital Medical Center to Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company for medical services provided to two individuals involved in work-related accidents; and Whether Macy’s Claims Services and Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company properly adjusted those bills of Florida Hospital Medical Center in accordance with the requirements of Florida’s Workers’ Compensation law and applicable rules.
Findings Of Fact Florida Hospital is a full-service, not-for-profit hospital system located in Orlando, Florida, that operates a smaller satellite hospital in Winter Park, Florida. Florida Hospital is a “health care provider” within the meaning of Section 440.13(1)(h), Florida Statutes. Macy’s and Amerisure are “carriers” within the meaning of Sections 440.02(4) and 440.02(38), Florida Statutes. The Department has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve disputes between carriers and health care providers regarding payments for services rendered to injured workers, pursuant to Sections 440.13(7) and 440.13(11)(c), Florida Statutes. Qmedtrix is a medical bill review company.3/ Case No. 09-6871 R. P., an employee of Macy’s, slipped and fell at work on May 20, 2009, and presented to Florida Hospital Winter Park for evaluation and treatment where medical personnel documented vomiting, brain attack, and brain trauma. After evaluation and treatment, patient R. P. was diagnosed with a bruise to the head and released the same day. On September 16, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to R. P. totaling $5,547.20 to Macy’s for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Macy’s forwarded the bill to its workers’ compensation medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix reviewed the bill by comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by Florida Hospital with examples in the CPT book for billing of emergency department services. Florida Hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 920, which reads “contusion of face, scalp, or neck.” Use of this code means R. P. presented with a bruise or hematoma, but not a concussion. Florida Hospital also reported ICD diagnosis code 959.01 (“head injury, unspecified”) which also means that R. P. did not present with a concussion, loss of consciousness, or intracranial injuries. Florida Hospital’s bill included a charge of $2,417 with CPT code 99285 for emergency department services. The bill also included separate charges for a head CT, and various lab tests, drugs, and IV solutions. According to Mr. von Sydow, the bill was sent through Qmedtrix’s computer program for review, and was flagged for review by a physician. Mr. von Sydow further testified that one of Qmedtrix’s medical director’s suggested that the CPT code of 99285 be reduced. The medical director, who Mr. von Sydow said reviewed the bill, however, did not testify and no documentation of his recommendation was submitted at the final hearing. Qmedtrix determined that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285. Qmedtrix found that, while the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285, its usual charge for an emergency department visit billed with CPT code 99284 is $1,354. Macy’s paid Florida Hospital a total of $2,683.55, which amount included $1,010.24 for the emergency department visit based on [approximately] 75 percent of Florida Hospital’s usual charge for CPT code 99284. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Macy’s (or its designated entity)4/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed,” and has columns designated as “BR Red,” “PPO Red,” “Other Red,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed” column. There is also a column entitled “Reason Code” which sets forth codes, as required by Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(5)(o)3., that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.5/ The “reason code” set forth adjacent to the $2,417.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” There is also another code, “P506” listed in the “Reason Code” column adjacent to the same line item, which, according to the key provided on the EOBR, means “[a]ny questions regarding this Qmedtrix review, please call (800)-833-1993.” “P506,” however, is not a “reason code” listed in Florida Administrative Code Rule 68L- 7.602(5)(o)3. The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99284 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99285 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Macy’s pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital in fact billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, 958 So. 2d 1127 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) for the proposition that “SB-50 amended section 440.13 . . . [revealing] legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographic area.” Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Macy’s also contended that “upcoding” and “unbundling” were additional grounds for adjustment or disallowance that were not identified on the EOBR. The response explained that “upcoding” refers to billing with a procedure code that exaggerates the complexity of the service actually provided; that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services; that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes; that the hospital billed $2,417 with CPT code 99285; and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a healthy, young adult patient who sustained a blunt head injury with local swelling and bruising without subsequent confusion, loss of consciousness or memory deficit” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99283. The response requested a determination by the Department that Macy’s payment equaled or exceeded the amount usual and customary for CPT code 99283. On November 13, 2009, the Department, through its Office of Medical Services (OMS) issued a determination (Determination in 09-6871) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $5,547.20 and the carrier reimbursed $2,683.55. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, references a manual not incorporated by rule, and provides CPT codes that the respondent alleges are correct. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5-DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 20, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $4,160.40 ($5,547.20 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$4,160.40). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Macy’s paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to R. P., and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Macy’s is required to pay for such services, equals $1,476.85. The Determination in 09-6871 did not directly address Macy’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6871 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Macy’s timely requested a hearing. Case No. 09-6872 J. L., an employee of Major League Aluminum, was injured in a work-related accident on the evening of May 3, 2009, and visited the emergency department of Florida Hospital Orlando. After evaluation and treatment, J. L. was diagnosed with a bruise to the knee and released the next morning. On September 23, 2009, Florida Hospital submitted its bill for services provided to J. L. totaling $2,851 to Amerisure, Major League Aluminum’s workers’ compensation insurer, for payment, utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. Amerisure forwarded the hospital bill to its medical bill review agent, Qmedtrix for review. Qmedtrix’s medical bill review in this case, as in the companion case, entailed comparing the procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book. The hospital reported ICD diagnosis code 924.11, which reads “contusion of . . . knee.” The hospital also reported ICD diagnosis codes 724.2 (“lumbago”), E888.1 (“fall on or from ladders or scaffolding”) and 959.7 (“injury, other and unspecified . . . knee, leg, ankle, and foot.”). Florida Hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 9924 for emergency department services and also billed for X-rays and various drugs and IV solutions. Comparing procedure codes and diagnosis codes reported by the hospital with examples in the CPT book, Qmedtrix concluded that billing with CPT code 99284 was not appropriate, but that billing with CPT code 99282 was. Qmedtrix also found that, while the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, the average charge in the community for a visit to the emergency department billed with CPT code 99282 is $721. Qmedtrix determined the “usual and customary charge” in the community from its own database compiled by entering all of particular hospital bills into Qmedtrix’s database, along with data from the American Hospital Directory. Qmedtrix derives the average charge in the community based upon zip codes of the hospitals. Amerisure paid Florida Hospital a total of $1,257.15, which amount included $524.70 for the emergency department visit codes based on 75 percent of what Qmedtrix determined to be the average charge in the community for CPT code 99282. The payment was accompanied by an EOBR. The EOBR Petitioner Amerisure (or its designated entity)6/ issued to Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. identifies the amount billed by Florida Hospital as to each line item in a column designated “Billed Charges,” and has columns designated as “FS/UCR Reductions,” “Audit Reductions,” “Network Reductions,” and “Allowance,” each containing an amount for each line item in the “Billed Charges” column. There is also a column entitled “Qualify Code” which sets forth reason codes that are supposed to explain the reason for adjustment of any line item.7/ The code set forth adjacent to the $1,354.00 billed by Florida Hospital for emergency department services is “82,” which means “Payment adjusted: payment modified pursuant to carrier charge analysis.” The EOBR does not advise that the bill was adjusted because of a determination that Florida Hospital should have used CPT code 99282 when billing for the emergency services rendered instead of CPT code 99284 as originally billed. Upon receipt of the payment and the EOBR, Florida Hospital timely filed a Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute with the Department pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(a), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, contending that payment should be at 75 percent of its total charges, and citing the Hospital Manual. Qmedtrix timely filed a response to Florida Hospital’s petition on behalf of Amerisure pursuant to Section 440.13(7)(b), Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-31, asserting that correct payment should be determined based on, first, whether the hospital, in fact, billed its usual charge for the services and, second, whether the hospital’s charges are in line with the charges of other hospitals in the same community, citing One Beacon, supra. Qmedtrix’s response on behalf of Amerisure contended “upcoding” as an additional ground for adjustment or disallowance that was not identified on the EOBR. As in the companion case, the response explained “upcoding,” that CPT codes 99281 through 99285 describe emergency department services, and that the CPT book includes examples of proper billing with these codes. The response further stated that the hospital billed $1,354 with CPT code 99284, and that the CPT book describes an “emergency department visit for a patient with a minor traumatic injury of an extremity with localized pain, swelling, and bruising” as an example of proper billing with CPT code 99282. The response requested a determination by the Department that Amerisure’s payment equaled or exceeded the usual and customary charge for CPT code 99282. On October 20, 2009, the Department’s OMS issued a determination (Determination in 09-6872) which found, in pertinent part: The petitioner asserts that services provided by Florida Hospital Medical Center to the above-referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009, were incorrectly reimbursed. Florida Hospital Medical Center billed $2,851.00 and the carrier reimbursed $1,257.15. The petition does not address a contract and does not reflect a contract discount in the calculation of requested reimbursement. The Carrier Response to Petition for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute disputes the reasonableness of the hospital’s “usual and customary charges”, maintains the petitioners’ charges should be based on the average fee of other hospitals in the same geographic area, and references a manual not incorporated by rule. There are no rules or regulations within Florida’s Workers’ Compensation program prohibiting a provider from separately billing for individual revenue codes. Therefore, the charges, as billed by the hospital, did not constitute billing errors. The carrier did not dispute that the charges listed on the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 (UB-92) or the charges listed on the itemized statement did not conform to the hospital’s Charge Master. Nor did the carrier submit the hospital’s Charge Master in the response or assert that the carrier performed an audit of the Charge Master to verify the accuracy of the billed charges. Therefore, since no evidence was presented to dispute the accuracy of the Form DFS-F5- DWC-90 or the itemized statement as not being representative of the Charge Master, the OMS finds that the charges billed by the hospital are the hospital’s usual and customary charges. Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment. The EOBR submitted with the petition conforms to the EOBR code requirements of Rule 69L-7.602(5)(q), F.A.C. Only through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill. Pursuant to s. 440.13(12), F.S., a three member panel was established to determine statewide reimbursement allowances for treatment and care of injured workers. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the applicable reimbursement schedule created by the panel. Section 440.13(7)(c), F.S., requires the OMS to utilize this schedule in rendering its determination for this reimbursement dispute. No established authority exists to permit alternative schedules or other methodologies to be utilized for hospital reimbursement other than those adopted by Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., unless the provider and the carrier have entered into a mutually agreeable contract. Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Since the carrier failed to indicate any of the services are not medically necessary, the OMS determined proper reimbursement applying the above referenced reimbursement guidelines. Therefore, the OMS has determined that the carrier improperly adjusted reimbursement to Florida Medical Center for services rendered to the above- referenced injured employee on May 3, 2009, and May 4, 2009. Based on the above analysis, the OMS has determined that correct reimbursement equals $2,138.25 ($2,851.00 x 75% [Hospital Manual]=$2,138.25). The carrier shall reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to the above-referenced employee; and submit proof of reimbursement of the amount determined by the OMS within thirty days of the date the Determination is received. . . . The difference between what Petitioner Amerisure paid Florida Hospital for services rendered to J. L. and the amount the Department determined that Petitioner Amerisure is required to pay for such services equals $881.10. The Determination in 09-6872 did not directly address Amerisure’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding.” The Determination in 09-6872 provided a 21-day notice for request of an administrative hearing and, as noted in the Preliminary Statement above, Amerisure timely requested a hearing. Alleged “Upcoding” for Emergency Department Services The Petitioners’ responses in both cases allege that Florida Hospital “upcoded” its bill for emergency department evaluation and management services. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital, however, reported alleged “upcoding” as an explanation for the Petitioners’ adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. While the Dispute Determinations by the Department do not directly address the carrier’s allegation of the alleged billing error of “upcoding” raised in the Petitioners’ responses, they found that “Rule 69L-7.602, F.A.C., stipulates the appropriate EOBR codes that must be utilized when explaining to the provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment[, and that] [o]nly through an EOBR is the carrier to communicate to the health care provider the carrier’s reasons for disallowance or adjustment of the provider’s bill.” According to Mr. von Sydow, who was offered by Petitioners as an expert in billing, coding, reimbursement, and payment issues,8/ the “reason codes” that workers’ compensation carriers are to use pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602, do not mention “upcoding,” and therefore an EOBR could not be generated with a reason code explaining reduction or disallowance based on “upcoding.” The following reason codes, however, are included in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602: 23 – Payment disallowed: medical necessity: diagnosis does not support the services rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: documentation does not substantiate the service billed was rendered. – Payment disallowed: insufficient documentation: level of evaluation and management service not supported by documentation. Neither EOBR submitted to Florida Hospital includes reason code 23, 40, or 41. And neither EOBR explains or otherwise suggests that that Florida Hospital’s level of billing was not supported by medical necessity, services rendered, or sufficient documentation. In fact, Petitioners did not disallow reimbursement and do not contend that reimbursement should be denied for any services rendered by Florida Hospital to R. P. and J. L. on the grounds that the billed services were not medically necessary for the injured employees’ compensable injuries. In addition, Petitioners did not adjust or disallow payment for any of the billed procedures on the grounds that the procedures were not provided. In sum, the EOBR’s did not give Florida Hospital notice that alleged “upcoding” was an issue. Even if Petitioner’s EOBR’s gave Florida Hospital notice that it was asserting “upcoding” as a reason to reduce or adjust the hospital’s bill, the evidence does not support a finding that Florida Hospital utilized the wrong code in its billing for emergency department evaluation and management services. The CPT® 2009 Current Procedural Terminology Professional Edition, (Copyright 2008), (CPT book), is adopted by reference in Florida Administrative Code Rule 69L-7.602(3)(d) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 60L-7.020(2). The CPT book sets forth the procedure codes for billing and reporting by hospitals and physicians. The CPT book sets forth CPT codes ranging from 99281 through 99285 used to report evaluation and management services provided in a hospital’s emergency department, described as follows: 99281: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A problem focused history; A problem focused examination; and Straightforward medical decision making. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are self limited or minor. 99282: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of low complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of low to moderate severity. 99283: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: An expanded problem focused history; An expanded problem focused examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of moderate severity. 99284: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A detailed history; A detailed examination; and Medical decision making of moderate complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity, and require urgent evaluation by the physician but do not pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. 99285: Emergency department visit for the evaluation and management of a patient, which requires these 3 key components: A comprehensive history; A comprehensive examination; and Medical decision making of high complexity. Counseling and/or coordination of care with other providers or agencies and provided consistent with the nature of the problem(s) and the patient’s and/or family’s needs. Usually, the presenting problem(s) are of high severity and pose an immediate significant threat to life or physiologic function. Mr. von Sydow testified that a Qmedtrix “medical director,” reviewed Florida Hospital’s bill for services rendered to R. P., but not the medical records, and recommended that the hospital’s charge for emergency department services under CPT 99285 be “re-priced” to Qmedtrix’s determination of the “usual and customary charge” for CPT 99284. Mr. von Sydow acknowledged the need for physician review for some cases (as opposed to review by non-physician coders) by testifying, “The more complicated the medicine, the more likely it is that he [a medical director at Qmedtrix] wants to see it.” Despite Qmedtrix’s original determination to “reprice” the bill from CPT code 99285 to CPT code 99284 (reflected in the reduced payment but not explained in the EOBR), Mr. von Sydow opined that the correct CPT code for emergency department services provided to patient R. P. was 99283, as opposed to 99285 billed by the hospital. Mr. von Sydow testified that his opinion was based upon his own review of the medical records, without the assistance of a medical director or medical expert, and review of examples for the CPT codes for emergency department services from the CPT book, and various provisions of ICD-9 and CPT book coding resources. Aside from the fact that Mr. von Sydow’s opinion differed from the purported recommendation of a Qmedtrix “medical director,” Mr. von Sydow is not a physician. Moreover, Qmedtrix failed to provide the testimony of the medical director, or anyone else with medical expertise to evaluate the medical records and services provided or to validate either the opinion of Mr. von Sydow or the original recommendation to “re- price” Florida Hospital’s use of CPT Code 99285 in its bill for emergency department services rendered to patient R. P. Mr. von Sydow offered similar testimony and examples to explain Qmedtrix’s “re-pricing” of Florida Hospital’s bill from CPT code 99284 to CPT code 99282 for emergency services rendered to patient J. L. on behalf of Amerisure. According to Mr. von Sydow, an internal Qmedtrix coder (not a medical director) reviewed the bill for emergency services rendered to J. L. and determined it should be re-priced to the usual and customary charge, as determined by Qmedtrix, using that CPT code 99282. While knowledgeable of the various codes and their uses, given the manner in which preliminary diagnostics under emergency circumstances drives Florida Hospital’s determination of the appropriate CPT code for billing emergency department services, without the testimony of a medical expert familiar with the medical records generated in these cases in light of the facts and circumstances surrounding the emergency care rendered to patients R. P. and J. L., Mr. von Sydow’s testimony was unpersuasive. Ross Edmundson, M.D., an employee, vice-president, and medical manager for Florida Hospital, explained that, unlike other settings, hospitals generally do not have the medical histories of patients presenting for emergency hospital services. When a patient comes to Florida Hospital for emergency services, they are triaged by a nurse to determine the level of urgency, then a doctor sees the patient, conducts a differential diagnosis to rule out possible causes, obtains the patient’s history, and then performs a physical examination. While emergency room physicians at Florida Hospital do not decide which CPT code is utilized for the evaluation and management services provided by its emergency department, the various tests and procedures they undertake to evaluate and treat emergency department patients do. James English, the director of revenue management for Florida Hospital explained the process through his deposition testimony. Florida Hospital, like over 400 other hospitals, uses the “Lynx System” – a proprietary system for creating and maintaining medical records electronically. The program captures each medical service, supply, and physician order that is inputted into the electronic medical record. The hospital’s emergency evaluation and management CPT code is generated from the electronic record. A “point collection system” in the Lynx System translates physician-ordered services, supplies it to a point system, and then assigns the CPT code that is billed based upon the total number of “points” that are in the system at the time the patient is discharged from the emergency department. The level of the evaluation and management CPT code (99281 to 99285) that is reported on Florida Hospital’s bill is a direct reflection of the number and types of medical services that a patient receives from his or her arrival through discharge. In light of evidence showing the manner in which emergency services are provided and the importance of medical records in generating the appropriate billing code for emergency evaluation and management services, it is found that Petitioners failed to provide an adequate analysis of the medical records of either R. P. or J. L. to show that the appropriate CPT codes were not utilized by Florida Hospital in billing for those services. On the other hand, both Petitions for Resolution of Reimbursement Dispute filed by Florida Hospital with the Department attached appropriately itemized bills utilizing Form DFS-F5-DWC-90, also known as UB-04 CMS-1450, identifying the charges billed for each line item by revenue code and HCPS or CPT codes. In addition, medical records for the evaluation and treatment provided by Florida Hospital for both patients R. B. and J. L. supporting the itemized bills were submitted to the Department. These documents were also received into evidence at the final hearing. Florida Hospital’s bills at issue correctly identified the hospital’s usual charges for each individual and separately chargeable item, service or supply, with the corresponding code assigned to such billable items as maintained in Florida Hospital’s “charge master.” In addition, Petitioners concede the compensability of both patients’ work-related injuries and do not dispute whether any service or supply rendered and billed by Florida Hospital for these two cases were “medically necessary.”9/ Unbundling As noted above, in Case No. 09-6871, Qmedtrix’s response to Florida Hospital’s petition for resolution of reimbursement dispute contended “unbundling” as a ground for adjustment or disallowance of reimbursement. At the final hearing, Arlene Cotton, the nurse who issued the Dispute Determinations, explained that reason code 63 regarding “unbundling” is inapplicable to hospital billing, as there is no rule that requires hospitals to bundle bill for its services. Mr. von Sydow agreed that reason code 63 was inapplicable. In addition, footnote 2 of Petitioners’ Proposed Recommended Order states, “they did not pursue the allegations of unbundling.” Therefore, it is found that Petitioners did not prove and otherwise abandoned their claim of “unbundling” as a ground to adjust or disallow reimbursement to Florida Hospital. Usual and Customary Charges The Dispute Determinations issued by the Department found that correct payment in both cases equaled 75% of billed charges, citing “Rule 69L-7.501, F.A.C., [which] incorporates, by reference, the Florida Workers’ Compensation Reimbursement Manual for Hospitals, 2006 Edition (Hospital Manual). Both Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and the Hospital Manual provide that hospital services provided to patients under the workers’ compensation law “shall be reimbursed at 75 percent of usual and customary charges.” The Department interprets the term “usual and customary charges” as set forth in the Hospital Manual and Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, quoted above, to mean a hospital’s usual charges of the hospital, whereas Petitioners contend that “usual and customary charges” means the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area. While apparently not contending that Petitioners failed to raise the issue of “usual and customary” charges in their EOBR’s,10/ at the final hearing, the Department argued that “nowhere in [either Macy’s or Amerisure’s] response is the issue of customary charges raised.” A review of the responses filed by Qmedtrix to Florida Hospital’s reimbursement dispute petitions filed with the Department reveal that both raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Mr. von Sydow’s letter attached to both responses state: As you may know, the proposed adoption of Medicare’s Outpatient Prospective Payment System as a methodology for reimbursing hospitals 60% and 75% of “usual and customary charges” follows from the decision of the First District Court of Appeals in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration, No. 1D05-5459 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (SB-50 amended section 440.13 to remove all reference to the charges of any individual service provider; this amendment reveals the legislative intent to eliminate calculation of a “usual and customary charge” based on the fees of any one provider in favor of a calculation based on average fees of all providers in a given geographical area). This court decision requires DFS to define payment rates for out patient service that are uniformly applicable to all hospitals in a given geographic area. In addition, at the final hearing, the Department argued that the petitions for administrative hearing did “not raise as a disputed issue of fact or law whether or not usual and customary charges should apply in this case.” Indeed, a review of the request for relief set forth in the petitions for administrative hearings filed by Petitioners do not mention the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Rather, the relief requested by both petitions for administrative review of the Dispute Determinations, as summarized in the Joint Prehearing Stipulation, is: Petitioner[s] seeks reversal of OMS’ Determination(s) and the matters remanded for the Department to: direct payment based upon the actual treatment required/provided and pursuant to the correct CPT code; find that the hospital upcoded and that Petitioner properly reimbursed (or exceeded amount due); and determine that the hospital has the burden of proof to substantiate its billing and the use of the chosen CPT code. Contrary to the Department’s argument, however, both petitions for administrative hearing raise the issue of “usual and customary charges.” Page 9 of Macy’s petition, in pertinent part states: Petitioner submits that in issuing the above findings OMS failed to consider the holding in One Beacon Insurance v. Agency for Health Care Administration (wherein the Court determined that reimbursement should not be based solely upon a mathematical equation [as found within the Reimbursement Manual] and applying it to the fee charged by a particular provider; and that by eliminating the reference to any one facility’s charges, the legislature intended that the charges be based on average fees of all providers in a geographical area as opposed to the fees of the particular provider in question). Likewise, review of Amerisure’s petition for administrative hearing reveals that the issue of “usual and customary charges” was raised. Pages 7 and 8 of Amerisure’s petition state, in pertinent part: Further, if the Hospital is permitted to utilize incorrect revenue codes it would be impossible to determine whether the charges are consistent with the Hospital’s own [usual and customary] charges for the service, procedure or supplies in question and, further, whether such charges are consistent with charges by other like facilities (in the same geographical area) for the same services, procedures, or supplies. See One Beacon Insurance, supra. In addition, Amerisure’s petition on page 12 states with regard to the Department’s determination: Such finding was issued without consideration of . . . the amounts charged for the same services in the Orlando area where this hospital is located. Petitioners further preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” in the first paragraph of their statement of position on page 3 of the Joint Prehearing Statement, as follows: Petitioners, Macy’s and Amerisure, take the position that the Determinations must be reversed as the Department has the duty to scrutinize the bills in question in order to determine, first, whether the hospital, in fact, charged its usual charge for the services provided, and second, whether the billed charges are in line with the customary charges of other facilities in the same community (for the same or similar services) and that the Department failed to do so. As such, Petitioners contend that payment for services provided by Florida Hospital should have been based upon 75% of usual and customary charges, not 75% of billed charges. Therefore, it is found that Petitioners have preserved the issue of “usual and customary charges” for consideration in this administrative proceeding. Although preserved, Petitioners failed to demonstrate that their interpretation of “usual and customary charges” should prevail. The Department has consistently interpreted the term “usual and customary charges” as used in the Hospital Manual, Section 440.13(12)(a), Florida Statutes, and rules related to hospital reimbursement under the workers’ compensation law as the “usual and customary charges” of the hospital reflected on the hospital’s “charge master.” The Hospital Manual requires each hospital to maintain a charge master and to produce it “when requested for the purpose of verifying its usual charges. . . .” (Emphasis added). Petitioners did not conduct or request to conduct an audit to verify whether the charges billed by Florida Hospital corresponded with the Florida Hospital’s charge master. In fact, Mr. von Sydow conceded at the final hearing that Florida Hospital’s bills at issue were charged in accordance with Florida Hospital’s charge master. Nor did Petitioners institute rule challenge proceedings against the Department regarding the Hospital Manual, incorporated by reference into Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-7.501. Instead, Petitioners assert that they should be able to reduce Florida Hospital bills based upon a different interpretation of the phrase “usual and customary charges” to mean the average charge in the community as determined by Qmedtrix. Qmedtrix is not registered with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations, and does not employ any Florida-licensed insurance adjuster, physician, or registered nurse. Qmedtrix earns 12 to 15 percent of “savings” realized by carriers utilizing their bill review services. For example, if a bill is reduced by $100, Qmedtrix is paid $12.11/ Qmedtrix uses a proprietary bill review system called “BillChek.” According to Qmedtrix’s website: BillChek reviews out-of-network medical charges for all bill types in all lines of coverage, including group health, auto, medical, and workers’ compensation. BillChek is a unique specialty cost- containment service that determines an accurate and reasonable reimbursement amount for non-network facility and ancillary medical charges. BillChek incorporates historical data to help determine reasonable payment recommendations across all sectors of the health care industry. All BillCheck recommendations are backed by extensive medical and legal expertise, and supported by Qmedtrix’s experienced Provider Relations and Dispute Resolution teams. According to the testimony of Mr. von Sydow, Qmedtrix collects and maintains data from various sources, including Florida’s Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), the American Hospital Directory (AHD.com), and HCFA 2552’s (data reported to the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services on HCFA 2522) in order to construct a database of health care providers’ usual charges. Mr. von Sydow advised that AHD.com data was a principle source for constructing the database. He also advised that AHCA data was included in the database even though Qmedtrix found the AHCA data defective. Examples of data downloaded from AHD.com for Florida Hospital showing a profile of the facility was received into evidence as P-5. The data did not, however, show usual charges for the CPT codes for emergency department services at issue in this case. Petitioners also introduced into evidence Exhibits P-6 and P-7, which contained AHD.com data showing average charges for Florida Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, respectively, for Level 1 through Level 5 emergency room visits (corresponding to CPT codes 99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained that the data was part of the information Qmedtrix used to construct the average charge in the community. Petitioners failed to provide similar AHD.com data for other hospitals in the area Qmedtrix determined to be the “community.” In addition, Petitioners introduced AHCA’s Florida Health Finder Web-site, as Exhibit P-8, which ostensibly included average charges for all hospitals in Florida for the subject emergency department CPT codes (99281 through 99285). Mr. von Sydow explained, however, “[w]e find that [the AHCA data] is not refreshed very often, unfortunately, and some other defects in the scrubbing of the data by the agency, which they know, I will say. But this is incorporated in our database to a large extent.” The exhibit was received into evidence for the purpose of helping to explain how Qmedtrix constructed its database, with the recognition that it was largely composed of hearsay. In sum, while Petitioners showed their methodology of constructing the database, other than the AHD.com data for Orlando Regional Medical Center and Florida Hospital, Petitioners failed to introduce reliable evidence sufficient to show the “usual and customary charge” of all providers in a given geographical area as determined by Qmedtrix. In addition, the AHCA data, though characterized by Mr. von Sydow as unreliable, indicates that there is a wide range of differences in emergency room charges between hospitals in Florida. Petitioners’ interpretation of “usual and customary charge” to mean the average fee of all providers in a given geographical area does not take into account an individual hospital’s indigent care, cost of labor, overhead, number of beds, size, age, or various other differences between facilities that could affect amounts each hospital charges for emergency department and other services; the Department’s interpretation does.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services, Division of Workers’ Compensation, enter a Final Order consistent with this Recommended Order that: Directs Macy’s Claims Services to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $4,160.40 for services rendered to patient R. P., and to submit proof of reimbursement of that amount within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received; Directs Amerisure Mutual Insurance Company to reimburse Florida Hospital Medical Center $2,138.25 for services rendered to patient J. L., and submit proof of reimbursement of that amount to the Department within 30 days from the date the Final Order is received. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JAMES H. PETERSON, III Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan is responsible for paying medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's newborn child where Petitioner had only individual coverage in effect at the time of the child's birth.
Findings Of Fact The State of Florida makes available to its employees several group insurance programs. In the area of health insurance, employees may choose to participate in the State of Florida Employees Group Health Self Insurance Plan (State Group Plan), or they may enroll in other plans, such as HMOs. The State Group Plan is a plan of self insurance established by the State and administered by Blue Cross/Blue Shield. This plan is described in general terms by a Plan Brochure and is described in more detail by the contract of insurance contained in the State Self Insured Health Plan's Benefit Document (Plan Document). The State Group Plan is regulated by those rules contained in Chapter 22K, Florida Administrative Code. At the time employees begin their employment with the State, they may select which, if any, of the optional health insurance programs offered by the State they desire. Thereafter, employees may only join one of the insurance programs or switch between programs during an annual open enrollment period. An employee who elects coverage from the State Group Plan may purchase either individual coverage or family coverage. Individual coverage provides health insurance coverage for only the individual employee. Family coverage provides health insurance coverage for the individual employee and the employee's eligible dependents for whom the employee has elected coverage. Family coverage does not begin until after the application for coverage is processed and the premium for family coverage is paid. The monthly premium for family coverage is paid one month in advance. An employee can, but he does not have to, wait for an open enrollment period to switch from individual coverage to family coverage. An employee having individual coverage may change to family coverage at any time during the year prior to the acquisition of an eligible dependent or at a time that is within 31 days of the date of acquisition of any eligible dependent. If family coverage is requested after the acquisition of the dependent, there is a gap in the coverage of the dependent between the date of acquisition and the date coverage begins. There is no retroactive coverage. An employee who completes the pertinent application for family coverage, who submits the application, and who pays the first month's premium for family coverage prior to the acquisition of the dependent has family coverage in place at the time the dependent is acquired through birth, adoption, or other means. Consequently, there is no gap in coverage between the date of acquisition and the effective date of coverage for that dependent. Petitioner is an associate professor of management and Director of the Doctoral Studies Program in the College of Business Administration at Florida International University (FIU). Petitioner teaches courses in a variety of areas including business administration, wage and salary administration, and insurance benefits. Petitioner enrolled in the State Group Plan in 1982. Petitioner was knowledgeable about the State Group Plan and had, from time to time, compared its benefits to those of other plans. At the time of their marriage, Petitioner and his wife reviewed their insurance coverage and decided not to convert their individual policies to one policy with family coverage. From the date of his initial enrollment until April 1989, Petitioner had individual coverage. On March 8, 1989, Petitioner executed the forms that were necessary to change his individual coverage to family coverage. Petitioner's family coverage went into effect on April 1, 1989, after the application was processed and the premium was collected. In March 1988 Petitioner married Annette Wellinghoff. Petitioner and his wife retained their respective individual insurance policies after their marriage. Mrs. Kroeck was not a state employee so the insurance coverage she had was independent of her husband's coverage. In August 1988 Petitioner and his wife learned that Mrs. Kroeck was pregnant with an expectant due date in February 1989. In August 1988, Petitioner telephoned the personnel office at FIU to inquire as to obtaining coverage for the expected child. The general information given Petitioner in response to his questions was accurate. He was told that he could convert his individual coverage to family coverage, if he so desired, during the open enrollment period scheduled for December 1, 1988, through January 31, 1989. There was no evidence that Petitioner specifically inquired as to when he should begin family coverage in order to have the child's birth expenses covered. Likewise, there was no evidence that Petitioner was specifically told that he could convert his coverage to family coverage after the birth of his child and have the medical expenses covered from the time of birth. Petitioner did not request any written information about the conversion process, nor did he request an application form to effectuate the conversion. Petitioner did not know the name of the person with whom he was speaking, only that she was a representative of the personnel office. Petitioner did not contact the FIU Personnel Office again until after the birth of his son. Instead, Petitioner relied upon his wife to take care of securing health insurance. Petitioner delegated this responsibility to his wife because she was also experienced and knowledgeable in matters concerning employee benefits and health insurance plans. Mrs. Kroeck has had at least 3 years experience in health insurance benefits administration. In December 1988 general information relating to the open enrollment program was mailed to all state employees, including Petitioner. Included in the information package were a Plan Brochure for the State Group Plan and an enrollment form for the various insurance options offered to State employees. Mrs. Kroeck read the application form and a portion of the Plan Brochure. Neither Petitioner nor his wife read, prior to the birth of their child, the section of the Plan Brochure entitled "Purpose of This Brochure". That section states that the Plan Brochure is not intended to be a contract document, that it is intended to give a summary of available benefits, and that an employee should contact either his personnel office or the office of the Division of State Employees' Insurance for the answer to questions. The employee is told that the contract document is the Plan Document and that a copy of the Plan Document is on file at the employee's personnel office. That section also contains the following admonition: The agency personnel office will provide needed assistance to State officers and employees enrolling in the Plan; however, such officers or employees should take care to assure that they receive the coverage applied for and that proper deductions are made. On January 9, 1989, Mrs. Kroeck telephoned the personnel office at FIU with questions relating to listing the unborn child as a dependent on the application form that had been mailed to Petitioner in December. Her questioning centered on how to complete the name, date of birth and social security number for an unborn dependent. Clara Martinez, the employee in the personnel office to whom Mrs. Kroeck spoke, does not recall talking to Mrs. Kroeck on January 8, 1989. At the time of this conversation, Ms. Martinez knew that family coverage had to be in place prior to the acquisition of a dependent for the dependent to be covered as of the date of acquisition. If Ms. Kroeck had asked Ms. Martinez a question to which Ms. Martinez did not know the answer, Ms. Martinez would have contacted the office of the Division of State Employees Insurance in Tallahassee for the answer. The evidence fails to establish that Mrs. Kroeck was misinformed by Ms. Martinez or that she specifically inquired as to the effective date of the family coverage. On February 19, 1989, Mrs. Kroeck had her baby. The baby was admitted to the hospital in his own name and incurred, in his own name, expenses in the amount of $4,274.95, for which Petitioner and his wife were responsible. On March 8, 1989, Petitioner signed an application to change his individual coverage to family coverage. Family coverage became effective on April 1, 1989, after the application was processed and the premium for family coverage was collected. At the time of the birth of his son, Petitioner had individual coverage issued through the State Group Plan. Petitioner's son was not a beneficiary under the State Group Plan at the time the medical expenses which are at issue were incurred. Petitioner's request for payment of the medical expenses incurred by his son at birth was denied by Respondent and this proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Administration enter a final order which denies the claim for payment of the medical expenses incurred by Petitioner's son prior to the effective date of family coverage. DONE AND ENTERED this , 27th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4929 The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of Respondent. 1. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 1 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. 2. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 2 are adopted in material part by paragraph 7 of the Recommended Order. 3. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 3 are adopted in material part by paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. 4. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are adopted in material part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. 5. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 5 are adopted in material part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. 6. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are adopted in material part by paragraph 9 of the Recommended Order. 7. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are adopted in material part by paragraph 11 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 8 are adopted in material part by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 9 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 10 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 11 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 12 are adopted in material part by paragraph 12 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 13 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 14 are adopted in material part by paragraph 10 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 15 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 16 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 17 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 18 are rejected as being unsubstantiated by the evidence as to Ms. Alam and as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached as to Ms. Martinez. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 19 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 20 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 21 are adopted in material part by paragraph 13 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 22 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 23 are adopted in material part by paragraph 8 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 24 are adopted in material part by paragraph 18 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 25 are adopted in material part by paragraph 16 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are adopted in material part by paragraph 5 of the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 27 are adopted in material part by paragraph 4 of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Augustus Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Kark G. Kroeck 9853 Costa del Sol Boulevard Miami, Florida 33178 Alette A. Lhutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 William A. Grieder, Esquire Office of the General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
